
Susan J. Flieder
BURSTING THE BUBBLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHEVRON, U.S.A., INC. V. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

The framers of the United States Constitution designed our government to provide for a separation of powers. The Constitution thus gives Congress the lawmaking power, which out of necessity Congress must often delegate to administrative agencies. Administrative agencies have no constituency. Therefore, Congress safeguards its delegation of authority by providing for judicial review of the agency’s decisionmaking process. That review ensures that the decision is consistent with congressional intent. Traditionally, courts have provided a meaningful review of agency decisionmaking by searching the agency’s rulemaking record to determine whether the agency’s decision is rationally supported by the record. After a recent Supreme Court decision, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., however, it appears that Congress is essentially delegating its lawmaking authority to the President when it authorizes an agency to administer a vague statute. Moreover, presidential intervention into the agency’s decisionmaking may render the decision unreviewable, thus failing to ensure that Congress’s intent is effectuated.

Congress has delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to make laws to protect the public’s health from air pollution and its effects, pursuant to the Clean Air Act. One regulation promulgated by the EPA provides for broad coverage of a permit program that was designed by Congress to restrict economic growth in unhealthy air states, unless that growth was accompanied by progress toward achieving clean air. President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, however, and ordered agencies to reevaluate their regulations in order to help ease the burden on industry from excessive regulation. Pursuant to this order, the EPA changed its prior regulation to significantly reduce the coverage of the permit program. Because of this change, Congress’s intent to allow only limited and conditional growth in unhealthy air states has been thwarted. When challenged in Chevron, however, the Court found that this change was reasonable. Moreover, the Court found that the EPA’s reliance upon the President’s policy views was proper.
The *Chevron* decision raises several important questions. First, it is unclear whether Congress can retain control over an administrative agency’s delegated lawmaking authority when the President decides to intervene. Similarly, the extent to which the Court will allow the President to intervene is also uncertain, especially when that intervention results in frustration of congressional policies. Moreover, the safeguard that judicial review provides is now in question. It may be that *Chevron* has reduced judicial review of agency action, following presidential intervention, to a hollow formality.

**BACKGROUND**

Article I of the United States Constitution vests all lawmaking authority in a politically accountable Congress.\(^{12}\) The “necessary and proper” clause\(^ {13}\) of that article allows Congress to delegate some of this authority to the unelected officials of administrative agencies.\(^ {14}\) Because an administrative agency lacks a constituency, ideally Congress is to make broad policy choices and then design a statute aimed at guiding the agency towards effectuating those policies.\(^ {15}\) Instead, Congress oftentimes delegates its policymaking authority by enacting a “goals statute.”\(^ {16}\) In contrast to a “rules statute,” which specifies rules of conduct, a goals statute specifies the statute’s goals and then authorizes the administrative agency to develop rules of conduct to further those goals.\(^ {17}\) The goals statute forces the agency to make the controversial choices avoided by Congress.\(^ {18}\)

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12. U.S. Const. art. I.
16. Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 740, 751-55 (1983). David Schoenbrod, a former attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council, claims that the Clean Air Act is a “goals statute” because Congress has delegated to the EPA the authority to make broad policy determinations to develop rules of conduct under the Act. The Act requires the EPA, for example, to set national air standards, categorize pollutants and list sources which will be subject to the Act’s provisions, all under the mandate of protecting the public’s health. Congress, however, failed to give the EPA guidance regarding the meaning of the Act’s goal of protecting the public’s health. The Act merely requires the EPA to set standards that are “adequate” or “ample” for achieving this goal, leaving the EPA to determine the meaning of these ambiguous guidelines. See id.
17. Id. at 783-89. A “rules statute” might require, for example, that cars are not to be driven in Los Angeles during daylight hours. The corresponding goals statute might authorize an agency to regulate vehicle emissions, with the aim of reducing emissions and improving air quality. Both statutes are designed to achieve essentially the same results, but under the rules statute, the goals serve as an interpretive guide. The goals specified in the goals statute, on the other hand, serve as a mandate under which the agency must promulgate rules. See id. at 784.
18. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7470(1), (3) (1982). The Clean Air Act requires the EPA’s Administrator to use his or her judgment in protecting the public’s health and welfare. Id. § 7470(1). This is to be done while balancing the conflicting policies of allowing economic growth and preserving existing clean air. Id. § 7470(3). Inevitably, any compromise between the two
Administrative agencies, as previously mentioned, have no constituency and often have been "captured" by the industry or interests of those they regulate. In an attempt to avoid this problem, Congress requires an agency to develop public rulemaking records that explain the justifications for the agency's decisions. To serve this purpose of open and visible rulemaking, the record must contain articulated criticisms of the proposed action and the agency's genuine reasons for rejecting those criticisms. Furthermore, the record must contain the facts and/or a reasoned analysis to support the agency's final decision. Finally, the agency's rationale must not be merely conclusory.

In addition to the public rulemaking record requirement, agency decision-making can be overseen in two ways. First, the President can coordinate and guide the regulatory process. Article II of the United States Constitution provides that the President shall appoint agency heads and "faithfully execute" the laws of the United States. Additionally, the President has the

policies will fail to satisfy either environmentalists, industry, or both. As one commentator remarked, "environmentalists and developers agree that government regulatory agencies figure costs and benefits incorrectly. Environmentalists argue that environmental protection is still being undervalued. Developers contend that arbitrary and time-consuming regulatory requirements add unnecessarily to the cost of doing business." Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1, 11 (1981).


23. See supra note 22.


25. Until recently, a third method of oversight was available, the legislative veto. The legislative veto was a device by which Congress could veto an agency decision with a one-house vote. The Constitution, however, requires both houses' consent and the President's signature, before a bill becomes a law. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Thus, the legislative veto was found unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). See generally Neustadt, The Administration's Regulatory Reform Program: An Overview, 32 AD. L. REV. 129, 147-48 (1980) (discussing what the author perceives as serious dangers posed in the event of a proliferation of legislative veto provisions).

26. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926); see Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1271.

27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The United States Supreme Court has rarely discussed the President's constitutional powers, however, it did so in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invalidated President Truman's order to seize the nation's steel mills). See Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193, 196 (1981).
authority to require executive agencies to report to him. Although the President cannot make the laws, the “faithfully execute” clause gives the President the authority to issue orders to manage executive agencies in their lawmaking function.

In 1981, President Reagan took office and, consistent with his campaign promise to deregulate, immediately issued Executive Order 12,291. The purpose of this order is, among other things, to reduce regulatory burdens, increase agency accountability, and provide for presidential intervention into agency decisionmaking. This order, unprecedented in its scope and effect, subjects agency regulations to complete review by a single agency, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This review occurs after the public rulemaking record is closed. The OMB has the authority to alter the regulations based on facts and influences outside of that record. Thus, during the review the President or his staff may effectively determine the

31. See Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 196-97. Rosenberg argues that the President’s authority to require written reports falls short of providing the power to control the actions of those reporting. Thus, he argues that the language in the Constitution generally suggests that the President is to serve only in an oversight function. Id.
33. The preamble provides, in pertinent part, that the order is to “reduce the burdens of existing and future regulations, increase agency accountability for regulatory actions, provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations, and insure well-reasoned regulations . . . .” Id.
35. Traditionally, an agency’s regulations have been reviewed by the courts on the basis of their relationship to the underlying statute. Under Reagan’s order, a single agency, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), reviews all agency regulations on the basis of their cost-benefit analysis. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1287.
37. While the agency is required to include the OMB’s views and the agency’s response to those views in the rulemaking record, there is no requirement that the facts or policies influencing the OMB’s views be included in the record. See Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(f)(2), 3 C.F.R. 130 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982). One commentator has asserted that the OMB’s views will most likely not be documented because much of its decisionmaking process will take place in phone calls and informal meetings. “And, much as our society values openness, it remains true that candor and the flexibility necessary for collaboration or compromise are most
substance of a regulation through private influence. The order also substantively affects regulations by requiring agencies to adopt regulations only when the regulation’s benefits outweigh its costs. This across-the-board requirement ignores the fact that Congress may have previously determined that an agency is to give special weight to particular policies in developing regulations. Instead, to become law, all regulations must survive the order’s cost-benefit analysis.

The second means of oversight is through judicial review of agency decisions. Article III of the Constitution gives jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law to the federal courts. Pursuant to that article, Congress has set forth the appropriate standard of review of agency decisionmaking likely to flourish in the shade.” Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 595 (1984); see also A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING, supra note 34, at 170 (suggesting that undisclosed private interests may be disguised as presidential suggestions and influences); K. DAVIS, supra note 34, § 6:40, at 152-54 (Supp. 1982) (the OMB can alter an agency regulation without the public comment which is required in agency rulemaking, thus the OMB’s failure to document facts and views presented to it may leave a reviewing court with an agency record not actually supporting the rule to be reviewed); Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 195 (noting that critics of Order 12,291 expressed fears that private interest would be advanced during OMB review and that the true reason that order required a cost-benefit analysis is merely to justify the deregulation of private industry); Verkuil, supra note 20, at 950-51 (order possibly violates separation of powers principle by directly reflecting through the executive branch the interests of private industry to deregulate).

38. For an example of the White House as a conduit for private interests, see Verkuil, supra note 20, at 951-52 (discussing Quarles-Flanigan incident).


40. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1971) (Congress had already taken cost into account). Perhaps, as one commentator has suggested, Congress will find it necessary to enact future statutes as rules statutes, rather than goals statutes, to assure that the statutes underlying goals will be faithfully carried out. See Schoenbrod, supra note 16, at 826-28. A statute authorizing an executive agency to make policy determinations will effectively shift this policymaking authority to the President. See Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 215; Comments of William Coleman, former Secretary of Transportation, reprinted in Strauss, supra note 37, at 664-65.

Although the President is accountable to the public, former Secretary Coleman is wary of the President’s order. Presumably, it will not always be the President that provides input once an agency regulation reaches the OMB. Often the President’s political advisors will be delegated the authority to guide the OMB in its balancing of policies. The danger in this delegation of authority lies not only in the fact that the advisor is unelected, similar to unelected agency officials, but that the advisor does not even possess the expertise of the agency official. Comments of William Coleman, former Secretary of Transportation, reprinted in Strauss, supra note 37, at 664-65.


42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
in the Administrative Procedure Act and mirrored that standard in individual statutes, including the Clean Air Act. This standard of review requires reversal of an agency decision that is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."

The Supreme Court has found that the arbitrary and capricious standard requires a "searching and careful" inquiry into the agency's decision-making process. This is where the agency's rulemaking record comes into


- decide[s] all relevant questions of law, interpret[s] constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine[s] the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.

Id.


44. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (1982). Section 7607 provides that a reviewing court must set aside agency action found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. Congress intended reviewing courts "to continue their thorough, comprehensive review" of actions taken pursuant to the Clean Air Act. See H.R. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1977); see also National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (acknowledging Congress's intent and applying the "hard look" approach).


46. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). The Supreme Court first articulated the "searching and careful" approach to reviewing agency action, under the arbitrary and capricious standard, in Overton Park. In that case, concerned citizens challenged the Secretary of Transportation's decision to allocate federal funds for the construction of a highway through Overton Park. Id. at 406. The Supreme Court found that the lower court had failed to carefully examine the Secretary's decision and so ordered the court to reconsider its decision, keeping in mind that protection of public parks was an important goal.

The Court stated that informal agency actions were appropriately reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard set forth in § 706(2)(A) of the APA. Id. at 413-14. The Supreme Court subsequently applied the same arbitrary and capricious standard to review an agency's informal action in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1978) (per curiam).

Commentators note that, although the Overton Park Court articulated the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Court appeared to equate this with the "rational basis" and "clear error of judgment" standards. See 5 K. Davis, supra note 34, § 29:5, at 353-54 (2d ed. 1984).
This inquiry, sometimes referred to as a “hard look” review, does not require a court to redo the agency’s job. A court does not determine whether an agency’s decision is correct, nor does the court impose additional procedures on the agency’s rulemaking process. Rather, under the “hard look” approach, the court determines whether the record contains evidence that the agency engaged in well-reasoned decisionmaking. Thus, in order for review to be meaningful, the agency must sufficiently explain its reasoning in the record. Of course the potentiality exists that a decision may be affected substantively by influences outside the record, such as presidential “prodding,” and yet still have factual support in the record. Although the agency would have chosen differently absent the ex parte contact, the court may never know that such contact occurred and thus cannot control the problem.

While the arbitrary and capricious standard is a narrow one, the other two standards broaden the scope of review. Perhaps the Court’s blending of the standards was inadvertent, but arguably the Court intended to add depth to the arbitrary and capricious standard. See id.; Note, Judicial Review of Informal Administrative Rulemaking, 1984 DUKE L.J. 347, 351 [hereinafter cited as Note, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking]. In any event, agency rulemakers might correctly pay notice to the message implicit in Overton Park, that a factual record must be developed if a regulation is to survive a thorough review. See A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING, supra note 34, at 222-23.

48. Judge Leventhal coined the term “hard look” to describe a court’s review of agency decisionmaking in Greater Boston Television Corp. Judge Leventhal stated that:
   If satisfied that the agency had taken a hard look at the issue with the use of reasons and standards, the court will uphold its findings, though of less than ideal clarity, if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, though of course the court must not be left to guess as to the agency’s findings or reasons.

Id. at 851. (footnotes omitted).
49. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (court engaged in exhaustive review of emissions standards developed by the EPA only “to see if the result make[s] sense, and to assure that nothing unlawful or irrational had taken place”).
50. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Read broadly, Vermont Yankee prohibits courts from imposing judicially-created procedural requirements upon an agency’s decisionmaking process. Apparently Vermont Yankee was all bark and no bite, however, because lower courts have continued to impose such procedures, treating them as substantive considerations. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court further narrowed the applicability of Vermont Yankee, in Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983), by requiring an agency to consider a specific alternative in its decisionmaking. See infra note 64.
54. Id.
Nevertheless, a court does have the authority to review agency decisions made pursuant to executive orders. The Supreme Court, in *Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.*, recently applied the "hard look" approach to a review of an agency's decision to deregulate in accordance with Reagan's Executive Order 12,291. In *State Farm*, insurers challenged the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration's (NHTSA) rescission of its passive restraint standard. Consistent with Reagan's order to justify each regulation through a cost-benefit analysis, the Secretary of Transportation rescinded the standard because the costs of complying with the standard outweighed its safety benefits. The Supreme Court held that NHTSA's decision to rescind was arbitrary and capricious.

The Court stated as a general proposition that an existing rule was

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57. 103 S. Ct. at 2865. The history of the passive restraint standard pertinent to this Note began in June 1976. At that time, Secretary of Transportation William Coleman suspended the existing passive restraint standard, see 41 Fed. Reg. 24,070 (1976), to avoid public opposition to the admittedly feasible standard. The year 1977 brought a new Secretary of Transportation, Brock Adams, and a new passive restraint standard. See 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289 (1977). The new standard required the installation of either airbags or passive seatbelts in all new cars by 1984. NHTSA noted the regulation's significant safety benefits and, as late as 1980, issued reports on the benefits of both airbags and passive seatbelts. *State Farm*, 103 S. Ct. at 2862.

58. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text. Although NHTSA's decision to deregulate and its use of the cost-benefit analysis were consistent with Reagan's order, NHTSA did not cite the order as a basis for the standard's rescission. See Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981).

59. President Reagan took office in 1981 and appointed Andrew Lewis as Secretary of Transportation. Faced with economic problems in the automobile industry and consistent with the President's order to reduce regulatory burdens, Secretary Lewis re-examined the standard in February 1981. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text. NHTSA concluded this re-examination by rescinding the standard in 1977. See 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981). NHTSA explained that rescission was necessary because the cost of complying with the passive restraint requirement outweighed its safety benefits. *Id.*

60. 103 S. Ct. at 2867-68. While the court of appeals had some difficulty determining the appropriate standard of review, the *State Farm* Court stated without hesitation that the arbitrary and capricious standard was the correct one. *Id.* at 2868. Petitioner Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association (MVMA) asserted, however, that NHTSA's rescission was close to being nonreviewable. *Id.* at 2866. The MVMA claimed that NHTSA's decision to rescind was equivalent to an agency's decision not to issue a rule. The Court dismissed this argument and stated as a general proposition that an agency reversing its prior position by revoking a rule must more thoroughly explain its reasoning than if the agency had merely failed to act initially. *Id.*
presumed to further congressional policies. The Court noted that a revocation of that rule therefore required a more thorough explanation from the agency than if the agency had merely failed to issue the rule initially.

Moreover, the Court identified three situations in which a court is to find an agency's decision arbitrary and capricious. These situations arise when the agency: (1) bases its decision on considerations other than those intended by Congress; (2) overlooks a significant aspect of the problem; or (3) justifies its decision with reasons contradictory to the evidence or completely implausible.

The Court undertook its review of NHTSA's decisionmaking in light of the policies underlying the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. The purpose of the Act is to protect the public's safety. The Court noted that the Act was necessary because of industry's insufficient response to safety concerns in the past; thus, the Act was technology-forcing in nature.

The Court also ordered NHTSA to reconsider its balancing of cost and safety considerations, keeping in mind that the primary goal of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act is safety. This is significant in light of the fact that Reagan's order would require an equal balancing of costs and benefits. Arguably, the majority's position stands for the proposition that the order to factor costs and benefits equally does not supercede the statute's mandate that greater weight be given to the primary goal of the Act—safety.

Although the State Farm majority never directly addressed the issue of

61. Id. at 2868.
62. Id. While an agency may reconsider its rules and policies on a continuing basis, the Court noted that "the forces of change do not always or necessarily point in the direction of deregulation." Id.
63. Id. at 2867.
64. Id. at 2867-71. The court of appeals and a unanimous Supreme Court found that NHTSA's reasoning was arbitrary and capricious because NHTSA had failed to consider an airbags-only standard. Id. at 2868-71. The State Farm Court found that NHTSA should have addressed that alternative and then provided reasons for its abandonment. Id. at 2869. The MVMA argued that the Court incorrectly required NHTSA to follow specific procedures, contrary to Vermont Yankee, by ordering NHTSA to consider an airbags-only alternative. Id. at 2870. The State Farm Court disagreed with the MVMA's interpretation of Vermont Yankee, however, and rejected the MVMA's interpretations of State Farm's order to reconsider. Id. at 2870-71. The State Farm Court, consistent with Vermont Yankee, had not imposed specific procedures on the agency, nor required it to consider every policy choice. The Court only required NHTSA to consider an existing technologically feasible alternative found in the rescinded standard. Id. The Court ordered NHTSA to consider an airbags-only requirement and to explain its decision if it chose not to retain the requirement. Id. at 2874.
65. Id. at 2873.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2870. The Court stated that "[i]f, under the statute, the agency should not defer to the industry's failure to develop safer cars, which it surely should not do, a fortiori it may not revoke a safety standard which can be satisfied by current technology simply because the industry has opted for an ineffective seatbelt design." Id.
68. Id. at 2873.
69. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
presidential intervention into agency decisionmaking,70 the dissenters clearly stated that such intervention was proper.71 Justice Rehnquist, joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice O'Connor, found it reasonable for an agency to reevaluate the costs and benefits of its regulations in light of a change in executive policies.72 Nevertheless, all nine Justices endorsed the "hard look" approach to judicial review.73

Just as review of an agency's decision to deregulate, consistent with an executive order, did not change the scope of review, neither will review of a technical regulation.74 In *Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*,75 the Natural Resources Defense Council challenged a decision of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding the licensing of nuclear power plants.76 The Commission decided that licensing boards can assume, for the purpose of every licensing determination, that the disposal of certain nuclear wastes will have no significant impact on the environment.77 Thus, the fact that nuclear wastes are to be permanently stored at the site is not to affect the decision of whether to license the plant.

Noting the "acute" public awareness concerning the issue of nuclear power, the Supreme Court began a careful review of the factors considered by the agency in its decisionmaking process.78 After discussing the agency's

70. See 103 S. Ct. at 2873. The Court found that while an agency may change its policies, its decision to change course must be reasonably explained. Id. The Court recognized that NHTSA's rescission was an attempt to deregulate, but failed to cite the President's Executive Order 12,291, as the possible reason. See id. at 2866.
71. Id. at 2875 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent clearly stated that "the agency's changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new President from a different political party." Id. at 2875 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Assuming congressional mandates will not be overlooked, the dissenters found that an executive order provides a reasonable explanation for an agency's re-examination of its regulations in light of a new cost-benefit analysis. See id. at 2875 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also *The Supreme Court, 1982 Term*, 97 HARV. L. REV. 230, 230-36 (1983) (suggests *State Farm* majority may have avoided mention of the political nature of the rescission as a means of rejecting Reagan's policies).
72. 103 S. Ct. at 2875 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra note 71.
73. 103 S. Ct. at 2874.
75. 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
76. Id. at 2250.
77. Id. at 2249.
78. Id. at 2252.
findings, the Court concluded that these findings rationally supported the agency's choice. Although the Court categorized this as a technical policy decision, it was still able to carefully review the process by which the agency reached its decision and to find that decision reasonable. This depth of review was not unique, and was consistent with the application by courts of the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing equally technical decisions under other complex statutes, such as the Clean Air Act.

The Clean Air Act is a goals statute. The primary goal of the Clean Air Act is to protect the public's health. The Act places the responsibility for achieving this goal on both the state and federal governments. Due to the states' failure to adequately respond to the problem of air pollution, however, Congress has increasingly placed greater reliance on the federal government to ensure the states' compliance.

79. Id. at 2256-57.
80. Id. at 2257.
81. See cases cited supra note 74.
82. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. "The problem with statutes that broadly delegate decisionmaking authority is that they leave key value choices to low visibility decision-makers fearful of making controversial choices." Schoenbrod, supra note 16, at 753-54. Schoenbrod asserts that the EPA designs rules, under the Clean Air Act, in such a way as to avoid economic, technical and political objections. Thus, the EPA essentially manipulates and redefines the Act's goals through its discretionary rulemaking. Id. at 767-79.

While a goals statute allows unelected officials, such as those within the EPA, to make broad and sometimes compromising policy judgments, a rules approach to the Clean Air Act raises objections as well. Congress lacks the time and expertise required to develop necessarily technical rules. Additionally, the cumbersome legislative rulemaking process makes it difficult for Congress to react quickly to new information. Arguably then, these factors require Congress to delegate its rulemaking authority to an agency that can develop the necessary expertise and will be able to react quickly and efficiently to new problems. Nevertheless, Schoenbrod asserts that the same concerns that weigh against congressional rulemaking have become realities with the EPA as rulemaker under the Act. Id. at 803-15. Accordingly, he concludes that rulemaking under the Act should be left to Congress; the rulemaking body which is politically accountable. Id.; see also D. Currie, AIR POLLUTION—FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS § 1.06 (1981) (discussing arguments for and against delegating executive agencies rulemaking authority).

83. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1982)). The primary purpose of the Clean Air Act is "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population." Id.
85. Although the problem of air pollution has plagued the nation for longer than 30 years, the first congressional recognition of the problem occurred in 1955 with passage of a bill authorizing the federal government to provide research, technical, and financial assistance to the states in an effort to combat the problem. Act of July 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 159, 69 Stat. 322. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare was charged with administering the statute, although primary responsibility for developing air pollution control strategies was left to the states. See Act of July 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 159, § 1, 69 Stat. 322, 322.

Growing concerns with the problems of air pollution, combined with the states' failure to act, soon led Congress to amend the Act. See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392. Accordingly, the purpose of this amendment was to improve, strengthen and accelerate programs for the prevention and abatement of air pollution. See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub.
Accordingly, the Act requires the EPA, the executive agency authorized to administer the Act, to develop two sets of national air standards. First, the EPA develops air quality standards that specify the maximum concentration of known pollutants that may safely be allowed in the air. These standards set the goals that, when attained, will result in clean air. Second, the EPA develops emission standards that specify the maximum rates at


Then, to provide the increased federal control, the Act required the newly-established EPA to, among other things, publish a list of known air pollutants, issue air quality criteria for each pollutant, set national air quality standards, review and approve state implementation plans, and determine which pollutants were hazardous. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 108-112, 84 Stat. 1676, 1678-86. The Act required the states to design plans to implement, maintain, and enforce the standards set by the EPA. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 110(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1676, 1680.

The Supreme Court recognized Congress's concern with the states' failure to act. In Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976), the Court stated that "the [1970] Amendments reflect congressional dissatisfaction with the progress of existing air pollution programs and a determination to 'take[e] a stick to the States' in order to guarantee prompt attainment and maintenance of specified air quality standards." Id. at 249 (citation omitted). For a detailed history of the Clean Air Act of 1970, see Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).

86. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was originally authorized to administer the Clean Air Act. After the EPA's establishment in July 1970, however, HEW's functions pursuant to the Act were transferred to the new agency. See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970 § 2(a)(3), 3 C.F.R. 1072, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982).

87. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (1982). That section requires the EPA to publish a list of each air pollutant:

(A) emissions of which, in [its] judgment cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare;
(B) the presence of which in the ambient air results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources; and
(C) for which air quality criteria had not been issued before the December 31, 1970, but for which [it] plans to issue air quality criteria under this section.

Id. Section 7409 requires that following publication of this list, the EPA is to establish national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards. Attainment of the primary standards will protect the public health. Id. § 7409(b)(1). The secondary standards are necessary to protect the public welfare. Id. § 7409(b)(2).
which hazardous pollutants may safely be released into the air. The emission standards are used to achieve the air quality standards.

The Act requires states to adopt implementation plans designed to meet both sets of national standards. Each plan must provide for the reduction of existing emissions that exceed emission standards. Furthermore, to prevent new pollution problems, each plan must assure that emissions from new and modified sources meet or fall below the emission standards. Assuming states would gradually reduce emissions, Congress envisioned the expedient attainment of air quality standards. Nevertheless, to force the states to comply, the Act originally required the halt of further economic growth, by way of a ban on construction, in those states failing to attain these standards.

88. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A) (1982). That section requires the EPA's Administrator to publish a list of all hazardous pollutants "for which he intends to establish an emission standard." Id. Section 7412(b)(1)(B) requires the Administrator to establish an emission standard for each hazardous pollutant "at the level which in his judgment provides an ample margin of safety to protect the public health from such hazardous air pollutants." Id. § 7412(b)(1)(B).

Section 7412(a)(1) defines a "hazardous air pollutant" as "an air pollutant to which no ambient air quality standard is applicable and which in the judgment of the Administrator causes, or contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to result in, an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness." Id. § 7412(a)(1).

89. Both sets of standards, however, are easily manipulated by where, when, and how they are applied. See L. LAVE & G. OENN, CLEARING THE AIR: REFORMING THE CLEAN AIR ACT 7 (1981).

90. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982). That section requires states to submit implementation plans to the EPA for approval. Id. These plans must include provisions for: attainment of air quality standards within a specified time period; compliance with applicable emissions standards; review of proposed construction; and assurance that the state's emissions will not interfere with other states' progress toward attainment. Id. Although the Act requires states to comply within three years of the plan's adoption, several methods are provided for extending this deadline. See id.

The Act gives states nine months, following the promulgation of any national air quality standard, to adopt and submit to the Administrator, a plan for attaining that standard. Id. § 7410(a)(1). Section 7410(a)(2)(A) requires attainment of the standards within three years from the plan's approval date. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A). This deadline may be extended, however, as follows: § 7410(b) allows the Administrator, in his discretion, to grant up to an eighteen month extension for a state's submission of the plan, id. § 7410(b); and § 7410(e) provides for up to a two-year extension if the necessary technology is unavailable, id. § 7410(e). Previously § 7410(f)(1) allowed for the postponement of the deadline with respect to a source (or class of sources) if "good faith efforts have been made to comply." See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(1) (1976). Subsection 7410(f) was omitted in the 1977 amendment to the Act and a substitute subsection inserted that relates to national and regional energy emergencies. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f) (1982).


92. Id. § 7412(c)(1)(A). That section permits the construction of "any new source or [the] modification of [any existing source which in the Administrator's judgment . . . will not cause emissions in violation of such [emission] standard." Id. Additionally, § 7412(d)(1) requires each state to design an implementation plan for "implementing and enforcing" these standards established pursuant to § 7412(c)(1)(A) and § 7412(c)(1)(B). Id. § 7412(d)(1).

93. See L. LAVE & G. OENN, supra note 89, at 8.
Unfortunately, many states, despite extensions, were unable to attain these standards by the deadlines established under the 1970 Act. A significant cause of states' nonattainment under the 1970 Act resulted from Congress's failure to recognize a major weakness of the Act. While the Act specified a deadline for attainment, it did not require states to demonstrate consistent progress toward that goal. Although states presumably intended to comply, many attempted to do so while continuing to allow the construction of new and modified pollution sources without requiring the installation of necessary pollution control equipment. Thus, emissions increased rather than decreased as states labored under the false hope that large emission reductions could be achieved just prior to the Act's deadline. Instead, the continued economic growth resulted in nonattainment of the standards. Moreover, under the Act nonattainment resulted in the halt of further economic growth.

94. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(4) (1982). That section prohibits the construction or modification of a polluting source if the change would prevent the attainment or maintenance of any air quality standard. Id. Read strictly, this provision bans all construction subsequent to passage of the attainment deadline because it would technically be impossible to attain the standards after that date. See H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 208 (1977).

95. According to the chief sponsor of the Act, Senator Muskie, only 91 of the 247 air quality control regions of the nation had met the air quality standards by the Act's deadline. Additionally, 45 states were notified, subsequent to the deadline, that their implementation plans were inadequate. 123 Cong. Rec. 18,015 (1977). The former head of the EPA, Russell Train, found that states had not been able to meet the standards for a variety of reasons, including both economic and enforcement problems. H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 207-08 (1977).


97. Id.

98. Id.

99. See supra note 94. To avoid this crippling ban and to provide temporary relief as Congress battled to amend the Act, the EPA adopted the Emission Offset Interpretive Ruling in 1976. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1976). The ruling allowed limited industrial growth in states subject to the construction ban if two conditions were met. First, a new or modified polluting source had to be constructed with the best available pollution control technology. Second, any increased emissions from the source were to be offset by a greater reduction in emission from another polluting source within the unhealthy air state. The EPA made it clear, however, that the Act forbade economic considerations to outweigh the primary goal of protecting the public's health. See id.

Many members of Congress were critical of the discriminatory effect the ruling had on new companies. See S. Rep. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 111-14 (1977) (view of Sen. Bentsen); 123 Cong. Rec. 16,204 (1977) (comment of Rep. Waxman). The approach of the ruling was also criticized because it made pollution a "marketable commodity" by rewarding polluters who had resisted compliance and could later "sell" available emissions offsets to newcomers. In addition, the ruling acted as a disincentive to modernization for polluters who opted to resist compliance rather than be subjected to the ruling's strict requirements. Moreover, this approach would be ineffective because it only applied to larger polluters. Many small polluters could locate in an unhealthy air state and, although together their net emissions might exceed emission standards, the polluters themselves would not be subject to the ruling's requirements. Finally, since a large polluter could foreseeably buy up small polluters in order to obtain allowable
Congress addressed the nonattainment problem in its 1977 amendments to the Act.100 Although protection of the public's health remained the Act's "overriding commitment,"101 Congress recognized the need to balance the environmental concern of ensuring steady improvement of air quality with the conflicting economic concern of allowing reasonable economic growth.102 Thus, through the 1977 amendments, Congress redesigned the Act103 to allow growth in the states where national standards are exceeded and the public health remains at risk. That growth, however, is limited so that the eventual attainment of the national air standards is ensured.104 To accomplish these objectives, the amended Act subjects the proposed construction of new or modified polluting sources within unhealthy air states to a stringent permit program.105 Additionally, construction of modifications in clean air states remains subject to a less stringent permit program.106 Under these programs
a permit must be acquired before construction of a new polluting source or modification of an existing source can occur.\textsuperscript{107}

Intended both as a tool for attainment and as a means for continued growth, the permit program is designed to consistently reduce emissions and to force industry to develop and install the most effective pollution control technology.\textsuperscript{108} Thus, the permit program reflects Congress's intent to place the burden of pollution control on the polluters themselves.\textsuperscript{109} Additionally, Congress intended the program to act as an incentive for existing polluters to comply with the states' implementation plans, because a company resisting compliance receives no permit and thus foregoes the opportunity to expand.\textsuperscript{110}

A permit is issued only when four statutory requirements are met.\textsuperscript{111} First, the EPA must determine that the unhealthy air state has adopted an approved plan for attaining national air standards and that the state is actually carrying out its plan.\textsuperscript{112} Without an approved and working plan, no industrial growth contribute to air pollution, and install the best available control technology on the source. See 42 U.S.C. § 7473(a)(3), (4) (1982). The "best available control technology" means "an emission limitation . . . which the permitting authority . . . taking into account energy, environmental and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable through application of . . . available technology. In no event shall application of 'best available technology' result in emissions of any pollutants which will exceed the [national] emissions [standards]." Id. § 7479(3).

\textsuperscript{107} Id. § 7502(b)(6) (nonattainment); id. § 7410(a)(2)(b) (general).

\textsuperscript{108} In a Senate debate of the 1977 amendments, Senator Muskie made the following remarks:

Concern has been expressed with the fact that the Clean Air Act does not permit new sources of pollutants to locate in areas where ambient standards for those pollutants are presently exceeded . . . . The committee position is—and the Clean Air Act supports the argument—that so long as a new source will not "prevent attainment or maintenance of standards, it can be located in a dirty air region . . . . The benefit of forcing both best available technology on the sources and assured compliance with applicable emissions limits.

\textsuperscript{112} Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1982) (section providing for the assessment and collection of noncompliance penalty).

Polluters should be required to pay the cost for using the public's clean air. See D. Currie, supra note 82, § 1.10. Currie suggests that the polluter may be required to pay for its use of our air through the use of private lawsuits or through emissions charges or taxes. He concludes, however, by finding that such lawsuits are ineffective and that an emission tax would most likely be arbitrary and unenforceable. Id. Thus, the logical conclusion, despite its deficiencies, is to resort to government regulation.


\textsuperscript{111} 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1982).

\textsuperscript{112} Id. § 7503(4). That section provides that one requirement for permit issuance is that "the applicable implementation plan is being carried out for the nonattainment area in which the proposed source is to be constructed or modified . . . ." Id.
is allowed in the state. The promise of growth is therefore intended to provide an incentive for unhealthy air states to comply with the Act.\(^\text{113}\)

Second, the state agency must determine that increased emissions from the proposed new or modified source will be offset by a reduction in emissions elsewhere in the area.\(^\text{114}\) Reducing emissions is necessary to avoid a major weakness of the 1970 Act.\(^\text{115}\) Consistent reductions in emissions will allow for steady progress toward the attainment of air quality standards. Thus, the unhealthy air state will not be forced to make drastic emissions reductions as the deadline for attainment under the 1977 amendments approaches.\(^\text{116}\)

Third, the applicant must bring all of its other noncomplying facilities within the unhealthy air state into compliance with that state’s plan.\(^\text{117}\) This requirement forces polluting companies to clean up facilities that are contributing to the state’s unhealthy air status prior to receiving the economic reward of industrial expansion.\(^\text{118}\)

\(^\text{113}\) Id. § 7413(a)(5). Existing industries wishing to expand and new industries wishing to locate in that state will be forced to seek locations in other states, thus depriving the unhealthy air state of needed economic expansion. One commentator asserts that this is unfair to newcomers to the state. Simply because the state has failed to force existing companies to comply, the new company is denied permission to construct. See D. Currie, supra note 82, § 6.10.

\(^\text{114}\) 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1) (1982). Before a permit is issued, the permitting agency must determine that:

1. by the time the source is to commence operation, total allowable emissions from existing sources in the region, from new or modified sources which are not major emitting facilities, and from the proposed source will be sufficiently less than total emissions from existing sources allowed under the applicable implementation plan . . . so as to represent . . . reasonable further progress . . . ; or
2. that emissions of such pollutant resulting from the proposed new or modified major stationary source will not cause or contribute to [exceeded] emissions levels.

Id. This offset policy is similar to the "bubble concept" discussed infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. The difference is that the bubble concept allows trade-offs between sources within a facility, while the offset policy allows trade-offs between entire facilities. L. Lave & G. Omenn, supra note 89, at 23.

\(^\text{115}\) See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.

\(^\text{116}\) “Reasonable further progress” must be made towards reaching air quality standards. Although the House sought to require progression in specific yearly increments, the conference agreement determined that this term was intended to mean regular, consistent emissions reduction. See H.R. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1977); 123 Cong. Rec. 26,613 (1977). Senator Muskie defined this term to mean that “further control to existing facilities, development of further production process controls, and new innovative control techniques must be applied on all sources.” 123 Cong. Rec. 18,019 (1977).

\(^\text{117}\) 42 U.S.C. § 7503(3) (1982). This section provides that “the owner or operator of the proposed new or modified source [must] demonstrate that all major stationary sources owned or operated by [him] . . . in such State are subject to emission limitations and are in compliance, or on a schedule for compliance with all applicable emission limitation and standards . . . .” Id.

\(^\text{118}\) This is one way of forcing compliance on those companies that have resisted compliance in the past, but seek to expand facilities or build new facilities in the area. This requirement may be “disproportionate to the offense,” however, because the owner may not be intentionally resisting compliance. It may be that the owner is unable to reasonably prevent the violation. See D. Currie, supra note 82, § 6.10.
Fourth, the applicant must ensure that the proposed new or modified source will be equipped with the most effective pollution control technology to obtain the lowest achievable emission rate. That rate is defined as the lower of either the lowest rate for that type of source in any state or the lowest rate achieved in practice. Thus, the applicant is forced to develop technology, when none exists, to achieve this rate. This concept, known as technology-forcing, places the burden of developing new technology on industry, the group most responsible for polluting the air. More importantly, it places the burden on those companies seeking to increase pollution in an area where the public health remains at a risk.

A permit is required prior to the construction or modification of a polluting source in an unhealthy air state. An existing source is modified when it is physically or operationally changed so that the change results in a pollution increase. Whether there is a pollution increase, however, depends upon

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120. Id. § 7501(3). That section defines the term “lowest achievable emissions rate” as: that rate of emissions which reflects—(a) the most stringent emission limitation which is contained in the implementation plan of any State for such class or category of source, unless the owner or operator of the proposed source demonstrates that such limitations are not achievable, or (B) the most stringent emission limitation which is achieved in practice by such class or category of source, whichever is more stringent.
121. Id. § 7501(3).
122. Use of the term “technology-forcing” was initially seen in published materials and cases in 1975. See Note, Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J. 1713, 1713 n.3 (1979); see, e.g., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75-77 (1975) (discussion of technology-forcing provisions in Clean Air Act).
123. In clarifying the purpose and intent of the 1977 Amendments, the Clean Air Act Conference Report specified that “this year’s legislation retains and even strengthens the technology-forcing and technology encouraging goals of the 1970 Act.” 123 CONG. REC. 27,070 (1977). In the Senate’s consideration of the Conference Report, Senator Muskie commented that the application of the best available control technology is a strategy that can best achieve a reduction in gross national emissions. He also made clear the fact that those who use environmental resources should bear the cost of protecting the environment. Id. at 18,016.
Under the Act, polluters are encouraged to develop superior technology through the EPA’s granting of conditional extensions. A facility may be granted an extension for compliance only if it is currently developing or installing a means of emission limitation better than that which is presently available. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4) (1982).
124. In developing its implementation plan, a state must “require permits for the construction and operation of new or modified major stationary sources.” 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982). While the provisions for unhealthy air states do not provide guidance as to the meaning of the term “major stationary source” or “stationary source,” § 7501(4) incorporates by reference the definition for “modified” from § 7411(a)(4) of the Act. See id. § 7501(4). Section 7411(a)(4) defines a “modification” to be “any physical change in, or change in the method or operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted.” Id. § 7411(a)(4).
125. Id. § 7411(a)(4).
whether the entire plant in which the modification occurs is considered the "source," or whether the individual device that is modified is considered the source. Thus, while a permit is clearly required prior to the construction of any new polluting source, it is unclear whether a permit is required for all pollution-increasing modifications. The coverage of the permit program therefore depends upon the EPA's interpretation of the term source.

The term source has been interpreted in one of two ways. As an illustration, take the case of a polluting company seeking to alter the method of operating a furnace so that the furnace will emit an entirely new pollutant. First, employing a broad interpretation of the term source, the furnace itself is considered a pollution-emitting source. Because the furnace's modification will increase pollution, it is subject to the permit program. This means that the company must assure that its entire plant, in addition to any other facilities it owns in the state, are in compliance with the state's implementation plan. The company must also install pollution control equipment on the modified furnace allowing it to achieve the lowest possible emission rate.

The second and narrower interpretation of the term source, however, subjects the proposed modification to the permit program only if the entire plant, rather than the individual furnace, increases pollution. This interpretation applies what is known as the "bubble concept" to the permit program. Under the bubble concept, the entire plant is treated as though it is encased within a single "bubble." Pollution is therefore measured by the total amount escaping from an imaginary hole at the top of the bubble. Thus, under the bubble concept the polluting company can shut down a non-productive furnace in an attempt to offset any increased pollution resulting from a modification to a different furnace. If the resulting emissions reduction is large enough to offset the increase from the furnace the company intends to modify, the total pollution from the plant does not increase. The

126. See infra notes 135-58 and accompanying text.
128. See id. §§ 7502(b)(6), 7411(a)(4).
129. Assuming that the furnace is a major stationary source, its modification will subject it to the permitting process because a "change in the method of [its] operation . . . [will] result in the emission of a [new] air pollutant." Id. § 7411(a)(4).
131. Id. § 7503 (2).
132. One study defines the bubble concept as "an Environmental Protection Agency program that permits choice within a plant of which specific pollution sources to abate, so long as the overall emissions from the plant do not exceed the allowable limit." L. LAVE & G. OMENN, supra note 89, at 50. The authors support the broad use of the bubble concept. They argue for its adoption because it allows polluters flexibility to control emissions in the least costly way to the polluters, while assuring that overall emissions do not increase. Id. But see Note, The EPA's Bubble Concept After Alabama Power, 32 STAN. L. REV. 943 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Bubble Concept].
company thus avoids the need for a permit.\textsuperscript{133} This means that the company need not bring its other plants into compliance, nor install the most effective pollution control equipment on the modified furnace.\textsuperscript{134} The company is allowed to modify the plant regardless of whether it owns four plants in the unhealthy air state that violate every applicable emissions standard, or whether this is its only plant and the plant is completely equipped with the most modern pollution control technology. Applying the bubble concept, there is no distinction between those complying and those resisting compliance when an existing source is modified.

The Act and its history contain no reference to the applicability of the bubble concept, or the plantwide interpretation. Indeed, the Act's only specific guidance regarding this issue is found in the ambiguous definition of the term "stationary source."\textsuperscript{135} A stationary source is defined as "any building, structure, facility or installation" which emits pollution.\textsuperscript{136} With this limited guidance, Congress delegated to the EPA the task of determining whether the bubble concept was appropriate in a given program under the Act. Not surprisingly, the EPA has interpreted the definition of a "source" differently for different types of programs, and each of these interpretations has been promptly challenged in the courts.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{133} If a change in a plant has no effect on emissions, it does not fall within the Act's definition of a modification. Thus, only modifications which increase emissions or add new pollutants, are subject to the permit requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1) (1982).

\textsuperscript{134} This may be one reason why industry has so strongly supported application of the bubble concept to the provisions for unhealthy air states. Although it may be burdensome to go through the red tape of the permit program, the real burden to industry comes in the form of forced compliance and technology-forcing. Had these industries complied with the Act's original deadlines, however, they presumably would not be subject to this burdensome process now because their states would have clean air.

\textsuperscript{135} A stationary source is defined under new source review in the general provisions of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (1982). While the Act's provisions for unhealthy air states refer to the new source review provision to define a modification, there is no corresponding reference for a stationary source or major stationary source. The Act's provisions for clean air states similarly do not define or refer to a definition for stationary source, however, a major stationary source is defined within those provisions as "stationary sources with the potential to emit 250 tons or more of any pollutant." \textit{Id.} § 7491(g)(7). Presumably, the definitions are applicable to all of the Act's provisions, although the obvious omissions almost appear to have been intentional.

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Id.} § 7411(a)(3).

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{See infra} notes 138-58, 175 and accompanying text. The challenges take place pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1982), which provides in pertinent part, that "[a] petition for [judicial] review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any nationally . . . applicable regulations . . . may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." \textit{Id.} The section further provides that "[a]ny petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register . . . ." \textit{Id.}

Congress provided for review of nationally applicable rules in a single court to allow a uniform and efficient reviewing process. Review is appropriate in the court of appeals rather than the
The first application of the bubble concept to a permit program occurred in 1976. That application involved a permit program that was designed to improve air quality. The EPA adopted a plantwide definition for the term “source,” thereby subjecting a proposed modification within a plant to the permit program only if an emissions increase was not offset by a reduction elsewhere within the plant. In defining a “source” for this program, however, the EPA had essentially redrafted the statutory definition to include the phrase, “any one or a combination of” facilities.

The Sierra Club challenged the EPA’s interpretation in ASARCO Inc. v. EPA, claiming that the Act defined a “source” as an individual facility, not as a combination of facilities. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the Sierra Club and found that the EPA had exceeded its statutory authority by rewriting the definition. Moreover, the court stated that the plantwide definition frustrated the purpose of the permit program, which was to improve air quality, because that interpretation merely maintained existing air quality. The bubble concept was thus found to be inappropriate.

District court because the appeals court takes no evidence, but merely reviews the agency’s rulemaking record. Within 60 days of a rule’s promulgation, a petition for review must be filed to timely determine the binding effect of the regulation. Without an early review, the rulemaking record and the agency’s procedural defects become stale. Once the 60 day period elapses, the unchallenged rule cannot later be judicially reviewed during an enforcement proceeding. This provision creates a potential problem, however, because the regulation’s future impact may be uncertain until its initial enforcement. Thus, those potentially affected may not realize this fact until the 60 day period has long since run. See R. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts 56 (1981); Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal Pollution Laws, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1221, 1258 (1977) (Currie asserts that the 60 day requirement may be unconstitutional because those entering into a business affected by the regulation but subsequent to the sixtieth day are precluded from asserting the invalidity of the regulation).

138. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.2(d) (1976).

139. The EPA defined a stationary source to be “any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant and which contains any one or a combination of the following: 1) Affected facilities. 2) Existing facilities. 3) Facilities of the type for which no standards have been promulgated in this part.”

140. 578 F.2d 319, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

141. Id. at 327-28. The court reasoned that Congress had provided for new source review after realizing that state implementation plans alone would not achieve air quality standards. Id. at 327. These standards had to be met to achieve the goal of improving air quality and new source review was a means for achieving that goal. Id. The means, however, were undercut by the EPA’s “applying the bubble concept [and] thus postpon[ing] the time when best technology must be employed and at best maintain[ing] the present level of emissions.”

142. Id. at 327-29. In addition to finding that the EPA had no authority to rewrite a statutory definition, in the majority opinion, Judge Wright also found the definition inconsistent with Congress’s intent to use new source review as a means for technology-forcing. See id. at 327. The court also noted that the EPA had agreed to this compromise with the nonferrous
In 1978, the EPA again employed the bubble concept, this time in a permit program for clean air states, that is, states that had attained national air standards. Thus, the program was designed to maintain air quality rather than improve it. This permit program for clean air states also contained an EPA revision of the statutory definition of the term "source." The EPA had added the words "equipment," "operation," and "or combination thereof" to the definition. When this interpretation was challenged in *Alabama Power Co. v. Costle*, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit again found that the EPA lacked the authority to rewrite the Act's definition and thus set aside the EPA's definition. Nevertheless, relying on *ASARCO*, the court found that the EPA could interpret the statutory definition of "source" to mean an entire plant. The court reasoned that this interpretation was allowable because the permit program was only designed to maintain air quality. Thus the court found that the EPA could apply the bubble concept to a permit program designed to maintain existing air quality. Taken together, *ASARCO* and *Alabama Power* create a test whereby it is appropriate to use the bubble concept in a program designed to maintain air quality and inappropriate to use that concept in a program intended to improve air quality.

In 1980, the EPA issued a regulation adopting a dual definition for the term "source." For purposes of the permit program for clean air states, smelting industry only because failure to do so would result in "strong opposition from the smelting industry and the Department of Commerce." *Id.* at 328 n.30.

Both the concurring opinion of Judge Leventhal and the concurring and dissenting opinion of Judge MacKinnon, however, found that the EPA had the authority to interpret the term stationary source flexibly. *See id.* at 330 (Leventhal, J., concurring); *id.* at 331-32 (MacKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge MacKinnon specifically pointed out that the term "facility" could refer to an entire industrial grouping. *See id.* at 333-34 (MacKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting); *see also* R. MELNICK, *supra* note 137, at 296 (Melnick asserts that Judge Wright, the author of the *ASARCO* opinion, consistently protects the public's right to a clean environment as opposed to industry's right to avoid regulatory burdens).


145. *For purposes of the permit program for clean air states, the EPA defined a "source" as "any structure, building, facility, equipment, installation or operation (or combination thereof) which is located on one or more contiguous or adjacent properties and which is owned and operated by the same person." Id.* § 51.24(b)(4).

146. 636 F.2d 323, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

147. *Id.* The Court found that, although the EPA had no authority to add language to the statutory definition, it did have discretion to interpret the statutory definition applying the bubble concept, as long as the interpretation was "reasonable." *Id.*

148. Currie argues that these two cases failed to determine whether a plantwide definition is appropriate for the term stationary source as both cases merely dealt with the problem of drafting. *See D. CURRIE, supra* note 82, § 3.05.

the EPA interpreted the term "source" to mean an entire plant, thus employing the bubble concept. For purposes of the permit program for unhealthy air states, however, the EPA interpreted the term source to mean both an entire plant and each installation within the plant, and thus the bubble concept was not employed.

The EPA supported its use of the dual definition by relying on the test developed by the courts of appeals in ASARCO and Alabama Power. The EPA found that because Congress designed the permit program for clean air states to merely maintain existing air quality, the narrow plantwide definition was appropriate. The EPA further found that because Congress intended the permit program for unhealthy air states as a tool to improve air quality, that program required use of the broader definition encompassing both an entire plant and each installation within the plant. Significantly, the EPA itself claimed that the interpretation was justified because the broad coverage of the permit program in unhealthy air states was consistent with Congress's intent.

Moreover, the EPA realized that the dual definition would complicate the permitting process. In some instances, a state might be an unhealthy air state with respect to some pollutants and a clean air state with respect to others, thereby subjecting a single modification emitting various pollutants to one permit program and not the other. Nevertheless, the EPA found the anticipated burden to be outweighed by the need for the permit program's broad coverage in unhealthy air states.

In response to President Reagan's order to reexamine regulatory burdens, in 1981 Anne Gorsuch Burford, the new head of the EPA, proposed a reversal of the EPA's 1980 regulation. The EPA planned to reduce regulatory burdens and complexities by adopting a plantwide definition of the term "source" for the permit programs under both the clean air states' provisions and the unhealthy air states' provisions. Thus, in deciding to use the broad definition for unhealthy air states the EPA reversed its 1980 decision. While the notice of the proposed reversal specified that its primary purpose was the reduction of regulatory burdens, the final notice indicated that the purpose for the reversal was to give states more flexibility in designing their implementation plans as required by the Act.
The EPA advanced four reasons to justify its decision to reverse its 1980 position. First, the EPA claimed that subjecting every modification to the permit program acted as a disincentive to compliance. Plant owners would choose not to replace inefficient pollution control equipment with new advanced technology because the replacement would be subject to the permit program. The plantwide definition, the EPA claimed, would encourage improvements in existing plants because many existing plant owners could now avoid the permitting process.

Second, the EPA stated that if the modification caused the plant as a whole to significantly increase pollution, the modification would still be subject to the permit program. The EPA determined this to mean that emissions would not, therefore, increase under the plantwide definition.

Third, the EPA concluded that the plantwide definition would reduce regulatory burdens. By simplifying the regulatory process and narrowing the scope of the permit program's coverage, confusion and inconsistency would be reduced. A modification to an existing plant would now be exempt from both permit programs if the state were considered to be both a clean

First, today's action means that both the [provisions for clean air states] and [provisions for unhealthy air states] will use the same definition of "source." This alone will reduce regulatory complexity. Sources will no longer have to figure out what an "installation" is, which should lessen any confusion engendered by [the 1980 regulation].

Second, and more important, by removing the requirement that states adopt a dual definition, EPA is acting consistently with [the provisions for unhealthy air states] of the Act. Congress expressly provided that states are to play the primary role in pollution control. . . . It is also intended that states retain the maximum flexibility to balance environmental and economic concerns in designing plans to clean up [unhealthy air areas].

Id. (citations omitted).

161. See id. at 50,766-67.

162. Id. at 50,766. The EPA, however, failed to support this reason with any data except to point to two potential situations which might arise, supplied by industry commentators. Id.

163. Id. at 50,767.

164. Id. at 50,768. The EPA pointed out that the plantwide definition was especially needed in areas subject to the construction ban. In those areas, a proposed modernization would be denied even though it would not increase air pollution. See id. The EPA failed to note, however, that the plantwide definition does not apply to modernizations only, but to any modification. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. Arguably, the plantwide definition would not actually encourage modernization at all.

States without approved and working implementation plans are subject to a construction ban. These states therefore do not have the added safeguard of reasonable further progress towards attainment that is required in an approved plan. The EPA's 1981 regulation allows construction in states where none was intended. See infra text accompanying notes 323-24.


166. Id. at 50,767.

167. Id. at 50,766. The EPA set forth its reasons for originally adopting the plantwide definition to be as follows:

[The] EPA adopted [the 1980 regulation] in order to most effectively use [new source review] to aid in the clean up of [unhealthy air states] . . . [because] a narrower
air state for some pollutants and an unhealthy air state for others. More-
over, the regulatory burdens would be greatly reduced due to a significant
decrease in the coverage of the permitting process as a whole.

Fourth, the EPA claimed that the plantwide definition provided the states
with more flexibility. Although this would not relieve states of the Act’s
requirement of reasonable further progress toward the Act’s goals, states
would be given the flexibility to either adopt or reject the plantwide defi-
nition, depending on the states’ individual needs.

Thus, under the 1981 regulation, an unhealthy air state is free to continue
largely unrestricted economic growth with the hope that it will ultimately
attain the standards by the Act’s deadline. Regardless of the state’s choice,
however, the Act’s deadlines will have to be met. In short, the EPA
justified its regulation change by claiming that modernization was more
likely to occur, emissions would not increase, confusion and inconsistency
would be alleviated, and states would still be required to comply with the
Act. Based on this reasoning, the EPA reduced the broad coverage of the
permit program for unhealthy air states.

THE CHALLENGE TO THE 1981 REGULATION

Natural Resources Defense Council, Citizens for a Better Environment,
and North Western Ohio Lung Association promptly challenged the 1981
regulation. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, the Court

definition of source brings in more sources for review, which [would] enable states
to ensure more reduction in emissions . . . .

Id. The EPA then asserted that the 1981 regulation was necessary to “reduce these regulatory
burdens and complexities associated with [new source review]” by significantly reducing the
coverage of new source review. Id.

168. Id. at 50,767-78. The EPA reasoned that sources subject to the permitting process
under both sets of provisions would “no longer have to figure what an ‘installation’ is,
which should lessen . . . confusion.” Id.

169. Id.

170. Id.

171. Id.

172. Id. at 50,768-69. The EPA argued that, although a state could adopt the plantwide
definition, the 1981 regulation did not forbid a state from subjecting all plant modifications to
the permit program. What the EPA failed to point out, however, was that a state would
generally not choose a definition that would put it at a disadvantage to its neighboring states.
Indeed, the Act itself has been amended many times to give the federal government increased
control after discovering that states were reluctant to, among other things, set strict air quality
standards. See supra note 85.

173. See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.


175. The final notice of the proposed 1981 regulation provided that “under section [7607](b)(1)
of the Clean Air Act, judicial review may be sought only in the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Petitions for judicial review must be filed on
or before December 14, 1981.” 46 Fed. Reg. 50771 (1981); see supra note 137.

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the bubble concept could not be used for a permit program in unhealthy air states, because the purpose of the program was to improve air quality. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the ASARCO-Alabama Power test. Although the EPA asserted that the regulation was necessary to give the states flexibility, the court dismissed that argument. The court found that flexibility was not a goal of the Act, but only a possible means for achieving the Act's goal of improving air quality. Moreover, the court stated that because the Act required states to submit proposed permit programs to the federal government for approval, it seemed unlikely that Congress intended states to then determine the applicability of the permit programs. Therefore, the court found that the EPA's 1981 regulation was arbitrary and capricious.

In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and found that the EPA's regulation was reasonable. The Court stated that the regulation should be set aside only if it was "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." This standard of review, the Court stated, required an examination of the Act and its history to determine whether Congress

177. See 685 F.2d at 726-27. In a footnote, the court addressed and quickly dismissed the EPA's contention that ASARCO and Alabama Power should be read to create a different test. Id. at 726 n.38. The EPA asserted that the line should be drawn between programs that are intended to be technology-forcing and those intended to reduce overall emissions. In ASARCO, the use of the bubble concept was inappropriate in a technology-forcing program, and in Alabama Power, use of the bubble concept was mandated in a program designed to reduce overall emissions. Thus, the EPA claimed that because the provisions for unhealthy air states focus on emissions reductions, the bubble concept was mandated. The court disagreed, however, finding that the provisions are intended to be both technology-forcing and emissions-reducing. Id. at 726 n.38. Moreover, the court found that the EPA had based its analysis on an improper reading of the cases. Id. at 727.

Arguably, the court decided ASARCO based upon an incorrect finding, as to the purpose of the provisions for new source review. See D. Currie, supra note 82, § 3.05. The ASARCO court failed to cite any materials which expressly indicated that enhancing air quality was the purpose of these provisions and in fact the Senate Report states that the purpose was "the elimination of new pollution problems." See id.

178. 685 F.2d at 725.

179. Id.

180. Id. at 727 n.41. The court, in footnote 41, also discussed the EPA's inconsistent positions in 1980 and 1981. Id. The court noted that in 1980, the EPA had claimed that providing broad coverage under the permit program was consistent with Congress's intent to improve air quality. In contrast, the EPA claimed in 1981 that broad coverage slowed air quality improvement by discouraging plant modernizations. The court did not find the EPA's change in position justified by "any study, survey or support" in the record. The court stated that because the EPA was required to explain why the 1980 regulation was no longer implementing congressional policies, its decision "would not rise to the level of reasoned decision-making" if based on this rationale. Id.


182. Id. at 2782.
had any specific intent regarding the use of the bubble concept in the permit program for unhealthy air states.\textsuperscript{183} The Court, however, made no mention of its duty to review the EPA's decisionmaking process.\textsuperscript{184} Nevertheless, finding an absence of congressional intent, the Court concluded that the 1981 regulation represented a reasonable policy choice.\textsuperscript{185}

The Court first discussed the formulas for proper review of an administrative agency regulation. The Court's initial inquiry was whether Congress had expressed any intention regarding the precise question at issue.\textsuperscript{186} The Court noted that if Congress had expressed no intention, a reviewing court must then determine whether the agency's interpretation of the statute was reasonable.\textsuperscript{187} Furthermore, unless the agency's interpretation was arbitrary and capricious, it must be given deference by a reviewing court.\textsuperscript{188} Additionally, the Court stated that an agency's decision involving a technical and complex policy question must not be set aside unless an examination of the statute and its history reveal an intention contrary to the agency's interpretation.\textsuperscript{189} The Court found that the appellate court had therefore erred when, in the absence of specific congressional intent, it imposed a judicial interpretation on the EPA rather than determining whether the EPA's interpretation was reasonable.\textsuperscript{190}

The Court next turned to an examination of both the Act and its history to determine whether Congress had addressed the precise question at issue. The only guidance the Court found in the Act itself for determining the appropriateness of the bubble concept in this case was in the Act's general definition of the term "stationary source."\textsuperscript{191} Looking to the legislative history of what the Court referred to as a technical and complex Act,\textsuperscript{192} the
Court found that the Act's history was silent regarding the precise question at issue. The history did, however, reveal to the Court the two policy concerns facing Congress when it enacted the statute. Without discussion, the Court concluded that the 1981 regulation was consistent with the concern of allowing reasonable economic growth. Moreover, the Court concluded that the EPA's statements that the environmental concerns would also be served by the regulation were supported by the EPA's reasoning.

To support its conclusion that the environmental objectives of the Clean Air Act were being served, the Court briefly noted that the rulemaking record and certain private studies supported the EPA's explanation. The Court then addressed, and quickly dismissed, respondents' argument that the 1981 regulation should not be given deference due to its inconsistency with prior regulations. The Court found that the EPA had always interpreted the term "stationary source" differently for different permit programs. The Court noted that such varied definitions supported the idea that the statutory definition was intended to be flexible. Moreover, the Court stated that the agency must continually reevaluate its decisions based on wise policy changes. In any case, the Court added, the EPA's 1980 regulation resulted primarily from the judicial creation of the ASARCO-Alabama Power test rather than from the EPA's attempt to further congressional intent.

The Court then turned to a discussion of policy considerations. Stating that the judiciary lacks the authority to balance competing policies, the Court suggested four reasons that might explain why Congress left this balancing to the EPA. Congress may have: (1) struck a balance, but failed to do so with respect to this very specific issue; (2) intentionally left balancing to EPA expertise; (3) failed to consider the issue; or (4) been unable to agree on an acceptable balance. Regardless of Congress's intent, however, the Court found the EPA's balance of economic and environmental concerns to be reasonable. The EPA had reconciled conflicting policies under a technical and complex Act and therefore, according to the Court, its decision was entitled to deference.

Significantly, the Court stated its general view regarding the policymaking roles among the different governmental branches. The Court stated as a
general proposition that once Congress delegates its policymaking responsibility to an agency, that agency may properly rely upon the President’s concept of wise policy in making its own decision. Moreover, the Court stated that the judiciary, which has no constituency, must not impose its own policy views on an agency but must uphold reasonable policy choices made by those accountable to the public. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the EPA’s 1981 regulation as representing a reasonable policy choice.

**ANALYSIS**

The proper standard for reviewing the EPA’s regulation change was the arbitrary and capricious standard. The *Chevron* Court’s application of that standard, however, ended with the Court’s recitation of the words “arbitrary and capricious.” Apparently, the Court chose to ignore its recent, well-reasoned *State Farm* opinion, in much the same way that it had allowed the EPA to ignore its recently reversed 1980 regulation. Had the Court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard as set forth in *State Farm* just twelve months earlier, the *Chevron* Court would have taken a “hard look” at the EPA’s justifications for its regulation change and ultimately remanded the regulation for the EPA’s reconsideration. Instead, the Court adopted an approach that virtually exempted the EPA’s decision-making process from review. The Court relied on the mere recital of the appropriate standard to summarily conclude that the EPA had provided some reasoning to indicate that the regulation change would serve the Act’s environmental concerns as well as its economic concerns.

The words “arbitrary and capricious” are virtually meaningless until a court applies them. Almost exactly one year prior to *Chevron*, Justice White, writing for the majority in *State Farm*, gave meaning to those words. Justice White began, as Justice Stevens had in *Chevron*, by reciting the appropriate reviewing standard. The *State Farm* Court, however, did not

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202. *Id.*

203. *Id.*

204. Section 7607(d)(9) of the Act does not expressly provide for review of a regulation regarding the requirements for state implementation plans. Congress, however, has expressed no intention that such a regulation should be unreviewable. Indeed, the Court incorporated by reference the standard articulated in § 7607(d)(9). See 104 S. Ct. at 2782. The Court stated that the 1981 regulation was to be “given controlling weight unless [it] was arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” *Id.; see also* Currie, *supra* note 137, at 1221, 1238 (appellate courts have, without discussion, entertained challenges to implementation plans).

205. For a discussion of *State Farm*, see *supra* notes 56-73 and accompanying text.

206. 104 S. Ct. at 2792.

207. Compare EDF v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (similar to *Chevron* in that court merely recited standards but failed to apply them) with NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (similar to *State Farm* in that court gave the standard of review meaning in its application). For an analysis of this comparison, see K. Davis, *supra* note 34, § 29.00-3, at 540-43 (Supp. 1982).

208. 103 S. Ct. at 2866-67.
Reflecting upon the purpose for reviewing an agency's decision to change its rules, the *State Farm* Court found that an abrupt change in the agency's policies may require even greater justification in the rulemaking record.\textsuperscript{209} Before examining the rulemaking record in *State Farm*, the Court outlined three situations in which a reviewing court must find that an agency's decision is arbitrary and capricious. An arbitrary and capricious decision is one that is based on considerations other than those intended by Congress, which overlooks a significant aspect of the problem, or is justified with reasons contradictory to the evidence or completely implausible.\textsuperscript{210} Moreover, the Court declared that when an agency reverses a prior regulation, it is to be presumed that the prior regulation would have been more effective in carrying out Congress's intent.\textsuperscript{211} Accordingly, the agency has a greater burden in justifying a change in an existing regulation.

Similar situations faced the Court in both *Chevron* and *State Farm*. Both involved informal rulemaking by an executive agency administering a statute intended to protect the public—one public health, the other public safety.\textsuperscript{212} Each agency had originally claimed that its rule was consistent with the purposes of the statute under which the rule was promulgated.\textsuperscript{213} The statutes themselves are both technology-forcing in nature and were both enacted because of the need to regulate industry.\textsuperscript{214} Additionally, consistent with an order from the then new Reagan Administration and followed by the President's appointment of a new administrator to each agency, both rules were re-examined.\textsuperscript{215} Finally, after re-examination, both agencies apparently concluded that because industry had effectively avoided the existing rule, the rule was no longer achieving its purpose.\textsuperscript{216} Thus, both rules were changed—

\textsuperscript{209} *Id.* at 2866.
\textsuperscript{210} *Id.* at 2867.
\textsuperscript{211} *Id.* at 2866.
\textsuperscript{213} When the rescinded passive restraint standard in *State Farm* was first issued, NHTSA claimed that requiring either airbags or seatbelts would save approximately 9,000 lives and avoid an estimated 65,000 injuries per year. See 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289-99 (1977). Similarly, the EPA had claimed that the broad coverage of the permit program was consistent with Congress's intent to clean the air, reduce emissions, and force technology. See 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766-67 (1980).
\textsuperscript{214} Compare *State Farm*, 103 S. Ct. at 2871 (discussing the technology-forcing nature of the MVSA) with *Train v. NRDC*, 421 U.S. 60, 91 (1975) (discussing technology-forcing nature of the Clean Air Act).
\textsuperscript{215} See Note, *Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking*, supra note 46, at 363 n.104; *supra* notes 58-59, 156-60 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{216} NHTSA argued that because automobile manufacturers had opted for the less effective alternative under the standard, the standard was no longer effective. See 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981); *supra* note 50. The EPA claimed that polluting companies would opt against modernization rather than be subjected to the permit program. Thus, due to polluting industries' avoidance of the permit program, the EPA decided that the regulation acted as a disincentive. *See* 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1984).
one modified, the other rescinded. An important difference lies, however, in the Court's review of each rule and in the results of that inconsistent treatment. One rule was upheld and the other remanded for reconsideration.

Reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard as employed in State Farm, the EPA's decision to reverse its 1981 regulation would similarly have been remanded for reconsideration. Using the State Farm approach, the Chevron Court would have performed a close substantive review not of the EPA's final choice, but of the EPA's decisionmaking process. The Chevron Court, however, failed to discuss the EPA's decisionmaking process.

The EPA's initial decision to re-examine the 1980 regulation resulted from the President's order to eliminate burdensome regulations. After receiving that order, the EPA decided to change the 1980 regulation to reduce regulatory burdens and to provide unhealthy air states with greater flexibility. These justifications for the regulation change, standing alone, satisfied the Chevron Court. They would not, however, have survived review under the State Farm approach. A careful review of the EPA's decisionmaking process would have revealed that all three situations articulated in State Farm, which give rise to an arbitrary and capricious finding, were present in Chevron.

Applying the State Farm approach, the Chevron Court would have found that the EPA, in deciding to reverse its 1980 position, considered factors other than those Congress intended to be considered. The purpose of the statutory scheme for unhealthy air states is to allow the states reasonable economic growth as they progress towards achieving healthy air status. The EPA is thus mandated to balance environmental and economic factors, keeping in mind that the overriding commitment of the Act is the protection of the public's health. Similarly, the State Farm Court required NHTSA to reconsider its balance of economic and safety concerns in light of the fact that the Motor Vehicle Safety Act's primary goal is safety.

When necessary, the EPA is to balance environmental and economic factors, giving special weight to the protection of the public health as the Act requires. Here, however, the EPA's decision was based on the desire to provide unhealthy air states with both regulatory relief and flexibility in

218. Compare State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2874 (rescission of standard vacated) with Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2794 (modification of regulation upheld).
219. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 160.
221. See 104 S. Ct. at 2792.
222. See 103 S. Ct. at 2867.
223. See supra note 102.
224. See supra note 101.
225. 103 S. Ct. at 2873.
226. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
applying the permit program.\textsuperscript{227} Neither the desire to allow polluting companies to expand with greater ease, nor the desire to allow unhealthy air states unrestricted economic growth, were factors that Congress intended the EPA to consider if balancing became necessary. Arguably, Congress had already struck a balance here by the very fact that it designed the permit program.\textsuperscript{228} With the permit program, unhealthy air states could have limited economic growth. Without the program, there could be no growth in these states.\textsuperscript{229} But even if the EPA was required to balance in this situation, it was not authorized to do so at the expense of considering the primary factor that it was mandated to consider—protection of the public’s health.

Indeed, it was because these unhealthy air states and the industries within them had failed to comply with the 1970 Act that it became necessary for Congress to amend the Act in 1977.\textsuperscript{230} In amending the Act, Congress increased federal responsibility and control.\textsuperscript{231} Nevertheless, both of the factors considered by the EPA favor reduced federal control and responsibility and thus appear contrary to Congress’s intent. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit correctly suggested, it seems unlikely that the Act would require unhealthy air states to adopt a stringent permit program and then turn around and allow those states to determine which sources will be subject to the program.\textsuperscript{232} Had the \textit{Chevron} Court actually reviewed the EPA’s decisionmaking process, it would have found that the EPA based its decision on factors other than those intended by Congress. Thus, a close look under the \textit{State Farm} approach would have revealed that the EPA engaged in arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking.

Moreover, the \textit{Chevron} Court would have found that the EPA engaged in arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking under the second situation specified in \textit{State Farm}. The EPA overlooked a significant aspect of the problem when it failed to consider the effect that the 1980 regulation had on the overall reduction of pollution.\textsuperscript{233} The EPA supported its regulation change

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{227} See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{228} See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{229} See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{230} See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{231} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{232} NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 727-28 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev’d sub nom. \textit{Chevron}, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). Two additional problems arise when allowing unhealthy air states the flexibility to use the bubble concept in their implementation plans. First, the EPA will inevitably approve a state plan to avoid political pressure because economic expansion would cease if a plan were not approved. Second, in balancing the concern of flexibility with that of reducing the risks to public health, flexibility must outweigh the risk to allow the application of the bubble concept under the Act. The risks, however, are greater than any benefits attained from increased flexibility. Thus, allowing unhealthy air states the use of the bubble concept is inconsistent with the Act’s primary goal of protecting the public’s health. \textit{See Note, The Bubble Concept, supra note 132, at 973.}
\item \textsuperscript{233} Respondents asserted this argument relying on the \textit{State Farm} opinion. Brief for Respondents Natural Resources Defense Council at 44-47, \textit{Chevron}, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). The \textit{Chevron} Court, however, failed to address the argument.
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with the claim that pollution control progress was slowed under the 1980 regulation because that regulation discouraged companies from modernizing.\textsuperscript{234} Even if this conclusory justification would have been acceptable standing alone, it did not justify thwarting the broad coverage under the 1980 regulation.\textsuperscript{235} Congress thought long and hard to devise a method by which pollution could be reduced while allowing continued economic growth.\textsuperscript{236} The tool Congress designed for achieving these goals was the permit program; the broad coverage of that program under the 1980 regulation was consistent with Congress's intent.

The 1980 regulation allowed a polluting company to modify its existing facility only if the polluter improved the overall air quality in two ways. First, the 1980 regulation required the polluter to bring into compliance any of its other plants within the state.\textsuperscript{237} Second, it required the polluter to install the most effective pollution control technology on its modified device.\textsuperscript{238} If such technology was unavailable yet feasible, its development was required.\textsuperscript{239} Through these requirements, the permit program was designed to and, according to the EPA in 1980,\textsuperscript{240} could accomplish the goal of reducing pollution overall. The EPA, however, failed to even address this goal of the permit program in its re-examination of the 1980 regulation.

Under the 1981 regulation, consistent emissions reductions will not take place because there has been a significant reduction in the coverage of the permit program. Accordingly, the development of new technology is significantly reduced. Industries that allegedly found the permit program to be a disincentive to modernization most certainly will not now voluntarily comply with the program's technology-forcing requirement. Of course, the actual

\textsuperscript{234} 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1984). Although the EPA claimed that this regulatory burden acted as a disincentive to modernization, it supplied no examples of a company deciding not to expand based on this regulatory burden. The EPA's argument is similar to that of industry's in opposing the permit program prior to the 1977 amendments. Industry's arguments were equally specious. According to Senator Muskie, the proposed new source review policy "was greeted with a storm of protest from industry" claiming "such careful scrutiny" would make it impossible to build new facilities. 123 Cong. Rec. 18,017-18 (1977). During the committee's deliberations, it was informed of several large, job-creating, tax-generating projects that would most certainly be killed by the stringent policy. Rather than kill these projects, however, the policy had the specific effect which Congress intended. Existing companies in the areas improved their own pollution controls in order to provide emissions offsets for the new projects, and existing, previously uncontrolled emissions were "discovered" which, once controlled, also provided offsets. See id.

\textsuperscript{235} See State Farm, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2869 (1983).

\textsuperscript{236} See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{237} Under the 1980 regulation, the polluter seeking to modify would have been subject to the permit requirements set forth in the provisions for unhealthy air states. Section 7503(3) requires the polluter to bring all other sources into compliance prior to modification. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(3) (1982).

\textsuperscript{238} Id. § 7503(2).

\textsuperscript{239} Id. § 7501(3).

determination of whether and how the bubble concept will affect the overall reduction in pollution control is properly left to the expertise of the EPA. 

Nevertheless, the Chevron Court should have at least required the EPA to address this significant aspect of the problem. Thus, had the Chevron Court applied the State Farm approach, it would have found that the EPA engaged in arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking by failing to consider a significant aspect of the problem.

The Chevron Court also would have found the EPA’s decision to be arbitrary and capricious under the third situation articulated in State Farm. The EPA justified its decision with a reason contrary to the evidence. The EPA claimed that requiring states to have approved implementation plans was a sufficient safeguard to assure timely compliance with the Act. Requiring an approved plan, however, does not lead to the conclusion that clean air standards will be timely met. Congress in fact designed the permit program to prevent the reoccurrence of the nonattainment problem, which arose because of a similar misconception. Prior to the 1977 amendments, states had mistakenly allowed unlimited industrial expansion, expecting to significantly reduce emissions just prior to the deadline for compliance under the Act. This false expectation resulted in noncompliance by a great many states and forced Congress to develop specific provisions for unhealthy air states. Included in these provisions is the very permit program to which the 1981 regulation now applies.

The 1981 regulation raises the concern that unhealthy air states will again fail to meet the Act’s deadline, especially now that they are allowed increased economic growth without a corresponding decrease in emissions. In addressing this concern, the EPA stated that an unhealthy air state must be given the discretion to run the risk if it so chooses. The safeguard, according to the EPA, is that the state must assure that it still plans to meet the Act’s deadline. The Chevron Court should have found that the EPA’s shortsighted reasoning contradicted the reality of the states’ past actions and Congress’s intent to prevent that action from reoccurring. Thus, under the State Farm approach, the Court would have found this reasoning to be arbitrary and capricious.

241. See State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2872 (an agency must rely upon its own expertise in determining feasibility of plans).
243. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
246. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (1981). The EPA stated that “[i]f a state wishes to use a plantwide definition and run [this] risk . . . then the state has the discretion to do so . . . .” Id.
247. Id.
248. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
Had the Court correctly applied the arbitrary and capricious standard employing the \textit{State Farm} approach, one final step in the Court's review would have been to note that the EPA's reasons for justifying its 1981 regulation contradicted its stand in 1980. In 1980, the EPA claimed that the permit program's broad coverage was consistent with Congress's intent to use the program to reduce emissions.\textsuperscript{249} The 1981 regulation, on the other hand, exempts from the permit program many modifications that, if regulated, would have provided reductions needed to meet Congress's intent. According to the \textit{State Farm} Court, an existing regulation is presumed to carry out the policies of Congress.\textsuperscript{250} The \textit{Chevron} Court should therefore have required the EPA to reasonably explain its change in course. Because the EPA failed to do so, the \textit{Chevron} Court should have found the EPA's decisionmaking to be arbitrary and capricious.

In summary, the \textit{Chevron} Court clearly arrived at an incorrect result by failing to examine the rulemaking record as required in \textit{State Farm}. Had the \textit{Chevron} Court engaged in a meaningful review of the EPA's decisionmaking process, it would have found that the EPA's decision was arbitrary and capricious for each of the reasons articulated in \textit{State Farm}. Instead, the \textit{Chevron} Court avoided any discussion of the EPA's decisionmaking process by summarily concluding that the EPA's decision was reasonable.

Despite the similarities in these two cases, the \textit{Chevron} Court did not follow, nor even cite \textit{State Farm}.\textsuperscript{251} This apparent inconsistency can be resolved, however, by focusing not on the proper scope of judicial review but on whether judicial review was in fact proper. The \textit{Chevron} Court clearly indicated its view of the proper separation of powers with regard to administrative agency policymaking.\textsuperscript{252}

The Supreme Court took the opportunity provided for it by \textit{Chevron} to express, for the first time in a majority opinion, its view regarding presidential intervention into agency decisionmaking. The Court stated that, while Congress has the first shot at determining policy when it enacts law, once Congress decides to leave that responsibility to an executive agency the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[250] 103 S. Ct. at 2866.
\item[252] 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
\end{footnotes}
President can intervene. In addition, the Court stated that the federal judiciary cannot review legitimate policy choices made by either the President or Congress. Therefore, had the EPA alone made the policy choice challenged in *Chevron*, arguably the Court would have engaged in a "hard look" review of the EPA’s decision.

The Court, however, found that the EPA had not made the policy choice involved with its 1980 regulation and intimated that the EPA did not make the policy choice relating to its 1981 regulation change. The 1980 regulation was based on a policy decision that the Court found had been made by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Indeed, the EPA had indicated that it based its dual definition in the 1980 regulation on the *ASARCO-Alabama Power* test. Similarly, the *Chevron* Court noted that the 1981 regulation change was based on Executive Order 12,291, which embodies President Reagan’s policy of deregulation.

This is in contrast to NHTSA’s decision in *State Farm*. Although NHTSA’s rescission of the passive restraint standard was based on a determination that the standard’s costs outweighed its safety benefits, NHTSA did not specifically indicate that this cost-benefit analysis was performed pursuant to Reagan’s order. The majority in *State Farm* noted that changing circumstances do not necessarily require deregulation. Apparently the Court recognized, but avoided discussing, possible presidential influence over NHTSA’s decision. As one commentator has suggested, that Court may also have been rejecting the deferential standard of review endorsed by President Reagan in deciding instead to revive the “hard look” approach.

The dissenters in *State Farm*, however clearly recognized the coincidence of President Reagan’s order to deregulate and NHTSA’s corresponding rescission of its regulation. Justice Rehnquist stated that a change in the administration’s policies would provide proper justification for an executive agency to reevaluate its regulations.

Dealing with a regulation that was specifically changed in response to President Reagan’s order, however, the six Justices participating in *Chevron* agreed that presidential intervention is proper when Congress has left a policy gap. This fact alone, however, still does not explain the Court’s decisions. In *Chevron*, the Court engaged in a "hard look" review of the EPA’s decision because the EPA had not made the policy choice involved with its 1980 regulation.

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253. *Id.*
254. *Id.*
255. *Id.* at 2787-89.
256. *Id.* at 2789.
257. *Id.* at 2792; see *supra* notes 149-155 and accompanying text.
258. 104 S. Ct. at 2789.
259. See *supra* note 58.
260. *State Farm*, 103 S. Ct. at 2871.
261. See *supra* notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
262. See *The Supreme Court, 1982 Term*, *supra* note 71, at 236.
263. 103 S. Ct. at 2871 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
264. *Id.* (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
265. *Id.* at 2872 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
approach to judicial review in *Chevron*. The *Chevron* approach signifies virtually no review at all. If the Court had determined that Congress had struck a balance between competing policies, arguably the Court would have performed the traditional review. Such a review would mean scrutinizing the EPA's rule-making record to ensure that the EPA engaged in well-reasoned decision-making pursuant to Congress's balance.266 Determining instead that presidential policies were responsible for the regulation change, however, the *Chevron* court completely avoided review of the EPA's decisionmaking process. Although the Court indicated that the federal judiciary was not to interfere in policy choices made by those responsible for making such choices,267 the Court here was charged with reviewing the EPA's decisionmaking process, not the policy choice of the President.268 Arguably, therefore, the Court agreed with the President's policy. Had it disagreed, as one commentator suggested in discussing *State Farm*,269 the Court merely had to review the EPA's decision, as discussed above, and find that it was arbitrary and capricious.

The *Chevron* Court also justified its failure to review the decision by claiming that the subject matter was too technical and complex for review.270 The Supreme Court, however, tackled review of an equally, if not more technical and complex, policy choice by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in *Baltimore Gas & Electric*.271 Possibly, the Court decided to substantively review the technical rule in *Baltimore Gas & Electric* not because the Court felt itself more capable, but because of the Court's notice of the "acute" public awareness of the issue of nuclear energy.272 While air pollution was also a topic of great public concern at one time, that concern has apparently given way to what are now perceived as more imminent dangers.273 This relaxed public concern, combined with the President's influence over the EPA's decision, might be the real factors that prompted the *Chevron* Court to conclude that it lacked the expertise and authority to review the EPA's technical policy choice. Indeed, as discussed above, if the Court had reviewed the EPA's decisionmaking process, it would have found that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, striking down the EPA's attempt to ease regulations would have been inconsistent with President Reagan's deregulation policy.

**IMPACT**

The *Chevron* decision raises three significant concerns in the field of administrative law. First, although the Constitution vests Congress with

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266. See *supra* notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
267. 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
268. See *supra* notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
269. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, *supra* note 71, at 237 n.54.
270. 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
271. See *supra* notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
272. See 103 S. Ct. at 2252.
273. See *supra* notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
lawmaking authority, it is now unclear how extensively that function may be usurped once Congress has delegated its authority to an administrative agency. Clearly, the Chevron Court would require an agency to abide by specific congressional intent when the agency engages in decisionmaking pursuant to a statute.274 Thus, after Chevron, when Congress provides only vague guidelines for agency action or delegates policymaking authority to the agency, it runs the risk that its intent will be frustrated. In such a situation, the agency may decide on its own whether furtherance of a given policy is appropriate. One problem this creates is that broad policy decisions affecting the general public are then being made by those who have no constituency.275 More importantly, such decisions may be immune from challenge.

Judicial review of the agency's decisionmaking could provide an effective safeguard to any abuse of an agency's delegated authority.276 Nevertheless, after Chevron meaningful judicial review may not be guaranteed. Until recently, Congress had its own, albeit imperfect, safeguard to check an agency's decisions—the legislative veto. The legislative veto, however, has been found unconstitutional.277

Once Congress delegates policymaking authority to an agency, Chevron allows the President to intervene in the agency's decision.278 The President may require the agency to consider policies other than those Congress intended to be considered. Additionally, the President may require the agency to balance congressional policy considerations in a different manner than Congress intended. If the resulting decision did not actually conflict with the underlying statute, that decision would be upheld under Chevron. Thus, Chevron enables the President to effectively frustrate Congress's intent.

Congress can avoid this situation, however, by amending the statute that gives the agency its policymaking authority.279 In so amending the statute Congress can make its intent clear by providing an agency with specific guidelines and standards to use in the agency's decisionmaking.280 Although it is difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to always foresee or agree on potential policy issues, the attempt would prove worthwhile. By delegating less policymaking authority to an agency, it is more likely that congressional intent, along with the concern of accountability, will be served. Arguably, however, this solution would be inefficient. It would return to the hands of

274. 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
275. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 25.
278. 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
280. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (President's authority to act may depend on whether Congress has spoken); Verkuil, supra note 20, at 950 n.41 (if Congress's intent is clear, President must respect it).
Congress much of the workload that it had originally intended to spread among administrative agencies.

To avoid the specific effects of Executive Order 12,291, Congress can amend a statute, such as the Clean Air Act, to alter the status of the rulemaking agency. An agency can be changed from an executive to an independent agency.\(^2\) Although the order requires compliance by executive agencies, consistent with the President’s constitutional authority, it only requests compliance from independent agencies.\(^2\) Thus, converting an administrative agency into an independent agency insulates agency decision-making from presidential influence.

The second concern that *Chevron* raises in the area of administrative law involves the scope of presidential intervention into agency decisionmaking. While the *Chevron* Court clearly endorsed the idea of presidential oversight and input into agency decisionmaking,\(^2\) the extent of this oversight needs further judicial clarification. *Chevron* did not specifically discuss Executive Order 12,291. Although the general proposition of presidential intervention into agency decisionmaking is proper, and even necessary,\(^2\) the scope of Executive Order 12,291 may be improper.

A challenge to this order on the ground that it conflicts with an underlying statute would most likely be fruitless. The order is effective only “to the extent permitted by law.”\(^2\) Nevertheless, the order appears to conflict with existing statutes both procedurally and substantively.

The procedures that an agency must follow during rulemaking are set forth in both the Administrative Procedure Act and individual statutes.\(^2\) The Supreme Court, in *Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC*,\(^2\) held that a court may not require an agency to adopt procedures in excess of the statutory requirements. In contrast, Executive Order 12,291 imposes additional rulemaking procedures on agencies, such as the requirement of a cost-benefit analysis.\(^2\) Courts, however, have continued to require agencies

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281. See K. Davis, *supra* note 34, § 6:40, at 151 (Supp. 1982); Verkuil, *supra* note 20, at 964. Arguably, however, Congress intended to have the President control the EPA. Because Congress knows that it can politically insulate an agency by making it independent, Congress’s failure to do so assumes Congress intended the present result. See Verkuil, *supra* note 20, at 964.


283. 104 S. Ct. at 2782.


286. See *supra* notes 43-44 and accompanying text.


to follow additional procedures, despite \textit{Vermont Yankee}, by categorizing
the additional requirements as substantive rather than procedural.\footnote{See, e.g., \textit{State Farm}, 103 S. Ct. at 2867.} Because
the force of \textit{Vermont Yankee} has largely been diluted, it is unlikely that a
reviewing court would object to the order’s additional imposition of proce-
dures.

The order substantively affects regulations by requiring agencies to justify
each major regulation with a cost-benefit analysis that places equal weight
on economic effects and the statute’s intended goals. The statute that gives
the agency authority, however, may not require such an analysis. For ex-
ample, when NHTSA engaged in a cost-benefit analysis to justify its regu-
lation rescission, the \textit{State Farm} Court found such an analysis inappropriate
under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act.\footnote{Id. at 2871; see supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.} NHTSA was thus ordered to recon-
sider its balancing of costs and benefits in light of the fact that safety is the
primary goal of the Act.\footnote{103 S. Ct. at 2871.} Earlier, in \textit{American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan},\footnote{452 U.S. 490 (1981).} the Supreme Court set aside a standard for cotton
dust in the workplace because the agency developing that standard had
improperly used the cost-benefit analysis. The \textit{Donovan} Court found that
the agency could not engage in a cost-benefit analysis when Congress failed
to require such an analysis on the face of the statute.\footnote{Id. at 510-11.} Perhaps the Court
would have found differently had the agency, in the absence of express
congressional authorization, relied upon presidential authorization to engage
in the cost-benefit analysis. \textit{Chevron} arguably would support such a result.

Nevertheless, a cost-benefit analysis may be inappropriate when the ben-
efits that a statute is designed to achieve are largely immeasurable.\footnote{See Costle, \textit{Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Reform}, 57 \textit{WASH. L. REV.} 409, 412 (1982). Douglas Costle, former Administrator of the EPA, argues that policymakers are
mistakenly trying to provide regulatory relief, rather than much-needed regulatory reform. \textit{Id.}} The Clean Air Act’s regulations generally are designed to prevent or lessen
pollution.\footnote{Id. at 415-16.} Benefits under the Act that cannot be measured include both
the negative benefits of the prevention of sickness, employee absenteeism,
and environmental damage,\footnote{See Bagby, supra note 285, at 546 (argues that “all economic justification procedures
are inherently deregulatory”).} and the positive financial benefits to the
manufacturer and installer of the pollution control equipment required by
expensive but cost-worthy compliance by industry with the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act).} Of course, extra costs will be imposed on those industries
with the least effective technology.\footnote{See id.} But overlooked in such a cost-benefit
analysis is the fact that these short term costs are necessary in order to achieve the Act's goal.\textsuperscript{299} Once the large initial expense of installing the most effective equipment is undertaken and the Act's goal is met, the cost of the regulation would be significantly reduced.

Additionally, a cost-benefit analysis is too subjective under statutes such as the Clean Air Act.\textsuperscript{300} For example, if the EPA chooses to impose strict regulations on industry, it merely has to place a high value on protecting public health. If the EPA chooses to provide regulatory relief, however, it need only place a lesser value on that protection. The substance of a regulation is therefore designed not so much to further the Act's goals, as to further the President's policies.\textsuperscript{301}

Although the 	extit{Chevron} Court allowed the EPA to balance cost against environmental benefits when it promulgated its 1981 regulation, it is unclear whether the Court would allow this balancing in every situation. Viewing 	extit{Chevron} in light of the Court's decisions in both 	extit{State Farm} and 	extit{Donovan}, it may be proper for an agency to engage in a cost-benefit analysis only when the underlying statute does not forbid such analysis and when the agency engages in the analysis pursuant to an executive order. It is difficult to determine, however, whether the Court's decision will rest upon these two factors, or upon the Court's view of the appropriate result.

The third concern raised by 	extit{Chevron} involves the courts' role in overseeing administrative agency decisionmaking. It is now uncertain whether meaningful judicial review is required of every challenged regulation. The 	extit{Chevron} Court determined that the EPA's decision had involved policymaking and suggested that the EPA had relied on President Reagan's view of wise policy, rather than its own, to make its decision.\textsuperscript{302} The Court then proceeded to summarily conclude that the EPA's decision was reasonable.\textsuperscript{303}

The Court overlooked the purpose and scope of judicial review of agency decisionmaking. The purpose of review is to insure that an agency has engaged in reasonable decisionmaking.\textsuperscript{304} Absent a careful judicial review, unelected agency officials can make broad policy choices affecting millions of citizens, without accountability. Apparently, accountability of the agency was of little concern to the 	extit{Chevron} Court, because the Court implied that the politically accountable executive branch had made the policy decision for the EPA.\textsuperscript{305} Thus, 	extit{Chevron} arguably stands for the proposition that

\textsuperscript{299} See id.
\textsuperscript{300} See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1276 (suggests that factors in cost-benefit analysis may be easily manipulated to result in the desired outcome).
\textsuperscript{301} See id.
\textsuperscript{302} 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
\textsuperscript{303} Id.
\textsuperscript{304} See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{305} See 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
judicial review of agency decisionmaking is unnecessary when elected officials are actually responsible for an agency's policy choices. Review in such a situation may even be improper after *Chevron*, because the Court stated that federal judges must respect policy decisions made by elected officials.306

The proper scope of review, however, has never required a court to substitute its own view for that of the agency307 as *Chevron* appears to suggest.308 A court is merely required to review an agency's decisionmaking process, not the agency's decision. This is done to determine whether the agency's reasoning supports its policy choice, or whether that choice was arbitrary and capricious.309

Perhaps the Court avoided review of the EPA's decisionmaking process in *Chevron* because, as discussed above, the EPA's reasoning did not in fact support its policy choice. Possibly the EPA's choice was not supported in the rulemaking record because the choice was actually made after that record was closed and forwarded to the OMB pursuant to Executive Order 12,291. Because facts and influences affecting a regulation as it passes through the OMB need not be included in the rulemaking record, it might be difficult, if not impossible, for a court to review the record and find that it supported the agency's decision.310 In such a case, the agency's rulemaking record would only be a "fictional account" of the actual decisionmaking process because of the ex parte contacts.311 Review of the record therefore would not be meaningful.

If this was the case in *Chevron*, the Court may have been expressing its own policy choice favoring deregulation when it upheld a regulation with apparently no rational support in the rulemaking record. The Court, however, expressed no view with respect to the propriety of ex parte contacts and the restrictions they place on judicial review. Therefore, it may be that the rulemaking record was accurate and that the Court simply favored deregulation, or that the Court recognized the existence of outside influences but declined to address them.

The *Chevron* Court, however, did attempt to justify its apparent failure to engage in a meaningful review. The Court claimed that it lacked the necessary expertise to review the regulation.312 Nevertheless, a look at past decisions reveals the Court's apparent ability to address other highly technical issues.313 This Court and lower courts have accomplished such technical

306. *Id.*
307. See *supra* notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
308. 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
309. See *supra* notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
310. See Verkuil, *supra* note 20, at 951 (court's role in review can only be fulfilled when basis for agency decision is apparent); *supra* notes 37, 53-54 and accompanying text.
312. 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
313. See *supra* note 74 and accompanying text.
reviews by appropriately examining the agency’s decisionmaking process, not the agency’s decision. If Chevron does stand for the proposition that courts need not review technical decisions, however, Congress must take steps to provide either an alternative method of review or an alternative to agency decisionmaking. Commentators have suggested the development of regulations through agency-industry negotiation, the review of agency decisionmaking by an administrative review board, and the use of scientific law clerks to aid federal judges. Another solution could be the development of a specialty court.

A special environmental court would possess the expertise necessary to conduct a thorough review of technical and complex regulations like the regulation challenged in Chevron. Congress could create a specialized court in one of two ways. First, it could create an article III court, with the requisite protections of salary and tenure for the court’s judges. Creation of an article III court for environmental issues is unlikely, however, given that Congress considered, but rejected, such a proposition when it recently established the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Congress declined to give that new court subject matter jurisdiction over environmental cases. A second option is for Congress to create a legislative,

314. See Stewart, supra note 52, at 84-86 (weighs pros and cons of approaching rulemaking through negotiation).
315. See id. at 83-84.
316. See B. Ackerman, The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality 147-61 (1974).
317. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. Article III provides that the “judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Id. Article III judges “shall hold their offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in office.” Id.

Although Congress appears to be opposed to the idea, arguably it has already “created” an
or article I, court. Such a court could be created pursuant to Congress’s “necessary and proper” powers found in article I. If Congress should choose to create an article I court, however, it must take care to avoid vesting that court with all the powers of an article III court because such a delegation of authority will inevitably be found unconstitutional.

It is unlikely that Chevron stands for the proposition that courts may no longer engage in meaningful judicial review under all circumstances. State Farm had been applauded by many as a revival of the “hard look” approach to review. While Chevron represents a retreat from this position, it clearly does not overrule State Farm. Arguably, courts will continue to employ the “hard look” approach except where, as in Chevron, the court finds that a politically accountable body, and not the agency, is responsible for the policy choice.

Not to be overlooked is the impact that Chevron may have on the environment and public health. Chevron undercuts the overriding commitment of the Clean Air Act. That commitment, to protect public health, was pushed aside in order to exempt polluters from permit requirements for the sake of regulatory relief and flexibility. Moreover, the 1981 regulation uses the bubble concept to allow existing polluters to avoid reducing pollution overall.

article III specialty court to hear environmental cases. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1982), a petition for review of many discretionary actions by the EPA may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See supra note 175. Not only does this provision provide national uniformity in decisions regarding the Clean Air Act, but it also allows the District of Columbia Circuit judges to develop expertise in environmental matters.

320. See U.S. Const. art. I. Congress relies on its powers enumerated in Article I, along with the necessary and proper clause, to create legislative courts. There are currently three types of legislative courts: (1) The Tax Court, see 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1982); (2) the United States Court of Military Appeals, see 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1982); and, (3) the Claims Courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1982). A legislative court functions as an “adjunct” to article III courts. See Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2875 (1982). For a discussion of special courts in general, see L. Redden, Federal Special Court Litigation (1982).

A fourth type of legislative court, the Bankruptcy Court, was recently found to be unconstitutional because it was vested with all the powers of article III courts. Northern Pipeline, 102 S. Ct. at 2858. For a detailed analysis of the Northern Pipeline decision and suggestions for allocations of judicial power, see Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 Duke L.J. 197. See also King, The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath of Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 99 (1983) (comprehensive history of bankruptcy courts).

321. For example, the article I Claims Court now replaces the former article III Court of Claims, pursuant to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1982)). Commentators suggest, however, that the new Claims Court may be found unconstitutional based upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Northern Pipeline. See Baker, Is the United States Claims Court Constitutional?, 32 Clev. St. L. Rev. 55 (1983); Swenen & Weich, The Constitutionality of the New Claims Court, 29 Fed. B. News & J. 477 (1982).

322. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 71.

323. See supra note 83.
Take, for example, a polluting company that owns four plants in an unhealthy air state. The polluter has resisted compliance up to this point, thereby helping to place the state in the unhealthy air category. Although the polluter wanted to tear down an old plant and replace it with a new one, it had previously decided against this choice. The permit program's requirement to first bring the polluter's other three plants into compliance would have been costly. Under the bubble concept, however, the polluter may now simply replace the old plant, piece by piece. Unless emissions increase overall, the 1981 regulation will not subject these replacements to the permit program. Thus, no emissions reductions will occur and the polluter's other three plants can and will remain in noncompliance. Additionally, the polluter can and will continue to avoid investing in the development and installation of advanced pollution control technology. Absent these reductions in emissions and the development of improved technology, progress toward reaching the clean air standards will be brought to a standstill. Without obtaining clean air standards, public health remains at risk.\footnote{324} Thus, the \textit{Chevron} Court's decision will have the practical result of substantially injuring the public's health. Moreover, this result is totally contradictory to Congress's intent underlying the Clean Air Act.

\textbf{Conclusion}

\textit{Chevron} represents a rare occasion in which the United States Supreme Court has spoken regarding its view of presidential power. The Supreme Court clearly endorsed the notion of presidential intervention into agency decisionmaking. While explicit congressional directives must be adhered to when Congress delegates policymaking authority to an agency, under \textit{Chevron} that delegation may be properly usurped by the President.

Once the President intervenes in an agency's decisionmaking, the availability and the extent of judicial review of the decision are unclear. Although \textit{Chevron} represents a significant retreat from the "\textit{hard look}" approach recently articulated in \textit{State Farm}, courts are unlikely to completely avoid review in all cases of presidential intervention. One can only speculate, however, on the unspoken factors which will influence the courts' decision to avoid a meaningful review.

In \textit{Chevron}, the Court's failure to meaningfully review the agency's decision resulted in frustration of the congressional intent to protect the public health. Thus, a court that favors presidential policy may choose to frustrate congressional policies by applying the \textit{Chevron} approach in cases in which the President has influenced the agency's decision. With courts allowing agency decisionmaking to thereby go unchecked, one can only hope that the policy views the agency relied upon are truly those of the President and not those of private industry.

\textit{Susan J. Flieder}

\footnote{324. \textit{See supra} notes 87-88 and accompanying text.}