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Negotiating Difference: The Roma and European-ness

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BY
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The Roma people are considered to be one of the most marginalized groups in all of Europe. Despite integration policies introduced by the European Union, their status as outsiders has remained consistent throughout the EU’s member states. This framing of Roma as outcasts has a historical dimension as well. The Roma have persistently been labeled as “outsiders” throughout their long history in Europe. They have been characterized as nomadic wanderers of distant origins. They have been portrayed as threats – both to the safety of full citizens and to the values of the societies they inhabit. The case has been made, time and time again, that the Roma do not belong in Europe. But their very presence in Europe throughout this turbulent history makes it clear that the Roma have belonged and continue to belong in that space. They are insiders as much as they are outsiders. This seemingly paradoxical duality is evidence of the Roma’s instrumental role in a system of constructing identities in Europe. The inability to move past the idea of “Roma” as a homogenous group made up of un-integrable outsiders is due to the necessity of having an Other in order to uphold the notion of European-ness. This thesis argues that the Roma problematize the idea of European-ness by showing that it is a construction that relies on the presence of a constitutive Other.

The Roma’s role as Other is vital to this argument. The Other is essentially the opposite of the Self. If the Self is a specific social identity, then the Other is separate and different from that identity. The Self can only be defined in comparison with what it is not. Therefore, the Other is necessary for defining the Self. The process of Othering labels an individual or group as outsiders; it excludes them from the social category of the Self (Bullock and Trombey 1999, 620). Since identity only has meaning when compared to something outside of itself, the Other is necessary for constituting identity. In the context of this thesis, the Self-Other relationship is
applied to the relationship between Europe and the Roma. The Roma are excluded from the category of “European.” The process of exclusion reinforces the meaning of “European-ness.”

The Roma are a useful case for examining the relationship between Europe and its Others. There are many other groups that are Othered in Europe, such as immigrants and refugees. However, the Roma are a unique case because they have a longstanding role as both insiders and outsiders in Europe. Their marginality and Otherness can be traced historically through the treatment of the Roma since the 12th century (Crowe 1994, xi). But the Roma have also become embedded in European societies. The inherent contradiction in framing the Roma as outsiders when they are part of Europe shows that European-ness and Roma identity are constructed around the Self-Other relationship. That is to say, these identities are framed in certain ways in order to construct and reconstruct the notion of European-ness.

My aim in this thesis is to examine the relationship between the notion of European-ness and the Roma. In Chapter 2, I analyze “European-ness” and the ways in which it is constructed. I conclude that European-ness is a fragile construction which relies on practices of exclusion. In Chapter 3, I analyze scholars’ representations of the ways in which Roma identity has been presented in various discourses. These include academic sources, national and supranational discourses, as well as studies on Roma self-identification. Examining these sources shows that Roma identity is presented as singular and homogenous, when it is none of these things. The simplistic representation of Roma identity makes it easier to juxtapose the Roma against the rest of Europe. In Chapter 4, I examine the securitization of the Roma in France. Securitization is a modern form of Othering which helps to construct the idea of European-ness. In Chapter 5, I present my conclusions and thoughts on the ways in which the ideas presented in this thesis may be useful.
Methodology

This thesis will examine the relationship between the ideas of Roma identity and European-ness. In order to do so, I use discourse analysis which is informed by scholarly sources. The three main sections of my thesis include examinations of the notion of European-ness as a construction, the ways that Roma identity is presented, and the securitization of the Roma in Europe. I begin each section with a story pertaining to the topic of the section. The narratives presented in these stories will provide a concrete backdrop for the subsequent discourse analysis. A discourse analysis approach is the most effective way of supporting the argument that the Roma problematize the notion of European-ness through their position of perpetual insider and outsider. This thesis ultimately examines how the Roma and the European are understood and constructed. Therefore, an analysis of the discourse is necessary because it shows how the construction of various identities takes place across a variety of discourses. At various points, the analysis is performed by examining scholars’ representations of the different discourses. In these cases, the analysis is informed by an academic lens. Discourse analysis allows for various sites to be explored with relative specificity. The narratives presented at the beginning of each chapter provide concrete pictures of the theoretical arguments being made in each section. Therefore, this method blends the advantages of both discourse analysis and the case study approach.

In Chapter 2, I unpack the notion of European-ness by examining policy discourse. Specifically, I look at policies that promote the exclusion of certain groups and therefore construct European-ness through Othering. I examine policies that deal with citizenship, mobility and minority rights because each of these three areas is closely tied to today’s Europe. The analysis of these policies shows that European states take part in exclusionary practices that
create boundaries between Europe and its Others. In Chapter 3, I examine the notion of Roma identity and the ways in which this identity is presented at the scholarly, national and supra-national levels. I first examine the trends within the academic literature’s presentation of the Roma. I then analyze state and EU policies that exemplify the treatment of the Roma in Europe. In this chapter I also examine Roma self-identification and compare it with outsider identification. In order to do so, I use information from surveys of Roma populations.

In Chapter 4, I draw on the field of security studies in order to show that the securitization of the Roma frames them as outsiders. I examine the public discourse of French officials that presented the Roma as a security threat. Specifically, I examine three speeches that were made by former President Nicolas Sarkozy in the summer of 2010. Security studies is an effective theoretical framework for this chapter because the securitization of the Roma effectively constructs them as Others. Examining the securitization of the Roma shows how certain minorities are Othered through calls to maintain order, uphold public safety and protect certain values.

**Literature Review**

**Historical Background**

Records show that the Roma migrated to Europe as early as the 12th century (Crowe 1994, xi). The Roma were sold as slaves in Wallachia and Moldavia, with the first recorded transaction taking place in 1385 (Kenrick 2007). This practice would continue until abolition in 1856 (Crowe 1994; Hancock 2001, 25). The Roma were routinely expelled and deported from various cities, regions and countries. In the 15th and 16th centuries, orders for their expulsion took place in Lucerne, Milan, France, Catalonia, Sweden, England and Denmark (Kenrick 2007).
Switzerland, England and Denmark instituted orders for Roma found in their territories to be put to death (Kenrick 2007). Due to these drastic practices of exclusion, many Roma migrated east toward Poland and Russia, which were more tolerant of their Roma populations (Radu 2009).

During World War II, the Roma were one of the groups marked for extermination by the Nazis. The systematic genocide of the Roma is known as the Porajmos. On November 26, 1935, a supplementary decree to the Nuremberg Laws was issued which marked the Roma as enemies of the state (“Sinti and Roma: Victims of the Nazi Era”). Roma were first transferred to internment camps and then deported to concentration camps (Fein 1979, 140-141). The number of victims has been estimated between 220,000 and 500,000 (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum b). Following the war, cases of Roma persecution continued. In Czechoslovakia, a policy of sterilization of Roma women was carried out in 1973. Cases of forced sterilization were found to take place until 2001 (Thomas 2006). The Roma have often been framed as security threats. This took place in Italy in 2008 and in France in 2010. In these cases, security rhetoric was used to justify evictions and deportations of Roma (Barbulescu 2012; Parker 2012; Sigona 2005).

The Roma remain a highly marginalized and impoverished group. According to a report presented by the European Commission, many Roma live in substandard or segregated housing. In Slovakia, a study found that such segregation inhibits the Roma’s access to the labor market (European Commission 2010, 9). Another major issue has been segregation in education. Roma children are often placed in separate classrooms and schools. At times, they are moved to classes and schools for students with mental disabilities (European Commission 2010, 9). In a statistical study performed in 2009, the Fundamental Rights Agency found high levels of discrimination against Roma in EU member-states. According to the study, “every second Romani respondent
was discriminated against at least once in the previous 12 months and one in five were victims of racially-motivated personal crimes at least once in the previous 12 months,” (European Commission 2010, 9). Prejudice against the Roma continues to have a negative impact on their lives.

Terms

It is useful to define the terms having to do with Europe and European-ness before continuing with an analysis of these ideas. “Europe” is a multifaceted term, as it is a geographic, political and cultural signifier. In terms of geography, Europe is a continent. It is divided into nation-states which uphold their own separate histories and cultures. However, they are all connected in that they are all European. In this thesis, I approach the notion of Europe as a community. It is a large grouping of people and states that occupy a tangible space and that share intertwining histories, politics and cultures. Following in this vein, “European-ness” is the quality of belonging to the community of Europe. There is a sense of identity that comes with belonging to this community. The meaning of Europe and European-ness have changed countless times throughout history. Even today, these terms are fluid and changing. However, these ideas remain influential and consequential and should therefore be analyzed.

When studying contemporary notions of Europe and European-ness, the European Union must be addressed. “Europe” and “the EU” are not interchangeable terms. However, they are closely connected to one another. The EU is a political and economic union consisting of European nation-states. It is derived from and based in a sense of European community. The original European Communities (European Coal and Steel Community, European Atomic Energy Community, European Economic Community) were a set of international organizations
that were governed by the same institutions (European Union 2017). However, it has been argued that the EU embodies the values and principles of the European community (Bruter 2005; Mikkeli 1998, 209-220). The EU takes part in Europe-building projects and works to further integration, which show its commitment to European unity.

My analysis of the notion of European-ness at times relies on the EU’s representation of Europe and European-ness. For example, in Chapter 2, I examine policies having to do with citizenship, mobility and minority rights because these three areas are highly valued in EU discourse. The EU’s representation of European-ness is useful to this project not only because it is easily accessible, it is also influential. Member-states and applicant states must demonstrate that they adhere to the values of the EU. The EU influences ideas about what it means to be European. Therefore, when studying contemporary Europe, it is useful and necessary to consider the role of the EU.

The Notion of European-ness

Before discussing European-ness and the ways that scholars approach this subject, it is first necessary to examine the idea of Europe itself and the ways in which it has changed over time. Scholars begin to recount the history of the idea of Europe in Ancient Greek mythology, in which Europa was a Phoenician princess who married the king of Crete (Delanty 1995, 17). Europe was often evoked in juxtaposition to the “less civilized” rest of the world, namely Africa and Asia (Mikkeli 1998; Delanty 1995). However, the notion of Europe was not distinct, even at times of relative unification. Under the Roman Empire, for example, there was a sense of Roman dominance, rather than a truly united Europe (Delanty 1995, 20-21; Mikkeli 1998). During the Middle Ages, Christian Europe was often contrasted against the Occident or Islamic outsiders.
Europe became a cultural idea with political consequences, rather than simply a geographical location (Delanty 1995, 29).

The nature of Europe was imagined in opposition to other outside entities throughout its history. The Ottoman Empire was one such power. Delanty goes so far as to say that the origins of a European identity can be traced back to resistance to the Turks in the sixteenth century (Delanty 1995, 37). The position of Other would later be replaced by the “savages” of the New World, the Slavs of the East and internal minorities such as the Jewish population (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). The first World War destabilized the common notion of Europe as a center of civilization. The war showed that Europe could be violently divided. The idea of “civilization” itself was viewed pessimistically, as the war showed that civilization could give rise to barbarism. But one of the biggest pushes towards greater unification and integration came with the formation of the European Union. This entity with political and economic influences allowed for the movement of people, goods, services and capital across its member-states. These connections were supposed to bring Europe closer together through an exchange of ideas, cultures, people and products (Favell 2009; Kaelble 2009; Delanty 1995, 154-157). Yet it remains to be seen how this has changed the notion of European-ness. This is by no means a comprehensive overview of the history of the idea of Europe. It does, however, show that the meaning of Europe was constantly changing throughout history. This thesis will be focused on the post-Maastricht Europe which exists in the context of the European Union. My analysis pertains to the ways in which European-ness is understood within this context.

Within the literature concerning Europe, some scholars argue that a common European spirit is present and based on common values. Amongst proponents of this viewpoint, the European Union is touted as a catalyst for integration and common identification among
Europeans. Bruter, for example, argues that a mass European identity has emerged throughout EU member-states. He specifically explores the influence that the media and political institutions, such as the EU, have on the creation of political identities (Bruter 2005). Mikkeli points out that scholars generally describe a pan-European identity that is based in shared values – such as recognition of the importance of democracy, peace and human rights – but one that also allows for differences through the slogan of “unity in diversity,” (Mikkeli 1998, 209-220).

A second trend among scholars is the idea that European identity lacks any common basis in Europe. Many see the “European project” of integration and a common identity as an idealistic notion which has very little basis for such claims. Checkel, for example, argues that the political projects and social processes that have shaped European identity have caused the fragmentation of this identity. Despite projects of “Europe-building” such as the single market, the Euro zone and the Schengen zone, the backlash from these programs have resulted in division within “European” identity (Checkel 2009). Others note that Europe as a singular entity lacks the common history, tradition and coherence that are attributed to national identities (Mikkeli 1998). Unlike the previous set of authors, these academics argue that a common European identity is fractured at best or completely inexistent.

Despite the presence of competing theories about the state of a Europe-wide identity, I argue that the notion of European-ness is a construction. However, different writers provide different accounts of how it is constructed. Many turn towards otherness as a way to form a European identity. Mikkeli states that “identity is often produced by speaking of threats” (Mikkeli 1998, 226), which references the need to consolidate against common enemies, as well as the phenomenon of juxtaposing oneself against outsiders in order to create a sense of cohesion. Many academics share this main idea. Cornelius Castoriadis maintains that Otherness
could be the central factor contributing to the creation of a consolidated European identity. He calls attention to the inability of groups to constitute themselves without excluding, and subsequently degrading, the Other (Mikkeli 1998, 231). Similarly, Vilho Harle argues that Europeanism is simply another expression of dualism between the self and the Other (Mikkeli 1998, 231). While he recounts the history of Europe, Delanty repeatedly returns to the role of the Other in constituting a European identity (Delanty 1995). All of these thinkers promote the idea of the Self-Other dichotomy underpinning the construction and re-construction of European identity.

Unlike other thinkers who look for a common history of the idea of Europe, Waever looks to the violence of past wars and divisions as a push towards integration. The awareness of the violence that was a product of separation is support for remaining united and peaceful. This creates a “security identity,” or a unity based on opposition to the violence of division (Mikkeli 1998). Waever’s observations are valid and can be sensed in contemporary EU discourse. However, the role of the Other should not be completely disregarded. Europe abounds with Others, and to say that it has moved past this dichotomy is certainly premature. In my work, I connect the notions of security and otherness in order to show that these work together in contemporary Europe in the process of reconstructing European-ness. I draw on the works of the scholars presented here in order to show that the fragile sense of European identity necessitates and depends on the presence of a constitutive Other.

Roma Identity: A Misleading Appearance of Consolidation

Before entering into the literature concerning the Roma, it will be useful to first examine some vital points of the historical background of their presence in Europe. The first mentions of
the Roma take place in records dating back to the 12th century. These records include census documents, scholarly works and letters. According to these early accounts, the Roma were mostly free, skilled workers who were considered “useful citizens” (Crowe 1994, xi). However, they often faced poor treatment in the various areas that they inhabited. In the Kingdom of Hungary, the Roma were associated with the Turks and deemed spies, which resulted in restrictions on their nomadism. In the Ottoman Empire, however, the Roma were given the lowest social rank. The 16th through the 18th centuries were characterized by Roma slavery, especially in Wallachia and Moldavia. Emancipation was followed with little access to land and therefore few opportunities for better quality of life. Many states have instituted policies of integration, such as the Magyarization policies of the 19th century (Crowe 1994).

Although the treatment of Roma populations took on different characteristics depending on specific contexts, some broad trends can be distinguished. The Roma were often designated the lowest social standing in most societies. Those who were able to move up in the social hierarchy usually assimilated. Therefore, only the poorest were associated with the term “Roma” or “Gypsy.” The 18th and 19th centuries were characterized by a need to control and make “good nationals” out of the Roma. More recently, there has been a call to uphold Roma culture while also advocating for greater integration. Crowe notes that the main historical constant is the negative perception of the Roma. He notes that “such feelings [of prejudice] indicated as much about the societies that created these images as they did about the Roma” (Crowe 1994, 236).

This brief overview has shown that, according to historical accounts, it would seem that the Roma are a singular group – one that can and has been measured through censuses, indicators and narratives. It is important to keep in mind, though, that indicators create the subject and that
definitions create boundaries around the object of a study. The goal of this thesis is to analyze the creation of such identities by examining the relationship between the Roma and European-ness.

A considerable portion of the discourse surrounding the Roma is focused on Roma identity. Two major trends exist in this field of study. The first group of scholars study the Roma as a consolidated group and therefore perpetuates the notion of a singular Roma identity. The second group examines the very notion of Roma identity and its formation. This distinction is important because it marks the different ways that Roma identity is discussed and portrayed by academics. Within the first trend, scholars take the existence of a singular Roma identity for granted. They focus on other issues that pertain to the Roma without giving a clear understanding of who the Roma are. A portion of these scholars endeavor to present a history of the Roma people. David Crowe and Yaron Matras each present a history of the Roma of Europe and Russia. Both of these sources describe the Roma’s long histories in various parts of Europe (Crowe 1994; Matras 2015). Zoltan Barany follows suit by looking at the Roma presence in post-communist societies (Barany 1994, 321-344). All of these sources endeavor to recount a history of the Roma in Europe.

Other scholars focus on issues pertaining to the Roma such as Roma activism and issues of citizenship and statelessness. Many such authors examine grassroots development and social movements that are directly related to the Roma (Brown and Schafft 2000; Cemlyn et al 2014; Gheorghe 2013). Andrew Ryder takes on an interesting perspective by looking at participatory community research and the creation of knowledge through work with Roma communities (Ryder 2015). The academics who connect the Roma to issues of citizenship and human rights focus on the consistent marginalization of the Roma (Biro et al 2013; Howard-Hassmann and Walton-Roberts 2015; Tait 2004). Warnke has noted that, despite the recent changes in minority
rights, the Roma are continually marginalized (Warnke 1999). This is often manifested in the forced mobility of Roma people. Various case studies portray the phenomenon of displacing Roma people, such as the forced returns of Roma to Kosovo or airport screenings in the Czech Republic (Troszczynska-van Genderen 2010; Tait 2004). Although these scholars consider various issues that relate to the Roma, they do not question the nature of the categorization of the people that they examine. By failing to do so, they implicitly contribute to the unproblematic-seeming mainstream representation of Roma identity.

Still other scholars question the portrayal of the Roma as a singular group. These academics see identity as a construction. They examine the ways in which the Roma are classified and the effects of this classification. Some examine the differences between internal and external ethnic identification, concluding that ethnic identity is produced dialectically and that internal and external identifications are not always the same (Ahmed et al 2007; Krieg and Walsh 2007, 169-186). Koulish takes the examination of ethnic identification a step further in his analysis of Hungarian Roma, in which he concludes that categorization based on ethnicity can lead to injustices (Koulish 2005). Many scholars examine the process of constructing Roma identity. Although their analyses differ, all of these scholars consider Roma identity as a construction with a political dimension (Kovats and Surdu 2015, 5-18; Krieg and Walsh 2007, 169-186; Lin 2013; Petrova 2003, 111-161). Farget examines the discourse tied to legal cases concerning Roma people, which results in defining their legal identity as a cohesive group. She argues that the outcome is a stereotype definition of being Roma which is both restrictive and distorted (Farget 2012, 291). This shows the ways in which states play a part in building the perception of Roma identity. Rovid also presents the dilemma of recognizing the Roma as a national minority or as a non-territorial nation (Rovid 2011, 1). Both of these scholars tackle the
question of normative European policy and its effects on those who are defined by it. Kovats and Mihai argue that Roma identity is constructed on the basis of political and expert knowledge by policymakers, Roma activists, international organizations and scholars. This identity is then attributed to groups of people who are not bound together in the traditional sense – through common language, religion, culture, location, or lifestyle. Kovats examines the practices that contribute to the construction of this identity, which include police profiling, administrative surveys, Romani activism, policies targeting the Roma and quantitative scientific research. The way that Roma identity is constructed reinforces exclusion of Roma which in turn leads to more policy initiatives that target Roma (Kovats and Mihai 2015, 5-18). This shows the ways in which discourse can impact its subject.

Other writers also consider the effects of a constructed Roma identity on the Roma. These sources examine a wide range of topics, including the securitization of the Roma, the framing of the Roma as a European problem and the roles of the media and public opinion. Owen, for example, observes the way in which the Roma population in France was considered a collective security threat, which justified their deportation. Owen asserts that the securitization of the Roma was possible due to conditionality in the EU citizenship law (Owen 475-491). Vermeersch examines the effects of framing the Roma as a group that should be given attention and for whom special policies should be enacted. This creates the idea that the Roma are a “European issue,” which shifts accountability away from individual states (Vermeersch 2012, 1195-1212). The media and public opinion are also heavily analyzed within this portion of the discourse. Strausz looks at the representation of Roma in film and the media in Hungary (Strausz 1-24), while Vamanu and Vamanu examine how Roma are presented in the mainstream media in Romania (Vamanu and Vamanu 2007). In both cases, the authors show how public opinion of
the Roma is formed and how the public makes sense of the Roma. All of these scholars consider the consequences of a discourse that takes for granted the categorization of a group of people who are called the “Roma.”

*The Roma through the Lens of Security*

The ideas presented in the field of security studies are necessary to understanding the relationship between the Roma and European-ness. The practice of securitization is a modern form of Othering, as it excludes certain groups through the rhetoric of security. Therefore, security is a useful tool for exploring the relationship between Europe and the Roma. Buzan and Hansen are two leading academics in this field and they provide an overview of the history of international studies and the various issues and approaches being used in the field (Buzan and Hansen 2009). Hansen also portrays the application of these theories through her discourse analysis of the Bosnian War (Hansen 2013). An examination of the various meanings of security are also useful. Huysmans explores the many ways that “security” is dealt with, including the definition, a conceptual analysis and the thick signifier approach. The various uses of the term “security” complicate the use of the term and ultimately call for a deeper understanding of the concept (Huysmans 1998).

Much of the conversation concerning security is also tied to Europe and its relationship to migrants and minority groups. Sasse, for example, argues for a reconceptualization of the framing of minority and migration issues. Instead of the security framing, she advocates for a rights-based approach to migration and minority policies (Sasse 2005). Similarly, Galbreath and McEvoy argue that the existing approaches to societal security have failed to make European organizations effectively transformative in the field of interethnic relations (Galbreath and
McEvoy, 2012). Evidently, security as a major framing of minority and migration discourse is a popular one, yet it is also criticized by many academics in the security studies field.

Various authors link security studies to the Roma, especially through the concept of securitization. This portion of the existing conversation creates connections between migration, minorities and security within the analysis of the Roma in Europe. Academics who embark on this kind of analysis overwhelmingly note that the securitization of the Roma is linked to an exacerbation of their status as stateless, marginalized people. For example, van Baar argues that the securitization occurring throughout Europe has impeded the ability of many Roma to exercise their citizenship – especially in the form of their right to the freedom of movement (van Baar 2015). A large portion of the discussion focuses on cases in which Roma are specifically targeted through discursive securitization or criminalization. Many writers have examined this phenomenon in France, where Roma migrants were constructed as a collective societal threat and subsequently deported (Barbulescu 2012; Parker 2012). Costi presents a similar case occurring in Italy, where the representation of Roma as outsiders in the public discourse has been matched by anti-immigrant and anti-Roma reforms (Costi 2010). Those who study security and the Roma find that the securitization of this minority group is implemented through the discourse in order to serve vested interests and ultimately has negative consequences for the Roma.

The securitization of the Roma is presented as a form of Othering by some scholars in the security literature. In their chapter in *The Discourses and Politics of Migration in Europe*, McGarry and Drake offer a case study of French authorities’ reactions to the increase in migration of Roma from Romania. Roma migrants were portrayed as an ethnic Other through the security discourse. This portrayal justified the deportation of Roma migrants by framing them as a group that did not belong in France. The Roma identity was constructed by the French state as
a problematic ethnic group that was a security threat (McGarry and Drake 2013). McGarry and Drake show how security can be applied to an analysis of the portrayal of the Roma in public discourse. Evidently, using security studies as a theoretical framework allows for an examination of the Self-Other relationship between Europe and the Roma.

**Contribution**

Other scholars have examined Roma identity, the notion of European-ness and the securitization of the Roma and other minorities. In this thesis, I bring together the ideas presented in these three areas in order to portray the process of constructing European-ness. Although this process has occurred throughout history – for as long as Europe has existed as an idea – I examine the ways in which it happens in contemporary Europe. I show that security is a rhetoric that allows for the Othering of certain groups. By showing how this process takes place, I make three notable contributions. First, I contribute to the conversation about constructing identities – specifically, European identity. I present a case which exemplifies the model for identity construction through Othering. Second, I call attention to the Roma’s position in Europe. Although the Roma are a marginalized group, I show that this marginalization is used to construct and uphold the notion of European-ness. In order for Europe and European-ness to exist as they currently do, the presence of constitutive Others such as the Roma is necessary. Third, my work comments on the treatment of minorities in Europe. Throughout Europe – and elsewhere – people are marginalized, exoticized and minoritized. They are Othered. As justification, it is said that they are different, foreign, less human, a threat to values and security. But this thesis shows that the real threat is towards a sense of identity. In the case I explore, the fragile sense of European identity is at stake and groups like the Roma are used to keep it intact.
Chapter 2: The Notion of European-ness

The Romanian PR Campaign

In September of 2008, the Romanian government began a nation branding campaign called “Romanians in Europe.” The campaign ran in Italy and Spain through November of the same year. The project was part of Romania’s response to the growing negative public opinion concerning Romanian immigrants in other EU member-states. Romanians were largely associated with criminal activity, especially in Spain and Italy. Part of the issue, as identified by the Romanian government, was that Romanians were being confused with Roma immigrants – many of which were Romanian as well as Roma (Kaneva and Popescu 2014, 513). A year before the campaign was launched, an Italian woman was murdered in Rome. The attack was allegedly committed by a Romanian Roma. This highly publicized event sparked reactions from the Romanian government. The state was interested in portraying “real” Romanians and correcting the association between Romanians and Roma (Kaneva and Popescu 2014, 511). The “Romanians in Europe” campaign was a nation branding campaign that was meant to create a specific image of Romanians within Europe.

The aim of the project was to reshape the public’s understanding of Romanians as being valuable and unthreatening to Spanish and Italian societies. The campaigns used print and television advertisements to accomplish this goal. In both formats, the advertisements presented immigrant Romanians living and working with Spaniards and Italians. The Romanians in the advertisements are portrayed as being fully integrated in their host nations. In the Italian television commercials, the Romanians speak fluent Italian. Both sets of advertisements present the Romanian immigrants’ occupations. According to these campaigns, Romanians are paramedics, hotel managers, entrepreneurs, gardeners, butchers, electricians and theater
directors. This is notable, since statistics show that between 1990 and 2006, 67% of Romanian immigrants in Europe worked in construction, agriculture and housekeeping (Kaneva and Popescu 2014, 516). The difference between the white-collar representation of Romanians in the advertisements and the occupational statistics shows that the campaign tried to present Romanians as skilled workers. The advertisements present an ideal Romanian – one that integrates, speaks the native language and is employed in a profession that is useful to the host society. This is also a Romanian who is juxtaposed against the stereotypical view of Romanian immigrants, which is criminal, threatening and failing to integrate into society.

In each case, the aim is to juxtapose Romanians against the Roma with which they are often conflated. There is an implicit comparison between the Romanians portrayed in the advertisements and the Roma. Longstanding prejudices against the Roma show them as being thieves, criminals and burdens on the societies in which they live (Mitchell 2005, 384-387). In opposition to that image, the Romanians in the advertisements are portrayed as being hardworking, ethical members of society. Furthermore, there are no Roma featured in the advertisements, which implies that the Romanian Roma are not truly Romanian. According to the 2011 census, the population of Roma in Romania reached 621,573 people, or 3.08% of the total population (Institul National de Statistica 2011). Other estimates place the number as high as 2.5 million since many Roma are not recorded due to a lack of identification documents, while others declare different ethnicities for fear of discrimination (Ciobanu 2008). Evidently, the Roma form a substantial minority in Romania. Therefore, Romanian Roma have a place in Romanian society; their Romanian identity and citizenship cannot be disregarded based on their ethnicity. However, the erasure of the Roma from the public’s understanding of Romanians is one of the goals of the “Romanians in Europe” campaign.
It is clear that the nation branding campaign sought to change Europe’s perception of Romanians by presenting them as law-abiding, integrating citizens of Europe, as well as to make claims about Romania’s European-ness. This portrayal was based on differentiating between who Romanians “really” are and how they are portrayed in the media. At the outset, this campaign was also set up to distinguish between Romanians and the Roma – despite the fact that many Roma immigrants are originally from Romania. The goal of the “Romanians in Europe” campaign was not only to show that Romanian immigrants should be welcomed into Italy and Spain; it also made an argument about Romanians’ European-ness. By juxtaposing themselves against the exoticized and criminalized Roma, Romanians show that they are just like the Italians and Spaniards. They belong in Europe just as much as the Roma do not.

**Construction of European-ness and the Necessary Other**

As was shown in the example of the “Romanians in Europe” campaign, identities are often, if not always, constructed in juxtaposition against something that is considered to be outside of the given identity. In the Romanian case, the Romanian government purposefully excluded the Roma from the Romanian identity. This choice of Othering rhetorically placed Romanians on equal ground with Italians and Spaniards while excluding the Roma. The campaign not only distinguished the differences between Romanians and Roma, it was an appeal on the part of Romania to be recognized as European as opposed to the Roma who are considered neither real Romanians nor true Europeans. This is one recent example of the Self-Other relationship that has shaped Europe and European-ness since the concepts first arose. As was made clear in the literature review, the meanings of Europe and European-ness have been constantly shifting. However, one common pattern is the practice of defining Europe in relation
to what it is not. Europe was often touted as a center of civilization and therefore juxtaposed against the barbaric rest of the world. In this vein, many thinkers juxtaposed Europe with Africa and Asia (Mikkeli 1998, Delanty 1995). This relationship mirrors the Self-Other dichotomy that constitutes many notions of membership. As Said notes, “It is the case that no identity can ever exist by itself and without an array of opposites, natives, oppositions: Greeks always require barbarians, and Europeans Africans, Orientals, etc.,” (Said 1995, 29). The notion of European-ness is applied to an expansive geospatial identity that includes many people who had otherwise been divided. The presence of the constitutive Other has been vital for the formation of the notion of European-ness.

The reliance on constitutive Others is evidence of the fragility of European identity. Despite European unification and integration under the EU, European-ness remains precarious and difficult to define. Furthermore, attempts at greater unification often have mixed results. The single market is one example, as some member-states reap the rewards of the common currency, while others are unable to compete in the unified market. Such divisions create fragmentation in the sense of European-ness. As Gulbernau notes, the community created by the EU “is also a fragile construction for it remains a community still in the making with an ambiguous sense of identity and within which powerful forces are at work,” (Gulbernau 2011, 31). European-ness is not based in the same unifying factors as other identities, such as national identity. Unlike the nations within it, Europe does not have a single common language, culture or religion (Kovats and Surdu 2015, 5-18; Petrova 2003, 111-161). Its history is marked by internal conflict. Therefore, it is understandable that national identity takes precedence over European identity. Due to the fragmentation and fragility of European identity, its construction relies heavily on a contrast between European-ness and its Others.
Since the rise of the European Union as a major supranational institution of power, European-ness is often defined within the context of membership to the EU. Discussions over membership occur on the state level, as with the debate over the possibility of Turkey joining the EU. But membership is also discussed at a more localized level, as certain groups’ membership to and protection under the EU are called into question. These exclusions are indicative of the ongoing process of Othering and identity-building that create and recreate European-ness on a large scale. Although the meaning of “European-ness” is highly contentious, there are certain rights and protections that are afforded to those who are identified as members of this group. Currently, the influence of the EU shapes these rights and they therefore include – but are not limited to – citizenship, mobility and minority protection. Citizenship and the rights it affords are markers of membership to Europe. Therefore, exclusion to any of these rights is indicative of exclusions to European-ness. In the following section, I examine three cases having to do with mobility, minority rights and citizenship in order to show how they are used to construct European-ness. Each one of these cases shows an instance in which the relationship between the Roma and Europe was framed by Othering through exclusionary policies.

Practices of Exclusion as Othering

Citizenship

EU citizenship is the basis for the rights and privileges of members of the EU. Any impediments to the expression of such citizenship can therefore lead to a loss of rights, as well as a loss of status as member of the European community. Due to the consequences of statelessness, the international community has made certain commitments to preventing loss of citizenship. The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons defines statelessness and
provides regulations for the treatment of stateless persons. The 1954 Convention was expanded by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees through the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of 1961. The 1961 Convention notably states that a “Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless,” (Parra 2011, 1674). This measure is meant to guarantee citizenship for all persons. Although the Roma are often considered a nation without a state, the 1961 Convention grants them the right to citizenship. All EU member-states are signatories to both the 1954 Convention and the 1961 Convention. By signing the conventions, they express their commitment to fighting statelessness.

In 1997, the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on Nationality which would deal with all issues concerning nationality. Article 4A states that “everyone has the right to a nationality,” (Council of Europe 1997, 3). This sentiment is echoed in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which also states that the right to nationality is a universal right and that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of it, (Parra 2011, 1676). It is clear that citizenship and nationality are considered vital to maintaining individuals’ rights and are therefore protected through various conventions and policies.

Although many Roma are citizens of EU member-states, many others remain stateless. Some are denied nationality due to their race or ethnicity, while others lack access to the administrative procedures or documents that would grant them nationality, (Parra 2011, 1668). An individual is automatically a citizen of the EU if she is a citizen of one of its member-states. This means that EU citizenship is based solely on national citizenship, which can create barriers to obtaining EU citizenship for those who lack a nationality. This is one of the main reasons that statelessness is possible within the EU. The international community views the conferral of nationality and national citizenship as matters of national sovereignty. Therefore, the right to
grant citizenship is reserved for member-states. Article 3 of the European Convention on Nationality states that “each State shall determine under its own law who are its nationals,” (Council of Europe 1997, 3). Many EU member-states base their nationality laws on the principles of *jus sanguinis*, meaning that minority ethnic and migrant groups are often rendered stateless (Parra 2011, 1680; Brubaker 1990). The issue of national citizenship can stand in the way of stateless persons accessing EU citizenship.

Marginalized groups are prone to *de facto* statelessness because they lack the rights and protections that comes with citizenship. For example, although Hungary grants citizenship to its minority populations, the Hungarian Roma experience systemic discrimination which results in *de facto* statelessness. This discrimination includes state policies that allow for segregated education, high unemployment rates due to prejudice, and violent hate crimes perpetrated against the Roma (Parra 2011, 1680; Koulish 2005, 323; Warnke 1999, 335-367). In spite of the various conventions and treaties which are meant to prevent statelessness, many Roma are either *de jure* or *de facto* stateless. This is in large part due to the importance placed on state sovereignty in the matter of conferring and controlling nationality. By placing full control over citizenship in the hands of its member-states, the EU is complicit in giving member-states control over European-ness. In other words, states choose who is considered truly European. This is highly consequential for groups such as the Roma who are excluded from the rights and protections that are granted to full citizens. Denying citizenship is an exclusionary practice that is possible due to the Roma’s perceived Otherness. The Roma are constructed as non-members because they are portrayed as outsiders. This practice also reestablishes their Otherness through the continuation of exclusionary and discriminatory policies.
**Mobility**

In recent years, mobility has had a major role in building a sense of European unity. Since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the European community has been closely associated with the four major freedoms of the EU, which are the freedom of movement of people, capital, goods, and services. Various policies and institutions have been introduced to encourage mobility and facilitate greater integration between member-states. The Schengen Zone, for example, is a major step in reducing barriers to mobility along the lines of national borders. The EU has also created various Trans-European Networks, which are “transportation, energy and telecommunication networks meant to guarantee the flows represented by the idea of the four freedoms,” (van Baar 2014, 2). According to the European Commission, the mobility of citizens – as both consumers and laborers – is vital to an interconnected, growing European economy (European Commission 2015). These developments are meant to allow for greater accessibility and more exchanges across borders. Projects such as the Schengen Zone and the Trans-European Networks contribute to the rhetorical framing of the EU as a space that is highly interconnected and therefore easily traversable. Of course, freedom of mobility is predicated upon EU citizenship, meaning that all nationals of member-states are allowed to freely move within the EU. Therefore, just as with citizenship, freedom of movement is a marker of European-ness or belonging within the European community.

Although freedom of movement is seen as a fundamental virtue of EU citizenship, the Roma’s mobility is often impeded. Such impediments to freedom of movement often take the form of deportations, declined asylum claims and denial of entry into member-states. The conception of Roma mobility differs from that of the Schengen Zone mobility. The Roma are seen as a nomadic people who are excessively mobile. Their mobility is tied to the nomadic past
of the Roma people – most of which are currently sedentary. The misleading representation of Roma mobility is used to justify limits on their mobility. Mobility within the EU’s Schengen Zone is supposed to allow for labor to be flexible and follow employment opportunities across member-states. Therefore, the Roma and other Europeans migrate for the same reasons. The conceptions of their mobilities are different, which allows for discrimination against the Roma.

In 1999, Roma asylum-seekers from Slovakia tried to apply for asylum after entering Belgium. Belgian officials did not allow the individuals to begin the asylum procedures. Instead, they were transported to a detention center and subsequently deported to Slovakia (van Baar 2014, 3). The Belgian officials violated the principle of non-refoulement of asylum-seekers by deporting the Roma migrants. Through their actions, they also made a statement about what kinds of people would be allowed mobility into the EU’s capital. In subsequent years, the Roma’s attempts to escape violations of their rights would be met with more impediments to mobility, as well as public condemnations of their attempts at mobility. According to a statement from Robert Fico, a Slovak politician who would later become Slovakia’s Prime Minister, the Roma’s “speculative requests for political asylum endangered the free movement of decent Central and Eastern European citizens,” (van Baar 2014, 3; Togneri 2000). A similar argument was made by French officials following the scandal of the 2010 deportations of Roma, which will be explored in Chapter 4 of this thesis. In these cases, the Roma are juxtaposed against “decent” European citizens who truly deserve the freedom of movement. Despite the rhetoric of integration and the fact that most Roma have EU citizenship, they are continually framed as belonging to some non-European group that should not have access to the same rights as full EU citizens. By portraying the Roma as “irregular” citizens, member-states can justify deportations
and other impediments to their freedom of movement. In doing so, they further the exclusion and Othering of the Roma.

State officials are able to frame the Roma as irregular citizens due to the common perception that Roma are nomadic people. Ironically, the call to limit Roma mobility is made on the grounds that the Roma exercise excessive mobility. The nomadicization of the Roma has two major consequences. First, it results in the criminalization of the Roma, as they are seen as less easy to control and more likely to take part in illegal activities. According to a communication from Europol, “Bulgarian and Romanian (mostly of Roma ethnicity), Nigerian and Chinese groups are probably the most threatening to society as a whole. Roma organized crime groups are extremely mobile, making the most of their historically itinerant nature,” (van Baar 2014, 5; CEU 2011, 14). It is evident that the Roma are collectively associated with criminality. Furthermore, their mobility is directly implicated as the cause of this criminality. The assumptions portrayed in this excerpt show that the Roma are essentialized as criminals based on their supposed historic mobility.

The second consequence of nomadicization is that it separates the Roma from any nation-state to which they may be members. In many cases, Roma are viewed as being Roma above all else, meaning that their identity as Europeans or nationals of certain states is subordinated. Therefore, they often lack the protections of the nation-states whose citizenship they hold. According to a Belgian report on itinerant criminal groups,

“Sedentary criminals are understood to be nomads, originally from the former Yugoslavian Republic, Romania, France or Belgium. These nomads are actually people without a real homeland. […] Despite the fact that a large part is settling down, the break between being sedentary and being mobile is not radical and
never final. Sometimes they strengthen their apparent sedentarisation… [but they]
can also start moving around again suddenly,” (van Baar 2014, 4; CGBFP 2010,
10-11).

This report shows how the criminalization and nomadicization of groups such as the Roma
occurs in policy discourse. The “nomads” are characterized as lacking a homeland, although
many Roma are citizens of EU member-states. Nomadicization becomes a tool for
discrimination. The “rootlessness” present in this rhetoric is further justification for impediments
to their mobility. And, since mobility is a vital part of EU citizenship and European-ness, it
essentially excludes the Roma from Europe.

Minority Rights

The protection of minority rights is another requirement of membership to the EU. Prior
to accession, states must prove that they meet political, economic and administrative criteria.
Under the political criteria, a state must have “achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities,”
(Ibryamova 2013, 351). Therefore, the protection of minority rights is indicative that a member-
state shares the values of the European community. Compliance with EU laws on minority rights
has often been based on the ratification of international instruments such as the European
Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European
Convention on Nationality and the European Social Charter of the Council of Europe
(Ibryamova 201, 351). The ratification of such documents is evidence of a state’s commitment to
protecting minority rights and its obligation to uphold European standards. At the national level,
member-states have adopted anti-discrimination legislation, implemented programs for Roma
integration and ratified the Council of Europe’s 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Ram 2014, 4). It would appear that EU conditionality has been effective in influencing nation-states on the issue of minority rights and protections.

However, once membership to the EU is attained, EU influence over minority rights weakens. Instead, member-states and their political elites choose to focus on the preferences of their constituents, (Ibryamova 2013, 350; Ram 2014, 1-2). As candidate countries become member-states, their newly-adopted minority policies coexist with exclusionary policies and practices. Among others, these exclusionary practices include discrimination in housing and employment, segregation in education, forced evictions, limited participation of minorities in political processes, as well as the discriminatory rhetoric of political elites and the media (Ram 2014, 2). These forms of exclusion are especially relevant for minorities with limited political representation, such as the Roma (Ibryamova 2013, 351). In the area of education, the Roma are often placed in either segregated classes or schools. In the Czech Republic, Roma children are placed into schools for the mentally disabled. In Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, Roma are disproportionately placed in separate schools or segregated classes (Ram 2014, 11). According to census data, about 12% of Roma in Bulgaria are illiterate, in comparison with 0.5% of ethnic Bulgarians (Ibryamova 2013, 357). Evidently, the commitment to minority rights stated through EU conditionality is problematized by the treatment of the Roma in the area of education.

Another important area is the political participation of minority groups. Many member-states guarantee Roma representation in their Parliaments. However, few Roma are actually elected to these positions (Ram 2014, 12). In Romania, Roma representation in parliament is strikingly low, as Roma-affiliated parties regularly fail to meet the electoral threshold. In the period between 1990 and 2007, Roma have only held five seats in the Romanian Parliament.
In Bulgaria, the Roma face similar issues of representation. Between 1990 and 2009, the Roma population was represented by only 10 seats in the parliament (Ibryamova 2013, 362). In both cases, it is evident that Roma political representation is low. Hungary has adopted a system of minority self-government (MSG), which is meant to “represent Roma interests and to establish Roma cultural autonomy,” (Koulish 2005, 317). However, the MSG system has proven to be largely focused on producing cultural autonomy, rather than social and political inclusion. Roma issues are relegated to the MSG’s, instead of being addressed by the state. The responsibility for Roma issues is shifted from the state to the Roma themselves. Roma attempting to access services from municipal governments are redirected to the MSG, which may not offer such services due to lack of resources and funds (Koulish 2005, 321-322; Ram 2014, 13). Due to the lack of viable forms of representation, it cannot be said that the Roma receive full protection of their rights as minorities. Many of the efforts to increase Roma participation appear to be symbolic, as they have failed to increase the political participation of the Roma. Without substantial political representation or participation, other minority rights and concerns are unlikely to be addressed. The Roma are essentially excluded from the protections offered to other European minorities. These practices of exclusion frame them as outsiders who do not merit the same protections and rights as other Europeans.

Conclusions

The construction of any identity relies upon constitutive Others against which the identity is framed. This Self-Other relationship is reproduced in the construction of European-ness through its relationship with certain minorities and outsider groups. In order to continually re-establish this relationship, Others are excluded from the rights and privileges that are associated
with membership in the European community. In this section, I have explored three cases in which rights that are fundamental to EU membership are not granted to the Roma. The Roma’s rights of citizenship, mobility and the protection of their rights as minorities are all impeded in various cases throughout Europe. Since the Roma are excluded from the rights of Europeans, they are framed as being non-European or belonging lower in the hierarchy of European-ness. The Othering of the Roma is also based on a history of anti-Roma prejudice, which shows that this relationship is continually created and re-created in order to uphold an otherwise fragile sense of European-ness.
Chapter 3: Roma Identity: Misleading Appearance of a Singular Identity

The Declaration of a Roma Identity

In the summer of 2000, the fifth World Romani Congress was held in the Czech Republic. Delegates and members of the International Romani Union gathered to discuss issues relating to the Roma community (Goodwin, 2004). The most notable result of the fifth World Romani Congress was the production of the Declaration of a Roma Nation. This document calls for the recognition of the Roma Nation while also making it clear that this nation does not seek statehood (International Romani Union, 2001). The declaration raised many questions in the international community, such as how a non-territorial nation could attain equal status with other nations and how such a nation would function. The representatives of the International Romani Union emphasized that the Roma nation was seeking representation at the United Nations and the European Union (International Romani Union, 2001). However, the declaration presents few details about how such representation would function. The nature of membership to the Roma nation must first be established, as it is unclear who such a nation represents. The document also lacks information about how representatives would communicate with the Roma population and voice their concerns. Although the declaration claims to unify the Roma community, there are many logistical questions about such a nation without a state.

The Declaration of a Roma Nation seemed to be evidence of unity within the global Roma community. By demanding international recognition, the Roma assert their ability to determine their own future and shape their relationships to other groups. In order to make the claim of nationhood, the Roma community should exhibit unifying factors. The declaration implies that the Roma not only share certain common characteristics, they also possess a common Roma identity. The document evokes a shared tradition, culture, origin, language and
history of persecution as proof of the nation (International Romani Union, 2001). However, many have claimed that the Roma lack the unifying traits which often characterize nations, such as common language, culture, religion, or even geographic location (Kovats and Surdu 2015, 5-18; Petrova 2003, 111-161). Others have noted that the Roma are made up of many subgroups, making true unity unlikely (Ahmed et al 2007, 231-255; Szuhay 2005, 226-236). Although the Declaration of a Roma Nation seems to bring up more questions than it answers, it is an example of a concerted effort to claim a common Roma identity. This chapter will focus on the construction of Roma identity during the 1990’s and early 2000’s and the issues that arise as Roma identity is represented in various discourses.

Introduction

As stated above, this chapter will be dedicated to an examination of the ways in which the Roma are presented in various discourses. It will begin with an account of the scholarly writings that have to do with Roma identity. These include works that present a view of the Roma as homogenous, as well as those that question this widely-accepted perception. In the second section, I will examine the various national and supranational discourses that present the Roma to the general population through the vantage point of the state and the EU. In order to examine the national discourse, I will turn to the rhetoric of state officials and political elites. I will also examine the discourse presented by the EU in order to show how the Roma are presented at the supranational level. This will include an assessment of the policies and political discourse about the “Roma issue.” In the third section, I will examine the implications of Roma self-identification in order to contrast between outsider and insider discourse concerning the Roma. Self-identification is important to consider because, although it is one of the least
publicized forms of Roma-related discourse, it is a direct reflection of the ways in which Roma view their own identity. It also problematizes the simplified view of the Roma presented in many other forms of discourse by calling attention to the diversity within the Roma community and the complexities inherent in the process of hailing identities.

This chapter will compare the different representations of Roma identity. It will remark on the stark differences that occur depending on the context in which a specific form of rhetoric is being used. In the most popular or visible discourses – and even in many scholarly works – the Roma are presented as having a singular, coherent identity. Moreover, this identity is considered to be common knowledge and self-explanatory, despite there being no actual definition of Roma identity in most cases. Scholarly studies and polls of Roma self-identification show that the Roma are a very diverse group with many subgroups. These studies show that outsider perceptions of the Roma rarely correspond with insider identification. All of these findings support the argument that the Roma are presented as a singular group with a clearly defined identity even though a more precise picture shows that the politics of Roma identity are much more complex. Discourse plays a major role in the understanding of Roma identity.

Representations of the Roma in Various Discourses

Scholarly Discourses

In this section I will examine academic sources as a form of discourse. It is understood that scholarly discourse shapes the object of its study and is therefore consequential and worth examining. The body of academic literature that focuses on the Roma is extensive and will therefore not be covered in its entirety in this study. Instead, this section will be an examination of the scholarly works that deal with the topic of Roma identity, both indirectly and explicitly.
This is itself a large pool of literature. In order to facilitate the analysis, it will be divided into subsections which are indicative of the various strains present within the larger literature. The first group will include academic works that assume the unproblematic presence of a coherent Roma identity. These include works that study the Roma ethnographically, as well as those that presume to make arguments about what it means to be Roma. This section will show that there is a large body of academic literature that presents the Roma as a singular group with a more coherent identity. The second group is made up of works from scholars who look at the idea of Roma identity more critically. These thinkers question the simplistic representation of Roma identity that is often taken for granted. These works will provide the foundation for the argument that Roma identity is—as are all other identities—a construction that is dialectically created through everyday processes as well as through discourse.

Within the scholarly literature concerned with the Roma, many works focus on the construction of a history of the Roma. Most of these sources focus on the Roma of Eastern Europe, as most of Europe’s Roma population has been concentrated in that geographical area. Zoltan Barany explores the socio-political and economic situation of the Roma in post-communist countries (Barany 1994, 321-344). Although he discusses the marginality and identity of Eastern European Roma, Barany lacks specificity in his analysis and generalizes his observations to reflect the experiences of all Eastern European Roma. Ethnographic works offer a similar dilemma. Szuhay notes that many ethnographic works fail to capture the diversity among the Roma. He states that many of these accounts study only one group of Roma—in most cases it is the Vlach Roma, which are seen as the most traditional Roma—and extend their findings to encompass all Roma subgroups. Studies undertaken by Gyorgy Rostas-Farkas, Ervin Karsai and Pal Farkas generalize observations on the Vlach Roma to the Roma as a whole.
(Szuhay 2005, 226-236). These works fail to present the diversity of the Roma and thus present a distorted picture of the Roma. By using the categorization of “Roma” without specificity, these scholars perpetuate the notion that Roma identity is neatly consolidated. However, there are sources that lay the groundwork for a reconceptualization of Roma identity as a multifaceted one.

Various scholars question the simplistic representation of Roma identity. These academics are critical of the generalization of Roma-ness. They explore the ways in which members of the Roma community depart from such a straightforward categorization. They also examine the effects that such a simplified representation of identity has on the Roma. Although some historical accounts are generalizing, others demonstrate the diversity of this group. David Crowe presents a history of the Roma of eastern Europe and Russia, in which he examines groups of Roma within the contexts of six nations (Crowe 1994). Crowe portrays the ways in which the histories of the Roma interacted with the histories of the nation-states that they inhabited. He also shows that each of these contexts had an impact on the Roma that inhabited that specific space. Similarly, Yaron Matras begins his history by stating that all Roma stem from a common point of origin which separated into groups with notable differences as the Roma became widely dispersed throughout Europe. Matras focuses on the organization of Roma society, its common language, history and traditions. However, he also makes note of the differences among Roma subgroups (Matras 2015). Although no work can provide a complete account of every Roma experience, scholarly works that contextualize different subgroups create a more complex picture of the Roma.

Certain scholars focus explicitly on the construction of Roma identity and its consequences. These scholars examine the ways in which the common conception of Roma
identity is produced, as well as the effects of this construction on the Roma. Gheorghe argues that Roma identity is at least partially shaped through discourse. He shows that the language of Roma-centered discourse has often held back the Roma in both activism and policy-discourse (Gheorghe 2013). By examining the discourse around the Roma issue, Gheorghe shows that the issue is shaped by the way it is presented and discussed. Kovats and Surdu argue that Roma identity is constructed on the basis of political and expert knowledge by policymakers, Roma activists, international organizations and policymakers. This identity is then attributed to groups of people who are not bound together in the traditional sense, which would be through attributes such as common language, culture, religion, geographical location, or lifestyle. Instead, identity is constructed through social processes (Kovats and Surdu 2015, 5-18). The treatment of the Roma by the reigning political elite is one example. Census information and police profiling that specifically target people identified as Roma both define the Roma in relation to the state. Similarly, policies that target the Roma – such as integration measures – also define the Roma in specific ways. Scholarly works have a similar effect. Surveys and quantitative scientific research are cited as forms of discourse that shape Roma identity and the ways in which it is understood (Kovats and Surdu 2015, 5-18). The works of Gheorghe and Kovats and Surdu show that academic literature is effective in shaping Roma identity. They also show that these representations are consequential, as they affect the ways that the Roma are treated.

Some scholars problematize the idea of identity and the processes that go into constructing it. Lin notes that identity can be used in the reproduction of social inequality since the rhetoric of identity can often essentialize groups (Lin 2013). This phenomenon can be seen through the governance of Roma peoples in Italy. Recent political discourse frames the “Gypsy problem” in Italy in terms of public security and emergency. Due to this framing, governance of
the Roma has shifted from the local to the central government. This shift in responsibility is accompanied by a change in tactics; the Roma question changes from a social policy issue to an issue of policing (Sigona 2011, 590-606). This demonstrates the difficulties of minority identification, as it can be framed in ways that are not beneficial to the minority group. Mitchell notes that present-day Roma are often identified based on social aspects such as poverty, unemployment and degraded living conditions (Mitchell 2005, 383-395). Many ethnographic studies use these socio-economic attributes in order to identify Roma groups. Of course, these Roma are the most visible. Those who are more integrated or affluent are less visible and are rarely included in studies of the Roma. This unequal representation can contribute to a negative and skewed view of the Roma.

An analysis of the scholarly work concerning Roma identity and representation shows that scholars have both generalized Roma identity and complicated it. However, an examination of these writings also makes it clear that Roma identity is a construction. Roma identity can be presented in such a variety of ways because it is constantly created and re-created through discourse. These various representations are reflections of the Roma being observed. However, they also show the intellectual commitments of the observers. Furthermore, all of these works show that the representation of the Roma as a coherent unit with a common and easily-identifiable identity is overly simplistic. The simplistic view of Roma identity is perpetuated by some scholars, although many more recent works are concerned with problematizing this simplistic picture. Roma identity does not come out of shared language, traditions, or ties to a geographical location. Instead, it is an idea that is constructed in part through scholarly discourse.
National and Supranational Discourses

State and EU discourses construct the Roma as a group that faces regular exclusion. Traditionally, state policies concerning the Roma have a history of being discriminatory. This can be shown through three examples: the case of the Berlusconi government’s security package, the screening of Roma by UK immigration officials and the Hungarian system of segregated schooling. In May of 2008, the newly elected Berlusconi government passed the ‘Nomads State of Emergency,’ a decree which granted the prefects of Rome, Milan and Naples allowances to carry out “the monitoring of formal and informal camps, identification and census of the people, including minors, who are present there, the expulsion and removal of persons with irregular status, and measures aimed at clearing ‘camps for nomads’ and evicting their inhabitants,” (Aradau et al 2013, 138-139). The security package on immigration contained a law maintaining that EU citizens could enter and reside in Italy for three months. After this period, migrants would have to prove that they were financially secure, possessed health insurance and that they lived in accordance with hygiene requirements. Failing to provide evidence of these requirements would result in those individuals being removed on the grounds of public and social security (Aradau et al 2013, 139). This security package greatly affected Italy’s Roma population, especially those living in camps. The ‘Nomads State of Emergency’ perpetuated the discursive framing of the Roma as both nomads and unhygienic welfare burdens. Under EU law, limits to freedom of movement can only be applied on an individual basis; such measures are not supposed to apply collectively to whole groups. However, the discourse of the Berlusconi security package demonstrates how the political rhetoric regarding the Roma in Italy resulted in collective discrimination and subsequent restrictions of mobility.
Another case of collective discrimination concerning mobility occurred in an airport in Prague in 2004. Screening arrangements carried out by British immigration officials were meant to “pre-clear” passengers before they boarded flights to the UK. The system allowed for Roma to be “treated with more suspicion and subjected to more intensive questioning under the pre-clearance arrangements,” (Tait 2004). The House of Lords ruled that the screening arrangements were systematically discriminatory and therefore unlawful. The Home Office of the UK, the office responsible for implementing the screening procedures, expressed that it was “committed to enforcing robust immigration controls, implemented fairly and consistently,” in a non-discriminatory manner (Tait 2004). However, further examination of the policy show that it allowed for the collective discrimination of Roma migrants.

The systematic discrimination of the Roma routinely takes place in national education. In Hungary, school segregation is a major issue for Roma populations. Oftentimes, education officials diagnose Roma children with “light mental retardation” and send them to special remedial schools. Roma children are also often segregated into special education classrooms even if they attend a mixed school. The result of both of these kinds of segregation is lower education standards for Roma students (Greenberg 2010, 936). Although special funds are committed to Roma education, these funds are often deposited into general municipal expense accounts by local administrations. Meanwhile, Roma students remain in segregated or special-education classrooms. Koulish notes that “affirmative action policies like minority rights offer indignities and humiliations, promises of separated classes rather than textbooks, pencils and quality instruction,” (Koulish 2005, 323). Evidently, policy discourse at both the national and local levels allows for collective discrimination against the Roma.
The policies put in place on the national and supranational levels are inclusionary in language but exclusionary in practice. This has the effect of further marginalizing the Roma. At the level of the EU, representatives often discuss the inclusion of the Roma. Every member-state must have a national strategy for Roma integration, as mandated by the EU. Recent years have seen the convergence of many Central and Eastern European member-states’ policies on minority protection. This is in part due to EU accession requirements and pressure from the EU following accession. The result of such pressure has been the increase in anti-discrimination legislation, the ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) and integration programs targeting the Roma. All current member-states have ratified the FCNM and most include minority rights protections in their constitutions and legislation. Government funding is allocated towards the preservation of Roma culture and projects that work to secure education, housing, health and employment for the Roma. The EU has also mandated that all member-states adopt anti-discrimination legislation under the EU Racial Equality Directive (Directive 2000/43/EC). Each EU member-state also has its own National Roma Integration Strategy (Ram 2014, 4-7). It is evident that the pressure exerted by the EU has been effective in creating awareness of Roma issues and in producing legislation and policies directed towards these issues.

However well-intentioned, the policies that directly target the Roma for integration frame the Roma as a group that is in need of special attention. The policy initiatives and integration measures emphasize their status as a marginalized group. This may cause governments to adopt policies directed at helping the Roma. However, framing the Roma as a European issue can minimize the responsibility of member-states in addressing the issue. It also frames the Roma as outsiders to the countries in which they reside. The push to Europeanize the Roma issue has been
used by nationalist politicians and those with anti-Roma agendas to further marginalize their Roma populations. Vermeersch notes that these politicians “exclude [the Roma] symbolically from their own national space and frame them […] as ‘outsiders’ and ‘cultural deviants,’” (Vermeersch 2012, 1195). Political actors use the framing of the Roma as a group in need of special treatment to further their arguments that the Roma are a burden to the state. Although the Roma have become a European issue, this has often led to further exclusion.

The national and supranational policies concerning Roma inclusion are often undermined by the discriminatory rhetoric of public officials. Many politicians are known for their public anti-Roma remarks. Zsolt Bayer, co-founder of the Fidesz party in Hungary, recently stated that “a significant portion of the Gypsies are unfit for coexistence, not fit to live among human beings. These people are animals and behave like animals… These animals should not exist. No way. This must be solved, immediately and in any way possible” (ERRC 2015). Many members of the extreme right party Jobbik are also known for their anti-Roma rhetoric. In the Czech Republic, anti-Roma discourse is common in both national and local discourse. According to a Czech politician, racist rhetoric is “used as a mobilisation tool wherever there is a receptive audience,” (Ram 2014, 9). In Romania, anti-Roma sentiment is evident in the rhetoric of top political officials. For example, former prime minister Victor Ponta compared Roma to monkeys in a zoo. Former president Basescu previously stated that “very few [Roma] want to work” and that “many of them traditionally live off what they steal,” (Ram 2014, 9). Although states are influenced by the pressure of the EU, underlying intolerance remains unchanged. This is evidenced by the numerous anti-Roma remarks of officials at both local and national levels.

Although all EU member-states express their commitment to Roma integration at the supranational level, national policy is often exclusionary in nature. Furthermore, the EU fails to
hold its member-states accountable for such transgressions. Despite the adoption of various policies geared towards minority rights, barriers to true Roma inclusion continue to exist. As one advisor to the Romanian Prime Minister has stated, Romania has a Roma Strategy, “but only because Brussels demanded it. It is just a paper,” (Ram 2014, 8). This statement shows the image- and compliance-oriented nature of member-states’ Roma policies. Outwardly, states project their self-image as complying to EU policies and maintaining the same values as the European community. Inwardly, however, policies and rhetoric show much less progress on Roma issues. In Hungary’s constitution, adopted in 2011, removed any explicit mention of “minorities.” Only outside nationals are acknowledged by Act 179 of 2011 on the Rights of Nationalities, which replaced the 1993 Minority Rights Act (Dobos 2016, 13). The change was met with criticism from the EU, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. However, the changes to Hungary’s constitution remain. This shows that policies at the national level continue to be discriminatory and that international pressure fails to produce sustained change.

Even programs expressly dedicated to Roma inclusion have exclusionary policies. France’s National Strategy for Roma Integration is meant to help implement projects that can catalyze the integration of the Roma population into French society. Both the EU and the French government allocate funding for National Strategy programs. According to a European Commission report, €4 million are annually allocated to local authorities in charge of implementing the annual circular of 2012 which called for evictions from illegal settlements (European Commission 2014, 2). The main goals are preparing for evictions of Roma persons from illegal settlements and camps, data collection and monitoring of such illegal settlements, using the European Regional Development Fund to build housing solutions, as well as
allocations of national budget funds to halting sites. The preoccupation with eviction contradicts the main goal of integration, as housing is a necessary component of inclusion. Stable housing is necessary in order to allow for improvement in education and employment. The goal is evidently not Roma inclusion and betterment, but maintaining reputations and relationships with the international community. Ultimately, these national programs allow for the nation to portray itself as a member of a European community that values certain ideals. But the maintenance of this identity is seen as more important that upholding the actual ideals.

As this examination of national and supranational discourse has shown, the discourse at the state and EU levels reproduces the exclusion of the Roma. The discourse presents the Roma as a group in need of special attention. Integration programs and policies are put into place in order to deal with the low education, high unemployment and housing issues that are correlated with the Roma. However, at the level of national discourse, the Roma are further excluded. Integration policies are comprised of exclusionary measures, such as evictions. Political elites contribute to the prejudice against the Roma through their discriminatory comments. This exclusionary discourse serves to justify the mistreatment of the Roma by framing them as outsiders.

*Roma Self-Identification*

Thus far, I have examined the scholarly and policy discourses that create representations of Roma identity. But in order for this to be a holistic account of the various representations of Roma identity, an analysis of Roma self-identification must be included. The Roma are often presented as a homogenous group with clearly identifiable common traits in many of the discourses previously discussed. However, a study of Roma self-identification shows that the
Roma are a heterogeneous group that is not easily defined. Various groups are often identified as Roma by outsiders, although they do not self-identify as such. Furthermore, there is a disconnect between outsider identification of Roma and insider identification. All of this shows that Roma identity and perception of this identity are highly contested.

Although the Roma are often presented as a homogenous group, Roma self-identification complicates this overly-simplistic narrative. There are numerous groups that are externally identified as Roma but do not consider themselves ethnically Roma. For example, Petrova notes that these groups include “the Jevgjit in Albania; the Ashkalija and Egyptians in Kosovo and Macedonia; the Travelers in Britain and Ireland; and the Rudari and Beyashi in Hungary, Romania, and other countries,” as well as the Sinti, (Petrova 2003, 112). Evidently, the idea that the Roma are a homogenous group is a problematic assumption. Certain groups across Europe are constantly mislabeled as Roma. This shows that there is a large-scale misunderstanding of Roma identity and the characteristics of membership to this group. But there is also a lack of understanding when it comes to the nature of Roma identity. Krieg and Walsh note the difference between how the Hungarian Roma self-identify as opposed to the majority population’s view of them. Within Roma communities, Roma view themselves as a “heterogeneous, sociocultural unit,” although they are often portrayed and viewed as a homogenous group, seen through stereotypes and negative bias (Krieg and Walsh 2007, 169). Roma identity is seen as a simplistic characteristic which is applicable to a large group of people. This in turn erases the complexities inherent in Roma identity. The signifier “Roma” corresponds to certain socio-cultural characteristics in the majority population’s imaginations. This makes it easy to identify many groups as being Roma, despite a lack of self-identification. There is a fundamental disconnect
between the way that Roma view their own identity and the ways in which they are seen by outside observers.

Studies of Roma self- and outsider-identification have shown that insider and outsider identification rarely match up. According to Kosa and Adany, there are three constructs for minority status which correspond with three forms of outsider and insider identification, and which can be applied to the Roma case. The first is the internal racial or ethnic identity, which is the individual’s belief about his or her own identification. This may or may not correspond to expressed identity, which is the identity that is conveyed by the speech and actions of the individual. The third form is external identity, or the observer’s belief about an individual’s identity, (Kosa and Adany 2007, 291). As this explanation makes clear, there are a variety of ways in which identity is interpreted. Various studies have been undertaken in an effort to explore the ways in which Roma are identified, both internally and externally. Both Ahmed et al and Koulish undertake such studies specifically focusing on Roma in Hungary. In a study performed by Ahmed et al, individuals were interviewed and subsequently labeled as either Roma or non-Roma based on the interview. The study found that interviewer classification does not match up with self-identification. According to the findings, 62% of those who did not identify as Roma were classified as such. Furthermore, 16% of self-identified Roma said that they were ethnically misidentified (Ahmed et al 2007, 243). The study found that interviewers used the self-identification of insiders, as well as social markers, to impute ethnicity. Interviewer classifications did not always match up with self-identification. Those who informed the interviewer that they self-identified as Roma were more likely to be identified as such. However, the results show that individuals who did not self-identify as Roma could still be classified as Roma. The interviewer identification was also heavily influenced by factors such as ethnic,
economic and demographic markers. The authors concluded that, although the Roma are composed of various groups, they are racialized because perceived social and cultural differences are viewed in biological or physical terms (Ahmed et al 2007, 243). The study shows that individuals label others as “Roma” due to ethnic and social markers, despite a possible lack of self-identification as Roma.

A study performed by Koulish shows similar results. The study was carried out by first contacting local individuals and determining whether or not they were Roma. Individuals identified as Roma by interviewers were selected to be respondents in the survey. The group included non-self-identified Roma who expressed that they did not self-identify as Roma but were classified as such by an interviewer. The assessments of Roma ethnicity were made “on the basis of the interviewee’s colour, language, dress, way of life and family name,” (Koulish 2007, 316). According to the survey, “a typical Roma is female, under 40, lives rurally, speaks Magyar and is Roman Catholic. Further, she is undereducated and was economically worse off in 2000 than in 1988,” (Koulish 2007, 316). Similarly to the study performed by Ahmed et al, this survey shows that external identifications of Roma differ from internal identifications. It also shows that classification of individuals as Roma is not wholly dependent on the individual’s self-identification as Roma. Interviewer’s decisions were primarily based on physical characteristics and social traits of those being interviewed. Even when internal identification is explicitly expressed, it can differ from external identity. Social and physical markers are just as influential as expressed identification – if not more so.

The studies analyzed above show that misconceptions about Roma membership are common. They also point towards an overall trend of viewing Roma identity as a social category, as opposed to a cultural one. In the study performed by Ahmed et al, individuals were likely to
be classified based on ethnic, economic and demographic markers. Common characteristics of those identified as Roma include living in areas perceived as Roma neighborhoods, having a low income and low socio-economic status, living in large households and being less educated (Ahmed et al 2007, 243). Interviewers were heavily influenced by ethnic and demographic markers, showing that the social and cultural differences commonly perceived in Roma are viewed in biological or physical terms. The markers used for external classifications of Roma identity are social markers that are perceived as being inherent to the Roma. This trend further complicates the question of Roma identity.

Conclusions

Throughout this examination of Roma self- and outsider-identification, several conclusions have been made. In the major discourses, the Roma are often generalized as one homogenous group. However, they lack the homogeneity that is often ascribed to them. Furthermore, Roma internal identification is not synonymous with external identification; these two forms of identification have been shown to vary through two studies. Evidently, the Roma view themselves differently from the ways in which outsiders see them. An account of external classifications has shown that the Roma are generally identified by social characteristics. This is a manifestation of the idea that the Roma are inherently characterized by certain social markers such as a lack of education or low socio-economic status. Roma identity is constructed from both the outside and the inside. It is highly influenced by the dialectical relationship inherent in the us/them dynamic that constructs the perception of the Roma.
Deportations of the Roma from France

On July 16, 2010, 22-year old Luigi Duquenet was shot and killed by French police at a police roadblock. Various reports surfaced surrounding the circumstances of his death. According to the police, Duquenet was a suspect in a robbery and failed to stop at a police roadblock when asked. Other reports claim that the car in which he was riding had charged a police roadblock and then hit an officer. Duquenet’s family, on the other hand, claims that he was afraid of being stopped by the police because he did not have a valid driver’s license.

Despite the ambiguity surrounding the circumstances of Duquenet’s death, it became known as the first in a chain of events that led to the expulsion of thousands of Roma from France. In the days following Duquenet’s death, rioting took place in Saint-Aignan and Grenoble, resulting in clashes between travellers (gens du voyage) and the police. These violent events were highly publicized in the French media. On July 30, President Sarkozy gave a speech in Grenoble in response to the demonstrations. He stated that the rioting was indicative of “the problems caused by the behavior of some Travellers and Roma,” (Davies 2010). Sarkozy denounced the demonstrations in Saint-Aignan and Grenoble, while underlining that these events caused destruction and endangered police lives. He then took the matter farther, by calling attention to the 539 Roma camps in France. The president stated that he could not accept the “wild squatting and camping of the Roma” and he promised that half of them would be removed within three months, (Fichtner 2010).

By correlating the riots with the Roma, French officials called for the public to equate violent outbursts with the Roma. This correlation had real consequences for the Roma communities in France. Sarkozy’s claims of dismantling Roma camps gained credibility as
French police began dismantling numerous settlements. The inhabitants of these camps – primarily Bulgarian and Romanian Roma – were either evicted or expelled from the country. Estimates show that approximately 1,000 of these Roma were deported between July and September of 2010 (Severance 2010). France’s national strategy for Roma integration allocates funds for the development of alternative housing options and emphasizes evictions as a route to better housing (European Commission 2014, 1-15). However, the deportations of Roma contradict the French claims of prioritizing integration. The evictions were justified as being “voluntary” because of a financial incentive. Each returnee was given €300 from the French Office of Immigration and Integration, as well as an additional €100 per child (European Roma Rights Center 2012, 1-2; Martin 2013, 1-2).

French officials offered other justifications for their treatment of the Roma migrants. The correlation between the violent riots and Roma populations implied the culpability of the entire Roma population in violence, criminal activity and general disruptions in French society. According to a statement from President Sarkozy’s office, camps were identified as a source of “illegal trafficking, appalling living standards, exploitation of children through forced begging, prostitution, and crime,” (Severance 2010). Thus, Roma camps and Roma individuals were cast as security risks as well as centers of crime.

One early winter morning, police came to a Roma camp to dismantle the settlement. The fifteen Roma families who had been living in the woods of Champs-sur-Marne outside of Paris were awoken by the police before dawn. They were given half an hour to collect their belongings and leave the premises. The group that had come to evict them was made up of about 100 riot police who then proceeded to dismantle the encampment. Excavator machines were brought in to assist in the demolition. Once the camp had been razed to the ground, large holes were dug in the
ground to discourage others from settling in the area. Meanwhile, the evicted Roma moved on and began building another camp nearby. When asked how he felt about the eviction and demolition of his camp, one member of the Roma group replied: “Nothing. I’ve been through this many times.” (Astier 2014). There are many differences between the rioters at Saint-Aignan and Grenoble and the people whose evictions were justified by those riots. The demonstrators and rioters were travellers, while those targeted for evictions and deportations were Roma. The French police’s treatment of both groups was the same, regardless. Riot police were deployed to handle the evictions of peaceful families. Despite the many incongruities in the French state’s treatment of the issue, it was able to justify illegal measures that targeted the Roma due to a rhetoric of security.

**Security and the Roma: French Rhetoric Concerning Roma Migrants**

Following the demonstrations in Grenoble and Saint-Aignan, French officials began creating a discourse that securitized the Roma issue. I will be undertaking a discourse analysis of President Sarkozy’s speeches about the demonstrations and the Roma in order to show that these were instances of securitization. Specifically, I will examine Sarkozy’s speech in Grenoble, his declaration on security during a meeting with the Council of Ministers and his speech during the inauguration of a new prefect in Grenoble. In order to examine these examples of security discourse and evaluate them as instances of securitization, I will be relying on a theoretical framework informed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. According to the academics in the field of Security Studies, securitization takes place through two stages. The first stage involves the presentation of an issue as an existential threat. The second stage takes place when the public accepts that the situation necessitates emergency measures as the only viable solution.
These two stages of securitization took place in the summer of 2010 in France. I will also argue that this resulted in a reconstitution of identities due to the negotiation of membership – in terms of both French membership and European citizenship – through the exclusion of the Other.

In the weeks following the rioting in Grenoble and Saint-Aignan, President Sarkozy made a series of speeches concerning the events and France’s Roma population. These statements cumulatively shaped the ways in which the events were understood by the French public. In doing so, the speeches also securitized the Roma. In the days after the rioting, Sarkozy visited Grenoble in order to make a speech about order and security. In his speech, Sarkozy denounces the actions of the rioters, stating that they endangered police lives and threatened the safety of the public. He first focuses on the specifics concerning the incidents, but then turns to general comments about the causes of the violence and the shortcomings of France’s immigration policy (Barbulescu 2012, 282; Parker 2012, 477). The second speech took place on July 21, 2010 during a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Sarkozy presented a declaration on security, in which he expresses the need to address crime in France. Following the ministerial meeting, Sarkozy placed his focus on French Travellers and Roma immigrants from Eastern Europe, connecting them to the issue of crime. The third instance of securitization took place on July 30, 2010, when Sarkozy gave a speech in Grenoble at the inauguration of a new prefect. Each of these are examples of security discourse which contributed to the securitization of the Roma in France. The arguments presented in these speeches were centered around three major themes – the Roma’s excess mobility, criminality and public safety and the threat to French society.
Throughout his speeches, Sarkozy makes several points about the Roma’s excessive mobility, which frames them as outsiders and intruders. During his speech in Grenoble, Sarkozy introduces the issue of immigration. He states that the recent violence was related to “50 years of migration not being sufficiently controlled” and then calls for a fight against illegal immigration (Barbulescu 2012, 282). Migration was not an issue at the forefront of the events at Grenoble. By bringing the issue of immigration into the conversation, Sarkozy effectively begins to frame the group of people who is to be held responsible for the violence and societal issues related to it – namely, the Roma. By stating that there has been a lack of sufficient control over immigration, Sarkozy argues that something has entered France which should not have been allowed in. These intruders are the Roma, who allegedly bring crime and squalor with them. Sarkozy frames the Roma as unwelcome guests who do not belong in France. He portrays them as outsiders who pose a threat to France. This strategy reifies the boundaries between the French and the Roma by framing the Roma as Others through securitization.

Within the securitization discourse undertaken by French officials, there is a trend in which the Roma are presented as abusing the rights afforded them through EU citizenship. According to Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament, EU citizens can exercise their right to move freely between member states of the EU. For stays over three months, migrants must be able to prove that they have sufficient resources so that they will not be a burden to the social services of the member state in which they choose to reside (European Parliament 2017). However, according to the securitization discourse, the Roma commit an “abuse of the freedom of movement,” (Barbulescu 2012, 287). The migration of Roma persons is not inherently illegal, as Sarkozy’s speech implies. However, the Roma are presented as undermining the rights of true European citizens when they express their mobility. There is a certain ambiguity in the notion of
European identity. Parker notes that citizens are supposed to be “settled national citizens” but at the same time “mobile entrepreneurs,” (Parker 2012, 485). The mobility of workers, students and tourists is seen as a fundamental part of the project of a united Europe. The European Single Market depends on the dismantling of borders and impediments to movement. But the mobility of the Roma is presented as excessive. Moreover, they are threatening to the values of French society.

The Roma are viewed as a security problem because they are presented as a criminal group that poses a threat to public safety. In the Grenoble speech, Sarkozy declares a “war against drug dealers” as well as traffickers and delinquents (Barbulescu 2012, 282; Parker 2012, 477). There was no mention of drugs or trafficking in any of the accounts of Duquenet’s death or the demonstrations. Sarkozy’s allusion to these issues indicates that he is making larger claims about the kinds of people who are a threat to French society. He argues that drug dealers and traffickers are not welcome in France because they do not abide by French values. Since the Roma are heavily associated with crime according to public perception, they are included in this group of outsiders. During his security declaration, Sarkozy calls for a “relentless fight against crime” and “a true war against traffickers and criminals” (Barbulescu 2012, 282). The issue is expanded further than Grenoble and Saint Aignan, as Sarkozy makes an argument about a general societal issue, rather than a couple of local events. It also further emphasizes the correlation between the Roma and crime. At the inauguration speech, Sarkozy characterizes Roma camps as “savage” and as “outlaw zones that we cannot tolerate in France,” (Barbulescu 2012, 284). The Roma are collectively associated with crime and immoral behavior. This is in part due to preexisting prejudices against the Roma, but it is also reinforced by Sarkozy’s security rhetoric.
During the ministerial meeting, Sarkozy appointed two new prefects in the regions involved in the demonstrations. These newly appointed prefects were Eric le Douaron in Isere and Christian Lambert in Seine Saint-Denis. Both were former police officers. The appointment of police officers as prefects creates the perception of insecurity in those areas (Barbulescu 2012, 282-283). It also contributes to the perception of the problem as being an issue of policing. This effectively erases other potential explanations of the disruptions, such as the socio-economic status of immigrant groups – especially those as marginalized as the Roma – which can contribute to criminal activity and poverty. In a press release which took place after the ministerial meeting, Sarkozy placed his focus on French Travellers and Roma immigrants from Eastern Europe. He characterized the Roma as living in an “outlaw situation” (*situation non droit*) in illegal camps and of being “sources of illicit traffic, of profoundly undignified living conditions, of exploitation of children for begging, prostitution or crime” (Barbulescu 2012, 283). This list of grievances frames the Roma as a group that poses a serious threat to public order and security.

In Sarkozy’s security rhetoric, the Roma present an existential threat to French society. During the security declaration, it becomes evident that Sarkozy aims to approach the question of security as a national issue with far-reaching consequences for all members of French society. He declares that crime must be addressed on a national level during his speech at the ministerial meeting (Barbulescu 2012, 282). The events that occurred at the local level in Grenoble and Saint Aignan are transformed into a national issue with dire consequences. He also frames the Roma as a problem group which poses a threat to French society. During the inauguration speech, the Roma threat is also heavily emphasized. This existential threat is presented as the destruction of values that are inherent to French society. Sarkozy states that during the rioting in
Grenoble, “certain values were destroyed; we must propose measures adequate to the situation,” (Barbulescu 2012, 284). Because the Roma are associated with crime, they are considered outsiders since they allegedly do not adhere to the values of French society. The existential threat is evident in the rhetoric of security and Othering. French society and French values are at risk of fundamental change and destruction because of the presence of the Roma.

In order to deal with the existential threat, Sarkozy proposes exceptional measures which are justified through Othering. After he presents the Roma as a threat to France, Sarkozy introduces the exceptional measures that will act as a solution. According to Sarkozy, the measures are “adequate to the situation,” (Barbulescu 2012, 284). Therefore, the evictions and deportations of Roma immigrants are justifiable because of the serious nature of the issue. He advocates for the dismantling and evacuation of illegal camps which are presented as the locus of criminal activity. He also calls for the removal of foreign nationals who allegedly abuse their European citizenship and the EU legislations regarding freedom of movement (Barbulescu 2012, 283). In other words, Sarkozy argues for deporting Roma migrants despite their right as EU citizens to cross borders freely. This solution calls for a state of exception for the Roma since it disregards EU legislation. Sarkozy also implies that the Roma collectively abuse the rights of EU citizens, although the support for this claim is not mentioned. Evidently, the Roma are excluded from France, as well as the EU, since they are not afforded the rights of other EU citizens. The solution to the existential threat is presented as the removal of the Roma from France, which repositions the borders between the French and the Roma, as well as that between the European and the Other.

The securitization discourse presented by Sarkozy in his speeches was particularly effective because it used the rhetoric of the point of no return. The idea that the Roma threat was
an existential problem was emphasized through this rhetoric. During the inauguration speech at Grenoble, Sarkozy states that France is at a “critical moment beyond which there will be no ‘us’ anymore,” (Barbulescu 2012, 285). He also argues that the values of French society are “values that are on the verge of extinction,” (Barbulescu 2012, 285). This way of framing the issue gives it a sense of urgency while reestablishing the presence of a real threat. It also emphasizes an “Us-Them” divide, which is indicative of the Othering taking place through the securitization discourse. This sentiment is underlined by the statement that “France cannot gather all the trash in the world,” (Barbulescu 2012, 285). The aim of this sentence is to equate the Roma with garbage that does not belong in France. The exclusionary sentiment and the blatant prejudice against the Roma are clear in this statement. Sarkozy also argues that criminal activity is a direct attack on French values. He states that “Current crime doesn’t come from a precarious situation, as I often hear: it is the result of a profound contempt towards the fundamental values of our society,” (Barbulescu 2012, 285). In this statement, Sarkozy erases the possibility of considering the socio-economic causes of crime. Instead, he essentializes the Roma, stating that their values are not only different from those of French society, but that they are actively attacking French values. This invocation of a threat to societal values is the existential threat that allows for exceptional measures to take place.

Sarkozy’s speech is also particularly effective as an instance of securitization because it emphasizes the existential threat in such a way that it inhibits any form of contrary opinion or discussion. Sarkozy delegitimizes any opposing opinion by making the claim that all of French society is under threat. Moreover, he emphasizes the need to act as soon as possible, rather than debate the issue. He states that
“The war that I decided to start against traffickers, against hoodlums […] exceeds the context of this government, of a majority or of a party. And I am sure that in all political formations we can find men and women of good will that are determined to react and to bring their support in this action of the government of the Republic,” (Barbulescu 2012, 285).

In this context, criticism of the government’s policies only hinders the solution to the existential threat. Democratic debate is presented as an unnecessary and time-wasting endeavor. This rhetoric is meant to show that Roma camps and criminality are critical issues that the public should react to with a common position. The threat to French values is presented as being all-encompassing; it has nothing to do with political affiliations or socio-economic positions. Everyone who is a member of French society is under threat. Therefore, everyone should unquestioningly subscribe to Sarkozy’s plans to evict and deport the Roma in the interest of keeping French values alive.

**Results of Securitization**

The second stage of securitization, as outlined above, takes place when the public accepts that emergency measures are necessary in order to deal with the existential threat. As can be seen above, Sarkozy calls for the support of all French citizens in his approach to dealing with the “Roma issue.” Certain ministers, including Brice Hortefeux claimed that the government’s policies had the support of the public (Parker 2012, 478; Schofield 2010). However, others have noted that the “the zeal with which the government reported its process of camp clearances and deportations caused palpable unease for many within France,” (Parker 2012, 478). Jean-Pierre Grand, a member of Sarkozy’s UMP party, remarked on the similarities between targeting Roma
camps and the arrests of French Jews and Gypsies during World War II (BBC News, 2010). In spite of the possible lack of full public support, the French government was able to implement policies that directly targeted the Roma for eviction and expulsion.

A series of confidential administrative circulars dated the 24th of June and the 5th and 9th of August of 2010 were produced in order to implement the dismantling of illegal camps. The circulars were leaked and showed that the intentional targeting of Roma as an ethnic group was taking place (Parker 2012, 478). According to the administrative circular from the 5th of August regarding the evacuation of illicit camps, “it is the responsibility of prefects from each department to proceed, on the basis of the situations on the 21st and 23rd of July, in the direction of a systematic approach to dismantle illicit camps, giving priority to those of the Roma,” (Barbulescu 2012, 287-288). It is evident that French authorities explicitly targeted the Roma for evictions from camps.

Although expulsion on account of public policy, public security, or public health can occur under the EU directive concerning freedom of movement, such expulsions must take place on a case by case basis (European Parliament 2017). The collective targeting and expelling of Roma migrants violates these safeguards. The targeting of the Roma population was made possible due to the securitization discourse which framed them as foreigners threatening the French way of life. French officials argued that outsiders should be excluded from France and should not be allowed the rights of full EU citizens. Therefore, in this case, the securitization resulted in the Othering of the Roma by excluding them from French society and EU citizenship. This Othering was consequential for the Roma as it provided justifications for the dismantling of their camps, as well as the collective deportations of Roma migrants.
The reality of the evictions and expulsions is indicative of the efficacy of the security discourse in reframing the ways in which identities are understood in France and Europe as a whole. The securitization of the Roma reshaped the borders around those allowed to be part of French society and those who are excluded from it. In the process, it served to redefine the identities of both the French and the Roma. Throughout his discourse, Sarkozy made statements about a group of people allegedly threatening the essence of French society and the republican order. By doing so, he draws lines around the insiders and the outsiders of France. The Othering present in the security rhetoric is meant to justify the evictions and deportations that took place in the summer of 2010. However, the discourse has greater implications for the perception and meaning of identities in France. Because of the link that was drawn between them and the riots, the Roma are associated with crime and immoral behavior. They are equated with “the trash of the world,” (Barbulescu 2012, 285). They are essentialized as criminals while the socio-economic causes of their situation are ignored. This results in the perpetuation of prejudices against the Roma. The framing of the Roma as a social threat adds an aspect of security to the already negative perception of the Roma.

The French are also redefined through this discursive relationship. French society is characterized by its values, which are worthy of the greatest amount of protection. These values are opposed to the “illicit traffic, […] profoundly undignified living conditions, […] exploitation of children for begging, prostitution or crime” that are associated with the Roma even though these are socio-economic issues and not indicative of the group’s inherent character (Barbulescu 2012, 283). The republican order is also seen as highly valued and in need of protection, despite the calls for ending democratic debate on the subject. Through the securitization discourse, French identity is shaped by being contrasted against a group that is presented as essentially non-
French. Despite the contradictions inherent in this discourse, the securitization of the Roma reshapes understandings of French and Roma identities.

The securitization of the Roma also brings up questions about who is truly considered European and who can benefit from the rights of EU citizens. The argument that the Roma abuse the right to freedom of movement implies that they are not full citizens of the EU. Their membership to the EU is called into question since they are not portrayed as deserving the mobility that is afforded to other EU citizens. In other words, the mobility of the Roma is not valued in the same ways as that of other individuals. They act as a surplus immigrant population as they are not needed or wanted in their host states. It has been argued that freedom of movement is the foundation of EU citizenship (van Baar 2014, 6; Verstraete 2010). Therefore, the rejection of the Roma’s freedom of movement indicates that their EU citizenship is not valued to the same extent as that of other nationals. This in turn shows that the Roma are in practice considered non-European. By implying a distinction between the Roma and the rest of Europe, the securitization of the Roma contributes to a process of Othering and subsequently defining the insiders and the outsiders of Europe.
Chapter 5: Conclusions

This thesis has been concerned with studying the relationship between two ideas – that of European-ness and Roma identity. Through close analyses of the discourses that shape both these forms of identity, certain conclusions about them have been made. The first and perhaps most important to the overarching argument of this thesis is that identity is a construction which is impacted and shaped by various forms of discourse. Therefore, these identities are constantly created and re-created through their representations. This is strongly evidenced by an examination of Roma identity and the ways in which it is presented in various discourses. A discussion of the scholarly and political discourses that define the Roma has shown that the project of defining the Roma is full of discrepancies. Scholarly, national and supranational discourses fail to present a clear picture of the Roma and the rules regarding membership into this group. Instead, the Roma are often presented as a homogeneous group, despite numerous discrepancies in the various definitions of “Roma.” The representation of the Roma as homogenous is further challenged by accounts of Roma self-identification, which do not match up with outsider identification. I have also pointed out that the construction of European-ness heavily relies on the Self-Other dichotomy. Due to the need for an Other against which to frame itself, Europe is consistently involved in the exclusion of certain groups. The process of establishing who is or is not considered “European” is a continuous project that inevitably involves discourse. Because the Roma are a group that has been subjected to both inclusion to and exclusion from Europe, they are a constitutive Other that is useful for examining the Self-Other dichotomy and the framing of European-ness.

Using security as a theoretical framework has been an effective tool for connecting these ideas with one another and showing the ways in which they function in contemporary processes.
I examine the case of the securitization and subsequent deportations that occurred in France in 2010. The language of security was used in order to frame the Roma as outsiders who were exceptions to the freedom of movement allowed to all citizens of the EU. By making the case that the Roma were outsiders that posed a threat to French society, the French government took part in redefining the distinction between the French and the Roma. By claiming that the Roma are unlike other Europeans, they justified the deportations that restricted the Roma’s freedom of movement. Securitization is a contemporary form of Othering that establishes the Self-Other relationship between Europe and its constitutive Others. The process of securitizing a group creates an outsider against which the majority group frames its own identity. This reifies difference between the two groups and influences understandings of each identity.

Throughout this examination, it has become clear that Othering has consequences for the Roma that extend further than the construction of their identity in the context of Europe. Political elites frame the Roma as outsiders and non-Europeans in order to justify extreme measures of controlling them. In France and other EU member-states, officials are able to deport or otherwise restrict the mobility of the Roma. The Roma regularly face evictions and expulsions. They are also treated as second-class citizens across Europe. They are prone to poorer education and lower employment rates due to systemic anti-Roma discrimination. Despite most of the Roma’s citizenships to the EU and its member-states, the discourse that frames the Roma as outsiders has diminished the effectiveness of these citizenships. The Roma are often not offered the same protections, rights and privileges that are afforded to other European citizens. Discourse constitutes both Roma and European identities. But the process of forming these identities and the outcomes of this process result in very tangible and real consequences for the Roma, as they
are further entrenched in the role of outsiders. In other words, the reification of difference allows for the further mistreatment of Europe’s minorities.

_The Roma as Insiders and Outsiders_

The Roma are an effective example of the Self-Other relationship because they are both insiders and outsiders in Europe. The Roma are insiders because they have been members of European societies over a long period of time. Records show that the Roma were noted in European documents during the 12th century (Crowe 1994, xi). They have inhabited the geospatial area now known as Europe for hundreds of years. Over this span of time, the Roma have become part of the societies they inhabit despite claims that they fail to integrate. Historically, the Roma were an important labor force, at times providing skilled wage labor, at others being placed into systems of forced labor. Today, the Roma live among their fellow Europeans. Just as their fellow Europeans, the Roma move across borders in the hopes of finding work and security for themselves and their families.

Despite their long history in Europe and their membership within European societies, the Roma are also outsiders there. Historically, they have been relegated to the lowest social ranks and their movement and access to land have been restricted. At the worst, they were used as slave labor in the 16th through the 18th centuries (Crowe 1994). Recently, the “Roma problem” has been framed as a question of integration. However, the Roma are continuously marginalized and exoticized at the local, national and supranational levels. This shows that the Roma are constantly placed in the position of outsider despite their history in Europe and their lack of another homeland.
This dual position allows the Roma to fulfil the role of constitutive Other over time as they remain an excluded group while also becoming an intrinsic part of the societies that they help define. The role of both insider and outsider is a precarious one, but it is useful in the aim of reconstituting identities. The Roma are framed as outsiders in various political discourses. But they are kept close enough that it is easy to call them into the public’s imagination when the need arises. In this way, the Roma fulfill the role of necessary Other to Europe. Europe’s otherwise fragile coherence and sense of unity are made stronger through the exclusion of certain groups. People can conceptualize themselves as Europeans if they can visualize the kinds of people who are not European – or at least not fully European. The Othering that takes place through securitization makes this possible today.

The Treatment of Others

The goal of this thesis has been to show how Othering takes place in Europe in order to create and recreate the idea of European-ness. The Roma have been an effective case in exploring this argument for the reasons explored above. However, the Self-Other relationship that exists between the Roma and Europe can also be seen in the treatment of Europe’s other Others. As has already been noted, Europe has historically been defined in relation to an outsider; “Europe” has meaning because it is not Africa or Asia. It has also been defined in relation to specific groups of people who were understood to be non-European. The Roma are not the only Others to Europe. Today’s Others include immigrants, refugees and religious groups. All of these groups are regularly excluded in various ways. One interesting similarity, however, is that they are all prone to securitization – just as in the case of the Roma. Evidently, the use of securitization rhetoric is a popular form of contemporary Othering.
The work of this thesis is useful in examining the reasons for the treatment of certain groups. The marginalized, minoritized, exoticized and generally excluded are all part of the Self-Other relationship. Those who frame these groups as outsiders provide many justifications for their actions. They claim that the given group does not belong in their society, that they are too foreign, that they are somehow less human than the general population. But it should be noted that all of these claims are relational. They create and define the relationship between the given group and the majority. In the case of the Roma and the various Others found in Europe, their exclusion helps shape the notion of European-ness. Therefore, it is necessary to look past the claims of security and outside threats in order to understand the reasons for framing certain groups as outsiders, as this is closely connected to identity politics.

This discussion of the Self-Other dichotomy between the Roma and Europe helps clarify the reasons for the ill treatment of various minorities in Europe. Migration and security issues are often presented as problems of vital importance; they are existential issues as they threaten the safety and inherent values of a society. These issues claim all of the public’s attention and they necessitate drastic measures. However, an examination of the discourse of these claims shows that what is really at stake is the identity of the threatened society and that this rhetoric can often be used to obscure other issues. Recreating European-ness in this way can result in disastrous consequences for the outsider groups. The work done in this thesis allows for a more detailed understanding of the ways in which identities are constituted in Europe. By doing so, it also allows for a reconceptualization of the treatment of minorities in Europe and can therefore serve to change the conversation about the treatment of Others.
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