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NOTES

PROCREATIVE CHOICE FOR THE INCOMPETENT
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED:
CONSERVATORSHIP OF VALERIE N.

Recognition of constitutional rights for the developmentally disabled has occurred only recently and has generated considerable controversy. Histor-

1. For the purposes of this Note the term "developmentally disabled" will refer exclusively to individuals who suffer from mental retardation. Mental retardation is defined by the American Association of Mental Deficiency as "subaverage general intellectual functioning which originates during the developmental period and is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior." See North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 453 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Haggerty, Kane & Udall, An Essay on the Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 6 Fam. L.Q. 59, 65 (1972).

Not all mentally retarded individuals are incompetent, however, and some disabled individuals may have the capacity for the informed consent necessary to obtain or refuse a voluntary sterilization operation. See Neuwirth, Heisler & Goldrich, Capacity, Competence and Consent: Voluntary Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded, 6 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 447 (1975). This Note is primarily concerned with the rights of those mentally retarded individuals incapable of informed consent.

2. See Dowben, Legal Rights of the Mentally Impaired, 16 Hous. L. Rev. 833, 833-34 (1976) (discusses the history of treatment of the mentally retarded from the 18th century to the present, and states that increased availability of federal funding in the 1950s and 1960s led to the development of mental health and retardation programs).

3. Not everyone is pleased that the developmentally disabled are being allowed to leave the institutions to live in community living arrangements. Programs designed to promote the mentally retarded individual's ability to survive in society are financed by state and federal funding. The use of public tax money to support training programs for these living arrangements is also a controversial issue. See generally Price & Burt, Sterilization, State Action, and the Concept of Consent, 1 Law & Psychology Rev. 57 (1975) (argues that the lack of state and federal funding of programs for the mentally retarded is being used as an excuse for the non-voluntary sterilization of the incompetent developmentally disabled).

In addition, many communities are reluctant to allow the developmentally disabled to live in group homes in their area, primarily because of inordinate fear of the retarded. See generally Chandler & Ross, Zoning Restrictions and the Right to Live in the Community, reprinted in The Mentally Retarded and the Law 305 (M. Kindred ed. 1976) (many communities are reluctant to grant zoning variances for individuals planning to construct group homes for the mentally retarded); Lippincott, "A Sanctuary for People": Strategies for Overcoming Zoning Restrictions on Community Homes for Retarded Persons, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 767 (1979) (discusses the various ways to avoid zoning restrictions designed to keep the mentally retarded out of the community); Comment, Can the Mentally Retarded Enjoy "Yards That Are Wide?", 28 Wayne L. Rev. 1349 (1982) (discusses the conflict between the mentally retarded individual's interest in deinstitutionalization and the homeowner's interest in keeping the mentally retarded out of the community). Recently, the Supreme Court held that the Developmental Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081, does not confer upon the developmentally disabled any substantive right to "appropriate treatment in the least restrictive environment." See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981). The Court reasoned that the Act showed no evidence of intent by Congress to impose on traditional
ically, the developmentally disabled have been subjected to compulsory "eugenic" sterilization and institutionalized to isolate them and to prevent them from passing "undesirable" traits to future generations. The developmentally disabled have also been labelled as sub-humans and denied rights and privileges normally afforded to average individuals.

Within the past two decades, both courts and legislatures have become increasingly aware of the problems that confront the developmentally disabled. The courts have recognized the developmentally disabled individual's right to equal educational opportunities, treatment, and appropriate community areas of state sovereignty. Instead, the Court believed that the Bill of Rights provision was intended merely to encourage the states to provide better programs for the developmentally disabled. See id. at 18.

In another recent Supreme Court decision, the Court held that the mentally retarded are not a "quasi-suspect" class entitled to greater constitutional protection in cases where mentally retarded individuals alleged violations of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (holding that the challenged legislation allegedly in violation of the equal protection rights of the mentally retarded need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest). Both the Pennhurst and Cleburne decisions suggest that the developmentally disabled are not entitled to special protection from legislation that would interfere with "appropriate treatment" or that would violate the equal protection clause.


For examples of the abuse under eugenic sterilization, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (mildly retarded woman sterilized without her knowledge or consent sued the judge that authorized the operation); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (state police power authorizes the state to involuntarily sterilize individuals to prevent them from passing on their "undesirable" traits to future generations).

5. In the past, the developmentally disabled were separated from the rest of society and placed in institutions that provided little or no training to help their assimilation into society. See Note, A Review of the Conflict Between Community-Based Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded and Restrictive Zoning, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 669, 672 (1980).


7. See Price & Burt, supra note 3, at 58 (the mentally retarded have been denied the rights to sexual relations, to marry, to have children, and to proper treatment). See also Shaman, Person Who Are Mentally Retarded: Their Right to Marry and Have Children, 12 FAM. L. Q. 61 (1978) (discusses the denial of the rights of the mentally retarded to vote, to marry, and to have children).


services. Moreover, Congress enacted the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act in order to afford the developmentally disabled minimal rights and to encourage the deinstitutionalization of the developmentally disabled.

In response to these new freedoms afforded the developmentally disabled, a growing minority of state courts have decided that the incompetent developmentally disabled have the same procreative rights as competent individuals. Consequently, these courts have concluded that the incompetent developmentally disabled cannot be denied access to a sterilization operation because sterilization is a form of contraception available to competent individuals.

Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).

In Wyatt, a federal district court held that the mentally handicapped can benefit from, and have a constitutional right to receive, adequate habilitation. As part of the constitutional right to habilitation, the court required a showing that admission to the institution was the least restrictive habilitation available to the mentally retarded person. Id. at 396. The court set forth several objective standards covering all facets of institutional care, including the hiring of qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer treatment and individualized treatment plans. Id. at 394-95.


The right of the mentally retarded to receive treatment outside of the institutions has been in question since the Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), rem'd on state law grounds, 673 F.2d 647 (3rd Cir. 1982), 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (the Court held that the Act does not confer any statutory entitlement to deinstitutionalization).

12. See supra note 1.
13. See, e.g., In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981) (incompetent individuals should not be denied their procreative rights to prevent pregnancy by means of a sterilization operation just because of their disability); In re Orady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (lack of capacity for choice should not deprive the incompetent developmentally disabled of the right to procreative choice); In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982) (adopted guidelines to provide access by the incompetent developmentally disabled to their procreative right to sterilization); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en banc) (adopted safeguards designed to permit access by the developmentally disabled to a sterilization operation). But see In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981) (any decision regarding the right of incompetent individuals to be sterilized should come from the legislature and not the courts).
14. Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether sterilization is a constitutional right, the great majority of courts have held that sterilization is within the constitutional right of privacy. These courts have based their holdings upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (both of which concern a woman’s right to an abortion). See In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982) (nothing that the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the right of a person to be sterilized as a fundamental right). See also Note, Ruby v. Massey: Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 191 (1979) (discusses implicit recogni-
In *Conservatorship of Valerie N.*,¹⁵ the California Supreme Court held that incompetent developmentally disabled individuals may obtain sterilization operations when they meet strict substantive and procedural guidelines.¹⁶ Unfortunately, the guidelines adopted by the court are not very rigid and do not afford the incompetent developmentally disabled realistic access to their newly recognized right.

This Note analyzes the reasoning of the *Valerie N.* decision, focusing particularly on the standards adopted by the California Supreme Court in an attempt to afford the developmentally disabled their fundamental right to procreative choice. The Note then concludes that the standards do not promote the developmentally disabled individual's interest in habilitation.

¹⁵. 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985) (en banc).

¹⁶. *Id.* at 160, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404.

The *Valerie N.* majority adopted standards selected from state court decisions providing the developmentally disabled with access to a sterilization operation. See *supra* note 14. These standards provide that the incompetent individual must be represented by an independent guardian *ad litem*, and that the proponent of the operation must prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, the need for contraception, the individual's incapacity to consent to the operation, and the inapplicability of other less intrusive forms of contraception. See *Valerie N.*, 40 Cal. 3d at 168, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404. In addition, the *Valerie N.* majority adopted the requirements of California Probate Code section 2357. Section 2357 governs intrusive medical procedures for individuals incapable of consent in situations where the operation is medically necessary to preserve the life or health of the incompetent individual. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2357 (West 1979).
Finally, this Note evaluates the impact of the decision on the fundamental due process rights of the developmentally disabled and proposes appropriate legislation.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Eugenic Sterilization

In the early twentieth century, many people believed in the unproven and now discredited theory of negative eugenic sterilization. Under this theory, the mentally ill and the habitual criminal were sterilized in order to prevent them from passing their undesirable traits to future generations. Negative eugenic sterilization was based on the assumption that undesirable traits are...
inherited through a simple scheme of dominant and recessive genes,\textsuperscript{19} and that certain traits are inherently undesirable.

The development of a relatively safe and simple surgical sterilization procedure prompted the eugenics movement.\textsuperscript{20} Soon after the procedure was established, states began to enact compulsory sterilization laws that called for the sterilization of persons with undesirable traits including mental retardation.\textsuperscript{21} In 1927, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of these statutes in \textit{Buck v. Bell}.\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Buck} held that a eugenic sterilization statute was a valid exercise of state police power\textsuperscript{23} and a reasonable procedure that enhanced the quality of future generations.\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{B. Fundamental Right To Procreative Choice}

Just fifteen years after \textit{Buck v. Bell}, the eugenics movement was set back by the Supreme Court's decision in \textit{Skinner v. Oklahoma}.\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Skinner} ruled that the right to procreate is among those fundamental rights that trigger more active review under modern interpretations of the equal protection and due process clauses.\textsuperscript{26} In \textit{Skinner}, the Court struck down a state

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{19} "Negative eugenic" theory proposes elimination of the unfit by preventing these individuals from procreating while encouraging the fit to procreate. See Bligh, \textit{Sterilization and Mental Retardation}, 51 A.B.A. J. 1059, 1060 (1965). See also Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 997-99 (the eugenics movement sought to end the "propogation of degeneracy").
  \item \textsuperscript{20} See \textit{In re Cavitt}, 182 Neb. 713, 721, 157 N.W.2d 171, 179 (1968) (sterilization of males and females involves a relatively simple and safe operation); Gray, \textit{Compulsory Sterilization In A Free Society: Choices and Dilemmas}, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 529, 535 (1972) (the vasectomy operation on males is an extremely simple operation while the salpingectomy operation on females is slightly more involved).
  \item \textsuperscript{21} See generally Comment, \textit{Sterilization of Defectives}, supra note 19 (discusses the statutes enacted in response to the eugenic sterilization movement, and noted that California performed 2,558 of the 3,233 total nonvoluntary sterilizations performed in the United States between 1909 and 1921).
  \item \textsuperscript{22} 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute that permitted sterilization of persons believed to suffer from hereditary conditions when the patient and society would benefit).
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Id. at 207.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Id. Justice Holmes' opinion for the majority analogized compulsory sterilization to a statute requiring compulsory vaccination upheld in \textit{Jacobsen v. Massachusetts}, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
  \item In a now famous quote from his majority opinion in \textit{Buck}, Justice Holmes stated: It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.
  \item Id. (citations omitted).
  \item \textsuperscript{25} 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
  \item Id. at 541. See also \textit{San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez}, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.76 (1973) (the right of procreation is among the rights of personal privacy protected under
involuntary sterilization statute, which included larcenists but excluded embezzlers, as a violation of the equal protection clause. The Court's decision reflects a heightened sensitivity to the abuses practiced in the field of eugenic sterilization and establishes the right to procreate as "one of the basic civil rights of man."

In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has held that the right to procreate is a fundamental right included within the constitutionally protected right of personal privacy. The right to personal privacy protects decisions made by married and single adults, and minors to obtain contraceptives. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court also recognized a woman's right to have an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy. In reaching its decision, the Court stated that the right of privacy encompasses activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, child rearing, family relationships, and education. A state may not abridge or deny the right to have an abortion

the Constitution); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (right to procreation included within the right of personal privacy under the penumbras of the first amendment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966) (the rights of marriage and procreation are fundamental rights which trigger heightened scrutiny); L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978) 921-23, 1010-11 (discussing Skinner decision under both the equal protection and due process clauses).

27. 316 U.S. at 541.

28. Id. Justice Douglas' opinion for the majority states:

[T]he power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which the state conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic civil liberty.

Id.

29. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the Supreme Court held that a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated the right to privacy under the penumbras of the first amendment).

30. Id.

31. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (the Court invalidated a statute that permitted distribution of contraceptives to married but not unmarried persons). Four justices observed that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453. Thus, the right to privacy in procreation was extended to cover an individual's decision as well as a married couple's decision.


34. Id. at 163-64. See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (state may not "unduly burden" the right of adult and minor women to obtain an abortion).

35. 410 U.S. at 152-53.
absent a "compelling state interest," 36 and the state interest may not be achieved by "means which are unnecessarily broad." 37

Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the precise question of whether sterilization is protected under the right of privacy, several courts have held that the right to choose sterilization is a protected component of the right to procreative choice. 38 Sterilization is viewed by many to be an accepted method of contraception, 39 and many courts allow individuals to be voluntarily sterilized. 40 Consequently, it seems likely that the courts will agree that the right to choose sterilization as a form of contraception falls within the right of privacy. 41

C. Substituted Judgment

Because sterilization involves a surgical procedure, 42 the individual's informed consent is a necessary prerequisite to the operation. 43 Most individuals

36. Id. at 163-64. See also Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (state regulations of the right to obtain an abortion after the first trimester of pregnancy must be closely drawn to protect the state's compelling interest).

37. 410 U.S. at 155-56. See also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (Supreme Court invalidated a provision of a Missouri abortion statute prohibiting the use of saline amniocentesis method of abortion and prescribing the prostaglandin method).


40. See supra note 39.


42. In females, the surgeon must make an abdominal incision, removing segments of the fallopian tubes (salpingectomy) and tying the cut ends. In males, the operation involves small scrotal skin incisions, and segments of the vas deferens are removed (vasectomy). The proximal ends are then tied. See In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 713, 721, 157 N.W.2d 171, 179 (1968); S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 207 (rev. ed. 1971); Comment, A Women's Right, supra note 42, at 291.

43. "Informed Consent" is based upon the knowledge and information received from the physician concerning all pertinent matters including the purpose and nature of the operation, the irreversibility of the operation, available options, and the potential medical and emotional
are capable of informed consent and can obtain the operation. Sterilization, however, may not be available to those individuals deemed incapable of informed consent due to mental retardation. In order to protect the fundamental due process rights of those individuals incapable of informed consent, some courts utilize the doctrine of substituted judgment to achieve the consent necessary to obtain the operation. Courts are especially likely to substitute their judgment when sterilization is the only available method of contraception for the individual.

The doctrine of substituted judgment initially developed in cases involving the disposition of incompetent individuals’ estates. In order to effectuate an individual’s intent, courts make a subjective inquiry into what the incompetent individual would do in that particular situation, taking into account

44. See Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (D.D.C. 1974) (minors and the mentally retarded do not have the capacity for informed consent to sterilization operation). See generally Neuwirth, Heisler & Goldrich, supra note 1 (not all mentally retarded individuals lack the capacity for informed consent).


46. Sterilization may be the last and best available method of contraception for an individual because the extent of the individual’s disability may rule out contraception that requires the individual’s conscious participation. For example, the individual may not remember to take birth control pills everyday and may be unable to insert a diaphragm prior to sexual intercourse. Thus, the individual may need contraception that is effective but does not require the individual to consciously remember to utilize it. See Green & Paul, Parenthood and the Mentally Retarded, 24 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 120 (1974); Comment, Procreation, supra note 14, at 364.

Moreover, several state decisions addressing the issue of the mentally retarded individual’s right to procreative choice and sterilization have involved mentally retarded females who would not cooperate in pelvic exams for the placement of an IUD. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 469 So. 2d 588, 590 (Ala. 1985) (Jones, J., dissenting) (incompetent minor would have to be put to sleep due to her inability to remain still and tolerate the uncomfortable insertion of an IUD); In re Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. 258, 286, 304 S.E.2d 793, 810 (1983) (mentally retarded female’s extreme fear of pelvic examinations). Thus, in some instances it may be that other conventional methods of birth control are inapplicable to the severely mentally retarded.

47. See City Bank Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 599 (1944) (the Court was to substitute itself as nearly as it could for the incompetent individual and to act upon the same motives and considerations as would have moved the individual). See generally Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752-53, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977) (the judge’s decision should be the same decision the incompetent would make, but taking into account the present and future incompetency of the individual as one factor).
the individual's previously expressed desires.

48 The doctrine has been extended to other personal affairs of incompetent individuals through a series of organ transplant cases. These courts focused on the individual's best interests and attempted to benefit those individuals incapable of making their own decisions. However, the decisions did not provide many procedural and substantive guidelines.

A further extension of substituted judgment appeared in the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision of In Re Quinlan. The Quinlan court employed the doctrine of substituted judgment to hold that a comatose patient's right to privacy includes the decision to consent to the removal of life-support equipment. The court reasoned that the right to remove the equipment was a "valuable incident of her right to privacy." Thus, the only way to protect her rights was to permit Karen Quinlan's guardian and family to render their best judgment as to whether she would terminate life support under the circumstances. Although the decision was technically made by her parents, guardian, and medical staff, Karen Quinlan was recognized theoretically as the legal decision-maker.


49. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (court substituted its judgment for consent to kidney transplant from mentally retarded boy to his brother and focused on the benefit to the donor in keeping his brother alive). See also In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979) (court utilized substituted judgment to consent to medication for incompetent individual); In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 372 A.2d 360 (1977) (court substituted its judgment to consent of an amputation for the incompetent individual). See generally Comment, Spare Parts From Incompetents: A Problem of Consent, 9 J. Fam. L. 309 (1969) (discussion of cases utilizing substituted judgment to consent to organ donations).


51. Id. at 148. The Strunk court held that in light of the fact that the transplant would benefit the donor, the court would exercise discretion to substitute its judgment for the benefit of persons incapable of protecting themselves.

52. Id. at 148-49 (relied exclusively on the determination that the transplant would be in the incompetent's best interests). See generally Robertson, Organ Donations By Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 48, 57-68 (1976) (discusses use of substituted judgment and standards used in its application).


54. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 664.

55. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 663-64.

56. Id.

57. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664. See generally Note, The Legal Aspects of the Right
Despite the absence of legislation authorizing jurisdiction, a growing minority of state courts have utilized substituted judgment to act on petitions for sterilization of incompetent developmentally disabled individuals. In these decisions, the courts have adopted substantive and procedural safeguards that allow the incompetent individual to exercise the right to procreative choice. At the same time, other state courts have refused to assume jurisdiction over sterilization petitions. These courts reject substituted judg-

to Die: Before and After the Quinlan Decision, 65 Ky. L.J. 823 (1977) (discussion of substituted judgment and its application to the Quinlan case). But see Note, Due Process Privacy and the Path of Progress, 1979 U. Ill. L.F. 469, 517-18 (The Quinlan decision represents "a right of privacy gone wild;" its presumption that an individual would choose to die cuts against human nature) [hereinafter Note, Due Process Privacy].


59. Most of the standards adopted by these courts provide similar determinations of the individual's incompetency, the need for contraception, and the inapplicability of other contraceptive methods. For example, in In re C.D.M., the Alaska Supreme Court held that the state's superior courts had jurisdiction to entertain and act upon petitions for sterilization. Moreover, the court stated that the proponents of the operation bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the operation is in the individual's best interests. The court required that the incompetent individual be afforded a hearing at which the individual must be represented by a guardian ad litem.

Next, the court required that the superior court determine that the individual is incompetent on the basis of comprehensive medical, psychological and social evaluation. Such a finding requires that the individual in question "lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person."

The court must then determine that there is a need for contraception. The proponent of the operation must establish that the individual is capable of procreation and unable to adequately care and provide for her offspring. In addition, the court must examine the incompetent's physical and psychological ability to deal with pregnancy, and the likely detrimental emotional effects of the sterilization. This determination must be based upon medical evidence concerning other methods of contraception and why they are impractical for the incompetent individual. In effect, the proponent of the operation must show the court that there is no less drastic method of contraception available for the individual.

Finally, the court must examine the incompetent individual and attempt to elicit her views regarding sterilization and her understanding of the operation and its consequences. Moreover, the court must examine the proponent's motive in bringing the petition. The court should "give careful consideration to whether the petition is motivated by genuine concern for the best interests of the individual rather than concern for the petitioner's own or the public's convenience." Id. at 612-13.

A minority of the courts that allow jurisdiction to authorize sterilization petitions also require that the operation be "medically necessary." For example, the Colorado Supreme Court in In re A.W., would only allow sterilization where the operation is medically essential "to preserve the life or physical or mental health" of the individual. The Massachusetts Supreme Court in In re Moe, required the state's lower courts to examine the medical necessity for the operation as one factor in their determination. 385 Mass. 569, 432 N.E.2d 722 (1982).

ment as a fiction by which the state infringes upon an individual's fundamental right to procreate.61

The Washington Supreme Court, in *In re Hayes*,62 was among the first state courts to adopt comprehensive standards allowing incompetent individuals access to the right of procreative choice. The *Hayes* court attempted to protect the incompetent individual's right to procreative choice by authorizing the state's superior courts to permit sterilizations.63 Moreover, the court established rigid substantive and procedural safeguards64 to protect against infringement of the developmentally disabled individual's right to procreate. The *Hayes* factors require the proponent of the sterilization to prove by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence"65 that the individual cannot consent on his or her own,66 that the operation is in the individual's best interest,67 and that there is a need for contraception.68 Finally, the judge must determine that sterilization is the only available method of contraception for the individual.69 Only if all of the required evidence is proven will the court allow the operation for the individual.

The New Jersey Supreme Court also utilized substituted judgment in conjunction with the right to procreative choice to enable the incompetent developmentally disabled access to court-authorized sterilizations. In *In re Grady*,70 the New Jersey court included substantive and procedural safeguards that resemble the standards adopted in *In re Hayes*. However, the *Grady* court's standards also included a factor that takes into account the physical

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61. *See In re Eberhardy*, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 576-77, 307 N.W.2d 881, 898 (1981) (Wisconsin Supreme Court held that lower courts had jurisdiction to authorize sterilization, but refused to allow the exercise of that jurisdiction due to the irreversibility of the operation and the potential infringement of the fundamental right to procreate).
62. 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en banc).
63. *Id.* at 234, 608 P.2d at 639.
64. *Id.* at 234, 608 P.2d at 639-42.
65. *Id.* at 234, 608 P.2d at 641. The standard of clear and convincing evidence was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in a case dealing with involuntary civil commitment. That standard is an intermediate approach utilized when "the interest at stake is more than mere loss of money." *See* Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979). *See also* Comment, Protection of the Mentally Retarded Individual's Right to Choose Sterilization: The Effect of the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 12 CAP. U.L. REV. 413 (1982) (argues that the clear and convincing evidence standard restricts access to court-authorized sterilization by the incompetent mentally retarded) [hereinafter Comment, Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard].
67. *Id.*
68. *Id.* The proponent of the operation must prove that the individual is capable of conceiving and that the individual is likely to engage in sexual activity at the present or in the near future under circumstances likely to result in pregnancy.
69. *Id.* All other less drastic methods of contraception, including supervision, education, and training must be prove unworkable or inapplicable by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
and psychological impact of the operation on the individual. The court focused on the individual's best interest, but unlike its decision in In Re Quinlan, the Grady court required the ultimate decision to remain with the court rather than the parents or guardian of the incompetent individual.

State court decisions that refuse to consider petitions for sterilization of the incompetent developmentally disabled assert that substituted judgment does not adequately protect the individual's right to procreate. Moreover, they conclude that the doctrine of substituted judgment is subjective and should not be applied to cases involving individuals who have never had the capacity to express desires regarding either sterilization or procreation. Instead, these courts view objective use of substituted judgment as insufficient protection of the individual's right to procreate. Rather than assume jurisdiction, these courts defer to the legislature because of the permanent nature of the deprivation of the right to procreate that results if sterilization is allowed.

II. The Valerie N. Decision

A. Facts and Procedural History

Responding to a history of abuse in the sterilization of the developmentally disabled, the California Legislature enacted Probate Code section 2356(d) in 1979. The statute deprived the probate court of jurisdiction over petitions for the sterilization of incompetent wards and conservatees. At the same time that the legislature acted, the New Jersey Supreme Court in In Re Quinlan, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981), stated that the court, rather than the parents, must determine the need for sterilization.

Id. at 263 n.9, 426 A.2d at 481 n.9.

71. Id. at 266, 426 A.2d at 483. In addition, the New Jersey Supreme Court required the proponents of the operation to demonstrate that they sought the operation in good faith and that their primary concern was for the best interests of the incompetent person rather than for their own or the public's convenience.


73. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264, 426 A.2d 467, 482 (1981). The court statedthat "it was the duty of the court, rather than the parents to determine the need for sterilization." The fundamental right to procreative choice is an individual right, and the parents' interests might not be the same as the child's interests.

In addition, the court rejected a requirement of "medical necessity" as a factor in the determination of sterilization petitions. The court stated that "a necessity standard would result in an unacceptable degree of state interference in the exercise of these rights concerning sterilization. It may prevent an individual who wishes to be sterilized from being so." Id. at 263 n.9, 426 A.2d at 481 n.9.

74. See supra note 61.

75. In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 576, 307 N.W.2d 881, 893-94 (1981). See also Price & Burt, supra note 3 (rejects third-party consent as a fiction and argues that strict controls must be placed on the use of substituted judgment).

76. See In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 576, 307 N.W.2d 881, 893-94 (1981); Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310, 312 (Ala. 1979).

77. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d) (West 1979).

78. Section 2356(d) provides that "no ward or conservatee may be sterilized under the provisions of this division." Id. § 2356(d).
time, the California Legislature repealed Welfare and Institutions Code section 7254,79 which authorized sterilization of patients in state institutions.80 Because of these legislative actions, neither the probate court nor state hospitals retained authority to permit nontherapeutic sterilizations of incompetent wards and conservatees.

Soon after the legislature enacted Probate Code section 2356(d) and repealed section 7254, the parents of Valerie, a severely mentally retarded twenty-nine year old woman, petitioned the probate court to be appointed conservators and for “additional powers” to consent to a sterilization operation in her behalf. Valerie suffered from Down’s Syndrome,81 had an Intelligence Quotient (I.Q.) of thirty,82 and the functional level of a four year old.83 Thus she was incapable of giving informed consent to a sterilization operation.84

At the probate court hearing, Valerie’s mother testified that Valerie was not sexually active and that she had been closely supervised.85 However, she testified that Valerie made inappropriate sexual advances to men86 and that counseling directed to curb her aggressive behavior was ineffective.87 She further testified that Valerie had been given two formulations of birth control pills in her early teens, but that she had rejected them and had become ill.88

Declarations of Valerie’s physicians and her counselor were submitted at the hearing, and all agreed that the severity of Valerie’s mental retardation meant that no other alternative forms of birth control were available that

80. At the time of its repeal section 7254 provided for sterilization of institutionalized patients. The section afforded an opportunity for judicial review and reflected primarily a eugenic-based policy. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7254 (repealed 1979).
81. Down’s Syndrome is a chromosome disorder in which the individual’s cells contain forty-seven rather than the normal forty-six chromosomes. The condition usually results in some degree of mental retardation. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 608 n.1 (Alaska 1981). Mental retardation is defined as “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that originates during the developmental period and is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior.” See North Carolina Ass’n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 453 (M.D.N.C. 1976). See also Haggerty, Kane & Udall, supra note 1, at 64-65 (discusses the different problems and abilities of mentally retarded individuals with different levels of retardation).
83. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 149, 707 P.2d at 763, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
84. See supra note 45.
85. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 149, 707 P.2d at 763, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
86. Id. Valerie’s mother testified at the probate court hearing that Valerie was “aggressive and affectionate towards boys. On the street she approached men, hugged and kissed them, climbed on them, and wanted to sit on their laps.” Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
would protect against pregnancy. Moreover, all three declarants agreed that a pregnancy would cause “psychiatric harm” to Valerie and that sterilization was “advisable and medically appropriate” in her case. Her counselor further stated that close monitoring had severely hampered Valerie’s ability to form social relationships.

Valerie’s appointed counsel did not offer any evidence at the hearing, but argued that less drastic alternatives to sterilization should be used. He also asserted that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to authorize the operation. No evidence was presented at the hearing to show whether or not less intrusive means of birth control were available, and no evidence was presented to show that Valerie was capable of conceiving.

The probate court agreed that a tubal ligation operation was medically safe and would enhance the quality of Valerie’s life, and that Probate Code section 2356(d) was unconstitutional. The court reasoned, however, that it was obligated to follow precedent holding that the probate court lacks jurisdiction to authorize the sterilization of wards and conservatees and therefore denied the petition. The trial court judgment was affirmed on appeal, and Valerie’s conservators appealed to the California Supreme Court.

B. The California Supreme Court’s Rationale

In Conservatorship of Valerie N., the California Supreme Court struck down Probate Code section 2356(d) and adopted substantive and procedural safeguards to allow the probate court the power to authorize sterilizations of wards and conservatees. The court reasoned that the Probate Code section prohibiting sterilization of incompetent developmentally disabled...
individuals denied those individuals their fundamental right to procreative choice and held that the probate court did have jurisdiction to consider the petition for sterilization. The court, however, denied authority to perform a sterilization on Valerie because there was insufficient evidence to allow the operation under the substantive and procedural framework.

To reach its decision, the majority examined the constitutional rights of the incompetent developmentally disabled and found that Valerie had a right to have basic decisions made for her by her conservators. The majority reasoned that the incompetent developmentally disabled have a right to personal growth and development that is implicit in Roe v. Wade and Allgeyer v. Louisiana. Thus, the court determined that the right to "habilitation" is a constitutionally protected right under the United States.

98. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
100. Id. The majority stated that there was no evidence presented to show that Valerie was capable of conceiving, nor was there evidence that other less intrusive means of contraception were unavailable to Valerie. However, the court affirmed the probate court judgment without prejudice to a renewed application for additional powers.
101. Id.
102. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). In Roe, the United States Supreme Court stated that the right obtain an abortion stems from the problems a woman would face if she were not able to obtain an abortion; "maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon a woman a distressful life and future." Id.
103. 165 U.S. 579, 589 (1897). In Allgeyer, the United States Supreme Court held that an individual must be free in the use of all his faculties and must be allowed to use them in any lawful way. See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (individual liberty cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective); Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636 (1914) (free to pursue life in any lawful calling).
104. The court examined state and federal efforts to afford the developmentally disabled constitutional rights, services and training. California's Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act establishes state regional centers for the developmentally disabled that provide training and other services. See Myers, Cvitanov & Lippman, Legislative Evolution of a State-Wide Services System: California's Regional Centers for Developmentally Disabled Persons, 14 Rutgers L.J. 653 (1983). See also Kay, Farnham, Karren, Knakal & Diamond, Legal Planning for the Mentally Retarded: The California Experience, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 438 (1972) (discusses the Lanterman Act and its impact on guardianship, involuntary commitment and state-wide services for the retarded).

In addition, the court examined the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1) and (2). This federal Act includes within its provisions the right to "treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities." The Act states that habilitation "should be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the person and should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty." Id. The United States Supreme Court in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), stated that "habilitation . . . consists of education and training for those, such as the mentally retarded, who are not mentally ill." Id. at 7 n.2. However, the court held that the bill of rights provision of the Developmental Disabilities Act does not create any substantive rights to "appropriate treatment" in the "least restrictive environment."

After examining the legislation, the Valerie N. court concluded that neither Act provided a source of authority under which to allow court-authorization of sterilization of the developmentally disabled. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 155, 707 P.2d at 771, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
105. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 157, 707 P.2d at 773, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
and California\textsuperscript{106} Constitutions.

Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet recognized a fundamental right to sterilization as a method of contraception,\textsuperscript{107} the majority concluded that the interests of the incompetent developmentally disabled required recognition of fundamental due process rights on the same basis as women competent to give consent.\textsuperscript{108} Because competent women could choose sterilization as a method of contraception in California,\textsuperscript{109} the majority reasoned that incompetent developmentally disabled women should not be denied this right simply because of their disability.\textsuperscript{110} The majority then subjected Probate Code section 2356(d) to strict scrutiny\textsuperscript{111} analysis and determined that the state's interest in protecting the procreative rights of the incompetent developmentally disabled did not justify the prohibition on all nontherapeutic sterilizations of wards and conservatees.\textsuperscript{112}

In rejecting the argument that the past abuse of eugenic sterilization mandated the prohibition on court-authorized sterilizations of wards and conservatees, the majority stated that "less restrictive alternatives" to total prohibition were available in statutory and procedural safeguards "as yet untried in California."\textsuperscript{113} These statutory safeguards included Probate Code section 2357\textsuperscript{114} and the standards that the Washington Supreme Court adopted in \textit{In Re Hayes}.\textsuperscript{115}

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{106} Id. at 162-63, 707 P.2d at 773, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 400. Article One, section one of the California Constitution provides that "all people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are: enjoying and defending life and liberty, aquiring, possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." Id.

\textsuperscript{107} But see supra note 40 (state and federal court decisions finding a constitutional right to voluntary sterilization).

\textsuperscript{108} Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 161, 707 P.2d at 772, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 399.


\textsuperscript{111} See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) (fundamental right to procreative choice received the greatest constitutional protection and infringement by the state upon these rights triggers strict judicial scrutiny).

\textsuperscript{112} Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 161, 707 P.2d at 772, 219 Cal Rptr. at 399.

\textsuperscript{113} Id. at 165, 707 P.2d at 774-75, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 402.

\textsuperscript{114} CAL. PROB. CODE § 2357 (West 1979). This sections governs consent to intrusive medical procedures for those wards and conservatees unable to give consent.

The Law Revision Commission comment to the section states, "Section 2357 provides for notice to interested persons, for the appointment of counsel to represent the ward or conservatee where necessary, for the presentation to the court of medical affidavits showing the need for the medical treatment, and for findings by the court before an order authorizing the treatment is made." CAL. PROB. CODE § 2357 (West 1979) (Law Revision Commission Comment).

\textsuperscript{115} 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en banc). The \textit{Hayes} case concerned a peti-
Under the Hayes factors, inability to consent must be established by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" that the individual is incapable of making a decision about sterilization and is unlikely to develop sufficiently to make an informed judgment about sterilization in the foreseeable future.\(^\text{116}\) The determination can only be made in a court proceeding in which the incompetent is represented by a disinterested guardian \textit{ad litem}.\(^\text{117}\) The court must receive independent advice based on comprehensive medical, psychological, and social evaluations of the individual, and to the greatest extent possible the court must elicit and take into account the views of the incompetent individual.\(^\text{118}\) The proponent of the operation must present clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the operation is in the best interest of the incompetent individual.\(^\text{119}\) The court must also take into account the age and educability of the individual, the likelihood of the individual bearing a retarded child, the individual's potential as a parent, and the availability of other less restrictive means of contraception for the individual.\(^\text{120}\)

In addition, the court must find that the individual is physically capable of procreating and likely to engage in sexual activity at the present, or in the near future, under circumstances likely to result in pregnancy.\(^\text{121}\) Furthermore, the court must find that the nature and extent of the individual's disability as determined by empirical evidence and not solely on the basis of standardized tests, renders the individual permanently incapable of caring for a child, even with reasonable assistance.\(^\text{122}\)

Finally, there must be no less restrictive alternative to sterilization. All contraceptive methods, including supervision, education, and training must be proven unworkable or inapplicable, and sterilization must entail the least
invasion of the body of the individual. The court must then determine by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the current state of scientific and medical knowledge does not suggest that either a reversible sterilization procedure or other less drastic method of contraception will shortly be available, or that science is on the threshold of an advance in the treatment of the individual's disability.

In addition to the Hayes factors, the Valerie N. majority adopted the requirements of Probate Code section 2357, governing approval of intrusive medical procedures. The court reasoned that application of section 2357 would insure that the conservatee would receive independent representation and that "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of the necessity for the procedure would be introduced by the applicant as a prerequisite to judicial approval."

In Conservatorship of Valerie N., the majority concluded that there was insufficient information in the record to authorize a petition for sterilization under the Hayes factors and section 2357. The record contained no evidence of Valerie's capacity to conceive, whether less intrusive means were available as contraception, or whether the "course of treatment" was necessary under section 2357.

C. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions

All seven justices concurred in the denial of authority to sterilize Valerie. Three justices, however, dissented from the majority's decision to rule Probate Code section 2357(d) unconstitutional and to adopt a substantive and procedural framework. Justices Reynoso and Lucas filed opinions in which they criticized the majority's decision to declare section 2356(d) unconstitutional in view of the history of abuse practiced under compulsory eugenic sterilization statutes. Moreover, Justice Lucas rejected the majority's decision to substitute the court's judgment for the incompetent developmentally disabled individual. He believed that the majority's decision overemphasized the parents' desires and did not adequately protect the incompetent individual from abuse.

Chief Justice Bird dissented from the majority on two grounds: the majority's treatment of the fundamental right to procreate and its use of the doctrine of substituted judgment. Because of the past abuse present

123. Id.
124. Id. at 236, 608 P.2d at 642.
125. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2357 (West 1979).
126. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 161, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
127. Id. at 161-62, 707 P.2d at 777-78, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05. The court stated that there was neither a finding that sterilization was required nor evidence to support that finding.
128. Id. at 161, 707 P.2d at 777-78, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (Reynoso, J., concurring and dissenting); Id. at 143, 707 P.2d at 781, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 164, 707 P.2d at 781, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 407 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
under compulsory sterilization statutes, the Chief Justice reasoned that section 2356(d) was necessary to discontinue the practice of state-authorized sterilization of the developmentally disabled.\(^{130}\) Moreover, she believed that the history of involuntary sterilization was the "frame of reference for evaluating the constitutionality of the legislature's ban on sterilization" of incompetent conservatees,\(^{131}\) as well as the framework adopted by the majority from the *Hayes* decision.\(^{132}\)

The Chief Justice rejected the majority's assertion that the right to procreative choice was paramount to the right to procreate.\(^{133}\) Rather, she believed that the right to procreate is a basic civil liberty "that goes deeper than, and does not depend upon, rational choice."\(^{134}\) In addition, Chief Justice Bird argued that the right to procreative choice concerning birth control and abortion could not be applied to incompetent developmentally disabled individuals since it creates "a false impression of equivalence between the 'decision' to procreate and the 'decision' to be sterilized."\(^{135}\) She argued that the right to be sterilized depends upon the exercise of rational or knowing choice, but the right to procreate includes the right to retain physical integrity and biological capabilities.\(^{136}\) On the question of substituted judgment, the Chief Justice criticized the majority's application of that doctrine to cases that involve an irreversible sterilization operation. Instead of allowing the incompetent developmentally disabled an opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to procreative choice, the Chief Justice believed that substituted judgment provided the means by which the state infringes upon the fundamental right to procreate.\(^{137}\) In effect, she believed that substituted judgment under the *Hayes* factors adopted by the majority was inconsistent with the notion that the choice being made is the one that the conservatee would have made\(^{138}\) and that the *Hayes* factors and section

\(^{130}\) *Id.* at 144, 707 P.2d at 782, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).

\(^{131}\) *Id.*

\(^{132}\) *Id.*

\(^{133}\) The Chief Justice asserted that the right to procreate also included the right to bodily autonomy. *See* Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1891) (common law right to be free from compulsory physical examination). However, the dissent does not acknowledge cases in which the right to procreative choice was held to be paramount to the right to procreate. For example, various United States Supreme Court decisions allow minor's decisions concerning contraception and abortion to override the parents' wishes under certain circumstances. *See* Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976). *See also* Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973) (woman's decision on sterilization paramount to husband's desires).

\(^{134}\) *Valerie N.*, 40 Cal. 3d at 169, 707 P.2d at 785, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).

\(^{135}\) *Id.* at 170, 707 P.2d at 786, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 413, (Bird, C.J., dissenting).

\(^{136}\) *Id.*

\(^{137}\) *Id.* at 175, 707 P.2d at 791, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 418. *See also* Burt & Price, *supra* note 3 (third-party consent "is a fiction which authorizes the state to intervene because a party other than the subject provides the green light").

\(^{138}\) *Id.*
2357 were inconsistent with the majority's concern for the habilitation of
the developmentally disabled. 139

III. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

Because the Valerie N. majority provided some access to the fundamental
right of procreative choice, the standards established by the court are pref-
erable to a total prohibition on access to court-authorized sterilization. 140
However, there are several problems with the majority's analysis and stand-
ards that remain unresolved. Habilitation connotes both the developmentally
disabled individual's right to maximize his or her potential 141 and the right
to be free in the enjoyment of all of his or her faculties. 142 However, the
majority's standards contradict the apparent concern for the incompetent
developmentally disabled individual's right to habilitation, and it does not
provide adequate guidance to the probate court judge who must apply the
standards.

Although the majority does provide a forum for the incompetent develop-
mentally disabled to assert their right to procreative choice, the court's
standards do not provide a realistic opportunity for those individuals to
exercise their rights. Most problematic is the majority's decision to adopt
Probate Code section 2357 as a threshold standard that must be met prior
to analysis under the Hayes factors. 143 Probate Code section 2357 allows

139. Id. at 176, 707 P.2d at 792, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 419. Chief Justice Bird stated that the
Hayes factor requiring that all less intrusive means of contraception including supervision be
ruled inapplicable was not consistent with the majority's position that Valerie has a liberty
interest in being sterilized in order to be free of parental supervision.

incompetent mentally retarded individual to choose sterilization should not result in a loss of
the person's constitutional interests); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 272-73, 426 A.2d 467, 480-81
(1981) (allowing substituted judgment produces a more compassionate result than leaving the
incompetent individual without a choice). But see In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 566, 307
N.W.2d 881, 893 (1981) (substituted judgment results in state intrusion into whether or not an
individual will be allowed the opportunity to procreate).

141. See supra note 105.

142. See supra note 106.

143. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 161, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 402. The court
stated that "pending action by the legislature to establish criteria and procedural protections
governing these applications, the procedures governing approval of intrusive medical procedures
set forth in section 2357 should be adapted and applied." Id. However, the majority never
stated how section 2357 was to be "adapted and applied" to situations involving nontherapeutic
sterilization operations. Thus, the majority implicitly adopted a "medical necessity" threshold
standard that the proponent must meet prior to analysis under the Hayes standards and "any
other relevant factors brought to the attention of the court by the parties." Of the other state
courts that have adopted standards to allow the mentally retarded access to the right to
procreative choice, only one has adopted a medical necessity threshold requirement. See In re
A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 375 (Colo. 1981) (Colorado Supreme Court adopting standards that allow
for sterilization of an incompetent individual only upon a finding that the operation is "medically
access to probate court review whenever "the existing or continuing medical condition of the ward or conservatee requires the recommended course of treatment." In *Conservatorship of Valerie N.*, Valerie's conservators sought the authority to use a nontherapeutic sterilization and neither Valerie's life nor health were in jeopardy. Valerie's conservators sought probate court authorization because sterilization is an irreversible method of contraception. The majority held that there was no evidence to show that sterilization was "required" or even "necessary" and that the conservators had not met the threshold requirement of section 2357. The majority, however, ignored evidence presented in the declarations of Valerie's personal physicians and her counselor that pregnancy and childbirth would cause Valerie "severe psychiatric damage."

As a result of the majority's narrow reading of section 2357, the probate court forum is potentially inaccessible, even where there is evidence that the individual could be harmed if not treated. Although this interpretation...
represents a substantial barrier to court-authorized sterilization, the court’s narrow reading of the medical necessity standard has not been accepted by the other courts that have addressed the issue.

If under section 2357 a sterilization is determined to be required or necessary, the probate court judge must then analyze the facts under the Hayes factors. Several of the Hayes factors, however, contradict the majority’s emphasis on the individual’s right to habilitation. One Hayes factor requires the probate judge to find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, that “all less drastic alternatives to sterilization, including supervision . . . have proven unworkable or inapplicable.” This factor places a high burden on the proponent of the operation and unnecessarily interferes with access to sterilization, even in cases where sterilization is in the individual’s best interest and would promote personal development. As a method of contraception, supervision can protect against unwanted pregnancy, but it does so at a high cost to the incompetent individual’s liberty and privacy interests. In effect, the court incorrectly ignored the main

the Hayes standards. The Court’s narrow reading of “harm” under section 2357, in conjunction with the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard, unnecessarily creates a high barrier to access to a court-authorized sterilization. See Comment, Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, supra note 66, at 433-34 (medical necessity requirements are designed to protect against abuse, but the practical effect is to foreclose the right to choose not to procreate).

151. See supra note 150.

152. See Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 293 Md. 685, 723, 447 A.2d 1244, 1263 (1982) (Donaldson, J., dissenting) (medical necessity requirement forces the lower court to place primary emphasis on single objective factor irrespective of the decision the incompetent individual would make if competent; requirement affords the individual’s physician an absolute veto over access to court-authorized sterilization). See also Comment, Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, supra note 66, at 433-34.

153. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 160, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404. The probate court may also consider “any other relevant factors brought to the court’s attention.” Id. It is not impossible that the “other factors” could include information on the benefit to the parents and society in sterilizing the incompetent or other eugenically-based rationale. The eugenic basis for sterilization is clearly not in the individual’s best interests.

154. See Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 238-39, 608 P.2d at 641.

155. Comment, Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, supra note 66, at 431-32 (clear and convincing evidence standard forecloses access to the right to obtain a “best interest” sterilization).

156. Id. at 433-34 (The state supreme court decisions in Hayes, Grady, In re A.W., and other cases do provide a forum for the mentally retarded. However, they do not provide realistic access to the right to choose not to procreate).

157. See Green & Paul, supra note 46, at 120 (mentally retarded individuals require contraception that does not require their conscious participation). If the mentally retarded are isolated from members of the opposite sex or supervised to make sure they take their birth control pills everyday, then the risk of pregnancy should be reduced.

158. The potential cost involved to the incompetent conservatee is that the standard, in combination with the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence requirement, could effectively foreclose sterilization to those individuals who would benefit most from greater freedom. Without any access to sterilization, and without the ability to utilize other forms of contracep-
reason Valerie's conservators sought a court-authorized sterilization. Valerie's conservators wanted to allow Valerie more freedom to develop socially without the need for constant supervision. Consequently, if this Hayes factor is narrowly construed, incompetent individuals will be denied access to sterilizations that would allow them to participate in services and activities that do not provide for close supervision.

Another defect in the court's decision is its failure to consider any physical and psychological harm that could result from the sterilization operation. It is anomalous to consider the physical impact of pregnancy and childbirth on the conservatee under section 2357, and then specifically ignore consideration of the psychological harm that could result from the sterilization operation itself. The once popular view that the developmentally disabled do not care that they are sterilized has been severely criticized and dis-
proven. The majority should have included a factor specifically addressing the psychological impact of a sterilization operation on the incompetent individual. Failure to include that factor disregards the full consideration of the individual's "best interests" that should be made where infringement of the fundamental right to procreate is possible.

In the court's analysis of the fundamental right to procreative choice, the majority held that a ward or conservatee's inability to consent should not result in a forfeiture of fundamental due process rights, nor of the effective protection of his or her "best interests." The majority reasoned that to preserve the right to procreative choice and the benefits that a meaningful decision would bring to the ward or conservatee, it may be necessary to assert that right on the ward or conservatee's behalf. In reaching a decision, however, the majority did not adequately address the problems inherent in the application of substituted judgment in cases involving the sterilization of developmentally disabled individuals.

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164. The fallacy of the opinion reflected in Buck v. Bell was revealed by several psychological studies. See Ross, supra note 6, at 621-22 (discusses results of psychological studies by Sabagh and Edgerton revealed in Sterilized Mental Defectives Look at Eugenic Sterilization, 9 Eugenics Q. 215-16 (1962)). See also Ross, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: An Overview, 1 Law and Psychology Rev. 151 (1975) (discussion of study results of incompetent individuals sterilized prior to release from state institutions and their feelings about being involuntarily sterilized).

165. See Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 234, 608 P.2d at 639 (sterilization touches upon the individual's right to privacy and the right to procreate and, because it is an irreversible procedure, should be undertaken only after careful consideration of all relevant factors).

166. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 146-47, 707 P.2d at 773-74, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 400-01.

167. Id.

168. Id. at 150, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404.

169. As it was originally developed, the doctrine of substituted judgment involved the court in a subjective inquiry in which the court was to "don the mental mantle of the incompetent." In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 545, 271 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).

However, where the court is asked to substitute its judgment for an individual who has been incompetent since birth, the court has no basis for a subjective inquiry and must interject objective analysis into the test. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-80, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70-72, 148 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-74 (1981). See also Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752-53, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977) (court rejected an objective "reasonable person" test and utilized substituted judgment to consent to chemotherapy for an incompetent individual).

Cases involving petitions for sterilization also present a problem in that substituted judgment must be made on the basis of objective factors rather than the incompetent individual's previously expressed desires and beliefs. See In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 565, 432 N.E.2d 712, 720 (1982) (court utilized substituted judgment to produce "a more just and compassionate result" than total prohibition of all sterilizations for the incompetent mentally retarded).

Not all the courts that have considered the issue agree that substituted judgment should be applied to situations involving nonvoluntary sterilization of the retarded. See In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 566, 307 N.W.2d 881, 893 (1981) (court rejected substituted judgment and stated that the "choice" involved in the decision to be sterilized under substituted judgment "clearly is not a personal choice, and no amount of legal legerdemain can make it so").
By allowing probate court judges to consent for the incompetent individual, the majority followed the decisions in *Hayes*, *Quinlan*, and *Grady*, all of which blur the distinction between objective and subjective use of substituted judgment. Application of substituted judgment to a case involving an individual who has never had the capacity to express any desires regarding procreation or sterilization does not adequately address the special problems and desires of the incompetent individual. Instead, it involves the court in an objective inquiry into what a reasonable person would do under the circumstances. Thus the probate judge's decision would not represent the best interests of the individual, but rather, the best interests of the average developmentally disabled individual under the circumstances. The irreversibility of a mistaken decision should caution the court against ruling in favor of sterilization under the objective test.

Although substituted judgment provides the developmentally disabled with a "choice," the majority fails to address the fact that the choice is made by a probate court judge under the *Hayes* framework. Supreme Court decisions in *Skinner v. Oklahoma*, *Roe v. Wade*, and other cases establish that the government cannot intrude in decisions regarding the choice of whether to bear children absent a compelling state interest. The majority did not require a compelling state interest in providing access to sterilization for incompetent developmentally disabled wards or conservatees. The majority's failure to take this extra step effectively abrogates the fundamental nature of the right to procreate as a "basic civil right of man," and does not adequately account for the developmentally disabled's right to bodily integrity.

170. *In re Hayes*, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en banc).
173. See supra note 170.
174. See Sherlock & Sherlock, supra note 15, at 965 (objective use of substituted judgment turns the inquiry into a "reasonable person" test that is not adequately protective of the retarded individual's rights and interests).
175. *Id.*
176. *See In re Eberhardy*, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 578, 307 N.W.2d 881, 899 (1981) (sterilization is irreversible, and the judicial process could afford no method for correcting an error in the exercise of its discretion).
177. The probate court judge must hear the evidence and determine whether the proponent of the operation has met the clear and convincing evidence standard under the *Hayes* factors. If the proponent of the operation meets the burden of proof then authorization for the operation also comes from the court.
180. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 25.
183. See Note, *Due Process Privacy*, supra note 57, at 515 (right to personal privacy is
Although other state supreme courts have adopted common law standards to allow access to the right to procreative choice, the decision in Valerie N. is novel in that the court ignored the question of probate court jurisdiction. In addition to Hayes and Grady, many decisions expressly address the question of jurisdiction. The court's power to order nonvoluntary sterilization is not as clear as the majority's opinion would suggest. A number of state court decisions have precluded judicial action absent statutory authority, and those cases that allow judicial action do so in the absence of statutory authority to the contrary. However, the Valerie N. majority was confronted with both a state statute expressly denying jurisdiction, as well as appellate court precedent directly opposed to probate court authority to order sterilization. Consequently, since the court failed to address the question of jurisdiction, the majority implicitly accepted the rationale of those state court decisions which approve jurisdiction. However, they did so without adequately analyzing or distinguishing the rationale of other state court decisions which have held that the legislature is better able to address the interests involved in this confrontation of fundamental rights. Legislative enactment of Probate Code section 2356(d) together with the repeal of Welfare and Institutions Code section 7254 clearly demonstrate the legislature's intent to restrict probate court jurisdiction. In light of the irreversibility of a sterilization operation, the majority moved too quickly in discounting the legislature's decision to end nonvoluntary sterilization in California. Instead, the court should have addressed the controversy involved in the jurisdiction issue. However, it is not unrealistic to assume that the legislature believed that the opportunity for discretion in the determination of the individual's based on the individual's interest in bodily autonomy). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (right of an individual to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion on right to use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married couples to be free from governmental interference with procreative choice).

184. 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en banc).
186. See supra note 61.
188. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d) (1979).
189. See supra note 97.
190. See In re Eberhardt, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 566, 307 N.W.2d 881, 893 (1981). In Eberhardt, the court held that lower courts had jurisdiction to authorize sterilization petitions. However, the court refused to allow those courts to exercise their jurisdictional power. Instead, the court decided to defer to the legislature due to the irreversibility of the operation and the potential infringement upon the right to procreate. The court stated that "the legislature is far better able, by the hearing process to consider a broad range of factual situations." Id. The court also believed that the legislature could best attempt an in-depth study on the issues involved, with the help of experts in psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and medicine.
"best interest" could not be eliminated even by strict substantive and procedural safeguards.\textsuperscript{191}

While all three dissenting opinions raised serious questions regarding the ramifications of state-authorized sterilization of the developmentally disabled, they failed to recognize the possibility that denial of probate court authority to approve sterilizations in exceptional cases "decides" the question of procreative choice in favor of procreation, but without any safeguards or standards to address the truly exceptional case.\textsuperscript{192} In effect, the dissenting opinions would resolve the "decision" in favor of procreation no matter how beneficial the operation would be for the incompetent individual, and no matter how traumatic pregnancy and childbirth would be for the individual. The major strength of the dissents' position is that they completely preclude probate court authority and discretion, and protect the individual's fundamental right to procreation. On the other hand, the weakness of their position is that they fail to recognize situations in which the "best interests" of the individual overwhelmingly compel access to the equally fundamental right to procreative choice.\textsuperscript{193}

The majority opinion provides the incompetent developmentally disabled a forum in which to assert the fundamental right to procreative choice. However, the requirements under section 2357 and the \textit{Hayes} factors are an inadequate replacement for well-crafted legislative standards designed to specifically reduce the opportunity for abusive sterilization. As a result of the majority's standards, even developmentally disabled individuals that would benefit most from sterilization may be denied the chance to exercise their newly-recognized constitutional right; an anomalous result from a court concerned about the incompetent individual's chance to maximize his or her potential.

\section*{IV. Impact}

The \textit{Conservatorship of Valerie N.} decision is significant because it adds California to the growing minority of states that recognize the procreative rights of the incompetent developmentally disabled. The \textit{Valerie N.} decision demonstrates that despite the resulting controversy, the states are concerned

\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Valerie N.}, 40 Cal. 3d at 154, 707 P.2d at 791, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 408.

\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Id.} at 153, 707 P.2d at 781, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 407 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Lucas stated that the legislature had a compelling state interest in enacting Probate Code section 2356(d). Moreover, he believed that the history of state compulsory sterilization could have made the legislature decide that the potential for abuse was too great to allow any court-authorized sterilizations. He also believed that the majority should have deferred to the legislature due to the irreversibility of the operation.

\textsuperscript{193} \textit{See In re Eberhardy}, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 597, 307 N.W.2d 881, 907 (1981) (Day, J., dissenting) (what the majority does not recognize is that by refusing to allow the individual's parents or guardians to decide in favor of sterilization, the majority decides the question in favor of procreation and potentially against the individual's best interests).
about allowing the developmentally disabled more freedom to live and interact outside of the institutions. Other states may also decide to afford the developmentally disabled their procreative rights to seek sterilization where sterilization is the only practical method of birth control available for the individual. These other states will probably also decide to adopt standards culled from the *Hayes*, *Grady*, and *Valerie N.* decisions. However, if they adopt a medical necessity prerequisite, or only allow sterilization if supervision is an inapplicable means of birth control, they will not be affording the developmentally disabled access to their newly recognized procreative rights.

The *Valerie N.* majority's opinion created ambiguities in the standards governing nonvoluntary sterilization of the developmentally disabled. Probate court judges will have to resolve these ambiguities on a case-by-case basis, and the standards are subject to both broad and narrow interpretations. Thus, the probate court judges must determine the construction to be given to the medical necessity requirement. Narrowly interpreted, the standard could be read to preclude access to court-authorized sterilization even where there is clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the individual would suffer severe psychiatric harm if she became pregnant and went through childbirth. However, if judges read the section broadly, then severe psychiatric harm could be sufficient to allow further review under the *Hayes* factors.¹⁹⁴

If the proponent of the sterilization has met and satisfied the medical necessity requirement, the probate court judge must then analyze the evidence under the *Hayes* factors and any other relevant factors brought to the attention of the court.¹⁹⁵ The *Hayes* factors are also ambiguous as to certain probate court determinations. For example, the requirement of "less drastic means of contraception" can be read narrowly to require that several formulas of birth control pills have proven "unworkable or inapplicable" as contraception. The majority opinion seems to favor the narrow reading.¹⁹⁶ Conversely, the probate judge could read the language to conclude that only one formula of birth control pill need be tried, and if the individual rejects that formula, then the birth control pill has been "proven unworkable or inapplicable" as a contraceptive measure.¹⁹⁷

Moreover, a probate court judge could read the requirement narrowly to require that supervision be proven inapplicable by clear, cogent, and con-

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¹⁹⁴. See supra note 32-38 and accompanying text.
¹⁹⁵. See supra note 146. The majority's narrow reading of the medical necessity standard is contrary to prior decisions utilizing a medical necessity requirement in the context of the sterilization of the mentally retarded.
¹⁹⁶. *Valerie N.*, 40 Cal. 3d at 150, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
¹⁹⁷. *Id.* at 150 n.28, 707 P.2d at 777 n.28, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404 n.28. In a footnote the majority stated that "forty-nine oral contraceptives are identified in the 1984 Physician's Desk Reference." *Id.* The majority opinion also stated that the record did not show "whether or not more than one formulation of birth control pill was tried." *Id.*
vincing evidence. Conversely, the judge could read the supervision require-
ment consistently with the majority's habilitation rationale and conclude that
supervision need only be inapplicable where it would not substantially inter-
fere with the individual's habilitation.

The confusion and complexity of the relationship between the medical
necessity threshold requirement and the *Hayes* common law standards can
be best appreciated by analysis of a hypothetical case based on the facts of
*Conservatorship of Valerie N.* Assume that the parents of a twenty-five year
old developmentally disabled woman petition the probate court to be ap-
pointed conservators of the woman and for additional powers to consent
to a sterilization operation for her. The conservatee suffers from Down's
Syndrome, has an I.Q. of thirty and the developmental level of a four year
old child. Moreover, the conservators assert that the individual has not been
sexually active in the past and has physically rejected birth control pills
while in her early teens.

The conservatee's physician and psychologist assert in their declarations
that the conservatee is physically capable of procreation and is unable to
apply, or understand the implications of not applying less restrictive forms
of contraception. An intrauterine device (IUD) is also not feasible because
the conservatee refuses to co-operate in a pelvic exam. In addition, all three
declarants agree that pregnancy and childbirth would cause severe psychiatric
harm to the conservatee. Finally, the counselor has also stated that the
woman's parents have isolated her from society and social activity due to
the fear that she might become pregnant and that this isolation has sub-
stantially interfered with her ability to interact with other individuals.

The conservators' reason for petitioning the court for the operation is to
allow the conservatee the opportunity to participate in a state and federally
funded program designed to allow the developmentally disabled to live in a
community setting that provides for greater social interaction without the
need for constant supervision.

Under the majority's decision in *Valerie N.*, the case would be scrutinized
under the medical necessity threshold requirement of section 2357. This
section requires that the conservatee be represented by an independent guard-
ian *ad litem*, and provides that "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" of
the "necessity" for the operation be presented. The hypothetical facts include
the declarations of the conservatee's personal physicians and counselor, and
all three agree that the conservatee would suffer "severe psychiatric harm"
if she were to become pregnant. However, under the majority's opinion,
"psychiatric" harm was not accepted as sufficient evidence of medical
necessity under section 2357. The conservators seek sterilization as a non-
therapeutic method of contraception and not as a therapeutic measure to
protect the conservatee's life or physical health.198 Thus, under the majority's

198. This reading of the "less intrusive" factor would better promote the individual's
analysis, this case would end here despite the counselor's declaration that
the conservatee's isolation has interfered with her interest in maximizing her
developmental potential.

Alternatively, if the probate court judge reads the medical necessity re-
requirement broadly to encompass psychiatric harm, and the proponent proves
the harm by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, then the next step would
be analysis under the *Hayes* factors. The *Hayes* factors place the burden of
proof on the proponent of the operation. Due to the extent of the conser-
vatee's disability, the hypothetical conservator will probably be able to prove
that the conservatee is presently incapable of choice with regard to steril-
ization and not likely to develop the ability in the reasonably foreseeable
future.

Analysis under the remaining factors is more difficult because the court
could give them a broad or narrow interpretation. First, the proponent must
prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the conservatee is likely
to engage in sexual activity at the present time or the near future under
circumstances likely to result in pregnancy. A narrow interpretation of this
standard could require the individual to have engaged in sexual activity in
the past or present. It would be very difficult to prove that contraception
was necessary without some evidence of past sexual activity. Thus, even
though the conservatee made "inappropriate sexual advances" under the
facts of the hypothetical, the probate court could decide that there was no
"necessity for contraception." If, on the other hand, a probate judge were
to give the standard a broader interpretation, the judge could conclude that
the lack of evidence of past sexual activity is not determinative. Instead, the
court could construe the factor to mean that the absence of constant super-
vision presents a possibility of future sexual activity. Thus, the effectiveness
of the parents' efforts to supervise their daughter and the isolation of their
daughter from social activity, would not foreclose sterilization when they
want to allow her more freedom.

The requirement of "less drastic methods of contraception" also leaves
room for broad and narrow interpretations. The applicability of birth control
tabs as contraception for an individual presents the question of how many
formulations of the pill must be proven "unworkable or inapplicable." The
majority opinion would require evidence that the conservatee physically
rejected several formulations before that method of contraception was ruled
out. However, probate court judges could require only one or two formu-
lations to be proven inapplicable.

interest in obtaining a "best interest" sterilization. However, because of the irreversibility of a
sterilization operation, this factor can best be read as requiring some reasonable number of
formulations to be tried and rejected. The exact number would depend on the reason the
individual rejected the pill, and on the possibility that different formulations would be rejected
by the individual. See infra note 204.
Moreover, the proponent of the operation would have to prove that supervision was "unworkable or inapplicable" as a method of contraception. Under the facts of the hypothetical, the conservatee's parents have prevented the conservatee from engaging in any sexual activity. In order for the conservators to meet the "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" standard they would have to prove that the conservatee had engaged in sexual activity in the past despite their best efforts at supervision. If the probate court judge reads the factor as supervision of all interaction between the conservatee and members of the opposite sex, then that method of contraception has not been "proven unworkable or inapplicable." The result is continued isolation and supervision for the conservatee, and the parents' desire to allow their daughter more freedom from isolation could be defeated.

Finally, the requirement that the conservators prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that science is not on the verge of discovering new, reversible contraception presents a difficult obstacle to court-authorized sterilization. It requires the conservator to prove a negative and does not account for the possibility that future methods of contraception may be unworkable or inapplicable for the same reasons that current methods may be inapplicable. Under the facts of the hypothetical, the conservators have a very high burden of proof, and the Valerie N. majority left the probate court judge without guidance on this issue. In future cases, the state courts that adopt similar standards may have to decide whether a medical necessity requirement presents an undue burden on the exercise of the right to procreative choice recognized by the Valerie N. majority and by other state courts.

Very few, if any, petitions for sterilization will meet the medical necessity requirement. Consequently, analysis under the Hayes factors often will not be necessary, and few wards or conservatees will be sterilized. Moreover, the state courts may have to determine what construction the standards should be given by the probate courts. The Valerie N. majority did not fully define the scope of the "less drastic alternatives" standard, nor did it completely

199. Nontherapeutic sterilization is sterilization for the benefit of the individual as a method of contraception in which neither the life nor health of the individual is in jeopardy. See Gray, supra note 20, at 533; Comment, A Woman's Right, supra note 39.

Therapeutic sterilization may be necessary to protect the physical health of the patient. For example, an operation may be necessary where a disease makes pregnancy dangerous for the woman. See Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 626, 185 Cal. Rptr. 516 (3rd. Dist. 1982) (therapeutic sterilization approved where developmentally disabled woman had 80% risk of developing cervical cancer without the operation).

200. Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 242, 608 P.2d at 644 (Stafford, J., dissenting) ("current state of medical knowledge" factor requires the proponent of the operation to litigate "nebulous eventualities of science"). See also Comment, Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, supra note 66 (Hayes factor concerning future contraceptive developments requires the proponent to prove the impossible and forecloses sterilization).

201. Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 242, 608 P.2d at 644 (Stafford, J., dissenting).
rule out the possibility of allowing severe psychiatric harm to fulfill the medical necessity requirement. For example, the courts may have to decide whether a probate court judge properly authorized a petition for sterilization where the proponent produced clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that a conservatee rejected one or two formulas of birth control pills, but the other forty-seven were not tried.\footnote{202}

The \textit{Valerie N.} decision may also impact on collateral issues involving other substantive due process rights. Under the court's decision, the developmentally disabled now may argue that they have the right to obtain an abortion or to have their guardians and conservators assert that right for them.\footnote{203} Under the \textit{Valerie N.} standards, many of the same problems would exist as did under the right to procreative choice. The medical necessity requirement may unduly burden the right to obtain an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy.\footnote{204} Under United States Supreme Court decisions, the state does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute veto over the decision of the physician and the patient to terminate pregnancy.\footnote{205} Perhaps the \textit{Valerie N.} decision may produce a further exten-

\footnote{202. \textit{See supra} note 13.}

\footnote{203. The number of formulations of birth control pills that must be tried is dependent upon the number of formulations that are different from each other, and thus provide the possibility that the individual will not reject them. For example, birth control pills come in two basic types: "combination" pills contain variable levels of estrogen and progestogen; "progestogen" pills contain only the hormone progestogen. The combination pill is both more widely used and more effective. Depending upon the individual's adverse symptoms, a doctor could prescribe a combination pill with a high, medium, or low level of estrogen, and a high, medium, or low level of progestogen. Thus, there are a total of nine combinations. In addition, "progestogen" pills could contain either progestogen, or a synthetic progestational agent such as norethundrone or norgestral. \textit{See R. Bressler, M. Bogouff & G. Suban-Shope, The Physician's Drug Manual: Prescription and Nonprescription Drugs} 831-32 (1981).

The number of formulations of oral contraceptives that must be ruled inapplicable in an individual's case will depend upon (1) the reasons for the individual's adverse reactions, and (2) the effectiveness of other formulations that would not cause a reaction. In order to protect the individual from an unnecessary operation, an attempt must be made to find a formulation that the individual can tolerate. Although this requirement may take time, it is preferable to sterilization of the individual where another less intrusive means of birth control is available.

In the probate court proceeding, the proponent of the operation must present evidence that the nine combinations of oral contraceptives, as well as the progestogen formula, have been either (1) tried and rejected due to the nature of the individual's disability; or (2) either rejected or contraindicated due to the nature of the individual's adverse reaction. The opponent of the operation can cross examine the witnesses and present evidence to show that certain formulations were not tried or are not inapplicable. The burden is on the proponent of the operation to disprove the applicability of this and other forms of less intrusive contraception.

\footnote{204. \textit{See Roe v. Wade}, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to obtain an abortion during first trimester of pregnancy).}

\footnote{205. \textit{See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth}, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (husband could not veto wife's decision to obtain an abortion). \textit{But see} Bellotti v. Baird, 433 U.S. 622 (1979) (where minor is not sufficiently mature or emancipated, the state may require parental consent to an abortion).}
sion of substituted judgment to allow the court to consent to an abortion for the developmentally disabled ward or conservatee. In light of the 
Valerie N. decision, one may persuasively argue that the right to obtain an abortion cannot be prohibited merely on the basis of the incompetent individual’s disability.

Another collateral issue effected by the Valerie N. decision is the incompetent individual’s right to refuse treatment. Courts have already utilized substituted judgment to consent to electric shock therapy,\(^\text{206}\) chemotherapy,\(^\text{207}\) and organ transplants.\(^\text{208}\) The Valerie N. decision utilizes these decisions and grants the developmentally disabled rights that all competent individuals possess. Implicitly, the Valerie N. decision confirms that the developmentally disabled have the constitutional right to terminate life support and drug therapy. Moreover, it seems that the incompetent also have the right to “consent” to operations that would promote their best interests such as an operation to correct a cleft palate or other deformity.\(^\text{209}\) The Valerie N. decision recognizes the constitutional rights of the developmentally disabled and thus brings those individuals closer to the status of competent persons.

V. PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

The Valerie N. decision adopted a medical necessity requirement and the Hayes framework as standards for court-authorized sterilization “pending action by the legislature to establish criteria and procedural protection.” Because of the Valerie N. majority’s decision to adopt a medical necessity requirement, state legislation regulating access to sterilization for the incompetent developmentally disabled is necessary. This proposal will allow the developmentally disabled greater opportunity to exercise their newly recognized procreative rights while protecting against the abuse prevalent under eugenic sterilization statutes.\(^\text{210}\)

A. Incompetency as a Threshold Requirement

Under this proposal, the ward or conservatee would be represented in the probate proceeding by a disinterested guardian ad litem\(^\text{211}\) to protect against

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\(^{208}\) Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
\(^{210}\) See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (state could refuse to provide Medicaid funding for nontherapeutic abortions even though it funded the expenses of childbirth). The Supreme Court held that \textit{Roe v. Wade} meant that a woman has a fundamental right to be free from “unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate pregnancy.” \textit{Id.} It did not mean that a woman had a fundamental right to an abortion. \textit{Id.} at 473-74.
\(^{211}\) The judge would appoint a public defender to represent the interests of the incom-
a court-authorized sterilization that is not the last and best alternative for the individual. The proponent of the sterilization must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the ward or conservatee is unable to choose between sterilization and procreation and does not understand the relationship between sexual intercourse and conception.212 The determination must be made on the basis of evidence provided by independent physical and psychological evaluation of the ward or conservatee by two physicians and two psychologists appointed by the court. Moreover, the probate court judge must meet with the ward or conservatee and attempt to elicit his or her views regarding sterilization, and his or her capacity for choice regarding procreation.213

Once the proponent establishes the individual’s incompetency by clear and convincing evidence, the proponent must then prove that contraception is necessary for the individual. Proof of the necessity for contraception requires that: (1) the ward or conservatee is capable of procreation based on medical tests conducted by two independent physicians appointed by the court; and (2) that the ward or conservatee was or is sexually active, or that the absence of constant supervision or isolation presents a substantial likelihood of sexual activity in the future.214 The proponent must also establish, by the testimony of physicians, that: (1) physical and psychological harm and complications that would result from pregnancy and childbirth; and (2) a lack of physical and psychological harm and complications would result from the sterilization operation. The opponent must be allowed to cross examine witnesses, and must be allowed to call physicians to demonstrate the possible consequences of a sterilization operation, or the lack of potential problems related to childbirth and pregnancy.

B. Less Drastic Alternatives

The proponent must also prove by clear and convincing evidence that all less drastic methods of contraception are unworkable or inapplicable. The
less drastic alternatives standard requires evidence that the individual has rejected at least five different formulation of birth control pills.\textsuperscript{215} In addition, evidence must be presented that an IUD is unworkable or inapplicable for medical reasons including: (1) the dangers presented to the individual’s health; and (2) complications presented by the individual’s disability in the performance of a pelvic examination for the insertion of an IUD. The proponent must also produce clear and convincing evidence of the unavailability or inapplicability the other forms of contraception.

C. Best Interests and Habilitation

Finally, the court must examine other factors that demonstrate that the operation would be in the individual’s best interest and promote the individual’s habilitation. The court must take into account the individual’s age, educability, and developmental capacity. The court must also consider the psychological harm that would result from continued isolation and supervision of the ward or conservatee, and the services and opportunities available for the individual that she would be allowed to participate in if not for the guardian or conservator’s fears of potential pregnancy. Moreover, the court should consider the individual’s capacity to care for a child when given reasonable assistance.\textsuperscript{216} The standards must not include a medical necessity test because such a standard unduly burdens the incompetent individual’s opportunity to obtain a court-authorized sterilization.

VI. Conclusion

As a result of the California Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Conservatorship of Valerie N.}, the probate court now has the authority to authorize sterilization of the developmentally disabled. The probate court judge’s discretion is circumscribed by strict substantive and procedural safeguards that protect against the abuse prevalent under state eugenic sterilization statutes. In adopting the safeguards, the court provided a forum in which the conservator or guardian of a ward or conservatee can assert the incompetent individual’s right to procreative choice. However, the court’s decision to adopt a strict medical necessity standard unduly burdens the individual’s ability to obtain a sterilization that would be the last and best resort for the individual. The strict standard contradicts the majority’s apparent concern for habilitation, and it does not adequately account for situations in which the individual would truly benefit from a sterilization operation where the individual’s life or health are not in jeopardy.

\textsuperscript{215} See \textit{supra} note 204.

\textsuperscript{216} The court must consider (1) the individual’s ability to care for a child if given reasonable assistance; and (2) the chance of the child being born retarded. This standard must also take into account the individual’s potential for child care in the future. For example, if the individual is allowed greater social interaction and training, she may become able to care for a child if given reasonable assistance.
As a result of the decision in *Conservatorship of Valerie N.*, the developmentally disabled will be able to have the right to procreative choice asserted for them by their guardians and conservators. Thus, the developmentally disabled can come closer to attaining the same rights and freedoms that competent individuals possess. However, the majority’s decision adopts guidelines that are not adequately delineated and which are therefore, subject to broad and narrow interpretations. Because the *Valerie N.* decision denies access to court-authorized sterilization in all but medically necessary situations, this Note sets forth guidelines that would protect the incompetent individual from abuse and provide greater access to the incompetent individual’s newly recognized procreative rights.

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