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A FAIR AND IMPlicitly IMPARTIAL JURY: AN ARGUMENT FOR ADMINISTERING THE IMPlicit ASSOCIATION TEST DURING VOIR DIRE

DALE LARSON*

INTRODUCTION

During my second year of law school, I had the opportunity to work on a trial involving an openly gay former police sergeant who had allegedly been discriminated against for his sexual orientation by a large, metropolitan police department. Because the trial had a high profile and was the culmination of many years of costly litigation, the lead attorneys representing the plaintiff—my bosses—decided that it would be wise to hire and fly in an experienced, very well respected, and very expensive jury consultant to assist with voir dire. The consultant was extremely active in the process and appeared to bring in a wealth of knowledge and years of lessons learned to the process. This view was shared by the lead attorneys, two distinguished trial lawyers who had conducted countless voir dires of their own in their combined fifty-plus years of practice. As we left the courthouse at the end of the second and final day of voir dire, with a jury now slated, the consultant noted that the process had gone

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particularly well. One of the lead attorneys told me that she had never been so pleased with a jury in her lengthy career. There was a sense of optimism about the trial ahead. Not only did we lose that trial, but the jury acted with such bias and animus towards homosexuals that our client was granted a retrial.1 During deliberations, comments were made rendering it clear that no homosexual could have won this type of case with this jury, regardless of the facts. Homophobic remarks were commonplace in the deliberations, and many jurors apparently refused to listen to fact-based or legal arguments by those showing less bias. This was despite the overwhelming feeling by the attorneys, the jury consultant, and the client that we had crafted a fair and impartial jury that would give our client an unbiased trial. In fact, none of the final jurors had shown any signs of bias or animus towards homosexuals during the two-day voir dire process.

Why this result? How could experienced attorneys and an even more experienced jury consultant have misjudged so severely these twelve individuals? This result is far from unusual. While many refer to jury selection as a science,2 others—perhaps more accurately—liken the process to voodoo.3 The jury consulting industry has exploded over the last 30 years, with many attorneys paying considerable money for voir dire for erratic and unpredictable results.4

1 The parties are currently involved in ongoing litigation with the new trial still scheduled.
2 A number of books have been written in the field of “scientific jury selection.” See, e.g., JOEL D. LIEBERMAN & BRUCE D. SALES, SCIENTIFIC JURY SELECTION (Am. Psychol. Ass’n 2007). It is important to note, however, that these books are generally not true science. They have no means of hypothesis testing and typically lack controlled experiments.
3 A March 2009 Google search of voir dire voodoo returned over 58,800 results.
4 Because there are so many variables in a trial, it is impossible to know for sure whether a victory was the result of the work of a jury consultant or certain “scientific” jury selection methods. For an overview of the history
One explanation for our current inability to detect bias accurately in potential jurors, even when using the latest findings in the scientific jury selection field, is that the tools currently available to attorneys and jury consultants give us only a partial picture of the individuals in question. Currently, voir dire consists of oral questioning and the occasional written questionnaires. These simple tools measure only the explicitly held and often filtered beliefs of the jurors, but we now know that our behavior and decision making are influenced by more than our explicitly held and publicly stated beliefs. To get a more accurate picture of an individual's potential biases and a more effective predictor of future behavior and decision making, our voir dire toolbox must be expanded to include measurements of implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes.

This article examines the impact of implicit bias within the context of criminal trials in federal courts, where the defendant's race is different from that of some jurors, and advocates for the use of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) during voir dire to fill out the currently insufficient tool box available to attorneys and judges. Part I of this article explores the science of implicit bias, using recent studies and findings to show that much of our behavior and decision making is beyond our conscious control and awareness. Part II examines existing studies to determine whether race plays a significant role in the outcomes of jury trials, both from a theoretical perspective and under the actual existing voir dire standards. Part III introduces the Implicit Association Test, starting with the theory behind the

and relative success rates of the jury consulting field, see Lieberman & Sales, supra note 2, at 3-15.

5 The findings in this Article are not limited to the area of race. The issues and solutions discussed throughout would apply equally to any characteristic a criminal defendant or victim may have, such as age, body type, immigration status, nationality, occupation, sex, sexual orientation, or religion. Also, race does not have to be a salient issue in these trials. In fact, the issues presented in this Article are most important in cases where race is not explicitly mentioned at all during the trial.
test and a discussion of the controversy of the tool as a measure of bias. Finally, the part concludes by examining the practical pros and cons of using the IAT during voir dire, concluding that the benefits of the test render use of the IAT a wise idea.

This article concludes by suggesting other ideas to limit the possible effects of implicit bias in criminal trials, with a focus on the use of de-biasing agents, and advocates further study of these, still theoretical, possibilities. Given the importance placed on our right to a fair and impartial jury, and given that implicit bias plays a real role in the decision making of jurors, steps should be taken to improve our ability to detect this bias in jurors and remove those who are unable to approach a trial with relative neutrality. The best possible way to accomplish this right now would be to administer the IAT during voir dire.

I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS

The study of implicit bias has played a major role in behavioral science in recent years. Because of the implications of implicit bias on our behavior and on the way that we interact with one another, numerous legal academics have taken an interest in the findings and have pondered the implications within our legal structure. This part introduces the science of implicit bias by exploring the difference between implicit and explicit bias and by contrasting stereotypes and attitudes. The part lays out four important implications of implicit bias in the legal framework: (1) implicit biases are pervasive; (2) they frequently deviate from our conscious or explicit biases and beliefs, especially when dealing with issues sensitive in our culture such as race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation; (3) they may be even more prevalent within the uncertainty of a trial setting; and (4) they, like explicit biases, predict behavior.
A. Basics of Implicit Bias

An explicit belief is one that is consciously endorsed by the individual. When an actor takes an action for a particular reason, that intention is conscious. When asked, an actor acting out of a conscious intent can state what that intent is. The current tools available in voir dire—oral and written questioning—attempt to learn about the explicit beliefs of the potential jurors, but there are two major problems with this system. First, individuals can choose not to reveal their explicit beliefs, perhaps for fear of public embarrassment if the belief is not publicly popular or acceptable. Second, actors “do not always have conscious, intentional control over the processes of social perception, impression formation, and judgment that motivate their actions.”

This is not to say that explicit measures are not important or that they do not predict behavior. They clearly do, as “consciously held attitudes and stereotypes” have been shown to predict behavior. It is important to stress that explicit beliefs or biases “are simply not the only ones to contend with as we understand human behavior and its vicissitudes.” It is now accepted that many of our mental functions operate implicitly, outside of conscious thought. Among these are implicit mem-

7 Id.
8 Bernd Wittenbrink, *Measuring Attitudes Through Priming*, in *IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ATTITUDES* 17, 18 (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007) (stating: “[P]eople do not necessarily tell the truth when asked about their attitudes towards socially sensitive issues.”).
9 Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 6, at 946.
11 Id.
12 Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 6, at 947.
ory, implicit perception, implicit attitudes, implicit stereotypes, implicit self-esteem, and implicit self-concept.  

Two of these, in particular, contribute to jury bias: implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes. An attitude is an evaluative disposition, or simply, "the tendency to like or dislike . . . someone or something." Attitudes can be explicit—such as every time we consciously like or dislike something—but attitudes can also be implicit, such as when we do something to show a like or dislike for someone or something but are unaware that we are, in fact, expressing that particular attitude. An example of an attitude would be a general dislike of tall people.

A stereotype, on the other hand, is a mental association between a group and a trait, and this trait can be favorable or unfavorable. With stereotypes, unlike with attitudes, we are less concerned with valence—that is, favorability or unfavorability—than we are with the content of the trait. The association between group and trait may be based on a statistical reality but often is not. As with attitudes, a stereotype can be a consciously held belief, or it can be implicit, beneath our own awareness. An example of a stereotype would be a belief that tall people lack intelligence.

Implicit bias, then, can be thought of as our implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes working together to create a range of possible judgments towards people, groups, or things. These judgments can be favorable or unfavorable. Implicit biases are interesting in the jury context for four reasons. First, implicit bias is pervasive in our society. Second, implicit bias often diverges from our explicit bias, especially when dealing with so-

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13 Id.
14 Id. at 948.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 949-50.
17 Id. at 949.
18 Id. at 949.
19 Id. at 950-51.
cially sensitive issues such as race, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. Third, implicit bias may be even more prevalent within the uncertainty of a trial setting than elsewhere. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, implicit bias predicts future behavior including decision making.

**B. Implicit Bias is Pervasive**

The fact that implicit bias is pervasive is not culturally driven, but instead, is anatomically driven. In other words, we have many implicit attitudes and stereotypes because of the way that our brains work. It is helpful to briefly look at the science of schemas.\(^{20}\) Schemas are "knowledge structures" that our brain creates to "represent knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among those attributes."\(^{21}\) These schemas are employed out of necessity, because we must process, encode into memory, and respond to constant stimuli, and schemas help us to organize that data.\(^{22}\)

This process operates during human interaction: "When we encounter a person, we classify that person into numerous social categories, such as gender, (dis)ability, age, race, and role."\(^{23}\) Within the context of race, our society has created categories by which we map individuals whom we perceive as fitting into those categories.\(^{24}\) An important byproduct of this system of racial schemas is that the categories we have in our brains carry with them implicit and explicit racial meanings, which we can think of as attitudes and stereotypes and that we activate these racial meanings when we map an individual into a given cate-

\(^{20}\) For an overview of the role of schemas in the legal context, see generally Jerry Kang, *Trojan Horses of Race*, 118 *Harv. L. Rev.* 1489 (2005).


\(^{22}\) Kang, *supra* note 20, at 1498.

\(^{23}\) *Id.* at 1499.

\(^{24}\) *Id.*
The triggering of these racial meanings then influences our behavior towards the individual. This process of creating schemas and mapping individuals is not something we control. "In sum, schemas automatically, efficiently, and adaptively parse the raw data pushed to our senses." Another writes that "stereotyping . . . is nothing special. It is simply a form of categorization, . . . that all people, not just 'prejudiced' ones, use to simplify the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining information about people in memory. They are central, and indeed, essential to normal cognitive functioning."28

To emphasize how ingrained these processes are within our brains, it is worth noting that causal influences on our attitudes come from "early (even preverbal) experiences, affective experiences, [and] cultural biases." Another writes that our stereotypic expectancies may arise from one's own experiences with members of other social groups . . . [and may result from] vicarious experiences of stories, television shows, movies, newspaper reports, and so forth." The associations in our brain have been forming for nearly our entire lives and come from sources surrounding us daily.

Studies and testing support the theory that implicit bias is prevalent. A review of more than 2.5 million completed IATs found that "[i]mplicit and explicit comparative preferences and stereotypes were widespread across gender, ethnicity, age, political orientation, and region." Two very common forms of implicit bias found in testing are that "socially dominant groups

25 Id. at 1500.
26 Id. at 1500-01.
27 Id. at 1504.
30 Krieger, supra note 28, at 1198.
have implicit bias against subordinate groups (White over non-White, for example),” and ingroup bias, or a preference for members of a category to which you belong, which are both discussed in greater detail in the next section.32

C. Implicit Bias Often Deviates from Explicitly Held Beliefs

An important characteristic of attitudes is that our implicit attitudes often diverge from our explicitly held attitudes.33 Many studies show that “implicit bias measures are dissociated from explicit bias measures”34 and that implicit bias operates absent any “intent to favor or disfavors members of a particular social group.”35 A meta-analysis of 126 individual studies indicates that there is substantial variability in the strength of the relationship between implicit and explicit cognitions and concludes that statistical analysis of both measures show that implicit and explicit measures rely on separate processes.36

As noted above, two common types of implicit bias are a preference of socially dominant groups over subordinate groups and in-group preference, or favoritism, towards a group to which one is a member.37 In fact, implicit bias measures show much more in-group and socially valued group favoritism than do explicit measures.38 This phenomenon carries over in the reverse situation, known as out-group degradation: people implicitly

32 Kang, supra note 20, at 1512.
33 Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 6, at 949.
34 Kang, supra note 20, at 1512.
35 Krieger, supra note 28, at 1188.
36 Lane, Kang, & Banaji, supra note 10, at 431-32. For a detailed scientific explanation of dissociation, see Brian A. Nosek, Moderators of the Relationship Between Implicit and Explicit Evaluation, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 565 (2005).
37 Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 6, at 951.
38 Nearly one hundred studies have documented “people’s tendency to automatically associate positive characteristics with their ingroups more easily than outgroups,” a phenomenon known as “ingroup favoritism.” See Ni-
tend to “associate negative characteristics with out-groups more easily than in-groups.” While these in-group preferences permeate both explicit and implicit biases, when it comes to favoritism for socially dominant groups, attitudes are much stronger at the implicit level than at the explicit level.

D. Mental Shortcuts such as Schemas Are More Likely to Occur Under Conditions of Uncertainty

Trials are situations filled with uncertainty. If a case were not uncertain, it likely would not make it to trial. Also, the information necessary to know what truly happened in the situation under dispute is either unavailable or presented to the jury in a voluminous and ambiguous way. It is significant, then, that mental shortcuts, such as schemas, are especially relied upon during conditions of uncertainty.

Social scientists have found that mental shortcuts “are used under conditions of uncertainty, or the unavailability or indeterminacy of important information.” This includes situations in which “the appropriate factual material may be inaccessible, it may not be gathered together in time to bear on the decision, or it may be too voluminous to be properly organized and utilized in a judgment task,” which arguably describes the conditions in a trial. Not only is information in a trial often unavailable, too voluminous, or ambiguous, that information is ultimately about human behavior, which itself is inherently ambiguous: “Given


39 Id.

40 Ingroup favoritism is so strong that people report a preference to a group even when randomly assigned to that group. See Lane et al, supra note 10, at 431-33.

41 Id. at 433-35.


43 Id.
that most significant social actions can be committed for a variety of reasons and will produce a variety of consequences, the meaning of social action is fundamentally ambiguous.”\footnote{Id.} The result from this incompleteness and ambiguity is that “people adopt [mental shortcuts] that enable them to make inferences and predictions from what scanty and unreliable data are available.”\footnote{Id.} Not only is implicit bias prevalent, but it may play an even larger role in a trial setting than outside a courthouse.

### E. Implicit Bias Predicts Future Behavior

An abundance of evidence from studies and research support the idea that implicit bias predicts disparate behavior towards individuals.\footnote{For a succinct overview of many interesting studies on this topic, see Kang, \textit{supra} note 20, at 1514-28.} This behavior may or may not be consistent with explicitly reported biases.\footnote{\textit{See Id.} at 1514.} In other words, not only might a person’s implicit biases potentially diverge from that person’s explicitly stated biases, but those biases can result in behavior inconsistent with the individual’s explicit beliefs.\footnote{Greenwald & Krieger, \textit{supra} note 6, at 951 (Theoretically, implicit biases “can produce behavior that diverges from a person’s avowed or endorsed beliefs or principles.”).} This consequence may be amplified in a situation such as a race-salient criminal trial: some studies emphasize that implicit bias is a greater predictor of behavior “in situations that are socially sensitive, like racial interactions, where impression-management processes might inhibit people from expressing negative attitudes or unattractive stereotypes.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 954-55.}

Studies show that implicit bias affects how we interpret data,\footnote{\textit{See Kang, supra} note 20, at 1515-19.} which is especially significant in a criminal trial where a jury’s primary task is to interpret information and come to a conclu-
sion about a given set of facts. Implicit bias also has an effect on how we perform on objectively measured tests\textsuperscript{51} and how we interact with others.\textsuperscript{52} The latter of these is also relevant in a criminal jury trial, as it could affect both non-verbal interpretations of a defendant in the courtroom as well as intra-jury interaction during deliberation.

The flip side of this is that individuals have the capacity not to let implicit bias affect their behavior, but this proves to be both difficult and uncommon. One way that this could happen is through exposure to counter-stereotypical group members.\textsuperscript{53} Perhaps more relevant to this analysis is that “[c]onscious exertion to be unbiased may—at least temporarily—reduce implicit bias.”\textsuperscript{54} One thing that might trigger this conscious exertion is a public declaration to act fairly during traditional voir dire questioning.\textsuperscript{55} Even if true, however, voir dire questioning testing only explicit bias still overlooks the very existence of implicit bias. And any de-biasing or neutral-behavior inducing effects of explicit questioning “are typically modest, taking the form of reduction, but not elimination, of implicit bias.”\textsuperscript{56}

* * *

Does implicit bias, then, represent the actual or true beliefs of an individual more than explicitly held beliefs do? Most studies do not believe so, but instead, believe that the explicit and implicit bias tests utilize separate mental constructs that each influence behavior. Both must be taken into account jointly for an

\textsuperscript{51} Id. at 1519-23.
\textsuperscript{52} Id. at 1523-35.
\textsuperscript{53} Lane, Kang, & Banaji, supra note 10, at 438. Both Part III and the Conclusion of this Article, infra, discuss this idea of debiasing in slightly greater depth.
\textsuperscript{54} Id.
\textsuperscript{55} Lieberman & Sales, supra note 2, at 27 (“Research on persuasion and attitude change has shown that individuals who make public commitments to behave in a certain manner are more likely to ultimately behave in that way.”).
\textsuperscript{56} Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 6, at 964.
accurate assessment of an individual’s total attitudes and stereotypes, which can then be used to predict behavior. Given that current testing in voir dire only gets at a person’s explicit bias and that trials sometimes involve individuals from the stigmatized groups prone to dissociation, current voir dire procedures are insufficient and, thus, problematic.

II. THE LIKELY ROLE THAT IMPLICIT BIAS PLAYS WITHIN JURIES

Now that we have a foundation of how implicit bias works at the individual level, we can explore the effects that implicit bias might have on a jury. The part examines the historical and cultural significance of the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury. It then surveys existing studies and writings regarding the effect that race plays in jury trials, examining the race of the defendant, the race of the individual juror, and the collective racial composition of a jury. This part concludes that race plays a real role in race-salient jury trials and that the documented effects of race are consistent with the science of implicit bias.

Lane, Kang, & Banaji, supra note 10, at 432 (“Most experts . . . do not believe that measures of implicit social cognition reflect the ‘true’ attitude any more than do measures of explicit social cognition such as questionnaire responses. Implicit and explicit measures appear to tap separate constructs that operate differently: They both predict behavior . . . . Privileging one over the other would be scientifically misguided.”). There is, in fact, an entire field of cognitive science called Dual Process Theory that examines the relationship between implicit and explicit processes. See, e.g., ROY F. BAUMEISTER, THE CULTURAL ANIMAL: HUMAN NATURE, MEANING, AND SOCIAL LIFE (2005); ALLAN PAIVIO, MIND AND ITS EVOLUTION: A DUAL CODING THEORETICAL APPROACH (2007); RON SUN, DUALITY OF THE MIND: A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH TOWARD COGNITION (2002); Lisa Feldman Barrett, Michele M. Tugade, & Randall W. Engle, Individual Differences in Working Memory Capacity and Dual-Process Theories of the Mind, 130 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 553 (2004; Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 3 (1996).
A. The Cultural Significance of a Fair and Impartial Jury

The United States places a great deal of importance on trials before impartial juries, especially in criminal cases. The American Bar Association estimates that 95% of all jury trials in the world take place in the American judiciary. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that the criminally accused shall enjoy the right to a trial “by an impartial jury.” The Supreme Court has held that this amendment applies to state criminal cases through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even before this, however, impartiality was paramount as the Court held that when states did use jury trials, the juries must be impartial.

The use of voir dire in our country as a tool to select a fair and impartial jury dates back to the 1760 Massachusetts Jury Selection Law. Since that time, the Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed concern over juries being impartial. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Court ordered a new trial over concerns that pre-

59 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
62 Lieberman & Sales, supra note 2, at 18.
63 See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g) (Marshall, C.J., sitting) (“Why do personal prejudices constitute a just cause of challenge? Solely because the individual who is under their influence is presumed to have a bias on his mind which will prevent an impartial decision of the case, according to the testimony. He may declare that notwithstanding these prejudices he is determined to listen to the evidence, and be governed by it; but the law will not trust him. Is there less reason to suspect him who has prejudged the case, and has deliberately formed and delivered an opinion upon it? Such a person may believe that he will be regulated by testimony, but the law suspects him, and certainly not without reason. He will listen with more favor to that testimony which confirms, than to that which would change his opinion; it is not to be expected that he will weigh evidence or argument as fairly as a man whose judgment is not made up in the case.”).
trial publicity had jeopardized the accused’s ability to “receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences.”\footnote{Id. at 362.} Since then, the Court has defined impartiality as a two-fold requirement. First, “the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment.”\footnote{Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).} The second, and more important to this article, is that there must be assurance that the selected jurors are not biased.

A line of cases, as described in Part III of this article, has set out the types and extent of questioning allowed towards this second requirement. Even in cases where the Court found no violation of rights upon rejecting questioning of juries,\footnote{For examples of such cases, see Part III, infra.} the Court was careful to frame the situation as one where the important right to a fair and impartial jury could not be infringed, even with the denial of questioning. It is not difficult to find commentary by judges outside of judicial decisions reiterating the basic goal of voir dire: a fair and impartial jury. Judge David Baker of the Middle District of Florida, in an overview of Federal Civil Voir Dire began with what he considered to be obvious: “\textit{Stating the Obvious}: The purpose of voir dire and the process of selecting a jury is to assure that the jury is free of prejudice and capable of rendering a free and fair verdict based on the trial proceedings.”\footnote{The Honorable David Baker, \textit{Civil Case Voir Dire and Jury Selection}, 1998 \textit{Fed. Cts. L. Rev.} 3, 1.1, \textit{available at} http://www.fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/1998/fedctslrev3.shtml.} Another judge wrote that “[i]t is well-settled that the purpose of voir dire is to secure an impartial jury, and ‘impartiality requires not only freedom from jury bias against the accused and for the prosecution but also freedom from jury bias against the prosecution and for the ac-

\footnote{\textit{A FAIR AND IMPLICITLY IMPARTIAL JURY}}
History and anecdotal evidence show that courts are committed to using voir dire to secure impartial juries.

B. Influence of Defendant’s Race on a Jury in a Criminal Trial

Implicit bias against socially underprivileged groups and outgroups is prevalent in our culture. As a result, there is a chance that implicit bias is present anytime a member of such a group is the defendant in a criminal trial. While no research has looked specifically at this question to determine the presence of implicit bias in actual trials involving minority defendants, many studies have examined whether the race or ethnicity of a defendant affects the outcome of the jury trial. These studies have mixed results, but those mixed results tend to be consistent with the theory behind implicit bias.

Upon an analysis of existing studies and study reviews covering tens of thousands of participants, two observers conclude that “[c]ertainly, there are enough published studies to permit the conclusion that [the race of victim and race of defendant] can exert an independent influence on jurors in a given case, though theoretically speaking, in-group/out-group biases seem most likely when a juror and victim are of the same race and the defendant is not.” The broad results are clearly not inconsistent with the science of implicit bias. Two common forms of implicit bias are in-group preference, where a juror is more likely to find against a defendant who has allegedly committed a crime against a member of the juror’s own race, and out-group degradation, where a juror is more likely to find against a defen-
dant who is a member of a group separate from the juror’s group.

C. Effects of Individual Juror Race

It is difficult to find conclusive results from studies that have examined the relative influence of a defendant’s race on white versus black mock jurors, because very few studies have examined non-white jurors and even fewer have examined jurors outside of the white-black dichotomy. From the available data, “one might reasonably conclude that black and white individuals have different race-related motivations when they serve as jurors.” Unfortunately, there is a lack of studies available to determine the causes and processes behind these differing motivations, but the science of implicit bias is not inconsistent with the findings of these theories.

One study, for example, presented white and black mock jurors with the summary of an assault trial. In one version of the interracial case, the altercation was racially charged and in the other it was race-neutral, meaning that the defendant and the victim were of different racial groups, but the issue of race played no apparent role in the incident, and racial issues were not made salient during the trial. The response in this variation differed between white and black jurors. When the issue of race was made salient, whites became much less influenced by the defendant’s race. Black jurors, however, were much less influenced by the race-saliency changes.

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71 Id. at 86.
72 Id.
74 Sommers & Adekanmbi, supra note 70, at 86.
75 Id.
76 Id. For much more on how whites and blacks perceive race in the discrimination context, see Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (2008).
While the authors of this study do not address it, a possible two-part explanation for these results can be found in implicit bias findings. First, as noted earlier, the science suggests that implicit bias can be mitigated or overcome through conscious motivation to overcome our own biases. Another study noted that "low- and high-prejudiced people have given very different responses when they have had to think consciously about what their responses imply about their self-image." Second, studies show that because of the potentially contradictory forces of preference for socially favored groups and in-group preference, blacks show much less implicit racial bias than do whites. A black individual may have some in-group bias operating to show preference for blacks but also have socially privileged group bias operating to show implicit preference for whites—arguably cancelling each other out. At the same time, however, studies show that blacks show greater explicit anti-white out-group degradation than whites do about blacks. All of this taken together might explain the results: because white jurors start off with greater dissociation between their explicit and implicit racial bias, triggering motivation to overcome implicit bias—such as making the issue of race salient at trial—has a stronger effect than with black jurors, where the dissociation is less pronounced.

77 Lane, Kang, & Banaji, supra note 10, at 438 (“Conscious exertion to be unbiased may—at least temporarily—reduce implicit bias.”).
79 Nosek, et al., supra note 31, at 30 (“Blacks show no preference between Black and White on average whereas other groups, and especially Whites, show strong White preferences.”).
Unfortunately, the courts are not aware of some of these important findings. For example, the Sixth Circuit upheld a trial court's decision to refuse voir dire questioning on the issue of racial prejudice in a violent-crime case where both the defendant and victim were black. There were many types of implicit bias that could have occurred within jurors of all races that the courts ignored in this case, such as bias against socially underprivileged groups. While this section catalogs only a few examples, there are many studies examining individual juror behavior that are consistent with the findings of implicit bias.

D. Racial Composition of Juries as Groups

Juries, while made up of individuals, operate as a group and are asked to make a group decision in a criminal trial. It is not enough, therefore, to examine the individual behavior of jurors. We must also understand the racial composition of a jury and how that composition might affect decision making. Studies, as one would expect with such a complex issue, tend to show mixed results and tend to lack definitive explanations for outcomes.

In one experiment, the "mere expectation of deliberating on a racially diverse jury was influential in this instance by leading both white and black mock jurors to be more punitive toward a same-race defendant when they expected to be in the racial minority of their jury." This result is an example of a situation that triggers motivating factors to be aware of, and overcome, possible implicit bias. It might also be evidence of the fact that implicit biases affect the way that individuals interact with others.

* * *

Our legal system takes the goal of a fair and impartial jury very seriously. Studies exist to show that race plays a role in

82 Sommers & Adekanmbi, supra note 70, at 89.
jury trials in three ways: (1) the race of the defendant, (2) the race of individual jurors, and (3) the jury's overall racial composition all play a role. The findings of studies looking at these different issues are generally quite consistent with, and can often be explained by, the science of implicit bias.

III. USE OF THE IAT DURING VOIR DIRE

It would be disturbing for the legal community if implicit bias, distinct from explicit bias, was prevalent, especially in a trial setting, and affected behavior and was undetectable through accessible testing. Fortunately this is not the case. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) has become a valid and extremely accessible tool for measuring implicit attitudes and stereotypes. While the test is not without controversy, it is currently recognized as an effective gauge of an individual's implicit bias, and the creators of the test have posted extensive research claiming that the test has predictive, construct, internal, and statistical-conclusion validity. This part begins with an overview of the theory behind the IAT, discusses the current controversies surrounding the test, and examines the two primary benefits of

83 Anyone can take a range of IATs online to test the strength of one's own implicit biases. The tests are available at http://www.projectimplicit.org or at https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/.
84 The IAT is one of only many measures of implicit bias that have been used, but because of its qualities as discussed in this section, it now stands out as the best known measure.
85 See Section III.A, infra, for an evaluation of the controversies surrounding the IAT.
87 For articles detailing the predictive validity of the IAT, see http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_validity.htm#predictive.
88 For articles detailing the construct validity of the IAT, see http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_validity.htm#construct.
89 For articles detailing the internal validity of the IAT, see http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_validity.htm#Internal.
90 For articles detailing the statistical conclusion validity of the IAT, see http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_validity.htm#statistical.
using the IAT during voir: eliminating individuals showing substantial implicit bias against a defendant’s category and the debiasing effects of simply administering the test.

A. An Overview of the IAT Along With Criticism and Rebuttal

The IAT, developed in 1998, can test either implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes by measuring automatic group-valence (implicit attitudes) and group-trait (implicit stereotypes) associations. It works by measuring response time to various stimuli. The amount of time it takes to make an association between two stimuli corresponds to their associational strength.91 We can examine this theory by applying it to an example.

An IAT configured to measure automatic associations between white or black faces and positive or negative concepts is measuring race-based implicit attitudinal preference.92 The test asks the examinee to pair two concepts, such as a black face and “good” or a white face and “good,” and measures the speed at which the examinee is able to make the pairings.93 Response time is crucial, because faster responses equate to pairings that are more strongly associated in memory. If an examinee associates white faces with positive words more quickly than black faces, then that examinee likely has a closer implicit attitudinal association between whites and positive thoughts than blacks and positive thoughts, thus, indicating an implicit bias in favor of whites. In other words, if the stimuli pair is schema-consistent, one expects a faster response, and if inconsistent, one expects a slower response.94

The test is not without its detractors. As of April of 2006, over 250 IAT-related studies had been published, engendering a

91 Lane, Kang, & Banaji, supra note 10, at 431.
92 Kang, supra note 20, at 1509-10.
93 Id. at 1509-12.
94 Id. at 1509.
lively debate as to the full meaning of the test.95 Some critics argue that the IAT uses arbitrary metrics, which makes any real-world use of the test meaningless.96 The argument is that a metric is arbitrary “when it is not known where a given score locates an individual on the underlying psychological dimension or how a one-unit change on the observed score reflects the magnitude of change on the underlying dimension.”97 Because the IAT relies on a fixed unit of measurement—the millisecond—the measurement lacks real-world meaning when used as a measurement of actual attitudinal preference.98 It is dangerous, the argument concludes, to examine a person’s IAT score and “imbue these values with meaning” about the individual’s implicit cognition.99

IAT creators and advocates respond by arguing that their normalizing process makes the data metrically meaningful and gives it consequential validity.100 Furthermore, advocates point to the wealth of published findings that show an accurate linkage between IAT scores and actual behavior, at least in a laboratory setting.101 Advocates also speculate that because the IAT is accessible and provides immediate (and often undesirable) feedback, it creates a “palpable and possibly unsettling” experience, thus making it prone to attack.102

96 Blanton & Jaccard, supra note 95, at 27.
97 Id. at 28.
98 Id. at 32.
99 Id.
101 Id. at 59.
102 Id. at 60.
Others have challenged the IAT’s construct validity, arguing that rather than measuring positive or negative attitudes, the IAT, instead, possibly measures familiarity with a certain group, empathy or sympathy towards a group, performance anxiety for “fear of being labeled a bigot,” or awareness of stereotypes and socio-demographic facts. First, IAT advocates have directly combated the claim that the IAT lacks construct validity through a number of studies and articles. Second, even if the critics’ claims that the IAT was measuring something other than negative attitudes, the fact remains that IAT results predict behavior, meaning that whatever the IAT measures still acts as a type of bias in a jury setting. Similarly, critics have attacked the IAT’s internal, external, and statistical-conclusion valid-

103 “Construct validity refers to the degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from the operationalizations in your study to the theoretical constructs on which those operationalizations were based.” Web Center for Social Research Methods, Construct Validity, http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/constval.php.


105 See Anthony Greenwald’s construct validity materials, supra note 88.


107 For a compelling argument that this and most other critiques of the IAT are not, in fact, attacks on the science of the IAT, but instead are actually normative attacks that go beyond the scientific merit of the test, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477 (2007).

108 Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 104, at 1032-33 (arguing that the IAT lacks internal validity because IAT researchers rely entirely on correlational evidence to find a relationship between implicit bias and discriminatory behavior, while not controlling for other possible variables such as discomfort or shame).

109 Id. at 1033 (arguing that the IAT lacks external validity because researchers have not shown that correlations between IAT scores and discriminatory conduct observed in laboratory settings reliably predict behavior in non-laboratory settings where “institutionalized layers of safeguards against the expression of prejudice” exist).
B. Could the IAT Be Used During Jury Selection?

The threshold question is whether attorneys should be allowed to administer the IAT to potential jurors during voir dire. A secondary question is whether IAT results could play a role in dismissals for cause, peremptory challenges, or both. To answer these questions, we can start with statutes, rules, and the case law interpreting those statutes and rules. While federal statutes and rules on the issue of voir dire are not conclusive as to the admissibility of the IAT, there is no clear statutory basis to bar the use of the IAT. Nor is case law a direct bar to its use. A more likely obstacle to its inception into voir dire are cultural and normative barriers within the judiciary.

C. Federal Statutes and Rules

At the federal level, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 states that “[t]he court may examine prospective jurors or may permit the attorneys for the parties to do so” in criminal cases, and that “[i]f the court examines the jurors, it must permit the attorneys for the parties to: (A) ask further questions that the court considers proper; or (B) submit further questions that

110 Id. (arguing that the IAT lacks statistical-conclusion validity because of “psychometric flaws and an alarmingly high false alarm rate,” which indicates that many factors other than association strength can affect reaction time).
111 For articles detailing the predictive validity of the IAT, see http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_validity.htm#predictive. For articles detailing the internal validity of the IAT, see http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_validity.htm#Internal. For articles detailing the statistical conclusion validity of the IAT, see http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_validity.htm#statistical.
112 Given that most criminal cases take place in state courts, it would perhaps be more worthwhile to examine state and local voir dire rules. Given the differences from state to state, however, this task is beyond the scope of this Article.
the court may ask if it considers them proper.”114 Similarly, on the civil side, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 47 states that “[t]he court may permit the parties or their attorneys to examine prospective jurors or may itself do so. If the court examines the jurors, it must permit the parties or their attorneys to make any further inquiry it considers proper or must, itself, ask any of their additional questions it considers proper.”115 The question, then, is whether use of the IAT could be considered “proper” in the eyes of a judge, either for establishing cause or for gathering information to make peremptory challenges. Unfortunately, no case is directly on point. There are cases, however, that address whether additional questions on the subject of racial prejudice are proper.

The Court held in Ham v. South Carolina116 that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a judge to interrogate potential jurors on the subject of racial prejudice where race is a salient factor in case:

Since one of the purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to insure these ‘essential demands of fairness,’ . . . and since a principal purpose of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to prohibit the States from invidiously discriminating on the basis of race . . . we think that the Fourteenth Amendment required the judge in this case to interrogate the jurors upon the subject of racial prejudice.117

It soon became clear, however, that this would not be a universal rule adopted in all criminal cases involving parties of different races and different ethnic origins.

114 Id.
115 Fed. R. Civ. P. 47.
117 Id. at 526-527.
In *Ristaino v. Ross*, the Court stated that "Ham did not announce a requirement of universal applicability" and interpreted *Ham* to mean that there must be "a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect [the] trial" before the constitutional requirement of questioning was triggered. In *Ross*, the Court upheld a district court decision to not allow black defendants accused of violent crimes against a white man to question potential jurors on the subject of racial prejudice, because "[t]he mere fact that the victim of the crimes alleged was a white man and the defendants were Negroes was less likely to distort the trial than were the special factors involved in *Ham*."120

Generally, courts are left with a great deal of discretion in determining whether questioning on the subject of racial bias is necessary, but there are a few restrictions designed to protect our right to a fair and impartial jury in select circumstances. First, federal district courts must allow inquiry into possible racial bias whenever requested by a defendant in cases where the defendant and victim are members of different racial groups.121 Furthermore, defendants in capital cases in which the defendant and victim are members of different racial groups have the right to question potential jurors on the question of racial

119 Id. at 596 and 598; see also United States v Brown, 938 F.2d 1482 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 992 (1991).
120 Id. at 597 ("The circumstances in *Ham* strongly suggested the need for voir dire to include specific questioning about racial prejudice. Ham’s defense was that he had been framed because of his civil rights activities. His prominence in the community as a civil rights activist, if not already known to veniremen, inevitably would have been revealed to the members of the jury in the course of his presentation of that defense. Racial issues therefore were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial. Further, Ham’s reputation as a civil rights activist and the defense he interposed were likely to intensify any prejudice that individual members of the jury might harbor. In such circumstances we deemed a voir dire that included questioning specifically directed to racial prejudice, when sought by Ham, necessary to meet the constitutional requirement that an impartial jury be impaneled." Id. at 596-97).
prejudice. In these cases, it appears to be sufficient for a judge to do the questioning into these matters, with no guarantee that the defendant’s counsel can conduct its own questioning. It is not sufficient, however, for the judge to direct general questions to the jury as a whole on these matters.

D. Cultural and Normative Barriers

Perhaps more substantial barriers to adopting the IAT in voir dire are cultural and normative in nature. A survey of published federal and state cases finds almost no mention of the IAT. Despite its apparent importance, it is simply not a part of current judicial practice. Similarly, a Lexis search for “implicit bias” among all published federal and state cases returned only eleven results, only two of which are published.

In one of the extremely rare occasions where a court did attempt to assess the possibility of a juror being affected by implicit bias, the court showed a very shallow and incomplete understanding of how implicit bias works. In United States v. McConnell, the Tenth Circuit attempted to determine whether a juror had any implicit bias by considering only that the juror may have failed to disclose that he had been involved in a previous criminal matter, a question he was asked during voir dire, ignoring the myriad of other influences that could

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125 A Lexis search of “implicit associations test” among all Federal and State Cases Combined returned only the unpublished case Jaffe v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12208 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2008) (detailed a settlement agreement as part of which “Morgan Stanley agrees to provide diversity related training to field sales branch management which incorporates elements of the Implicit Association Test or similar tool agreed upon by the parties.”).
126 464 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1361 (2007).
127 Id. at 1157.
have contributed to the existence of implicit bias. Based on their inquiry, the court found that the juror did not have any implicit bias.\textsuperscript{128} The judges' analysis, of course, was not at all consistent with what is now known about implicit bias.

In a recent criminal trial in New Hampshire,\textsuperscript{129} the state tried to block an attempt by the defense to have a leading expert in implicit bias, Professor Mahzarin Banaji, testify in trial as an expert witness "to demonstrate the link between [implicit bias research] and death penalty decision-making."\textsuperscript{130} The court, in that case, did grant funds for, and allow, Professor Banaji's testimony, which may be a sign that at least some courts will begin to consider the effects of implicit bias in criminal cases. Currently, however, the American judiciary does not appear ready to listen to arguments that use implicit bias, despite the fact that these arguments are consistent with the stated and revered goals of voir dire.

\textit{E. Benefits of Utilizing an IAT During Jury Selection}

Even if the IAT were permissible, its benefits still must be determined. If one's goal is to reduce the effects of implicit bias on jury members in trial, then, there are two primary benefits to using an IAT during jury selection. The first, and more obvious,
is to remove from the jury those individuals whose IAT results indicate strong implicit bias. The second stems from the de-biasing properties of the IAT itself.

1. Removing Individuals Showing High Levels of Bias

The most obvious benefit of using the IAT during voir dire is that a strongly biased juror could be removed from the final jury. While it's unclear where a cutoff point could be to remove a juror for cause based on an IAT result, or even whether such a result is enough to show cause at all, an IAT result showing strong bias against a relevant category of people would be an important factor in an attorney’s determination to use a peremptory challenge on that individual. This raises a problem that in certain states the IAT test could only be used for determinations of cause and not for peremptory challenges. Further, the test unlikely would be sufficient to establish that cause on its own.

In these states, the best case use of the test might be as one factor of many used to support a general finding of cause for removal by a judge, and in turn, to act as a factor in a decision by an attorney to use a peremptory challenge. If the resulting jury consisted of individuals free from strong levels of implicit bias, as measured by an IAT, it is likely that that jury would be closer to the ideal envisioned in the primary goals of fairness and impartiality.

2. De-biasing Properties of the IAT

One positive fact about implicit bias is that it is malleable. "Implicit biases are sensitive to features of the local situation."

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131 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 223 (West 2007) (“Examination of prospective jurors shall be conducted only in aid of the exercise of challenges for cause.”).

132 Lane, Kang, & Banaji, supra note 10, at 437-38.
Exposure to counter-stereotypical out-group members often reduces implicit bias."\(^{133}\) Relatively, a conscious motivation to act unbiased may reduce implicit bias, at least temporarily.\(^{134}\) From this, it follows that the greater a situation creates self-awareness about possible bias, the more likely a person may overcome any negative effects of that implicit bias.\(^{135}\) In some ways, the IAT acts as a mirror, but perhaps, even as a more probing mirror than an external, physical mirror. Once people take the IAT and are aware of the existence of their own implicit biases, they will be better situated to overcome negative effects of that bias, at least theoretically. Of course each individual is different, both in terms of motivation to be nonprejudiced and in terms of cognitive styles, and taking the IAT will have a different effect on different test takers.\(^{136}\)

Aside from individual variations, administering the IAT would not ensure a less biased jury, because some studies have shown that de-biasing agents can result in a rebounding effect, where those individuals subject to these agents feel greater animus to a certain group than before.\(^{137}\) It is possible, then, that an individual could take an IAT and have negative emotions for being subjected to the test. Rather than acting as a complete bar to use of the IAT, however, this simply raises questions about the methodology of administering the IAT, which must be resolved before it could be used. If the test were given to a jury panel for a specific case on a specific category such as race, for example, then the jurors would likely know what the test was

\(^{133}\) Id. at 438.
\(^{134}\) Id.
\(^{135}\) Id.
\(^{136}\) Id. at 439 ("Some people are more dispositionally motivated to be non-prejudiced . . . . People motivated to be non-prejudiced for personal (or internal) reasons, but not social (or external) reasons showed reduced implicit racial bias . . . . Implicit bias is also related to more general cognitive styles, such that people with highly rigid thinking styles or strongly right-wing ideologies exhibit stronger implicit bias.").
\(^{137}\) Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 859 (2007).
about, which would increase the likelihood of a rebounding effect. A wiser protocol is to make the IAT universal in jury assembly rooms, before they are associated with a particular case, and test jurors for the categories most likely to generate bias that could play a role in the cases scheduled for the day, such as age, immigration status, nationality, poverty, sex, sexual orientation, religion, as well as for different types of relevant professions, like police officers or corporate executives. The results of these tests could then be accessible to the judge and to attorneys within specific courtrooms during voir dire. Administering it blindly, in this fashion, would surely decrease any negative rebounding effects and help the benefits of administering the test outweigh possible consequences.  

CONCLUSION

Our legal system places great emphasis on the right to a fair and impartial jury in criminal cases. Current voir dire tools only assess potential jurors’ publicly admitted, explicit biases. We all necessarily have implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes, and these implicit attitudes and stereotypes often deviate from our explicit beliefs and influence our behavior and decision making. The Implicit Association Test is an effective way to measure an individual’s implicit bias, and has been shown to have predictive, internal, external, construct and statistical-conclusion validity. For all of these reasons, administering the IAT during voir dire would get us closer to our primary goal of having fair and impartial juries.

Statutory and case law are seemingly not an absolute bar to implementing this solution, but current norms and judicial culture might be. If the IAT were allowed in voir dire, its primary benefit would be to eliminate individuals who show strong im-

138 For more on general jury de-biasing, aside from use of the IAT as a de-biasing agent, see Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive. Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1241 (2002).
Explicit bias against a category to which a defendant in a criminal trial belongs. A secondary benefit would be the de-biasing effect of the test, itself, on all jurors.

The field of implicit bias has provided a wealth of information about how the brain works and the implications of those brain processes. The legal community is currently in a position to apply those findings to the goals of the judiciary. If, during this endeavor, it is discovered that certain cultural norms need to be reevaluated and updated, then, this author argues that this should be done.

Even within the small piece of the pie dealing with voir dire in race-salient criminal jury trials, there is much more about implicit bias to explore than discussed by this article. For example, it would be useful to explore the benefits of using de-biasing agents beyond the test itself to counteract the negative effects of implicit bias in criminal trials. This includes the use of objects in the courtroom, objects in jury pool waiting rooms, and objects in jury deliberation rooms; the use of individuals who might provide a debiasing effect; and techniques to raise awareness of possible bias including pre-jury selection videos and the use of mirrors or closed-circuit video cameras in jury deliberation rooms. Such a discussion would help evaluate the effectiveness of these, yet theoretical, solutions and would have to consider the possible "rebound" effect of de-biasing agents, which ultimately could result in even more bias. It would also be useful to explore the difficulties of implementing these solutions and the possible need for a regulatory system to ensure compliance and to promote best practices in courtrooms around the country.

These ideas may just be the tip of the iceberg. In addition to promoting the use of the IAT during voir dire, this article also hopes to serve as an example in illustrating the complexities involved in implementing a real-world solution to the concerns raised by the science of implicit bias. Most of all, this article hopes to persuade readers that despite these complex obstacles,
the science is compelling enough to begin a process to overcome those obstacles and fill in a few gaping holes in our current jury regime.