Home > Law > DePaul Law Review > Vol. 74 > Iss. 1
Abstract
Why do countries enact stronger legal protections for trade secrets? Existing
research on other types of intellectual property (IP) rights suggests at
least three potential mechanisms. First, more powerful countries, such as
the United States, coerce other countries into implementing stronger IP
rights by threatening to enact trade sanctions against them. Second, countries
agree through international legal instruments to strengthen their IP
protections in exchange for benefits in other issue areas, especially trade.
Third, countries that are open to capital flows increase their IP rights
through regulatory competition with other countries to attract or retain
multinational investment. This Article provides empirical evidence for an
alternative mechanism, using data on the trade secret protection levels of
seventeen Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries and twenty OECD trading-partner countries during
the period of 1985 to 2010. This Article demonstrates that countries
with civil-law legal systems were statistically more likely to implement
increases in trade secret protections over time, all else being equal. Consequently,
the findings in this Article provide support for emulation as
a causal mechanism for increased trade secret protections. This Article
argues that civil-law countries saw a lack of domestic-led innovation
as an impediment to economic growth and sought to spur innovation
by reducing legal uncertainty in the trade secret realm. In doing so, they
emulated the relatively stronger trade secret protections of common-law
countries. This Article provides a novel contribution to the literature on
the diffusion of IP laws and holds significant implications for U.S. IP
policy abroad. In particular, U.S. policymakers’ efforts at shifting collectively
held ideas about trade secrets through exchanges with foreign
officials, like those that occur through the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office’s IP attaché programs in foreign countries, offer substantial promise
for raising other countries’ trade secret protections to emulate those of
common-law countries like the United States.
Recommended Citation
Christopher Dinkel & Jeff Lingwall,
Legal Origin and Emulation of Trade Secret Protections: A Cross-National Empirical Study,
74
DePaul L. Rev.
1
(2024)
Available at:
https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol74/iss1/2