Home > Law > DePaul Law Review > Vol. 75 > Iss. 2
Abstract
The incorporation of behavioral economics and cognitive
psychology has profoundly challenged traditional legal
scholarship’s understanding of human decision making. This Article
explores how insights from the behavioral sciences have
fundamentally recast the academy's approach to legal doctrine in
the private law subjects that have long been the foundation of legal
training. By demonstrating systematic cognitive biases and
heuristics that deviate from rational choice theory, behavioral
research has upended the rational choice assumption that anchored
consequentialist analysis of law and left in its wake a more
contingent and context-dependent, and thus a fragmented,
normative landscape.
Recommended Citation
Russell Korobkin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Legal Analysis After the Behavioral Revolution,
75
DePaul L. Rev.
(2026).
Available at:
https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol75/iss2/15
