September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage Comes Home

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INTRODUCTION

The federal government responded swiftly to the mass destruction and horrible loss of life on September 11, 2001. Quickly initiating a war on terror, the U.S. government pursued military action in Afghanistan. The violation of the civil rights of Arab and Muslim noncitizens in the United States followed as well. In the months immediately after September 11, the federal government arrested, interrogated, and detained more than one thousand Arab and Muslim "material witnesses" without charging them with crimes. Congress swiftly passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Proving Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), which, among other things amended the immigration laws in important ways. Although Arab and Muslim noncitizens felt the brunt of the civil rights deprivations in the immediate...
aftermath of September 11, immigrants in general will suffer the long-term consequences of the many measures taken by the federal government in the name of fighting terrorism.

The U.S. government directed drastic measures at noncitizens, in part because the law affords great deference to the executive branch in immigration and national security matters. This Article analyzes important collateral damage of the “war on terrorism,” specifically the impact of the government’s response to September 11 on the Mexican immigrant community in the United States, as well as on prospective Mexican immigrants and temporary visitors. More than 200,000 immigrants from Mexico came to the United States in 2001 alone, the largest contingent of migrants from any nation and almost 20% of all immigrants to this country. In addition, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has estimated that, at least as of 1996, more than 2.7 million undocumented immigrants from Mexico, over half of the total undocumented population, live in the United States. In sum, Mexican citizens comprise the largest group of immigrants, legal and undocumented, in the United States.

As we will see, past immigration reforms in response to terrorism fears offer sobering lessons for immigrants. The history of ideological


6. Indeed, the indefinite detention of Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen who had converted to Islam, arrested in the United States, but labeled an “enemy combatant” and held without being charged with a crime, suggests that citizens as well as noncitizens should be concerned about the powers of the government in these times. See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); David Johnston, F.B.I. Talked of Following Bomb Suspect Before Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at A32; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (addressing claims of another U.S. citizen held as an “enemy combatant”).


regulation, including severe steps in the name of fighting the communist threat such as ideological exclusion and deportation, indefinite detention, and similar extreme measures, shows the extremes that U.S. immigration laws have gone to protect the nation's security. Recent events fit in well with the historical pattern. In 1996, Congress enacted immigration reform legislation, motivated in no small part by a desire to fight terrorism, which adversely impacted the immigrant community as a whole. The reforms resulted in record levels of deportations, including the removal of thousands of Mexican nationals. Similarly, post-September 11 immigration restrictions, enforcement measures, and citizenship requirements will likely have a disparate impact on immigrants, particularly those from Mexico. To this point, little attention has been paid to the general impacts on the immigrant community of the U.S. government's response to the tragedy of September 11, 2001. As with immigration measures generally, the new enforcement measures will predominately impact people of color.

This Article focuses on concrete immigration law and policies affected by the events of September 11. The federal government's reaction, however, may well have stirred the nativist pot, thereby triggering a general antipathy for immigrants. The nasty efforts of one member of the U.S. Congress in the summer of 2002 to deport an undocumented honor student and his family to Mexico suggests the resurgence of a generalized anti-immigrant sentiment not limited to Arabs and Muslims. Nativism historically has proven difficult to limit to certain immigrant groups. For example, public concern with the use of public benefits by undocumented immigrants, exemplified

10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 43-130 and accompanying text.
14. See Hing, supra note 5 (documenting violence and hate crimes directed at immigrants after September 11).
by California’s Proposition 187,17 culminated in the denial of most benefits to legal immigrants in the 1996 welfare reform.18 In a similar vein, the attacks on immigrants may effectively amount to thinly veiled attacks on racial minorities, with U.S. citizens sharing the ancestry of certain immigrant groups stereotyped as “foreigners.”19 Consequently, the legal damage to the immigrant community outlined in this Article is only part of the entire picture.

Part II of this Article considers the possible immigration reforms that may come on the heels of September 11 and identifies how they might well have broad negative impacts on the immigrant community, including on many immigrants having nothing remotely to do with terrorism.20 Part III analyzes how September 11 put the brakes on reform efforts that would have benefited immigrants immensely and has encouraged law enforcement conduct that will likely have adverse effects on immigrant and minority communities,21 Ultimately, persons of Mexican ancestry—citizens and noncitizens—will be disparately affected by the legal changes triggered by September 11.

II. PAST IMMIGRATION REFORM AS PRELUDE? CHANGING IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT LAW AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

The leeway afforded the federal government in immigration matters allows the political branches to swiftly take aggressive actions, thereby appearing to respond to complex problems. Such actions historically have injured immigrant communities. A concrete example is the effort to seal the U.S./Mexico border as part of the “war on drugs” and halting undocumented immigration, which has had a limited impact in achieving those goals.22 However, heightened border enforcement


20. See infra notes 22-102 and accompanying text.

21. See infra notes 103-130 and accompanying text.

has resulted in increased race-based law enforcement\textsuperscript{23} and hundreds of deaths of Mexican citizens along the border.\textsuperscript{24}

In the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed two pieces of tough immigration legislation.\textsuperscript{25} As Professor Peter Schuck succinctly observed, the 1996 immigration reforms constituted "the most radical reform of immigration law in decades—or perhaps ever."\textsuperscript{26} Congress tightened the U.S. immigration laws despite the fact that a natural born U.S. citizen masterminded the Oklahoma City bombing, and there was absolutely no evidence of any involvement of foreign citizens.\textsuperscript{27} This recent history sheds valuable light on the downside potential of immigrant reforms in response to fears of terrorism spawned by the events of September 11.

A. Antiterrorism and Immigration Reform in 1996: Lessons About Reform in the Name of Terrorism

In the end, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) arguably did little to quell the threat of terrorism in the United States.\textsuperscript{28} However, AEDPA and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), passed just months later, denied judicial review of many deportation and related orders of the immigration bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{29} Not until 2001 did the Supreme Court resolve a conflict among the circuits and ensure that habeas corpus review of removal orders remained intact, a result that the executive branch strongly opposed at every step.\textsuperscript{30} Terrorism fears also fueled passage of a new summary exclusion procedure in 1996 by which a noncitizen could be barred admission into the country at the port of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{footnote24} See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
\bibitem{footnote26} \textsc{Peter H. Schuck, Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens} 143 (1998).
\bibitem{footnote29} See AEDPA, supra note 25, § 440; IIRIRA, supra note 25, §§ 306(a), (d), 308(g)(10)(H), 371(b)(6); see, e.g., Jennifer A. Beall, Note, \textit{Are We Only Burning Witches? The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's Answer to Terrorism}, 73 \textit{Ind. L.J.} 693, 705-07 (1998); Lisa C. Solbakken, Note, \textit{The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: Anti-Immigration Legislation Veiled in an Anti-Terrorism Pretext}, 63 \textit{Brook. L. Rev.} 1381, 1389-91 (1997).
\end{thebibliography}
entry by an INS officer without judicial review. In signing AEDPA into law, President Bill Clinton candidly admitted the collateral damage of the new law, which "makes a number of major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws having nothing to do with fighting terrorism." 

Besides limiting judicial review of a variety of immigration decisions, the 1996 reforms vastly expanded the definition of "aggravated felony," which subjects an immigrant to deportation (without judicial review) and mandatory detention. As Professor Nancy Morawetz aptly summarized, the expanded definition of "aggravated felony" has an Alice-in-Wonderland-like [quality]... As the term is defined, a crime need not be either aggravated or a felony. For example, a conviction for simple battery or for shoplifting with a one-year suspended sentence—either of which would be a misdemeanor... violation in most states—can be deemed an aggravated felony.


34. See INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000); INA 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2000). Indeed, the Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) took the extreme position that it could indefinitely detain criminal aliens subject to deportation who could not be deported because their native countries would not accept them: the Supreme Court held that Congress had not authorized such an extreme step, which would raise serious constitutional concerns. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).

To exacerbate matters for noncitizens, until the Supreme Court corrected the practice in 2001, the INS retroactively applied the new deportation grounds in the 1996 reforms to criminal convictions before passage of the law.

With the prodding of Congress, the INS made deportation of criminal aliens its highest priority. The 1996 immigration reforms resulted in record levels of deportations of "criminal aliens," with by far the largest number to Mexico. In fiscal year 1999, for example, the INS removed more than 48,000 (of a total of 62,359, or over 77%) Mexican nationals on criminal grounds. In fiscal year 1998, the INS removed over 170,000 noncitizens from the United States, with over 139,000 (over 80%) from Mexico on all grounds. Removals increased from 42,469 in fiscal year 1993 (with over 27,000, about 64 percent, from Mexico) to over 170,000 in fiscal year 1998, with over 147,000 (about 83%) from Mexico.

In sum, although AEDPA ostensibly was focused on terrorism, it and IIRIRA went well beyond that concern. Immigrants, especially those from Mexico, suffered.

B. The USA PATRIOT Act, Visa Monitoring, and Other Immigration Reforms

As suggested by the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, a congressional response to September 11 likely will include immigration reforms. Congress has already taken some initial steps in this direction; more are on the horizon.


40. See INS 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at 215, 217 tbl.65.

41. See id. at 218, 220, 222, 224 tbl.66.

42. See supra note 40 (citing authority).
The USA PATRIOT Act expands the definition of "terrorist activity" for purposes of the immigration laws in ways that may result in an additional removal ground for noncitizens convicted of assault and similar crimes.43 "Terrorist activity" thus has gone the way of "aggravated felony" for immigration purposes, expanded well beyond what one normally would consider to be truly "terrorist" in nature.44 The USA PATRIOT Act further provides that a spouse or child of a "terrorist" generally is inadmissible.45 A noncitizen also may be deemed inadmissible for being "associated with a terrorist organization," broad terms reminiscent of the principle of guilt by association, a discredited law enforcement technique popular during the dark days of the McCarthy era.46 Fears also have been expressed that the expanded definition of "terrorist activity" in the USA PATRIOT Act will adversely affect bona fide asylum-seekers fleeing persecution in their native lands.47

Although there is no evidence that the terrorists involved in the September 11 hijackings evaded border inspection, the USA PATRIOT Act appropriated funds for increased enforcement of the U.S./Canada border.48 The new funding responded to fears that terrorists might seek to enter the United States from Canada; on the eve

43. See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 4, § 411 (expanding definition of "terrorist activity" to include using any "explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property"). The Justice Department reportedly was considering a second USA PATRIOT Act, expanding the Federal government's powers in the "war on terrorism." See An Overzealous Patriot, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at pt. 2, p. 11.

44. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.

45. See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 4, § 411.


47. See Regina Germain, Rushing to Judgment: The Unintended Consequences of the USA PATRIOT Act for Bona Fide Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505 (2002).

48. See USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 4, § 402 (authorizing appropriations necessary to triple the Border Patrol personnel along northern border). The September 11 -airplane hijackers entered the country on visas. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
of the new millennium, the federal government arrested an Algerian man with bomb-making materials seeking to enter at the Canadian border who was plotting to bomb Los Angeles International Airport. Because the INS often utilizes race in border enforcement, one can expect an expansion of race-based immigration enforcement. One potential benefit, however, is that the USA PATRIOT Act may help shift the myopic focus from the southern border with Mexico, which saw a dramatic escalation in border enforcement in the 1990s resulting in hundreds, perhaps thousands, of deaths of undocumented Mexican citizens seeking to cross the border in desolate, inclement locations.

In sum, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of "terrorist activity" in ways that will offer the INS expanded powers to deport noncitizens having only the most attenuated connection to "terrorist activity." Border enforcement also will be bolstered. In light of the current national mood, the federal government can be expected to aggressively exercise such powers against noncitizens.

1. Visa Processing and Monitoring

Most of the September 11 airplane hijackers apparently entered the country on student visas, which understandably provoked concern. Concern erupted into a national furor when the INS sent visa renewals to two suspected hijackers many months after their deaths. Efforts by the INS to improve the monitoring of temporary visitors on student and other visas became a high priority.

Immediately after September 11, the State Department began to slow the processing of visa applications, especially in nations believed to harbor terrorists. In December 2001, the INS announced the ar-

50. See Johnson, supra note 23, at 904-06.
52. See Hing, supra note 51, at 135-44.
55. See Jason Dearen, For Immigration Lawyers, A Practice Completely Changed, Recorder (San Francisco), Sept. 11, 2002, at 6; Neil A. Lewis & Christopher Marquis, Longer Visa Waits
rests of noncitizens who had violated the terms of their student visas from nations with alleged terrorist links.\textsuperscript{56} Shortly after, the Justice Department announced that its “Operation Absconder” would focus deportation efforts on six thousand young Arab and Muslim men from the same nations.\textsuperscript{57}

The federal government followed nation-specific monitoring of student visas with across-the-board efforts. In May 2002, Congress passed the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act\textsuperscript{58} to improve the monitoring of noncitizens in the United States on student and other visas. Attorney General John Ashcroft later proposed a new National Security Entry-Exit Registration System that imposed special registration requirements on noncitizens who, as determined by the federal government, posed “national security risks.”\textsuperscript{59} Despite concerns that the proposed regulation would allow discrimination on the basis of race and religion, the final regulation was almost identical to the proposal.\textsuperscript{60}

In fiscal year 1998, Mexico was the third leading nation of origin of nonimmigrants (generally speaking, temporary visitors), sending over 65,000 nonimmigrants to the United States.\textsuperscript{61} As a consequence, even if tightened visa monitoring is not aimed directly at Mexican noncitizens, it will negatively impact them. Mexican students already have faced difficulties in entering the United States.\textsuperscript{62} More generally, tighter enforcement at the border has slowed trade and migration within North America, with economic and related consequences for Canada, the United States, and especially for Mexico.\textsuperscript{63}


\textsuperscript{57} See DOJ Focusing on Removal of 6,000 Men from Al Qaeda Haven Countries, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 115, 115 (2002); Deputy Attorney General Releases Internal Guidance for “Absconder” Apprehensions, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 261 (2002).


\textsuperscript{60} See 67 Fed. Reg. 52,584, 52,585 (Aug. 12, 2002). Registration later focused on Muslims and Arabs and resulted in hundreds of detentions. See Rights Groups Sue Due to Arrests of NSEERS Registrants, Lawmakers Respond to NSEERS Implementation, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 41 (2003); Megan Garvey et al., Hundreds are Detained After Visits to INS, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at pt. 1, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{61} See INS 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at 123 chart G.


In essence, increased visa monitoring, and more general concerns with the verification of the identity of noncitizens, have had ripple effects that have negatively affected the immigrant community. For example, the California governor vetoed a law that would have made certain groups of undocumented immigrants in California eligible for driver’s licenses—and would have given them access to a certain degree of security in U.S. society—because of concerns about identity fraud by terrorists after September 11.\textsuperscript{64} Efforts of the Social Security Administration to verify the social security numbers of employees have resulted in many undocumented immigrants losing their jobs.\textsuperscript{65}

As with immigration reform generally, increased monitoring of non-immigrants will adversely affect noncitizens from many countries. Mexican citizens will be disproportionately affected by increased efforts at visa monitoring.

2. \textit{Increased Immigration Enforcement}

As part of efforts at fighting terrorism, the U.S. government likely will pursue immigration enforcement policies that will adversely affect immigrants generally, not simply Arab or Muslim noncitizens. The Justice Department already has announced its intention to enforce the requirement that noncitizens report changes of address within ten days of moving or be subject to deportation.\textsuperscript{66} Enforcement of this reporting requirement likely will result in many more possible removal cases based on a technical, relatively minor violations of the law. Given Attorney General Ashcroft’s stated willingness to use the immigration laws, or, for that matter, any law, necessary to remove suspected “terrorists” from the country,\textsuperscript{57} it is troubling to see any expansion of the grounds for removal.

The most dramatic change in immigration enforcement may be the incorporation of the INS into the new Department on Homeland Security, the proposal of which stemmed directly from the events of Sep-


\textsuperscript{67} See Philip Shenon & Don Van Natta Jr., \textit{U.S. Says 3 Detainees May Be Tied to Hijackings}, \textit{N.Y. Times}, Nov. 1, 2002, at A1 (reporting that Attorney General “Ashcroft offered a detailed explanation of the government’s ‘spitting on the sidewalk’ policy, in which immigrants suspected of terrorist ties are apprehended for even minor, unrelated charges, just so long as they are taken off the street”).
September 11. The INS long has over-emphasized enforcement to the neglect of its service mission, which includes adjudication of visa and naturalization petitions. The reorganization may well result in an even greater over-emphasis on immigration enforcement in the name of “homeland security.” Consequently, the reorganization likely will exacerbate the enforcement priority of the INS and adversely affect noncitizens.

C. Citizenship Requirements

The Supreme Court has permitted state governments to impose citizenship requirements on state jobs that perform a “political function.” By executive order, the federal government has barred noncitizens from federal civil service jobs. As a result of the tragedy of September 11, the nation may well see a new round of citizenship requirements for a variety of jobs to ensure loyalty to the United States. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which placed airport security in the hands of the federal government, made U.S. citizenship a qualification for airport security personnel. The citizenship requirement injures many lawful immigrants who had held these low-wage jobs in airports across the country.


It was reported that over eighty percent of the security screeners at San Francisco International Airport and about forty percent of those at Los Angeles International Airport were lawful immigrants. Although immigrants can be conscripted into the military and stationed at airports, they no longer can work in airport security positions.

Immigration checks of airport employees have led to the arrests of undocumented persons. Few were of Arab or Muslim ancestry, and many almost invariably were from Asia and Latin America. Moreover, the INS enforcement focus on airports has generated fear and heightened insecurity in immigrant communities.

Discrimination based on alienage can have disparate impacts on particular national origin groups. For example, in *Cabell v. Chavez-Salido*, the Supreme Court in 1982 rejected an equal protection challenge to a California law interpreted to require that probation officers be citizens. For that reason, Los Angeles County did not hire Jose Chavez-Salido, a lawful permanent resident for twenty-six years who had been born in Mexico and had received all of his formal education, including a Bachelor of Arts degree, in the United States. After reviewing the history of the California law, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote in dissent that, "I can only conclude that California's exclusion of these appellees from the position of deputy probation officer stems solely from state parochialism and hostility toward foreigners who have come to this country lawfully."
Justice Blackmun’s hint has gone largely unexplored. The scholarship analyzing the alienage discrimination decisions of the Supreme Court focuses on the constitutionality of the states’ imposition of citizenship requirements, without considering their racial impacts.80 A few commentators, however, suggest the need for strict scrutiny of alienage classifications in part because they can mask racial animus.81 This argument finds historical support. At various times in U.S. history, alienage discrimination, with state “alien land” laws targeting Japanese Americans, a notorious example, has served as a device to discriminate on the basis of race.82

The federal government’s movement toward citizenship requirements can be expected to encourage state and local governments, as well as private employers to do the same. Even before September 11, immigrants often found it difficult to avoid discrimination by employers in the workplace. The most potent bar to employment discrimination—Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—does not prohibit discrimination based on immigration status.83 Although the immigration laws prohibit discrimination against noncitizens eligible to work, evidence suggests that discrimination by employers against persons of Latina/o and Asian ancestry continues to be a problem.84 New citi-

80. See, e.g., Bosniak, supra note 46, at 1086-1137; Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arro-
gation of Power: Alien Constellation in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591
(1994); Earl M. Maltz, A History and Critique of the Supreme Court’s Alienage Jurisprudence, 28

Review of Federal Alienage Classifications after Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 76 OR. L.
REV. 425 (1997); Tamra M. Boyd, Note, Keeping the Constitution’s Promise: An Argument for
Greater Judicial Scrutiny for Federal Alienage Classifications, 54 STAN. L. REV. 319, 338-41
(2001); Developments in the Law — Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1286, 1408 nn.57-58 (1983); see also Johnson, supra note 13, at 1505-08 (stating that discrim-
inination based on immigration status may mask racial discrimination because of the overlap be-
tween immigration status and race). Cf. Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martínez,
Discrimination by Proxy: The Case of Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227 (2000) (analyzing how English language proficiency can serve as a
proxy for race in controversy over bilingual education).

82. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258
(1925); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948) (addressing commercial fishing license regulation directed at Japanese immi-
grants); Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth Century “Alien Land Laws” As a
Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1998); 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 37 (1998) (con-
tending that alien land laws directed at Japanese immigrants in early twentieth century paved the
way for internment of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II).

83. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973); see also Ruben J. Garcia, Across the
(contending that Congress should amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to bar discrimi-
ination against immigrants authorized for employment under the law).

84. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND
zenship requirements will likely increase discrimination against Latina/os and Asian Americans, who are stereotyped as “foreign” even if they are U.S. citizens.  

Large numbers of lawful permanent residents from Mexico reside in the United States. Although Mexican naturalization rates have increased in recent years, many legal immigrants from Mexico live in the country and will be affected by the imposition of citizenship requirements.

D. Increased Local Involvement in Immigration Enforcement as a Threat to Civil Rights

The “war on terrorism” has caused the federal government to reconsider its exclusive domain over immigration enforcement and show a new willingness to delegate power to state and local law enforcement agencies to enforce the immigration laws. In the summer of 2002, for example, the Justice Department entered an agreement with Florida to train a group of police officers to assist in the enforcement of the immigration laws. This devolution-to-the-states movement ultimately could change the entire balance of immigration law enforcement power, which until relatively recently was almost exclusively in the hands of the federal government.

State and local involvement in immigration enforcement warrants concern because of the many civil rights violations of immigrants by local authorities, even though not officially in the business of immigra-


86. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

87. See INS 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at 180 tbl.48 (showing that Mexican immigrants who naturalized had increased from 18,520 in fiscal year 1989 to over 217,000 in fiscal year 1996).


When given the opportunity, local governments have fallen prey to the popular stereotype of Latina/os as foreigners. A videotape captured local police in Riverside County, California in 1996 brutally beating two undocumented Mexican immigrants who tried to evade the Border Patrol. In an effort to rid the community of undocumented immigrants, police in a Phoenix, Arizona suburb violated the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants of Mexican ancestry by stopping persons because of their skin color or use of the Spanish language. The Los Angeles Police Department’s Ramparts Division reportedly engaged in a pattern and practice of violating the rights of immigrants over many years. One can expect additional civil rights violations when local law enforcement authorities, who generally are not well versed in the immigration laws, seek to enforce those laws.

A shift in immigration enforcement from the federal to local level would have a dramatic impact on the immigrant community in the United States, perhaps the most significant of all the responses to September 11, 2001. It would open the door to further civil rights abuses of Latina/os. Moreover, it may also be bad for law enforcement, as immigrant communities would be afraid to cooperate with the police in reporting crime and participating in criminal investigations. That is precisely why so many police agencies prohibit their officers from inquiring about the immigration status of victims, suspects, and witnesses.


92. See Johnson, supra note 19, at 117-29.


95. See Theodore W. Maya, Comment, To Serve and Protect or to Betray and Neglect?: The LAPD and Undocumented Immigrants, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1611, 1622-23 (2002).


97. See Maya, supra note 95, at 1612-13, 1614-24, 1627-30.
E. Conclusion

More immigration reform may be coming in the future, with likely negative impacts on immigrant communities having nothing to do with terrorism. In dealing with noncitizens, the political branches of government can act with relatively few constraints, at least in the short run. Consequently, security measures in the immigration laws can be overbroad to the detriment of noncitizens. In times of crisis, politicians and policymakers are reluctant to resist laws, such as the Antiterrorist Act and the USA PATRIOT Act, because of the possible claim that they are “soft” on the terrorist threat. Despite the relative lack of legal constraints, several courts have intervened to halt the excesses of the federal government’s war on terrorism. Nonetheless, efforts at persuading the political branches of the federal government—Congress and the President—to soften the “war on terrorism” will no doubt also be necessary in attempts to fully protect the rights of noncitizens.

III. INDIRECT LEGAL IMPACTS OF SEPTEMBER 11 ON IMMIGRANT AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES

The events of September 11 likely will have more general legal consequences than simple reform of the immigration laws. Two major immigration reform measures in the works on that date—both which would have particularly benefited Mexican citizens—fell by the wayside. More ominously, after years of national consciousness-raising about its evils, racial profiling enjoyed a comeback in popularity as efforts to locate Arab and Muslim terrorists were the number one priority of the federal government. This development threatens not sim-

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98. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
ply immigrants but minority communities generally in the United States.

A. The End of Positive Immigration Reform

Before the tragedy of September 11, immigrant rights advocates believed it possible that Congress would ameliorate the harshest edges of the 1996 immigration reform legislation. Over several years, immigration rights activists had built broad support for a series of immigration reforms to “Fix 96.” All such legislative proposals appear to have died a quick death on September 11. Immigrant advocacy groups currently marshal scarce political resources to attempt to thwart aggressive pieces of restrictionist legislative and regulatory measures that would adversely impact the immigrant community.

The demise of immigration reform legislation will allow the harsh 1996 immigration laws to continue to injure immigrants. As discussed previously, immigrants from Mexico have been adversely affected by the 1996 immigration reforms, with record levels of deportations. Consequently, Mexican immigrants who stood to gain the most from immigration reform are now the big losers with the failure to “Fix 96.”

A more far-reaching immigration reform possibility also was moved to the back burner on September 11. A short-lived historical moment appeared in 2001 that promised to fundamentally transform migration to the United States from Mexico. Only days before September 11, the highest levels of the U.S. and Mexican governments discussed dramatically changing the migration relationship between the two nations; both U.S. President George W. Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox expressed optimism about the possibility of a historic bilateral agreement addressing migration. The Mexican government supported a program that would allow for greater labor migration and the “regularization” of the status of many undocumented Mexican migrants in the United States, while members of the Bush administra-

103. See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 43-102 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
tion hoped for a revamped guest-worker program. Although difficult issues remained to be resolved, compromise appeared possible. After September 11, discussions virtually stopped in their tracks. A U.S./Mexico migration agreement restructuring migration between the United States and Mexico was apparently another casualty of the catastrophic events of that day. The immigration talk of the day became about closing, not opening, the borders.

The end of serious discussions of a migration pact means that undocumented Mexican immigrants, the largest group of undocumented immigrants in the United States, will not have the opportunity to legalize and enjoy some modicum of security in their daily lives. Undocumented immigrants live on the periphery of U.S. social life, always subject to possible removal and often subject to economic exploitation in the workplace. They also are more likely to experience the ripple effects of heightened border enforcement accompanying the overall enforcement crackdown after September 11. Only time will tell whether the historic opportunity to fundamentally change the migration relations between the United States and Mexico was destroyed with the World Trade Center.

B. September 11 and the Comeback of Racial Profiling

Over the last few years, scholars and policymakers have been critically scrutinizing the use of racial profiling in criminal law enforcement, which in its most extreme form finds manifestation in police stops of African Americans, Latina/os, and other racial minorities on


110. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.


account of their perceived group propensities for criminal conduct.\textsuperscript{113} Not long before September 11, the highest levels of the federal government publicly condemned racial profiling of African Americans by state and local government's law enforcement on the nation's highways.\textsuperscript{114} Public support appeared to coalesce around efforts to end racial profiling. Similarly, race-based enforcement of the immigration laws also was being re-examined.\textsuperscript{115} Although the Supreme Court condoned the practice in 1975,\textsuperscript{116} one court of appeals in 2000 held that the Border Patrol could not consider a person’s “Hispanic appearance” in making an immigration stop.\textsuperscript{117}

Similarly, sustained public criticism of racial profiling in national security matters came in the wake of the Wen Ho Lee case in which trumped-up espionage charges evaporated when exposed to the light of day.\textsuperscript{118} Presumptively disloyal because of long-held stereotypes about persons of Asian ancestry, Lee stood falsely accused of crimes against national security.\textsuperscript{119}

The core argument against racial profiling is that law enforcement measures based on alleged group propensities for criminal conduct run afoul of the U.S. Constitution, which is generally premised on the view that individualized suspicion is necessary for police action.\textsuperscript{120} Unfortunately, governmental reliance on statistical probabilities at the core of racial profiling has been resurrected by the September 11 terrorist attacks and has been met with broad public support.

After September 11, persons of apparent Arab ancestry and Muslims were questioned for possible links to terrorism, removed from
airplanes, and generally subject to scrutiny at every turn. Many commentators proclaimed that the reconsideration of the use of race in law enforcement made perfect sense. Public opinion moved to favor racial profiling, which will not affect the vast majority of U.S. citizens, in the "war on terrorism." The Wall Street Journal proclaimed that racial profiling in fighting terrorism "isn't discrimination; given the threat, it is common sense." A Case for Profiling, The Case for Using Racial Profiling at the Airports, and Americans Give in to Racial Profiling were titles of articles found in the popular press that offer a clear indication of the direction that the post-September 11 political winds are blowing on the issue.

The federal government's profiling of Arabs and Muslims in the terrorist dragnet promoted the legitimacy of racial profiling. It also undermined federal efforts to pressure state and local law enforcement agencies to end the practice in criminal law enforcement. Ironically, a handful of local law enforcement agencies refused the Attorney General's request to interview Arabs and Muslims on the grounds that this constituted impermissible racial profiling. Racial profiling in the "war on terrorism" poses serious risks to all minority communities in the United States, not just Arab- and Muslim-appearing people who may be subject to profiling given the current fears. Once the government embraces the use of race-based statistical probabilities as a law enforcement tool, the argument logically follows that probabilities may justify similar law enforcement techniques across the board, from terrorism to fighting crime on the streets to apprehending undocumented immigrants. As they were for

121. See Akram & Johnson, supra note 3; Volpp, supra note 5. at 1576-86; see, e.g., Thomas Ginsberg, Profiling Charged on "Nightmare" Flight: A Doctor on Delta Flight 442 Was Detained by U.S. Marshals, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 19, 2002, at A1 (discussing case of Indian doctor pulled off plane and detained by U.S. Marshals after flight landed).


127. See Akram & Johnson, supra note 3. at 331-41.

many years,\textsuperscript{129} statistical probabilities can also be employed to justify focusing police action on African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latina/os in cities across the United States. Besides ordinary criminal law enforcement, the reliance on statistics, which justified internment of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II,\textsuperscript{130} could be used to justify racial profiling in immigration and national security matters.

\textbf{IV. Conclusion}

The federal government’s multifaceted response to the horrible loss of life on September 11 has had, and will continue to have, a devastating impact on Arabs and Muslims in the United States. Although the harms to Mexican immigrants, as well as other immigrant communities, are less visible, these communities also will be adversely affected by the changes to the immigration laws and their enforcement. As the largest single group of lawful and undocumented immigrants in the United States, Mexican noncitizens are particularly sensitive to immigration regulation and stand to be the group most affected by immigration reform. Similarly, Mexican-American families who have immigrant members, or seek to bring family members to the United States from Mexico, will be affected as well. Unfortunately, however, little attention has been paid to the impacts of the “war on terrorism” on persons of Mexican ancestry. To avoid the negative impacts on Mexican immigrants that followed the 1996 immigration reforms designed to address concerns with terrorism, attention must be given to the post-September 11 immigration reforms allegedly directed toward terrorism.

The lessons of the immigration reforms triggered by the events of September 11, 2001 reinforce broader teachings about immigration law and policy. Immigration law can be reformed in overbroad ways to the detriment of immigrant communities, with much political support and little political resistance. Those adversely affected—immigrants of color in modern times—have limited political power, which is easily overcome in times of national crisis. This latest chapter simply reinforces what we have seen time and again in U.S. history.

\textsuperscript{129} See supra note 113 (citing authorities).