Scottish and Ukrainian nationalism: a comparative study

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SCOTTISH AND UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY

A Thesis
Presented in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

June 2013

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, I study the similarities and differences between the development of Scottish and Ukrainian nationalisms in the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries, analyzing the role of the ideology in successful proclamation and maintaining of the Ukrainian independence, as well as determining the perspectives and vitality of the idea of Scottish independence. I concentrate on three major components of their sovereignty – political, economic, and cultural. My main hypothesis is that Ukrainian political nationalism has been stronger and more successful than Scottish due to the political independence of Ukraine. At the same time, despite lacking political sovereignty, I argue that Scotland is better off from an economic perspective as well as more culturally independent from Westminster than Ukraine from Moscow, even though Ukraine is politically independent. Additionally, I investigate the effectiveness of the leading nationalist political parties in both nations as the main agents of the nationalist ideology, juxtaposing Scottish National Party, founded in 1934, and a string of developments in the Ukrainian nationalist spectrum with a focus on Rukh – the major pro-independence force founded in 1989 and Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union founded in 1991 (“Rukh” is translated as “Movement” and was a disambiguation of its official name – the National Movement for Perebudova or Reconstruction, while “Svoboda” is Ukrainian for “freedom” and is sometimes referred to as the Freedom party).

1 Here and after, Westminster stands for the UK central government located in London’s Westminster – both Houses of Parliament and the Cabinet as opposed to the regional powers of Scotland, and since 1999 to Holyrood – the place of the restored Scottish Parliament.
My focus is on the development of the nationalist agenda in both countries, and the role of politics and culture in its pursuit. I will contrast Ukrainian nationalism with the similar movements and processes on the Scottish political arena, and economic and cultural spheres differentiating its two main types – ethnic and civic nationalist approaches, their correlation and presence in each of the case studies. Also, I will pay attention to the historic developments, as well as current distinct positioning of the Scottish National Party on the left of the political spectrum, contrasting this tendency of mostly conservative right-wing nationalist movements and parties in Ukraine which developed in opposition to over seventy years of Soviet communism.

This topic is timely as European nationalist movements are gaining more political power in many countries across the continent, albeit with different degrees of intensity. This is happening due to, amongst other issues, debates about immigration and severe economy austerity. Recent parliamentary elections include those in Finland (2011; True Finns increased their representation by 34 Members of Parliament), Sweden (2010; Sweden Democrats managed to enter the Parliament for the first time with 20 members), Austria (2008; center-right ÖVP – 51 seats with far-right FPÖ and BZÖ getting another 55 seats between them), Hungary (2010; ruling Fidesz – overall majority and far-right Jobbik – debuted in the Parliament with 47 members), France (2012; Front National increased its vote percentage, which granted them two seats), Netherlands (2010; right-wing PVV gained 24 seats in addition to center-right VVD’s 31 members), Belgium (2010; two nationalist parties – NVA and VB obtained 39 seats of the federal lower house in addition to the center-right CD&V’s 17 seats), whereas the most recent June 2012 ‘anti-austerity’ general election in Greece returned not only a stronger ruling center-
right *New Democracy* party, but also two smaller nationalist factions – the Independent Greeks (20) and Golden Dawn (18). In addition to the above-mentioned victories, Shekhovtsov (2011, 204) also emphasized that:

in 2006, the far right Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families), which polled 7.97% in the 2005 elections, joined the government of Jarosław Kaczyński as a minor coalition partner… in Slovakia the Slovenská naša strana (Slovak National Party) failed to bring its representatives to the parliament of Slovakia only once during the period 1990–2006. In the 2006 parliamentary elections, the party won 11.6% of the votes and became a minor coalition partner of Prime Minister Robert Fico. In Romania the Partidul România Mare (Greater Romania Party) has never had deputies in the Romanian government, but the party’s participation in the 2000 and 2004 parliamentary elections was successful to a considerable degree, as it won 19.48 and 12.99% of the votes respectively.”

As far as Ukraine is concerned, on the regional level, in 2009 “the Freedom Party obtained 34.69% of the votes and 50 seats out of 120 in the Ternopil regional council, while its nearest competitor, the *Yedynyi Tsentr* (United Centre), gained only 14.20%.” (Shekhovtsov 2011, 206)

Later, nationalists outperformed their opponents in the whole of Ukraine’s Halychyna and since the 2011 local election *Svoboda* controls three oblast councils and has increased its support in most opinion polls during the 2012 parliamentary election campaigning throughout Ukraine. Of special interest to this thesis is the success of the Scottish National Party in all the election campaigns: the 2009 European Parliament, 2011 Scottish Parliament, and 2012 local Scottish elections. In all those European democracies, nationalist political parties gained their additional political weight by either greatly increasing the number of parliamentarians, or by getting into legislatures for the first time. There are many differences between the political processes in a given country, which derive from both internal disagreements (like the secessionist ideas in Belgium, or

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2 Sometimes written in the English sources as Galicia (identically to the westernmost historic province in Spain). In this thesis the Ukrainian version will be used for consistency and to avoid any confusion. The region incorporates three westernmost Ukrainian provinces: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil – the center of all major pro-independence movements in the Ukrainian history.

3 Oblast – is a Ukrainian administrative unit; province or region. Currently, there are 24 oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
proposed 2014 independence referendum in Scotland), or an uncompromising position
towards the cultural and economic influences of former or current metropoles, as in the
case of Ukraine. Further, unlike elsewhere, in both Ukraine and Scotland, the issue of
immigration is not central to the political agenda of Svoboda or the SNP.

Among the issues that I will focus on, is language. This will focus on the
dichotomy of the native tongue and the language of the metropole, showing the role of
the preservation of Ukrainian as a national language for the whole nationalist agenda and
state-building process, as opposed to either Scottish Gaelic, or Scots language, which
failed to play a similar role in Scottish nationalism.

Similarly, religion is another important factor in the national unification of a
people. In both countries the church is unique: in Scotland, the Presbyterian Kirk (Church
of Scotland) is no longer in danger of being Anglicized; in Ukraine the Orthodox Church
is still in danger of being further Russified and amalgamated. There are some historic
similarities between the division into the followers of the Kirk and Catholics in Scotland
and Ukraine’s Eastern Catholics and the Orthodox. Additionally, there is another variable
– that of a regional divide in both Scotland and Ukraine – Scottish Highlands and
Lowlands versus Ukraine’s East and West – visible in a variety of areas from electoral
performance, devotion to the national culture and traditions to a somewhat different
attitude towards the nationalist agenda and the historic metropole.

Lastly, I will examine the role of the politically mobilized diaspora, which in both
cases remains an important player on the nationalist arena. Finally, separate attention
must be paid to the economic dependence or independence. Here the main controversy
will lie in the comparison of the oil-rich Scotland that being part of the UK cannot fully
benefit from it on one hand, and Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas in the officially independent economy on the other.

1.1. Outline of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into six chapters: the introduction and a literature review on nationalism and theories pertinent to my comparative study. The third and fourth chapters will focus on the separate developments of nationalist movements in Scotland and Ukraine within the political processes in both countries, and will include sections on the political situation and electoral performance, economic influences, and culture, including the role of the language preservation and religious independence, diasporas, and regional divisions, as well as the role of a living memory of the Ukrainian genocide – the Holodomor ("mass killing by hunger") of 1932-33. The similarities and differences in both national movements will be scrutinized in chapter five, with the sixth chapter being overall conclusions.
CHAPTER TWO. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 th of Theories

Nationalism is one of the most debated topics in the social sciences. For the purpose of this thesis, my particular interest in nationalism lies in its relation to the current political situation in Scotland and Ukraine. Therefore, my assessment of the literature helps determine the similarities and differences in the nationalist movements of the two countries. Consequently, I discuss theories of nationalism that pertain to my thesis subject, and may be used as tools for further understanding of the role of political, economic and cultural factors.

There is an undoubted connection between nationalism and the nation-state itself, as “nations and nationalist groups enhance political statements by adding imagery and history, creating a national image people can relate to.” (Hague 1994, 140) Edwin Muir (1935, 128-129) commented on the element of negativity that the term ‘nationalism’ sometimes implies, saying that “to some people the very name of Nationalism is hateful; it is overweening and dangerous in a great nation, and niggling in a small one; trying either to set up a world empire, or to establish a provincial caucus.” In his turn, Scottish nationalist and historian Paul Scott (1992, 57) dismisses negative meaning towards nationalism in general, fairly stating that “to blame nationalism for its excesses is like condemning all religion for the Inquisition or sectarian killing in Belfast,” later hinting specifically at the Scottish nationalism, associating it with liberation – “it would be less confusing if we could all agree to call the oppressors the imperialists and the liberators nationalists.”
Widely discussed in academia is the role of nationalism in the contemporary world, ranging from suggesting its decline related to the supposed downfall of the nation-state, to the opposite insistence on increasing nationalism, as suggested by recent election results all over Europe. Nairn (1981, 94) assures that “nationalism did not come to a stop in Europe in 1922 after the Versailles agreements [but] is still extremely alive,” and, according to Anderson (1996, 3), who wrote in the 1980s that “the ‘end of the era of nationalism’, so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight.” Hobsbawm (1992, 169) contradicting Anderson, argues that “nationalism, however inescapable, is simply no longer the historical force it was in the era between the French Revolution and the end of imperialist colonialism after World War II.” Indubitably, due to certain extreme forms of the ideology, as noticed by John Hall, “nationalism is neglected by academics, possibly because it is associated with many wars and much conflict in the twentieth century.” (quoted in McCrone 1992, 203)

There are also different approaches towards studying nationalism in general. Interestingly enough, Ernest Gellner, who according to John Breuilly (2006, xxi), author of the introduction to the revised edition of Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism (1983) – “was at odds with existing approaches to nationalism.” Gellner (1997, 102) himself suggested that “[it] is not just a phenomenon, it is also a problem...[as] one must be perturbed by the havoc, suffering, cruelty and injustice often brought by nationalism.”

Anthony Smith (1992, 1) in his Ethnicity and Nationalism emphasizes that “in the study of nationalism, [there] is the growing convergence of two fields, which had been formerly treated as separate: the study of ethnicity and ethnic community, and the analysis of national identity and nationalism.” Meanwhile, Peter Alter (1989, 4-5) writes
that “the plethora of phenomena which may be subsumed under the term nationalism suggests that it is one of the most ambiguous concepts,” later concluding that “it is more appropriate to speak of nationalisms in the plural form than of nationalism in the singular.”

Important to the understanding of nationalism is also a duality of primordial and constructivist (sometimes called instrumentalist, as in Thomas Eriksen’s (2002) Ethnicity and Nationalism) perspectives towards this ideology. Also, Eriksen (2002, 53) suggests that Abner Cohen was branding the primordialist position as one that “defines ethnic identity as an imperative status, as a more or less immutable aspect of the social person.” Constructivist ideas are central to Hobsbawm and Ranger’s Invention of Tradition, being the basis of Anderson’s Imagined Communities – both originally published in 1983. In the same decade, Ernest Gellner also stated that “nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures; that is reality.” (summarized by Spencer and Wollman 2002, 34) Craig Calhoun (1997, 30) calls this theoretical duality “one of the biggest tensions in the literature on nationalism.” He analyzes the peculiarities of each perspective, stating that instrumentalists “emphasize the historical and sociological processes by which nations are created”, while “only nationalist ideologues tend to assert primordialist positions so strong that they imply that the nations have existed in anything close to their modern form since the beginnings of history.” (Calhoun 1997, 30-1)

The trend of rather skeptical constructivism in analysis of nationalism was set by Marx and Engels, who pursued a goal of “forceful internationalism” and claimed that “nationality was an irrelevance or an illusion…[as] the working men have no country,”
but in the same time, Marks and Engels argued for differentiating between “the nationalism of oppressor and that of the oppressed.” (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 9-11) In retrospect, Calhoun argues that Marx and Engels underestimate nationalism, suggesting that they “were wrong to think that workers of the world…would agree to place [class] membership…ahead of membership of their individual nations, religions, and other cultural or ethnic groupings.” (1997, 23) A Marxist and well-known writer on nationalism, Tom Nairn, has noticed that “the theory of nationalism represents Marxism’s great historical failure.” (quoted in Anderson, 1996, 3). Benedict Anderson (ibid) proceeded further in that debate, stating that “it would be more exact to say that nationalism has proved an uncomfortable anomaly for Marxist theory and, precisely for that reason, has been largely elided, rather than confronted.”

Nation-State. Ethnic vs. Civic Nationalism

The concept of nation-state is one of the main constituents of the discourse on nationalism. Similar to the analysis of the ideology as a whole, this concept is challenged by the theories of the declining role of the Westphalian state, which is popularly illustrated by trends such as greater pan-European integration, and implementations of contemporary confederal developments. Analyzed by Douglas Holmes (2000, 38) who claims, in the context of European federalism, that “the first principle of the EU is the rejection of the nation-state as the preeminent institutional vehicle,” this belief is echoed by Guibernau ([and Berdun] 1996, 102) who agrees that “nation-states have lost aspects of their sovereignty and are forced to face patterns of increasing global interconnections.” Walker Connor (1994, 96) by contrast is primarily concerned that term “nation-state has come to be applied indiscriminately to all states,” adding also that as a result of “a survey
of the 132 entities generally considered to be states as of 1971…only twelve states can justifiably be described as nation-states.” Analyzing primarily ethnic nationalism, Connor suggests that in the 1970s most of the world states were made up on largely civic basis rather than ethnic or ‘national’, which essentially brings up a contradiction, in his understanding, as they are not ethnically pure ‘nation-states’.

Many modern authors concerned with nationalist discourse often elaborate a typological binary of nationalism, juxtaposing ethnic and civic nationalisms. The former is based on the titular ethnicity as the main agent, while the latter is carried by the civic society of a specific nation of multiple ethnicities. Many authors prefer to concentrate on ethnic nationalism, which is vividly seen from the names of their books. For instance, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, as a name, unites the works of Thomas Eriksen and Anthony Smith, while Walker Connor named his monograph *Ethnonationalism*. Ethnic nationalism could be defined as “based on a belief in common descent and identity.” (Smith 1992, 66)

At the same time, the Canadian politician and theorist Michael Ignatieff, calling himself a “civic nationalist” insists that “civic nationalism is a political creed, which defines common citizenship and which emerged from the universalist philosophies of the Enlightenment…the nationalism of established European democracies at their best.” (quoted in Billig 1995, 47)

**Culture**

John Armstrong (1982, 241 & 282) contends “that language was more often the product than the cause of polity formation; but cause and effect were rarely unidirectional”, while also discussing the importance of linguistic codes, especially in
bilingual societies, and “European linguistic barriers.” E. J. Hobsbawm discusses language and religion as indicative components of *Proto-Nationalism* (a reference to ethnically-based nationalism), stating that “nationalism of a later period may have genuinely popular linguistic proto-national roots.” (Hobsbawm 1992, 53) Discussing Herder’s cultural nationalism, Edwards acknowledged that “language has been perceived by many to be the very embodiment of the national character and its genius, the main marker of national identity,” while linguist Joshua Fishman labeled it “a link with the glorious past and with authentic nature of a people.” (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 76)

Ernest Gellner (2006, 42-3 & 152) conceptualizes language as “at least provisionally acceptable criterion of culture…at least a sufficient, if not a necessary touchstone of it”, providing numerical approximations for potential nationalisms based on the number of national languages worldwide, also paying attention to the cases where “potential nationalisms [are generated] by analogies invoking factors other than language,” as an example with Scotland and Ireland.

Like language, religion is a crucial component of many nationalist worldviews. John Armstrong’s *Nations Before Nationalism* (1982, 203) explores the role of religion and its influence on ethnicity, and, consequently, nationalist ideology, arguing that “the penetrative power of religious organizations has important implications for formation of ethnic identity.” Hobsbawm (1992, 68) believes that religion “is a paradoxical cement for proto-nationalism, and indeed for modern nationalism, which has usually (at least in its more crusading phases) treated it with considerable reserve as a force which could challenge the nation’s monopoly claim to its members’ loyalty.” Lisa Wedeen (2008) in her narrative on Yemeni nationalism emphasizes that it is of great importance for the
political scientists to decouple nationalism and secularism, while discussing the role of religion in nationalist mobilization.

For Ukraine and Scotland, the issue of language is debated differently in the context of nationalism. While in Ukraine, the Ukrainian language became one of the unifying factors for the nationalist movement throughout its modern history, in Scotland, though, the failure of both Gaelic and Scots to gain nationwide popularity are often mentioned among the nationalist mobilization. Some see this primarily as negligence in the education system (at least, as evident in the 1960s – at the time of publication), as “in Scotland itself, in our schools and universities, little or no place is accorded to Scottish literature or to our two native tongues, Scots and Gaelic.” (MacDiarmid 1968, 3) But in the same time there are many activists that participate in the nationwide movements which address the language issue, as described by H.J. Hanham (1969, 15) about a Scottish equivalent of the Irish Gaelic movement with a slogan ‘No language, no nation!’ Nevertheless, the number of Gaelic-speakers kept declining “since the first Census was taken in 1891”, and, as Macdonald suggests (1997, 221), “there is, of course an irony…that Gaelic has seen such decline in its heartlands for it is in the same period [of] introduction of policies and institutions designed to promote Gaelic.”

In *Imagined Communities* (1996, 150 & 67-8), Anderson puts language at the center of his monograph. He states that “‘national print-languages’ were of central ideological and political importance”, discussing “European conception of nation-ness as linked to a private-property language,” as well as indicating the role of Russia in the language domain as “colonial empire, with its rapidly expanding bureaucratic apparatus and its ‘Russifying’ policies.” Yuri Slezkine was also quoted as discussing “the central
role played by the manipulation of language in the Soviet nationalities policies of the 1920s.” (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 78) Walker Connor, referring to pre-independent Ukraine, focused mostly on the importance of the issue for the nation itself, underlining that “Ukrainians, as a method of asserting their non-Russian identity, wage their campaign for national survival largely in terms of their right to employ the Ukrainian… tongue in all oral and written matters… maintaining that their continued existence as a separate nation is at stake.” (Connor 1994, 43-4; 153)

Many academic sources refer to the importance of national poets and writers to the overall development of the nationalist movement. Trumpener (1997, 73) points to the fact that “neoclassically trained poets such as Robert Fergusson and Robert Burns self-consciously turned back to the Scottish vernacular [while] many [of Scotland’s] Enlightenment intellectuals…labored to anglicize their own pronunciation and to develop a stately prose style in a language not fully their own.” Anderson (1996, 74) links the creation “of the first Ukrainian nationalist organization” with “[Shevchenko’s use of the Ukrainian literary language in the mid-19th century, as] the decisive stage in the formation of the Ukrainian national consciousness.”

Calhoun (1997, 52) focuses on the attempt of revival of Gaelic in the 21st century as linked to nationalism, suggesting that “the international wave of nationalism which also brought the revitalization (if not outright reinvention) of Catalan, Gaelic, and other relatively small languages linked to separatist political ambitions elsewhere in Europe.” While discussing the importance of the language in Celtic nationalism, Scottish nationalist and poet Hugh MacDiarmid (1968, 301) acknowledges the interconnection of both: “[Celtic Nationalism] is precisely a phenomenon …in Wales, Scotland, Ireland,
Britanny and – confined for practical purposes to the language question – in Cornwall and the Isle of Man.”

Some historic similarity could be seen between religions in Scotland and Ukraine, not only in terms of their opposition to the historic Anglicizing and Russifying policies and provoking nationalist aspirations, but also in their historic binary division – Presbyterian (the Kirk) and Catholic in the former, and Orthodox and Greek Catholic in the latter.

MacDiarmid recalls the historic event that shows the political role of the Kirk, when in May 1966 it officially pleaded for “an elected national authority in Scotland.” (Hobsbawm 1992, 312) Andrew Wilson (1997, 86) discusses the important role of the Ukrainian church, calling its suppression “depriving…of a crucial cultural marker with which to distinguish themselves from other East Slavs.” In presenting religious distinction of Ukrainians and the neighbors as part of his topic of proto-nationalism, Hobsbawm (1992, 68) also refers to it as another ethnic badge, “as Russians, Ukrainians and Poles could differentiate themselves as Orthodox, Uniate and Roman Catholic believers.”

**Diaspora**

In the times of closer global integration, the issues of international migration and diaspora are of growing importance to nationalist debates. Scholars have tried to determine if ethnic groups in specific host countries can be classified as diasporas, or if they are rather sojourners and only temporarily visit the more developed states out of economic reasons with a clear pattern of returning home on seasonal basis. Milton Esman (2009, 4-5) suggests that only a third of those sojourners eventually return back home,
while the rest of them remain in the host countries, “hoping to retain their inherited culture and to reproduce…the familiar environment of their former homeland”. Other questions can be asked about different groups or waves within one diasporic community based on the time frame and specific circumstances of their arrival.

As far as the term is concerned, according to Safran (quoted in Satzewich 2002, 14) “by the 1990s, any group that had a history of migration and community formation was termed a diaspora.” The most widely cited framework for diaspora studies was presented by Robin Cohen (1997, 177-180) in Global Diasporas: An Introduction, where he clarifies theoretical guidelines of whether to consider a specific ethnic group as such. Both Scottish and Ukrainian émigré groups are widely accepted as ‘diasporas’, as seen in Satzewich (2002) and Sim (2011) among other authors, discussing also their political affiliations and nationalism as a dynamo for the long-awaited Ukrainian independence and still expected Scottish political sovereignty.

Especially relevant in this regard is Anderson’s “concept of 'long-distance nationalism' refers to the nation-state of departure (Anderson 1992, 6), Turkey, which acts on its exiled population by way of language, religion and dual nationality,” where “this nation-state tries to reinforce as much as possible the loyalty of its nationals residing outside its frontiers.” (quoted in Bauböck 2010, 44)

Globalization

The issue of globalization and its place in the nationalist agenda is also important as nationalism is often understood as a counter-globalization force. For example, Peter Evans (2008, 271) draws on ‘Polanyi’s concept of the ‘double-movement’…to challenge
the hegemony of neo-liberal globalization”. Saul Newman (2000, 25) quotes Michael Keating who sees in the late-20th century situation some political challenge for nationalists, claiming that “globalization is providing the opportunities for nationalists to transform state authority.” Another problem sometimes raised in relation to globalization is whether it could possibly endanger the existence of nationalism in general, which was answered by Spencer and Wollman (2005, 238): “By itself, globalization does not seem to guarantee any particular outcome to nationalism or its antitheses…as the local and the global seem to interact in ways than can produce quite contradictory circumstances.”

Some may argue that one of the reasons why nationalism opposes globalization is a degree of cultural threat that the latter can raise against a national culture of a given nation. One of the most popular and widely quoted assertions is Benjamin Barber’s (Holton 2000, 146) passage on “global cultural polarization in terms of conflict between McWorld and jihad,” where “these powerful metaphors stand for global consumer capitalism, on the one side, and the fundamentalist struggle for justice for the downtrodden, on the other.” Even though global culture is primarily influenced by Western and American way of life, “cultural threats in many countries are often perceived in terms other than Americanization…as Japanization may be for Koreans, Indianization for Sri Lankans, Vietnamization for Cambodians,…so cultural power is, in other words, multicentered rather than organized within a unitary core-periphery relations system centered on the United States.” (Holton 2000, 144) Contrariwise to the popular belief is Riggs’ (2002, 41) claim that “ethnic nationalism is a more recent phenomenon” and that “globalization has accelerated the emergence of these ethnic nations.” A similar assertion is raised by Catarina Kinnvall (2004, 763) who claims that “the prominence of
religion and nationalism, in novel interpretations, thus may engender the growth of new local identities in response to the destabilizing effects of globalization.”

2.2 The Case Study

Theories of nationalism can help position a case study: from this review the most compelling is the opposition of ethnic and civic nationalism. This is one of the fundamental differences between the Ukrainian and Scottish nationalist movements. The former is clearly ethnic and on the political right; the latter – is of a leftist civic nature.

The role of culture is important for both Scottish and Ukrainian nationalisms, but with differing degrees of intensity and in different historic time periods. Language and religion are more acute in nationalist terms for the Ukraine’s Svoboda, as they are considered as primary ethnic markers of the Ukrainian statehood. On the contrary, language does not take such an important place on the SNP’s agenda, and the Kirk was granted autonomy by the 1707 Treaty of the Union. What is common for both nationalisms in cultural terms, is the role of the national writers and poets who express patriotic and nationalist ideas sometimes more efficiently than the political parties. The subsection on diaspora will contrast émigré groups and the final section will explore the discourse on globalization and the economic peculiarities of dependence of the politically independent Ukraine on Russian energy supplies and the economic benefits and disadvantages of Scotland in the United Kingdom.

4 The historic treaty passed by both English and Scottish Parliaments, ratifying the union between the two independent nations, successfully passed in 1707.
Why Compare?

One of the purposes of this thesis is to demonstrate the multiple commonalities and differences in these two nationalist movements, a topic that is not widely addressed in academia. One example of an academic work comparing the two countries is Velychenko’s (1997) article *Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism in Great Britain and Imperial Russia, 1707 to 1914: Institutions, Law, and Nationality in Scotland and Ukraine*, which primarily covered the period before the First World War. Velychenko (1997) targeted a few important areas of intersection between the two nationalisms:

a. “In Scotland and Cossack-Ukraine, dissatisfaction over incorporation lingered for decades afterwards” (ibid, 414) – which supposedly encouraged various forms of the pro-independence nationalist movements in both polities;
b. “Until 1914, unlike the Poles or Irish, the Ukrainians and Scots staged no nationally inspired armed uprisings or terrorism” (ibid);
c. “The majority of the elite were loyalist in both countries, and there was no Scottish nor Ukrainian state in the nineteenth century” (ibid).

He also pinpointed such differences as:

a. “Although loyalists condemned it in the mid-eighteenth century as the language of treason, Gaelic was never formally proscribed” (Velychenko 1997, 417)
b. “Scotland …was annexed by a negotiated compromise in the Treaty of Union (1707).”
c. “[Scottish autonomous] institutions generated judges, lawyers, clerks, teachers, and ministers who effectively erected an invisible border with England and ensured that Scots remained Scots behind it.” (ibid)

d. “Scotland may have become a “north Britain” – its official title in the Act of Union – but it never became a “Little England” or a shire” (ibid).

What Is Needed?

Velychenko’s article serves as a good source of historic reference, and the only academic piece covering the same case study, but it only explores developments before WWI. This thesis concentrates on the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries. Many lines of comparison are still valid although, as I show, there are other similarities and differences between the two nationalisms and countries. This thesis will mostly focus therefore on the post-WWI evolution of Scottish and Ukrainian nationalism, taking into consideration the change of status of both polities – Ukraine’s brief independence of the 1918-21, colonial status of the Soviet period and the independence since 1991, as well as Scottish devolution process that ended up with the restoration of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 with, devolved powers. As a result, I will analyze the role and agenda of the Ukrainian nationalists (Rukh of the 1990s and Svoboda), comparing their agenda and manifestos with their Scottish counterparts from the SNP.
CHAPTER THREE: SCOTTISH NATIONALISM

3.1. Historic Background

Since the 1707 Treaty of Union, the whole concept of the United Kingdom was relatively uncontested until the 1979 referendum on devolution, with an exception of the self-government movement of the late 1880s. Never before the late 1970s was the Scottish nation so close to the autonomous government, but due to the technicalities (and specifically the low turnout and the required disproportionately high percentage of vote) the results were not satisfactory for the protagonist camp, and it took another two decades until the successful 1997 referendum for the devolution to be implemented. As a result, in 1999 Scotland reestablished its own Parliament and devolved Government, which since 2007 is led by the pro-independence Scottish National Party. The SNP leader and Scotland’s First Minister, Alex Salmond has declared that the Scots will have a chance to restore their historic independence in yet another Scottish referendum in the fall of 2014.

The authors of the *Claim of Right for Scotland* – members of the 1988 Constitutional Steering Committee (1988, 1), one of the many advocates of Scottish Home Rule, emphasized the concept of a Scottish nation, stating that “much ink [is] wasted on the question whether the Scots are a nation. Of course they are. They were both a nation and a state until 1707.” According to novelist Alasdair Gray (1992, 17), “the [1314] Bannockburn victory\(^5\) made Scotland the first European nation state – the first to have territorial unity under one king.” Paul Scott (1992, 15) takes this idea even further, suggesting that “possibly the idea [of self-determination] first appeared in

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\(^5\) The 1314 Battle of Bannockburn secured Scotland’s independence from England.
Scotland, since the 1320 Declaration of Arbroath⁶ may be the earliest, as well as one of the most eloquent, statements of it.” Later, as it is known from history, Scotland’s political independence was lost to a Union with England in 1707, even though “during the long debate on this Treaty of Union an English government spy judged that the Scottish people were fifty-to-one against. Churchmen denounced it; burghs petitioned against it; Glasgow, Dumfries and Edinburgh mobs rioted against it.” (Gray 1992, 36)

Popular disagreements were seen in the first decades of United Kingdom’s existence, with later eventual disappearance and a new resurgence in a form of a string of Home Rule movements in the late 19th century and unsuccessful Scotland bills of the early 20th century. In Gordon Donaldson’s (1969, 4) view, the history of Scottish attitudes to the Union of 1707 falls into three clearly-defined phases:

There was, first of all, a period of some forty or fifty years during which there was considerable discontent with the Union. Then came, secondly, a period of roughly a century, 1750-1850, during which the Union was all but invariably accepted as part of the established and unalterable order of things. Thirdly, there has been a period of now a little more than a hundred years during which the Union has been the object of intermittent or recurrent criticism: ever since 1853 there has been a series of waves of unrest in which the Union has been…attacked and challenged.

Additionally, many of the Treaty of Union’s “major provisions have been violated, and its spirit has never affected the huge areas of government which have evolved since,” (Constitutional Steering Committee 1988, 2) despite Nairn’s (1981, 129) consideration of Scotland “a nationality which resigned statehood but preserved an extraordinary amount of the institutional and psychological baggage normally associated with independence – a decapitated national state, as it were, rather than an ordinary ‘assimilated’ nationality.” In opposition to these developments, according to Scott’s (1992, 50) calculations, “since 1889 no fewer than 34 Scottish Home Rule Bills have

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⁶ Declaration of Independence – an important Scottish document, known as the in the form of a letter to the Roman Pope.
been presented to the House of Commons,” but “all have been lapsed in spite of the support, in nearly every case, of a majority of the Scottish MPs.” The issue of Scottish political sovereignty “after 1928 [was] … never again raised in parliament for almost forty years.” (Donaldson and others 1969, 10) The proposed laws ranged from the Scotland Bills offering an assembly with limited powers to the idea of Scottish National Convention in 1926 “designed to go further than its predecessors, for it was now proposed to abandon representation at Westminster and give Scotland virtually Dominion status” (Donaldson and others 1969, 11) – a concept of independence similar in style to Canada or Australia, which eventually became known as a Commonwealth realm – full statehood with the preservation of the British monarch as a formal head of state. Consequently, “the Scottish National Party started life in 1934 with a well-established base and a Home Rule policy,” unlike its predecessor – the National Party – which “emphasized the independence,” as its primary political target. (Hanham 1969, 163) The role of the Scottish National Party has been central to the Scottish nationalist movement. The SNP, as a party, came a long way from almost a marginal organization of the 1930s and 40s to winning a landslide election to the Scottish parliament in 2011, and dominating both local and European polls.

Scottish nationalism is one of the most widely debated illustrations of the ideology in Europe, often compared to similar political movements in Canada’s Quebec, Spain’s Catalonia and the Basque Country, France’s Brittany, or its UK’s co-partner in devolution developments – Wales. Gwynfor Evans, alongside other participants in this academic debate emphasizes independence as the primary target of Scottish nationalism, insisting that “Brittany, Scotland and Wales are three of the oldest nations in the world
[and] each of the three countries should have a place in the United Nations.” (quoted in MacDiarmid 1968, 342) Hechter (1999, 5 & 22) dedicates a large portion of his monograph to the relation between the “core”, which is London, and the “periphery”, which are primarily Scotland and Wales, later coming up with the model, which equates “periphery” with the “internal colony”, as the theoretical base of his analysis. In contrast, Tom Nairn (1981) disagrees that the Scottish type of nationalism is just another example of the ideology. Referring to it as “neo-nationalism” in the 1970s, Nairn finds resemblance to it only in the comparable Occitan movement of the same period. The core reason of the emergence of “neo-nationalism” for Nairn (1981, 127) is relative “over-development” due to a discovery, in Scotland’s case, of North Sea oil, contending that “the new Scottish separatism of the 70s is in some ways comparable to trends in Brittany, Catalonia, Wales, and other regions of Western Europe, in certain respects it remains unique [as] nowhere else has the transformation been so abrupt, or so extensive.”

There may be different approximations on when nationalism became a seriously debated issue in the international relations or political science in general, but many authors on the subject agree that it was boosted, in Nairn’s terms (1981, 94), by “the major nationalist settlement of 1918-22,” where the author refers to the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles. These years, coincidentally or not, became rather important for Scottish nationalism, as two significant events happened in the 1920s: “the emergence of a permanent political movement with the formation of the National Party of Scotland (direct ancestor of the SNP) in 1928” and “the appearance of the epic poem of modern Scottish nationalism…MacDiarmid’s A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle, in 1926.” (Nairn 1981, 95) However, contradicting Nairn’s argument, McCrone (1992, 197) underlines
that “in crucial respects…Scottish nationalism is a phenomenon of the late twentieth, not the nineteenth century,” referring to the rise of the SNP’s popularity and electoral successes in the 1970s and then later in the 1990s, also dismissing the particular importance of the ‘Home Rule’ movements of the 19th century.

Proposals for greater Scottish self-government were used as a leitmotif in the UK-wide electoral campaigns, by the Westminster-based parties in order to gain a larger percentage of the Scottish electorate – firstly by the Liberals between the 1880s and 1940s, to whom “Scottish Home Rule might have a very special and practical attraction, because…they might reasonably have expected to enjoy a permanent majority in a Scottish Parliament.” (Donaldson and others 1969, 9) Since the 1960s, it was also picked up by the Labour Party who “followed very much the Liberal pattern – approval of Home Rule when out of office, inaction when in office.” (Donaldson and others 1969, 4-16) In other words, “so far as the Scots vote for the United Kingdom parties, these parties will themselves regard Scottish issues as subsidiary to the winning of British votes.” (Constitutional Steering Committee 1988, 3) As a result, many Scottish voters felt a need for a new force in the Scottish political system dedicated to Scottish interests, and ideally not biased by the peculiarities of the Westminster politics. Such a “failure to gain effective support from any existing party had led in 1928 to the formation of the National Party of Scotland, formed from an amalgamation of some existing small bodies, possessing a left-wing bias and aiming at complete separation from England.” (Donaldson and others 1969, 12)

The state of the British Union and the increasing support for nationalism requires deeper analysis of the nature of the Union itself. Tom Nairn (1981, 129) underlines that
“Scotland’s real peculiarity lies ... in the lateness [and] the manner of the fusion: there are many stateless nationalities in history, but only one Act of Union – a peculiarly patrician bargain between two ruling classes, which would have been unthinkable earlier, under absolute monarchy, and impossible later, when the age of democratic nationalism had arrived.” His description of uniqueness of the United Kingdom is challenged by Hanham (1969, 10 & 66) who compares the Union of Scotland and England to other dynastic alliances: Holland and Belgium, Sweden and Norway, and the Habsburg Empire, eventually revisiting the question later in his monograph pondering if “Texas got better terms when it joined the United States than Scotland got when it joined Great Britain.”

Another important aspect of the 1707 Union is the question of benefits from the Union and unionist support in the Scottish society as opposed to the historic processes of hostility. Nairn (1981, 12) weighs those two views on the same issue, trying to emphasize the presence and coexistence of both: “There were episodes of conquest in the histories of Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland, true enough [but] these were followed or accompanied by episodes of assimilation and voluntary integration.” At the same time, Hanham (1969, 34) recognizes that “pressure for Anglicization began to be felt in Scotland about the middle of the eighteenth century.” This position is supported by the Scottish historian Rosalind Mitchison, as quoted by Nairn (1981, 135-6): “A foreign, much stronger State and political system was imposed on Scotland by the Union. Through it the country was ‘managed...by a set of monarchs chosen by English politicians for English political purposes’.” McCrone debates on a different, although interrelated issue of British nationalism as an opposition to the peripheral Scottish and Welsh nationalism, insisting that “[British nationalism] has depended historically upon
the British Empire, the monarchy, and institutions such as the BBC.” (McCrone 1992, 209) Nairn in a similar fashion draws readers’ attention to the fact that the long awaited political changes in the form of proposed Scottish self-government in the 1970s were minimal in nature: “The changes were at heart ways of preserving the old state – minor alterations to conserve the antique essence of English hegemony,” (Nairn 1981, 63) and later, revisiting the problem of widely anticipated administrative changes, states that “pious, somewhat sleekit\(^7\) debates about ‘Home Rule’ for Scotland and Wales have appeared and reappeared in imperial politics since the 1880s…[as] a modest degree of self-government in order to strengthen the Union, and Great-British nationalism.” (ibid, 130) In his analysis of the Union’s success, Harvie (1994, 207) singles out the style of its containment and economic advantages by claiming that “the Union had survived by balancing nationalism and assimilation, first as a type of elitist federation, then as a bargain in which the Scottish elite gave up much…of its political autonomy for proper representation, industrial growth and imperial development.”

Christopher Harvie (1994, 179) in his *Scotland and Nationalism*, provides an essential overview of the Scottish political, cultural and economic history since 1707’s Act of Union, and, among other issues, compares two events in the UK’s history of equally anti-Scottish nature – “pseudo-endorsement” of the all-Scottish Covenant of 1950 by the Conservative Churchill government and a Labour government’s establishment of ‘Constitutional Committee’ in response to Winnie Ewing’s victory as the first SNP MP in 1967 (and its eventual dismantling). Both episodes in the history of Scotland illustrated Westminster’s negativity to any concessions in terms of administrative devolution and underlined the opportunist position of both Westminster parties.

\(^7\) According to Dictionary.com, “Chiefly Scot. sly; sneaky.” (Dictionary 2012)
Widely discussed is also an issue of Union’s parliamentary mechanism, which MacDiarmid (1968, 322) considered “especially absurd …when in the Westminster Parliament the Scottish representation is in a permanent minority which can be – and is – continually overruled in purely Scottish matters by an English majority.” This is still relevant for the Scotland’s influence on the Westminster Parliament in terms of macroeconomy, defense, and international affairs, while the electoral system for the Scottish Parliament since 1999 is much more inclusive. McCrone (1992, 121) looks into the question of relations with Westminster with similar amount of enthusiasm stating that “political incorporation of Scotland seems complete.” Meantime, Nairn (1981, 53) studies the peculiarity of the formation of the system of parliamentary participation concluding that “the two-party equilibrium, with its antique non-proportional elective method and its great bedrock of tacit agreement on central issues, was formed to promote stability at the expense of adventure.” Many Scots were also dissatisfied with the situation with the local government, which seemed as a reserved autonomous element of Scottish governance, but yet it was constantly revisited and modified, and sometimes stirred political consequences. “The abolition of parish councils in 1929,” Harvie (1994, 141) maintains, “boosted the National Party, as local government was assumed by the Act of Union.” Similarly unpopular was another proposal – Churchill’s idea of devolution by “counterbalancing regional legislatures” creating ten areas with local bodies (Hanham 1969, 97), considered by Harvie (1994, 142) to be “seen as a ‘rational’ alternative to nationalism.”
3.2. Scottish Politics

Scottish National Party

The SNP was neither the first, nor the only force in the nationalist spectrum of Scottish politics, but definitely became the major player in that segment, being “in the right place at the right time, making explicit the ‘national’ dimension of the post-war consensus, and providing a political alternative when the British settlement began to fail.” (McCrone 1992, 164) In a similar manner, Harvie (1994, 117) sees that “the rise of SNP was not itself inevitable. The other parties could have pre-empted it. They failed to do so partly because they regarded Scotland as ‘marginal’.”

The Scottish National Party, or the SNP, was created in 1934, as a merger between the National Party of Scotland, and “a separate Scottish party, with a more moderate political tone” (Donaldson and others 1969, 12). From its outset, therefore the SNP contained two internal groups – a gradualist and a stridently pro-independence one. According to Taylor (1999, 165-6), “the early years of the party were spectacularly unsuccessful on the fringe of Scottish politics.” The Second World War and its aftermath boosted Unionist feelings and had no positive electoral effect on the Scottish independence or, for that matter, any self-government movement, or the SNP in particular, except for Robert McIntyre’s unexpected victory in the by-election in Motherwell “in 1945 during the electoral wartime truce between the main British parties.” (Young and Murison 1977, 23) During the Second World War, there were multiple instances of political ignorance and misunderstandings. On one occasion “with the Germans overrunning Norway, the British Secret Service momentarily panicked and early one morning descended on several prominent Nationalists in various to raid their
homes for seditious or treasonable articles.” (Young and Murison 1977, 16) One of the
SNP’s leaders, scholar Douglas Young (1950, 72), was twice imprisoned during World
War II for his “views on Scottish conscription and the Act of Union,” and specifically the
SNP’s decision made in 1937, stating that in “the eventuality of another world war …
members of military age should not serve in British Forces unless and until Scotland had
her own government.” Young (1950, 72-4) based his argument on the text of the 1707
Treaty of Union, the fact that in the First World War “Scotland had suffered
disproportionally heavy casualties as compared with any other part of the British
Empire”, and that in WWII Westminster “had not applied … [conscription] to Northern
Ireland,” creating double-standard within the UK. Disregarding the validity of Young’s
concerns, and with popular approval for British involvement in WWII, these policies
diminished the SNP’s chances and support. Moreover, as described by Hanham (1969,
166), this issue became an additional point of difference within the SNP’s membership,
with the party eventually supporting the war. One of the explanations for this may be “the
place of Highland regiments in national identity…based on this age-old tradition of the
Scots as martial people,” whereas these “were imperial units but their soldiers…were
recognizably and unambiguously Scottish.” (Devine 2011, 225)

Another problem that internally divided the SNP were “tensions between
moderate and extreme elements,” which ultimately in the mid-1940s caused “the
withdrawal of the moderates to form a body called Scottish Convention, aiming at a
federal system within the United Kingdom,” (Young and Murison 1977, 13), and
opposed to the SNP’s independence aim. In addition, the Scottish National Party was also
divided on rules of membership – as an exclusive political party, or as, in Young’s ([and
Murison] 1977, 23) view “an all-party coalition, presumably a coalition against the Conservative party, which was uncompromisingly unionist.” But that latter view was in reality preventing the SNP candidates from full participation in the election campaigns, as they might have been members of other parties, their possible opponents. This duality was later reviewed by the party conference, and “in 1948 they succeeded in getting the SNP to change its constitution to exclude from its own membership members of any other party…on the general grounds that divided allegiances had got and would continue to get the Scottish cause nowhere.” (Young and Murison 1977, 23)

Furthermore, this historic period was also significant in terms of coinage of the party’s goal of Scottish self-government, hence letting Scott (1997, 137) insist that “the Scottish National Party has been equally consistent and has not deviated in aims from a statement which it adopted in 1946.” In terms of electoral performance, “from foundation to the early 1960s, it hovered around 1 per cent in overall support…it presented relatively few candidates: only two, for example, in each of the general elections of 1951 and 1955” (Taylor 1999, 166), so as a result “the great achievement of the SNP from 1942 to 1964 was simply to have survived,” (Hanham 1969, 179).

The SNP in the 1950s was largely invisible in terms of electoral performance. The 1960s became the period when the Scottish National Party made a transformation into an all-Scottish political force able to contest Westminster seats, successfully positioning itself on the Scottish electoral map. As suggested by Gordon Donaldson ([and others] 1969, 15), “until 1967, once only had a Scottish Nationalist candidate, Dr. Robert McIntyre, been returned to Westminster…The second victory, that of Mrs. Ewing at Hamilton in November 1967, was again at a by-election,” whose accomplishment was
boosted even further by “remarkable successes of Nationalists in local authority elections.” Scott (1997, 144) also attributes the successes to “the discovery of oil in Scottish waters” in the 1960s, which in turn “encouraged further support for the SNP which doubled its share of the vote in each successive General Election between 1966 and 1974.” Another well-known writer on Scotland, Tom Nairn paid attention to the interrelation of culture and economy in the SNP’s campaigning: “Beneath hegemonic British culture is a Scottish subculture, reinvigorated by the 1970s discovery of North Sea Oil, a (sub-)culture around which the SNP rallies” (quoted in Hague 1994, 140), adding also that “the SNP won its startling victories in 1974 on the slogan ‘It’s Scotland’s Oil’! If taken seriously, there can be no doubt that this and other nationalist rhetoric portends a real battle.” (Nairn 1981, 191) The best illustration of the rise of the SNP vote was definitely when “at a General Election in October 1974 the SNP won 30 per cent of the vote and eleven seats and was in second place in forty-two others” (Scott 1997, 147), making it the best result in a Westminster election to this day.

The discovery of the North Sea oil in the 1960s, and a subsequent rise in SNP’s popularity resulted in formation in 1969 of the Kilbrandon Commission on Scottish and Welsh devolution, which discussed different options for proposed future devolved national assemblies. Nevertheless, there was no mention of a referendum in the original 1977 Scotland (and Wales) Bill. (Bochel, Denver and Macartney 1981, 3) The successful addition of that option became possible only because “the Parliamentary progress of the Scotland and Wales Bill…showed how little discipline the Government was able, or wished, to exert over the rebels in its ranks, such as, George Cunnigham, who first forced a Referendum on the government and then the notorious “40 per cent rule”. (Bochel,
Denver and Macartney 1981, 149) The whole Bill was originally planned to be discussed and voted for in the Parliament without any referendum, while the 40 per cent rule – the requirement to obtain forty per cent from the total electorate instead of a simple majority – all but doomed the referendum on Scottish devolution before a vote was cast. It meant that even if over a half of the voters were to support self-government, it was not enough, as 40 per cent of the overall electorate was needed.

The 1970s became not only the historic period of the best electoral performance of Scottish nationalists, but also the time of a change in attitudes towards the SNP, and especially from the opponents. According to one of the former SNP leaders, Billy Wolfe (1973, 66) “there were three stages in the change in the climate of opinion which opposed [SNP’s] struggle: 1, Ridicule; 2, Toleration and friendly banter; and 3, Gloves off, savage and dirty.”

The same decade witnessed the controversy about the opinions of Scots towards independence or devolution. According to the Kilbrandon Report (1973, 147) of 1969-73, “in neither Scotland nor Wales has the nationalist cause attracted support anything like sufficient to constitute a general vote for independence; but it has provided a means for…changes in the system of government which would acknowledge their separate identities and special interests,” referring to devolution. At the same time, to many Scots in the 1970s saw successful independence movements in the former British empire set an example to follow, as the SNP’s leader Billy Wolfe (1973, 53) explained: “Nyasaland [now known as Malawi] had just been granted independence, so [SNP’s] advertisement read: “Nyasaland now has independence – what about Scotland – but of course Scotland
is a profitable colony. So long as we are a nation of labourers in our own land we will remain England’s last satellite.

John MacKintosh (1974, 153-4) considers the popularity of nationalists in the 1970s interrelated with a complicated notion of “dual nationality,” more precisely that a string of events both worldwide and nationwide “made the British side of the dual nationality less and less attractive till finally considerable numbers, for the first time for 200 years, began to doubt whether it was worth preserving at all.”

A referendum on Scottish devolution was held in March 1979. It was the first major effort to reform the constitutional status of Scotland as one of the constituent countries of the United Kingdom since 1707 and introduce a proposed Scottish assembly. Eventually, the referendum was conducted with multiple irregularities if compared with the sole previous experience of such a plebiscite – the nationwide vote on EEC participation four years earlier, in 1975. Among vividly acknowledged downsides of the 1979 Referendum in contrast with the EEC vote, Bochel, Denver and Macartney (1981, 5-7) emphasize the absence of official leaflets, a ban on political broadcasts, setting of a rather inappropriate time for the vote, absence of the information on campaign expenditures (as guide to the amounts and sources of financing of both camps), and the forty percent threshold. All these details were far from just slight drawbacks, and might have influenced the final result. Meanwhile, one of the most celebrated constitution and devolution experts, Vernon Bogdanor (quoted in Bochel, Denver and Macartney 1981, 7) in his 1980 analysis was more puzzled with the mysterious shift from the regular parliamentary passage of the Bill (according to the British constitutional tradition) to the referendum, acknowledging the deceit of the Scottish electorate:
The genesis and constitutional status of this provision are of great interest for a number of reasons. Resulting from an amendment by a backbench MP on the Government side of the House, it has some claim to be the most significant backbench initiative in British politics since the war since it played a crucial part in securing the repeal of the Scotland Act, depriving the Scots of an Assembly for which a majority had voted.

Scottish politician Jim Sillars further suggests that there was no proper cooperation between different political parties on the issue, as “all the parties who mounted their own campaigns were “fishing for post-referendum credits.” (quoted in Bochel, Denver and Macartney 1981, 18)

As a result of the above-mentioned shortcomings in organization, the 1979 referendum was marked by a controversy, as almost fifty-two per cent voted in favor of self-government. On the other hand, the ‘forty-per cent rule’ prohibited it from being recognized as a successful ‘Yes’ vote, as the total number of electors fell short from the required percentage. The consequences of the referendum brought to an end a decade of victorious performances by the SNP and, after a vote of no-confidence in the Labour government in 1979, the next two decades of the UK politics were dominated by the pro-Unionist Conservatives. It so happened that “the dilemma for the SNP was that, if the issue was not brought to a head, the Party was in danger of losing all credibility as the party which “spoke for Scotland”. Instead, as things turned out, the SNP could be blamed for causing the downfall of the [1974-79 Labour] Government and with it the [Scotland and Wales] Act.” (Bochel, Denver and Macartney 1981, 148)

Disregarding the outcome, Nairn (1981, 376 & 399) in his postscript written in the early 1980s, suggested that “1979 opened an era of disintegration at the UK political level,” even though “separatism had been exorcized by the March referenda.” This episode in the Scottish history found its logical and consistent continuation in the referendum of 1997.
The idea of self-government was on the agenda of Scottish politics since the second half of the 19th century with its multiple downturns and achievements, but it has never got that close to realization as in the late 1970s. Many nationalists had hopes for the 1979 referendum as one of the steps to future independence, even though “most trace Labour’s adoption of devolution to the rise of the SNP in the 1970s, when the Nationalists gained first seven and then eleven seats in the two general elections of 1974.” (Taylor 1999, 147) Unfortunately, due to many last-minute obstacles, including, but not limited to, the infamous forty percent rule, the 1979 referendum failed, triggering the collapse of the Labour government with it.

Many SNP voters never forgave the party’s vote of no confidence that helped oust the Labour government in 1979, and eventually brought in the Conservatives for almost two decades. At the 1979 Westminster election, SNP’s representation went down from eleven seats to just two, with Scott (1997, 164) commenting that the failed 1979 devolution referendum “was a Labour measure, but the SNP took the blame.”

The SNP’s key new political idea of the 1980s, which got implemented in the SNP manifesto at the 1992 election campaign, was a U-turn in the SNP’s European perspective. Largely attributed to Jim Sillars (1988, 179), the SNP’s shift of policy on EEC, underlined that if the party maintained its anti-European stance, then “next time the charge will be that we are ‘double separatists’, seeking to break away from not only our large English market, but from the 323 million European market offered by the Community.” Referring to his newly envisioned type of Scottish statehood as “internal independence”, Sillars (1988, 180-1) insisted in 1988 that EEC “member status, should become a priority objective of the whole Scottish nation, and the centerpiece of SNP
policy,” accusing “both the British unionists and the Scottish withdrawal group,” that is the Euro-skeptic SNP members, as both taking anti-Scottish positions. “While advancing different views”, Sillars (ibid) maintained than both perspectives, “would leave us in the same dangerously exposed position.” Popular support for the pro-European agenda soon materialized, when “two months later [after his pamphlet’s publication] in 1988 Sillars overturned a Labour majority of 19,000 to win by-election for the SNP in Govan,” with Scott (1997, 182) also seeing this victory and the SNP’s possible future menace as the reason “why Labour, usually suspicious of cooperation with other parties, decided to participate in the Constitutional Convention.”

The Labour, Liberal-Democrats and a number of smaller parties and organizations, united in a “cross-party organization, the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly…and reported in July 1988 in a Claim of Right for Scotland, a deliberate reference to the previous claims of 1689 and 1841 which were earlier responses to misgovernment.” (Scott 1997, 164) As it was noted in the 1989 Scottish Constitutional Convention’s report – *Towards Scotland’s Parliament* – “it became clear that the Scottish National Party had reservations, and they subsequently indicated that they will not be taking part.” (Scottish Constitutional Convention 1990, 4) Even though the document did not specify the SNP’s skepticism, it was quite apparent from the following passage: “Although the Claim of Right clearly acknowledges the right of the people of Scotland to opt for a wholly independent state, the Convention believes that this does not have majority support,” later in the text generically referring to nationalist ideology in a dismissive manner – “this is no narrow nationalism: no desire for some nostalgic “little Scotland.”” (Scottish Constitutional Convention 1990, 7 & 18) Along these lines, Scott
(1997, 182) agreed that the SNP “in any case…could hardly support an organization which said that its object was not to annul the Union, but to strengthen it.”

The Westminster electoral campaigns of 1983 and 1987 provided no substantial change to the SNP’s 1979 results, with the same low level of SNP support at around 12-14 per cent. The hope was for the new decade’s election of 1992, especially after the revision of the party’s policy on European issues. On the other hand, the electoral gap between the North and the South was becoming wider with every new victory of the Conservatives, as “this South of England view contrasts sharply with the working class image of Scotland, a division reasserted in 1980’s elections.” (Hague 1994, 140).

In the 1990s voters in Scotland came back to the SNP, with a percentage of support going solidly up. As noted by Scott (1997, 188), between 1987 and 1992 “the SNP share of the vote went up from 14 per cent to 21.5 per cent, but such are the vagaries of the electoral system that this gave them only three seats”, which became “another disappointment for the supporters of Scottish self-government.”

Most analysts agree that in the 1990s due to the disproportionate over-representation of the unpopular Conservative party in Scotland (“that won only 25% of the Scottish vote”, yet received “11 out of 72 Scottish Members of Parliament” in 1992) (Scott 1997, 189), the Scots “should have the government which [they] elected, not the one elected by…larger neighbor to the south.” (Scott 1992, 16) It became quite clear, as Scott (1997, 193) noted, that “since the 1992 Election, Labour and the SNP have been so far ahead in the opinion polls and in European and local elections that Scottish politics seemed to be resolving into a straight fight between them, which means between devolution and independence,” as “both opposition parties demand a Parliament –
Labour’s would be devolved from Westminster, the Nationalists would govern an independent Scotland.” Another key feature in that duality of possible scenarios was the European question, which Alex Salmond, the SNP leader and a guest in the 1995 TV program The Great Debate described as the following: “There is a stark contrast between the SNP’s open vision of the new Europe and Labour’s narrow view of regional Scotland cowering behind the walls of fortress Britain.” (quoted in Scott 1992, 194)

Devolution as a Way Out

By the 1970s many people in Scottish society, not just nationalists, were not satisfied with the situation where “absorption, not federation, had always been the principle of [UK’s] development.” (Nairn 1981, 12) As a result, even though the main focus of Scottish nationalists was independence, in the short run many supported some sort of devolution as the first step.

This idea was not new, and was successfully exploited by different political parties in various historical circumstances – at first in the 19th century, mainly by the Liberal Party in opposition to the Conservatives as to acquire as much support from the Scottish electorate as possible, and later, following its formation in 1900, by the Labour Party on similar principles. That support also differed depending on the political environment, and it is important to keep in mind that “until the secession of southern Ireland in 1922, a general formula of ‘Home Rule’ for all three countries was widely discussed and approved of.” (Nairn 1981, 13)

Two decades after the failed 1979 referendum, with the devolution in the air after the Labour Party’s victory in the 1997 Westminster election, there suddenly reinvigorated
an old issue, known from the 1979 experience, of the appropriate referendum. The Labour “party line was that the referendum would make devolution ‘stable and durable.’” (Taylor 1999, 76) This was seen as a surprise to many as the Labour party majority as Bogdanor recalled for the 1979 experience could have easily served as an unconditional right to implement it in the parliament.

Many saw these 1997 devolution developments as just another instrument to stop the increase of the SNP’s popularity, especially if to take into consideration SNP leader Alex Salmond’s claim that “Labour supports Scotland when Scotland supports the SNP.” (quoted in Scott 1992, 195) For the SNP itself, devolution was just a big step in the right direction, as they still considered that “there is all the difference in the world between a country free to take its own decisions and participate fully in international relations, and a province, even if it has some degree of internal self-government.” (Scott 1992, 52)

Another peculiarity, similar to the last-minute 40%-arrangement with the 1979 plebiscite, was a second question on the ballot in the 1997 devolution referendum regarding tax powers. Even though of great importance to the future parliament and its potential fiscal authority, the question on delegation of more tax powers to Holyrood, due to its complexity, could stimulate a negative outcome for the whole devolution process. It was even seen by many top Labour politicians “as a ‘wrecking device’, who warned against ‘the men in the dark’…who, allegedly, wanted to dump the tax power” (Taylor 1999, 77), as well as probably influence the overall result on devolution.

One of the central tasks of the post-1999 Scottish Parliament (the year when the Scottish Parliament first met after almost three centuries break) was to overcome centuries-old political disagreements, while “in both countries it is probably the result of
the Westminster style of confrontational politics, encouraged by the old two-party, first-past-the-post system and even by the design of the House. In Scotland there is a wide measure of consensus on what needs to be done.” (Scott 1992, 39) To help with that, it was decided to amend the election rules, as to avoid scenarios when under “the ‘first past the post’ electoral system…a party with less than a majority of the votes quite often wins a large majority of the seats.” (Scott 1992, 19)

Unlike the 1970s, or maybe because of the unsuccessful 1979 referendum, the Scots were much more active and “some 1 775 045 or 74.3 per cent voted Yes to a Parliament while 614 400 or 25.7 per cent were against. That left Scotland three to one in favor of devolution,” and consequently “that clearly empowered the [UK] Government to introduce its Bill, the Scotland Bill, to legislate for a Scottish parliament.” (Taylor 1999, 138) Also successful was the question on the tax powers, even though with the slightly smaller margin. As a result, Scotland was rewarded with the long-awaited restored parliament in Edinburgh, finalizing an over-a-century-long debate on “Home Rule”, and opening, albeit not consciously at that time, a Pandora’s box of looming new independence argument, as “the mandate for independence is now defined in terms of support within the Edinburgh Parliament.” (Taylor 1999, 170).

Scottish National Party’s Platform and Key Issues

As far as the SNP’s nationalism is concerned,

"It is not, and never has been at any time in history, aggressive, but wants only good relations and cooperation with other countries. It is entirely on the side of democracy and emancipation... Scottish nationalism is liberal and civic, not...intolerant. The SNP would welcome everyone living in Scotland to Scottish citizenship, if they want it." (Scott 1992, 58-9)
In terms of historic development, “the Party did not grow without stresses and strains resulting from tension between persons of different ideologies whose meeting ground was self-government for Scotland” (Wolfe 1973, 114), even Alex Salmond was “briefly thrown out of the SNP in the early 1980s as a leading light of the ’79 Group which attempted, after the 1979 general election, to reshape the SNP as a party of the Left.” (Taylor 1999, 164) Eventually, and not without Salmond’s endeavors, the SNP was clearly positioned as a left-wing political party, while he himself is sometimes seen as “something of a paradox: an undoubted Nationalist who nevertheless displays few of the customary characteristics of cultural Nationalism. He dutifully attends the party’s Bannockburn rallies – but appears more at home expounding the alleged economic benefits of independence.” (Taylor 1999, 163)

The main line of all the SNP manifestos (e.g. 1997, 9-10) is definitely: “A vote for the SNP is a vote for Independence,” accompanied and reinforced by multiple economic, political and social issues, as for instance, “an independent Scotland will have a written constitution and Bill of Rights. This means that Scots will be citizens, not subjects.” The future constitutional status is widely debated, and the form of government is also sometimes challenged, as the party itself shifted from proposing a republican form of government towards the preservation of a symbolic monarchy: “The SNP propose the reform of the Monarchy…allowing the Queen and her successors to remain Head of State…In the absence of the Queen from Scotland the elected Chancellor (Speaker) of the Scottish Parliament will act as Head of State.” (SNP 1999, 10) This is a uniquely Scottish solution, as within the British Commonwealth, the Queen is usually represented by a Governor-general. Scott fully agrees with the party’s clause on keeping the Queen: “The
monarchy will be no more of an obstacle to Scottish independence than it was for Canada, New Zealand and all the others. After independence it will be for the Scottish people to decide whether they wish to regard the Queen as Head of State.” (Scott 1992, 62-3)

Scottish National Party’s manifesto (e.g. 1997, 22 & 27) pays attention to the issues of cultural heritage, as in the proposal that “Gaelic and Scots must be given equal status with English, both legally and in broadcasting and the arts,” as well as to the issues of economic prosperity, insisting that “an Independent Scotland will secure a division of North Sea oil assets based upon the latitude of 55°50’ north or the international legal principle of equidistance.”

Since the SNP’s 1980s U-turn, independence in Europe became a key issue of all the campaigns since 1992, as, in Scott’s terms (1992, 44), “better a small voice than no voice at all…The fact is that international organizations are of more benefit to small countries than to larger ones.” Scott (1992, 40-1) also dismisses the anti-EU propaganda that argues an independent Scotland would need to re-apply for EU membership: “Under the international law they would both [independent Scotland and the rest of the UK] inherit the other treaty rights and obligations of the former United Kingdom and that includes membership of the European Community.”

With independence in Europe as a key idea, the SNP clearly does not want to lose Scottish voters who, according to Michael Lynch in his New History of Scotland, “embraced not Britain, but the British Empire,” (Scott 1992, 7 & 25) and their manifesto (SNP 1997, 31) correspondingly assures that “only political union will end – our social union will be as strong as ever, and indeed improved by our new equal status as good
neighbours,” as well as that “Scotland will seek to assist in the establishment of an
Association of States of the British Isles which will include England, Wales and Ireland.”
Wolfe (1973, 137) agreed with such a possibility and even clarified possible formats of
this cooperation: “There is no reason why an independent Scotland managing her own
affairs and in control of her own finances should not have a customs and passport union
with the other states of the British Isles and have other forms of cooperation also.”

Among the SNP’s historic disadvantages, Wolfe (1973, 107) underlines the
following: “we suffered, and still suffer, from two handicaps – lack of a daily newspaper,
radio and television station with a wholly sympathetic outlook on self-government; and
insufficient funds.” Taylor (1999, 170) also comments on his observations in 1999 that
“nationalists will say, with some justification, that one reason for that disparity in
treatment is that Scotland’s newspapers are generally hostile to the SNP.” That is why
during debates on jurisdiction of the newly established legislature, “the Nationalists
wanted further powers devolved in the fields of broadcasting, finance and relations with
Europe.” (Taylor 1999, 140) In the same time we should not forget that, especially
before the Westminster elections, “many people read London newspapers and take most
of their political information from network television which hardly mentions Scottish
issues.” (Scott 1992, xiii) Since 2007, the situation in Scottish media has changed in
terms of impossibility of ignoring the nationalists, as the SNP has been in power with its
leader, Alex Salmond as the First Minister.

As far as major problems inside the SNP, Hanham is quoted as analyzing “the
chronic division between ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ wings of the movement – a division far
deeper and more irreconcilable, one should add at once, than the customary quarrels
between idealists and ‘practical men’ which dog all national parties.” (quoted in Nairn 1981, 175) Some ideological differences include the conflicts between the proponents and opponents of the EEC integration in the mid-70s, as well as the party is sometimes torn between those who see independence as the only solution, and those who support “the concept of an Association of British States as the successor to the United Kingdom, to preserve what is indeed functional and ‘viable’ in the union.” (Nairn 1981, 77) This situation pertains to the early 21st century as well, when we witness a debate between the supporters of both the full Scottish independence and “devolution max” – a term for the maximum autonomy but within the United Kingdom.

In his characterization of the SNP’s political agenda, Nairn (1981, 71) emphasizes that it operates “overwhelmingly a politically-oriented separatism, rather exaggeratedly concerned with problems of state and power, and [is] frequently indifferent to the themes of race and cultural ancestry.” While scrutinizing party’s election broadcasts of 1992, Euan Hague in a way agrees with Nairn (1994, 147), elaborating further on its future agenda, stating that the “[SNP] need to move beyond the fragmented image of Scotland to create a genuine, not just emotional following…For the SNP, revisiting a Scotland past of kitsch stereotypes, is not an option. Their broadcasts disregard the past and concentrate on the freedom and glory of future separatism.”

Among the key issues on the SNP’s current political agenda is the 2014 independence referendum, which is mentioned in a separate “Independence” section of the most recent manifesto (SNP 2011, 28), where the SNP states that the party “think[s] the people of Scotland should decide our nation’s future in a democratic referendum and
opinion polls suggest that most Scots agree. We will, therefore, bring forward our Referendum Bill in this next Parliament.”

3.3. Scottish Society and Culture

Often mentioned by authors on Scotland and its nationalism, is a difference between the current ‘stateless’ political position of previously independent old European states and ‘civil society’. Famed 19th century Scottish novelist Robert Louis Stevenson was quoted as saying “that no two neighbor peoples were so utterly – and unalterably – different as the Scots and the English.” (quoted in MacDiarmid 1968, 344) At the same time there is a classic scenario for the nation-state laid out by Max Weber, who insisted that “[a nation is] a community of sentiment which would find its adequate expression only in a state of its own, and which thus normally strives to create one.” (quoted in McCrone 1992, 204)

One of the reasons that so many people in Scottish politics, as well as Scots of different social groups and origins, demand more rights for their nation is the abovementioned fact that “the Union of the Crowns in 1603 and of Parliaments in 1707 have transferred cultural as well as political power to England.” (McCrone 1992, 122)

Even when trying to present the nation to the outsider, the united ‘British’ face is often understood, and sometimes misrepresented, as solely English, but according to Hague (1994, 141) the images of England and Scotland are distinct:

England’s national image, masquerading as British, is a fabricated, nostalgic, rurality, an idyllic nation at ease with itself. Scotland’s image, similarly nostalgic and contrived, is very different. Scottish history, landscape and subsequently culture create an image of Scotland independent of British or English influence.
Civil Society

Nairn (1981, 135) subtly depicted the situation of Scottish civil society while juxtaposing “standard European (and later world) pattern of one political State and its society, or one distinguishable ethnic society and its own State” versus the fact that “Scotland was a hippogriff: a manifest bastard, in the world of nationalist wedlock”. This idea is strongly supported by James Kellas who stated: “While possessing neither a government nor a parliament of its own, it has a strong constitutional identity and a large number of political and social institutions…These became the transmitters of Scottish national identity from one generation to the next.” (quoted in Nairn 1981, 171) McCrone (1992, 211) defines these as “the old institutional trinity of law, education and religion,” while Harvie (1994, 138) recalls one other important element of societal autonomy, also underlining constant fear of being assimilated, claiming that back in time “Kirk, law, local government and education had traditionally protected the nation…but the estates were at risk through secularization, collective intervention, and doctrinaire educational prescriptions.” The fact of menace to those “estates”, to use Harvie’s term (1994, 137-8), is supported by the famed nationalist poet and author MacDiarmid (1968, 344) who relates that in the past “the English have persistently encroached on the remaining vestiges of difference … and sought complete assimilation of Scotland to England,” later linking this to the situation in Scottish literature by saying that “the Union with England, and the abandonment of Scottish subjects in Scottish schools and colleges, threw the independent Scottish literary tradition into the discard.” (ibid, 347) On the contrary at the end of twentieth century, Christopher Whyte (quoted in Schoene-Harwood 2007, 1) suggested that “in the absence of an elected political authority [in Scotland], the task of
representing the nation has repeatedly devolved to its writers” – proving not only the overall importance, but also the positive developments in the Scottish literature.

Regional Divide

When discussing Scottish society, it is hard not to mention the historic regional divide between the Highlands and Lowlands, and the Shetlands. This is accepted by overwhelming consensus by most of the authors on Scotland, although typically interpreted in different ways. While Nairn (1981, 147) himself contrasts the two parts of the country in the past by stating that “Gaelic-speaking Scotland had remained predominately pre-feudal, while the Lowlands had evolved into a bourgeois society,” he also cites A.J. Youngson who reiterates the fact by saying that “there were still obviously two worlds in Scotland, a poor highland world and a comparatively prosperous lowland world.” McCrone (1992, 31) describes the multiple “competing versions of Scotland... Scotland of the past and the present; Scotland of the Highlands and the Lowlands; small-town east-coast Scotland versus Scotland of the west-coast conurbation.” Hechter (1999, 310) reminds us of a third, though smaller, cultural region as opposed to a common binary by claiming that “for centuries Scotland has contained three separate cultural groups, Celts in the Highlands, Norwegians in the northern counties, and English-speaking groups in the Lowlands and Border counties.” It is also hard not to notice the changing demographics in the Highlands versus the rest of the country: “Scotland is divided into Highland and Lowland regions. Between 1755 and 1911, the total population rose from roughly 1.3 million to 4.8 million, while the percentage of Highlanders fell from 20 percent to 8 percent.” (Velychenko 1997, 416)
Hague (1994, 142) lays out a theoretical framework of popular interpretation of Scotland by singling out three major stereotypical perceptions of the country – through the prism of Tartanry, Kailyard and Clydesidism, which he calls “images and idylls”:

Clydesidism has stretched to cover urban Scotland, Tartanry has elevated rural Highland Scotland to globally recognized kitsch (and an image very different from the English rural idyll). The Kailyard, a literary genre nostalgic for a non-industrial ‘golden age’ of parish gossip, shows Scotland’s numerous small towns as different from the four cities.

Tartanry is probably the most recognizable of all, as it is associated with the Highlands and “the Scottish face presented to the outside world was increasingly a Highland face.” (McCrone 1992, 117) Nairn (1981, 165) explains this phenomenon in his own terms: “Tartanry will not wither away, if only because it possesses the force of its own vulgarity – immunity from doubt and higher culture.”

Language

In the beginning of the 21st century the question of language is not as crucial in Scottish society nor on the nationalist agenda, as it might have been in the past. But historically there are areas of Scotland, where Scottish Gaelic and the Scots language are spoken. Although there are other views on the cultural aspects of nationalism, Nairn (1981, 144) considers that “in every superficial respect except one – language – Scotland was quite exceptionally well equipped for the usual nationalist struggles”. McCrone (1992, 29) says that “it is not necessary for nations to be linguistically distinct, but there are plenty of examples – not simply the Scottish one – of nations … reconstructing ‘national languages’ for political purposes: Hebrew, Norwegian, and even Irish.”

As far as the history of Scottish languages is concerned, Colley (2009, 12) suggests that “long before the Act of Union, a cognate language with English called Scots
had spread throughout the Scottish Lowlands and beyond.” while MacDiarmid (1968, 352-3) claims that in the late 1960s there were positive developments in Scots and Gaelic literature. Similarly to Irish nationalism, Hanham (1969, 125) recalls that the short-lived Scottish Party\(^8\) of 1907 even suggested “a compulsory qualification in Gaelic for every person in Scotland holding state office.” Nairn (1981, 106), on the contrary, believes that “the Scots did not have a really separate majority language.”

A good explanation of the decline of the regional languages of Scotland is provided by Hechter (1999, 302) who thinks that “peripheral groups, like those in the Celtic fringe, were…substantially culturally differentiated from the dominant groups…As industrialization proceeded much of this peripheral cultural distinctiveness, especially linguistic distinctiveness, began to be muted.” The question of linguistic Anglicization is also raised by Hanham (1969, 34-42), who argues that England intended to downplay and assimilate the Scottish elements in the language and educational system.

Nevertheless, since the 1999 devolution and the Scottish National Party gained more political (and since 2007 – administrative) powers in the Parliament and Government, some legislation on language has been successfully implemented in cooperation with our parties in Scottish Parliament. Despite the fact that “the total number of people recorded as being able to speak and/or read and/or write and/or understand Gaelic in the 2001 census was 92,400 (1.9 per cent of the Scottish Population)” (The Scottish Government 2011), Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005 was adopted, which is

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\(^8\) The historic party that existed in the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century, not to be confused with the more popular namesake of the 1930s, which merged to form the SNP. It is briefly mentioned in the *Sydney Morning Herald* on Saturday, 9 February 1907 and can be accessed at http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/28152873
An Act of the Scottish Parliament to establish a body having functions exercisable with a view to securing the status of the Gaelic language as an official language of Scotland commanding equal respect to the English language, including the functions of preparing a national Gaelic language plan, of requiring certain public authorities to prepare and publish Gaelic language plans in connection with the exercise of their functions and to maintain and implement such plans, and of issuing guidance in relation to Gaelic education. (Legislation.gov.uk 2005)

The adoption of the Act followed “some initial attempts by SNP MSPs Mike Russell and Alex Neil to introduce legislation.” (Sim 2011, 173) This fits along the lines of past Scottish National Party’s manifestos (e.g. 1999, 30), which suggested that “English, Gaelic and Scots must co-exist on an equal basis in Scotland, and we will grant Scots and Gaelic “secure status” in the Parliament and national life.” The most recent SNP Holyrood election manifesto (2011, 33) is equally concerned with the nation’s other language – Scots, while laying out its party’s language priorities:

- We will develop a national Scots language policy, with increased support for Scots in education, encouragement of a greater profile for Scots in the media, and the establishment of a network of Scots co-ordinators. We will promote the acquisition, use and status of Gaelic through the implementation of the Gaelic Action Plan with the aim of ensuring that by 2021 the proportion of Gaelic speakers is back up to 2001 levels. We will continue to raise the profile of the Gaelic language across Scotland.

Literature

Literature often plays an important role in promotion certain aspects of the nationalist vision, or national identity in general. Poets and writers often played a role in popularization of the Scottish culture, as it is impossible to imagine the overview of Scottish culture and society without mentioning Robert Burns and Walter Scott. Although Scott’s works are considered by many as nationalist, Hanham (1969, 70) argues that “The Waverley novels are full of Scottish propaganda but they are not directed against the status quo.”

Worth mentioning is also the part that the Scots (alongside the Irish and Welshmen) played in the overall English-language literature, which “would be very
diminished if we eliminated from its roster such figures from the so-called ‘Celtic fringe’ as W.B. Yeats, Dylan Thomas, James Joyce, George Bernard Shaw, Gerard Manley Hopkins, Samuel Beckett and Sean O’Casey, to mention but a few.” (MacDiarmid 1968, 308) Nairn (1981, 156) was critical of the outflow of some Scottish poets and writers in the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, suggesting that “among the numerous strands in the neurosis, two are especially prominent: cultural emigration, and the Kailyard School.”

In many instances literary developments are more important for the nationalist aspirations than unsuccessful politics, as in the example with “the 1980s, a decade which, politically and economically, Scotland could have done without, [which] turned out intellectually and culturally remarkable.” (Harvie 1994, 199)

Some literary traditions are inseparably combined with other cultural processes, sharing the same name, as seen from the abovementioned example of tartanry, considered by Nairn (1981, 168) “a borrowing… not in the name of ‘nationalism’ but in order to enrich a sub-nationalist culture.” At the same time, “the Kailyard was – and still is – very much the reverse of the coin of emigration. Its lack of ‘human and political dignity’ does not express some collective fault in the Scots psyche, but the ‘historical fact’ of the relationship between the intelligentsia and the people.” (ibid, 161)

Schoene-Harwood (2007, 2), however, analyzing the late 20th and early 21st centuries’ Scottish literature, states that “it is imperative that post-devolution Scotland cease once and for all to identify itself in opposition to all things English,” adding that “while discussions of Scottish nationalism and nationhood feature prominently…they are conducted invariably with reference to other [contemporary] debates.” The author also
mentioned “the fundamental contribution Scottish literature has made to national identity,” which according to him “was conspicuously celebrated in the Opening Ceremony of the Scottish Parliament on 1 July 1999,” providing a list of the famous Scottish contemporary and classic authors who were “featured prominently in the ceremony.” (Ibid, 17)

Religion

In many societies, religion plays an important role in nationalist mobilization, as it “can identify a community but it can also inhibit the sort of imaginative political commitment that progressive nationalism requires” (Harvie 1994, 145). For Scottish nationalism, the Church of Scotland or Kirk, or other Scottish churches for that matter, do not play the same role in the current stage of nationalist agenda. The major reason for that is the preservation of Kirk’s autonomy under the provisions of the 1707 Treaty of Union, as it was known that “religion has never been the opium of the Scottish masses. The politics of the Kirk had been closer to most people than those of Parliament or town council.” (Harvie 1994, 147) Although if compared with the neighboring English, “[the Scots] had…the enormously important factor of a clear religious difference” (Nairn 1981, 106), “the Kirk tradition is both irrelevant to SNP Scotland and responsible for every one of the country’s numberless unacceptable faces!” (ibid, 164).

One of the most difficult events for the Kirk was the 1843 Disruption, “a major split which saw about one third of the Kirk break away to form what came to be the Free Kirk,” although in 1929 a “process of reunion gave the Church of Scotland an
opportunity to resolve once and for all how it wanted to govern itself and how it wanted to relate to the state.” (The Church of Scotland 2012)

In terms of its cooperation with the government it is important to mention that, unlike the Scandinavian countries and England, “the Church of Scotland (the Kirk) is not State-controlled, and neither the Scottish nor the Westminster Parliaments are involved in Kirk appointments”, but it does have a “status as the national Church in Scotland [which] dates from 1690, when Parliament restored Scottish Presbyterianism, and is guaranteed under the Act of Union of Scotland and England of 1707,” (The Church of Scotland 2012) with over 42 per cent of Scots reported to be its members. (The Scottish Government 2001)

Important among other churches in Scotland is also the Catholic Church, being prevalent in the areas of compact historic resettlement of the Irish, and according to the 2001 Census is followed by almost 16 per cent of the population. (The Scottish Government 2001) The same results suggest of the increase of the Scots who follow no religion (around 28 per cent), as well as presence of many immigrant religions, as Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. (The Scottish Government 2001)

Diaspora and Emigration

Emigration is substantial in contemporary Scotland, as it has been historically. MacDiarmid (1968, 345) complains that in the late 1960s “the rate of emigration from Scotland is without parallel in any other advanced industrialized nation…[Scotland] has lost more than half a million in the last ten years,” with Hanham (1969, 18) concentrating
on the issue of diasporic communities, as “emigration also led to the creation of new Scotlands across the world.”

“Between 1951 and 2006 net migration loss, defined as the difference in the number of people moving to and leaving a country, was about 825,000, described by one authority as ‘a staggering amount’ from a nation of little more than 5 million.” (Devine 2011, 271).

There has been many examples of participation of foreign Scots in the nationalist struggle of the homeland, and as an example MacDiarmid (1968, 349) describes a new wave of pro-independence support by people who came back from abroad in the late 1960s, while Hanham (1969, 121-2) notes the importance of Australian diaspora in Home Rule movement, which is echoing Anderson’s idea of “long-distance nationalism” (Bauböck 2010, 44).

According to Sim (2011, xiii) émigré communities are sometimes especially important nationalists, as “many nationalist movements…may look to their diasporas for support.” Detailing Scottish immigration and community formation in North America, to the formation of heritage organizations and associated festivities, Sim emphasizes the changing fortunes of Scottish identity in recent US history. Unpopular until the 1990s, Sim suggests the recent increase in American adoration for a distinctly Scottish culture with a Celtic flavour as being largely due to the success of Hollywood blockbusters such as *Braveheart* (1995). Among the most popular heritage activities for American Scots are Highland Games, clan society events, Gaelic language courses, St. Andrew’s balls, Burns Nights, and Tartan Day celebrations. Given this upsurge in Scottish-identifying American residents, Sim examines the increasingly complicated issues of how Scottish
identity is understood in North America. Sim’s interviews demonstrate a clear disconnect within the American Scottish community between those identifying as Scottish American by ancestry and those that were Scotland-born on a variety of issues, including the perception of Scotland itself. Quoting one of his interviewees, Sim notes that some American Scots feel that rather than being Americanized, they are more Scottish than those “people who lived in Scotland went on and became far more anglicised in some ways” (C11, p. 140). Another respondent argues for subdividing American-born Scots into “Scottish Americans” and “Americans of Scottish descent” depending on the degree of assimilation (N6, p. 122).

As far as the type of identity of Scots in diaspora is concerned, Devine (2011, 279) claims that “the Scottish identity embraced by American descendants of Highland Scots, Lowland Scots or Ulster Scots is a Highland Gaelic identity which was formed in the nineteenth century,” namely “Tartanry”.

This “disjunction between the activities and traditions of American Scots and homeland Scots”, argues Sim (2011, 128), is pervasive and he describes major differences between these two subgroups in their interpretations of, amongst other things, the ‘invented traditions’, largely unobserved in Scotland, of the Kirkin’ o’ the Tartan – “a prayer service that generally begins with a local pipe band leading a procession of officers and members of the St. Andrew’s Society” (ibid, 126), Tartan Day – a Scottish American festival established by U.S. Congress in 1998 (Hague 2001), and even dispute over traditional Scottish dancing styles. Sim also records Canadian examples, such as that of Nova Scotia where, between 1933 and 1954, the “impact of a single individual in
promoting a personal vision of ‘Scottishness’” (ibid, 57), saw premier Angus Macdonald build a Scotland-themed provincial identity.

Devine (2011, 277) insists that “the recent evolution and popularity of Scottish heritage in the United States is an indigenous American development, managed and directed by the transatlantic diaspora and often containing elements which native Scots find risible or even offensive.”

Since its inception in 2009, the Scottish Government’s Homecoming event strengthens Scottish American ties to Scotland. Devine (2011, 286-7) also informs that “in September 2010 the Scottish government announced a ‘Diaspora Engagement Plan’, proclaiming that Scotland was the first European nation ‘to develop a formal approach to motivating and engaging its diaspora’,” and, furthermore, “the Scots have also taken note of Ireland’s economic success in developing rewarding relationships and networks with elite members of its diaspora.”

### 3.4. Scottish Economy & Globalization

**Economic Overview**

When discussing the issue of Scottish sovereignty, it is crucial to mention the economic situation of the country. Economic policy plays an important role in SNP manifestos and its governing agenda, and it is an integral part of the country’s everyday policy-making. Control over the economy is also an important issue for the secessionist movements and parties in their pro-independence agenda. In a similar way, Scottish nationalists stress a central role for an Edinburgh-controlled economy, especially after the discovery of the North Sea oil in the 1960s. The most common SNP accusation was that
Westminster is subsidized at the expense of Scottish economy. Moreover, it is widely understood that the revival of Scottish nationalism was interrelated with these economic developments, which underlines the indivisibility of economy from politics.

Currently, taking the most important economic parameters into consideration, Scotland is definitely a developed European economy. According to the The Scottish Government (2012), based on GDP quarterly growth rates, Scottish economy is recovering from the effects of the Euro crisis (as in Figure 1). Despite the fact that, according to the same sources (ibid), “Scottish Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in constant basic prices fell by 0.1 per cent during the first quarter of 2012,” in the same time, as seen from Figure 2, the “output in the services sector grew by 0.2 per cent, total output in the production sector grew by 1.2 per cent, within which manufacturing output grew by 0.9 per cent.” In terms of inflation, it “remained at 2.7% for the fourth month running in January 2013” (The Scottish Government, 2013) – which is quite acceptable in the light of the recovery from the Euro crisis.
Figure 1. GDP Quarterly Growth Rates (The Scottish Government, 2012)

GDP Quarterly Growth Rates 2007 - 2012 Q1

Figure 2: GDP at Constant Basic Prices (The Scottish Government, 2012)

Percentage Change: latest quarter on previous quarter (seasonally adjusted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total GDP</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011 Q1</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Q2</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
<td>+1.9</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Q3</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Q4</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Q1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>+1.2</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among Scotland’s major trading partners, “the rest of the UK accounts for almost 70% of Scotland’s [trade] and the EU is the largest overseas export partner. During 2008, an estimated £9.5 billion of Scottish exports were to the EU, 46% of the total. In terms of individual countries, the USA is Scotland’s largest overseas export destination, receiving an estimated £3.1 billion in exports during 2008 [while the] Netherlands is the second largest export destination.” (Scottish Enterprise, 2010)

The question of public debt is an important component of the future debate on the viability of Scottish independent economy, as well as in analysis of the requirements for the possible entry to the Eurozone. This calculation for Scotland as part of the UK is possible due to the fact that “Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland (GERS) assigns Scotland a population share of UK debt interest payments, irrespective of the relative strength or otherwise of Scotland’s fiscal position,” while it is also important to emphasize that “the recent deterioration in the UK public finances has increased the expenditure on debt interest payments assigned to Scotland in GERS from £1.8 billion in 2002-03 to £4.1 billion in 2011-12 in cash terms” (The Scottish Government, 2013). As a result of the Scottish Government’s (2013) economic research on that topic, it was discovered that:

UK public sector net debt at the end of 2011-12 stood at £1.1 trillion. Scotland’s per capita share is estimated to have been equivalent to £92 billion (62% of GDP). This would represent a lower debt to GDP ratio than for the UK as a whole (72%), reflecting the fact that Scotland has a higher level of GDP per capita (including North Sea oil) than the UK.

Another criterion taken into consideration in analysis a potential Eurozone candidate or viability of the economy in general, is budget deficit or surplus. From that perspective “over the period 1980-81 to 2011-12 as a whole, Scotland is estimated to have run an average annual net fiscal surplus equivalent to 0.2% of GDP. The UK is
estimated to have run an average annual net fiscal deficit worth 3.2% of GDP.” (Scottish Government, 2013) This comparison definitely helps the whole independence debate, as it was primarily “driven by the significant growth in North Sea revenues.” (ibid)

Oftentimes we may come across comparisons of what Ireland has reached in economic terms (at least before the Euro crisis of 2000s) with political sovereignty as opposed to what Scotland is losing lacking full independence and control over its economy. Hechter (1999, xiv-xv) argues that historically, “the lack of sovereignty had different economic consequences in Ireland than in Scotland and Wales. In Ireland, it encouraged agricultural specialization; in Wales and Scotland, however, it promoted economic stagnation.” MacDiarmid (1968, 317) in *Scottish Nationalism* provides statistical information for the year of 1964 on sufficient difference between unemployment rates in the UK in general and Scotland in particular, where the latter is much higher, and interestingly, this statistical data is somewhat different now. The period of deindustrialization was followed by the SNP success. The Scottish Government (2012) statistics suggests that as of February 2012, “Scotland has the highest employment rate of the four countries in the United Kingdom.” As a result, it may be considered as a successful implementation of some effective socio-economic policies of the devolved Scottish Government.

At the same time, absence of full sovereignty prevents the Scots from overall control over their economy, as the macroeconomic policies are managed by the Westminster government, including the key elements of fiscal and monetary policy. The latest key document that regulates Westminster-Holyrood spheres of control is the 2012 Scotland Act (Legislation.gov.uk 2012) – “an Act to amend the Scotland Act 1998 and
make provision about the functions of the Scottish Ministers. It has the following passage – known as Schedule 5 – on the economic jurisdiction reserved by the Union in accordance with the amended Scotland Act 1998” (Legislation.gov.uk 1998), claiming that Westminster has control over “fiscal, economic and monetary policy, including the issue and circulation of money, taxes and excise duties, government borrowing and lending, control over United Kingdom public expenditure, the exchange rate and the Bank of England.” This reality contradicts the ideas of MacDiarmid (1968, 327) from the late 1960s, as well as many contemporary nationalists that “the key sectors of Scottish industry, essential of a buoyant Scottish economy, must be controlled by the Scottish people.” Reserved for the Scottish Government (Legislation.gov.uk 2012) are “local taxes to fund local authority expenditure (for example, council tax and non-domestic rates),” as successfully voted for in the second question of the 1997 devolution referendum.

Another important economic question is potentially sovereign Scotland’s future economic cooperation and a degree of integration into the European economic institutes in the increasingly globalized world economy. The most recent debate before the future referendum, given that Scotland becomes politically and economically independent, is the status of a new British state in the contemporary European Union: will it automatically preserve its status as part of an existing member-state or does Scotland need to re-apply as a newly proclaimed independent country?

If Scotland remains in the European Union, equally debated is the issue of hypothetic economic sovereignty of Scotland in case of a successful 2014 independence referendum, as well as at has been analyzed by the SNP in the latest manifestos. One of
the major questions is definitely the euro versus pound sterling choice, which in the recent time (following the European and world crisis) is no longer a serious controversy. The SNP’s change of policy towards potential adaptation of the euro is well motivated due to the vulnerability of the current EU monetary union, as at the time of creation of the Eurozone some important economic components of some of the prospective members were overlooked. Before joining the euro area, each member state was expected to meet all five Maastricht criteria – low inflation, \( \leq 3\% \) of the budget deficit, \( \leq 60 \% \) of public debt in relation to the GDP, low long-term interest rates, and successful entry to the pre-euro ERM II system of exchange rates (Reuters Financial Glossary 2012), but in reality many of them did not perform accordingly, which eventually led to a crisis due to a highly globalized Eurozone financial sector.

After the European crisis and during the 2014 independence debate, Alex Salmond and his fellow ministers express their interest in preserving the pound sterling as a more viable currency option. But this also creates the same problem, which has been already seen in the Eurozone – the perspective of regulating a common monetary policy with the existence of two (or over a dozen in the case of Europe) separate fiscal policies.

### 3.5. Conclusion

From the above-mentioned chapter, it is clear that Scotland is not a fully sovereign state in the political sense, but at the same time it possesses a considerable degree of cultural, religious and administrative autonomy due to the articles of the 1707 Treaty of Union, reinforced by the 1999 devolution implementation following the all-Scottish referendum of 1997. Historically, Scottish type of nationalism has been
predominantly inclusive and civic in nature, as is also recently seen in the Scottish National Party’s manifestos, which include multiple references to the “civic society” and “civic Scotland”. (e.g. 1999, 29) Additionally, diaspora Scots actively engage themselves in Scottish customs and traditions, and follow events in their historic homeland, although without any financial or legal mechanism to influence politics in general, or elections in particular, in their homeland. In terms of economy, based on its major components, there is a strong tendency to recovery from the European crisis, and Scotland as a potentially independent country in 2014 clearly meets the required Maastricht criteria, if it decides to join the euro, or peg its potential future currency to it. Additionally, the future economy, if the electorate chooses independence, will be boosted by the revenues from Scottish oil, which are currently benefiting the entire UK economy.
CHAPTER FOUR: UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

Eastern European nationalist movements, according to Miroslav Hroch (quoted in Wilson 1997, 26), “typically developed in three phases”: “scholarly interest”, “patriotic agitation”, and “the rise of a mass national movement.” Ukrainian nationalism developed through a series of historic forms, many of them cultural, with the prevalence of distinctly political, and furthermore, pro-independence movement in two historic periods – 1918-1921 and 1989-91. It was undeniably related to the fact that:

the only part of the Tsarist Russia which contained a genuine national movement before 1917, though not a separatist one, was Ukraine. Yet Ukraine remained relatively quiet while Baltic and Caucasian republics demanded secession, remained under the control of the local Communist party leadership, and did not resign itself to separation until after the failed coup of August 1991 destroyed the USSR. (Hobsbawm 1992, 166)

4.1. Historic Background

Forced Union

The colonial dependence of Ukraine within the Russian Empire can be traced back to 1654, when military protectorate treaty between the Cossack Hetmanate under Bohdan Khmelnytsky was later interpreted by Muscovy as ‘the union’ – event known as the Pereyaslav Rada.9

As a result, a large part of today’s Ukraine eventually ended up being a colony of Muscovy. This forced incorporation was challenged multiple times by uprisings in the 17th and 18th centuries, as well as by the abundant nationalist literature of the 18th-20th centuries, which helped to educate Ukrainians under imperial rule about national origins and culture, and mobilized many to rebel against tsarist power. One of the reasons why

9 ‘Rada’ is Ukrainian for ‘council’, while Pereyaslav is the city where it took place. Later in the text, the term “rada” is used in a number of parliaments in Ukraine, as in Central Rada in 1917-19 and in present Parliament – the Verkhovna Rada or Supreme Council.
Russia could not sustain the loss of Ukraine was and still is the element of local nationalist mythology of linking its history to the period of the Ukrainian state Kyivan Rus, which would be challenged after disintegration, as “for several centuries prior to the union with Ukraine, official Muscovy had a very dim sense, if indeed any at all, of being the direct heir of Kyiv… [and] the idea that…the Muscovites were really "Russians" performed a significant integrating function in the eighteenth century and afterwards.” (Szporluk 1997, 95)

Similar stateless political situation was common for the rest of the Ukrainian territories under Poland, and later – Austro-Hungarian rule between 1772 and 1918, while other smaller segments being absorbed by Romania, Hungary and, briefly, former Czechoslovakia, and were only reunited with the rest of Ukraine during Soviet rule. At the forefront of the Ukrainian nationalist struggle for a separate state and reunification with the rest of the ethnic territory were numerous literary and public organizations and groups, which especially flourished under relatively moderate Austro-Hungarian colonial power prior to the WWI.

Nationalist Agenda and the brief Independence of 1918-21 and 1941

The first short-lived period of Ukrainian political sovereignty of 1918-21 followed the Bolshevik Revolution and loosening of the grip of power of Petersburg over many territories. As a result, many ethnic communities used that chance to proclaim their national independence, most notably the countries of the Baltic region, Poland and Finland. In a similar fashion, Ukraine also chose the path of sovereignty, but with the co-existence of two distinct groups – autonomists (who fought for more rights within ‘new
democratic Russia’) and separatist one on the political arena. Also, historians agree that “Ukrainian nationalists had no strong political organizations before 1914, nor any links with foreign powers.” (Velychenko 1997, 422) These circumstances prevented an effective functioning of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) proclaimed in 1918 by a document called ‘Fourth Universal’ of the Central Rada – a self-governing legislative body created a year earlier on behalf of the Ukrainian people. Unlike the first three documents – ‘Universals’ – of the Central Rada, the fourth no longer recognized any formal federal relation to the ‘future democratic Russia’, but instead created an independent state: the Ukrainian National Republic. This historic step was implemented despite the opposition of the autonomists and was advocated strongly by the writings and ideas of “the two most influential Ukrainian nationalist thinkers of the twentieth century” (Wilson 1997, 41) – Dmytro Dontsov and V’iacheslav Lypyns’kyi, as well as Mykola Mikhnovsky’s famous manifesto, Independent Ukraine (1900).

Due to numerous disagreements on the issue of cooperation with Russia, the West and internal development, and constant pressure from Russia, instead of a functioning independent state, “Ukrainian nationalists formed three short-lived governments in the period [of 1917-1920]: the Ukrainian People’s Republic (November 1917 to April 1918), the Hetmanate (April to December 1918) and the Directorate (December 1918 to December 1919).” (Wilson 1997, 11) The Central Rada was overthrown by the Hetmanate in cooperation with Germany in April 1918 – Ukrainian State headed by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, who, nevertheless, continued the state-building initiatives, and many would argue, even more successfully, as his state was recognized by a number of countries.
In 1919, Hetman Skoropadsky was deposed by the third Ukrainian entity, the Directorate of Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, the latter becoming one of the iconic figures of Ukrainian statehood, with Ukrainians often referred to as the Petliurites or ‘petliurivtsi’. Among the shortcomings of this stage of Ukrainian state-building, which essentially ended with a loss of sovereignty, “V’iacheslav Lypyns’kyi identified the key weakness as the failure to win over elements from the old imperial elite to the national cause.” (Wilson 1997, 14). In addition to internal and external disagreements, there was military presence of a number of mutually hostile foreign armies on Ukrainian territory: the Reds, the Whites, the Central powers (specifically, the German army), the Poles, and local anarchists with a relatively small presence of the UNR’s own army. The underdevelopment of the national army under UNR was seen by many as the main reason of the state-building failure, with Stephen Horak stating that “the UNR’s idealistic leaders paid too little attention to the task of building up proper armed forces” (quoted in Wilson 1997, 12). On the other hand, “as with Mikhnovs’kyi, Dontsov’s starting point was a violent critique of the alleged provincialism, inferiority complex and Little Russian mentality of the Ukrainian intelligentsia”, which added up to the explanation of possible reasons. (Wilson 1997, 42)

The beginning of the twentieth century became the time of formation of active political life in Ukraine, as during the tsarist times of Russian Empire any type of political activity – and more so an ethnically Ukrainian one – was strictly banned. Another important development to keep in mind when analyzing the political processes in early 20th-century Ukraine, is the division of Ukrainian intelligentsia after 1848 (the year
of all-European revolutions that effectively outlawed the serfdom in Halychyna\textsuperscript{10} and
boosted the nationalist agitation) into three groups: “the Old Ruthenians, the
Ukrainophiles, and the Russophiles.” (Magocsi 2002, 22) Accordingly, “the first stirrings
of separatist sentiment were amongst the Brotherhood of Taras [secretly established in
1891]…Several of its members were instrumental in forming the RUP (the first political
party in Ukraine established in February 1900 in Kharkiv), and in 1902 broke away to
form the Ukrainian People’s Party (UPP), the first truly nationalist political group in
tsarist Ukraine.” (Wilson 1997, 33)

While most of the Ukrainian territory was incorporated into the USSR, western
part of it – Halychyna – constituted the Eastern Galician region of Poland, Bukovyna was
part of Romania, while Transcarpathia was occupied by Czechoslovakia, and the
Crimean peninsula – was part of Russia. In all those territories between the two world
wars there were distinct Ukrainian nationalist organizations fighting for self-government
and eventual reunion into one Ukraine. Due to the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime
there was no possibility to partake in the parliamentary process, which was totally
marginalized and pre-arranged, the only way to fight the system and the unfair Union
arrangements was through illegal underground activity, where the Organization of
Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was actively operating.

In terms of comparison of the two occupied portions of the Ukrainian territory,
Shekhovtsov (2011, 207) underlines: “both Western and Eastern parts of Ukraine had
their nationalist movements. The Soviet authorities successfully suppressed the Ukrainian

\textsuperscript{10} Historic region of Ukraine, comprised by contemporary Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil oblasts, and territories now in Poland.
nationalists, either moderate or radical, but in Poland there existed different political nationalist parties that tried to normalise relations with the Polish state.”

In Halychyna, after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 another Ukrainian state, the Western Ukrainian National Republic (WUNR) was proclaimed. This proclamation, as well as the establishment of the UNR was then followed by the formal union of two republics into one UNR, in January 1919 – an event known as Unity Day. Eventually, Western Halychyna was absorbed by Poland and remained occupied as part of its territory until the beginning of the World War II.

According to Shekhovtsov (2011, 207), “in the course of the 1920s, the most radical nationalist organisation in Western Ukraine was the Ukrayins’ka viis’kova orhanizatsiya (Ukrainian Military Organisation, UVO) led by Colonel Yevhen Konovalets.” Wilson (1997, 45) differentiates three tendencies in national movement in Western Ukraine “after the international recognition of Polish administration (1923)”: there was a movement for Ukrainian autonomy within Poland, “pro-Soviet or pro-Russian” bloc and finally, an “ultra-nationalist current, and its call for an independent Ukraine,” which eventually became associated with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The real turn in Ukrainian nationalist thought took place when “in 1926, Dontsov published his magnum opus, Nationalism, in which he expounded the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism.” (Shekhovtsov 2011, 208) Consequently, OUN was formed “in 1929 [in Vienna, when] radical Ukrainian activists in Poland completed the process of uniting all their forces into a single organization… led by Evhen Konovalets, who was also the leader of the Ukrainian Military Organization.” (Marples 2006, 559). Along the lines with the vision of other nationalist groups in Europe of the early 20th century, “the
OUN...declared that a future independent ‘Ukrainian state would be a national
dictatorship [natsikratiia]’, defined as ‘the power of the nation in the state’.” (Wilson
1997, 47) According to Shekhovtsov (2011, 208), “in terms of doctrine, the OUN was
indebted to the works of Dmytro Dontsov (who, however, never joined the organisation),
as well as some ideologues within the OUN, in particular Mykola Stsibors’kyi,
Volodymyr Martynets and Yuliyan Vassyyan.”

Most sources depict the disagreement as one that developed on generational lines,
as “the designated leader Andrii Melnyk failed to gain the support of the more radical
members, who gradually broke away into a separate faction under Bandera… the new
revolutionary wing of the OUN” (Marples 2006, 560). David Marples (2006, 555)
captured the controversy between the two attitudes towards the Ukrainian national leader
of the mid-20th century – Stepan Bandera – that of the Soviet propaganda, anti-Ukrainian
in its contents, and contemporary Ukrainian in the country’s spiritual ‘heart’ –
Halychyna, the westernmost region of Ukraine: “In the Soviet period, his name was
associated with evil, terrorism, and treachery by Soviet authorities and propagandists. In
various towns and villages of western Ukraine, on the other hand, statues have been
erected and streets named after him, including a prominent avenue in the largest city of
L'viv.”

Another attempt to recreate the Ukrainian state occurred in Lviv after “the
formation of the two units and the event that followed after the German invasion of the
Soviet Union – the declaration of a sovereign Ukrainian state on 30 June 1941 by
Yaroslav Stets'ko on Bandera's behalf.” (Marples 2006, 560) “However, the Nazis did not
support the idea of Ukraine’s independence and arrested both Bandera and Stets’ko. They
were sent to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp and released only in 1944.”
(Shekhovtsov 2011, 209).

Soviet Union and the Genocide of Ukrainians

At the time of the unsuccessful state-building attempts in 1918-21, before Ukraine was absorbed into the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks simultaneously fought for the territory of Ukraine, having created their own puppet government in the city of Kharkiv in Eastern Ukraine, which became the center of the occupied Soviet Ukraine and, since 1922, part of the USSR. The creation of the Soviet Union was far from democratic, as the citizens of Ukraine did not have any say in that decision (similarly to the Pereyaslav Rada of 1654), which was largely made by the Communist party functionaries. Aware of the nationalist aspirations of Ukrainians (as well as other nations), Moscow laid out a policy of ‘korenization’ (translated as ‘going to roots’) with its Ukrainian equivalent in the form of ‘Ukrainianization’. This policy was not only designed to pacify the nationalists and to “legitimize [Communist] rule in Soviet Ukraine by attracting to its ranks a broader spectrum of the local population” (Magocsi 2010, 569) but, more importantly, to detect them in order to neutralize or exterminate them later.

As a result, the next stage in Stalin’s policies in 1930s was oppression in the form of mass murders, detentions in Siberian concentration camps, and, horrifically, mass killing by hunger, a widely recognized genocide, the Holodomor of 1932-33, which “caused the death of up to 10 million Ukrainians due to starvation” (Semotiuk [n.d.]). This tragedy of the Ukrainian nation was promulgated by the order to confiscate the grain yields and reserves targeted villagers, those living on the land, with “roadblocks set up by
the authorities [which] prevented Ukrainian peasants from entering the cities, where food was sometimes available, though far from plentiful.” (Naimark 2010, 73) This was a logical continuation of oppressive anti-Ukrainian policies and, as noted by Wilson (1997, 151), “three centuries of Russian rule have supposedly been a demographic catastrophe for Ukraine. In 1654, it is claimed there were more Ukrainians than Russians, six million as opposed to five, whereas today the population of Russia outnumbers that of Ukraine by almost three to one.”

The instrument of Holodomor greatly changed the demography of Ukraine. Deserted villages were subsequently settled with Russians from all over the Soviet Union, largely continuing the imperial policies of Russification of Ukraine, which effectively ended the transitional Ukrainianization stage in the late 1920s, with its “ultimate aim…to foster the elimination of national distinctions within Soviet society and to create a new Soviet man (Homo Sovieticus11), whose primary concern would be loyalty to the [USSR] through the medium of the world’s only “true revolutionary” language, Russian.” (Magocsi 2010, 695)

The World War II and Ukraine

During the Second World War, similarly to the First one in 1914-18, Ukraine had no statehood, being part of the USSR with most citizens formally fighting on the side of its yesterday’s conqueror – the Red Army. This predicament did not satisfy many freedom-minded Ukrainians who dreamed of an independent state, and envisioned the war as a chance to materialize their plans. This latter group of Ukrainian nationalists in large numbers secretly belonged to the OUN, which decided to create “the Ukrainian

11 Original emphasis
Insurgent Army (UPA) in October 1942 though in active form only from the spring of 1943 […] which was a large and well organised military and later guerrilla army under Roman Shukhevych,” (Marples 2006, 562) which “fought against the Nazi and Soviet forces,” and even later the war “the UPA continued its struggle against Soviet law enforcement up until the early 1950s but then was suppressed [and] fighters of the UPA and Bandera’s OUN were sent to Gulag prison camps, while other members of these organisations had to emigrate to Western Europe, Canada and the USA.” (Shekhovtsov 2011, 209) The UPA was so highly organized and efficient that former French President Charles De Gaulle noticed the following: “If I had an army such as the OUN has, the German jackboot would never have trampled the French soil.” (quoted in Lypovetsky 2009, 1)

With the decade of 1950s – the time of latest mention of the UPA fighters and their dugout bunkers – which was mainly characterized by a newer wave of oppressions, the 1960s were also marked by another distinct cultural nationalist wave – the “60iers” or the “Sixties group” – “no part of a deliberately organized movement, these [were] writers, together with a few theatrical directors, film directors, composers, and artists [whose literary forms] both implicitly and explicitly sought to renew traditional Ukrainian cultural values and to restore the Ukrainian language, which had suffered sovietization and russification during the Stalinist era.” (Magocsi 2010, 704) All of them were either murdered or sentenced based on “flirting with “decadent Western artistic notions” and, even worse, with Ukrainian “bourgeois nationalism”. (Ibid, 710)
4.2. Ukrainian Politics

It is often believed that independence of Ukraine just happened due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some may even question if “Ukraine and Ukrainians suddenly appeared deus ex machina in 1991?” (Magocsi 2002, ix), but it is far from reality, as it was a distinct nationalist movement, I argue, that did the most to reinforce the idea of national statehood for the Ukrainians after centuries of colonial rule, and united millions in the fight for the independence. According to Hobsbawm (1992, 164), “the eggs of Versailles and Brest Litowsk are still hatching…The explosive issues of 1988-92 were those created in 1918-21…The simplest way to describe the apparent explosion of separatism in 1988-92 is thus as ‘unfinished business of 1918-21.’”

After proclamation of independence on 24 August 1991, many Ukrainians believed there would be immediate changes in their country’s political and economic development but, similar to other states in the region, the transition appeared to take longer than expected. In the period of ‘Perebudova’\textsuperscript{12}, with the elements of democratization in place, there appeared the first political organizations like the Ukrainian Helsinki Group – human rights movement, organized by many former dissidents, with majority of its members eventually belonging to newly established Ukrainian Republican Party of Levko Lukyanenko, a prominent dissident himself. Historic organizations were also revived, like Prosvita – a famous educational society founded in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. As Kuzio (quoted in Shekhovtsov 2011, 209) states that “although small Ukrainian nationalist groups, such as the Natsional’nyi front (National Front) or Ukrayins’ka helsins’ka hrupa (Ukrainian Helsinki Group), did appear in the Ukrainian SSR in the 1960s and

\textsuperscript{12} ‘Reconstruction’ – in English, or ‘perestroika’ – in Russian
afterwards, they were generally national democratic in their ideological orientation ‘with a concentration upon cultural and linguistic issues, human rights and national oppression’.”

The most important event occurred “on 8-10 September 1989 the founding congress of the Popular Movement of […] Ukraine for Perestroika,” (Paniotto 1991, 177) which gave birth to the Ukrainian banner of the pro-independence movement, commonly known as Rukh13. The establishment of Rukh was comparable to the formation of the Polish Solidarnost, both in time and importance, as it instrumentally opposed the communists in cultural and political domains of Ukrainian life, attracting millions of people into support of independence, and then sustainable political and economic development. In its evolution, Rukh was on the center-right of the political spectrum has effectively changed its priority from just cultural and political autonomy to a clearly pro-independence stance in 1990 (Narodnyi Rukh of Ukraine). Adopting the name Narodnyi Rukh of Ukraine (People’s Movement of Ukraine), Rukh formalized into a political party to participate in the 1994 election campaign as the main opponent to still powerful Communists, having “transformed itself from a movement for perestroika into a movement for the state independence of Ukraine.” (Wilson 1997, 68)

Ukrainian independence, proclaimed in August 1991, was confirmed by a nationwide referendum on 1 December 1991. After centuries of foreign rule and different assimilations, Ukrainians voted for independence: “According to the Central Electoral Commission, out of a total of 37,885,555 eligible voters, some 31,891,742 (84.18 percent) took part in the Referendum.

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13 ‘Rukh’ is Ukrainian for ‘movement'
Of those, 90.32 percent or 28,804,071 voted for independence; 2,417,554 or 7.58 percent voted against.” (Potichnyj 1991, 129)

In its twenty years of independence, Ukraine has been governed by four presidents: Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994), Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004), Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010) and the incumbent Viktor Yanukovych, elected in 2010. Major problems that divert Ukraine from further development and implementation of effective economic and political reforms are corruption, cronyism, and the omnipresent Russian factor – which keeps Ukraine hostage in matters ranging from gas supplies and energy dependence, to cultural dependence with the expansion of Russian media, entertainment and publishing through multiple proxies in the Ukrainian establishment. One reaction to these developments is a nationalist agenda, historically more prevalent in Halychyna and Western Ukraine. It is also worth mentioning that according to Wilson (1997, 137) the nationalist parties and movements represented in Ukraine should be divided into “national-democratic” and “ultra-nationalist”. Many would argue about such division, but Wilson (1997, 197) provides the historic parallels, claiming that “most national-democrats have taken their ideological inspiration from Hrushevs’kyi and Lypyns’kyi rather than Mikhnovs’kyi or Dontsov.” Indeed Rukh was initially much more liberal and centrist in its political nature drawing heavily from Lypynskyi’s teachings, while Svoboda clearly positions itself as the descendant of the Ukrainian People’s Party (UPP) of the early 20th century and the OUN of the 1920-40s, favoring the ideology of Dontsov, Mikhnovsky and Bandera. While Rukh preferred parliamentary activity with electoral participation, Svoboda (known as SNPU – the Social National Party of Ukraine14 –

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14 Not to be confused with national socialist ideology, this social nationalism is based on the traditionally Ukrainian right nationalism with respect to human and religious virtues.
before 1991) before the election of 1998 concentrated heavily on extraparliamentary activities, like protests and education activities. According to Shekhovtsov (2011, 213),

the Sotsial-natsional’na partiya Ukrayiny (Social-National Party of Ukraine, SNPU), which changed its name to the Freedom Party in 2004, was launched in Lviv on 13 October 1991. Several small nationalist organisations contributed to the formation of the SNPU, namely the Varta rukhu (Guard of the Movement) led by Yaroslav Andrushkiv and Yurii Kryvoruchko, Students’ke bratstvo L’vova (Lviv Student Fellowship) led by Oleh Tyahnybok, and Molodizhna orhanizatsiya ‘Spadshchyna’ (Organisation of Ukrainian Youth ‘Legacy’) led by Andrii Parubii…In terms of ideology, the SNPU claimed that its social nationalism was founded on the work Two Revolutions [1951], written by Yaroslav Stets’ko under the pseudonym ‘Z. Karbovych’, who argued that a Ukrainian revolution had to combine two revolutions, a national and a social one”

Additionally, Shekhovtsov (2011, 209) argues that “in the post-communist but ‘pre-Orange’ period, the radical rightwing milieu in Ukraine was dominated by three major political organisations, the Vseukrayins’ke politychne ob’ednannya ‘Derzhavna samostiinist’ Ukrayiny’ (All-Ukrainian Political Union ‘State Independence of Ukraine’, DSU), Konhres ukrayins’kykh natsionalistiv (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, KUN) and Ukrayins’ka natsional’na asambleya (Ukrainian National Assembly, UNA).”

Years of mismanagement and absence of expected political and economic reforms, invigorated by the repression against opposition leaders and the murder of the famous journalist Heorhiy Gongadze in 2000, and the allegedly rigged 2004 presidential election, precipitated the Orange Revolution, a popular uprising in the country’s capital, Kyiv, in late 2004 and early 2005. The Orange Revolution reached its apogee in Kyiv’s Independence Square or Maidan Nezalezhnosti, which gave the uprising an alternative name: the ‘Maidan’. It became a symbol of nationwide unity and demand for immediate change, which was seen in the initial success of an opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, but was deprived of victory in the runoff of the 2004 election, and was allegedly poisoned, having his face transfigured. It was only later

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15 Famous Ukrainian journalist allegedly killed by the Kuchma regime as confirmed by the “Melnychenko’s tapes” (sometimes referred to as Gongadzegate in mass media) – recordings of the former security head of President Kuchma.
determined that the Orange Revolution, according to some, had “mobilized the largest number of participants of any democratic revolution and lasted the longest,” (Kuzio 2010, 285).

Ukraine’s geopolitical situation also plays an important role and, according to Meyer “with the EU's indifference and Russia's not-so-covert enmity, the danger is that it will end up stranded between two worlds, neither East nor West.” (Meyer 2005, 78)

Since independence, the Euroatlantic card was regularly played by almost all the presidents, counterbalancing it with the strategic partnership with Russia. Often this duality in international relations was used to threaten one of the sides by preferring either a European, or a Russian vector. As for the nationalist forces, the European cooperation is a major priority, while Russia – impossible to be totally ignored – needs to recognize the crimes of the Soviet system, its official predecessor, and primarily the genocidal Holodomor of 1932-33 before any serious political cooperation. According to Morrison (1993, 677), “since the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia and Ukraine have been at odds over a wide range of issues, ranging from the future of the Black Sea Fleet to the division of former Soviet property, from international debt repayments to energy deliveries, from the shape of the CIS to the control and ownership of nuclear weapons.” Additionally, nationalists are among a few political and pressure groups in contemporary Ukraine that demand ‘lustration’ – a politically motivated clearance which was successfully conducted in a number of Central and Eastern European states. “According to the Freedom Party,” claims Shekhovtsov (2011, 221), “one of the instruments for fighting political corruption would be the implementation of lustration policies, which would purge the Ukrainian political system and administrative
machine of ‘komunisty-kadebisty-kuchmisty’ (communists, KGB agents, and adherents of Kuchma).”

Political System

The current Ukrainian Constitution was adopted in 1996, and has been amended a number of times. Its Article 1 states that “Ukraine is a sovereign and independent, democratic, social, law-based state” (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 1996), and by the form of government is a mixed presidential-parliamentary republic. Even though there was a tendency to delegate more powers to the VRU – the unicameral parliament, in reality both Kuchma (1994-2004) and now Yanukovych (2010-) are trying to adopt additional amendments to extend their powers over the candidature of the Prime Minister and the cabinet, simultaneously limiting those of the VRU. Constant changes are also made to the electoral legal framework, substituting firstly a first-past-the-post system majoritarian (which is based on voting for specific candidates similar to the British and U.S. systems) with a mixed model – majoritarian-proportional (reintroduced for the 2012 VRU election) – and then, transforming into the solely proportional parliamentary election (common in western Europe), depending on the political environment and on the opportunity to influence the election. It was more beneficial for the pro-Kuchma parties to be elected by the old first-past-the-post system, when they had control over local government, but after the Orange Revolution they insisted on changing the law, realizing that by the proportional system they still could draw the electorate as Party of Regions in south-eastern Ukraine, which is their electoral base. Such electoral manipulations are common and provoke the heated debates over the percentage barrier for the parties to get into the VRU, with the pro-presidential parties proposing to raise it above the current
three per cent, while some smaller opposition parties emphasize a lack of democracy with such a high requirement, which will always leave smaller political parties and blocs outside the parliamentary participation, marginalizing them.

The reform of 2004 – known as a compromise between the outgoing Kuchma government and the president-elect Yushchenko – has been considered by many analysts and political scientists as an unnecessary move by Yushchenko’s team in the midst of the Orange Revolution, when he had a clear lead over any other possible candidate and support of millions of Ukrainians. When “most of his key aides believe[d] that the remaining one-year window of strong presidential power will give him sufficient time to deal with the legacies of corruption and to shape a broad future parliamentary majority” (Karatnycky 2005, 46), many of “Yushchenko’s supporters were against these changes, arguing that it was unfair to change the powers of the presidency during presidential elections.” (Kubicek 2009, 327)

The contents of the abovementioned reform became a trojan horse of the outgoing regime for the sake of legitimization of the rerun of the 2004 rigged November election, leaving the new President and his government with limited powers and possibilities to facilitate visible changes in the country, as a lot of important powers were now transferred to the VRU – the national legislature. The President, according to the amendments, remained only fully responsible for a few key ministries (defense, interior and foreign affairs), while the other top government departments were dependent primarily on parliamentary coalition. The greatest loss of that political compromise between the outgoing and incoming elites was delegation of the power to nominate the Prime minister from the head of state to the parliamentary majority, which essentially
both weakened the leader of the Orange Revolution and popularly supported President, and, simultaneously, necessitated formation of a governing coalition in a still weak parliamentary democracy in 2005. This development became a matter of bitter disagreement between the pro-presidential political forces and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, a political union supporting the other popular figure of the Orange Revolution, who later became the Prime minister.

Following the 2006 election, these feuds created something similar to a British hung parliament. As a result, the President Yushchenko had to dissolve the ineffective legislature and a new election was held in 2007. This became a breakthrough campaign for the losers of the Orange Revolution, the Party of Regions, who won a majority and, according to the logic of the creators of the amendments, were eager to nominate their Prime Minister. Mathematically the Orange parties and blocs could have reunited and formed their own coalition, but they were not able to agree on a candidate for the Prime Minister. One of the Orange parties, the Socialist Party of Ukraine switched sides, building a coalition with the Party of Regions.

One of the most controversial steps during Yushchenko’s presidency, and one of the reasons for his failure to be reelected, was a memorandum agreed with his former opponent, the pro-Kuchma and pro-Russian candidate, Yanukovych “in September 2005, by which Yanukovych delivered the votes of the Party of Regions to approve Yushchenko’s nominee, Yuri Yekhanurov, as Prime minister.” (Kubicek 2009, 325) Many considered that move as a betrayal of principles of the Orange Revolution, not only were the organizers of the alleged electoral falsifications unpunished, they were instead offered government offices. According to Menon and Motyl (2011, 137) Yanukovych’s
victory and first years at power only “rolled back democracy and the rule of law, 
deepening political, regional, and linguistic divisions in the country.”

The judiciary, despite being the independent branch of government in accordance 
with the Constitution, has been heavily influenced by the executive branch through the 
mechanism of appointing judges. Following the Orange Revolution, a number of court 
orders, including the decision of the highest Constitutional Court, enabled the rerun of the 
2004 presidential election. But the whole judicial branch needed according to Kubicek 
(2009, 334) encompassing fundamental changes, “a vast reworking of legal codes to take 
into account new social, economic, and political realities – needed to take root.” But they 
did not: neither before, nor after the Revolution.

**Euro-Atlantic Integration**

Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, there has been ongoing debate over its 
choice between Euro-Atlantic integration and some sort of cooperation with a Euro-Asian 
sphere of Russian influence. The governments under Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma 
gravitated closer to the Russian geopolitical orbit, formally calling their foreign policies 
multi-vector or even non-aligned, despite having advocates in the European Union, 
specifically Ukraine’s neighboring countries of the Visegrád Group (Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) and the Baltic nations, eager to negotiate some EU 
preferences on Ukraine’s behalf.

One of the central objectives of the Orange Revolution was to review Ukrainian 
foreign policy. Proponents favored integration to both the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and the European Union. In 2005, for the first time, Ukrainian authorities
opened a serious nationwide debate on closer integration into the European organizations. The West was astonished by these developments in Ukraine, as “by the time victory was announced – in the form of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko’s electoral triumph – the [O]range Revolution had set a major new landmark in the post-communist history of eastern Europe, a seismic shift Westward in the geopolitics of the region.” (Karatnycky 2005, 35)

It was an especially uneasy start to the debate on the NATO, as the southeastern part of the country is greatly affected by the post-Cold War sentiment against any military cooperation with NATO, while the rest of the country has predominantly seen possible NATO entry as a move away from the Russian sphere of interest and towards EU membership. This is primarily dictated by the unwritten practice of other nations, as most of the post-communist neighbors have walked that same way of the NATO membership before the EU entry.

After 2010, Ukraine’s bipolar foreign policy was effectively reinforced by the pro-Russian Yanukovych regime, where similar Kuchma-like rhetoric of strategic partnership is used to an equal extent in Brussels and in Moscow, while the media invigorates a debate on whether to strive for the association status with the European Union, or to simply agree on the warm welcome of the post-Soviet Euro-Asian customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

In terms of European cooperation, Svoboda supports Euro-Atlantic integration as long as it coincides with the country’s national interests, promoting closer cooperation with the countries of the Black Sea basin and formerly Soviet Baltic states. As noted by
Wilson (1997, 173) “Ukraine’s primary foreign policy tasks should be to secure a ‘return to Europe’ and build a strong independent state free from pernicious Russian influence.”

Ruling Parties

Between 1922 and 1990, the Communist Party of the USSR and its Ukrainian branch – the CPU – were the only legal political actors in all the Soviet elections. Kravchuk, the first post-USSR President in 1991, was not favoring any political party when in office, the Communist party was briefly banned from political life. Despite this ban, “former Communist Party officials, recast as national patriots, led the new state,” (Karatnycky 2005, 38) some disguised as national democrats, while others as reformed socialists or social democrats.

Ruling parties were a symbol of the Kuchma presidential administrations: during his second term in office, the President was supported by the highly centralized United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine led by the head of his administration, and later ordered the creation of a pro-presidential For the United Ukraine election bloc during the 2002 presidential election. Following the Orange Revolution, the opposition Yushchenko-led Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko’s Bloc won a sweeping victory during the 2006 campaign, but eventually internal conflicts led to a new election in 2007, which brought in the largest parliamentary faction of the former rival – Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, and gave him a Prime ministerial post, and after Yushchenko lost re-election became a new ruling party. As pointed out by Shekhovtsov (2011, 221), another reason of the failure of the Orange coalition is the fact that “in September 2008, two ‘Orange’ coalition parliamentary groups, Nasha Ukraina–Narodna
Samooborona (Our Ukraine—People’s Self-Defence, NU-NS) and the BYuT, started clashing with each other over the scope of presidential powers, and Prime Minister Tymoshenko was accused of colluding with the ‘anti-Orange’ Partiya rehioniv (Party of Regions, PoR).”

The major concern about the whole political participation debate in contemporary Ukrainian politics is that, as claimed by many independent observers, the presidents in office usually enact extensive ‘administrative resource’ (corrupt schemes to influence an election result through control over the election precincts in general and judges), abusing their positions to promote their own political brands and create an autocratic centralized system of government. The only exception was the Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc, which came from opposition and eventually lost its support and dissolved into smaller constituent parties that originally established it. Since 2010 the ruling Party of Regions has been building a communist-like highly centralized party structure, successfully wooing top businessmen and regional politicians to become members for granting political preferences. In the event of their support of the opposition parties, they might be prosecuted and under formal charges put in jail. In other words, President Yanukovych has returned the totalitarian methods, oppressing opposition parties and media, due to the fact that “Ukraine enjoys a bewildering array of security and law enforcement (the distinction is blurry) bodies within its government, and an equally remarkable lack of clear delineation of functions among them.” (Harasymiw 2003, 327) Party of Regions could be described as “a collection of ex-Soviet functionaries who have amassed wealth through corruption and have scant understanding
of democracy and even less appreciation of Ukrainian identity.” (Menon and Motyl 2011, 137)

Nationalist Opposition

The first election after Gorbachev’s ‘perebudova’ in 1990 came as a surprise to many, as it successfully ended the Communists’ monopoly on power. This provoked a surprising electoral makeover of the Western Ukrainian oblast councils, which were dominated by the dissident-led Rukh (People’s Movement). Opposition deputies were elected among others to the parliament in the first Ukrainian parliamentary election of 1994, even though the number of communists was still disproportionate, and according to Wilson (1997, 134), who comparing two parliamentary campaigns of 1990 and 1994, comes to the conclusion that little has changed in the political spectrum, with the exception of the fact that “from late 1992 onward anti-nationalist forces began to revive.” Commenting on the results of the 1994 Rada election – the first since independence, Kubicek (2000, 284) stated that “the national-democrats, endorsing more reform, withdrawal from the CIS and various aspects of Ukrainianisation, were favoured in the west and in Kyiv, and communists and their allies backing less reform and closer ties with Russia won elsewhere.”

Most non-party parliamentarians were ex-Communists and formally independent, and just waited for a time to form an economically beneficial coalition with the ruling elite, especially during Kuchma’s presidency (1994-2004), while the first President Kravchuk (1991-94) had to work with a somewhat remodeled, but still Soviet parliament which he once headed as a speaker and a leader of the Communists.
The results of the 1998 Rada election according to many were very similar to the previous one, and underlined “quite clearly that regionalism has not waned in Ukraine…national-democrats, led by Rukh, fared well, as usual, in the western regions (31.4% of the vote there, 48.4% in L'viv) and in the city of Kyiv (24.8%), but only received 15.6% of the national total.” (Kubicek 2000, 286).

With leftists having been in power for the whole Soviet period and then reconfigured into the political center, the political opposition was on the nationalist right flank. As claimed by Wilson (2009, 27), “modern Ukrainian nationalism has its roots in the national revival of the nineteenth century,” but it was also greatly invigorated by opposition to the Soviet regime in the dissident movements since 1960s. With transformation into a political party, Rukh participated in all the post-independence elections, but always remained in opposition to the existing governments until the Orange Revolution when, as a member of the Our Ukraine electoral bloc, it received a real opportunity to take enter the government. After the death of Rukh leader, Vyacheslav Chornovil in 1999, which by many was seen as an ordered assassination masked by a traffic accident, Rukh broke up into two separate factions. As a result, its popularity was affected, as well as it influenced the whole nationalist movement. Interestingly enough, another smaller nationalist party – the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (CUN), which claims its roots in the historic OUN, was also part of the Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc, having a few deputies in the Verkhovna Rada, as well as the chairman of the NaftoGaz of Ukraine – a state-controlled oil and gas monopoly. After Yushchenko’s lost re-election both Rukh and CUN were further marginalized, leaving Svoboda at the forefront of Ukrainian nationalist struggle.
While in the first SNPU’s (Svoboda’s) election “in 1998, the party formed an electoral alliance *Menshe sliv* (Fewer Words) with the DSU” and earned little electoral support, “in 2006, for the first time, the Freedom Party flexed its renewed organizational and ideological muscles at parliamentary, regional and city council elections [and] announced the document ‘Program of the Protection of Ukrainians’ as its political program for the parliamentary elections.” (Shekhovtsov 2011, 214 and 217) In 2012, nationalists remain the most effective opposition to the ruling Party of Regions whose ministers have “spent most of their professional lives in the Donbas, where entrenched communist rule was replaced with entrenched oligarchic rule,” while the leftist parties are cooperating with the Yanukovych regime on the basis of the common business interests and pro-Russian rhetoric. In 2012, the most popular opposition party on the nationalist flank is *Svoboda*, and among its electoral gains is the 2010 victory in the heartland of the Ukrainian nationalism – Halychyna, controlling the three oblast councils, repeating the same electoral result as the Rukh victory in 1990. Furthermore, *Svoboda* has increased its nationwide support with each election since 2006 to reach the required 5 per cent to get into the 2012 Parliament. In the 2000s, nationalists increased their support in the Central and Eastern Ukraine unlike in the 1990s, when “nationalists took control of the three oblast councils in Galicia (with between 60 and 80 per cent of the seats) and performed strongly in Volhynia and Kyiv (40 per cent), but made little progress elsewhere.” (Wilson 1997, 124)

Yanukovych’s regime allegedly uses its possible influence via the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the supposedly independent Office of the Prosecutor General to imprison the opposition leaders on formal allegations, similar to those in the Soviet times.
Among the most high-profile arrests is the capture of the former Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko and the former Prime Minister Tymoshenko herself, and “from the start western observers thought that the charges were politically motivated,” (The UK Parliament 2011, 3) as well as “the trial has only galvanized the opposition and discredited Ukraine just as it has sought to move toward the West by signing a free-trade agreement with the European Union.” (Menon and Motyl 2011, 137) Similar prosecutions are common against opposition journalists. The nation’s second President Kuchma, for example, has a marred “reputation after scandals concerning the Gongadze murder case,” (Pavlyuk 2005, 308), which prompted a Ukraine Without Kuchma rally in the capital Kyiv in 2001, considered by many as a rehearsal of the 2004 Orange Revolution.

Svoboda’s Main Goals

Svoboda’s political agenda and goals are best illustrated in the party’s main document, Program of the Protection of Ukrainians (The Program of the Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union 2011), where the preamble reads that “the main goal of the Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union is the creation of the powerful Ukrainian state on the basis of social and national justice…the state, which will take its decent place among the world nations and will guarantee uninterrupted development of the Ukrainian nation.” This document alongside Svoboda’s own Constitution Bill is the major document complemented by the party’s manifestos during each election campaign. It consists of eight chapters dedicated to the specific area of country’s life – system of power and lustration (mentioned earlier), national economy (economic independence and social justice), nation’s health and
overcoming the demographic crisis, citizenship and immigration, information and
education, historic legacy, foreign policy and defense, Crimea and Sevastopol.

Shekhovtsov (2011, 221), similar to other political scientists and analysts of
contemporary Ukrainian politics, insists that “anti-establishment strategies plays a crucial
role in [Svoboda’s] voter mobilization.” It is important to emphasize that Svoboda’s
ideologists do not solely concentrate on the cultural side of the revival of modern
Ukraine, but also plan to modify its political system and “adopt a special anti-corruption
law”, design transparent economic policies and mechanisms, modify the system of
education, regulate the status of Crimean autonomy and Sevastopol through the
nationwide referendum (The Program of the Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union 2011). In
terms of historic legacy, Svoboda insists on the formulation of the historic continuity
between the major stages of Ukrainian statehood with in all constitutional matters with
the emphasis on renewal of the Ukrainian political independence in 1991 rather than
proclamation, referring to the period between the existence of the UNR and Ukrainian
State of the 1918-21 and 1991 as “occupation”, similarly to the Baltic states or Georgia;
also paying special attention to the present-day matters of foreign cooperation and
defense referring to the ideal national foreign strategy as “European Ukraine-centrism,
based on which Ukraine must become not only a geographical, but also a geopolitical
center of Europe.” (ibid) Additionally, Svoboda maintains cooperation with other
nationalist parties in Europe, jointly coining their position in the contemporary
continental political arena within the Euronat, a right-wing pan-European alliance.
4.3. Ukrainian Society and Culture

As with many other European nationalist movements, Ukrainian culture played an important role throughout the centuries of oppression, being one of the major components on the agenda of nationalists. Of most importance are the questions of language and religion, but also relevant are the poems and writings of Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko and Lesya Ukrainka, and other authors who were the frontrunners of the Ukrainian nationalist idea of independent homeland. As an example, Taras Shevchenko, “the son of a serf who was eventually to be canonized as Ukraine’s national bard…wrote in Ukrainian, where his very talent validated the use of the language and constructed its modern form,” writes Wilson (2009, 90) and, as he continues, “according to the writer Oksana Zabuzhko, he was therefore the first true ‘national intellectual’.” According to Subtelny, one of the leading Ukrainian historians, Shevchenko’s “poetry became in effect a literary and intellectual declaration of Ukrainian independence.” (Wilson 1997, 29)

For Ukraine’s nationalists defense of the national culture is a primary concern, as noted by The Program of the Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union (2011), where both of the chapters – on information and education, and on historical legacy and continuity are dedicated to a variety of cultural matters on both international and internal level, such as “to gain recognition by the VRU [and of the world organizations] of the Ukrainian Genocide of the 20th century,” “revive traditionally Ukrainian holidays”, “establish a state museum of the Ukrainian fight for independence”, as well as “facilitate a return to Ukraine of the national, cultural and historic treasures, removed abroad during the periods of occupation.”
Religious conflicts

In terms of Ukraine’s religious identity, since the times of Kyivan Rus and Prince Volodymyr’s Christening of 988, Ukraine has followed the Byzantine or Orthodox tradition of the Christian faith, which found its logical continuation in the formation of the Kyivan metropolis. Its existence was interrupted by the illegal “subordination of the Kyiv Metropolitanate to the Moscow Patriarchate in 1686” (RISU, 2012). With Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the four largest churches were the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) of Kyiv Patriarchate, UOC of Moscow Patriarchate, Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church, and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church – formed in 1596 as the Byzantine church in communion with Rome. Moscow Patriarchate is supported financially and politically from Moscow and pro-Russian groups in Ukraine, as it “had been part of the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church, and only in 1990 was granted autonomy and given its current name though it remained administratively subordinate to the patriarch of Moscow.” (Hentosh and Sorokowski 2000, 193) The other three churches are supported by a larger number of Ukrainian adherents, but have less political power. Being affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, the Moscow Patriarchate still possesses church property from other religious denominations as a result of the Soviet confiscations, which greatly impedes the positive intercommunal dialog of the Ukrainian churches in opposition. As a solution, the other three major Ukrainian churches, with the exception of the Russian patriarchate, are eager to negotiate further union to form an independent Ukrainian Autocephalous Church of its own right without jurisdiction of Moscow or Rome. This idea was present among the unifying slogans in the ideological framework of the Orange Revolution, in accordance with the Christian Orthodox
practices, each independent nation has a right for their own autocephalous church in full communion with other Orthodox churches. This was not implemented due to fierce opposition from Moscow that heavily depends on its Ukrainian adherents, especially in financial and property terms, as “since approximately half of all Orthodox parishes in the former Soviet Union were [and still are] located in Ukraine.” (Harasymiw 2002, 212) At the same time, “a very prominent feature of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate remains its Russianness, [as] the sermons are usually in Russian and the entire religious culture of the Moscow Patriarchal parishes is Russian…and is often accompanied by a dismissive attitude toward Ukraine and the Ukrainian language as inappropriate for serious and sacred church matters.” (Magosci 2010, 743)

Nevertheless, the issue was raised as a legitimate one, because of the outgoing Kuchma regime’s politics of supporting the anti-Ukrainian agenda of the Russian church for their own political, and specifically electoral dividends, whereas Magosci (2010, 743) juxtaposes two of the first Ukrainian presidents – President Kravchuk who “favored the Kyiv Patriarchate” and President Kuchma with his support of the Moscow-oriented jurisdiction. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union (2004, 13) in their review even suggested that “the Kuchma election appeared to represent a full victory for the east and south of Ukraine, the Russian-speaking population, and the Moscow Patriarchate.”

During the Orange Revolution rallies, the church question played a unifying role, as Ukrainians of all parts of the country expressed their desire to obtain a fully independent and recognized national church, although realizing that the widely supported Orange government cannot do much in exercising this popular will as according to the
Ukrainian Constitution the church is separated from the state. Many political scientists agree that “Ukraine’s Orthodoxy has a pro-Western orientation and a majority of its believers supported the Orange Revolution and Yushchenko’s candidacy”. (Kuzio 2010a, 287) As a result, throughout his term in office, Yushchenko firmly supported the idea of a unified Ukrainian church with its historic center in Kyiv was mentioned in all his public addresses and official protocols. This stance of a new President added to the existing conflict with the Russian establishment, but Yushchenko was adamant that this issue could never be a matter of any debate, especially between the two officially secular countries.

Since Yanukovych took power in 2010, there started an extensive implementation of the Russian strategic interests through a charade of its proxies. Yanukovych’s regime is manipulating the church question in a similar fashion to Kuchma, officially recognizing and supporting only the Russian affiliate, the Moscow patriarchate. This tendency becomes even more persistent now, after the Russian government’s official policy of sponsoring the ‘Russian world’ – strategically constructed new regional expansion covered by the interests of the church and promoted by the Russian patriarch Cyril during his multiple official visits to Ukraine.

Ukrainian nationalists in general, and the Svoboda party in particular support the idea of an independent or autocephalous Ukrainian church with its center in Kyiv, which will unite all the Ukrainian Orthodox churches of Kyivan tradition. Section 29 of the fifth article of Svoboda’s Program (2011) is specifically dedicated to this cause, as the creation of a totally recognized worldwide, or canonical, in the words of the world Orthodoxy, church will strengthen the cultural and political independence of Ukraine.
Language issue

Another greatly politicized issue in the Ukrainian everyday life is language. The best illustration of anti-Ukrainian linguistic policies were the two tsarist prohibitions which “proscribed that language from schools in 1804 and, in 1863 and 1876, prohibited publishing in it” (Velychenko 1997, 420), known as Ems and Valuev Ukaz “during Russian tsarist rule in the mid to late nineteenth century…overtly banning any publications or public uses of Ukrainian.” (Bilaniuk 2003, 51) With an exception of a brief official status for the Ukrainian language during the short-lived independence in 1918-21, as well as the policies of Ukrainianization of the early 1920s, in the later periods “soviet linguistic policies were usually more covert, carried out under the banner of internationalism, they generally continued to suppress the Ukrainian language (and other non-Russian languages) in favor of Russian.” (Bilaniuk 2003, 51)

“Under the Soviet regime”, writes Bilaniuk (2003, 51), “Russian was imposed forcefully and also attracted people by the privileges associated with it [while] Ukrainian was publicly held in low regard.” Under the Soviet system, Russification became an official policy in the 1930s, and resulted in a tremendous change towards decline of the use of Ukrainian: “from 1959 to 1989 the number of Ukrainians speaking Russian as their mother tongue rose from 2 million to 4.6 million, while the proportion of the republic’s population citing Ukrainian as their mother tongue fell from 73 per cent to under 65 per cent.” (Wilson 1997, 22)

In 1989, Ukrainian became the official language of the country as “one of the first legal steps towards de-Sovietization and independence of the country in 1991.” (Bilaniuk 2003, 50). Although official support for Ukrainian occurred during the Kravchuk
government, this was reversed by the pro-Russian Kuchma regime. Most Ukrainians consider Ukrainian as their native language. According to the latest census of 2001 (Ukrainian Census 2001) “the part of those whose mother tongue is Ukrainian totals 67.5% of the population of Ukraine, this is by 2.8 percentage points more than in 1989.”

In reality, the situation is rather different with a disproportional prevalence of the Russian language in southeastern Ukraine, and ineffectiveness of the language laws. There are nationwide irregularities in the language distribution in the media, schooling, entertainment, business and local government official use. Wilson (1997, 153) suggests that “as Ukrainian is the only true indigenous language…for nationalists Ukrainianization is more accurately described as ‘de-Russification’, that is the reversion to a more natural status quo ante.” Language is a critical question in every presidential or parliamentary election, where pro-Russian political parties and blocs oftentimes use the issue for attracting voters in the oblasts along the Russian border. The issue of the Russian language was central to the presidential campaigns of Kuchma and Yanukovych, and, to date, Yushchenko is the only President who advocated the protection by the state for the Ukrainian language. As noted by Bilaniuk (2003, 51 & 61),

Russian is still a politically powerful presence, a lingua franca of the post-Soviet regions, and its cultural prestige remains strong - a situation that the Russian government is trying to maintain [and] although Russian is not the official language of the state of Ukraine, it is still used by many officials, and it is the official language of Ukraine's large and powerful neighbor to the north.

The Orange Revolution as a symbol of national consciousness led many people from the Russified southeastern parts of the country to switch to Ukrainian in their everyday use, similar to the post-independence developments in 1991. Maidan became a symbol of national unity, and the Ukrainian language was one of its elements, with almost all the speeches made in the country’s official language.
Yanukovych’s government is promoting the opposite agenda. Most of his government’s officials come from the predominantly Russian-speaking far-eastern industrial Donbas region and typically ignore the constitutional norm of the mandatory knowledge of Ukrainian, as the single state language. As noted by Menon and Motyl (2011, 139), “Yanukovych reversed Yushchenko’s pro-Ukrainian cultural initiatives by appointing the notoriously anti-Ukrainian official Dmytro Tabachnyk as minister of education and science and permitting him to roll back a variety of state-funded programs aimed at fostering Ukrainian language and culture,” which legitimately united people around Svoboda’s nationalist agenda, as it “provoked outrage within significant segments of the Ukrainian public, especially the pro-democratic, Ukrainian-speaking electorate based largely in central and western Ukraine.”

Another language issue, debated in Ukraine since the 1994 ascension of Kuchma is the interpretation of the European Charter. Its emphasis on the protection of minority regional languages has been reversed by some in Ukraine to refer to the regional languages of minorities. Such an assessment specifically prioritizes the Russian language, which is both far from being endangered, and prevails in the Ukrainian regions neighboring Russia. This Kuchma-government approach was widely critiqued by the Orange governments, which rejected the pro-Russian interpretation.

However, with the victory of Yanukovych in 2010, the issue was revisited. Party of Regions emphasizes protection of the Russian language, and as in previous electoral campaigns, “incitement of regional and inter-ethnic tensions was a major strategy adopted by the Yanukovych shadow campaign and Russian political technologists…it drew on the success of Kuchma’s 1994 election campaign.” (Kuzio 2010 b, 384)
The question of the language has always been among the main ones on the agenda of all the historic and contemporary nationalist parties and movements in Ukraine, as losing the language is often compared to losing the national statehood.

Regional Divide

There is a historic territorial division of Ukraine, as for many centuries the western and eastern regions of the country were ruled by the neighboring powers – the former by Poland, Austro-Hungary, Romania and Hungary, while the latter by Russian and then Soviet Empires. This post-colonial legacy not only influenced the differences in some cultural elements, but also produced an electoral predicament for the contemporary Ukraine, where politicians sometimes go as far as to threaten the territorial integrity of the country. While they draw heavy support from only one of its two opposing parts, primarily the south-eastern Ukraine, those politicians lament the possible breakup of the country due to extreme political and supposedly cultural differences.

Roman Szporluk (1997, 87-88), the Ukrainian American historian provides a perfect overview of the Ukrainian regions and their historic evolution starting his analysis by introducing that “before 1648, virtually all Ukrainians lived within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, whose eastern frontier extended to the east of the Dnieper River,” proceeding with the details of each region: “southern Ukraine, including the Crimea, conquered by the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century from the Ottoman Turks,” “the region of Transcarpathia… uninterruptedly a part of Hungary from the Middle Ages until 1919,” “the Chernivtsi region – the northern part of the former Austrian province of Bukovina – was Romanian from 1918 to 1940,” while also
analyzing the past of Halychyna, from the times of Polish domination through Austro-Hungarian rule, brief independence as WUNR, and then Soviet times.

Having this history in mind, and knowing similar unification processes in the history of Germany and Italy in the late 19th century, many authors agree that the center of national and state-building unification for Ukraine was Halychyna, while Magocsi even called his book *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont* (2002), comparing Ukraine’s Halychyna (using its Western name variant) with Italy’s leading nationalist unification region of Piedmont. The author also suggests that one of the reasons for this is the fact that “Habsburg rule [...] was from the standpoint of Ukrainian nationalism quite positive.” (Magocsi 2002, 57) Ukrainian National Committee of the United States (1919, 40) also refers to Halychyna as “‘intellectual Piedmont’ for the Ukrainian movement,” while Zales’ka Onyshkevych and Revakovich (2009, 225) agree that “many view Galicia as the center of the Ukrainian national revival, both past and present.”

In the same time, the issue of regionalism of Ukraine is really politicized, both culturally and electorally, which are two intertwined and interdependent aspects of the division. Also, it is important to mention that despite the fact that many regions of Ukraine were occupied by different former colonial powers, the real duality since the beginning of the 20th century and the period of the first independence of 1918-21 was and still is between the “Ukrainian differentiation from Russia and Poland respectively [which] did not necessarily guarantee the unity of those Ukrainians who refused to be Russian with those Ukrainians who refused to be Polish.” (Szporluk 1997, 109) Even though it is a simplified perception and mostly relevant to the early statehood attempts,
conceptually the differences are still on the West and Center versus South-East line.

Heavy industrialized regions, artificially vacated from Ukrainians by the genocidal Holodomor in South-eastern Ukraine were settled with Russians, which provoked that duality between them and the rest of Ukraine, which is more Western-oriented and Ukrainian-speaking. Kubicek (2000, 273) provided a detailed overview to the regional distinction of Ukraine, calling it a state,

In which regional and ethnic divisions and the uncertain loyalties of a substantial body of citizens have been the source of numerous troubles and worries since independence was achieved in 1991…Generally, analysts draw a line along the Dniepr river, dividing the country into a Russified and heavily industrialised East, and a more ethnically Ukrainian, Western-oriented West. The former harbours conservative communists who are ardently against market reforms and desire closer links with Moscow. The latter is the home to Ukrainian nationalists and assorted national-democrats who seek more rapid political and economic reforms and integration of their country with the West.

**Diaspora and Nationalism**

Discussing the question of Ukrainian émigré communities, Magocsi (2010, 457) differentiates ‘Ukrainian diaspora’ – “which almost always refers to communities of ethnic Ukrainians and their descendants living in various places outside Ukraine” – and ‘Ukraine’s Other Diasporas’, “since Ukraine was – and is – home to many different peoples.” Similarly, in this thesis I refer to the ethnic ‘Ukrainian diaspora,’ not at the least because other ethnic communities stemming historically from the territory of Ukraine do not regard themselves as such, preferring their own ethnic markers, as the Poles, Jews or Romanians etc.

The phenomenon of Ukrainian nationalism is almost impossible to imagine without an important role of its numerous diaspora. Similarly to other émigré groups, there are multiple discourses within and about the diaspora regarding the use and applicability of the term as such, as well as differentiation of the diasporic communities based on the wave of arrival to a host country and its geographic location. Important to
my debate in this thesis is also the role played by nationalism as the main ideology of the diaspora in the struggle of the Ukrainian nation for its independence, and, more recently, in the fight to preserve Ukraine’s political and cultural sovereignty from the geopolitical and interventionist economic influences of its northern neighbor – the Russian Federation.

While most historians agree that the first wave of Ukrainian immigrants was the least politically active, the next waves came to play more important roles in the community’s political life, expressing their various ideological preferences. With smaller socialist and monarchist groups, nationalists were the most numerous, and benefited in membership with each new wave, especially the ideologically strongest third immigration stage of DP immigrants. From that perspective, the members of the interwar and post-war (pre-1991) diaspora were also the strongest actors on the Ukrainian nationalist arena, and a substantial part of the émigré Ukrainians belonged to the OUN, as well as UPA, which fought both the Nazi Germany and Soviet Union. This event became possible after “Ukrainians in Europe came to realize that their political effectiveness was diminished by the divisions that had formed earlier in the decade...[and together with] the subsequent split within it had a profound effect on the Ukrainian diaspora.” (Satzewich 2002, 64)

Similarly to the situation in the western Ukraine from where most of the immigrants historically migrated or the circumstances of the interwar diasporic community (with its fragmentation between the monarchists-hetmanists and supporters of the republic), the division into Banderites and Melnykites – two nationalist factions – was clearly present and influenced the everyday life of the diaspora, as “the differences between the...wings of the OUN, along with other nationalist-oriented groups, split many Ukrainian diaspora
In the same time, Luciuk in his article is referring to the Ukrainian DP camps as “Little Ukraines” or “Ukrainian villages”:

Since most Ukrainian refugees were to spend two or more years in these centers many eventually came to share the worldview of the militants among them. They came to believe that only through militant struggle would they return to a Ukraine freed from the powers which occupied this nation. They would, in the meantime, place all their resources at the disposal of the nationalist movement, no matter where they resettled (Luciuk 1986, 474).

As a consequence, nationalism has become a common ideology for the prevalent part of the Ukrainian diaspora, being the only acceptable instrument in their struggle against the formally leftist Soviet system, stemming back from the first part of the twentieth century and being the integral part of the diasporic community until the proclamation or rather rebirth of the Ukrainian independent state in 1991. It is still playing its role when the recent developments in already independent Ukraine go the unexpected way, in an openly pro-Russian pattern, which is immediately implemented in the form of protests and boycotts.

4.4. Ukrainian Economy and Globalization

Economic Overview

One of the major problems facing Ukraine in 2012 is overwhelming unemployment, a result of the bankruptcies or closures of the former heavy machinery enterprises, which were primarily involved in the cold-war military industry, and poorly managed agriculture that has hardly recovered from the transition from collective to private farming. As a result, many Ukrainians are emigrating in search of better employment opportunities, forming a new, primarily economy-driven, diasporic wave. One of the possible positive developments in the country’s economy depend on investment, but corruption and lack of effective liberalism, and overwhelming crony protectionism make the country an economy with an unstable financial climate.
In terms of major economic characteristics, we can see from Figures 3 and 4 that Ukraine’s economy is recovering from the worldwide crisis. According to the Trading Economics (2013), the GDP “in Ukraine contracted 2.50 percent in the fourth quarter of 2012 over the same quarter of the previous year,” while “historically, from 2000 until 2012, Ukraine’s GDP annual growth rate averaged 4.43 percent reaching an all-time high of 14.30 percent in September of 2004 and a record low of -19.60 percent in March of 2009,” with the Economist (as in Figure 3) putting these figures at 12.1 for 2004 and -14.8 in 2009, following the global crisis. At the same time, according to Figure 3, the 2002 GDP Growth is the lowest in the three recent years while these negative markers are very similar to the same developments elsewhere in Europe or the rest of the world.

Figure 3. Overview of the Ukrainian Economy (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012).

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-14.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget balance/GDP</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt/GDP</td>
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<td>33.5</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
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<td>34.8</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation %</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<td>Unemployment, %</td>
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<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP/head</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-14.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Balance, billion $</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance/GDP</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
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<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>-8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inward foreign direct investment/GDP</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inward foreign direct Investment/</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total debt/GDP</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>80.6</td>
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Figure 4. Ukrainian GDP Annual Growth Rate (Trading Economics, 2013 – from the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine).

Important in the analysis of economic independence is also an overview of the main trading partners. For Ukraine in 2011, according the influential report “Ukraine: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World” (European Commission, 2012) the main trading partners were on one side Russia with an average summary of exports and imports at about 32.4%, and the European Union partners (based on percentage from all 27 member states) with about 29.1% and China with 5.6% on the other side. This means that Ukrainian economy successfully diversifies its markets, but Russia still remains a major economic partner, with energy supplies accounting for the major stake of the overall Ukraine’s imports.

At the same time, another criterion important to the future consideration of Ukraine’s readiness for the EU application and further economic independence from the
northern neighbor, Russian Federation, is public debt as a percentage to the national GDP, and in 2011, “Ukraine recorded a government debt to GDP of 36.50 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product,” whereas “historically, from 1997 until 2011, Ukraine’s government debt to GDP averaged 32.40 percent, reaching an all-time high of 61 Percent in December of 1999 and a record low of 12.30 percent in December of 2007.” (Trading Economics, 2013) These figures mean that Ukraine’s public debt is quite acceptable with the EU requirement of >60 percent. Current inflation rate seems also applicable to the above-mentioned Maastricht criteria, and according to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, it “was recorded at -0.80 percent in March of 2013” and in the same time “historically, from 1995 until 2013, Ukraine’s inflation rate averaged 38.99 percent, reaching an all-time high of 530.30 percent in September of 1995 and a record low of -1.20 percent in June of 2012.” (ibid)

One other important component of economic analysis of any potential EU candidate is \( \leq 3\% \) of the budget deficit, based on which Ukraine needs to improve the current “government budget deficit equal to 1.80 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product in 2012.” (Trading Economics, 2013) According to the same source (ibid), “historically, from 1997 until 2011, Ukraine government budget averaged -2.33 percent of GDP, reaching an all-time high of 5.10 percent of GDP in December of 1999 and a record low of -6 percent of GDP in December of 2010.”

In post-socialist transition economies, a central issue is privatization of the formerly vast public sector, which in many instances was not properly controlled and sometimes lacked an appropriate legal framework. Ordinary citizens often claim no real benefits except for almost worthless share certificates, while “wide-ranging privatization
also enabled government insiders and cronies to buy state enterprises at bargain-basement prices...steel mills, today worth several billion dollars, were bought for a few million.” (Karatnycky 2005, 39) It is also sometimes referred to as “nomenklatura privatization”, under which members of the old Soviet-era elite used their positions to obtain ownership in economic enterprises.” (Kubicek 2009, 331)

Ukraine’s tax system has been widely used as another element of corrupt persecution, “as the government manipulated it to gain financial and political advantages: competitors could be harassed or forced out of business by inspections and fines, and oligarchs could easily evade paying taxes.” (Kubicek 2009, 339) Oligarchy\(^\text{16}\) is a very widespread phenomenon in Ukrainian everyday life, which basically controls its politics, economy and mass media, and, according to Petrunya (2008, quoted in Shekhovtsov 2011, 220), “the [Svoboda] party leaders consider their radical right-wing project a political alternative to ‘the crisis of parliamentarianism and seizure of power by the oligarchic clans, who deprived the people of any possibility to influence the processes in the country.”

A rather disturbing illustration can be found in the book and print media market, where the major role is played by the Russian publishing houses that have lower taxes and better opportunities for the authors and editorial boards, while in the same time Ukrainian domestic laws remain fiscally austere, which is explained by the close ties between the publishers in Russia and their business lobbyists in the Ukrainian parliament who support the neighbor’s market with proper legislation, in the same time bringing the local book market to a decay.

\(^{16}\)A Greek borrowing which, according to the Dictionary.com, means: “a form of government in which all power is vested in a few persons or in a dominant class or clique; government by the few.”
The issue of solution of all those multiple economic problems was on the to-do list of the most urgent plans of the protesters at Maidan in 2004-5. They hoped that under an effective and transparent management of a new government these goals could be easily achieved, and they were assured accordingly by Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. What kept protesters’ expectations high were Yushchenko’s specialization in finances and his effective and positively regarded terms in office as National Bank chief and Prime Minister, when he managed to eradicate the post-Soviet tendency of severe salary distribution delays in the public sector. His team was also eloquent in making abundant promises during their addresses from multiple revolutionary tribunes, boasting many famous reformers from the previous governments, and those who yet never had a chance to demonstrate their economic skills. As the only possible way to implement the desire of people of Maidan, “Yushchenko needed to crack down on Ukraine's crony capitalism.” (Karatnycky 2005, 41)

Unfortunately once in office, no serious reforms were introduced, and Yushchenko’s once highly regarded team of professionals became known for their own new type of cronyism, employing and supporting their close allies, and paying less attention to urgent economic problems. This then was coupled with severe in-fighting between the former allies, primarily Yushchenko’s and Tymoshenko’s parliamentary and executive factions, which was followed by the latter’s disastrous gas negotiations with Russia, which were partially classified. Mutual disagreements and accusations ended in government reshuffles and revival of Yanukovych, firstly as Prime minister following the memorandum, and then as the new President in 2010.
Russian Gas and Ukraine’s Dependence

One of the major problems of the post-independence Ukrainian development is definitely the issue of sustainability, especially in the context of natural resources. But instead of exploration of nationally owned gas fields, Ukraine’s governments over-concentrated on negotiating the gas deals with the Russian federation, which have usually ended up in strategic losses for the Ukrainian government.

Russia continuously uses the issue of gas supplies in promoting its expansive policies bargaining the implementation of favorable projects, while Ukraine has so far failed to respond respectfully by protecting their own national interests. That is why this question was also urgently stressed at the times of the Orange Revolution, whereas Maidan favorites assured the supporters that new Ukrainian governments will work much harder in protecting Ukraine’s own national priorities, specifically in renegotiating the deal on the rent of the port of Sevastopol by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, making it dependent on possible raises in gas prices.

After he was sworn into the office in 2005, Russian authorities continued to play the gas card with Yushchenko’s government, but the Orange ministers decided to revisit the gas agreements. The northern neighbor responded by cutting gas supplies to all of Europe, which made other European states think of Ukraine as an unstable economic player as most of the pipelines are currently laid through Ukrainian territory. By this maneuver of blackmailing Ukraine, the Russian government at the same time started two different debates – one on necessity of the takeover of the Ukrainian pipeline system by the international community with their supervision, and another – on possible alternative pipeline projects outside Ukraine.
With Yanukovych’s takeover, the question was debated again, but was solved at the expense of Ukraine, seen as one of the greatest losses since Ukrainian independence. The former President Yushchenko suggested that it “would lead to the ‘Russification’ of Ukraine,” while another opposition leader, Yuliya Tymoshenko “said the agreement violated part of the Ukrainian constitution, which forbids the country from hosting foreign military bases after 2017.” (Jeffries 2011, 213) The 2010 Kharkiv agreement consisted of supposed gas price discounts in exchange of an extension of the lease for the Russian Black Sea fleet for another twenty years. When this agreement was made public, it was a great shock for the Ukrainian community both in Ukraine and abroad, and was considered by many as a severe blow to the country’s sovereignty, comparable to the rejection of the third largest nuclear potential in the beginning of the nineties. According to Menon and Motyl (2011, 138), “even Ukrainian government officials admit in private that it was a bad deal: Ukraine still pays exceptionally high gas prices and failed to negotiate an adequate rent for the base, whereas Russia has succeeded in ensconcing itself for the long term in the intensely pro-Russian Crimean Peninsula.” At the same time, the fiercest opposition to the Kharkiv agreement was expressed by the Svoboda party, which not only staged mass protests across the nation, but also dedicated a special point in the part 8 of its Program (2011) – “The Crimea and Sevastopol. Introduction of the constitutional order and maintenance of the stable development” – demanding “to denounce the Kharkiv agreement of Yanukovych-Medvedev of 21 April 2010.”

4.5. Conclusion

Having finally gained its political independence in 1991, nonetheless Ukraine remains vulnerable to Russia’s economic expansion due to heavy dependence on energy
imports. Through a string of pro-Russian governments, Ukraine failed to distance itself from numerous cultural and political influences from its northern neighbor and former metropolis, without implementation of legislation to protect the Ukrainian language, further develop local book printing business and cinematography. Additionally, Russian Orthodox church still heavily influences Ukraine’s spiritual life and church politics through its formally autonomous branch – Moscow patriarchy. Nationalism in Ukraine, both historic and contemporary remains ethnic in nature and concentrates on the political right. Ukrainian diaspora, consolidated primarily by its second and third waves, political in nature, plays an important role in preserving cultural and linguistic identity of Ukraine abroad, as well as actively supporting democratic processes in the homeland and its Euro-Atlantic integration. In order to have a political or legal mechanism to influence Ukraine’s election or politics, a member of diaspora has to be a citizen of Ukraine. In terms of Ukrainian economy, it is still transitioning towards fully market processes, being severely hit by post-Soviet oligarchy and overwhelming corruption that prevent normal and steady development. The main economic parameters are far from the required Maastricht criteria with much higher inflation, public debt and only nominal GDP growth.
CHAPTER FIVE: COMPARISON

5.1. Differences

Of utmost importance is the actual political status of both nations. Having established that both countries can be considered nations for their culture and religion, it is also a well-established fact that from the point of view of international diplomatic relations and their respective status in the United Nations and other international organizations, Ukraine is politically independent while Scotland is a part of the United Kingdom with a devolved status due to the unwritten character of the UK Constitution.

Prior to 1980s, Scottish nationalism was stuck in the left-or-right debate with an eventual predominance of the leftist agenda in the Scottish National Party, especially due to the leadership of Alex Salmond. There has been little or no such debate in the Ukrainian nationalist flank, as any leftist ideology was tainted by association with the USSR and considered deeply anti-Ukrainian. Even though there were a few leftist political parties in the 1918-1920s, they were far from advocating a nationalist agenda and mainly relied on their potential federalist ties with the expected democratic Russia.

In a similar fashion, another dichotomy in the nationalist discourse – between ethnic and civic nationalism – is also a point of dissimilarity between Ukraine and Scotland: “Tsarist Russian relations with Cossack-Ukraine and English relations with Scotland provide two valuable examples illustrating the importance of law and civil institutions in determining whether regional patriotism would evolve into a separatist "ethnic" nationalism or a "civic nationalism" compatible with an imperial loyalism.” (Velychenko 1997, 415) And this difference is both historic and contemporary, where
Scottish ethnic nationalism is as much non-existent as its Ukrainian civic nationalist counterpart, neither in a form of ideological support, nor as an organized party.

Another dissimilarity lies in the field of language use, as disregarding a somewhat similar duality between English and Gaelic in Scotland versus Ukrainian and Russian, the background and historic developments are quite incomparable. With a mutual presence of the factor of geographic opposition in both countries, it was the oppression in the form of two prohibitions of the Ukrainian language that primarily caused the eradication of Ukrainian in some (primarily urban) areas of the south-eastern Ukraine, while Gaelic was geographically bound, and only later was it the lack of government’s support that caused its near extinction, not least because of the 18th century government oppression – even in the area of historic prevalence of the Scottish Gaelic language – in the Highlands and Western Islands. Also, contrary to Magocsi’s (2002, 83) claim for the importance of language for stateless peoples, the revival of Scottish national aspiration was mainly concentrated on the issue of political autonomy through self-government, while for Ukrainian nationalism language played a major part in the fight against oppression, as “national revivals in East-Central Europe were led by […] linguists.” (Magocsi 2002, 84)

At first sight, religious distribution also seems very much alike, but at closer look there are multiple peculiarities absent in the opposite case study. Firstly, traditionally Scottish Church of Scotland or the Kirk was granted autonomy by the 1707 Treaty of Union and was considered as one of the greatest pillars of the national autonomy of Scots, especially due to an importance that religion played at that time. At the same time, in Soviet Ukraine (as well as in Ukrainian territories under Muscovy before) the official ban on traditional Autocephalous Orthodox and eastern-rite Greek Catholic churches
oulawed any kind of religious activity unless it was operated under the jurisdiction of KGB-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (Bourdeaux and Shenk, 1996). Secondly, despite some similarities between the efforts of Kremlin and Westminster to break down the churches’ unity, even after the Disruption of 1843, Scotland managed to preserve its Kirk – as a symbol of its religious freedom. Finally, the opposition of the Kirk (or rather Presbyterian church) on one hand and the Catholics on the other, is primarily based on the ethnically motivated dichotomy of Catholic Irish settlers against the autochthonous Scottish Calvinists, while the geographical division (unlike the Ukrainian Orthodox in the east versus Eastern or Greek Catholic in the west) has only played a marginal role earlier in the 20th century and is no longer a major factor in Scotland’s contemporary religious affairs.

Among the distinctions between Scottish and Ukrainian colonial history, it is worth mentioning that Ukraine (specifically, its contemporary Western part), unlike Scotland, was subordinated to more than one foreign power. Among them were Poland, Czechoslovakia (later - Hungary) and Romania, with all of them being unwilling to recognize any type of autonomy for the Ukrainians – neither cultural, nor political, similarly to the developments in the Soviet-controlled east of the Ukrainian territory. Spencer and Wollman (2002, 143) who, noting the Polish colonial administration over Ukraine’s Halychyna: “After the First World War, many of the newly-recognized nation-states of Eastern Europe proved intolerant of nationalist movements in their own areas, Polish treatment of Ukrainians being a case in point.” Seeing a successful example of self-determination elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe, Ukrainian nationalists were
unwilling to give up, and according to Wilson (1997, 15), “persecution only contributed to the rise of radical Ukrainian nationalism.”

As another point of difference between Ukrainian and Scottish nationalisms is the degree of cultural sovereignty within Russian and British empires accordingly, “whereas Scottish subordination to England and its commitment to empire did not imply subservience nor the destruction of Scottish identity, the Ukrainian subordination to empire almost did erase Ukrainian identity.” (Velychenko 1997, 438)

The role of diaspora is another example of disconnection between the two nationalisms. There are at least two apparent asymmetries here, where one lies in the degree of assimilation (more typical of the Scottish émigré community), and the other is based on the formal opportunities to participate in the homeland’s political life due to the appropriate legal framework, primarily because there are considerably more current Ukrainian citizens living in contemporary diasporic communities, than their Scottish counterparts in their respective groups, which limits the access to electoral process of the latter community.

Economy is yet one more example of dissimilarity between the two case studies, even though equally addressed in both major parties’ manifestoes. Scotland’s economy if counted separately from the rest of the UK could fit the requirements of any European institution, whereas Ukrainian economy struggles a lot to pursue some economic growth amongst omnipresent corruption, controlled privatization and rule of oligarchy.

5.2. Similarities

There are many similarities between the circumstances in which developed both Ukrainian nationalism on one hand, and Scottish one on the other, as it is somewhat
proven by Benedict Anderson (1996, 2), who said that “the fact that the Soviet Union shares with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland the rare distinction of refusing nationality in its naming suggests that it is as much the legatee of the prenational dynastic states of the nineteenth century.” And in both instances the central governments were working on creating one nation, whether it is Britons or Soviet people, through the common practices of assimilating Scots and Ukrainians accordingly. This is one of the most debated topics in Scottish historiography, which cannot omit nationalist discourse, as well as in the Ukrainian one.

Similarly to the Scottish case, it was important for Ukraine during its complicated Soviet history to secure, in Calhoun’s (1997, 63) terms “a modicum of independence from the Russian-dominated Soviet Union.” USSR continued with a tradition of Russian Empire in specific abusing the national peculiarities of many ethnic groups, whose territories they conquered, with a distinct desire to Russify them before the revolution of 1917, or later to build one Soviet nation, which was a disguise for even further neglect of their rights. In this regard, Craig Calhoun (1997, 25) had skillfully underlined the formal propaganda rhetoric that “the Soviet Union had long claimed to represent a special kind of internationalism and to have brought an end to nationalism and historic conflict of nations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.” While discussing another issue – of political maps – Calhoun (1997, 16) fairly suggested that “most symbolically, Soviet Union was in a sense an ‘anti-national state’…[as there was not enough information on] the status of the separate republics that made it up.”

Scotland and Ukraine share also many common features in terms of components of nationalist agenda, which may have influenced their respective development of
nationalism in the discussed historic time periods. Undoubtedly, the most important commonality until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was the stateless political status for both polities, where Scotland (within the UK) and Ukraine (within the USSR) were considered distinct nations, but without a clear mechanism of leaving a political union. Moreover, in both situations the union as such was deemed to be a priori supported by the countries’ populations, even though implemented only by a small group of people: in 1707 Scotland – by allegedly corrupt members of the Scottish parliament that preserved basic elements of Scottish autonomy with their eventual, while the events in Ukraine in 1654 – the treaty of Pereyaslav by which “the Hetmanate became a protectorate of the Muscovite tsar, a ruler whose powers were tempered by custom rather than delineated by laws and whose prerogatives, unlike those of European monarchs” (Velychenko 1997, 420), signed by Hetman Khmelnytsky and his council, were misinterpreted by Muscovy’s tsars as a union, by assuming more and more power over Ukrainian territory with every new treaty. Similarly, the 1922 creation of USSR was a narrow communist party decision later confirmed by a treaty issued by the same communist leaders. Taking into consideration the reality of the 17th and 18th centuries, and even the 1920s with the limited electoral powers of citizens, the demands for a fairer union and independence became popular with a further expansion of voting suffrage. The major starting point for the rise of nationalist agitation in both countries were the successful independent movements in a number of European states following the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and partially Russian Empires, as well as, for the Scottish nationalism, proclamation of Irish independence, which all occurred between 1918 and 1920. Unlike their more successful neighboring states, both Ukraine
and Scotland have lost their historic chances to either preserve independence (as in the case of Ukraine after the WWII) or even create a viable independence movement as in the Scottish example in the first part of the 20th century. Consequently, in a very similar fashion to the Scottish nationalist sentiment to the pre-Union past, “with the end of the communist regimes in the USSR and many Eastern European countries, it has become common to appeal to the pre-communist era as a time of imagined national unity and normality.” (Calhoun 1997, 52) Velychenko (1997, 438) also noticed that “the fates of Scotland and Ukraine in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries illustrate the importance of laws and civil institutions in shaping the national identity of stateless minorities.”

In the 19th century, both the revival of the nationalist struggle for cultural autonomy in Ukraine and national self-government in Scotland emerged. Magosci (2002, 67-72) identifies the “‘Ukrainian rebirth’ in 1848, a year known as the ‘Spring of Nations’”, while Hanham (1969, 91-2) refers to the year of 1886 – the foundation of the Scottish Home Rule Association, stating that “support for Scottish Home Rule within the United Kingdom was confined to a tiny minority before 1886.” Additional similarity that prevented both nationalisms from full development and reaching its possible goals was involvement of both elites in the imperial state-building known as processes of Anglicization for the Scottish society, and Russification (as well as Polonization) – for Ukrainian communities within their metropolises. Velychenko (1997, 432) sees the reason of such developments in the fact that “Ukrainians and Scots had rights and privileges as members of supranational imperial elites and saw nothing "unpatriotic" in seeking assimilation into this elite.”
Another similarity in both countries’ histories is the official policies of Westminster and the Kremlin respectively to Anglicize Scotland and Russify Ukraine linguistically. Multiple authors provide examples of both processes as a set of instruments directed for a further administrative and cultural assimilation, even though the process in Soviet Ukraine was much more violent and involved millions of lives. Respectively, both nations at different stages of their history, in the twentieth and throughout the twenty-first centuries have been making steps to divert these processes. The successful implementation of the 2005 Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act (Legislation.gov.uk 2005) and other legislation can be compared with the 1918 Hetman Skoropads’kyi’s policies who “sought to Ukrainianize education, establishing 150 new Ukrainian gymnasia and a Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and organizing the printing of more than a million new Ukrainian-language textbooks,” (Wilson 1997, 13) as well as the 1989 Language Act providing for the status of Ukrainian as the sole state language, essentially dismissing the imperial myth of the “long-established diglossic relationship between Ukrainian as a "low, peasant" language, and Russian as the "high, cultured" language.” (Bilaniuk 2003, 50)

Formal autonomy granted to both polities by law was never strictly followed – both within the formally federal Soviet system, and according to the 1707 Treaty clauses delegated to Scotland. The unique status for Scottish legal system and education was often challenged and overridden with all-British laws, the role of local government was regularly reviewed. In Ukraine, all the constitutional vestiges of autonomy were only guaranteed on paper and, if questioned, punished by murders or concentration camps. Neither Scotland since 1707, nor Ukraine before 1991, disregarding the quasi-
autonomous rights, had a guaranteed written clause for independence if chosen by people. It only became possible for Ukraine to technically proclaim and contain its independence due to the overall decline of the Soviet system and similar processes in all member republics, while there are similar legality concerns regarding the possible independent status in Scotland in the event of a successful 2014 independence referendum. Additionally, the current rise in popularity of the nationalist parties in both countries become another shared commonality, with the SNP forming its own majority government and Svoboda forming its first faction in VRU.

To strengthen the ties within the union, both Kremlin and Westminster often overemphasized the common victory in the World War II as a sign of symbolic unity, while at the same time many Ukrainians and Scots disagreed with the role of their country in the war without an ability to make decisions as an independent state. In Ukraine, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (or OUN) – politically, and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (in Ukrainian UPA) – militarily, fought against both the Nazis and Soviets, while in Scotland the Scottish Nationalist Party under the leadership of Douglas Young insisted on impossibility of conscription of Scots under the current political status, as it was against the 1707 Treaty of Union. Another commonality in that involvement in the WWII is that, to a great disappointment of the Ukrainian and Scottish nationalists, the majority of both countries’ military age men fought in the unionist armies of the UK and USSR, despite the fact of the stateless status. In the case of Ukraine, the Red Army had multiple similarities to the German Wermacht, coming to occupy, not to liberate. With the overall similarity, the UK did allow the Scots form solely Scottish regiments essentially to boost support for the draft from local population.
Nationalist ideas survived despite the historic divisions into different factions within both nationalist movements – the split of the OUN in 1940 and a split in the SNP in 1942 led by John MacCormick who favored devolutionist approach over party’s independence stance.

Figure 5: Differences and Similarities of Scottish and Ukrainian Nationalist Developments

**Differences**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCOTLAND</th>
<th>UKRAINE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Devolved status within the United Kingdom – no formal independence</td>
<td>Officially independent since 1991, and previously – in 1918-1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of the civic and leftist nationalist ideology</td>
<td>Prevalence of the ethnic nationalist ideology on the right of the political spectrum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious autonomy and other cultural vestiges somewhat respected as proscribed by the 1707 Treaty</td>
<td>Religious autonomy totally abolished (until late 80s), oppression for desire to express cultural differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of English, with almost non-existent Gaelic-speaking and minimal Scots-speaking communities</td>
<td>Distinct political issue of language differences between the West and Central Ukraine and South-eastern parts by the Ukrainian-speaking majority and sizeable Russian-speaking minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful referendum of 1979</td>
<td>Impossibility of any referendums under the Soviet rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England as the only metropole state with its superiority in the UK</td>
<td>Multiple historic metropoles: Russia, Poland, Austro-Hungary etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another rise of pro-independence movement with the SNP at power</td>
<td>Anti-Ukrainian activity of pro-Russian Yanukovych regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed European economy meeting the Maastricht criteria for potential entry into the Eurozone and presence of North Sea oil</td>
<td>Still transitioning to the market economy with overwhelming presence of corruption with oligarchs in charge and dependence on Russian gas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Similarities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCOTLAND</th>
<th>UKRAINE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historic Statehood and Stateless Status (since 1707)</td>
<td>Historic Statehood and Stateless Status (until 1918, 1921-91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object of constant Anglicization (and Britanization)</td>
<td>Object of constant Russification (and Sovietization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Union of 1707 – not supported by people, never properly followed</td>
<td>Treaty of 1654 (Protectorate) - not supported by people, never properly followed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost chance of self-government (1880s-1914), unlike Ireland</td>
<td>Lost attempt to preserve independence (1918-21), unlike Poland and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal vestiges of autonomy in the form of cultural pillars (Kirk, law and education)</td>
<td>Formal vestiges of autonomy (before 1991) in the form of de-jure federal autonomy status, UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>membership etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of WWII as a symbol of Unity by the official propaganda</td>
<td>Use of WWII as a symbol of Unity by the official propaganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rise of pro-independence (economic) tendencies in the late 60s</td>
<td>The rise of pro-independence (cultural) tendencies in the late 60s and the 60-iers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Divide (Highlands vs. Lowlands)</td>
<td>Regional Divide (West vs East/South-East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rise of popularity of the SNP and independence agitation in the early 90s</td>
<td>Dissolution of USSR and proclamation of independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful referendum of 1997 and devolution</td>
<td>Successful referendum of 1991 and Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNP’s recent rise in popularity with some historic decades of poor electoral performance previously</td>
<td>Svoboda’s recent rise in popularity with a historic decade of poor electoral performance previously</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis I hypothesized that Ukrainian political nationalism has been stronger and more successful than Scottish due to the fact of political independence of Ukraine, while also suggesting that Scotland is better off from an economic perspective as well as more culturally independent from Westminster than Ukraine from Moscow, despite political sovereignty. This hypothesis was fully confirmed by the body of this thesis. These findings were facilitated by the detailed analysis of the theoretical framework of existing literature on the subject, as well as comprehensive case study of the components of nationalist agendas in both Ukraine and Scotland, their major nationalist political parties as agents of the ideology, in addition to the comparison of historic and contemporary commonalities and differences.

I base my conclusions on the following perspectives: historical, contemporary political, economic, and cultural (including religion and diaspora). Firstly, the majority of similarities between the nationalist agendas of both countries lie in the history of Scotland and Ukraine, with the following important comparisons: failed attempts to preserve statehood or even functioning autonomy, assimilation policies of Anglicization and Russification, the unifying role of national church. All those factors emphasize the commonality of issues that served as basis for nationalist agenda.

Secondly, from the political perspective Ukraine did manage to gain and preserve its independence in 1991 (unlike the previous unsuccessful try of 1918-21) – the development which was not fully addressed in Scotland until the start of such debate in the late 1970s since the discovery of North Sea oil with the first referendum on the issue scheduled for September 2014. While Ukrainian nationalist political parties have been
supported by a smaller margin than Scotland’s SNP forming the majority Scottish
Government, Rukh of the late 1980s – early 1990s played an important role in
mobilization of the people of Ukraine in nationalist revival and a surprising for the post-
Soviet society 92% support for the independence in the national referendum in December
1991. Additionally, Scottish National Party’s inclusive leftist (non-Conservative) civic
nationalism attracts broader electorate than Svoboda’s right and ethnic nationalist
variation (even though constantly raising in electoral support), widely downplayed by the
pro-Russian propaganda.

Thirdly, in terms of economy both nations have different degrees of development,
where Scotland is a developed European economy, fully ready to potentially join
European economic and monetary union based on the Maastricht criteria, Ukraine’s
inflation, public debt and budget deficit are currently far from consideration for the EU
membership. Additionally, on the contrary to Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas,
Scotland, if proclaimed independent, could benefit in full from its North Sea oil reserves.
With the devolution in place since 1999, Scotland currently exercises some of its
sovereign powers, with the macroeconomic policies still reserved by Westminster.

Fourthly, from the cultural perspective Scotland managed to reserve some of the
important autonomous points in the 1707 Treaty of Union that guaranteed independence
to its Kirk – national church, education and some areas of legislation. Even if to agree
that some of those agreements might not have been fully exercised in Scotland within the
UK, Ukrainian voice in terms of cultural or religious autonomy within Russia and USSR
was totally unheard, with the current consequences. The role of the Scottish diaspora is to
some degree less efficient due to greater assimilation and relatively smaller number of
current UK citizens in its ranks, unlike the Ukrainian émigré community with the abundant fourth economic wave of primarily economic immigrants.

Lastly, in terms of the recent developments, both Ukrainian and Scottish nationalist movements have reached new highs in their popularity and electoral support. While the SNP has secured a safe majority in the 2011 Scottish Parliament election and pursues the independence referendum with the officially announced date of September 18, 2014, Ukrainian Svoboda has successfully conducted the 2012 parliamentary campaign and for the first time in the Ukrainian history created the nationalist faction in the Ukrainian Parliament with 37 members.
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