The Federal Civil Rights Act: A Judicial Repeal

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The great import of the *Rylander* case is not found in the definitive words of the court but rather the impetus it provided the state legislature. After forty-six years of existence the phrase "was not proximately caused by the negligence of the employer or his employees" was omitted in the 1959 statute. The section was not otherwise changed. This legislative action is in complete accord with the previous decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court. The question is now absolutely resolved.

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17 Stat. 13 (1871), "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."

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Section 1985 gives a cause of action for denial of equal protection of the laws, but not for denial of due process.

Section 1983 does not mention conspiracy, while Section 1985 does, therefore the Act creates a cause of action for conspiracy to deny equal protection, but not for conspiracy to deny due process.

Neither diversity of citizenship, nor amount in controversy are prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction of the cause of action asserted under the Civil Rights Act. The right to maintain an action under the Act is conferred by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and by statute. Section 1343 provides jurisdiction for the benefit of a plaintiff who otherwise cannot meet the requisite amount in controversy for federal jurisdiction. While most courts have relied on it for jurisdiction, a few courts have entertained an action by basing jurisdiction on Section 1983 itself.

**SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT**

Civil proceedings in vindication of civil rights are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under these rules the theory of the plaintiff in stating his claim is not of utmost importance. The complaint should not be dismissed on motion of the defendant unless, upon any theory, it appears that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts that could be proved in support of his claim.

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13 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (Supp., 1959) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: (9) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States."


In recent years, many complaints alleging violations of civil rights by state law enforcement officers have been dismissed as insufficient.\textsuperscript{18} The most recent example of a complaint being dismissed as insufficient is Monroe v. Pape.\textsuperscript{19} Plaintiff alleged an unreasonable search in the night time, assault and battery, illegal detention for a ten-hour period, and denial of counsel during that period. In dismissing the complaint the district court said that an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers acting under color of law was not a violation of due process, unless evidence was obtained by the search which might later be used against the plaintiff.\textsuperscript{20} In so holding the court completely misconstrued the rule on unreasonable searches and seizures as stated in Wolf v. Colorado,\textsuperscript{21} where although the court was divided on the issue of the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in a state prosecution, all nine Justices agreed with Justice Frankfurter when he stated:

The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police . . . which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment . . . is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause.\textsuperscript{22}

This position of the Court has been reaffirmed in Irvine v. California\textsuperscript{23} where two Justices recommended immediate criminal prosecution, under the Civil Rights Act,\textsuperscript{24} of the state police officers who perpetrated the illegal search and seizure.\textsuperscript{25}


\textsuperscript{19} 272 F.2d 365 (C.A.7th, 1959).

\textsuperscript{20} Transcript of Proceedings on Motion to Dismiss Complaint, 59 C 329 (N.D. Ill., 1959).

\textsuperscript{21} 338 U.S. 25 (1949).  \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., at 27, 28.  \textsuperscript{23} 347 U.S. 128 (1954).


In Stefonelli v. Minard, although refusing to enjoin the introduction of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure in a state court proceeding, the Court stated: "[U]nder the very section now invoked [Section 1985(3)], we have withheld relief in equity even when recognizing that comparable facts would create a cause of action for damages." Nonethelss the court in Monroe relied on Mackay v. Chandler and Jennings v. Nester. Mackay treated the unreasonable search in the following manner:

The exemption from unreasonable searches and seizures is not one of the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States which the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the state to abridge, nor is it an element of due process of law guaranteed by the latter amendment against state action.

Jennings held that since the defendant had been retried and the whole record indicated a fair trial, the plaintiff had been accorded due process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. This position is irreconcilable with both the history of unreasonable searches and with the holding of the Supreme Court in Wolf. In fact, such decisions have led writers to state that: "... Wolf's intermediate finding signifies little if anything. ..." "It would seem that the practical effect of the Wolf case is virtually to leave for local determination, unimpeded by federal judicial supervision, the matter of making effective a federal guarantee of a basic constitutional immunity." "The net effect of the Wolf decision was the recognition of a basic constitutional right without any corresponding remedies, a privilege without substance, an immunity without force."


Ibid., at 122.


127 Ibid., at 122.

See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).


Handler, The Fourth Amendment, Federalism and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 8 Syracuse L. Rev. 166, 178 (1957).
However, the *Wolf* court did provide a remedy for unreasonable searches and seizures:

[T]he exclusion of evidence is a remedy which directly serves only to protect those upon whose person or premises something incriminating has been found. We cannot therefore, regard it as a departure from basic standards to remand such persons, together with those who emerge scatheless from a search, to the remedies of private action. . . .

This remedy is the Civil Rights Act. Justice Learned Hand indicated that in order to show a cause of action, the plaintiff need only show a violation by state officers of a privilege secured by federal law. Therefore since *Wolf* holds that freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is a right protected against state abridgement by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the *Monroe* court has compounded the errors of *Mackey* and *Jennings* by saying that it is not such a right. The court of appeals did not even mention *Wolf* in affirming the district court, thus it would seem that on the basis of *Monroe* and *Jennings* the *Wolf* decision has no effect in the Seventh Circuit today.

In direct contrast to *Monroe* is *Davis v. Turner* where the complaint alleged that a sheriff and deputy sheriff entered and searched plaintiff's store without a warrant of any kind, found nothing unlawful, seized and arrested plaintiff and refused to allow her to consult an attorney, struck her, put her in jail and refused to tell her the crime of which she was charged. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action for damages for deprivation of rights by the sheriff and deputy sheriff acting under color of state law. Since the allegations in *Monroe* and *Davis* are so similar it is very difficult to determine why one complaint was sufficient and the other insufficient. The *Davis* court did not consider each allegation separately, nor did the *Monroe* court of appeals. However, the district court treated each separately (e.g., unreasonable search, battery and detention). As to the assault and battery the district court held that it must be alleged that the battery was for purpose of eliciting information and/or confessions. It seems odd that if the plaintiff had confessed as a result of the beatings his confession would have been ruled inadmissible as a violation of due process, and yet the district court would hold that unless the inherently coercive beating produced a confession there would be no violation. Beatings by law enforcement officers acting in the course

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86 338 U.S. 25, 30, 31 (1948).
88 197 F.2d 847 (C.A. 5th, 1952).
89 Transcript of Record on Motion to Dismiss at 13, 59 C.539 (N.D. Ill., 1959).
of their duties have been held to violate the criminal provisions of the Civil Rights Act.\(^{41}\) Under Section 1983, it is now well settled that law officers who do exact confessions by violence can be held civilly liable.\(^{42}\)

Although it is not specifically made to appear that the objective of the defendant deputy sheriff was to obtain a confession in the case of *Dye v. Cox*,\(^ {43}\) the plaintiff alleged that the deputy sheriff, acting under color of state law, but without cause, arrested the plaintiff, locked him in the county jail and kept him there overnight, refusing him an opportunity to make bail and beat him while confined to a cell. The court noted that the alleged behavior of the defendant, if true, deprived the plaintiff of the right to be free of arrest except on probable cause, and of his right to bail and to personal safety while in the hands of his jailor. But in dismissing the action, it was held, that to state a cause of action under the civil rights statute as the denial of civil rights, the denial must have been accomplished with the *purpose* of robbing the plaintiff of such rights and that the action could not be maintained in the absence of an *allegation of purposefulness* on the part of the defendant.

By so holding, the court has created judicial legislation and inserted the word "wilfully" where it does not expressly exist. The court relied on *Screws v. United States*\(^ {44}\) where the Criminal Civil Rights Statute\(^ {45}\) was construed and Justice Douglas defined intent in this manner:

\[\text{[T]he specific intent required by the Act is an intent to deprive a person of a right which has been made specific, either by express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by decisions interpreting them. \ldots He who defies a decision interpreting the Constitution knows precisely what he is doing.}\]

Thus the *Dye* court created an intent where it does not exist in the civil section and also made the intent greater than that expressed in *Screws*.

**CONCLUSION**

Thus, it appears, that there exists in the Seventh Circuit a right without a remedy. Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to provide a


\(^{42}\) Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714 (C.A.7th, 1953).


\(^{44}\) 325 U.S. 91 (1945).

\(^{45}\) Note 24, Supra.

remedy for private persons against state officials who deprived them of due process. However, the courts have indulged in mental gymnastics to deprive such persons of a congressionally enacted remedy. There exists the curious situation that a plaintiff may prepare a sufficient complaint in the Fifth Circuit, if he alleges an unreasonable search and seizure, but upon the same facts he cannot prepare a sufficient complaint in the Seventh Circuit. The Fourth Circuit requires a wilful intent greater than that required under the criminal counterpart of the civil action.

This situation certainly does not create an impression of uniform enforcement of federal legislation.

The Seventh Circuit has consistently pointed out that the plaintiff is not without remedy in the state courts. However, this is not the problem at issue. The Ninth Circuit has pointed out that the existence of a state remedy under the same facts would not be a bar to the suit under the Civil Rights Act. At best, the situation is in a state of great confusion.

As this paper is being written, Monroe is under petition for a writ of certiorari. If certiorari is granted Justice Frankfurter will finally have the opportunity to completely clarify the intermediate finding in Wolf, and give the district courts a concrete guide to determine the sufficiency of complaints under the Civil Rights Act.

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52 28 Law Week 3247 (February 17, 1960) (Docket No. 712).

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"Caveat manufacturer" may relegate the revered "caveat emptor" saw to legal limbo if the holding in a recent case receives approval. The implications of the Cobb v. American Motors Corp. decision to big manu-