Ike and Adlai Revisited - Mirror Images Reversed?

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BOOK REVIEWS


Reviewed by Jeffrey O'Connell,* Charles Elson,** and Thomas E. O'Connell***

Porter McKeever’s highly acclaimed biography of Adlai Stevenson may be of particular interest to lawyers because, among other things, it describes the Democratic presidential candidate’s quondam career in the law. It will, of course, be of even greater interest to Illinois lawyers because Stevenson, born and raised in Bloomington, graduated from Northwestern University School of Law and practiced law in Chicago on and off during his entire professional life.

“Adlai,” as McKeever refers to his close friend and United Nations associate, was always like a moth around a light bulb about the practice of law. He started off badly in 1924 when he flunked out of Harvard Law School in his second year. He had not liked Harvard. It was only under his father’s urging and the stimulation of the legendary Northwestern law dean, John Henry Wigmore, that Adlai returned to his law studies at Northwestern and graduated with dramatically improved grades in 1926.

Adlai’s liking for the practice of law and his performance as a lawyer were also variable. McKeever says, “he never really liked the law.” As Stevenson began his career after Northwestern, he seemed to feel that there was a direct conflict between “doing good” and doing legal work. After accepting a law clerk’s post in the prestigious law firm of Cutting, Moore and Sidley, he wrote to a friend:

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2. Id. at 45.
3. Id. at 50.
4. Id. at 45.
I must confess, heretical and un-American as it may seem, that I view the prospect without the least eagerness. . . . I know perfectly well that if I am to make a "success," sooner or later I must "sell out"—I mean chuck most of my ideas and my acute sympathy for the less fortunate. A stony and obedient loyalty to class and vested interests seems to be the necessary adjunct of a lifetime of hard and imaginationless work.

Yet, on one of his many forays back into the law from stints of public service, he wrote to a friend in 1956, "It is wonderful to be a lawyer again!" As for the quality of his work, his protégé and partner, Newton Minow, once said, "the grubby details bored him, but he was a good negotiator."

Unquestionably, it was public service or government work that proved to be his real love. Stevenson's early work with Cutting, Moore and Sidley conflicted almost from the start with his participation in the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Elected president of the Council in 1933, Adlai devoted more and more time to its activities. While it impinged on his work as a lawyer, his presidency of the council served as a springboard into public life. For Stevenson, the law was always a fallback from public service roles: various early assignments in Washington, D.C., including the World War II job that he called "legal maid servant to [Navy Secretary] Frank Knox"; his term as Governor of Illinois; his two runs for the United States presidency in 1952 and 1956; and his final work at the United Nations. Overall, he was a successful and sought-after lawyer and he worked hard at the law, but law always took second place in his heart.

Stevenson's stature has fallen off since he was the darling of nearly all liberals and most Democrats in the 1950s. How might Porter McKeever's biography affect that change of view? McKeever has written a generally favorable assessment of his old colleague but certainly not a hagiography. Rather, we have a balanced, careful, scrupulously researched and well written book. A reader senses, though, that McKeever's heart is in conflict with his head. He loved Adlai as many of us loved him in the 1950s; we saw Adlai as an extraordinarily graceful, articulate, thoughtful candidate in 1952 and 1956—especially in 1952. But while many of us who loved him in the 1950s without knowing him personally have had second thoughts, it is incomparably more difficult for McKeever, who knew Adlai well. We sense McKeever trying manfully to show us Adlai, blemishes and all—but his love keeps showing through. One of the charms of this readable biography is watching an engaging and thoroughly professional, experienced writer struggle with how he feels about his old friend and what he must nevertheless tell us honestly about him.

5. Id. at 54.
6. Id. at 395.
7. Id. at 342.
8. Id. at 65.
9. Id. at 64.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 75.
So we learn about Adlai's tendency toward self-pity, his foppish and somewhat snobbish Princetonian attitudes and associations, his tendency, particularly but not exclusively late in his life, to surround himself with sycophantic, often vastly wealthy, women, and his overindulgence, particularly during his United Nations years, in food and drink.

In light of what we now know from McKeever and others, would Adlai have made a good President? A corollary question arises: in light of the parallel reassessment that Dwight Eisenhower is currently and perhaps even more dramatically undergoing, would Adlai have made a better President than Ike? This question becomes particularly intriguing when one notes that the emerging views of the two men, particularly as they are being perceived increasingly by liberals such as McKeever, are dramatically opposite to views widely held in the 1950s. Originally considered a great intellectual and the liberal voice of conscience on the American scene, Stevenson has lost much of his aura with the publication of several recent works, including McKeever's. The once gleaming, silver reputation has become more than a bit tarnished. This decline is all the more stark in contrast to newfound respect for Eisenhower.

Before proceeding to further examination of a flawed Adlai and an examination of the "new" revisionist Ike, it may be helpful to review in more detail how liberals in the 1950s viewed the two men.

In the minds of liberal intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s, Adlai was like a knight in shining armor. Historian Herbert Muller, in his 1967 book, Adlai Stevenson: A Study in Values, called him a thoroughly civilized man, sensitive, reasonable, gracious, humorous, urbane and a man of true style... an especially rare sort in politics as a civil idealist who was most earnest and high-minded, raising both the intellectual level and the moral tone of our political debate, yet who remained genial, humble, and more magnanimous than most idealists, never pompous or self-righteous.

Stevenson represented "conscience in politics" and "provide[d] a leadership the victor, [Eisenhower]," could not. Stevenson was considered a progressive, erudite, brilliant intellectual and almost immediately, upon stepping into the national political arena during the 1952 election, he captured the hearts and passion of the liberal intelligentsia. James Reston, writing in the New York Times in July of 1952, called Stevenson "a man of reason... distinguished for the intellectual content of what he says... a Wilsonian figure, highly literate, idealistic and urbane." Arthur Krock, also in a Times column, sug-

12. Id. at 402.
13. Id. at 54-55.
14. Id. at 555.
15. See, e.g., id. at 515 (Adlai "was... very overweight. [He] had long been a compulsive eater.").
gested, rather grumpily, that much of Stevenson’s support and Eisenhower’s opposition came from “the ‘true liberals,’ particularly those in the faculty houses.”

Throughout the 1952 campaign, the *New Republic* was an enthusiastic supporter of Stevenson’s candidacy. In mid-October, under a banner headline proclaiming “Stevenson Speaks,” the magazine reported that “very rarely in American politics the best among us is nominated for the Presidency . . . . Adlai Stevenson is such a man.” Why was Stevenson “the best”? He was “whimsical, intellectual [and] high-minded,” a man of “dry wit, courage and audacity,” and, of course, a liberal. He was “a remarkable figure—possibly one of the really great politicians of this century.” What apparently impressed the *New Republic* editors most about Stevenson was his seeming brilliance, which they felt was responsible for spectacular public speeches. The editors likened his “literate” addresses, especially when compared with those of his less gifted opponent, to the works of Emerson. Much space was devoted to the reprinting of some of the Governor’s choicest lines. In fact, a Stevenson speech pamphlet was printed up and heavily advertised in every weekly issue of the *New Republic* throughout the campaign. The speeches were to be “treasured as classics in the finest tradition of the United States.” Indeed, Stevenson possessed “the ability to take a tough problem and make the common man understand what he is saying without condescending . . . . [H]e seasons his talk and wit and humor, expresses his ideas in razor-sharp phrases, and at heart is a compassionate and humble man.”

Stevenson’s tremendous popularity among many liberal intellectuals flourished throughout the 1950s and early 1960s and continued for a time after his death in 1965. Much of the praise he received centered on his intellect. He was honored as “a highly literate man at home in the world of ideas, at ease in the company of intellectuals.” His speeches were looked upon as literary and philosophical masterpieces and were collected and published in book form by Random House, with the noted novelist John Steinbeck writing the foreword. Adlai was a happy, “civilized” man, “who brought humor into American political life, a rare combination of gaiety, wit, and grace.” “Both philosophical and earthy, his humor made it possible for him to be as earnest as he pleased.

col. 2.

27. H. Muller, supra note 16, at 3.
29. H. Muller, supra note 16, at 327.
without being pompous, as high-minded without being self-righteous." The Governor was honored as a true liberal both in politics and personal philosophy. His lack of prejudice was the result of his boyhood; he was "spared the prejudice and intolerance that flourished on the common Fundamentalism of rural America." Indeed, the nation's "best hope" lay in Stevenson's "wisdom"—"a clear intelligence, informed by a sufficient awareness of complexity and difficulty, sobered by a tragic sense, but sweetened by a spirit of faith, hope, and charity."

In contrast, liberal intellectuals of the 1950s saw Eisenhower as an unlettered boob. In a 1958 book entitled Eisenhower: Captive Hero, Marquis Childs seemed to sum up liberal frustration with the President. Ike was "simple-minded" and indecisive. According to Childs, Eisenhower was no intellectual. "In high school he had been good in mathematics and history, and he was to continue to interest himself sporadically in military history. But this was the beginning and the end of his intellectual interests. Today for pleasure he reads only Westerns." Indeed, "at night he ignored the memorandums he was given and spent time on his favorite Westerns."

To emphasize his point, Childs reprinted a political cartoon that appeared in 1956 in the Denver Post. The cartoon depicted a genial, smiling Ike reading a newspaper full of holes, with a wise old elephant in another room removing articles entitled "Middle East Crisis," "Missile Program," and "Economic Aid Program" from another paper destined for the President's attention, saying, "We Don't Like to Worry Him."

Childs supported his characterization of Eisenhower as indecisive by stating: "[H]is temperament, it is fairly clear, is a passive one. The outward geniality conceal[s] ... caution that has made it excessively difficult for him to make decisions. He is moved by forces; he does not undertake to move them himself." "Eisenhower," said Childs, "must be put down as a weak president." Indeed, "he brought to the office so little preparation for what is surely the most difficult and demanding position in the world."

Finally, Childs criticized Eisenhower for a lack of both political savvy and energy in office. The President seemed detached from the responsibilities of his position. He delegated much of his authority and was "unwilling or unable to
exercise many of [his] powers.” As his term progressed, Childs suggested that Ike’s “commitment to politics, to the office, to the responsibilities of leadership was visibly slackening.” This “lack of knowledge and . . . abhorrence of all things political” was a fatal flaw in both the man and his administration.

Not that liberals had always taken such a dim view of Eisenhower. In 1948, the Americans for Democratic Action (“ADA”), a liberal political organization, had begun a campaign to dump then President, Harry Truman, and make Ike the Democratic nominee. The General “seemed capable of spectacular accomplishments at home and abroad . . . . According to ADA, Eisenhower would ‘stir the popular enthusiasm which will sweep progressive candidates across the country into Congress’ and produce the type of leadership that would ‘defeat both the forces of vested reaction and the Communist-dominated third party.’”

By the 1952 campaign, however, with Eisenhower’s nomination for President by the Republican Party, liberals had adopted a radically different stance toward Ike. Throughout the campaign, the liberal New Republic was particularly biting in its attacks on Eisenhower. Although calling Ike “earnest [and] sincere,” the editors found little else to recommend him. Calling him an “ordinary man,” they found him a candidate lacking in great intellectual qualities. Their constant attacks on his speeches are particularly illustrative:

There is amusing frustration in Ike’s press cars. Reporters gag at the synthetic banalities of the rear-platform talks, and the sanctimonious unction of the major speeches, (which are written and sent in from New York for Ike to deliver). The contrast with Stevenson’s literate speeches makes this election seem like a race between one of Emerson’s essays and an advertisement for bubble-gum. To help him in speech-writing . . . Ike picked Stanley High of Readers’ Digest. Somehow that tells the story . . . . Now the estimable . . . Mr. High is doing his best to give us a Readers’ Digest President.

Particular note was made of the fact that Eisenhower did not write his own speeches but employed a legion of “ghost-writers.”

The New Republic also called Ike grossly uninformed. In early October, an article remarked that “Ike's capacity for amazement at the discovery of the

42. Id. at 290.
43. Id. at 282.
44. Id. at 70.
46. Id. at 3103-04.
47. Id. at 3104.
49. Stevenson Speaks, supra note 20, at 9.
ADLAI STEVENSON every day facts of economic life is astonishing." A week earlier, in a report on an Eisenhower speech on defense policy, it was suggested that “the General is ignorant of what has been taking place in the Defense Department under [Secretaries] Marshall and Lovett.”

Throughout the campaign, it was hinted that Eisenhower was a sort of puppet under the control of the right wing of the Republican Party. His “embracing” of Senator McCarthy was strongly attacked, and it was claimed that the candidate was “surrounded by advisors” representing “reactionary elements.” If elected, “Ike would act as a regent and [Ohio’s conservative Senator Robert A.] Taft would hold the reins.” Indeed, the New Republic repeated the oft-cited comparison between Eisenhower and another hapless general-turned-politician, Ulysses S. Grant.

Throughout his term as President and for many years thereafter, the liberal intelligentsia remained markedly unimpressed with Dwight Eisenhower. They considered him an unlearned dullard, “an indecisive leader overwhelmed—or bored—by duties that called for intellect and firmness.” His news conferences were particularly ridiculed. His answers to the reporters’ queries were often considered uninformed, vague, and inartically presented. Indeed, he was called “a ‘captive hero’ in the clutches of his ‘palace guard’ of unelected assistants and millionaire cabinet advisors.” Ike was a “limited” man, suffering from “naïveté.”

As times change, however, so do interpretations of past figures and events. Both Ike and Adlai are now seen quite differently.

First, as to the tarnishing of Stevenson’s image, much was written about Stevenson immediately following his death in 1965, most of it very favorable. The less adulatory reassessment really began when John Bartlow Martin, a longtime Stevenson aide, published his comprehensive biography of Stevenson in two volumes in 1976 and 1977. While the portrait Martin painted was on the whole favorable, the paragon of the 1950s was often hard to find. For example, Martin revealed that the Governor was scarcely as well-read as earlier supposed. He described Stevenson’s study at his Libertyville farm home as being filled with numerous books.

56. Brant, supra note 52, at 6.
60. Id. at 28-29.
61. Id. at 29.
63. H. Muller, supra note 16, at 107.
encrusted not only with his own speeches and books by and about him, but also . . . a disorderly collection of books, mostly on current foreign affairs, sent to him by publishers or authors, written by such people as James Byrnes, Barbara Ward, Thomas K. Finletter, Chester Bowles, Theodore H. White, James P. Warburg, and Walter Lippmann.66

Despite his collection, however, "Stevenson was not a great reader, and few of the books . . . show much evidence of having been read."67 Indeed, Stevenson, Martin suggested, was never really an intellectual at all, contrary to widely accepted opinion. Close aide Newton Minow once said:

I never thought of him as an intellectual. He was not a great reader. Not a great student. He complained that he never had time to read a book but the fact is that he did not want to read a book [although] . . . he knew it was important to read books.68

Stevenson was an aural person . . . A lonely man after his divorce, he did not occupy his free time by reading but, rather, by seeing people. He always had people around him, was never alone if he could help it (despite his repeated protestations that what he wanted was quiet time, time to be alone, time to read, time to think). He was remarkably lacking the internal resources that enable men to live alone and think and read. Despite his powerful appeal to intellectuals, he was not really himself an intellectual.69

If that was the case, with what sources were those magnificent speeches written, speeches considered to be such eloquent literary masterpieces by such liberal intellectual publications as the New Republic? "[A]n encyclopedia, a Bible, an anthology of quotations, plus three shelves of books on Lincoln," reported Martin.70 Not a very broad range of intellectual sources.

George Ball, another close Stevenson associate, in his 1982 autobiography,71 also described Stevenson as scarcely the intellectual he had previously been presumed to be. Writing about preparations for the 1956 presidential campaign, Ball mentioned that the Governor attended

few meetings and when he did attend gave little evidence of having read the position papers. That reinforced my long-held suspicion that he had little taste for the arduous laboratory work of dissecting tough issues, cutting through the gristle to the bone, and paring away the obfuscating tissue. He preferred to talk generally about problems and was bored by their technical complexities.72

66. J. Martin, supra note 64, at 129.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 473.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 128-29.
72. Id. at 132-33.
Ball also called Stevenson indecisive, a quality even his admirers in the 1950s faulted him for, and criticized him for "overdramatiz[ing] his own predicament—portraying himself as a hero beset by temptations, while at the same time indulging in a self-disparagement that was tinged with artifice." Martin had also referred to Stevenson’s long recognized characteristic of indecisiveness, claiming:

[Stevenson] seemed to lack direction. Though he had a great capacity for leading, in the behind-the-scenes labor of running a government or a campaign it was always hard to get him to focus on a problem until he really must; and sometimes then it was too late . . . . [B]etween crises he drifted, fretted more about future planning than he planned, left it to his staff. And this pattern persisted throughout his presidential campaigns and his UN ambassadorship.

Although Adlai Stevenson was considered the hardworking champion of many liberal causes, privately he appears not quite so democratic. Martin presents Stevenson, particularly in his younger days, as something of a snob. At Choate, Princeton, and Harvard Law School, he tended to associate only with the tonier sets. He appeared to be constantly immersed in "society" at one elite gathering or another. Indeed, the young Stevenson comes through in Martin’s volumes as a club man through and through, a "gentleman" of the type most commonly found in F. Scott Fitzgerald novels. In this vein, he was sometimes seen to display a "hint of prejudice" common to those in that grouping. One day, according to Martin, in describing his father’s visit to Harvard, Stevenson remarked that his elder was “‘very impressed with the display of erudition not to mention the thirsty intellects of the semitic element.’” This remark about Jews, according to Martin, was “not an isolated instance. It flawed Stevenson’s attitudes for years.” Admittedly, Martin explains this prejudice away as common to those of Stevenson’s socially prominent background. Stevenson appears, however, to have remained throughout his private life a snobbish aristocrat whose idea of the perfect weekend was to sit about in leisurely “pleasure with attractive wealthy people in elegant country surroundings.”

Indeed, in the words of George Ball, “‘Adlai was never a real liberal.’” As Martin puts it:

In domestic affairs [as governor, Stevenson] . . . had pursued conservative
fiscal policies and had not liked the drift of power to Washington. His instincts were conservative. [Arthur] Schlesinger [Jr.] considered Stevenson illiberal on civil rights and economics . . . . When Stevenson became a national figure in the Democratic Party, which was dominated by liberals at the time, he had to abandon conservative ideas he had picked up in Bloomington and Lake Forest. He abandoned them reluctantly. More than once during the 1952 campaign Schlesinger protested to Stevenson strongly about [his Vice Presidential candidate and Alabaman] John Sparkman's remarks on civil rights. Stevenson seemed unmoved. More than once Schlesinger and others tried to push him into a strongly pro-labor position. But Stevenson seemed convinced that Truman was in trouble because he was regarded as the captive of labor. . . . He finally refused to say that he favored repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act. Carl McGowan [another key Stevenson aide and later a federal judge] once said that after the [1952 Democratic] convention several liberal members of the Truman administration came out to Springfield from Washington to discuss their views with the man who might become their leader. Some of them went back to Washington dazed and shocked by what they regarded as Stevenson's conservatism.8

Although regarded by many in his heyday as most elegant and urbane, by the end of his life, according to George Ball, Adlai Stevenson "'sort of went to seed.'"84 He became a glutton—too much to eat, out at parties too often and too late, surrounded by too many sycophants. He was "'overweight,'"88 and "'sneaked food like an alcoholic.'"86 He became rather pitiful. Ball noted with particular poignancy Stevenson's last years:

"This business of living in New York with all these middle-aged women—all of them very rich—some of them public figures—he loved the fact that he couldn't walk through the streets of New York without being recognized. He loved the fact that he got great adulation from very rich women. That was his destruction. I had a funny sense about Adlai. It was symbolic. He—well, you don't get lean and healthy from adulation—you get overweight and despairing. There was a certain self-destruction in Adlai's early death. I used to tease him about it a little—tell him he was letting himself go because he really didn't have it any longer. And he knew it was a very phony life—the UN—divorced from the reality of politics—living in the un-critical adulation of these women all the time—adulation largely on the part of people that didn't count—and not being where the real decisions were being made. It was a study in futility. Yet he couldn't break free of it."87

To the public and to his intellectual admirers, Stevenson was an ebullient, witty intellect, but to Martin and Ball he seemed a lonely and unhappy man. He had grown up in a turbulent and very unpleasant family setting.88 His
mother and father did not get along; in Martin’s words, they “‘fought all the
time’”88 and lived apart a great deal of the time,89 foretelling Stevenson’s own
unhappy marriage and divorce.90 Although his parents were socially prominent
people, the home in which Stevenson was raised seems to have been no happy
place.91 Their “miserable married life”92 quite clearly had an effect on young
Adlai.94 Of perhaps even greater impact was a 1912 accident in the Stevenson
home in which the twelve-year-old Adlai, while playing with a rifle, accidently
shot and killed a young girl.95 The episode was obviously most traumatic and
painful to Stevenson, and the memory of it, suggests Martin, continued to
haunt him for the rest of his life.96 Could his lifelong “self-doubts and protesta-
tions of unworthiness”97 perhaps have resulted from this occurrence?98 Mc-
Keever asks the same and related questions, and then terminates his discussion
of the incident this way: “A definitive clue to the mysteries embedded in these
questions can be found in a letter he wrote in 1955 to a woman he did not
know, whose son had been involved in a similar accident. ‘Tell him,’ Adlai
wrote, ‘that he must live for two.’”99

Now, a dozen years after Martin’s full biography of Stevenson, and half a
dozen years after George Ball’s autobiography, we have the summing up by
Porter McKeever. How does he see his subject from the vantage point of the
quarter century since Stevenson’s death and in light of the revisionist tenden-
cies of other former colleagues of Adlai? Can McKeever defend Stevenson
against the less than adulatory assessments by Martin and Ball? Essentially,
the answer is no. True, on one point McKeever is at pains to exonerate Adlai.
He spends many pages explaining why Adlai was perceived as being indeci-
sive. From Adlai’s first uncertainties about running for governor of Illinois in
1948100 to his last wavering about how long to stay on at the United Na-
tions,101 McKeever attempts, only in part successfully, to explain why Adlai
was not in fact indecisive and why he appeared to others to be so.102 In the
case of that first governor’s race, he says, “Those involved at the time argued
that his apparent indecisiveness was more the product of his wanting to involve
as many as possible of those close to him in the decision and to make sure he
was giving it balanced consideration . . .”103

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 35.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 42-43.
96. Id. at 44-45.
97. Id. at 43.
98. Id. at 44-45.
100. Id. at 112-13.
101. Id. at 563.
102. Id. at 114.
103. Id. at 113-14.
McKeever is less impressed, however, with Adlai’s perceived indecisiveness at the United Nations in 1961.104 Adlai had tried to make it appear that he was interested in running for the Senate in order to strengthen his position at the United Nations within the Kennedy administration.105 He succeeded, however, “the President recognized but was not amused by the purpose behind Adlai’s ploy.”106 Indeed, Kennedy was one of those who perceived Stevenson as indecisive:

Adlai enjoyed playing intellectual games with a problem. At best this was irritating to Kennedy, who was direct, practical, operational and preferred crisp, concise statements. It caused him to feel that Adlai could not make up his mind . . . Adlai’s [humor] was more discursive, and its self-derogatory quality contributed to Kennedy’s perception that he was uncertain and indecisive.107

With respect to most of the other faults cited by Martin and Ball, McKeever is also unable, in all honesty, to exonerate Stevenson. Adlai was, it appears, socially something of a snob in spite of his lofty, liberal speeches.108 He was a somewhat self-indulgent man who preferred an endless social schedule of rich meals with wealthy women to reading books.109 He did indeed dislike the nitty-gritty of detail that makes up so much of the world of work, whether it be in the law or public service.110

In stark contrast to Adlai Stevenson’s early life, Dwight Eisenhower’s boyhood was untouched by the tony upper-class privilege and the painful turbulence that characterized Stevenson’s childhood. Stephen Ambrose, in his biography of Eisenhower, speaks of Ike’s upbringing:

It is easy, and tempting, to romanticize Eisenhower’s family background. Living in the Norman Rockwell setting of turn-of-the-century Abilene, David and Ida Eisenhower instilled in their sons the time-honored virtues. They could serve as a definition of what most Americans think good parents should be. And the success of each of their six sons in their six different careers seems to provide proof that they were as ideal as they appear at first glance.111

Eisenhower grew up in a happy, loving, unpretentious—even financially strapped—small town home.112 Especially happy and loving was his mother, as opposed to his much more “aloof,” stern, and authoritative father.113 This background may help explain his pleasant, open, and self-confident adult per-

104. Id. at 504.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 504-05.
107. Id. at 491.
108. Id. at 46.
109. Id. at 505, 555.
110. Id. at 342.
112. Id. at 18-19.
113. Id. at 21.
sonality. Even as a child Ike demonstrated the leadership and organizational skills so important in adult life.

It was in sports that he first discovered his talents as a leader and an organi-

zer. As a boy, he provided the energy and leadership that led to a Saturday afternoon game of football or baseball. Later, he was one of the or-

ganizers of the Abilene High School Athletic Association, which operated independently of the school system . . . . Dwight also organized camping and hunting trips. He got the boys together, collected the money, hired the livery rig to take them to Lyons Creek, twenty miles south of Abilene, bought the food, and did the cooking.114

As a student at West Point, after his own brilliant career as a halfback was aborted by an injury, he helped coach the football team.115 Ambrose suggests:

[t]he act of coaching brought out his best traits—his organizational ability, his energy and competitiveness, his enthusiasm and optimism, his willingness to work hard at a task that intrigued him, his powers of concentration, his talent for working with the material he had instead of hoping for what he did not have, and his gift for drawing the best out of his players.116

Later in life, Eisenhower himself spoke of his coaching days, both at West Point and at many Army posts in his early career: “I believe that football, perhaps more than any other sport, tends to instill in men the feeling that victory comes through hard—almost slavish—work, team play, self-confidence, and an enthusiasm that amounts to dedication.”117 These traits that Eisen-

hower demonstrated at a young age would be an integral part of his personal-

ity as an adult and were evident throughout his career.

This brings us to Eisenhower’s changing image. The former and longtime Senator, J. William Fulbright, a noted liberal Democrat and once the “domi-

nant intellectual force in Congress,”118 was asked in 1983 for which United States President he had the most respect. Interestingly enough, in his reply Fulbright did not mention such Democratic luminaries as John Kennedy or Harry Truman, but instead cited Eisenhower.119 He told the New York Times:

My respect for Eisenhower grows almost daily. There wasn’t this machismo factor like Kennedy and Johnson and Reagan. He refused, over great pres-

sures from Dulles and Nixon and others, to go to Dienbienphu in Vietnam.
He did not get us entangled in these foreign ventures. The country was eco-

nomically strong. He understood foreign policy.120

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114. Id. at 35.
115. Id. at 51.
116. Id.
117. Id.
119. Id.
This reply was dramatically different from what a liberal Democrat’s response would have been only a few years earlier, but it was symptomatic of the positive reappraisal of Dwight Eisenhower underway in both intellectual and political communities.

Dwight Eisenhower, the man who The New Yorker’s liberal Washington correspondent, Richard Rovere, characterized in 1956 as possessing a mind that was “unschematic” and “distrustful of fine distinctions,” has recently been looked upon as an individual of “keen intelligence.” Once viewed as simple, amiable, and politically inept, Ike emerges in recent assessments as a tough, hardened, savvy politician who successfully concealed from public view his partisanship and fiery temper toward friend and foe. The image of the golf-playing, benign, inactive “head of state” has been replaced with that of a hardworking “politically informed” leader of party and country. No longer a conservative “captive hero,” Ike has lately even been seen as a praiseworthy leader in the fight for liberal values, adroitly blocking right-wing quests for dominance.

As long ago as 1967, former New York Post editor and columnist Murray Kempton, a liberal working for a very liberal paper, anticipated the switch in opinion on Eisenhower. He wrote an article in Esquire magazine entitled, “The Underestimation of Dwight D. Eisenhower.” In this piece, Kempton described Ike as a man of “marvelous intelligence,” calling Eisenhower:

the President most superbly equipped for truly consequential decision we may ever have had, a mind neither rash nor hesitant, free of the slightest concern for how things might look, indifferent to any sentiment, as calm when he was demonstrating the wisdom of leaving a bad situation alone as when he was moving to meet it on those occasions when he absolutely had to . . . . [H]e was the great tortoise upon whose back the world sat for eight years. We laughed at him; we talked wistfully about moving; and all the while we never knew the cunning beneath the shell.

No longer considered an amiable “boob,” Eisenhower slowly acquired a reputation for a steely tough intellect, a mind capable of precise, rational, detached analysis.

In his 1979 biography of Eisenhower, historian Elmo Richardson dealt at
length with Eisenhower's intellectual prowess.\textsuperscript{130} He stated that the "[P]resident's private papers reveal a predilection for precision and logic."\textsuperscript{131} Although the President's official statements were produced by underlings, he played a significant role in their writing, issuing "lengthy and specific instructions to them, mercilessly edit[ing] their drafts, and just as savagely edit[ing] his own revisions up until the moment a statement was issued."\textsuperscript{132} Ike was not, as suggested by intellectuals in the 1952 campaign, a simpleton, merely parroting what others had written. Richardson specifically attacked the "captive hero" criticism directed at Eisenhower. He recounted the President's method of dealing with subordinates as an indication of his sharp intellect:

> At work in the Oval Office, the president proceeded steadily—occasionally with what he described as "ordered haste"—but never impulsively. As he listened to briefings by an assistant, he gave the impression by frowning or doodling that his thoughts were wandering; then he precisely recapitulated the main points and fired questions that would put his staff member on the spot. . . . Such behavior seemed contentious, but he was actually encouraging his subordinate to consider the alternatives and consequences involved in the problem . . . . At the close of some discussions he would gently make suggestions that were, of course, instructions . . . .\textsuperscript{133}

Finally, Richardson criticized suggestions that Eisenhower was unread. He noted that the President "preferred to read books by men who had carried out responsible tasks or who wrote about such men."\textsuperscript{134} Ike particularly enjoyed the works of philosopher Eric Hoffer, "whose The True Believer expressed the president's own attitude on individuality endangered by a mass society."\textsuperscript{135} It was only because Eisenhower did not discuss his reading habits publicly that he gained the reputation that he was no intellect, Richardson suggested.\textsuperscript{136}

The liberal political commentator Theodore White has also written of Dwight Eisenhower's sharp intellect.\textsuperscript{137} In his autobiographical work, In Search of History, White remarked that like many in earlier days, he too "had made the mistake . . . of considering Ike a simple man, a good straightforward soldier."\textsuperscript{138} In actuality,

\begin{quote}
Ike's mind was not flaccid; and gradually, reporting him as he performed, I found that his mind was tough, his manner deceptive; that the rosy public smile could give way, in private, to furious outbursts of temper; that the tangled, rambling rhetoric of his off-the-cuff remarks could, when he
\end{quote}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{130} See E. Richardson, supra note 59.
\bibitem{131} Id. at 28.
\bibitem{132} Id.
\bibitem{133} Id. at 29-30.
\bibitem{134} Id. at 28.
\bibitem{135} Id.
\bibitem{136} Id.
\bibitem{137} T. White, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure (1978).
\bibitem{138} Id. at 347.
\end{thebibliography}
wished, be disciplined by his own pencil into clean, hard prose.139

Henry Kissinger was another intellectual whose perception of Eisenhower changed radically over time. While teaching at Harvard, Kissinger had written several works deploring "‘the vacuum of leadership’ " in the Eisenhower administration, "‘a view I have since changed.’"140 Kissinger was reported to have met with the dying Eisenhower shortly after the Nixon inauguration and was visibly impressed with Ike's "vividly forceful personality and great political sophistication and interest."141 Kissinger recalled that Eisenhower's "forcefulness was surprising. His syntax which seemed so awkward in print, became much more graphic when enlivened by his cold, deep blue, extraordinarily penetrating eyes and when given emphasis by his still commanding voice."142 Kissinger was much taken by the former President's political awareness and sharp mind.

Of all historians examining the period, it is Fred Greenstein of Princeton who appears most impressed with Eisenhower's personality and intellect. In his 1982 book on Eisenhower entitled The Hidden Hand Presidency, Greenstein calls Ike a man with a "keen analytic mind," that resulted in a "clear incisiveness" of expression.143 Greenstein suggests that the famed Eisenhower press conferences, cited by some as proof of the President's lack of brilliance because of their "intellectual thinness and syntactical flaws,"144 were purposefully lackluster.145 Eisenhower's seemingly rambling and uninformed performances actually resulted from caution. With press conferences open to quotation and broadcast, "an inadvertent misstatement in public would be a calamity." But . . . realizing that "it is far better to stumble or speak guardedly than to move ahead smoothly and risk imperilling the country," by consistently focusing on ideas rather than on phrasing, he "was able to avoid causing the nation a serious setback through anything [he] . . . said in many hours, over eight years of intensive questioning."146

There were many matters that the President thought best left undisclosed. To prevent damaging disclosure, he either feigned ignorance of the matter or replied in double talk to confuse the issue thoroughly.147 Thus, his press conference performances, far from indicating Ike's ineptitude, were actually demonstrative of his political savvy. Greenstein also speaks of numerous private memoranda, which Eisenhower had composed, as reflecting his intellect:

139. Id.
140. F. GREENSTEIN, supra note 121, at 16-17.
141. Id. at 16.
142. Id. at 17.
143. Id. at 18.
144. Id. at 19.
145. Id. at 19-20.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 66-70.
They include dispassionate, closely reasoned assessments of contemporary issues and personalities that belie the amiable, informal, and often vague usages of his press conference discourse. Startlingly, for a man who seemed, to as acute an observer as Richard Rovere, to have an "unschematic" mind, many of his confidential writings display geometric precision in stating the basic conditions shaping a problem, deducing their implications, and weighing the costs and benefits of alternative possible responses.\(^{148}\)

To Greenstein and others, then, Eisenhower possessed a first-rate intellect. Not only do contemporary writers now suggest that Eisenhower was a man of superior intellectual ability, he is no longer considered to have been a political neophyte. Ike now has developed a reputation as an intense, tough, skilled political operator and, indeed, as a manipulator. Herbert Parmet suggests that Eisenhower had "a remarkable political instinct . . . he knew how to manipulate men, to use them for his purpose and then cut them loose."\(^{149}\) Greenstein also paints the portrait of a shrewd, intense politician.

In contrast with a previous view of him as being somewhat lazy, Ike is now seen as a man of tremendous "restless energy."\(^{150}\) This energy made the numerous meetings the President attended most disconcerting to the others present. Dillon Anderson, his National Security Advisor,

> was one of many . . . who described the way Eisenhower would get up and pace the floor in an informal meeting as his enthusiasm mounted. "He was a man of a lot of native animal energy, which came out when a subject stirred him up, and he used to get up and walk the floor."\(^{151}\)

Greenstein states that although Eisenhower

subjected himself to the passive context of regular long meetings and more tightly packed, longer work schedules than he chose to publicize, his physical comportment in meetings revealed his force and drive. His concentration was intense: his excess energy spilled over as he would doodle, finger his glasses, swivel in his chair, and look at other speakers with piercing bright blue eyes that innumerable observers sensed as windows to an inner dynamism.\(^{152}\)

The Eisenhower workday began early in the morning and generally did not end until late at night, and he often extended this schedule into the weekend.\(^{153}\) The length and fullness of his schedule, however, was never publicized, in contrast to his highly touted periods of relaxation, which included much golf.\(^{154}\) This probably led to his contemporary reputation for passivity and laziness. The President, however, purposely concealed his hard work because

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148. *Id.* at 20.
151. *Id.* at 40.
152. *Id.*
153. *Id.* at 41.
154. *Id.* at 39-40.
“[p]ublicity . . . would have been discordant with the impression he conveyed of being a president who so successfully maintained national and international order that he did not have to work intensively around-the-clock” —a seemingly shrewd, politically inspired action. Indeed, “[t]he much publicized golfing trips, the working vacations, and even the Wild West stories he read at bedtime, which many critics suggested were the outward signs of a passive president with a flaccid mind,” were actually medically required “prescriptions for winding down a man whose drive and intensity needed to be kept in check.” Even then, periods of “relaxation” were not all that relaxing:

Golfing companions describe the stubborn determination he would pour into replaying an unsatisfactory shot. And what he liked about bridge was the opportunity it gave him to focus sharply on the solution to a logical problem and at the same time master the psychology of effective cooperation with his partner and competition with his opponents.

If, then, the public image of President Eisenhower throughout his term in office was that of an amiable “non-political chief of state” as opposed to a partisan activist, historian Greenstein claims that Eisenhower’s image was not an adequate reflection of the realities of the Eisenhower presidency. Rather, it was an image purposely cultivated by the President in order to render himself both politically effective and nationally popular. Greenstein suggests that the presidency of the United States is really a most unique office combining the usually separate roles of prime minister—a partisan position—and chief of state—a nonpolitical position. In order to reconcile these seemingly conflicting roles, and “balance the contradictory expectations that a president be a national unifier yet nevertheless engage in the divisive exercise of political leadership,” Eisenhower conducted a “hidden-hand Presidency,” whereby to the public he appeared nonpartisan, above politics, “a proper chief of state,” yet at the same time acting decisively behind the scenes to effectuate his partisan political objectives. Acting in this manner enabled Eisenhower to be successful, Greenstein claims, in both roles. He was able “to exercise power without seeming to flex his muscles.” Indeed, “[o]n the assumption that a president who is predominantly viewed in terms of his political prowess will lose public support by not appearing to be a proper chief of state, Eisenhower

155. Id. at 42.
156. Id. at 39.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 5.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 57.
163. Id. at 57, 58-65.
164. Id. at 5.
165. Id. at 57.
went to great lengths to conceal the political side of his leadership.”

Greenstein describes a number of episodes demonstrating Eisenhower's energetic political leadership. For example, Eisenhower could be impressively energetic in pushing his legislative program through Congress. Both the centrist domestic program and the internationalist foreign policy he pursued brought much opposition from such conservative Republicans as Senators Robert Taft of Ohio and William Knowland of California. Ike therefore devoted a great deal of time and effort in attempting to moderate their opposition and lessen its impact. In fact, to ensure the success of his 1954 legislative program, Eisenhower covertly acted to bring pressure to bear on Senate Democratic Leader Lyndon Johnson to coerce his support, “using a wealthy Johnson supporter.”

In this connection, Eisenhower, through Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, apparently attempted to push Texas oil multimillionaire and Johnson backer Sid Richardson to “get [Johnson] . . . on the right channel, or threaten to get [Texas Governor Allen] Shivers in a primary and beat him for Senate.’”

Eisenhower’s most telling example of political leadership was his covert activity designed to bring about the downfall of Senator Joseph McCarthy. While many liberals in the 1950s attacked Eisenhower for supposedly refusing to take any action against McCarthy, Greenstein counters this criticism, devoting many pages to describing the hitherto undisclosed direct and indirect efforts Eisenhower made to “eliminate[ McCarthy's influence”.

Though Eisenhower was far from being the only (or even the decisive) agent of McCarthy's political demise, upon taking office he quickly recognized the importance of defusing the senator. He formulated and even summarized in his private diary a basic strategy for accomplishing this, a strategy he continued to use, but adjusted and supplemented during the periods of McCarthy's seemingly unchallenged sovereignty in 1953 and his precipitous decline in 1954.

Greenstein claims that, contrary to earlier belief, Eisenhower was quite active in the drive to destroy McCarthy, although he acted in both subtle and undisguised ways. Throughout 1953 and 1954, there was apparently a flurry of secret White House strategy sessions to devise various ways to undermine McCarthy's power within the Republican party and derail his quest for popular

166. Id. at 5.
167. Id. at 70-72.
168. Id. at 68-72.
169. Id. at 59.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 155-227.
172. Id. at 157.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 158-227 (describing various strategies imposed by the Eisenhower administration “for dealing with McCarthy”).
A behind-the-scenes strategy of manipulation was developed. Cryptic public remarks were made by the President, which though not referring to McCarthy by name, were designed to steadily erode the Senator's respectability through praise of those men and institutions he had attacked. Finally, Eisenhower directed a private "hidden-hand" campaign with Republican congressional leaders to eradicate McCarthy's influence within the Senate itself.

Greenstein also confirms that Dwight Eisenhower was not nearly as conservative as liberals in the 1950s believed him to be. In this context, much was made at the time of his hobnobbing with rich businessmen such as Cliff Roberts at the posh Augusta National Golf Club or other sporting retreats. Much was also made of his cabinet of, in the New Republic's phrase, "eight millionaires and one plumber," his Secretary of Labor, Martin Durkin. In fact, Ike was moderate to liberal in most areas, with the significant exception, in many views, of school desegregation.

It was his abiding belief in internationalism, and the fear that right-wing Republicans such as Robert Taft would, if in power, act to return the nation to isolationism, that avowedly caused Eisenhower to become the Republican candidate for President in 1952. He also felt that domestically the Republican party must move more leftward, toward the center, in order to survive. While preparing the 1953 budget, he felt that "it was vital to include measures in the administration program that would proclaim 'broad and liberal objectives in certain fields'" such as "(a) slum clearance and public housing, (b) utilization of America's water resources, (c) extension of social security and old age benefits.'"

[Eisenhower] sought to keep the public from perceiving the Republicans as

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., id. at 161. On June 14, 1951, McCarthy attacked "Eisenhower's mentor George Marshall for 'losing China.'" Eisenhower responded "by going out of his way on August 22[, 1952] to pay impassioned tribute to his former chief in one of his first campaign conferences." Id. But see E. Cray, General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman 728-29 (1990). Cray tells us of Eisenhower's "stumble" in Wisconsin, McCarthy's home state. Id. at 728. Eisenhower had planned to deliver a speech in Wisconsin "strongly praising" Marshall, but, under pressure from McCarthy, he deleted those comments. Id. "When word of the deletion leaked to newsmen, Harry Truman was quick to rake Eisenhower for having 'betrayed his principles' and 'deserted his friends.'" Id.
178. See, e.g., F. Greenstein, supra note 121, at 195-96 (discussing Eisenhower's support of "a Senate Eisenhower republican, Vermont's Ralph Flanders, who accused 'the junior Senator from Wisconsin' of 'doing his best to shatter the party whose label he wears'.")
179. Id. at 169-227, 212.
181. See infra note 185 (discussing, among other things, Eisenhower's record on civil rights).
182. F. Greenstein, supra note 121, at 49. Interestingly, it was also Stevenson's opposition to Midwestern isolation that drew him into public life prior to World War II. J. Martin, supra note 64, at 167-73.
183. F. Greenstein, supra note 121, at 51.
the party of big business while at the same time thwarting passage of “radical” Democratic programs by initiating moderate Republican alternatives . . . . Eisenhower hoped that by enunciating “broad and liberal objectives,” advancing moderate improvements in social programs, and establishing a reputation . . . for fostering a thriving economy, he could . . . reconstitute the electoral base of his party . . . depriv[ing] the Democrats of their corner on “the common man.”

CONCLUSION

In sum, our earlier images of Stevenson and Eisenhower now seem somewhat reversed. It now appears that it was Eisenhower who was energetic, decisive, cerebral, involved, focused, disciplined, in control, democratic, and, on balance, liberal, while Stevenson tended to be vague, superficial, unintellectual, removed, self-indulgent, drifting, snobbish, and rather conservative. Perhaps in time our views will change again, given the complexity of each man, but the dramatically shifting views of both men should at least give us some pause about contemporaneous judgments of political leaders, shouldn’t it?

184. Id. at 50-52.

185. For a report on a symposium at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, commemorating the centennial of Eisenhower's birth, celebrating him “most of all for his personal magnetism, his political balance, his historical perspective and his organizational skills,” see Apple, On His Centennial, They Still Like Ike, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1990, at A16, cols. 1-3, stating:

Few critical words were heard this weekend about Eisenhower, and most of those concerned his record on civil rights. Professor Ambrose argued that Eisenhower's failure to "stand before the American people and say that segregation was morally wrong" validated segregation in the eyes of many Southerners.

But Herbert Brownell, Jr., the 87-year-old former attorney General [under Eisenhower] strongly disagreed. . . . Mr. Brownell cited the appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice, the desegregation of Washington and the decision to send troops to Little Rock, Ark., however slow in coming, as demonstrations of Eisenhower's commitment to racial progress.

Id.

For an appraisal of Eisenhower's foreign policy skills, see supra note 120 and accompanying text.


For a favorable review of Stevenson's prescience in that he "expressed doubts about the Cold War, warned that the U.S. could not afford to court Europe at the expense of the Third World, and that Americans were entering an era of limits," see Washington Post, Feb. 17, 1991 (Book World) at 12, col. 1. Stevenson's early concern with arms control might also have been mentioned in this context.