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CONFLICTS BETWEEN LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN PATIENT SAFETY

David D. Woods*

INTRODUCTION

Currently the mechanisms of, and beliefs about, accountability are in a phase of transition in our society, particularly for health care.¹ For example, when patients are injured as a result of care, a part of the response calls for imposing new accountability relationships between health care professionals or care delivery organizations and the public they serve. Ultimately one can see the whole patient safety movement as an expression of the public’s concern about how economic pressures erode past accountability and trust relationships. The public desires new accountability mechanisms to ensure that the patient will remain foremost relative to the other goals of health care organizations and personnel.²

Accountability is emphasized in the debate on patient safety because the way decisionmakers are held accountable is presumed to influence how they make decisions and the quality of those decisions. Social links such as accountability are indeed powerful forces influencing human decisionmaking, and these relationships have been studied in organizational dynamics, social cognition, and human-machine interaction.³ Social and cognitive scientists have shown how human decisionmaking occurs in a context of expectations that one may be

* David D. Woods, Professor, Institute for Ergonomics, The Ohio State University. The ideas for new directions in accountability have emerged from discussions with Lawrence Palmer (University of Louisville), Linda Emanuel (Northwestern University), Sidney Dekker (Linkoping University, Sweden), Larry Hirschhorn, Jane Carthey (National Health Service England), Gene Rochlin (University of California, Berkeley), and Phil Tetlock (University of California, Berkeley).

called to give accounts for those decisions to different parties. How
and to whom people expect to be called to account affects their per-
formance in implicit and explicit ways. The expectations for what are
considered adequate accounts and the consequences for people when
their accounts are judged inadequate are critical parts of a cycle of
giving accounts and being called to account. This is a reciprocating
cycle because how one may be called to account influences behavior
and how one calls others to account is influenced by beliefs about the
factors that inform human decisions. Interestingly, different factors
in this reciprocating cycle can support or undermine practitioner per-
formance and learning in predictable ways.

Thus, the patient safety movement can be seen as an ongoing case
of change in this reciprocating cycle. The calls for new accountability
relationships that emerge following famous cases of patient injuries
represent beliefs by different stakeholders in health care about how
different forms of accountability will effect behavior and perform-
ance. However, different assumptions regarding how cycles of ac-
countability work lead to very different and conflicting plans about
how to change health care systems to improve patient safety.

This Article contrasts those common beliefs about accountability
with research based on how different mechanisms of being called to
account affect those aspects of decisionmaking most relevant to im-
proving patient safety. First, past research shows that there is a com-
plex set of factors, relationships, and effects at work in the
reciprocating cycle of the calling on, and giving of accounts. Second,
the empirical regularities and relationships are not consistent with
motivational accounts, that is, that accountability creates general im-
provements by increasing task motivation. Third, and most startling,
the research demonstrates that some factors in the reciprocating cy-
cles of accountability may degrade decisions, performance, coopera-
tion, and learning, while other relationships in the cycle may enhance
these cognitive processes. For example, under some conditions the
need to give an account for a decision to others can increase critical
thinking and attenuate commitment (presumably ways to enhance the
decision), while other conditions can increase self-justification, and
bolster an initial attitude and commitment (presumably ways that re-
duce the quality of a decision). Some forms of accountability can in-

Social Systems, in Shared Cognition in Organizations: The Management of Knowledge
117 (Leigh L. Thompson et al. eds., 1999).
4. See generally Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 3.
5. Id. at 256–57.
6. See generally Cook et al., supra note 2.
crease defensive behavior, create adversarial relationships among parties who need to cooperate, or lead people to prefer options that are easier to justify given knowledge of the standards others impose for giving suitable accounts.

Thus, a systems approach to patient safety also examines the reciprocating cycle of giving accounts and calling to account to determine the lawful effects of different systems for accountability. The slogan of “moving beyond a culture of blame” in the patient safety movement is a call to abandon poor systems of accountability and to begin to design a more effective reciprocating cycle, not a tolerance for an absence of accountability. This Article presents a set of conflicts between the typical beliefs about the effects of systems of accountability and the research results that relate to building high-reliability organizations, including several ways that poor systems of accountability can degrade cognitive and cooperative work and human-computer cooperation.

II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN ACCOUNTABILITY-AS-BLAME AND LEARNING

The patient safety movement is based on three ideas derived from results of research on human expertise, collaborative work, and high-reliability organizations developed through investments by other industries:

1. adopt a “systems approach” to understand how breakdowns can occur and how to support decisions in the increasingly complex worlds of health care;
2. move beyond a culture of blame to create open flow of information and learning about vulnerabilities to failure; and


(3) build partnerships across all stakeholders in health care to set aside differences and to make progress on a common overarching goal.\(^\text{11}\)

The lessons from research point out that blame and the accompanying threat of punishment and stigmatization activates defensive mechanisms, drives out information about systemic vulnerabilities, stops learning, and undermines the potential for improvement.\(^\text{12}\)

As these new messages about a systems approach to safety circulated and became more visible in health care, they collided with the common belief that practitioners and managers should be “accountable” to patients and to other stakeholders.\(^\text{13}\) For many, the systems approach seems to erode accountability relationships or to provide cover for individuals or organizations involved in episodes where patients are injured in the process of care. Hence, the patient safety movement faces a basic conflict between learning or improving systems and holding individuals responsible for the consequences of their decisions and actions.

In the common belief, accountability systems are operationalized in terms of identification of culprits, threats of disciplinary (or even criminal) proceedings, monetary losses, and threats of stigmatization.\(^\text{14}\) Thus, calls for increased accountability take the form of imposing new or increased consequences for practitioners and delivery organizations after a patient is injured as a result of care. These beliefs rest on assumptions that remedial and disciplinary actions will produce improvements by channeling or increasing the motivation and energy devoted to patient care. To many who may bear the brunt of failure, any argument to move beyond a culture of blame is suspected as a disguised attempt to protect culprits.\(^\text{15}\)


\(^\text{13}\) See generally Sharpe & Faden, *supra* note 1.


At the root of these reactions is one model of how people contribute to success and to failure—the notion that erratic people degrade an otherwise safe system. In this belief system, work on safety involves methods to protect the system (managers, regulators, and consumers) from unreliable people. Blame becomes part of the process of identifying and protecting us from those other erratic people. Once culprits are identified, we can then invoke methods of remedial training, professional disciplinary action, limits on practice, banishment, or even criminal prosecution to improve safety.

This is an intuitive, common, and powerful way to view safety, and it is erroneous, based on research results of expert human performance, results of characteristics of high-reliability organizations, and experience from other industries. The alternative model derived from research is that people create safety at all levels of the socio-technical system by learning and adapting to information about how all participants can contribute to failure. Progress comes from helping people create safety in the face of systemic vulnerabilities. Startlingly, this is what the science says—help people, at all levels of organizations and institutions, cope with complexity to achieve success. The social value of accountability, when interpreted and implemented as threats of sanctions against those acts judged after the fact as causal, then collides with these results on how to achieve high reliability in several ways.


17. Critiques of widespread “folk” models of human error can be found in Dekker, supra note 7; Erik Hollnagel, Barriers and Accident Prevention ch. 5 (2004); Woods & Cook, supra note 16.


19. See Hollnagel, supra note 17; Rasmussen, Human Error, supra note 8; Rasmussen, The Role of Error, supra note 8; Rochlin, supra note 8 (providing general results).

A. Blame Blocks Information Flow and Learning

Empirical results of organizations that manage potentially hazardous technical operations successfully are quite surprising. Success was not related to how these organizations avoided risks or reduced errors. High-reliability organizations created safety by anticipating and planning for unexpected events and future surprises. These organizations did not take past success as a reason for confidence. Instead, they continued to invest in anticipating the changing potential for failure because of the deeply held understanding that their knowledge base was fragile in the face of the hazards inherent in their work and the changes omnipresent in their environment. Safety for these organizations was not a commodity, but a value that required continuing reinforcement and investment. The learning activities at the heart of this process depended on the open flow of information about the changing potential for failure. High-reliability organizations value such information flow, use multiple methods to generate this information, and then use this information to guide adaptive and constructive changes without waiting for accidents to occur.

These results mean that mechanisms are needed to help health care organizations learn about the changing potential paths to failure and about the changing effectiveness of their failure-sensitive strategies before injuries occur. However, accountability established through blame and personal consequences for those closely associated with cases of failure creates pressure to limit or suppress communication of information regarding the potential hazards and paths to failure.

The contrast between two parallel and highly visible disasters that played out in 2003 is particularly instructive. An independent and highly distinguished technical panel examined the Columbia accident and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as an organization. The public, independent process produced a wide-ranging and detailed set of information on how to improve the organi-

21. See generally Ramussen, Human Error, supra note 8; Ramussen, The Role of Error, supra note 8; Rochlin, supra note 8.
22. See generally Reason, supra note 8; Weick et al., supra note 8.
23. Experience in aviation safety is widely cited to indicate the power of information about potential hazards to produce very high levels of success. Several mechanisms exist in aviation to step outside of normal mechanisms of blame to emphasize learning about systemic vulnerabilities, which create the potential for failure. See, e.g., Billings, supra note 12. Aerospace has also shown the importance of independent technical investigations in the learning process.
24. Both events occurred in February of 2003 and the struggles to understand and learn from these tragedies played out in parallel over the next few months.
zation. NASA supported the investigation and is acting on what was learned despite enduring the burden of criticism and the public dissemination of significant deficiencies as an organization. The lessons are critical for all organizations that manage risky processes. Systemic changes are widespread and the only question is will these new investments be sustained over the long term.

During the same time period a seventeen-year-old girl died following mistakes in a transplant procedure at the Duke University Hospital.\(^2\)\(^6\) Little is known publicly, with any confidence, about the deeper systemic and organizational contributors to the accident. Press releases by the hospital itself and press reports provide most of the available information (as the legal, institutional, and professional responses that followed the event are largely invisible to the public).\(^2\)\(^7\) The comparison of the responses to the two tragedies raises questions for health care organizations such as: Why was there no deeper independent investigation? What systemic responses are needed and how are these changes monitored over time? Can press releases about an organization’s responses reestablish trust and confidence?\(^2\)\(^8\)

Accountability cycles based on blame deflect energy that could be devoted instead to a search to define who is responsible. This takes the form of psychological and social processes of causal attribution such that one of several contributors will be judged as the cause after the fact.\(^2\)\(^9\) The party defined as responsible for that part of the systems operation will then be seen as a culprit to whom sanctions should be applied. Evidence of blemishes is gathered to justify that party’s deficiencies. Even simple variations in normal work processes can be made to look like an ominous early warning sign of internal deficiencies in the context of a known failure.


\(^{27}\) See generally Duke University Medical Center, Background Information on Jessica Santillan Blood Type Mismatch, at http://dukemednews.duke.edu/mediakits/detail.php?id=6498 (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).

\(^{28}\) The contrast between the two investigations is striking and provides an interesting lead-in to results on how learning after accidents can break down. See WOODS ET AL., supra note 18, ch. 6.

\(^{29}\) See generally DEKKER, supra note 10; DEKKER, supra note 7; WOODS ET AL., supra note 18.
B. Distributed Responsibility in Systems of Care

The increasingly interconnected nature of health care produces a dramatic shift. Today, a patient’s course and outcome depends on a system of care where connections, handovers, cross checks, and information exchange takes place between different providers, in different roles, in different places, and at different times. Smoothly interconnecting these different roles and activities to achieve continuity for the patient is difficult. A consequence of this shift, that is, a joint result of the disjointed care delivery system, is that it creates the need to consider distributed or collective responsibility.\(^30\)

As the health care community learns more about taking a systems approach to safety issues, we see people troubled and fearful that the focus on “systems” rather than individuals dilutes responsibility.\(^31\) For example, a chair of a nursing board expressed frustration with a systems approach: “What is ‘a system’? A system is an inanimate thing and you can’t blame an inanimate thing. I believe a system is created and perpetuated by people.”\(^31\)

The irony is that pressure for individual accountability continues with intensity while processes of organizational and technical change distribute care increasingly in a larger system of interconnected parts.\(^32\) How do we coordinate and share responsibility in a distributed system of care?

C. Multiple Contributors to Failure

Research on how complex systems fail reveals the following: (1) accidents have multiple contributors, each necessary but only jointly sufficient; (2) some of these factors occur prior to the accident and arise in management or what is termed the blunt end of the organization; and (3) knowledge of outcome biases assessment regarding the quality of the processes that contributed to that outcome.\(^33\) The combination of multiple contributors and hindsight bias creates another difficulty for attributions of responsibility. Since most responses to accidents are still based on a single “cause” (or linear chain of causes) view of how accidents occur, the presence of multiple contributors allows peo-


\(^32\) Dekker looks at the trend to criminalize error. See Dekker, supra note 14.

\(^33\) These are described in Dekker; supra note 10; Reason, supra note 8; and Woods et al., supra note 18.
ple to debate which contributor is the dominant cause and therefore the person or group who should be held accountable. Consequently, after the accident we see people or groups jockeying to deflect accountability and consequences onto other contributing factors as the cause and onto other parties as responsible for those parts of the overall system. This process resembles the children's game of musical chairs as each group jostles to avoid being labeled as "cause" when the music of post-incident review stops. For example, hindsight bias makes it easy to downplay organizational contributors and only pursue those people who stood closest to the failure event—nurses, physicians, pilots.

Others will play the attribution of causality process in the other direction. By focusing on the full range of multiple factors that came together to produce the accident, one can absolve or lessen the consequences for any one party to the adverse event. This creates the public impression that none of the relevant parts of the organizations are being held accountable. Finally, some have used the research results that point to organizational contributors to an accident to argue for punishment and stigmatization for the relevant organization as well as the individual professionals involved at the sharp end of the accident. Despite these difficulties in learning after accidents, in two significant cases, independent investigation boards have characterized NASA accidents as organizational failures, analyzed the multiple parallel contributors, and recommended broad, major, sustained institutional reforms. Failures in complex systems are characterized by multiple parallel contributors, not single causes. Given that, how can accountability systems address how multiple contributors come to—

34. See Dekker, supra note 10; Woods et al., supra note 18, ch. 6; and Nancy G. Leveson, A New Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems, 42 Safety Sci. 237 (2004).
35. See generally Dekker, supra note 7.
36. See generally Dekker, supra note 10; Woods et al., supra note 18.
37. To see these kinds of processes play out, consider the debate over the Colorado nurses case in which a medication misadministration resulted in the death of a newborn as captured in John W. Senders, Error, Negligence, Crime: The Denver Nurses Trial, in Enhancing Patient Safety, supra note 11, at 65. Analyses showed many contributors to the misadministration (wrong dose and wrong route of administration) including the pharmacy and physicians, yet criminal proceedings were directed at the three nurses who were on hand during the misadministration. The criminal case involved competing analysis of the role of the multiple contributors. See also Manoj S. Patankar et al., Ethics in Cases from Aviation, Medicine, and Environmental and Occupational Health (forthcoming 2005) (analyzing the safety dilemmas in managing health care systems); Dekker, supra note 14 (analyzing criminal cases against pilots following accidents).
gether over time and over different levels of the organization to avoid a counterproductive, fractionated, and partisan debate over which of these contributors is the "cause"?

D. Responsibility and Autonomous Computers in Health Care

Among the multiple parties and organizations that may contribute to the genesis of a patient injury, computers—and the organizations that design, produce, and maintain them—are becoming more central in patient care. Computers increasingly have or will have the autonomy and authority to make decisions and take actions; computer networks allow new forms of delivery and communication, as in telemedicine.39 Increasing the scope, authority, and autonomy of computers in health care changes the nature of practitioners' roles in the delivery of care.40 How people and computers work together as a team becomes a new and critical part of achieving success or failure. Breakdowns in coordination between people and computers are increasingly a major part of the story of accidents in other fields as well as in some areas of health care.41 The computer's new role also changes vulnerability to failure as software reliability becomes an important contributor to adverse events.42 Unanticipated behavior of software or unforeseen interactions across software modules have contributed to numerous failures in aerospace applications.43

When computers are integral parts of care, how are software engineering and automation design included in reciprocal cycles of ac-

40. For further discussion, see the “uncelebrated” cases in COOK ET AL., supra note 2, and failures such as the one detailed in Graham Brink, Patient Dies in Robot-Aided Surgery, St. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at 1B.
41. For studies of human-automation coordination breakdowns in aviation, see Billings, supra note 12; and N.B. Sarter et al., Automation Surprises, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS 1926 (Gavriel Salvendy ed., 1997). For human-automation coordination breakdowns in anesthesiology, see Richard I. Cook et al., Unintentional Delivery of Vasoactive Drugs with an Electromechanical Infusion Device, 6 J. CARDIOTHORACIC & VASCULAR ANESTHESIA 238 (1992), and Laura Lin et al., Applying Human Factors to the Design of Medical Equipment: Patient-Controlled Analgesia, 14 J. CLINICAL MONITORING & COMPUTING 253 (1998).
countability? To date, the dominant cycle is a kind of attribution game: When the outcome is success (new levels of performance), software development organizations are quick to tout the software as the critical ingredient (single factor credit attribution).\textsuperscript{44} When the outcome is failure (new accidents), software development organizations are quick to say that the system was only optional or a backup and that erratic people at the sharp end were the critical ingredient in the adverse event (blame attribution). This pattern is particularly vivid in the responses to accidents involving the breakdown of coordination between automation and people.\textsuperscript{45}

These arguments over attributing cause to people or to automation serve as a specific example of the process of deflecting consequences following bad outcomes to those who represent other contributors to the adverse event. It illustrates how the search for "the" cause blocks understanding of how complex systems fail through the conjunction of multiple contributors, that are only jointly sufficient.\textsuperscript{46} Accountability systems that emphasize sanctions for the individual or group that represent the "cause" increase the effort devoted to these processes of attribution after the fact.\textsuperscript{47} Thus the question remains: How are software organizations responsible for failures when working with others in a system of accountability that is distributed across the multiple organizations determining the overall performance and resilience of health care delivery?

III. POOR SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY CREATE OR EXACERBATE DOUBLE BINDS AND GOAL CONFLICTS

Multiple, simultaneously active goals are the rule, rather than the exception, for virtually all domains in which expertise is involved.\textsuperscript{48} Practitioners must cope with the presence of multiple goals: shifting

\textsuperscript{44} For one list of computer designer/manager rationalizations for why the lessons from accidents do not apply to them, see David D. Woods & Nadine B. Sarter, Learning from Automation Surprises and "Going Sour" Accidents, in COGNITIVE ENGINEERING IN THE AVIATION DOMAIN (Nadine B. Sarter & Rene Amalberti eds., 2000). For a specific case of these rationalizations in health care, see D. John Doyle & Kim J. Vicente, Patient Controlled Analgesia, 164 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 620 (2001) (and reply by Charles H. McLeskey).

\textsuperscript{45} See generally COOK ET AL., supra note 2; Lin et al., supra note 41 (for cases involving infusion devices in health care); LEVESON, supra note 42 (for a review in space operations); and Woods & Sarter, supra note 44 (for a review in aviation).

\textsuperscript{46} See Woods ET AL., supra note 18, ch. 6.

\textsuperscript{47} One observer of technology defined interface as "an arbitrary line of demarcation set up in order to apportion the blame for malfunctions." STAN KELLY-BOOTLE, THE COMPUTER CONTRADICTIONARY 101 (2d ed. 1995).

between them, weighing them, choosing to pursue some rather than others, abandoning one, and embracing another. Many of the goals encountered in practice are implicit and unstated. Goals often conflict. Sometimes these conflicts are easily resolved in favor of one goal, sometimes they are not. Sometimes the conflicts are direct and irreducible, for example when achieving one goal necessarily precludes achieving another one. But there are also intermediate situations, where several goals may be partially satisfied simultaneously. Multiple interacting goals produce tradeoffs and dilemmas. Resolving these tradeoffs and dilemmas takes place under time pressure and in the face of uncertainty. While some dilemmas arise from demands inherent in the process, organizations also constrain and pressure practice in ways that create or intensify dilemmas. Organizational factors at the blunt end of systems shape the world in which practitioners work by influencing the tradeoffs they face and the means available to resolve dilemmas. Any adequate analysis of a field of practice requires explicit description of the interacting goals, how they contribute to tradeoffs and dilemmas in particular situations, and the ways in which practitioners handle them.

How do different systems of accountability exacerbate or help resolve goal conflicts and dilemmas? The research results are clear—when organizations’ and industries’ system of accountability creates authority-responsibility double binds, they impose new complexities and dilemmas that undermine practice at the sharp end. Authority-responsibility double binds occur when one has responsibility and others will impose sanctions for outcomes, but the responsible party no longer has sufficient authority to influence or control the processes that lead to the outcomes.

For example, in a study by Professional Consultant Larry Hirschhorn, after the Three Mile Island accident, utility managers were encouraged by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop detailed and comprehensive work procedures. The management at a particular nuclear power plant instituted a policy of verbatim compliance with all written procedures. This development occurred in a regulatory climate where absolute adherence to procedures is the means to achieve safe operations and avoid “human error.”

49. See, e.g., Woods et al., supra note 18, at 87; Brown, supra note 14.
50. See Woods et al., supra note 18, ch. 4.
51. See generally Hirschhorn, supra note 3.
52. See id. at 139.
53. See id.
However, for the people at the sharp end of the system who actually did things, strictly following the procedures posed great difficulties because the procedures were inevitably incomplete, sometimes contradictory, and novel circumstances arose that were not anticipated in the work procedures. As a result, sometimes success could not be obtained if one only followed the procedure.

When accountability standards demanded strict adherence to procedures, the policy created a "double bind." In some situations, if workers followed the standard procedures strictly, then the job would not be accomplished adequately. On the other hand, if they always waited for formal permission to deviate from standard procedures, then throughput and productivity would be degraded substantially. If they deviated and it later turned out that there was a problem with what they did (for example, they did not adapt adequately), it could create re-work, safety, or economic problems.54

The double bind arises because the workers are held responsible for the outcome (the poor job, the lost productivity, or the erroneous adaptation); yet they did not have authority for the work practices because they were expected to comply exactly with the written procedures. As Hirschhorn put it,

These people have a good deal of responsibility. As licensed professionals, they can be personally fined for errors but are uncertain of their authority. What freedom of action do they have? What are they responsible for? This gap between responsibility and authority means that operators and their supervisors feel accountable for events and actions they can neither influence nor control.55

In a process of adaptation to organizational pressures, practitioners respond in one of two basic ways. When one party has responsibility, in that it can experience sanctions based on outcomes, without effective authority to influence the outcome sufficiently, one response is to try to pass responsibility on to others. This is sometimes referred to as a learned helplessness response, as people distance themselves from both responsibility and authority.56 For example, narrowly following rules, even when they are inappropriate, is a way workers can reject responsibility when they do not possess appropriate authority.

54. Authority-responsibility double binds and operator coping strategies also arise in the context of autonomous computers given the fundamental brittleness and literal mindedness of algorithms. See Woods et al., supra note 18, ch. 5.

55. See Hirschhorn, supra note 3, at 140. See also Rochlin, supra note 48; Weick et al., supra note 8 (observing that taking responsibility depends on having authority on the processes that influence outcomes).

56. See Woods et al., supra note 18, ch. 4.
Because practitioners are committed to get the job done in the face of omnipresent organizational hurdles and other difficulties and gaps, a second response is more common—development of a covert work system. Practitioners develop one work system to get the job done given the inherent demands, tradeoffs, uncertainties, and constraints imposed while they appear to carry out another work system through formal documentation and other means to meet the standards for providing accounts to other stakeholders at the blunt end of the organization.\[^{57}\]

Accountability systems can demand that practitioners give accounts based on adherence to procedures.\[^{58}\] Since procedures can never be a complete, consistent, and coherent account of the skills and judgments required in practice, this creates a gap between the organization's image of technical work and the actual nature of technical work at the sharp end. Authority-responsibility double binds also exacerbate this gap. High-reliability, high-resilience organizations work hard to close this gap, always questioning whether they understand the dilemmas and tradeoffs faced in sharp end practice.\[^{59}\]

### IV. Poor Systems of Accountability Degrade Cooperation

Health care, like all complex systems, requires coordinated activity to achieve continuity of care.\[^{60}\] The nature of organizational, economic, and technological change in health care increases demand for effective collaboration to deliver care both safely and efficiently. The question then becomes how do different relationships in cycles of accountability affect collaborative activity?

In order to carry out joint, interdependent activity, research has shown that the parties involved enter into a “basic compact,” that is, an agreement (often tacit) to facilitate coordination, work toward shared goals, and prevent the team's breakdown.\[^{61}\] One aspect of the

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57. Covert work systems also have been explored in Mathilde Bourrier, *Constructing Organizational Reliability: The Problem of Embeddedness and Duality, in Nuclear Safety: A Human Factors Perspective* 25 (Jyuji Misumi et al. eds., 1999).

58. See generally Dekker, supra note 7.

59. Cook et al., supra note 2; Rochlin, supra note 8; Weick et al., supra note 8; Woods & Cook, supra note 9.

60. See Emily Patterson et al., *Handoff Strategies in Settings with High Consequences for Failure: Lessons for Health Care Operations*, 16 INT'L J. FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 125 (2004) [hereinafter Patterson et al., Handoff Strategies]; Emily Patterson et al., *Examining the Complexity Behind a Medication Error: Generic Patterns in Communication*, 34 IEEE TRANSACTION ON SYSTEMS, MAN AND CYBERNETICS, Part A 749 [hereinafter Patterson et al., Examining the Complexity], for an adverse event where coordination broke down.

61. For an overview of how cognitive activity is coordinated and the role of common ground, see Herbert H. Clark & Susan E. Brennan, *Grounding in Communication, in Perspectives on*
basic compact is the commitment to some degree of aligning multiple goals. Typically this entails one or more participants relaxing some shorter-term, more local goals in order to permit more global and longer-term goals to be addressed.

Studies of cooperative exchange indicate that the basic compact is a form of positive reciprocity because overall results on critical goals like patient safety or continuity of patient care depend on the joint impact of the actions and decisions of multiple parties over time. As one researcher described the complex reciprocal dependency,

Person 1 shows "trust" for person 2 by taking an action that gives up some amount of immediate benefit in return for a longer-run benefit for both, but in doing so person 1 relies on person 2 to "reciprocate" in the future by taking an action that gives up some benefit in order to make both persons better off than they were at the starting point.62

Accountability systems based on sanctions increase defensiveness and reduce commitment to this basic compact that underlies coordinated activity.63 If one party can experience high negative sanctions depending on outcome, that party is less likely to relax its local goals, if it exposes the party to risks in being called to account after the outcome is known. Under threat from the system of accountability, each party defends their local goals rather than work toward aligning subgoals to better achieve more global ends.

A second aspect of the basic compact is that all parties are expected to bear their portion of the responsibility to establish and sustain common ground and to repair it as needed.64 Common ground refers to a process of communicating, testing, updating, tailoring, and repairing mutual understandings (this is much more than each party having the same knowledge, data, and goals).65 Detecting and correcting any loss of common ground that might disrupt the joint activity requires a significant investment of effort to track other groups and connect one’s activities to their activities and needs. The value of the basic compact is this shared willingness to invest energy and accommodate others,
rather than just performing alone walled off inside one's narrow scope and sub-goals. In general, achieving coordination requires continuing investment and renewal as parties to joint activity invest in those things that promote the compact and counteract those factors that could degrade it. These results raise the danger that accountability systems based on sanctions reduce the investment of effort in establishing, maintaining, and repairing common ground and fragment activities that should be smoothly interconnected.

Trust in coordinated activity occurs when all parties are reasonably confident that they and others will carry out their responsibilities within the basic compact. One danger of poor accountability systems is a breakdown in this form of trust. Factors that risk degrading the required coordination across the interconnected system of health care delivery increase risks of adverse events for patients.

V. CULTURE OF BLAME AS A POOR SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY

From the cognitive sciences, the label "culture of blame" points to some factors that operate in cycles of accountability. In effect, it is a kind of system of accountability, but represents only one way to design and manage such systems. Analyzing a "culture of blame" in terms of the dynamics of this cycle, as described above, reveals many of the factors that have been implicated in degrading performance, cooperation, learning, and, therefore, safety.

Conceptualizing the slogan of "moving beyond a culture of blame" as a poor system of accountability reveals that the systems approach does not mean an absence of accountability. It is a necessary part of our life as social creatures that we may need to explain our actions to others. The issue is to design and manage those relationships in ways that advance the common goal of very high levels of safety in a health care delivery system that also needs to be efficient.

Analyzing and studying cycles of accountability is very difficult because these results intrude on highly sensitive beliefs about oneself and others in different social roles. It requires us to consider how our image of how we call others and are called ourselves to account can be inconsistent with the actual empirical effects.

66. Id.
68. See generally Patterson et al., Examining the Complexity, supra note 60; Patterson et al., Handoff Strategies, supra note 60.
VI. Innovating New Systems of Accountability?

Cognitive science can help stakeholders in health care to step back and look with fresh eyes at the effects of our systems of accountability. It helps us see the social dilemmas embedded in individual-focused (or subunit), culprit-based systems of accountability, such as how the threat of increased sanctions can undermine cooperative and reciprocal trust relationships. Can such analysis, coupled with legal and ethical scholarship, also help us innovate new possibilities? What system of “being called upon to give an account” would maximize organizational learning before patients are injured as a result of care? How can we move existing embedded attitudes and regulatory, quality assurance, civil, and criminal systems toward new targets?

Some things are clear. After the fact analyses need to focus on how multiple contributors combine rather than isolate one “cause.” Accountability systems must encourage constructive and sustained investment toward systemic change. Enabling and energizing independent, technical investigations following dramatic cases of patient injury to produce public accounts is a necessary base step. But in order to avoid injuries, proactive anticipation of how vulnerability to failure change is needed. To accomplish this, new studies are needed to understand how people can be “courageous” in focusing on safety risks even when such concern sacrifices current production or economic pressures. Progress needs to be accelerated regarding how to measure and enhance organizational resilience, so that organizations can better adapt as changes modify the risk of different vulnerabilities to failure and further the effectiveness of planned countermeasures.

In this process of innovating systems of accountability, the conflicts noted above become a set of testing and measurement criteria. Do proposed changes enhance the flow of information to learn and anticipate vulnerabilities? Do they help connect and share responsibility across the distributed system of care? Do proposed changes help people see how multiple factors and organizational factors combine to create the conditions for adverse events? Do they connect autonomous computers and software engineering into the cycles of accountability? Do proposed changes reduce double binds and help people

69. See generally Woods & Cook, supra note 9.
71. Kathleen M. Sutcliffe & Timothy J. Vogus, Organizing for Resilience, in Positive Organizational Scholarship 94 (Kim S. Cameron et al. eds., 2003).
balance and resolve goal conflicts? Do they degrade the required functions needed for high levels of coordination and interchange?

While analysis of systems of accountability is a difficult and contentious process, the need to discover a different way to achieve simultaneously high accountability and high openness to information and learning is also intense. Poor systems of accountability degrade decisionmaking and safety, as outlined above. New designs of systems of accountability are needed to help health care organizations anticipate paths to failure that can arise as capabilities, organizations, and technologies change, before any patient is injured.