Tardive Dyskinesia: Reducing Medical Malpractice Exposure Through a Risk-Benefit Analysis

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INTRODUCTION

An academic physician once postulated a truism accepted by most clinicians, but often disregarded by both the lay and legal communities: "Few drugs that help anybody will not hurt somebody, and all potent drugs, no matter how skillfully used, can cause untoward effects in some patients." Antipsychotic drugs are extremely helpful in pharmacotherapy and have, likewise, revolutionized the treatment of schizophrenia. Antipsychotic drugs are also effective in treating "paranoid and schizophreniform disorders, brief reactive psychoses, schizoaffective disorders, atypical psychoses, manic episodes, major depressive disorders with psychotic features, certain organic psychoses, and some borderline patients." Further, these drugs are credited with substantially decreasing the number of mentally ill hospital patients.

An estimated three million Americans were prescribed antipsychotic drugs in 1986, and 945,000 new patients are prescribed antipsychotic drugs each year. The only efficacious drug treatment for schizophrenia...
is antipsychotic drugs. Significantly, these drugs enable millions of people to lead healthy and more productive lives, however, not without costly side effects that may include: acute dystonic reactions, Parkinsonian Syndrome, akathisia, akinesia, Rabbit Syndrome, and Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome.

One of the more serious side effects of antipsychotic drugs is Tardive Dyskinesia (TD). TD is a disorder characterized by involuntary movements of the face, trunk, or extremities, and is often associated with the prolonged exposure to dopamine receptor drugs such as antipsychotic drugs. Involuntary movements include: frowning, blinking, grimacing, puckering, chewing, smacking, rolling of the tongue, foot tapping, and rocking of the hips. Other drugs, such as the antidepressant amoxapine, and the antiemetic agents metoclopramide and prochlorperazine, are also known to cause TD.

The term “tardive” refers to the fact that the condition usually develops only after a prolonged antipsychotic drug regimen of at least six months, whereas “dyskinesia” refers to the involuntary movements resulting from the actual drug use. “Neuroleptics” is another name for antipsychotic medications, and the name itself suggests these drugs may produce undesirable side effects on the central nervous system. It is

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7See TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 905 (A. Hayes & S. Yudoksky eds., 1994) [hereinafter HAYES & YUDOSKY].
8Id. at 909. Acute dystonic reactions include bizarre and sustained postures of the face, jaw, tongue, neck, and trunk. These reactions can occur within days after starting medication and can disappear when the drugs are discontinued. Akathisia can be defined as motor restlessness which is relieved by moving. It also gradually disappears when the drugs are discontinued. Drug-induced Parkinsonism causes patients to exhibit the tremors and rigidity of those afflicted with Parkinson's disease, but can also be treated effectively with drugs. Akinesia is defined as a behavioral state of diminished spontaneity characterized by few gestures, unsponsive speech, and apathy. Rabbit syndrome consists of rapid movements of the lips that mimic those of a rabbit. This syndrome, too, can be easily treated. Neuroleptic malignant syndrome is a rare but potentially fatal disorder characterized by mental status changes, rigidity, delirium, severe anxiety, mutism, elevated white blood cell count, tachycardia, and diaphoresis. Id.
9Id.
10Id. at 912.
11Id.
12Id.
14Id.
relatively rare that TD's effects are considered disabling, since few people
suffering from this disease experience difficulty walking, breathing, eating, or talking. Nevertheless, because 10 to 20 percent of those
patients treated with antipsychotic drugs for more than one year
experience TD, the administration of these drugs has recently stirred much
controversy and subsequent litigation affecting the psychiatric field.

Although advocates in the medical and legal communities recognize
the risks of antipsychotic drug use, many lose sight of the benefits
associated with these drugs, a fact that often frustrates the medical
community. Notably, antipsychotic drugs allow millions of people to
return to work or school, and often mean the difference between
institutionalization and community living for the patient. In the event a
patient discontinues antipsychotic drug treatment, relapse is often
inevitable, painful, and costly. In addition, the deteriorating effects of
discontinuation are potentially irreversible. Consequently, the
repercussions associated with either relapse or untreated schizophrenia
affect the patient, family members, mental institutions, and society in
general.

While the benefits of antipsychotic drug use are evident and quite
profound, the risks, though often overstated, are real. Antipsychotic
medication, for example, is similarly used to treat neurotic anxieties
and/or character disorders for which efficacy is yet to be established.

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15HAYES & YUDOSKY, supra note 7, at 906.
17See Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 441.
18APA Report Summarizes Recent Developments in Prevention and Treatment of Tardive
Dyskinesia, 43 HOSP. COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 413 (1992) [hereinafter APA Report].
19Id.
20See Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 457.
21Id. The reader should note that nearly thirty percent ($19 billion) of schizophrenia's cost
involves direct treatment and the rest is absorbed by other factors -- lost time from work for
patients and caregivers, social services and criminal justice resources. Schizophrenia affects one
percent of the population but accounts for a forth of all mental health costs and takes up one third
of the psychiatric beds. Since most schizophrenic patients are never able to work, they must be
supported for life by Medicaid and other forms of public assistance. The debilitating nature of the
illness brings enormous family and societal costs that often go unnoticed because they are not
reported to health insurers or mental health agencies. Id.
22See Smith & Simon, supra note 1, at 344.
23Id. The consensus of opinion in the literature asserts that antipsychotics should virtually
never be used with conditions such as character disorder or anxiety. The risk of TD is much
higher with such use and alternative treatments are much more successful. If the physician uses
antipsychotics for such conditions, he should carefully document his reasons. Id.
Thus, when treating schizophrenic patients, the psychiatrist must assume responsibility for both the risks and the benefits of antipsychotic medication.\(^2\)

This article discusses the risks and implications of antipsychotic drug use, and the nexus between these drugs and TD. Having already discussed the primary concerns involved with antipsychotic drug use in Part I of this article, Part II establishes the requisite medical foundation upon which antipsychotic drug use and TD exist. Combined with this medical background, Part II explores TD risk factors, assessment techniques, and drug treatment variables and strategies. Part III attempts to provide insight into preventing TD malpractice claims. Specifically, Part III focuses on clinician liability and the appropriate standard of care for patients taking antipsychotic medication. Part IV analyzes various jury verdicts and settlement agreements from TD malpractice claims nationwide. Part V discusses the doctrine of informed consent and in particular, seeks to define the requisite disclosure and patient consent necessary for antipsychotic drug treatment. Part VI addresses the controversial debate surrounding a patient's right to refuse treatment by discussing three different approaches, the "rights-driven" approach, the "treatment-driven" approach, and independent clinical review, and this part of the article further considers how each of these approaches uniquely impacts the right to refuse treatment debate.

The ultimate goal of this article is to demonstrate that a careful, well-reasoned, and fully-informed risk-benefit analysis of TD can mitigate tension amongst the medical, legal, and lay communities, thereby improving the standard of patient care and reducing TD malpractice claims. Also, the implementation of a risk-benefit analysis in the administration of antipsychotic medication protects the clinician from the undesirable consequences of judicial "judgment by hindsight," and leads to consistent and factually supported judicial decisions that can be shared, justified, and taught to everyone.\(^2\)

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\(^2\)See APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.

\(^2\)T. GUTHEIL ET AL., DECISION MAKING IN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 58 (1991) [hereinafter GUTHEIL]. This author seeks to address the needs and concerns of the medical, legal, and lay communities, and aspires to forge a common ground between them.
MEDICAL BACKGROUND

In order to analyze the relationship between a clinician's decision to administer antipsychotic drugs and the subsequent risk of developing TD, the clinician must identify and examine a variety of factors which include:

1. drug treatment variables;
2. risk factors;
3. methods and variables of assessment;
4. methods of prevention; and
5. advances in the treatment of TD.26

Since 1973, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has warned the medical community of the causal connection between antipsychotic drug use and TD; yet, the psychiatric community still under-recognizes this disease.27 Increased knowledge and understanding of the risk factors, treatment, and even prevention of TD, will likely diminish the seriousness and number of neuroleptic-induced TD cases.28

General Background

The first reported case involving antipsychotic drug-induced TD occurred in 1957, five years after the introduction of antipsychotic drugs.29 Following years of controversy and denial by the psychiatric community, there is currently general agreement that antipsychotic drugs are a major factor in the development of TD.30 However, not all involuntary movements demonstrated by patients who take antipsychotic drugs establish the presence of TD.31 In fact, spontaneous tick-like and

29Id.
30Id.
31Several neurologic disorders of the basal ganglia such as Huntington's disease, Wilson's disease, brain neoplasm, Fahr's syndrome, Hallervorden-Spatz disease, and Sydenham's chorea can also produce abnormal involuntary movements. Other identifiable movement disorders include hyperthyroidism, hypoparathyroidism, torsion dystonia, Tourette's syndrome, Meige...
perseverative movements often identified with TD have been observed in psychotic patients for many years prior to the introduction of antipsychotic drugs.\textsuperscript{32}

Spontaneous dyskinesias are poorly understood and difficult to study; yet, they are substantially significant to the clinical and medicolegal fields.\textsuperscript{33} An estimated 4 to 7 percent of the elderly population in the United States develop dyskinesia in the absence of antipsychotic drugs, and estimated prevalence rates of spontaneous dyskinesia among schizophrenic patients have reached 30 percent.\textsuperscript{34} The issue of spontaneous dyskinesia is important to the risk-benefit analysis for prescribing antipsychotic drugs because this factor appears to weaken the causal connection between dyskinesia and antipsychotic drug use.\textsuperscript{35}

The prevalence of TD is difficult to estimate, because incidence rates vary depending on the nature and demographics of the study.\textsuperscript{36} The American Psychiatric Association (APA) has estimated the prevalence of TD between 15 and 20 percent of patients using antipsychotic drugs.\textsuperscript{37} Also, the incidence or proportion of any group that is initially free of TD or that will develop symptoms of TD pursuant to antipsychotic drug use within a designated time period is also difficult to estimate.\textsuperscript{38} Medical studies also indicate that the incidence of TD increases as the length of syndrome, and spasmodic torticollis. The distinction between tardive dyskinesia and these disorders can be difficult to make, especially for the inexperienced observer. TD is a diagnosis of exclusion and other possibilities should be excluded, especially if the history and medications are unknown. Latimer, \textit{supra} note 26, at 50.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{APA Report, supra} note 18, at 413.
\textsuperscript{33}Latimer, \textit{supra} note 26, at 50.
\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Id.} Data on spontaneous dyskinesia is hard to obtain and it is difficult to determine whether an individual patient’s abnormal movements are induced by antipsychotic medication or have developed spontaneously. Therefore, it is likely that tardive dyskinesia’s accepted prevalence of 20 percent is inflated because researchers have not adjusted for spontaneous dyskinesia. Age is a definite risk factor for spontaneous dyskinesia. After the age of forty the prevalence of spontaneous dyskinesia is sufficiently high to conclude that many patients with diagnoses of tardive dyskinesia have abnormal movements attributable to causes other than antipsychotics. For an insightful discussion about spontaneous dyskinesia see Khot & Wyatt, \textit{Not All That Moves is Tardive Dyskinesia}, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 661 (1991); Fenton et al., \textit{Risk Factors for Spontaneous Dyskinesia in Schizophrenia}, 51 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 643 (1994).

\textsuperscript{35}Latimer, \textit{supra} note 26, at 50.
\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{37}\textit{APA Report, supra} note 18, at 413.
\textsuperscript{38}Jeste & Caligiuri, \textit{supra} note 28, at 304 (studies of incidence are variable because of the age of patients in the study, their psychiatric diagnosis, and the length of drug treatment).
antipsychotic drug treatment increases. In one long-term study where the median length of lifetime exposure to antipsychotic drugs was twelve months, there was a 5 percent incidence level of TD after one year, 10 percent after two years, 15 percent after three years, 19 percent after four years, and 26 percent after six years.

Preliminary studies tracking the course of TD indicated the disorder was progressive and irreversible. Recent studies, however, indicate TD is not progressive in most patients; instead, the individual's condition will actually stabilize, and may even improve. A number of studies have also documented the course and development of TD among patients who take antipsychotic drugs, and, thereafter, exhibit symptoms of the disease. The majority of these studies indicate these patients either demonstrated signs of improvement or showed no significant change in their current condition. These findings are significant to both the medical and legal fields, and should influence the clinician's decision on whether to continue administering antipsychotic medication to a TD patient. Clearly, these figures do not support the proposition that a clinician should discontinue antipsychotic medication if TD develops, especially since TD symptoms diminish even with the continued use of medication. In addition, the risk-benefit analysis is further influenced in the case of severely psychotic patients for whom discontinuing medication would lead to a potentially catastrophic relapse.

[39Id.]
[40LATIMER, supra note 26, at 51.
[41KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 13, at 2005.
[42Id.
[43Id.
[44Id. In a 1994 study done by Gardos & Cole, a group of 122 neuroleptic-treated Hungarian outpatients were assessed for TD over a ten year period. The overall prevalence of TD in this group changed little over time; it was 30.2 percent at baseline, 36.5 percent at five years, and 31.7 percent at ten years. Gardos et al., Ten-year Outcome of Tardive Dyskinesia, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 836 (1994). In another study done in Italy, the course of TD outcomes was followed up for three years in a population of 125 institutionalized patients receiving continuous antipsychotic treatment. The prevalence of TD rose from 39.2 percent at the first examination to 52.8 percent at the last one. However, 28.6 percent of TD affected patients recovered and 30 percent improved. This finding of no certain irreversibility confirms the Gardos study. Cavallaro et al., Tardive Dyskinesia Outcomes: Clinical and Pharmacologic Correlates of Remission and Persistence, 8 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 233 (1993).
[45See Gardos, supra note 44, at 840.
[46Id.
[47See APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
One study has suggested that rather than viewing TD as "a reversible or irreversible condition, it may be more helpful to view it as being on a continuum from resolution to persistence."\(^{48}\) The potentially serious consequences of TD include both physical and psychosocial complications, as well as the inherent complication of persistence.\(^{49}\) The most common physical complications of oral dyskinesia include dental and denture problems, muffled speech, and traumatic ulceration.\(^{50}\) Swallowing disorders, on the other hand, are not commonly identified with oropharyngeal dyskinesia.\(^{51}\) Respiratory disturbances accompanied by reflexive grunting, snoring, gasping, and shortness of breath have also been reported,\(^{52}\) as have weight loss\(^{53}\) and a shorter life expectancy.\(^{54}\) Finally, abnormal involuntary body movements that characterize TD may also produce psychological problems such as depression; because such movements often create a sense of stigma and anxiety for the patient.\(^{55}\) Consequently, although TD is potentially disabling, severe forms of TD are rare;\(^{56}\) it would be unusual for a clinician to refrain from administering antipsychotic drugs for fear of these uncommon complications.\(^{57}\)

**Risk Factors**

Clinical knowledge of the various TD risk factors is critical to determining whether to administer antipsychotic medication. If the clinician provides treatment to a high risk patient, he or she must monitor and guard against burgeoning signs of TD.\(^{58}\) Also, the clinician should tailor the patient’s drug regimen in an effort to reduce and/or prevent TD.\(^{59}\)

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\(^{49}\)Id.

\(^{50}\)Id.

\(^{51}\)Id.

\(^{52}\)Id.

\(^{53}\)Id.

\(^{54}\)Id.

\(^{55}\)Id.

\(^{56}\)See Mehta et al., *Mortality of Patients with Tardive Dyskinesia*, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 371 (1978). In this study nineteen dyskinetic patients had died after five years compared with twelve patients in the control group. The results of this research are fairly controversial and other researchers have not found associations between tardive dyskinesia and a shortened longevity. *Id.*

\(^{57}\)Jeste & Caligiuri, *supra* note 28, at 310.


\(^{59}\)Id.

\(^{50}\)See APA Report, *supra* note 18, at 414.

\(^{59}\)Id.
The most implicated risk factor for TD, especially the more severe and persistent forms, is increased age. Many studies indicate there is a strong correlation between a patient’s age and the prevalence and severity of TD. Therefore, clinicians must be extremely cautious when administering antipsychotic drugs to elderly patients and any side effects should be carefully monitored.

A second major set of TD risk factors is age and gender. The prevalence of severe TD among elderly woman is significantly higher than among young women. A 1992 review from seventy-six selected studies totaling 39,187 patients, revealed the prevalence of TD was significantly higher among women at 26.6 percent than men at 21.6 percent. The same survey also evaluated the prevalence of TD among patients from various geographic locations and found TD was less common among patients of Asian descent than patients of North American, European, and African descent.

Clinicians should also warn patients of the following risk factors associated with TD: smoking, alcohol use, and the use of antidepressants. Diabetes mellitus has similarly been identified as a possible risk factor. Dyskinetic patients also demonstrate indirect evidence of brain damage, such as a perinatal event or traumatic brain injury in infancy or early childhood.

Although TD is primarily associated with schizophrenic patients, patients with primary affective disorders and schizoaffective disorders

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69 Id. at 413.
62 Id.
63 APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
65 Id.
66 Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 305.
may even be at a higher risk when treated with neuroleptics.\textsuperscript{71} Other studies have revealed that mood disorders, including major depression and bipolar disorder, are also risk factors for neuroleptic induced TD.\textsuperscript{72} Nevertheless, in a 1992 report on TD, the APA decried the lack of research directed toward TD risk factors, arguing that such research would aid in the development of TD prevention.\textsuperscript{73}

Assessing Tardive Dyskinesia
A careful and successful diagnosis, coupled with an ongoing clinical assessment of TD symptoms, is crucial toward controlling the development of TD symptoms.\textsuperscript{74} Unfortunately, clinical assessments are often complicated by various methodological problems, and the lack of precise and reliable assessment methods.\textsuperscript{75} For example, voluntary suppression, fluctuation of symptoms due to changes in arousal, posture, mobility or medications, spontaneous increase or decrease of the symptoms of the disorder, and differentiating the diagnosis from other movement disorders all play a role in clinical assessment.\textsuperscript{76} The lack of precise assessment methods may be one of the main factors leading to the inability to adequately delineate the syndrome, determine prevalence, and develop more effective treatment programs to improve these assessment methods that have been utilized over the last fifteen years.\textsuperscript{77}

The diagnostic criteria currently employed by clinicians to assess TD include:

1. a three month minimum of cumulative neuroleptic exposure;
2. moderate abnormal involuntary movements in one or more body areas, or mild movements in two or more body areas; and
3. the absence of other conditions that produce involuntary hyperkinetic dyskinesias.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{71}APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
\textsuperscript{72}Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 305.
\textsuperscript{73}APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
\textsuperscript{74}Latimer, supra note 26, at 49.
\textsuperscript{75}Id.
\textsuperscript{76}Id.
\textsuperscript{77}Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 307.
\textsuperscript{78}Latimer, supra note 26, at 50.
Following a diagnosis of TD, the clinician should initiate a quantitative method of assessment.\textsuperscript{79}

The APA has stressed the need for quantitative methods such as multi-item scales to assess TD.\textsuperscript{60} Currently, the most common multi-item scale used to test for TD is the Abnormal Involuntary Movement Scale (AIMS).\textsuperscript{81} Other scales include the Rockland Scale, the Extrapyramidal Symptom Rating Scale (ESRS), and the Dyskinesia Identification System Condensed User Scale (DISCUS).\textsuperscript{82} The quality of scoring on rating scales often depends on the experience of the observer,\textsuperscript{83} and a careful clinician should monitor patients every three to six months to assess for TD.\textsuperscript{84} A 1992 APA Report has also recommended that the clinician, especially one who is inexperienced, consult with a specialist in those cases difficult to assess.\textsuperscript{85}

Instrumental assessments for TD first appeared in 1973.\textsuperscript{86} These assessments were designed to enhance clinical understanding of TD, and to distinguish TD from other movement disorders, thereby helping to treat and prevent TD.\textsuperscript{87} In addition, recent advances in computer technology and increased sophistication of instrumental procedures over the past few years have been promising.\textsuperscript{88} Researchers currently use accelerometers, electromyography, force gauges, position transducers, Doppler ultrasound, and digital image processing to detect and differentiate TD from other disorders.\textsuperscript{89}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{79}Id.
\bibitem{53}APA Report, supra note 18, at 413. The APA has indicated that scores on a rating scale cannot be used to diagnose the patient’s condition.
\bibitem{81}Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 308. The AIMS test identifies seven areas of the body and their most common abnormal movements and assesses each movement on a scale of 0 to 4. The AIMS is a reliable rating for trained observers, but it does not distinguish between TD and other movement disorders. \textit{Id.}
\bibitem{82}See Kalachnik & Sprague, \textit{The Dyskinesia Identification System Condensed User Scale (DISCUS): Reliability, Validity, and a Total Score Cut-off for Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded Populations}, 49 J. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 177 (1993) (The psychometrically derived (DISCUS) cut-off score of 5 or above is a “red flag” that clinicians may use in monitoring individuals prescribed antipsychotic medication).
\bibitem{83}Jeste & Caligiuri, supra note 28, at 308.
\bibitem{84}APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
\bibitem{85}Id.
\bibitem{86}Id.
\bibitem{87}Id.
\bibitem{88}Id. at 308-309. See also Lohr & Caligiuri, \textit{Quantitative Instrumental Measurement of Tardive Dyskinesia: A Review}, 6 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 231 (1992).
\end{thebibliography}
Drug Treatment Variables

The efficacy of antipsychotic drugs to treat and prevent schizophrenia relapse is well established. Within a twelve-month period, clinical studies have indicated on average 16 percent of neuroleptic patients suffering from schizophrenia relapse, whereas 74 percent of patients who do not receive neuroleptics relapse. However, there is still no consensus on what constitutes an optimal dose of antipsychotic drugs for the individual patient.

The typical antipsychotic drugs used in treatment include: Thorazine, Haldol, Prolixin, Mellaril, and Stelazine. One study has revealed that no one antipsychotic drug is superior, and there is little data identifying specific drugs or drug classes in the development of TD. Recent data, however, indicates that several atypical antipsychotic drugs result in milder side effects and are equally efficacious in treating psychosis. The APA has cited, for example, the potential of Clozapine in lowering the risk of TD, but has also determined further research is needed in light of other potential side effects. A second novel antipsychotic is Risperidone. Although several times less potent than Haldol, Risperidone parallels Haldol in controlling the psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia.

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90See APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
92Id.
93There are three major generic classes of antipsychotic agents: phenothiazines (chief brand names are Thorazine, Mellaril, Prolazin and Stelazine); thioxanthenes (chief brand names Taracan and Navane); and butyrophones (chief brand name Haldol).
95KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 13, at 2016.
96APA Report, supra note 18, at 413. Clozapine’s most significant side effects include agranulocytosis, seizures, weight gain, hypotension, and sedation. See Buchanan, Clozapine: Efficacy and Safety, 21 SCHIZOPHR. BULL. 579 (1995); Gerlach & Peacock, Motor and Mental Side Effects of Clozapine, 55 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 107 (Supp. 1994). Clozapine’s other benefits include: effectiveness in 30 to 50 percent of treatment resistant psychotic patients, thus it is the treatment of choice for severely disabling psychotic illness that has not responded to “standard” antipsychotic. See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 13, at 2016.
97Id. at 2017. For an interesting discussion of the potential of risperidone see Keltner, Risperidone: The Search for a Better Antipsychotic, 31 PERSPECT. PSYCHIATRIC CARE 30 (1995). The authors maintain the potential for risperidone as a first line antipsychotic because it is arguably better than traditional antipsychotic in treating schizophrenia, but will not likely cause extrapyramidal symptoms and has less severe and fewer side effects than clozapine. See also Marder & Meibach, Risperidone in the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 823.
To date, much research has focused on the design of new drugs to treat psychosis without the possibility of causing dangerous side effects such as TD. Studies have also been conducted on the optimal antipsychotic drug dosage a clinician should administer, and the various techniques used to administer these drugs. The results of such research could potentially shift the risk-benefit ratio of antipsychotic drugs from a moderate risk/high benefit to a low risk/high benefit. Because the risk of TD is greater in long-term treatment, acute (short-term) treatment must be distinguished. While it is often imperative to administer antipsychotic drugs in an acute situation, it is not always necessary to administer these drugs on a long-term basis.

Medical literature suggests that clinicians should administer the least possible effective dose of antipsychotic drugs to a patient. Unfortunately, it is often difficult for the clinician to determine the least possible effective dose. SIGNIFICANTLY, the authors of a popular medical textbook determined that there are no additional benefits received from the use of high doses, and the greatest medical benefit is reached with “600 to 900 mg a day of Chlorpromazine, which is sufficient for most patients and consistent with an average of 10 mg a day of Haloperidol (Haldol) and upper limits of 12 to 20 mg a day.” A higher dose, nevertheless, is often required for a patient who experiences severe psychosis and/or an extremely high degree of agitation. However, the clinician must realize that an antipsychotic drug which causes side effects in one patient may be harmless to another. In fact, a patient may have as much as a twenty-fold variation in blood level after receiving the same antipsychotic dosage. Over one-hundred clinical studies have attempted to delineate the degree of correlation between dose, neuroleptic blood level, and clinical response, but to date these studies have met with only moderate

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(1994).

98 Kaplan & Sadock, supra note 13, at 2016.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 2005.
101 Davis et al., supra note 3, at 118.
102 Id.
103 APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
104 See Kaplan & Sadock, supra note 13, at 2013.
105 Id.
106 Hayes & Yudosky, supra note 7, at 906.
107 Id.
108 Kaplan & Sadock, supra note 13, at 2014.
success. Plasma level determination, however, is useful in recognizing noncompliance and has guided the clinician toward distinguishing between neuroleptic-induced behavioral toxicity and increased psychosis.

The APA and standard psychiatric textbooks have published various guidelines for initiating antipsychotic drug therapy. Many psychiatrists are pressured by staff members to control the patient’s behavior and, therefore, may increase the dosage or switch antipsychotic drugs prematurely. Pursuant to the patient’s first psychotic episode, antipsychotic drug treatment should continue for no less than one year. Five years of treatment is recommended once the patient has experienced a second psychotic episode.

There are several techniques used in antipsychotic drug maintenance therapy. Many research scientists attempt to administer a lower dosage to the patient through intermittent and targeted treatment in order to prevent side effects, such as TD. Intermittent treatment involves a fixed administration schedule incorporating medication-free days, whereas targeted treatment limits the use of antipsychotic drugs to periods of incipient relapse. The efficacy of intermittent and targeted treatments depends on patient monitoring, which in turn requires an ongoing and well-established therapeutic relationship.

The APA task force on TD has determined that both intermittent and targeted treatment are not viable forms of treatment for most patient subgroups due to the threat of relapse. A common strategy, according to the APA, is continuous low dosage of oral antipsychotic, 2.5 mg per day for oral haloperidol or fluphenazine, or depot dosage, 50 mg to 60 mg every four weeks for haloperidol decanoate, or 6.5 to 12.5 mg every two weeks for fluphenazine decanoate.

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109 Shriqui, supra note 91, at 39.
110 Id. Note that it is often difficult to determine plasma level concentrations for the average clinician (as opposed to research scientists) because of cost and time constraints. Id.
111 See Hayes & Yudofsky, supra note 7, at 907.
112 Kaplan & Sadock, supra note 13, at 2014.
113 Id. at 2019.
114 Id.
115 APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Shriqui, supra note 91, at 44.
Today, most clinicians reject the rampant megadosing that occurred during the 1980's, prescribing lower doses of antipsychotic medication instead.\textsuperscript{120} Studies, however, indicate the current relapse rate for schizophrenia is three times higher than average.\textsuperscript{121} This increase may, in effect, lead to and simultaneously lead to deterioration of the patient's condition increased health care costs.\textsuperscript{122} The high relapse rate can be attributed to the inadequate dosing that results from clinician and patient noncompliance.\textsuperscript{123} Clinician noncompliance occurs when the clinician fails to recommend prophylaxis, discontinues treatment too soon, and overestimates the risk of complications such as TD. Therefore, the clinician must properly assess the myriad of drug variables, guard against relapse and side effects such as TD, and account for all potential risks in determining whether to prescribe antipsychotic drugs.\textsuperscript{124}

**TD Treatment Strategies**

The APA task force on TD recommends that once a patient's condition worsens, antipsychotic drug use should either be discontinued or a new drug tried,\textsuperscript{125} since for many patients, the presence of TD does not alter the clinician's decision to stop treatment, especially in light of the benefits received.\textsuperscript{126} However, if the patient is only moderately in need of antipsychotic drugs, the risk-benefit analysis might change and the clinician may decide to stop treatment.\textsuperscript{127} Further, a patient with borderline indications for antipsychotic drugs should also receive short, drug-free intervals as a method for unveiling latent TD.\textsuperscript{128}

Clinicians should become familiar with the benefits of antipsychotic drug use and monitor for symptoms of TD at least once every three months.\textsuperscript{129} Although TD poses a potential risk for the clinician, in most cases TD is mild and requires no particular treatment other than a gradual

\textsuperscript{120}Id. at 45.
\textsuperscript{121}Id.
\textsuperscript{122}Id.
\textsuperscript{123}Id.
\textsuperscript{124}Id.
\textsuperscript{125}See APA Report, supra note 18, at 414.
\textsuperscript{126}Davis et al., supra note 3, at 120.
\textsuperscript{127}Id.
\textsuperscript{128}Id.
\textsuperscript{129}APA Report, supra note 18, at 413.
neuroleptic dose reduction. Complete discontinuation of antipsychotic drug use, however, is unwarranted since the potential risk of relapse outweighs the benefit of preventing TD.

Some patients who display TD symptoms need not discontinue antipsychotic drug use entirely. These patients should switch to Clozapine or Risperidone because these drugs produce fewer side effects than typical antipsychotic drugs. Moreover, one study has indicated that Clozapine and Risperidone may be therapeutically capable of reducing the symptoms of TD. Additionally, other novel antipsychotic drugs which offer fewer side effects are gradually being introduced into the United States market.

Notably, there is also a growing number of alternative methods of treating TD. The APA task force on TD has indicated that vitamin E,

130 Shriqui, supra note 91, at 45.
131 Id. The reader should also be aware that when antipsychotic drugs are discontinued (especially precipitously) in patients who have been treated with the drugs for a year or more, there is potential for a condition called withdrawal supersensitivity psychosis. If left untreated, the psychotic symptoms will usually disappear in several weeks. Unfortunately, the clinician often views this condition as the reemergence of the underlying psychosis and will treat with additional antipsychotic drugs. Restarting antipsychotic drugs with patients with withdrawal supersensitivity psychosis will needlessly prolong the use of antipsychotic drugs and increase the threat of TD. HAYES & YUDOSKY, supra note 7, at 915. Also, there are instances where continued antipsychotic therapy is clinically necessary even if the patient has severe tardive dyskinesia. The patient may even die without drug treatment. This situation usually occurs in the elderly who have risks of respiratory failure. Id. at 914.
132 Id.
134 There still needs to be more research in this very promising area and some authors disagree with the potential of these drugs to treat TD (or at least question the methodology of the studies that suggest clozapine and risperidone can treat TD). But for an examination of the potential of these two drugs to treat TD, see Lieberman et al., The Effects of Clozapine on Tardive Dyskinesia, 158 Br. J. Psychiatry 503 (1991).
135 These novel antipsychotic drugs include serdolect and zotepine. Clinicians should consider switching to these novel antipsychotics because of the significantly less threat of tardive dyskinesia. Typical antipsychotics still constitute about 85 percent of the prescriptions written for antipsychotic drugs. One problem is that many of these novel antipsychotics are very expensive. But studies have shown that patients are more likely to stay on therapy and stay out of the hospital by taking these novel drugs. This lessening of downstream costs could significantly decrease the financial burden of schizophrenia. A greater educational effort is needed to convince Medicaid officials, state legislators, and other policy makers to permit greater access to novel antipsychotic drugs.
136 APA Report, supra note 18, at 414. For an examination of Vitamin E treatment see Lohr & Caligiuri, A Double-Blind Placebo-controlled Study of Vitamin E Treatment of Tardive Dyskinesia, 57 J. Clin. Psychiatry 167 (1996); Elkashef et al., Vitamin E in the Treatment of
ceruletide,\textsuperscript{137} and gamma-linolenic acid\textsuperscript{138} may effectively treat TD.\textsuperscript{139} Pharmacological agents that have received mixed results, yet may nonetheless effectively treat TD include: propranol, clonidine, baclofen, sodium valproate, benzodiazepines, bromocriptine, levodopa, amantadine, verapamil, diltiazem, nifedipine, pindolol, lecithin, naloxone, and isosorbide dinitrate.\textsuperscript{140} The use of adjunctive therapies with neuroleptics is not risk-free, and therefore, a risk-benefit analysis that considers the patient’s past and current medical condition is necessary.\textsuperscript{141}

\textbf{PREVENTING TARDIVE DYSKINESIA LITIGATION}

Medication-related injuries accounted for 20 percent of the total claims against psychiatrists during the 1980's.\textsuperscript{142} A substantial number of these claims involved the use of antipsychotic medication.\textsuperscript{143} According to one commentator, “there is an enormous backlog of cases that is going to plague us for years,”\textsuperscript{144} and as such, “the impending flood of [TD] litigation has begun.”\textsuperscript{145} To date, however, there have been relatively few reported TD-related lawsuits.\textsuperscript{146}

There are a number of possible reasons why litigation surrounding TD is relatively uncommon. First, chronically ill patients with TD might

\textsuperscript{138}Feltner, \textit{supra} note 133, at 30.
\textsuperscript{139}Id.
\textsuperscript{140}Hayes & Yudosky, \textit{supra} note 7, at 914-15.
\textsuperscript{141}Id.
\textsuperscript{143}Id.
\textsuperscript{145}Baker, \textit{supra} note 144, at 806.
\textsuperscript{146}Simon, \textit{supra} note 16, at 230. As of 1990, Simon's research revealed less than thirty cases (including settlements and unpublished cases) dealing with tardive dyskinesia. The author will cite many of the cases and settlements occurring since 1990 in the next section of the article. The number of cases dealing with TD malpractice after 1990 number less than twenty-five. Many of the recent cases deal with the issue of “right to refuse treatment” and legal defenses like the statute of limitations. Not all of the cases dealing with “right to refuse” or the statute of limitations will be cited. \textit{Id.}
not recognize the opportunity for legal recourse.\textsuperscript{147} A relatively high number of severely psychotic patients maintain limited family contacts,\textsuperscript{148} and many of these patients are unable to identify the causal connection between their condition and antipsychotic drug use due to factors such as age, type of disability, and lack of information from the clinician.\textsuperscript{149} In addition, many of these patients do not wish to publicize their psychiatric condition, and therefore, are reluctant to pursue a claim for fear of public recognition.\textsuperscript{150}

Causation is another reason why there have been so few TD-related lawsuits reported.\textsuperscript{151} Failure to document the time and place a patient develops TD is not uncommon, especially since a schizophrenic patient often receives treatment from numerous physicians and mental health workers at different psychiatric facilities.\textsuperscript{152} Therefore, to establish a \textit{prima facie} case against a clinician or health care facility, the patient must eliminate the causal connection between TD and other toxic, infectious, neurological, and pre-existing movement disorders.\textsuperscript{153}

The latent appearance of TD may further hinder the patient's ability to seek legal recourse.\textsuperscript{154} The statute of limitations for malpractice claims, coupled with inevitable discovery rules often bar such claims at the pleading stage.\textsuperscript{155} While it may be true that the majority of TD cases demonstrate no signs of malpractice, many prominent psychiatrists believe TD is a condition that appears with regularity.\textsuperscript{156} The avoidable TD cases are discouraging to research scientists, especially in light of FDA warnings and guidelines established by the 1992 APA Report on TD.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{147}Sim\textsuperscript{on} & Sad\textsuperscript{off}, supra note 142, at 110.
\textsuperscript{148}Id.
\textsuperscript{149}Id.
\textsuperscript{150}Id.
\textsuperscript{151}Id.
\textsuperscript{152}Id.
\textsuperscript{153}Sim\textsuperscript{on}, supra note 16, at 218.
\textsuperscript{154}Id.
\textsuperscript{155}Id.
\textsuperscript{156}Sim\textsuperscript{on}, supra note 16, at 226 (citing Jeste \& Wyatt, Therapeutic Strategies Against Tardive Dyskinesia, 39 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 803 (1982)).
\textsuperscript{157}Id.
A recent 1994 survey indicated that TD continues to stir reactions from both clinicians and clinical administrators. The survey revealed the "denial of [TD], plus the great fear [of] making its risk known, will drive patients off their needed medication [and therefore] clearly continues to get in the way of establishing more rational practice." Studies pertaining to the underrecognition of TD also indicate that physicians at all levels lack concern for TD. Consequently, TD experts emphasize the need to continue educating clinicians and other mental health professionals about the prevention of TD.

To minimize the occurrence of TD malpractice and alleviate the present "extreme reaction" among clinicians, the entire mental health community must be properly informed as to the nature, benefits, and use of antipsychotic drugs. Education must be directed toward psychiatrists, general practitioners, social workers, psychologists, rehabilitation counselors, nurses, and administrators. The reason for this is simple: mental health facilities currently lack properly trained staff members capable of administering and supervising antipsychotic drug use and assessing TD. The mental health community must develop

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159 Id.
160 Hansen et al., supra note 27, at 342.
161 Id. The author of this article realizes it is not the role of the attorney to give medical advice to the clinician. This article has several functions. First, it attempts to correct many of the factual inaccuracies that many attorneys and judges have concerning TD and antipsychotic drugs. The author believes it is important for an attorney, especially a judge, to understand the medical nuances of TD and antipsychotics because most do not have access to recent medical literature. Most lawyers read legal journals and court cases with inaccurate medical information because the authors of these articles fail to cite recent and accepted medical authority (usually no medical authority is cited). Second, this article may be useful to the social worker, the psychologist, or the nurse who often has to assess patients taking antipsychotic drugs. Third, the article may be useful for the general physician or the general psychiatrist not in an university setting who must administer antipsychotics but may not be expert in their use. Fourth, this article is an attempt to minimize TD litigation by suggesting several medicolegal solutions and commenting on various potential regulatory solutions. This function is the more traditional one for the attorney and is certainly an appropriate topic for both the legal and medical communities. Although the author concedes many in the medical community wonder if "solutions" coming from an attorney do more harm than good. This article will hopefully do more good as it "valiantly" attempts to be sensitive to the concerns of the medical community and attempts to be factually accurate with respect to the medical literature.
162 Hopefully, this article will alleviate some of the fear in the mental health community regarding TD by explaining the dearth of TD lawsuits and the difficulty of winning a case.
163 See Benjamin & Munetz, supra note 158, at 344.
continuing medical education programs that specifically address TD. Furthermore, since studies suggest that live lectures are an ineffective method of altering clinician prescription habits, videocassettes, journal articles, and symposiums may ultimately be more effective.

**Clinician Liability**

Clinician liability for the development of TD is based largely upon the following acts or omissions:

1. administering dosages of antipsychotic medication for improper reasons, and/or for improper time periods;
2. negligent diagnoses which may result in the wrong prescription of antipsychotic medication;
3. failure to monitor the patient’s condition;
4. negligent treatment of TD;
5. failure to reduce or discontinue medication;
6. polypharmacy, or the dangerous combination of multiple drugs;
7. failure to seek expert consultation;
8. failure to learn a patient’s medical history;
9. failure to incorporate risk factors such as age and gender; and
10. failure to obtain informed consent prior to administering antipsychotic medication.

Notably, the essential function of tort law is to provide a legal remedy for a civil wrong. Negligence principals and methods of recovery likewise provide incentive for people and entities to act in a careful and conscious manner in order to avoid civil liability. While many clinicians carefully administer antipsychotic drugs in an effort to

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165 *Id.* See *infra* for a more explicit discussion of specific solutions like monitoring and other regulatory proposals.
166 The following examples of negligent conduct were taken from the author’s analysis of the TD case law. For further references to examples of negligence see *Simon & Sadoff, supra* note 142, at 106; Wettstein, *Tardive Dyskinesia and Malpractice*, 1 *Behavioral Sciences and the Law* 85, 89 (1983).
167 The author will give an in-depth analysis of the issue of informed consent and the litigation that surrounds it in a subsequent section of this article.
169 *Id.*
prevent TD,\textsuperscript{170} prolonged treatment from numerous physicians and institutions tends to minimize the physician’s ability to familiarize herself with the patient’s medical history, thereby diminishing the overall quality of treatment.\textsuperscript{171} Because physicians and institutions are often threatened with malpractice claims resulting from their failure to adequately care for and monitor these patients,\textsuperscript{172} both groups must consciously defend themselves from allegations of improper delegation of authority, substandard supervision, inadequate training procedures for staff members, and failure to establish appropriate clinician-patient contact.\textsuperscript{173}

One reason for the physician’s fear of malpractice is the “belegaling” of medicine or the perceived legal intrusion into the medical field.\textsuperscript{174} Many physicians become frustrated and subsequently experience a lack of autonomy from the need to adhere to strict defensive medicine, where the primary aim is self-protection from liability in the event of a bad outcome, rather than seeking to ensure the well-being of the patient.\textsuperscript{175} This attitude creates an adversarial relationship between the physician and patient, which may ultimately result in poor treatment decisions and increased health care costs.\textsuperscript{176} The legal system today must give more deference to the combined professional judgment, competence, and ethics of those in the medical field.\textsuperscript{177} In \textit{Youngberg v. Romeo},\textsuperscript{178} the United States Supreme Court declared that significant heed must be paid to the judgments of qualified professionals in determining when reasonable care has been given.\textsuperscript{179} Therefore, lower courts must never lose sight that the

\textsuperscript{170}Id. Many clinicians give inadequate dosages because of the threat of TD litigation. The result of this “defensive practice of medicine” is potential relapse and paradoxically an increased threat of malpractice exposure.

\textsuperscript{171}Id.

\textsuperscript{172}Id.

\textsuperscript{173}Id. at 992-93.

\textsuperscript{174}Id. at 214.

\textsuperscript{175}GUTHEIL, \textit{supra} note 23, at 211.

\textsuperscript{176}Defensive medicine nationwide is costing an additional $15 billion annually, an amount translating to $1.19 per week for every American. GUTHEIL, \textit{supra} note 25, at 211. Practitioners, the public, and third party insurers all experience the same impact on the price of medical care in the form of additional and possibly unnecessary testing. Fear among physicians and administrators has contributed to a different kind of cost expressed in the unavailability of services in sectors of high-risk exposure. Id.

\textsuperscript{177}Brakel & Davis, \textit{supra} note 6, at 437.

\textsuperscript{178}457 U.S. 307 (1982).

\textsuperscript{179}Id. at 322-23.
clinician is in the best position to determine the appropriate course of treatment for the patient. \(^{180}\)

**The Standard of Care**

In malpractice litigation generally, the applicable standard of care can be established by: authoritative treatises such as the Physician’s Desk Reference, government regulations and institutional guidelines, expert witness testimony, and studies like the APA 1992 report on TD. \(^{181}\) With respect to TD, the APA guidelines contain several unknowns and qualifiers. For example, the directive that patients on antipsychotic drugs be carefully monitored for TD would probably be given great weight in establishing the applicable standard of care. However, it is yet to be determined whether a physician would be deemed negligent if he failed to administer vitamin E in an attempt to treat TD, failed to utilize the most advanced technology in assessing the patient for TD, and/or administered antipsychotic drugs to treat a condition for which they are not required. Conversely, a violation of government regulations and/or institutional guidelines may serve as *prima facie* evidence of negligence despite the various existing standards of care for TD. \(^{182}\)

Because there is a degree of uncertainty involved with treating TD, not one, but several possible standards of care are available. \(^{183}\) Despite this ambiguity, clinicians, like other specialists, are presently being held to a high standard of care entailing that of a “reasonable specialist,” irrespective of community standards. \(^{184}\)

There are many reasonable people in the legal profession who may question the need or wisdom of giving deference to the judgment of the medical professional. Most plaintiffs’ attorneys view themselves as defenders of patients wronged by those whom they trusted, and may cast a wary eye at the medical profession. But it is not reasonable to hold an anti-medicine mentality which serves to exacerbate tension between both

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\(^{180}\)SIMON, *supra* note 16, at 108. The physician is also in the best position to personally familiarize himself with the patient’s condition and medical history. *Id.* Also, it is often difficult for courts to determine the appropriate standard of care and to distinguish bad results from unacceptable behavior because of the variability of practicing patterns. See Wettstein, *supra* note 168, at 89.

\(^{181}\)Id. at 90.


\(^{183}\)Id.

\(^{184}\)Id.
communities, and which will ultimately harm the patient. An example of anti-medicine mentality is that of one legal academic who said, "antipsychotic drugs inflict physical and mental harms on a broad scale -- a scale perhaps unprecedented in modern law." This anti-psychiatry and anti-medication attitude among many in both the legal profession and society has increased the potential for psychiatric litigation.

Legal literature also indicates a propensity to emphasize the risks of antipsychotic medication, while downplaying its profound benefits. Unfortunately, the majority of legal literature dealing with antipsychotic drugs is not only biased but also factually incorrect. The inaccuracies in legal literature often taint the opinions of judges who rely on law review articles. For example, the judge in Rennie v. Klein opined that antipsychotic drugs may cause cancer, although this is, in fact, untrue. Another example of an inaccuracy becoming an established legal fact can be found in In re the Mental Commitment of M.P, where the Indiana Supreme Court asserted that the risk of contracting TD for people taking antipsychotic drugs is 50 percent. One year later, an Illinois Court of

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185 Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugging -- Atomistic and Structural Remedies, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221, 223 (1983). Mr. Gelman was the plaintiff's-patient trial and appellate counsel in the infamous right-to-refuse case of Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981). Mr. Gelman and the other attorneys who worked on the Rennie case should be commended for working to change the grossly negligent environment in the New Jersey state mental hospital system in the 1970's. The psychiatric community in the 1970's was slow to acknowledge the threat of TD. This lack of acknowledgment slowed research, hurt the credibility of the profession, and hurt the patients in these hospitals. But it is dangerous and counterproductive to extrapolate from one grossly negligent situation in the 1970's to the practice of psychiatry today. Such cases today do not support normal institutional psychiatry. One extremely important function of the first part of this article was to show the profound benefits of antipsychotic medicine. Essentially, one could colorfully assert that antipsychotic medicine provided benefits "unprecedented in modern" psychiatry. Id.

186 See Davis et al., supra note 3, at 121.
187 Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 436.
188 Id. Professor Brakel and Dr. Davis explain in their article that factual inaccuracies occur in legal literature because articles "rely almost exclusively on one another, they merely repeat spurious myths, piling misinformation on top of misinformation." Id. at 437. The authors further explain that the original medical information in these law reviews is often inaccurate and misleading. Most legal commentators did not read the original information or could not completely understand the significance of what they read. Another problem is simply the lack of medical articles and textbooks available to most lawyers. Id.

190 Id. at 646.
Appeals cited this case and asserted this inaccurate information. The factual errors in these cases are profound and have more than theoretical consequences. The legal principles stemming from these cases may harm the individual patients affected by the ruling, as well as all patients and the mental health professionals who treat them. Also, such errors can adversely influence a clinician's decisional analysis if the physician feels compelled to accept judicial risk perception and not the actual risks involved. Psychiatrists need to use clinical rather than legal criteria in making treatment decisions.

This divergent perception of the risks involved in the treatment of antipsychotic medication is yet another reason for the perceived medical malpractice crisis and the tensions between the medical and legal communities. Thus, judges may tend to view clinicians' treatment decisions as reckless. The differences in risk perception are magnified by "hindsight bias," as judges in malpractice suits seek outcomes inevitable in retrospect. Judges become more risk adverse because they address treatment decisions retrospectively, while psychiatrists must make treatment decisions prospectively. Judges also become more risk adverse because the side effects of antipsychotic medication are visible in a courtroom, while the benefits of antipsychotic medication are not readily apparent.

The anti-medicine rhetoric often found in legal literature, and the judicial misunderstanding of those medical facts involved in antipsychotic medication and tardive dyskinesia, must be altered. The legal community should be educated on the real risks of antipsychotic medication and TD and must also be informed of the great benefits provided by such

\[\text{In re Orr, 531 N.E.2d 64, 74 (1988). The accepted prevalence rate for TD is between 10 percent and 20 percent. The incidence of TD is approximately 4 percent per year.}\]

\[\text{Bursztajn et al., Medical and Judicial Perceptions of the Risks Associated with Use of Antipsychotic Medication, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 271, 271 (1991). In this study psychiatrists and judges agreed about the probability of TD they would tolerate in order to prevent the recurrence of relapse (50 percent). But the groups diverged in the estimation of the actual probability of TD associated with the continued use of medication. The judges estimated the medication carried a 62.5 percent probability of TD, while the psychiatrists estimated a 25 percent probability of TD. Id. at 273. The data indicates that the decision analysis of the two groups differ in many situations where the judges would not treat, the psychiatrists would deem treatment appropriate. Id.}\]

\[\text{Id. at 274.}\]

\[\text{Id.}\]

\[\text{Id.}\]
medication. Judges and juries can learn through expert witnesses the true medical facts in order to make reasoned decisions, and the medical community should approach the problem of TD honestly in order to develop an educational dialogue between the two professions. The communities must be aware of each of the profession's inherent differences, but also acknowledge the communities' real similarities. Although there are profound uncertainties in medical decision analysis, individual and institutional negligence does occur in the administration of antipsychotic medication. An especially controversial issue surrounds the administration of antipsychotic medication to both the mentally retarded and the elderly in nursing homes. Clites v. Iowa is the seminal case involving the negligent administration of antipsychotic drugs to a mentally retarded individual. The plaintiff, Timothy, in Clites was a patient at the Glenwood Hospital-School, a large residential facility for the

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195 One of the most significant differences between the two professions is the tolerance for ambiguity and the manner in which it is handled. Clinicians will always question the ethics of attorneys as long as the adversarial process continues to ignore the uncertainties of the medical decision process. A function of this article is to cause attorneys to be more cognizant of the uncertainties of antipsychotic treatment. But the legal profession is rightly frustrated by the medical profession's assertion that they are the more moral and ethical of the professions. Lawyers, in the eyes of most physicians, are at most amoral. The author has been questioned by several in the medical profession regarding any lawyer's competence in ethical issues. The legal profession allegedly makes all its decisions from some large and secret code (maybe in Louisiana) without any moral or ethical perspective. The author completely rewrote several decisions as a clerk because the decision, although supported by case analysis, was simply not "ethical" according to the judge. Many judicial decisions are not "cut and dried" and the answers cannot often be picked out of some code. There are often two or three almost equally valid decisions—the very definition of an ethical dilemma. Although the author may be venturing into complex and controversial jurisprudential waters, judicial decisions are often based on one's own personal ethical code. Ethical analysis is part and parcel of the average attorney's everyday life. The legal profession is wrong in indicting the mental health system for one or two bad cases; but the medical professional is also wrong in indicting the entire legal profession for several bad experiences.

Several commentators have attempted to distinguish the professions by illustrating that the law is grounded in a deontological perspective while the medical profession is grounded in a teleological perspective. But the law, as illustrated above, is focused not just on rules and procedures, but often acts teleologically as it strives to help each individual reach their highest level of attainment. The medical and legal profession must acknowledge their similarities. Both professions have a high duty to their client or patient, both seek the truth and the attainment of the highest virtue—justice, and both are concerned about healing (medicine's goal is the healing of the patient's body and the legal profession is concerned about healing the rifts between individuals and healing the "ills" in society).

196 Clites v. Iowa, 322 N.W.2d 917 (1982). This case will be explored in detail in the next two sections.
mentally retarded, operated by the State of Iowa.\textsuperscript{193} Approximately seven years after Timothy's admission to the hospital, his treating physicians modified his treatment program.\textsuperscript{199} Timothy was prescribed major tranquilizers to curb aggressive behavior, and between 1970-1975, he received a "myriad of different tranquilizers, administered in various combinations, under the auspices of several different physicians."\textsuperscript{200} In 1975, Timothy was diagnosed as suffering from TD, and thereafter filed a negligence action against the hospital. Timothy was ultimately awarded $385,165 in future medical expenses, and $375,000 in past and future pain and suffering.\textsuperscript{201}

In response to the \textit{Clites} decision, many commentators have promoted the conservative use of antipsychotic drugs with mentally retarded individuals.\textsuperscript{202} In the mid-1980s, studies revealed that approximately 40 percent of the mentally retarded population received antipsychotic medication, whereas recent studies indicate a significant decrease in antipsychotic drug use among these individuals.\textsuperscript{203} This decrease may be the result of an effort to selectively administer antipsychotic drugs to mentally retarded individuals experiencing psychotic problems, and to avoid administering drugs to those individuals merely demonstrating aggressive behavior.\textsuperscript{204}

The improper administration of antipsychotic drugs to the mentally retarded and elderly is troublesome, given the deteriorated physical and/or mental condition of these individuals. A 1980 study revealed that 43 percent of patients in Tennessee nursing homes received antipsychotic medication.\textsuperscript{205} The excessive use of antipsychotic medication in nursing

\textsuperscript{193}\textit{Clites}, 322 N.W.2d at 918. Since early childhood, the plaintiff had been diagnosed as mentally retarded due to an unknown prenatal cause. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{199}\textit{Clites}, 322 N.W.2d at 918.

\textsuperscript{200}\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{201}\textit{Id.} at 919.

\textsuperscript{202}See Gualtieri et al., \textit{Tardive Dyskinesia in Mentally Retarded Children, Adolescents, and Young Adults: North Carolina and Michigan Studies}, 18 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 62, 64 (1982).


\textsuperscript{204}\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{205}Goode, \textit{Antipsychotic Drugs: Regulating Their Use in the Private Practice of Medicine}, 15 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 331, 338 (1985) (citing Ray et al., \textit{A Study of Antipsychotic Drug Use in Nursing Homes: Epidemiologic Evidence Suggesting Misuse}, 70 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 485, 490 (1980)).
homes often occurs because physician-patient contact is limited, medication is overused, and staff turnover is frequent. Limited physician-patient contact often requires the delegation of duties to inexperienced nursing staff, which in turn, leads to confusion over dosage levels, telephone errors, and the continuation of medication beyond its clinical usefulness. Also, given their lack of psychiatric training in the nursing home, staff members might administer antipsychotic drugs solely to calm the patient, rather than to treat the underlying illness.

While education is paramount to the prevention of TD, certain regulatory schemes may also prove valuable. Some states require clinicians and staff members to undergo extensive training in the administration of antipsychotic medication. Such regulations may be useful in preventing TD, without limiting the autonomy of the medical profession.

The implementation of physician-patient contact requirements is another area where statutory regulations may be effective. To illustrate, states could simultaneously require physicians to review a patient’s medical history prior to administering a new drug prescription, and to interview patients who take antipsychotic drugs every three to six months per APA guidelines. Mandates governing physician-patient contact may be the most helpful in the context of a nursing home or mental

205 Goode, supra note 205, at 340.
207 Id. (citing Dyer et al., Geriatrics & Gerontology—The Role of the Pharmacist in a Geriatric Nursing Home: A Literature Review, 18 DRUG INTELLIGENCE & CLINICAL PHARMACY 428 (P. Lamy ed., 1984)).
209 Id.
209 There are commentators who question the efficacy of educational efforts for the medical community. See Gelman, supra note 193, at 234-240. The essence of this argument is that the cause of TD is not lack of knowledge or carelessness, but the refusal to even acknowledge there is a problem. Consequently, the use of education as a remedy will not solve the problem. Although it may be true that some in the mental health community have difficulty acknowledging the problem of TD, it is through education that these people will understand the realities of TD and the minimal malpractice risk they face if their decisions are informed and documented. Id.
210 Jacqueline Guidry, J.D. et al., Persons With Developmental Disabilities and Tardive Dyskinesia: A Historical Perspective and an Examination of State Policies Responding to Litigation Questions, 16 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 625, 646 (1988). The federal government also has entered the picture and has allocated large sums of money (via DHEW) toward training programs for pharmacists who could perform clinically-oriented services and promote the rational clinical use of drugs. Goode, supra note 205, at 341.
211 Guidry et al., supra note 210, at 647.
212 Id. at 647-49.
institution, since these entities traditionally offer limited physician-patient contact. \textsuperscript{213}

While the benefits of state implemented regulatory schemes are profound, there are also some controversial regulations. One such regulation is the Jamison-Farabee consent decree, which requires external review of clinical treatment within three days of antipsychotic drug administration. \textsuperscript{214} Regulations like California’s quality assurance system and the Jamison-Farabee consent decree have been arguably successful, but they do have setbacks. These mandates often waste clinical resources because the review procedures are expensive and treatment methods are rarely overridden. \textsuperscript{215} Moreover, the patient’s condition may worsen during treatment review. \textsuperscript{216} Finally, passive or timid physicians may blindly conform to all guidelines, thereby denying the patient the right to individualized treatment. \textsuperscript{217}

One promising area in the prevention of TD involves TD screening and assessment programs. Enhanced methods of instruction and specific clinical examinations should improve TD recognition rates. \textsuperscript{218} Studies suggest that without formal training, even TD assessments from pharmacists, physicians, and psychologists may be inaccurate. \textsuperscript{219} Data also suggests that neither professional group should perform TD screening to the exclusion of the other, \textsuperscript{220} especially since a wide range of properly trained medical professionals can accurately screen for TD, although the assessment should be reviewed by a physician. \textsuperscript{221} Pharmacists and nurses, in particular, perform an integral function in screening for TD because

\textsuperscript{213}Id.
\textsuperscript{214}Id.
\textsuperscript{215}See Hargraves et al., Effects of the Jamison-Farabee Consent Decree: Due Process Protection for Involuntary Psychiatric Patients Treated with Psychoactive Drugs, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 188 (1987).
\textsuperscript{216}See Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 455. See also Hargraves, supra note 222, at 188.
\textsuperscript{217}See Laska et al., Automated Review System for Orders of Psychotropic Drugs, 37 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 824-27 (1980).
\textsuperscript{218}Hansen et al., supra note 27, at 343.
\textsuperscript{219}Kalachnik & Sprague, supra note 27, at 188.
\textsuperscript{220}Id. at 189.
\textsuperscript{221}Id.
physicians are often burdened by a myriad of numerous administrative and cost-containment duties.\textsuperscript{222} Regulations requiring TD screening in state hospitals may aid in preventing TD and minimize the likelihood of medical malpractice. A 1986 survey revealed that 61 percent of states required some form of TD assessment for institutionalized patients, but only 18 percent maintained TD assessment policies for individuals residing in community placement.\textsuperscript{223} A 1994 study indicated that 41.3 percent of community placement facilities maintained TD screening policies, but the majority of clinical directors at these facilities stated that TD screening was uncommon.\textsuperscript{224} Regrettably, state regulations may have little effect on the actual screening of patients for TD. As one study revealed, only 11.5 percent of psychiatrists affiliated with public hospitals were aware of state regulations on TD risk disclosure.\textsuperscript{225} The discouraging results of these studies may be somewhat alleviated, given that 10 percent of hospitals have instituted or altered their TD screening policies since the Benjamin and Munetz survey.\textsuperscript{226} Therefore, physicians must never lose sight of the fact that such policies exist as a means to protect both the physician and patient from the negative implications of TD.\textsuperscript{227} One method potentially capable of shielding physicians from malpractice liability is the documentation of treatment decisions. One commentator has even declared that documentation of clinical reasoning is the "first commandment of due care."\textsuperscript{228} Documentation is necessary to demonstrate awareness of clinical uncertainty and the effort taken to

\textsuperscript{222}Id. For example, a nurse can conduct a TD assessment and forward the results to a pharmacist if the DISCUS score is over 5. The pharmacist can then review the assessment in terms of drug treatment variables and can forward the assessment to a physician if the case needs more formal diagnostic evaluations. This model may be especially useful in a nursing home or large state mental hospital where physician contact is limited. The reader should note that non-physician assessment is still controversial to some commentators. The use of social workers, case managers or rehabilitation counselors is especially controversial. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{223}Guidry et al., supra note 210, at 644.

\textsuperscript{224}Benjamin & Munetz, supra note 158, at 346 (noting systematic TD assessment is also now being emphasized through HCFA guidelines).

\textsuperscript{225}Kennedy & Sanborn, Disclosure of Tardive Dyskinesia: Effects of Written Policies about Tardive Dyskinesia, 28 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 93-100 (1992).

\textsuperscript{226}Benjamin & Munetz, supra note 158, at 346.

\textsuperscript{227}State or hospital screening policies are also pointless if medical personnel are not adequately trained to give the assessments.

\textsuperscript{228}GUTHEIL ET AL., supra note 25, at 56.
confront such uncertainty. The physician should, therefore, document his method of reasoning as a means to demonstrate the reasonableness of the treatment and that the anticipated benefits of the treatment outweigh the potential harm. Also, without documentation, the clinician is defenseless to judicial hindsight. Finally, proper consultation with colleagues is the "second commandment" of due care. While knowledge gained from consultation is beneficial to the patient, it may also reduce TD liability.

Societal recognition and understanding of mental illness is a significant yet indirect method of preventing TD. The public must realize that psychosis is not a sign of weakness, but a devastating disease. Knowledge gained by employers, family members, and friends will undoubtedly aid the schizophrenic's return to society. Also, lobbyists must urge the government and third-party insurance companies to reimburse medical costs while continuing to fund mental illness research. Improved methods of drug and psychosocial treatment for psychotic patients will hopefully prevent relapse and reduce harmful side effects like TD. In addition, there must be societal pressure to fund staff increases and other improvements in large state mental institutions and nursing homes. These changes demand that the medical, legal, and lay communities collaborate in their effort to effectively treat the psychotic patient and prevent TD.

CASE ANALYSIS

Despite the fact that relatively few TD claims ever survive the pleadings stage, clinicians and institutions must nevertheless familiarize themselves with the appropriate standard of care. Therefore, attention must be directed toward those TD claims that have actually survived the pleadings stage, for these cases offer evidence of the requisite standard of care in antipsychotic drug treatment.

229 Id. at 58.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 56.
233 Id.
234 There are more TD cases that have been settled, that involved "right to refuse" treatment, and were dismissed because of legal defenses like the statute of limitations. But the author still could only locate approximately 50 cases involving tardive dyskinesia.
The Iowa Court of Appeals decision in *Clites v. Iowa* provides valuable insight into litigation surrounding antipsychotic drug treatment and TD. Faced with the issue of whether high doses of antipsychotic drugs were necessary to curb the patient’s aggressive behavior, the court determined the doses were clearly disproportionate to the patient’s level of aggression. In support of its decision, the court found the hospital failed to closely monitor the patient for TD, and failed to conduct a physical examination of the patient for three years. In addition, the hospital neither addressed the patient’s burgeoning signs of TD, nor altered its treatment program until four years after the patient first showed symptoms of TD. Finally, the court noted that the attending physicians never consulted with specialists to formulate a safe and effective treatment plan for the patient. Based on these facts, the court concluded the hospital was negligent in caring for the patient and upheld a $760,165 judgment against the hospital.

Of mutual importance in *Clites*, was the lack of control the hospital maintained over its own staff and drug treatment policies. Because the hospital was severely understaffed, Timothy frequently received antipsychotic medication from non-psychiatrists who were unfamiliar with TD. *Clites*, therefore, is a classic example of a hospital’s negligent care and treatment of a patient receiving antipsychotic drugs.

The *Clites* court also reached several more dubious conclusions that emphasized why the legal community needs to be educated in antipsychotic drug treatment and TD. First, the *Clites* court concluded that the practice of polypharmacy, the concurrent use of multiple drugs, impeded the TD detection process and increased the likelihood of adverse reactions. Second, the court considered the clinicians negligent for not providing a “drug holiday.” Third, the court concluded the physicians at Glenwood negligently administered antiparkinsonian agents which

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232 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (The appellate court upheld all findings of the trial court including the application of the correct standard of care and the amount of damages).

236 *Clites*, 322 N.W.2d at 920.

237 *Id.*

238 *Id.*

239 *Id.* The author will discuss the issue of informed consent in *Clites* in the next section.

242 *Clites v. Iowa*, 322 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).

244 *Id.*

245 *Id.*

246 *Id.*
suppressed the TD.\textsuperscript{244} Here, the error in the court’s argument was that the use of more than one drug is often warranted for treatment of TD, including antiparkinsonian agents, to alleviate severe continuous extrapyramidal symptoms.\textsuperscript{245} Further, the use of two antipsychotic drugs has no greater effect than a higher dosage of one drug alone.\textsuperscript{246} Moreover, the court’s stipulation of the necessity of “drug holidays,” or intermittent treatment, is also controversial. In 1992, the APA stated intermittent therapy is not a viable treatment option for most patients.\textsuperscript{247}

Finally, the court in \textit{Clites} also stated that the use of antipsychotic drugs was designed as a convenience rather than a therapeutic program.\textsuperscript{248} Much legal commentary contains misleading information like the “fact” that psychiatrists mainly prescribe antipsychotic medication for their own convenience.\textsuperscript{249} Consequently, \textit{Clites} teaches physicians that they must document that antipsychotic drugs are being used for therapeutic purposes and not for the convenience of the medical staff.\textsuperscript{250}

The Michigan Court of Appeals reached a similar decision in \textit{Faigenbaum v. Oakland Medical Center}.\textsuperscript{251} The plaintiff in \textit{Faigenbaum} was fifty-six year old psychiatric patient suffering from depression and schizophrenia.\textsuperscript{252} Between the years of 1964 and 1966, the patient was hospitalized for what “may have been manic psychoses” caused by marital difficulties.\textsuperscript{253} At this time, she responded favorably to low doses of chlorpromazine.\textsuperscript{254} The patient was again hospitalized in 1976, suffering from manic-depression, chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, and hysterical neurosis,\textsuperscript{255} and she was prescribed chlorpromazine.\textsuperscript{256} Hospitalized for nearly one year, the patient developed a movement disorder,\textsuperscript{257} incorrectly diagnosed by a staff neurologist as Huntington’s

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{244}Id.
\bibitem{245}Davis et al., \textit{supra} note 3, at 121.
\bibitem{246}SIMON, \textit{supra} note 16, at 227.
\bibitem{247}APA Report, \textit{supra} note 18, at 413.
\bibitem{248}Clites v. Iowa, 322 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
\bibitem{249}Davis et al., \textit{supra} note 3, at 122.
\bibitem{250}Id.
\bibitem{252}Gualtieri, et al., \textit{supra} notes 5 at 192.
\bibitem{253}Id.
\bibitem{254}Id.
\bibitem{255}Id.
\bibitem{256}Id.
\bibitem{257}Id.
\end{thebibliography}
Chorea, rather than TD. As a result of the misdiagnosis, the hospital physicians continued to administer antipsychotic drugs for one year until the patient’s family demanded the medication be discontinued.

In determining whether the hospital was negligent in treating the patient, the Faigenbaum court concluded that the hospital physicians incorrectly diagnosed the patient’s condition, failed to monitor the patient’s condition properly, and negligently continued to administer antipsychotic medication after she displayed clear symptoms of TD. The trial court, therefore, awarded a $1 million judgment in favor of the patient.

Faigenbaum illustrates the importance of recognizing TD in a patient displaying movement disorders pursuant to taking antipsychotic medication. Interestingly, a controversial issue in Faigenbaum was whether the patient actually suffered from mental illness. Although the patient was diagnosed as mentally ill in the 1960s, and responded favorably to antipsychotic medication, the trial court determined that she never suffered from mental illness.

The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota awarded nearly $3 million to the plaintiff in Hedin v. United States, where the plaintiff received outpatient treatment from a VA hospital for a period of seventeen months, during which time he saw no physician and continued to receive antipsychotic drugs through the mail. In determining whether the VA physicians were negligent in failing to monitor the plaintiff’s condition, the court noted that the physicians prescribed an excessive amount of antipsychotic drugs over a prolonged period of time. As it turned out, however, the VA ultimately admitted that the prescribed doses were excessive, the plaintiff’s condition was not adequately monitored, and the plaintiff’s condition had been previously

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259Gualtieri et al., supra note 5 at 1920.
261Id. The patient also received approximately $500,000.00 in settlement awards. Id. The reader should further note that the appellate court reversed the trial court decision against the state hospital and several of its employees because of governmental immunity. Id. at 166. The operation of a mental hospital was considered to be a governmental function entitled to immunity. Id. at 164-66.
262Faigenbaum, 373 N.W.2d at 162.
263No. 5-83-3 (D. Minn. Jan. 4, 1985).
264Id. The plaintiff received 600 mg of Thorazine over a four year period.
diagnosed as untreatable.\textsuperscript{265} Therefore, the sole issue before the court was the amount of damages. The court thereafter awarded the plaintiff nearly $3 million, including a $30,000 loss of consortium award to his ex-wife.\textsuperscript{266} 

*Hedin* is an interesting case because the VA neither disputed causation, nor raised a contributory negligence defense in light of the plaintiff's addiction to amphetamines.

In *Leal v. Simon*,\textsuperscript{267} the New York Court of Appeals recommended that a $2.5 million jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff be reduced to $1 million.\textsuperscript{268} The plaintiff in *Leal* was a mentally retarded patient who developed TD at the UCPA facility.\textsuperscript{269} The defendant-physician ordered a change in the plaintiff's medication from 4 to 2 mg of Haldol, as needed.\textsuperscript{270} The medication was administered only if the plaintiff became hyper or abusive.\textsuperscript{271} Nearly one month after reducing the patient's Haldol prescription, the plaintiff regressed and became severely self-abusive.\textsuperscript{272} The defendant-physician thereafter prescribed Haldol in dosages fifteen times higher than the plaintiff's original maintenance amount.\textsuperscript{273} The plaintiff soon experienced severe side effects such as the inability to eat, walk, or talk.\textsuperscript{274}

The jury in *Leal* found the physician negligent.\textsuperscript{275} Expert testimony supported the jury's determination of negligence based on:

(1) the physician failed to familiarize himself with the plaintiff's medical history;\textsuperscript{276}

(2) the physician failed to obtain complete medical records and neglected to review the appropriate medical literature and consult with other colleagues with regard to the plaintiff's condition;\textsuperscript{277} and

\textsuperscript{265}Id.

\textsuperscript{266}Id. at 18.

\textsuperscript{267}147 A.D.2d 198 (N.Y. 1989).

\textsuperscript{268}Id. at 207.

\textsuperscript{269}Id. at 199-200.

\textsuperscript{270}Id. at 201.

\textsuperscript{271}Id.

\textsuperscript{272}Leal v. Simon, 147 A.D.2d 198, 201 (N.Y. 1989).

\textsuperscript{273}Id.

\textsuperscript{274}Id. at 201.

\textsuperscript{275}Id. at 203.

\textsuperscript{276}Id. at 204.

\textsuperscript{277}Leal v. Simon, 147 A.D.2d 198, 204 (N.Y. 1989).
(3) the physician was negligent in monitoring the plaintiff's condition, and he should have restricted the plaintiff to an "at-bed-time" dosage of Haldol.278

Interestingly, the physician in Leal explained that his decision to reduce the medication was prompted by an impending state audit from the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities of all UCPA programs and physician medical records.279 The audit sought to review whether the UCPA physicians had reduced the overall prescription of antipsychotic medication, a goal of the UCPA facility because of its concern for TD and other side effects.250 The jury noted this defense and found the UCPA facility negligent by adding a handwritten "special finding" in the general verdict.281 The appellate court, however, rejected this finding as "surplusage" and "gratuitous" because the jury was "bound to render its verdict in the form prescribed by the court."252 The UCPA facility was, nevertheless, found vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the physician.283 Consequently, that a physician would alter his method of treatment to avoid administrative interference from a state audit, is one danger that critics of such audits are quick to point out.

There are several other notable TD verdicts. In Vincent v. Walz,224 the plaintiff was prescribed Mellaril for menopausal symptoms and maintained the prescription for seven years until she developed symptoms of TD.285 Trial proceeded on the sole issue of damages, after a default judgment was entered against the defendant-physician for failing to answer the complaint in a timely manner.226 The jury ultimately awarded the plaintiff $1.25 million in damages.287 In Hudson v. Texas Mental Health & Retardation Center,288 a Texas court awarded a patient $820,000.00 in damages after the defendant-physician attempted to treat the chronically depressed patient with Thorazine and Loxitane, even

278 Id. at 205.
279 Id. at 201.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 206.
283 Id.
284 No. 86-3710 (DeKalb County Sup. Ct., Jan. 14, 1988).
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 No. 424,100 (Bexar County Sup. Ct., Jan. 28, 1991).
though she exhibited no signs of schizophrenia. The court subsequently reduced the award to $250,000.00 in compliance with the damages limitations imposed by the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Finally, in a products liability case, a Texas court in American Cyanamid Co. v. Frankson, found the defendant, Lederle Laboratories, negligent for its design and manufacture of the drug Loxitane. The court awarded the patient $2,195,000.00 in compensatory damages and $500,000.00 in punitive damages. Interestingly, the court did not find the physicians who administered the medication negligent. Nevertheless, while there are relatively few TD verdicts on record, there are several reported settlement agreements.

In some situations, a patient may develop TD even though the clinician diligently follows the applicable standard of care. There are a number of TD-related cases where the defendant-physician and/or hospital was found not liable even though the patient experienced a "bad result" from the treatment. This is common during the pleading stage when, for example, the patient fails to establish proximate cause or the applicable statute of limitations has expired. Where the patient fails to inform the

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289 Id.
290 Id.
291 732 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1987).
292 Id. at 651.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Some of the more noteworthy settlements include: Snider v. Harding, No. 84-CV-06-3582 (Franklin Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas August, 1988) where a $800,000 settlement was reached after a 34 year old male teacher developed TD resulting from negligent treatment of acute psychotic episodes with a medication called Navane; Urbani v. Yale University School of Medicine, No. 85-46EBB (Conn. 1986) a $30,000 settlement was reached even though the 15 year old plaintiff recovered from initial TD symptoms.
296 For examples of TD defense verdicts see: Rivera v. N.Y.C. Health and Hospital Corp, No. 27536/82 (New York Sup. Ct. 1988) where the defense argued that plaintiff had only one incidence of torticollis and it was attributable to stress, so Thorazine did not have to be discontinued; Haney v. Serbin, No. 90-430 (Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas April 19, 1991) where defense successfully asserted Triavil was appropriately prescribed for depression and other physical problems; Durell v. Mawhinney, No. 482189 (San Diego Sup. Ct. July 22, 1988) where defense successfully asserted Haldol was appropriately prescribed; Cleary v. Eugenia Hospital, No. 85-11-03593 (Philadelphia County Ct. Common Pleas, December 1991) where defense successfully asserted plaintiff did not suffer from TD but had Huntington's chorea.
297 For examples of three of approximately 10 TD cases dealing with the statute of limitations defense see Barnhart v. United States, 884 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1989); Bolen v. United States, 727 F.Supp. 1346 (Idaho 1989); Gatling v. Perna, 788 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. 1990).
physician of any known side effects from the medication, contributory negligence may also serve as a bar to complete recovery.\(^{293}\)

**INFORMED CONSENT**

Under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician must disclose sufficient information that would allow a patient to make an “informed” decision about a proposed treatment.\(^{299}\) In *Canterbury v. Spence*,\(^{397}\) the United States District Court for the District of Columbia explained that, “true consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each.”\(^{301}\) At least one court has indicated that “every person has a right to determine and control what is to be done to his or her body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits [a battery] for which he is liable for damages.”\(^{302}\) The requirement of informed consent seeks to promote, among other things, greater patient autonomy, the preservation of the patient’s livelihood, self-regulation and rational decision making by the physician, and greater public involvement in medical decision making.\(^{393}\)

Physician liability for lack of informed consent is premised on two legal theories: (1) the intentional tort of battery; and (2) negligence. In the context of TD litigation, a patient might allege battery, since the failure to disclose potential side effects of antipsychotic drug use is tantamount to treatment without consent.\(^{304}\) Similarly, a TD patient might allege negligence in the event she was not adequately informed of the risks and implications necessary to make an informed decision as to whether to submit to such treatment.\(^{305}\) In the latter situation, the patient asserts that, “had the physician disclosed the risk and implications of antipsychotic drug use, I would not have consented to the treatment.” Moreover, a claim based on lack of informed consent does not require that the physician provide the “best” or “optimal” treatment; rather, a lack of

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\(^{299}\)Id.

\(^{302}\)Schoendorff v. New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).

\(^{305}\)Id.
informed consent claim merely requires the physician to provide treatment consistent with the standard of care.\textsuperscript{306} Three basic elements comprise the informed consent requirement:

(1) knowledge of the risks;
(2) patient competency; and
(3) voluntariness of the consent.\textsuperscript{307}

Traditionally, the scope of disclosure has been determined by “what a reasonable medical practitioner would disclose under the same or similar circumstances.”\textsuperscript{308} This standard was challenged in 1972 when the court in \textit{Canterbury v. Spence}\textsuperscript{309} rejected the reasonable practitioner approach, adopting instead the objective or “reasonable patient” approach.\textsuperscript{310} This approach, according to the court, requires the physician to disclose all known “material risks” to the patient.\textsuperscript{311} A risk is therefore material, the court stated, “when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient’s position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether to forego the proposed therapy.”\textsuperscript{312} The court rejected the substantive standard by stating that a standard based upon the opinions of a physician could not regulate patient rights.\textsuperscript{313}

Significantly, \textit{Canterbury} does not stand for the proposition that a physician is required to disclose every risk that is theoretically possible.\textsuperscript{314} Rather, the court indicated the category of risks the physician should communicate “is no broader than the complement he could communicate.”\textsuperscript{315} The duty to disclose, the court determined, may extend to any risk the physician has actual knowledge of, excluding of course,
those risks that the physician is unaware exist.\(^{316}\) Thus, nondisclosure of an unknown risk, according to the court, "does not, strictly speaking, present a problem in terms of the duty to disclose although it very well might pose problems in terms of the physician's duties to have known of it and to have acted accordingly."\(^{317}\)

Physicians should therefore incorporate five general categories of disclosure into their method of treatment:

1. the diagnosis;
2. an overview of the proposed treatment;
3. a description of the most likely risks and benefits of the proposed treatment;
4. alternative treatments, if any; and
5. the prognosis.\(^{318}\)

Treatment posing great risks obliges the physician to disclose even relatively remote risks, especially if alternative therapies are available.\(^{319}\) Consequently, because of its relatively high prevalence/incidence rates, and its potentially permanent nature, physicians have both an ethical and legal obligation to disclose the risks of TD to a patient.

Patient competency is another element of informed consent.\(^{320}\) The law presumes a patient to be competent unless judicially determined otherwise.\(^{321}\) Courts employ four standards to determine patient competency:

1. ability to communicate choice;
2. whether the patient comprehends the information provided to him;
3. recognition of alternative forms of treatment; and
4. ability to make rational decisions.\(^{322}\)

While most lawyers define patient competency in cognitive terms, courts tend to focus on the patient's ability to communicate choice and the level

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\(^{316}\) *Canterbury*, 464 F.2d at 786, n. 84 (referring to Waltz & Scheuneman, *Informed Consent To Therapy*, 64 N.W.U.L. REV. 628, 630-35 (1970)).
\(^{317}\) *Id.*
\(^{318}\) *SIMON & SADOFF*, supra note 142, at 103-04.
\(^{319}\) Wettstein, *supra* note 168, at 95.
\(^{320}\) *SIMON & SADOFF*, supra note 142, at 104.
\(^{321}\) *Id.*
\(^{322}\) *Id.*
of comprehension the patient displays. Nevertheless, true informed consent is generally believed to exist when the patient makes a rational decision to undergo treatment after being fully apprised of the risks and benefits of the given treatment.

Determining patient competency is critical to the administration of antipsychotic drugs. With respect to an incompetent patient, the physician should obtain consent by means of a proxy as soon as clinically possible. If a patient's competency level is questionable, commentators recommend that the psychiatrist obtain consent from both the patient and a proxy. Also, in the event a patient experiences prolonged psychosis, the physician should seek a judicial declaration of competency, or lack thereof. The physician must acknowledge a competent patient's right to refuse antipsychotic medication. Legal and ethical problems often arise in those situations where the patient, who is borderline competent, refuses antipsychotic medication for fear of developing TD.

The final element of informed consent is voluntariness. Here, the patient should never be coerced into accepting or rejecting treatment, either by threats of punishment or promises of favored treatment. One example of coercion is when physicians condition television privileges upon taking antipsychotic medication.

There are four potential exceptions to the requirement of informed consent:

(1) incapacity;

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323 Id.
324 Id.
325 Mills, supra note 307, at 249.
326 Id.
327 Id. From a liability standpoint, the physician should never "assume" the patient is competent.
328 SIMON, supra note 16, at 225. A more detailed discussion of the "right to refuse" issue and its relationship to TD and antipsychotic medication will be done in the next section. This is a very complex issue and proper exploration is impossible in the scope of this article. The right to refuse medication or treatment is a foundation for informed consent and has the same philosophical underpinnings. The tension between autonomy and paternalism runs to the heart of the right to refuse issue. Further, the problem of TD exacerbates this tension in the right to refuse antipsychotic medication. Again, much of this tension could be alleviated if the medical and legal community placed primacy on the ethical value of respect for persons in medical and legal treatment analysis. Id.
329 Id.
330 SIMON & SADOFF, supra note 142, at 105.
(2) emergency;
(3) therapeutic privilege; and
(4) waiver.\textsuperscript{331}

The patient, for example, may request that the physician not disclose any potential risks of treatment.\textsuperscript{332} The physician might invoke therapeutic privilege if disclosure of an uncommon risk will place undue stress upon the patient and thereby cause the patient to refuse treatment.\textsuperscript{333} There should be little reason, however, to use the therapeutic privilege exception because any patient can gradually be exposed to stressful information at repeated intervals of time.\textsuperscript{334}

Physicians must treat informed consent as an ongoing process rather than a limited method of disclosure occurring at a single point in time.\textsuperscript{335} This view is especially appropriate for psychiatrists treating patients with schizophrenia. A 1982 study revealed that many schizophrenic patients, previously informed of the risk of TD, lacked the capacity to retain the information necessary to make an informed decision.\textsuperscript{336} The patients did not appear to comprehend the nature and implications of the consent form.\textsuperscript{337} In light of this, the study recommended continuous sharing of information between the physician and patient.\textsuperscript{338}

Another controversial aspect of informed consent, especially in the context of TD, is determining which staff member should disclose the risks and implications of treatment to the patient. Absent hospital guidelines, informal delegation, often referred to as "buck-passing," may occur.\textsuperscript{339} Moreover, in those situations where the patient seldomly communicates with the physician, the likelihood of inadequate disclosure is profound.\textsuperscript{340} Therefore, and as a matter of good practice, the hospital should educate staff members on the pertinent issues, elements, and

\textsuperscript{331}Id. at 103.
\textsuperscript{332}Id.
\textsuperscript{333}Id.
\textsuperscript{334}Id. at 101.
\textsuperscript{335}Latimer, \textit{supra} note 26, at 53.
\textsuperscript{336}Munetz et al., \textit{Tardive Dyskinesia and Informed Consent: Myths and Realities}, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 77, 88 (1982).
\textsuperscript{337}Id. at 86.
\textsuperscript{338}Id.
\textsuperscript{339}Munetz, \textit{Overcoming Resistance to Talking to Patients About Tardive Dyskinesia}, 36 HOSPITAL COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 283, 284 (1985).
\textsuperscript{340}Id.
exceptions to informed consent, and encourage members to collaborate in
their effort to disclose relevant information to the patient.341

Determining the proper method of disclosure is yet another
controversial aspect of informed consent. A 1985 study indicated that
therapists prefer a stringent disclosure program that incorporates a
risk/benefit evaluation of antipsychotic medication.342 This may include,
among other things, the periodic administration of an AIMS examination,
questionnaires used to gauge patient knowledge before and after
disclosure, and patient medication instruction sheets.343 Group study is
another effective disclosure method. Here, patients can express their
corns with TD, as opposed to the burden of psychosis.344

The same 1985 study also found that oral consent used in conjunction
with a stringent disclosure program, had a greater impact on the patient
than a written consent form.345 In fact, in a 1991 report, the APA
expressed dissatisfaction with the use of written consent forms as a
method of disclosing the risks and implications of antipsychotic drug
use.346 Careless application of written consent forms, commentators
suggest, stifle communication between the patient and physician,347
which may increase malpractice exposure, especially since the patient’s
decision to undergo treatment was heavily influenced by sources other
than herself.348

Some commentators argue that use of a written consent form detracts
from the benefits of joint decision making between the patient and
physician.349 These individuals urge physicians to reject the written
consent form in favor of a non-threatening, verbal explanation of the risks
and benefits of antipsychotic medication.350

Clinicians may nevertheless reject the findings of the APA Report for
the following reasons:

341 Id.
342 Id. at 286.
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id. There is an ongoing debate over which method of consent is more effective, oral or
written consent.
346 APA Report, supra note 18, at 414.
347 Id.
348 Benjamin & Munetz, supra note 163, at 345.
349 Id.
350 SIMON, supra note 16, at 224.
Irrespective of the rationale behind rejecting the APA’s findings, clinicians must realize that courts can invalidate the written consent form in light of public policy considerations such as unconscionability, vagueness, patient incompetence, and even duress. In a 1985 comparative analysis between TD patients informed of the risks and benefits of antipsychotic drug treatment through a written consent form, and TD patients informed verbally, the patients who received verbal disclosure retained more information within two months after testing than the other patients. Accordingly, clinicians who are required to use written consent forms should attempt to incorporate verbal disclosure into the clinician-patient relationship. A therapeutic alliance between the clinician and patient would place the clinician “next to” rather than “across from” the patient. Because malpractice litigation is often triggered by physician arrogance, indifference, insensitivity, and the “malignant synergy of a bad outcome in the context of bad feelings,” continuous communication between the clinician and patient may reduce these “bad feelings” and counter the terrible experience of suffering from schizophrenia all alone. Patience and respect for the patient is likewise a necessary component of informed consent because many psychotics require additional time to develop a trusting relationship with the physician. Also, psychological support may enable a borderline competent patient “to conduct a risk-benefit analysis sufficient to give a valid consent to treatment.”

The last controversial issue surrounding informed consent is determining when disclosure should occur. The APA has indicated the

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351 Benjamin & Munetz, supra note 158, at 346.
352 Wettstein, supra note 168, at 101. Written consent forms are often extensive and quite difficult to comprehend because they are written at a post-graduate level.
353 Munetz & Roth, Informing Patients About Tardive Dyskinesia 42 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 866, 869 (1985).
354 Gutheil et al., supra note 25, at 80.
355 Id. at 82.
357 Id.
The phrase "as soon as clinically feasible" has sparked debate among commentators because of its lack of clarity. Several commentators argue that the risks and benefits of antipsychotic drug use should be disclosed prior to treatment, unless an emergency or therapeutic privilege exists. Thus, failure to disclose prior to treatment may increase a patient's cumulative intake of drugs, thereby increasing the likelihood of a malpractice claim against the physician. If the clinician must resume the administration of antipsychotic drugs to a patient with TD, there is no justifiable delay, absent an emergency.

The question often arises as to when the risks and implications of antipsychotic drug use should be disclosed to an acutely psychotic patient. In most cases, acute psychosis will remit within two months and at that point, there should be full disclosure and patient consent. Nevertheless, as a safety measure, the physician should always document why there was no disclosure and/or patient consent prior to treatment, or within a relatively short time thereof.

There still remains widespread physician resistance to informed consent guidelines. Some physicians characterize informed consent as a "legalistic fiction" because they believe a fully-informed patient might refuse necessary treatment if provided with "too much" information, thereby reducing the physician's ability to treat illnesses such as schizophrenia. To the contrary, other studies have suggested that patients are rarely "frightened out of treatment" after receiving full disclosure of the risks and implications of antipsychotic drug treatment and TD. According to these studies, TD disclosure increases the level of trust between the patient and physician, and mitigates the impact when alarming information is conveyed to the patient.

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358 APA Report, supra note 18, at 414.
359 SIMON, supra note 16, at 221. See also Mills, supra note 307, at 245.
360 SIMON, supra note 16, at 221.
361 Id. at 224.
362 Id. at 132.
363 Munetz, supra note 339, at 283.
364 Wettstein, supra note 168, at 97.
365 Munetz, supra note 339, at 283.
366 Id. at 284.
It must be emphasized that a mentally ill patient is not per se unable to comprehend the risks and implications of antipsychotic drug treatment.\textsuperscript{367} A 1985 study indicated that mentally ill patients are nearly as capable of appreciating the risks and implications of antipsychotic drug as other patients.\textsuperscript{368} A 1983 study similarly revealed that while acute schizophrenic patients are less likely to comprehend the risks and implications of antipsychotic drug treatment, post-acute schizophrenic patients respond well to detailed, yet informal, discussions concerning the risks of antipsychotic drug use.\textsuperscript{369}

Lack of informed consent is most acute in state hospitals and nursing homes.\textsuperscript{370} A 1988 study involving ninety-one elderly patients, 44 percent of whom were taking antipsychotic drugs, revealed a genuine lack of informed consent.\textsuperscript{371} The same study also revealed that 82 percent of the patients in a state mental hospital clearly demonstrated a lack of familiarity with the risks and benefits of antipsychotic drug treatment, and were therefore, unable to properly consent to the treatment.\textsuperscript{372}

Unfortunately, not even the most conscientious physicians and careful institutional regulations can overcome all the barriers to providing informed consent to many schizophrenic patients. These patients have difficulty processing information, they have lower literacy skills, and

\textsuperscript{367}Simon, supra note 16, at 222.
\textsuperscript{368}Stanley et al., Psychopharmacologic Treatment and Informed Consent. Empirical Research, 21 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 110, 113 (1985). This study did indicate that schizophrenic patients have more difficulty in the consent process than patients with major affective disorders. But the study did show that factors other than medicated or non-medicated and psychiatric or non-psychiatric are more important in the consent process. Factors such as verbal ability and practical reasoning are more indicative of competency to give informed consent. Id.
\textsuperscript{369}See Marder et al., A Comparison of Patients who Refuse and Consent to Neuroleptic Treatment, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 470 (1983).
\textsuperscript{370}A 1985 study indicated that 50 percent of community placement facilities administered informed consent. A recent study completed in 1994 indicated 73.8 percent had policies of obtaining informed consent, 73.7 percent used a consent form, 17.8 percent used a checklist, 73.7 percent used documentation of a verbal discussion, 5.9 percent used a patient information sheet, 61 percent used a combination of techniques, and 56.8 percent incorporated a consent form and documented discussion. Benjamin & Munetz, supra note 163, at 345. Unfortunately, another study indicated that only 11.5 percent of public hospital psychiatrists were aware of state policies regarding risk disclosure. See Kennedy & Sanborn, supra note 232, at 93.
\textsuperscript{371}Beck, Determining Competency to Assent to Neuroleptic Drug Treatment, 39 HOSPITAL COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1106, 1110 (1988).
\textsuperscript{372}Id.
many schizophrenics' primary focus is to avoid relapse at all costs. Other barriers to informed consent exist because some psychotic patients deny they have TD, and many of the elderly have no family to provide proxy consent.374

It is important for physicians to document the patient's actual understanding and consent in the medical record to further protect herself from legal liability alleging lack of informed consent.375 The APA's Task Force on TD has stated that "careful documentation of the disclosure process is recommended. Further, the clinician should note what she told the patient, what the patient said and understood, and how a treatment decision was reached."376 One commentator cited the following defenses that can be used to defend a malpractice claim alleging lack of informed consent:

(1) common knowledge of the risk;
(2) waiver;
(3) therapeutic privilege;
(4) a written consent form;
(5) the fact that a reasonable person would have undergone the treatment anyway;
(6) no expert medical testimony; and
(7) insubstantial risk.

While TD litigation stemming from the lack of informed consent is still relatively uncommon, the majority of reported cases involve mentally retarded and elderly patients.377 In Clites, the court determined the physician failed to properly inform Timothy's family of the risk of TD.378 The parents, as proxy, were never informed of the potential side effects of the prolonged use of major tranquilizers, nor did they consent to the use.379 The industry standard, according to the court, required Timothy's parents to be apprised of the dangers and benefits of the prescribed treatment

373 Munetz & Roth, supra note 353, at 870.
374 Munetz, supra note 339, at 284.
375 Davis et al., supra note 3, at 124.
376 APA Report, supra note 18, at 414.
377 Id.
378 Clites v. Iowa, 322 N.W.2d 917, 923 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
379 Id. at 922.
Also, the court indicated that while consent need not always be in writing, the physician must make "reasonable disclosure to the patient of the nature and probable consequences of the suggested or recommended treatment." The court further indicated that even if a physician is not required to describe in detail all possible risks of the treatment, as this may alarm the patient, the physician should, nevertheless, disclose all material risks. Finally, the Clites court rejected the notion of "implied consent." The court acknowledged that although Timothy's parents may have known Timothy was receiving medication, "they were not informed of the risks attendant to the treatment program." Because the parents were ignorant of the potential dangers of the treatment program, the court concluded there was "no basis for saying [the parents] impliedly consented to the administration of major tranquilizers by their failure to object." The court, therefore, upheld the damages award against the hospital.

The Supreme Court of Texas similarly addressed the issue of informed consent in Barclay v. Campbell, where plaintiff ("Milton") developed TD after he was prescribed neuroleptic drugs by the defendant-physician in an effort to treat his mental illness. Thereafter, Milton brought a malpractice claim against the physician, alleging the physician negligently prescribed the neuroleptic drugs and failed to disclose the risks associated with the drugs. On the issue of informed consent, the court determined the focus was not whether Milton could have been influenced in making a decision to give or withhold consent to the procedure had he known of the risk. Rather, the issue was "whether a reasonable person could have been influenced in making a decision to give or withhold consent to the procedure had he known of the risk." If a reasonable person could have been influenced in making a decision, Milton, the court

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380Id. at 922-23.
381Id. at 923.
382Id.
383Clites v. Iowa, 322 N.W.2d 917, 923 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
384Id.
385Id.
386Id. One interesting aspect of Clites is that the hospital asked the parents' permission to use their son's picture at a presentation, but did not think it necessary to ask for their permission in using antipsychotic drugs. Id.
387704 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. 1986).
388Id.
389Id. at 10.
determined, "was also entitled to be warned of the risk."

Based on those facts, the court concluded that the issue of informed consent should have been submitted to the jury.

Both Clites and Barclay support the proposition that courts are visibly concerned with the lack of informed consent in antipsychotic drug treatment. As more of these cases are litigated, physicians and lawyers alike, will become more familiar with the appropriate disclosure and patient consent guidelines applicable to antipsychotic drug treatment, improving the overall standard of care in antipsychotic drug treatment.

THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT

A patient's right to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment is a controversial issue which causes much strife between the medical and legal communities. As the risks of antipsychotic drug use become more identifiable, the right to refuse treatment issue will gain paramount importance in the context of antipsychotic drug treatment. The past abuse of antipsychotic drugs in the 1960s and 1970s is a vivid example of why there should be safeguards governing a patient's right to refuse medication. Whether a patient has a right to refuse treatment often incorporates constitutional implications such as:

(1) freedom of speech;
(2) prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment;
(3) due process guarantees;
(4) equal protection;
(5) freedom of religion; and
(6) the right to privacy.

Legal commentators attribute the high risk of TD as the main reason why competent patients, institutionalized or not, deserve the right to refuse

399 Id. at 10-11.
391 Id. at 11.
393 Id.
395 Id. at 125. See also Perr, supra note 392, at 311.
antipsychotic medication.\textsuperscript{396} The same holds true for decisions made by incompetent patients. However, in the latter situation, the patient's decision to refuse antipsychotic medication should be subject to judicial review.\textsuperscript{397} Advocates of the right to refuse medication have adopted the rationale espoused in \textit{Rogers v. Okin},\textsuperscript{398} where the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts commented on the constitutional implications of a patient's right to refuse mind-altering psychotic drugs:

The concept of a right of privacy also embodies First Amendment concerns. It is clear from the evidence in this case that psychotic medication has the potential to affect and change a patient's mood, attitude, and capacity to think .... At stake is the [sic] fundamental question as to whether the state may impose once again on the privacy of a person, already deprived of freedom through commitment by forcibly injecting mind-altering drugs into his system in a non-emergency situation.\textsuperscript{359}

The \textit{Rogers} court further stated:

The right to produce a thought -- or refuse to do so -- is as important as the right protected in \textit{Roe v. Wade} to give birth or abort. Implicit in an individual's right to choose either abortion or birth is an underlying right to think and decide. Without the capacity to think, we merely exist, not function. Realistically, the capacity to think and decide is a fundamental element of freedom.\textsuperscript{400}

The legal community did well exposing the abuses, neglect, and ignorance in the state hospital at the time. Its goal of improving patient care and defending patients' rights/liberty was laudable, but the legal community went too far and paradoxically diminished psychotic patients' liberty and quality of care. Why do patients refuse medication and what should the legal and medical communities do when refusal of antipsychotic medication occurs?

\textsuperscript{355}WEINER & WETTSTEIN, supra note 394, at 131.
\textsuperscript{397}Id.
\textsuperscript{399}Id. at 1366.
\textsuperscript{400}Id.
Patients who experience delusions often refuse antipsychotic medication as a result of the *symptomatic* nature of their illness. Many of these patients possess an unrealistic fear of the effects of antipsychotic drug treatment, often associating the administration of depot medication as a form of bodily assault. While legal advocates must respect a competent patient’s decision to forego antipsychotic drug treatment, the same does not necessarily hold true for patients who experience delusions, as many of these patients expressly deny the very existence of their illness. Therefore, the decision not to administer antipsychotic drugs to a patient who experiences delusions must be, to a large part, based on medical information, usually to the exclusion of the patient’s delusion-induced requests.

Other patients temporarily refuse medication because of problems with the staff or their own family. The voluntary patient has the right to leave the hospital if she does not wish to cooperate with the prescribed treatment. But the “well-meaning” legal advocate who defends the “right” of an involuntary patient to refuse antipsychotic treatment ventures into dangerous territory if not in possession of all the medical facts or if the lawyer does not understand the nuances of the treatment plan.

When medication is given, the patient can recover, go home, and have her liberty restored. After the patient regains competency then the patient can make an informed decision whether or not to continue taking medication. The legal community should understand that involuntary patients were committed because they posed a risk to themselves and/or the community and were unable to rationally participate in any treatment decision. Legal advocates must begin to appreciate how illogical it is

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401 Brakel & Davis, *supra* note 6, at 467.
402 *Weiner & Wettstein*, *supra* note 394, at 131.
403 *Id.*
404 Id.
405 Courts in their zeal to prevent past abuses may be depriving patients of the best treatment available. As explained earlier in the article, judges may be relying on heavily biased and inaccurate law review articles in their determinations of the risk/benefits of antipsychotic drugs. An important function of this article is to help eradicate any biases, prejudices, or faulty information regarding antipsychotic drugs and their risk/benefits. Although reasonable people may disagree on certain issues surrounding the right to refuse antipsychotic medication, it is unreasonable not to be educated and objective regarding the medical information.
406 *Weiner & Wettstein*, *supra* note 394, at 131.
407 See Brakel & Davis, *supra* note 6, at 441.
408 *Id.* at 450.
409 *Id.* at 442.
to commit a patient involuntarily and then assert the patient has the “right”
to refuse the treatment necessary to regain both competency and liberty.

Those who advocate the “right to refuse” treatment seek to eliminate
institutionalization as a factor in determining whether to acknowledge the
patient’s rejection of treatment. To the extent these advocates are
concerned, a competent, yet institutionalized, patient’s rejection of
antipsychotic medication must be respected. If the institutionalized
patient is incompetent, a judicial hearing should be held to determine the
patient’s best interests and whether the patient would in fact benefit from
antipsychotic drug treatment. Because the court in the latter situation
is the ultimate decision maker, disputes often arise concerning the ability
of a judge to implement final orders on technical medical issues like
TD.

A patient’s right to refuse treatment has impacted the medical
community in several other ways. A 1990 study, for example,
documented the purported impact of Rivers v. Katz, a 1986 New York
Appellate Court decision, which held that in a nonemergency situation, a
patient previously adjudged legally unable to make an informed decision,
may be compelled to submit to antipsychotic drug treatment, irrespective
of the fact the patient does not wish to undergo such treatment. The
study revealed that competency hearings increased the average amount of
time necessary to resolve a treatment dilemma. While the resolution of
refusal-disputes occurring in a private hospital averaged ten days prior to
the Rivers decision, the study revealed that the same disputes averaged a
thirty-one day resolution period after Rivers. Consistent with these
findings, the study also revealed that while resolution of refusal-disputes
at a public hospital averaged twenty-one days pre-Rivers, the same
disputes averaged a sixty-eight day resolution period post-Rivers.

410 Id. This is the same view articulated by the court in Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
414 Id.
416 Id.
417 Id.
study further indicated that while judicial denial of a patient's request to refuse treatment decreased from 2.9 percent to 1.2 percent after Rivers, only 6 percent of the patients expressing a desire to stop treatment actually received a judicial hearing.\footnote{Id. at 211.} Consequently, while hospitals and physicians during the pre-Rivers era encouraged patients to inquire about the risks and implications of antipsychotic drug use, the study revealed that since the Rivers decision, health care workers have been less inclined to refute a patient's request to discontinue antipsychotic medication.\footnote{Id.}

The study attributed this decrease to the time delay involved with formal competency hearings, and noted that on average, patients would not receive medication anywhere from one to three months prior to the initiation of the hearing.\footnote{Id. at 212. Note that in 12 studies studying 5,000 cases of patient refusals, the court sustained only 3 percent of these refusals with a time delay of 48 days on average. Not one of the studies reported clinical benefit to the patient from a delay in treatment. Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 456. It is interesting to note that judges sustained only 3 percent of these treatment refusals. Researchers have concluded that judges have tended to still think like physicians (but without the training) when forced to make treatment decisions. Consequently, rights based cases like Rogers and Rivers have not cause the "collapse of the mental health profession" as some clinicians have feared; but the delays caused by these decisions have resulted in more harm than the legal community would like to admit. Id.}

There is real harm that may result from the refusal of antipsychotic medication and the subsequent delay in the judicial process. For those patients awaiting a formal competency hearing, the Ciccone study found a regression in the mental health of some patients, many of whom ultimately required emergency medication, seclusion, and even physical restraint.\footnote{Id. at 213.} In the event the patient becomes physically violent, other patients and staff members are the most obvious victims.\footnote{Weiner & Wettstein, supra note 394, at 120.} Thus, the ironic aspect of the "rights driven approach" is that a patient exercising her right to refuse treatment may ultimately be physically restrained by staff members. Consequently, while respect for the patient's freedom of choice is critical, it is yet to be determined whether the perils of withholding treatment outweighs this right.

In addition to potentially violent consequences, the patient may experience permanent mental and/or physical damage as a result of the
delay in treatment. Treatment delays incur institutional costs and harms as well. Hospitals must assume a custodial position for the patient, and the estimated cost of hospitalization over a four and one-half month period is $50,000.00.

Commentators from both the medical and legal communities believe that a "treatment-driven" approach may reduce the controversy surrounding a patient's "right to refuse" treatment, and simultaneously improve the quality of patient care in these situations. The treatment-driven approach suggests that a patient's right to refuse treatment should be determined prior to hospitalization and without a separate judicial hearing. Under this approach, the patient is protected because her rights are fully documented in a judicial hearing prior to hospitalization. Moreover, since competency is determined prior to hospitalization, treatment is facilitated and the conundrum of confinement can be avoided. Finally, the patient under the treatment-driven approach may assert her right to refuse medication after recovery, when she is competent.

The treatment-driven approach has found legislative support in Utah, Michigan, Iowa, Kansas, Delaware, and South Carolina, where statutes expressly authorize this mode of decision making. Skeptics, however, are concerned with whether the right to refuse treatment can be preserved once the patient has been hospitalized. To counter this problem, patient treatment plans should be periodically reviewed by specially designated review teams and independent psychiatrists. In addition, the patient

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423 Id. at 457.
424 Id. at 460.
425 This model is also referred to as the "medical model" approach.
427 Id. at 416.
429 Id. at 362.
430 Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 450.
431 Id. at 470 (An example of such a statute can be found in UTAH CODE ANN. Sec. 62A-12-234(c) (1991)).
432 Brakel & Davis, supra note 6, at 470.
433 Id.
may request a formal review by the institution once every month or two, and there is always the opportunity for a judicial hearing.\textsuperscript{434}

Independent clinical review is yet another approach used by several states. Under this approach, if the patient refuses treatment, the hospital conducts an independent clinical review to determine patient competency and the appropriateness of the patient's treatment plan.\textsuperscript{435} In \textit{Rennie v. Klein},\textsuperscript{436} the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld New Jersey's independent clinical review policy against a due process attack, when it determined the decision to administer antipsychotic drugs against a patient's will "must be based on accepted professional judgment and the procedures specified in New Jersey Administrative Bulletin 78-3 satisfied due process requirements."\textsuperscript{437}

One problem with clinical review was identified in \textit{Rogers}, where certain hospitalized patients might not receive treatment if they are determined to be competent.\textsuperscript{438} Therefore, the question arises as to what can be done with these patients who are hospitalized without the prospect of treatment.\textsuperscript{439}

As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the right to refuse treatment is a controversial issue that plagues both medical and legal communities. Paradoxically, the patient who desires to discontinue treatment, may often find himself physically and involuntarily confined to a mental hospital for several months longer than anticipated. Furthermore, as many members of the medical community assert that the right to refuse treatment is not a solution to the underlying problem of inadequate patient care, maybe these individuals should concentrate their efforts to promote the patient's right to proper and effective treatment,\textsuperscript{440} especially since a disproportionately low number of patients actually refuse treatment.\textsuperscript{441}

\textsuperscript{434}Id. at 471. The patient would receive treatment during the interim period. See Brakel and Davis, \textit{supra} note 6, at 471.

\textsuperscript{435}Brakel & Davei, \textit{supra} note 6, at 471.

\textsuperscript{436}20 F.2d 266 (3rd Cir. 1983).

\textsuperscript{437}Id. at 268-69.


\textsuperscript{439}Appelbaum, \textit{supra} note 409, at 415.

\textsuperscript{440}Id. at 201.

\textsuperscript{441}Appelbaum & Gutheil, \textit{supra} note 426, at 200.
CONCLUSION

The ultimate goal of a careful risk-benefit analysis of TD is, obviously, improving patient care. Yet, the benefits of a consistent utilization of such an analysis will undoubtedly stretch much further. As tension within the medical community diminishes, the road will be paved for the development of concrete legal and judicial standards. As these fact-based principles emerge, societal tensions will be mitigated and most importantly, clinicians will have clear treatment paths which they can consistently implement and trust. Although we lack the answers to all the problems associated with TD, as consensus grows and cooperation is fostered, the medical, legal, and social consequences will inevitably be greatly minimized.