Date of Award
Fall 2025
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Department
Philosophy
College
College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences
First Advisor
Richard Lee
Abstract
In the Metaphysical Disputations (1597), Francisco Suárez asserts that the human intellect, because it is imperfect, must make use of determinate mental fictions in order to know “real being” (ens reale). In this dissertation, I reconstruct why and how this should be the case. I show that the supreme imperfection of our intellect implies our embodiment, which in turn implies our inability to know any being entirely as it is in itself. To compensate for this inability, we humans must make use of both “beings of reason” (entia rationis) and “nonbeings of reason” (non entia rationis). In the process of discovery or abstraction, we use distinctions of reason, relations of reason, and positive negations in order to generate universal concepts of singular beings’ essences, properties, and divisions. In the process of teaching or explication, we use the same mental fictions in order to rearrange these concepts, such that the properties and divisions necessarily follow from the essences. This interpretation constitutes a novel contribution to the ongoing debate concerning the status of the supertranscendental in Suárez and post-Suárezian philosophy. Suárez does not posit a supertranscendental concept of being somehow inclusive of both real being and being of reason. But he does both thematize and utilize a supertranscendental method for the study of being, in which our sole mode of access to knowledge of the real is nothing other than our artful use of the fictive.
Copyright
Copyright © 2026 William Martin Nee Cox
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Recommended Citation
Cox, William Martin Nee, "The Reality of Reason: Fiction, Method, and Modernity in the Metaphysics of Francisco Suárez" (2025). Theses and Dissertations from DePaul University. 69.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/theses-dissertations/69