6-2010

Higher education and development in the global south: The case of Kenya

Erin Ashely Mink Garvey
DePaul University

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/29

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.
Higher Education and Development in the Global South:

The Case of Kenya

A Thesis

Presented in

Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Science

June, 2010

By

Erin Ashley Mink Garvey

Department of International Public Service

in the Masters of Public Service Graduate Degree Program

School of Public Service

DePaul University

Chicago, Illinois
Globalization has challenged and changed roles for governments, non-profits, and non-governmental institutions for countries in the Global South. It has similarly spawned the births of numerous manifestations of NGOs, which potentially complement the approximately 7,000-9,000 higher education institutions that exist worldwide. Improving education is an oft-cited goal of many countries’ development efforts—including Kenya, in her most recent Vision 2030 plan for development—but many scholars and students alike fall short when they deem only primary or secondary education as the main avenues to realize development goals. This exploratory, qualitative study considers if Kenyan higher ed public or private institutions play a role in the country’s development process.
Chapter One:

Introduction
Introduction

Globalization has challenged and changed roles for governments, non-profits, and non-governmental institutions (herein, NGOs) for countries in the Global South. It has similarly spawned the births of numerous manifestations of NGOs, such as community-based organizations, cooperatives, and people's organizations, and these seemingly-limitless NGOs potentially complement the approximately 7,000-9,000 higher education (herein, higher ed) institutions—specifically, public or private universities—that exist worldwide. For this thesis inquiry, higher ed refers to universities, specifically, as they are the most universally-recognized, best exemplifier of higher ed globally.

Many sub-Saharan African (herein, SSA) countries' higher ed institutions operate in environments vastly different than those of the Global North, in part because many SSA countries have only recently secured political independence from their former colonizers. Moreover, many SSA countries have also only been navigating their development efforts for a few decades, following the wake of the World Bank's (herein, WB) and International Monetary Fund's (herein, IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes (herein, SAPs) of the 1980s. Furthermore, in addition to operating in environments wherein constituents can freely notice a fierce, if not uncomfortable, difference between the lives of the country's “haves” and “have-nots,” some SSA higher ed institutions also operate in lieu of, and during, times of (inter)national political upheaval, sometimes serving roles as diverse as the “bastion of the revolution” or the “peace-keeper among the fury.” Thus, while the Global North and SSA higher ed may share students' and faculty’s desires for the pursuit of intellectual satiation, the backdrops of each higher ed system, in many ways, could not be more radically different.

Intersecting SSA Development with Higher Ed
Though research into higher ed in SSA is lacking, the few published scholars that exist seem to agree that higher ed plays some role(s) in a country and in its development process. For example, Ogom notes that higher ed has a key role in guaranteeing that a state can maintain a competitive edge (2007, 108). Birdsall adds that higher ed incorporates four distinct areas: training students to function in professional, entrepreneurial, managerial, and technical positions; conducting research; executing public and private sector services; and encouraging and fostering “indigenous self-expression” to help “conserve and adapt local traditions and values, and constitute important symbols of national prestige and attainment” (1996, 411-412). Higher ed also serves as the bastion of scientific research, with the government bearing responsibility for its financial support (Ogom 2007, 110). Increasing a state's scientific knowledge often results in positive spillover for the rest of society, resulting in modernization and social transformation (Ogom 2007, 110).

Altbach also notes that universities play critical roles in nations' development processes, since they are sources of both social mobility and political forces (1970, 1). Additionally, though universities are important for their educational perspectives as well as their political ideologies and connections—or resistance—to the government, this paradoxical situation sometimes renders them unable to protect their interests and autonomy from state intervention (Altbach 1970, 2). This paradox is the very crux of the dilemma which universities must negotiate, since they have an obligation both to their societies as well as to the entities that support them. Before the SAPs, many SSA nations subsidized their higher ed institutions, though perhaps due more to symbolism than pragmatism, as van der Bor questions:

“universities in the developing world have to cope with severe problems originating from both national policy conditions and institutional weaknesses. Yet universities are considered to be of prime importance by both governments and the consumers of higher education. […] Is it because the university is considered by government to be a
symbolic asset in the process of nation-building, like a national flag, or airline? Or is the university seen as an important instrument for national development? Is university education considered by students to be an absolute necessity for vertical mobility, irrespective of its content, or are students genuinely interested in intellectual development? In other words, is higher education a collective or personal status symbol or is it something more?” (1991, 2)

Moreover, Carnoy asserts that one underlying assumption surrounding education, of all levels, in the Global South is that its growth will “equalize opportunities between social classes and income distribution and develop a more employable labor force” (1986, 73). Likewise, Ogom explains that “many SSA countries had looked to higher education as a fundamental vehicle of economic and political development. In recognizing the potential of its [higher ed] institutions as indigenous incubators of national progress and revitalization, these countries devoted substantial economic and human resources to projects that demonstrated the priority of [higher ed]” (2007, 108). In this regard, scholars have written that some SSA countries espoused higher ed as a type of panacea to their development woes, since governments originally “looked to the universities for implementation of development plans. It soon became clear, however, that higher ed could not automatically solve the problems of modernization” (Altbach 1970, 7). Guedeghe notes that the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, UNESCO, has made higher education a priority, once it recognized the connection between higher education and science, technology, and sustainable human development (1997, 44). The author writes that UNESCO affirms that

“higher education plays an important role because it is the enhancement of its relevance and quality that creates the conditions for progress in education at all other levels [primary, secondary]. Not only is higher education responsible for the training of teachers and other education personnel, but its mission also includes educational research [...] as well as curriculum reform and the development of teaching methods and materials.” (1997, 44)

Van den Bor also notes the troubles in assuming that higher ed, and education in general,
Garvey 5

is the “magic bullet” to achieve development goals. Like Guedeghe and UNESCO, van den Bor explains that “The impact of education will lead to individual and social change only if combined with relevant non-educational inputs. […] Socio-economic development absolutely requires education, including higher education. Thus, the contribution of higher education to development is relative, conditional and inevitable” (1991, 11). The author asserts that many universities cannot yet “exert a substantial impact on national development, simply because they themselves still need to be developed. And even if the university has reached a state of development in which good management is able to tap sufficient resources to organize a high quality of teaching and meaningful programmes of research and outreach, the pretense that the university could play the role of the only and omnipotent instrument for development would be false or at least misleading,” further emphasizing earlier points that higher ed should be but one actor, among many, in a country's development process (1991, 11). Because development encompasses so many fields and disciplines, it is logical that education—specifically, higher ed—cannot be the exclusive or even prominent actor. Instead, as the aforementioned scholars note, higher ed should be but one among many in a smorgasbord of development actors.

Research Question

As a higher education practitioner interested in issues of development, globalization, and education, I have grown increasingly interested in determining the role(s), if any, that Global South higher ed institutions have in their countries' developments. Additionally, as a result of my recent trip to Kenya with DePaul University's School of Public Service, I am especially interested in Kenya's intersection between its higher ed institutions and its development process. This thesis research explores how Kenyan higher ed institutions contribute to the country's development process, if at all. In other words, it asks what is the role of the Kenyan university to Kenya's development efforts? The study also notes the differences, similarities, strengths, and
limitations that Kenyan public or private higher ed institutions bring, or fail to bring, to the country's development efforts.

**Significance of Study**

Each country in the Global South certainly has its own unique circumstances, strengths, and limitations, in terms of how it can use its higher ed institutions in its development processes. Though we may not necessarily be able to extrapolate the experiences of Kenya and note how the country has, or has not, used its higher ed institutions to realize its development aims to other Global South countries, a study of Kenya will nonetheless present the country's development and educational strengths and limitations, as well as recommend possible ways forward.

Improving education is an oft-cited goal of many countries' development efforts—along with decreasing malnutrition rates, eradicating preventable diseases, or increasing gender parity or literacy—yet primary or secondary education are often thought of as the main avenues for Global South countries to realize their development aims. My research explores if Kenyan higher ed does, in fact, have a meaningful role in that country's development process.
Chapter Two:

Literature Review
Framing the Research Scope

As we investigate the role of higher ed to Kenya's development efforts, it is first helpful to consider what scholars have already documented about its role(s) in the Global South. As previously described, our examination of higher ed in the Global South, generally, and in Kenya, specifically, only considers the university, as it is the best exemplifier, and most recognizable manifestation, of higher ed.

This Literature Review's “Roadmap”

Before exploring Kenya's specific higher ed landscape and challenges, this literature review first examines how higher ed has come to exist in SSA. The first section of the review provides a history of higher ed in SSA from the 1960s-present; elaborates the intersections between SSA development and higher ed; and explains challenges that SSA higher ed faces.

After the review lays the initial groundwork of higher ed in SSA, it then describes the history and current reality of Kenyan higher ed. It details Kenya's higher ed history from the 1960s-present; explains the growth of Kenya's private higher ed; and finally, describes Kenya's higher ed challenges, paying particular attention to issues of equity and the Kenyan state's role in its higher ed systems.

History of Higher Ed in SSA

1960s

Originally, colonizing powers established universities in their colonies as a way to guarantee that they would have a sufficient number of skilled personnel to undertake the bureaucratic tasks inherent in running a colony. Thus, from their inception, universities had attained an “alien” relationship to their local context, putting them at “sharp variance with local patterns of social organization and traditional orientations” (Altbach 1970, 3). As is often the
case, history repeats itself, as universities in SSA decades later came under additional scrutiny for not adapting to the needs and cultural contexts of their SSA communities. However, the 1960s marked the “glory days” for many SSA universities, because they developed strong curricula, employed indigenous professors, and created a new sector of “educated elites” that later became the “political conscience of African nations” (Ogom 2007, 110-11). Additionally, higher ed was at “the forefront of the movement for human rights, democracy, privatization and economic liberalization occurring throughout much of the continent” (2007, 110-11). Again, history repeats itself, specifically in the Kenyan context, as university students there held prominent roles in the country's democratization process in the early 1960s.

1970s

SSA higher ed's “glory days” of the 1960s quickly came under scrutiny in the 1970s for not adequately improving its people's well-being or changing societal norms. Guedeghe documents that universities were “called upon to move away from the colonial past and adjust to the developmental needs of African nations” (1997, 26). Altbach also notes this transition, explaining that “vocationalization has been an important trend in higher education […] The traditional notion that higher education should consist of liberal nonvocational studies for elites or that it should provide a broad but unfocused curriculum has been widely criticized for lacking 'relevance' to the needs of contemporary students” (1992, 49).

1980s

By the 1980s, higher ed had become a strategy of many SSA governments as part of their development processes. However, once higher ed faced the IMF and WB's SAPs, its importance in the development process withered. The SAPs called for SSA countries to “not only reduce their funding for SSA higher education […] but to […] either re-direct funding
from higher to primary education, or risk forfeiting technical and financial assistance” (Ogom 2007, 113). Varghese further notes that:

“state-supported higher education was not seriously questioned for nearly three decades. SAPs of the 1980s included policies to reduce the role both of the public sector in general, and of public-funded higher education in particular. Furthermore, these programmes favoured the diversion of public resources from education to productive sectors, as well as the diversion of public investment from higher to lower levels of education. These measures led to a decline of higher education in many countries.” (2006, 19)

Higher ed fell—hard—from its perch of governmental priorities, and many scholars lament the 1980s as the era responsible for the beginning of SSA higher ed's overall downfall. Additionally, scholars commonly blame the implementation of the SAPs for the present conditions in SSA.

1990s-Present

SSA higher ed still feels the repercussions, decades later, of the SAPs. Not only do many public universities lack sufficient funds to deliver a rigorous course of academic study, but qualified faculty are leaving in droves, seeking better research opportunities and living wages elsewhere, also. Furthermore, many universities have not updated their course curricula in years, rendering their students' education outdated, if not obsolete. Like other scholars, Ogom feels that African universities nowadays are “mere shadows” of their earlier glory days, due to “an air of demoralization,” “incipient decay,” and “degenerated infrastructure” (2007, 111).

After the SAPs, many states were unable to support their higher ed institutions, which led to the births of private higher ed institutions alongside the public higher ed institutions in SSA (Varghese 2006, 19). Private higher ed institutions can be for-profit or not-for-profit, and many are religiously-focused and managed like transnational corporations (Varghese 2006, 20).
Oftentimes, private higher ed institutions offer courses that “require less investment in terms of infrastructure and equipment,” like law, the humanities, and commerce (Varghese 2006, 22).

**Challenges Facing SSA Higher Ed**

SSA higher ed has wavered since the 1960s, and it has continued to negotiate challenges throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century. Some scholars claim that “the university has lost its soul,” since it must manage pressures from “governmental authorities, militant students, or external constituencies” while ensuring its autonomy in governance and research (Altbach 1992, 51). Clearly, managing pressure and autonomy is something easier said than done, especially when resource-stricken universities rely on the state, or on its students or donors, for what scarce funding it receives in order to stay afloat.

Van den Bor and Ogom list similar challenges, ranging from inappropriate curricula to a mismatch of graduates in lesser-needed fields. Carnoy takes higher ed's failings one step further by examining it through the lens of conflict theory, by saying:

> “the educational system (as part of the state) may have technical and financial problems, but these problems have to be viewed as largely inherent in the class state […] The observed inefficiencies and inequalities in education are the product of the capitalist organization of production and the social-class structure inherent in it, not of lack of financial resources or inefficiency per se. Putting more resources into education and managing it better may make the educational system a more pleasant place and may even increase 'learning' […] but will not solve social and economic inequality or unemployment—these are attributes of the development pattern itself.” (1986, 75)

In this way, Carnoy argues that the educational system is simply an extension of the state, only supporting those in society it usually supports, the upper echelon, and continuing to further marginalize society's most vulnerable.

Carnoy adds yet another challenge to SSA higher ed by indicating that “research shows that there has been a rapid increase in education in the labor force in most countries of the world,” resulting in a recently-produced “bulge of university graduates who […] end up in work
which is relatively simple or even requires skills that they learn primarily on the job” (1986, 79).\(^1\) Issues stemming from “brain drain,” the “flight of Africa's top intelligentsia to the developed world, particularly the USA and Western Europe,” and SSA institutions' inabilities to remunerate its employees adequately, also plague SSA higher ed institutions (Ogom 2007, 113).\(^2\)

Additional challenges SSA higher ed systems face include a “growing social demand for higher education opportunities” that “not only evokes frustration among the unemployed graduates […] but also implies a huge waste and misuse of (human) capital”; a lack of quality output from the university, resulting from a scarcity of material inputs, weak university management, and “feeble instructional skills” among teaching staff; poor research environments; and inequitable and inefficient financing (van den Bor 1991, 3-4). Inadequate, “excessively theoretical” curricula that are seldom evaluated and an incapacity to conduct research without having to deal with “governments [who] often want quick answers, definite conclusions and control of the results, particularly when based on confidential data from government files” also challenge SSA higher ed's ability to operate as an educational institution (van den Bor 1991, 6). Other challenges include increasing enrollments as well as an unsustainable pattern of expenditures; declining educational quality; and perhaps most importantly, an increasing irrelevance to national needs (Guedeghe 1997, 26).

The funding of higher ed in SSA, in terms of its priority position, remains “one of the major controversial issues in research on higher education, particularly between African decision makers and the donor community” (Guedeghe 1997, 40). SSA education policy-

---

\(^1\) My recent trip to Kenya revealed that this was the case, as our tourist group van operator was a university graduate, as was my group's volunteer tour guide at the Nairobi National Museum.

\(^2\) The WB estimates that 23,000 scholars emigrate annually from Africa in search of better working conditions, and estimates predict that there are more African scientists and engineers currently living and working in the USA than in the entire African continent (Ogom 2007, 114).
makers have bemoaned the effects of limited spending on higher education in their countries, which they feel leads to a “knowledge gap” or “intellectual dependency” (Birdsall 1996, 407). This “intellectual dependency” inevitably makes SSA higher ed institutions “peripheral,” eons away from the “centers” of the leading institutions in the Global North, and inevitably undermines the potential contributions that SSA higher ed institutions can bring to both their local and international environments. Birdsall also challenges the popular notion that developing countries should allocate fewer of their funds to higher ed than to primary or secondary, as she explains that “there may be a case for maintaining and even increasing spending on higher education, as long as public funds can be directed to research and other 'public good' functions of institutions of higher education” (1996, 407).

As the twenty-first century proceeds, SSA higher ed must decide if it wants to be an “‘ivory tower’ of speculation and of socialization for a future elite” or a “direct participant in the exciting but difficult tasks of national development”; it must also decide whether it should emphasize “high level graduate instruction and research” or “the production of large numbers of first-degree holders” (Altbach 1970, 7). Should a higher ed degree be for the few select or for the masses? Should the university permit only the traditional, Western education to dominate, or should it instead incorporate elements of the country's national heritage and identity? Answers to these questions will directly affect both the intellectual landscape of SSA higher ed institutions as well as each SSA country's citizenry.

Kenya's Higher Ed History

As we transition from a SSA focus to one more Kenya specific, readers might notice some recurring themes, realities, and challenges. Since 1970, Kenya has had fifteen private and six public universities, and higher ed mostly originated in Kenya during President Moi's reign.
Kenyan universities were not necessarily established out of a desire for the advancement of national intellect, however. Oketch describes, “the tendency has been to create new institutions by presidential pronouncements. Thus, the creation of additional state universities after the University of Nairobi was associated with former President Moi's desire for national pride and domestic politics than with planned need for these institutions” (2004, 120). Oketch’s assertion coincides with van den Bor's earlier consideration of higher ed as a personal status symbol or comparable to establishing a national airline.

Kenyan higher ed has greatly evolved since the mid-1960s, thanks in large part to dynamic policy reforms specific to the country's educational pursuits. The First Development Plan, of 1964/70, was perhaps the country's first development document that emphasized economic expansion and “Kenyanization” of education to provide manpower and skills for the country (Eshiwani 1990, 28). Soon after, in 1965, Kenya's Sessional Paper No. 10 detailed education as “much more of an economic than [a] social service” and again, like the First Development Plan, made it the main vehicle through which the country could equalize economic disparities by equipping its citizens to become valuable human resources (1990, 28). Years later, the University of Nairobi Act established Kenya's first and oldest public university in 1970, and from 1972-73, the country's newly-established University Grants Committee began to explore the financing of expanding the country's higher ed system while meeting its manpower needs (1990, 29).

The 1980s brought about even more heightened visibility to Kenya's higher ed system, beginning in 1981 with the Presidential Party on the establishment of a Second University in Kenya, which again reviewed the country's higher ed system and recommended restructuring the
nation's educational system to 8-4-4\(^3\) (Eshiwani 1990, 31). The University Grants Committee Report of 1983 then made recommendations that Kenya continue to finance its higher ed by using public funds, though students would be expected to pay for their own food, books, and accommodations via a loan system (1990, 31). Just a few years after the nation considered opening a second public university, in 1985, Kenya established Kenyatta University, thanks to the Kenyatta University Act, and in the same year, the nation also passed the New University Act, which established the Commission for Higher Education, a body that would later serve in an advisory capacity for the establishment of Kenyan public and private higher ed institutions (1990, 31). Finally, also in 1985, Kenya eliminated its original British 7-(4-2)-3 education system and introduced 8-4-4, the same educational system used by the US (1990, 31).

As the previous paragraph details, public higher ed in Kenya experienced “unprecedented expansion” in the 1980s—until the advent of the SAPs (Oketch 2004, 120). The SAPs brought a drastic reduction in Kenya's expenditures on higher ed. SAPs manifested in the form of a “suspension of construction of residential and non-residential buildings at the universities” as well as

“over-congestion at the public universities, dilapidated buildings due to reduced workforce for maintenance, introduction of cost-sharing tuition, and the suspension of the student pocket money […] Also suspended were the reasonably high quality meals at the university catering services and the introduction of user-[fees] for both meals and residential-halls.” (Oketch 2004, 122)

These factors all compounded to result in the students' disillusionment of the university (Oketch 2004, 122).

Additionally, Kenyan higher ed history has been wrought with student protests, especially since the SAPs (Amutabi 2002, 159).\(^4\) Originally, in the 1960s, university students were

---

\(^3\) For more information about the 8-4-4 system, please refer to Appendix D.
\(^4\) Kenyan students have also protested against cost-sharing, unemployment, and employment freezes in the public
politically disinterested and disconnected (Amutabi 2004, 161). The 1970s made the students “abandon their ivory tower mentality and begin a systematic engagement in political action, including violent confrontation. The political apex of student activism was reached in the mid-1970s and lasted to the mid-1990s, by which point student action was more likely to be accompanied by demands for democratic reform” (Amutabi 2004, 161). Students especially challenged the state and the university once the SAPs introduced cost-sharing\(^5\) (Amutabi 2004, 163). According to Amutabi, since the SAPs, “the fate of university students has increasingly become inextricably linked to that of the masses. Students have been forced to become societal watchdogs as it has become clear that as stakeholders, they must participate in order for their stakes to count” (2004, 163). In fact, some scholars believe that “Kenya would still be wallowing in dictatorship today were it not for orchestrated street demonstrations by the University of Nairobi students in the period leading up to multiparty politics” (Amutabi 2004, 162). University students have “bequeathed to Kenyans and to the democratization process the power to riot, to protest, and stand up for their rights. Street demonstrations in Nairobi and other towns are almost synonymous with university students,” since students have been both initiators of change while also being part of it (Amutabi 2004, 164, 175).

*The Growth of Kenyan Private Higher Ed*

Soon after Kenya's six public higher ed institutions accomplished their original missions of “developing human capital, [...] supplying manpower to the civil service, [...] and [fostering] an intellectual community in the country,” they began to face exorbitant enrollment and financial challenges and a decline in educational quality (Oketch 2004, 119). These challenges spurred the

---

\(^5\) Cost-sharing refers to when public higher ed changed from being freely available to students, without financial stipulations, to being user-fee-based, similar to how American higher ed works. Until this time, Kenyans could attend university and not pay for tuition, room and board, dining, or other materials.
Kenyan government to establish and facilitate the growth of private higher ed institutions through its Commission for Higher Education Act (herein, CHE) (Oketch 2004, 119). The CHE Act entails yearly self-evaluations for university employees; internal evaluations from teaching staff, assessed by both students and colleagues; and a continual review of programs and curriculum, all of which is lacking in the Kenyan publics (Abagi 2006, 89). Abagi details that since the 1980s, the Kenyan government “has adopted the strategy of promoting private institutions of higher education to meet the ever increasing public demand” and that employees and lecturers “have turned to private higher ed for educational and upgrading services. As the demand for higher ed increases in the country, new types of private higher ed institutions are emerging” (2006, 75).

The SAPs also held some responsibility for the growth of Kenyan private higher ed institutions, since SAP policies “urged for government divestiture from state enterprises, including education.” As a condition to the WB granting Kenya credit in 1991, the government had to limit public university enrollment to “no more than 3 percent [growth] per annum up to 2017,” which produced a sizable clientele for private higher ed institutions, “given the inability of public universities to absorb all of the qualified candidates” (Abagi 2006, 77). Additionally, scholars contest that more women attend private higher ed institutions than public higher ed institutions because males typically out-perform the women on their Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) exams, which determine to which universities students can apply (Oketch 2004, 126). In this respect, private higher ed gives opportunities to those who may not have had it otherwise: provided they can fully subsidize their education (Abagi 2006, 81). Kenya's rising presence of private higher ed institutions coincides with global trends surrounding higher ed, as “many parts of the world are moving from elite university systems to mass higher
education” (Oketch 2004, 129). Likewise, as more Kenyans are going to primary and secondary school, it is logical that more would want to attend university (Oketch 2004, 129).

Kenyan public higher ed institutions have some sway to them that private higher ed institutions still lack, such as being “hallowed symbols of national identity,” “articulate advocates with access to media, monopolies on professional training and tight ties with influential professions,” and “student masses ready to march or more privileged constituencies ready to defend their degrees” (Oketch 2004, 133). In the past few decades, though, Kenyan public higher ed institutions have lost some of their original allure and societal positions of prestige. Because of this, families who can afford to send their children to private higher ed institutions now often do (Oketch 2004, 129). Abagi documents that private higher ed institutions' alumni tend to get jobs more quickly than those of the public higher ed institutions, perhaps because of the “credibility attained by some of the private universities in some of the courses offered,” like accounting, business studies, economics, and commerce (2006, 90).

Further, private higher ed institutions adapt their programs in accordance with market demands, which in turn increases public demand for their courses and makes employers target students who graduate from such contemporary fields (Abagi 2006, 91-92). Private higher ed institutions offer both undergraduate and graduate degree coursework, though the undergraduate courses and programs are the main emphasis (Abagi 2006, 83).

Similar to public or private higher ed institutions in the USA, Kenyan public and private institutions each have their own sets of advantages and disadvantages, so it is important to consider both types of institutions when we examine how Kenyan higher ed fits into the country's development process. Scholars believe that the dynamics between Kenya's private and public higher ed institutions can only mean good for the country. Abagi claims that “the
growth of private higher ed in Kenya has had an intended effect on public universities. They have created competition for, on the one hand, both students and lecturers, and for the production of graduates with market-oriented and in-demand skills on the other hand” (2006, 90). Just as in the business world, Oketch notes that higher ed competition is healthy because “it can lead to higher standards and to significant benefits for individual students” (2004, 135). He calls for the government to extend its portable student loans to the privates, as do American higher ed institutions, so as to guarantee their survival (2004, 135). He also opines that the Kenyan state should help privates launch “scientific departments which can encourage research in areas of critical need in the country” to help “boost the production of human resources with scientific skills” (Oketch 2004, 135).

**Kenya's Higher Ed Challenges**

Kenyan higher ed shares the same challenges as those of other SSA nations. “Increased public demand, the rising importance of knowledge as the principal driver of growth and development, dwindling employment opportunities and the fast growth of information, communication and technology” all compound to stretch the ability of Kenyan higher ed to positively effect any social or development change in the nation (Abagi 2006, 75).

Kenya's private higher ed institutions, in particular, also carry their own set of challenges related to equity. What is perhaps most problematic about Kenyan private higher ed, despite its contemporary programs or its consistent assessment by the CHE, is its price-tag: and especially because students and their families are expected to foot the bills entirely by themselves, unlike at the public higher ed institutions. Abagi notes this point in his assertion that “the majority of Kenyans are yet to access private university education […] whereas those in public universities can apply for loans and/or a bursary” (2006, 92). Is it better for an individual to attend a public
higher ed institution, where the curriculum may be outdated, but have a degree from a university with a “name recognition quality” over a newly-established private institution? Or instead, provided he or she can afford to attend a private higher ed institution, is the same individual better-off to attend a private, where the programs of study are more regularly assessed and curriculum updated, even if the institution lacks any “name recognition quality”? We could indubitably argue for either side here—attesting to the myriad advantages and disadvantages that each higher ed institution type brings to Kenya's development aims. These larger issues related to the inherent differences between Kenya's public and private higher ed institutions are of utmost importance to Abagi, in the author's assertion that:

“Equity should mean more than access into higher education. It must [include] equity of opportunity—the institutional environment in which learners, through curriculum options, teaching learning materials and processes, and mentoring, genuinely have every chance to succeed. Equity, to be meaningful, also means ensuring that learners have access to quality and relevant education, and graduate with the relevant knowledge, skills and attributes that are required not only in the labour market, but also for the economic growth and social and political development of the country.” (2006, 93)

Abagi's claims that public higher ed, and the opportunities it gives its students, must be equitable to those of Kenya's private higher ed, coincides with many of the contentious debates surrounding public and private education, of all levels, in the USA.

Additionally, the Kenyan state has to answer what roles it will play in its public and private higher ed systems, aside from its creation of the CHE. On the broadest scale, as Oketch claims, the Kenyan state has an important, central role to both “[ensure] accountability for the resources provided,” as well as to guarantee that the universities are “providing the best possible quality in teaching, research and service” (2004, 134). Scholars contest that Kenyan university students should be afforded the same type of intellectual and post-collegiate employment opportunities—regardless of which type of university they attend—and guaranteeing and
maintaining this educational equity may fall under the state's purview. If Kenyan higher ed institutions are to play a meaningful role in the country's development efforts, it behooves the state to ensure that its institutions graduate students of ample intellectual and vocational capacities. To some degree, the creation of the CHE Act does so for Kenyan privates. Kenyan public higher ed institutions, on the other hand, seem to remain without strong governmental oversight.

**Summation and Next Steps**

As the scarce available literature reveals, the discourse related to the role of higher ed to SSA, generally, or to Kenya, specifically, is unresolved, at best. It seems most scholars believe there is potential for higher ed to contribute to a country's development efforts but that oftentimes, that potential is thwarted by seemingly-impenetrable obstacles, such as “brain drain,” state interference with research endeavors, or inadequate remuneration. Consequently, how public and private higher ed institutions fit into Kenya's development process, if they do at all, remains an infrequently-explored consideration, and as such, warrants further study. Based on Kenya's experiences with its own public and private higher ed institutions, can higher ed can help a country's development efforts? In other words, is the university a vehicle for development, and why or how so?

Examining Kenya's higher ed institutions has shown us that they share many of the same challenges as other SSA institutions, yet Kenyan public and private higher ed institutions alike have varying strengths and weaknesses. It seems that the state could use these complementary forces to its advantage, as it pursues its development aims, but unless it can guarantee an equitable educational experience for its students—regardless of the type of university they attend—a sizable educational outcome discrepancy will all-too-easily exist among students.
This discrepancy, in turn, could potentially jeopardize how university-educated Kenyan students can contribute to their country's development efforts, assuming that they can at all. The subsequent methodology and data collection chapter will capture our process to compare Kenya's public or private higher ed institutions, so we can better understand each university type's role—if any—in the country's development efforts.
Chapter Three:

Methodology and Data Collection
Identification of Research Design

My research data was comprised strictly of primary source data. Additionally, I secured respondents from both Kenyan public and Kenyan private higher ed institutions—the University of Nairobi (herein, UoN) and Tangaza College, respectively—to compare their faculty and staff’s expertise and experiences in their specific realm of higher ed. I planned to interview 20 experts between the institutions I examined, gaining at least five respondents per type of institution, on the role of higher ed to Kenya’s development efforts. The university representatives answered my questions from the perspective of experts, thereby not giving their “personal” experiences or opinions; I have included my questions and the cover sheet introduction I used with my respondents in Appendix A.

Once I earned institutional approval from DePaul University's Institutional Review Board to conduct research with live persons for my thesis inquiry, throughout the months of April and May 2010, I emailed approximately fifty higher education faculty and staff from the UoN and Tangaza College. Additionally, I accessed Kenyan faculty and staff's e-mail addresses by scouring the universities' websites and, once I secured the addresses, emailed the individuals directly. I did not discriminate as to who could participate in my study; that is, if an individual had an email address listed with his or her academic homepage, I emailed him or her. I gave each participant the option to complete the interview by having a conversation with me over Skype or by sending his or her answers to me in an email or a Microsoft Word attachment.

During my time in Kenya in the 2009 intersession with the School of Public Service, SPS students and I spent a few days at Tangaza College, with some of the school's social ministry faculty, staff, and students, and I used these forged connections strategically when I was

---

6 I did not restrict my participants to only being from “development” fields, as I anticipated that having an array of expertise represented would ensure a diversity of answers to the question of the role of Kenyan higher education to the country’s development process.
gathering research respondents. One Tangaza administrator, specifically, offered to help me secure my desired ten research respondents from Tangaza, since the administrator had met me in December, developed a rapport with me, and felt that the administrator would be able to vouch for the integrity and purpose of my thesis inquiry and research. This was especially helpful to me because Tangaza's website lists few faculty and staff email addresses, so it would have been challenging for me to try to secure my respondents simply through this vehicle. The responses I garnered from Tangaza were the result of my Tangaza colleague's outreach on my behalf.

In the absence of any real connection to the UoN, I primarily relied on “cold e-mailing” staff and faculty whose names I found online. Fortunately, I was able to secure a large number of UoN faculty and staff administrators' emails from the UoN website.

**Respondent Recruitment**

I recruited participants based on the “snowball” method of research, asking interviewees for their suggestions of other university officials whom I could interview, while making it clear that if they did not want to give any potential respondents' names, they should not feel inclined to or that I would not be any less likely to use their responses. After each interview, I aggregated the respondents’ answers to ensure their anonymity.

When I emailed potential Tangaza respondents and potential UoN respondents, I stressed the snowball sampling technique and asked each participant to consider “spreading the word” of my research inquiry to his or her colleagues. To this end, I gave respondents the option to either a) send me the names and email addresses of individuals whom they thought would be willing to participate, and I would inform them that their colleague had referred me to them, or b) simply send my email to their colleagues directly, thereby giving the colleague the liberty to contact me on his or her own accord. This happened a few times throughout my data collection process and
ultimately resulted in my gaining a few more respondents—folks whom I had not originally contacted, myself.

As the spring quarter 2010 continued, I emailed my potential and actual respondents on a weekly basis—and at times, more frequently—to gain a better sense of how many potential respondents were planning to participate in my inquiry. From April-May 2010, respondents received, on average, five emails from me, asking that they indicate their intention to participate, reminding them of my study, or simply checking-in with them to see if they had any questions about my questionnaire as they were in the process of completing it. Due to end-of-quarter deadlines, I asked my participants to submit their responses to me by the beginning of the week of May 24, 2010—week nine of DePaul's ten-week quarter system—so I would have an adequate amount of time to synthesize and analyze my findings, as well as to summarize them in my thesis document. In total, I secured five respondents from UoN and three from Tangaza, short of my original goal for each institution, but enough to lay the data groundwork for my exploratory inquiry. Needless to say, contacting potential respondents earlier, rather than later, in the spring quarter, once I received Institutional Review Board approval, was invaluable.

**Challenges**

Initially, it was challenging to secure interview respondents and to convince respondents to share the names of their colleagues whom I could interview. Additionally, it was challenging to infer the exact “ways” in which Kenyan private or public higher ed institutions are contributing, if at all, to the country’s development efforts, based solely on the respondents’ expert qualitatively-focused opinions. By starting my research-gathering process early, I mitigated any challenges that arose from respondents either not initially participating in my study or from not readily sharing the names of their colleagues whom I could also interview.
Moreover, instead of “rating” public versus private higher ed institutions, in terms of their potential contributions to Kenya's development efforts, I summarized my interviewees’ responses and deconstructed their answers to gauge the strengths and limitations that each type of university brings to Kenya’s development process, according to my respondents' expertise.

**Qualifying Respondents' Answers**

Drawing from Julie Keane and Janelle Allison's “The Intersection of the Learning Region and Local and Regional Economic Development: Analysing the Role of Higher Education,” I categorized my respondents' answers into the various components outlined in the article. The authors assert that a higher ed institution's value lies primarily in its linkages and quality of embeddedness to its local economy. Their conceptualization of this, which they call a “learning region,” provides “an analytical framework to explore qualitatively the role of higher education institutions. We argue that the conceptual framework provides a rigorous tool to accommodate interviews and surveys designed to capture more clearly the value of higher education institutions. The conceptual framework also encompasses the different ways in which interaction might occur” (1999, 896). As I categorized my respondents' answers, I looked for emerging patterns—such as a strong agreement that Kenyan higher ed is more influential in one area over another—and also looked for any discrepancies or disagreements regarding the potential role(s) that higher ed plays in Kenya's development process, in the view of my Kenyan higher ed practitioners. In Appendix B, I have attached the authors' framework, so readers can see how the authors disentangled the various ways higher ed could contribute to a country or its development processes.

Specifically, the rubric encompasses five different “knowledge” categories—codified knowledge, tacit knowledge, learning capacity, learning infrastructure, and global/local
interface—and provides ample definitions and sample indicators, as the diagram in Appendix B reveals. Apart from these categories, the rubric also delineates four “factor conditions,” which include human resources, physical resources, knowledge infrastructure, and physical infrastructure. Here, too, the authors provide additional definitions and indicators. The final category relates to the institution's “regionalism” and features just two categories—endogenous and regional governance—and again provides definitions and indicators. Against all these categories, the diagram charts the indicators and definitions' applications to the universities under scrutiny and gives specific parameters for the expected general contributions that the universities may contribute to each category. For example, under a “knowledge” category, the authors list the general contributions of “courses that are responsive to local needs,” “course requirements for industry work experience,” and “student placements in local businesses.” Similarly, under “factor condition,” the authors list contributions as diverse as “environmentally sustainable campus” or “lifelong learning.”

Though the authors' original usage of the rubric was to examine universities in Australia, a context likely different than those in Kenya, the rubric, its indicators, its categories, and its categorical definitions are sufficiently generic to encompass current Kenyan higher ed institutions. I used Keane and Allison's original rubric as a springboard, a way to deconstruct my respondents' answers and gauge how Kenyan public and private higher ed institutions fare in their potential contributions to Kenya. The next chapter of this thesis inquiry highlights the patterns and discrepancies of my qualitatively-derived data and elaborates the opinions and expertise of current “on-the-ground” Kenyan higher ed practitioners, related to issues of Kenyan public and private higher ed and the country's development efforts.
Chapter Four:

Data Analysis and Results
Categorical Analysis

According to Keane and Allison, a nation's higher ed institutions could contribute to the state in the following areas: knowledge, which includes codified knowledge, tacit knowledge, learning capacity, learning infrastructure, and global/local interface; factor conditions, which encompasses human resources, physical resources, knowledge infrastructure, and physical infrastructure; and finally, regionalism, which includes regional governance and endogenous regionalism (1999, 902). As the authors indicate in their original assessment of the University of the Sunshine Coast in Australia, it is possible for a higher ed institution to contribute in all, some, or none of these ways to a state, as it is also possible that higher ed may or may not impact an area in all, some, or none of the aforementioned ways.

The subsequent analysis outlines the themes that became most prominent in my respondents' answers to my questions regarding the role of Kenyan higher ed—public or private—to the country's development efforts. Based on the qualitative data derived from my interviews with my respondents, the following areas emerged as being where higher ed and the state's development efforts intersect most vividly: codified and tacit knowledge, learning capacity, human and physical resources, knowledge infrastructure, endogenous regionalism, and regional governance. What follows is a categorical breakdown, summation, and analysis of my respondents' answers.

Knowledge

Codified and Tacit Knowledge

Keane and Allison describe codified knowledge as "the stock of knowledge able to be quantified," such as the number of graduate or post-graduate courses an institution offers, the research and development into which an institution invests, or the availability of courses that are responsive to local needs (1999, 902). Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, is the non-quantifiable stock of knowledge an institution bears and is most often manifested in the forms of staff networks, university-
business linkages, and community networks an institution shares (Keane and Allison 1999, 902).

Several respondents explained that the greatest importance of Kenyan higher ed is in its ability to generate and create “hard,” factually-based knowledge—knowledge that can be of use to the state. One respondent's views summarized those of the other respondents, as the respondent held that:

"higher education for its own sake is useless! [Higher ed is] only relevant as far as [it] help[s] to promote development via research and inventions. People in higher education must generate knowledge, collect it, organize it, preserve and then disseminate it to those who need it. Knowledge is therefore a critical resource for any country. University experts must support the government in drawing development plans and then carry out [evaluations] of the same."

No respondent asserted that Kenyan higher ed fails to add any educational contributions to the state, and all alluded to the aforementioned remark, about the institutions' abilities to execute research—if given financial resources—and development plans that could be of some good to the country.

Research, to some degree, seems to be more closely associated with the larger public higher ed institutions in Kenya and less so to the private higher ed institutions. To this end, a public practitioner remarked that the Kenyan private higher ed institutions "play a positive role in the country's development efforts, mainly by offering relevant teaching programmes that supplement those offered in public institutions. Private institutions conduct very little research, so they make only a small contribution in this regard." Note that the respondent did not dismiss potential contributions that private higher ed institutions could make to Kenya’s development efforts but instead, said that the private higher ed institutions could complement the work of the public higher ed institutions. This idea of synergy, and its opposite, competition, between Kenya’s public and private higher ed institutions was a theme that emerged repeatedly throughout my conversations with the higher ed practitioners. My respondents’ views showed the potential “hard” knowledge that higher ed can have on, or create for, a state—but only if given the proper resources. As the respondents reported, however, there is typically a dearth of resources available for SSA higher ed institutions, generally, but also Kenyan institutions, specifically, to contribute to their fullest capacity to the state.
There was some discrepancy between the knowledge contributions produced by the public higher ed institutions and by the private higher ed institutions, in the views of some respondents. One private higher ed practitioner explained that "private universities are seen as threats and hence are never encouraged. Their contributions are mainly to the private sectors and benefit a limited category of people. The energy of private and public [together, working harmoniously] has never been tapped." A public practitioner, on the other hand, wrote that private higher ed institutions are "more serious and pertinent in their academic programmes" than are the public higher ed institutions, while the private respondents collectively asserted that the cultural and religious values that come with a private education can only bode well for the country and perhaps, in the long run, help end some of Kenya's deeply-seated nepotism and corruption challenges. Further elaborating on this point, another private practitioner wrote that "graduates from private universities and colleges are given proper ethical formation that helps them to avoid corruption and to serve the citizens with dedication."

Comparatively, a public practitioner noted that Kenya's private higher ed institutions "have a great potential to form the person in all aspects of growth and not just the intellect. This is what keeps the spirit of Kenya alive."

This consideration of holistic education—educating a person's mind and spirit equally, not just his or her mind—is an interesting idea to ponder. What would Kenya look like if all its students seeking a higher ed received one from a private, religiously-focused or religiously-affiliated higher ed institution? How different would the country be—in terms of national character or morale, for example—if at all? Conversely, if the onus is on private Kenyan higher ed institutions to "keep the spirit of Kenya alive," where do the Kenyan public higher ed institutions fit into the picture? One must also consider the long-term relevance that the church has to the state of Kenya and to its needs. For example, if the church does not adequately address the HIV/AIDS pandemic or devise realistic ways to control the spread of infection, is it also possible that a religiously-affiliated higher ed would also have
serious shortcomings in the curriculum it extends to its students? And perhaps most importantly, it seems unsafe to assume that a religiously-based education could guarantee a more promising future for Kenyans, generally, or for the state of Kenya, specifically. Simply because students receive a religiously-based education does not guarantee that they will not advance in their service-based careers by making poor choices that are detrimental to the health and vitality of their nation.

Other respondents also noted that, in some ways, private higher ed institutions have an advantage over public higher ed institutions in that they can create challenging, market-responsive programs of study for students, though they may have difficulties attracting students to the programs because of (usually) higher tuition costs. Respondents remarked that it seemed to them that private higher ed institutions are somewhat more dynamic than public higher ed institutions, simply due to their ability to quickly change with the times. Public higher ed institutions, on the other hand, seemed a bit less responsive to change.

Learning Capacity

Keane and Allison describe learning capacity as the "difference between competence and capability," in that "competence is often associated with vocational knowledge, where an ability to do something is easily obtainable." Learning capacity, they argue, "is the higher level ability to shape the knowledge," and they list examples like lifelong learning, student placement in local firms, and course requirements for industry experience among the methods to qualify an institution's learning capacity.

Respondents from both Tangaza and UoN noted their institutions' linkages with other external firms and global universities, contributions that they felt are "helping students to be in touch with the [world] long before their graduation." A private practitioner noted that in Kenya, "people with less education are not taken seriously when they give their views on issues facing the Kenyan society," and that "as long as the majority was ignorant [under the Moi regime], the government was able to sell political propaganda. Educated citizenry are not easy to rule because they know their rights and
demand them." A public practitioner further noted that public higher ed institutions provide "general and professional education for the majority of Kenya's political, business, academic, and professional leaders" and that they undertake "much of the country's research in science, technology, development, and other fields. There are some non-university research institutions [...] but many of these are staffed at least in part by researchers from the public universities." A public practitioner also wrote that "for many years, African universities had to look to the North for Ph.D. training, research partners, etc. This is beginning to change, and there is increasing evidence of efforts to partner with other southern institutions," such as the University of Cape Town, the University of Dar es Salaam, Mzumbe University, the University of Addis Ababa, and the University of Mauritius.

Several respondents noted how, in some ways, the Kenyan state undermines higher ed's potential learning capacities—its potential to employ a "higher level ability to shape the knowledge"—in its inadequate staff remuneration, an undermining that some feel ultimately leads to professorial and professional "brain drain," as mentioned in an earlier chapter. One public practitioner lamented that "the state's unwillingness to pay competitive salaries in public universities has, in my view, worked against development. Low salaries [encourage] various forms of moonlighting, from running small businesses to offering consultancy services. This distracts lecturers from academic research and, in many cases, even from pursuing their own Ph.D. studies." A private practitioner noted the same phenomenon and remarked that "the government assists universities but not as much as is needed. University professors and lecturers are so poorly paid. Many of them resort to running private businesses apart from teaching, [which] has led to falling standards at [Kenya's] public universities." Another public practitioner explained that "there is a lot of brain drain due to the fact of a lack of appreciation and opportunity. Economics plays an important part in curtailing the contribution of the public universities to development."

Similarly, another public respondent noted that Kenyan public higher ed institutions fail to
"optimally" play any roles to the country's development process because "besides training human resources, other roles of research and dissemination are weak due to low budgetary allocation for research. Also, linkages with policy organs are weak since people in government prefer to work with external 'experts' [compared] to local university professionals." Perhaps people in the government prefer to work with external “experts,” and not local university professionals, because they feel that the talent and wisdom available at Kenyan higher ed institutions is “second-rate” or incapable of addressing the state’s problems. As a respondent explained, oftentimes the government “poaches” professionals from the higher ed community to serve in the public sector or in special commissions, so perhaps because these government individuals are aware of this “talent poaching” taking place, they feel more comfortable working with an external individual, rather than with a local expert. This dilemma showcases the very serious implications of professional and professorial “brain drain,” especially when a state feels like an external actor will be more adept at addressing the state’s concerns than would be a local expert.

**Factor Conditions**

*Human and Physical Resources*

Keane and Allison define human resources as the "availability of a highly skilled, educated workforce with the capabilities to learn," while physical resources include those environmental resources "which contribute to the livability of a region," like having an environmentally sustainable campus (1990, 902).

Both human and physical resources were among the most frequently-cited methods, from my respondents, of the ways in which Kenyan higher ed contributes to the country's development efforts. A Tangaza practitioner noted that Tangaza's technical institute graduates have "been responsible for the preparation of graduates [who design] useful machines used by the rural folks in the areas of agriculture," as well as the college's contributions to assisting the government "to create renewable
energy, create jobs, supply power, and promote businesses among the rural folk. We are therefore contributing to the realization of the Vision 2030 declared by the Kenyan government recently."

Without the Tangaza institute that educated its students to create the machinery, rural Kenyans would not have been able to use the devices on their agriculture. Conversely, a public practitioner noted that "the state recruits graduates at all levels into its service, [and] we hope that what [the students] have learned at university will inform their work," and details that several UoN graduates work in the Ministry of Gender, Provincial Administration, the Ministry of Planning, and the National Bureau of Statistics governmental offices, among others.

Adding to this sentiment about the proximity of higher ed and development, another public practitioner stated that "one cannot divorce Kenyan politics and higher education since the two share a lot in terms of human resources, such as many people in government/politics are former university faculty and staff and they stay aligned to higher education actors." One public practitioner explained that "the intellectual resources of a nation are always a product of higher education," and another public practitioner further explained that public higher ed institutions, such as the UoN, have especially close linkages to Kenya's development, noting specifically that the:

"University of Nairobi has continuously reshaped the political landscape of [Kenya], such as pushing for an end to dictatorship in the 1980s, pushing for multiparty democracy in the 1990s, [or] working with civil society in the constitutional change. Universities are also behind HIV research [and] agricultural research. Many university faculty are also serving in community services like schools, health care institutions, [and] water boards."

Public higher ed institutions, one respondent felt, are especially critical to Kenya's development efforts, as "we have no option since we owe the country a contribution like everyone else. We [public higher ed practitioners] are paid from taxpayers' money and we therefore have to train human resources for the country as well as be there to play different roles when called upon to do so."

Numerous respondents also alluded to higher ed faculty and staff serving on think tanks and as consultants to the Kenyan government, which could be problematic, as previously explained. A public
respondent explained that "the state often looks to the universities for top managers. A number of permanent secretaries in Kenyan ministries are former university professors. One can only hope that such recruitment is actually mutually beneficial, but it is possible to view it as poaching the best university talent for government service." In one respect, this speaks highly to the caliber of professionals teaching in Kenya’s higher ed institutions, but it also sets up a problematic long-term implication, possibly, of decreasing talent and expertise in the country’s higher ed institutions. How will future generations of Kenyan higher ed students be able to meaningfully contribute to the country’s development aims if they are only instructed by “second-rate,” non-government-selected professionals? This long-term implication is worthy of consideration, especially if Kenya wants to advance its higher ed institutions throughout the twenty-first century or, minimally, more receiving a higher ed degree more accessible or attainable for the masses.

*Knowledge Infrastructure*

According to Keane and Allison, knowledge infrastructure entails a type of "tangible knowledge infrastructure, as well as a culture of learning," that is, a type of learning that is "socially and culturally embedded in society's norms" (1990, 902). To this degree, they list lifelong learning and community education classes as indicators of a knowledge infrastructure.

In some ways, knowledge infrastructure and human resources go hand-in-hand. One public respondent wrote that it is not uncommon for public higher ed institutions to use their research results to make policy recommendations to the government, and that other tertiary institutions, like teacher training colleges, medical training institutions, polytechnics, or technical institutes also provide specific skills that the nation needs in order to develop. Additionally, as higher ed has become more accessible and less "Ivory Tower," as one respondent described, "people have become more aware of their dignity and are able to stand up to evils in society. Though much needs to be done to reach perfection, many more people have access to higher education and are able to do well in life."
However, a public practitioner was careful to note a distinction about higher ed becoming *too embedded* into Kenyan societal norms, as the respondent wrote that "the greatest strength of the public sector is its ability to reach as many students as possible, but it needs to make quality education more than quantity education"—that is, emphasizing the depth and degree of the education it offers, not simply churning out graduates year after year with a dearth of analytical and higher-thinking capabilities. A public practitioner explained that higher ed's role in Kenya has changed a bit throughout the years, in that "the university is now more visible in terms of expanding its programmes to fit the market needs" and that "it has embraced people who would otherwise not have accessed university services." Another public respondent explained that as more people earned university degrees, especially individuals who serve in the government, the resultant tension and suspicion between the government and higher ed decreased significantly. This public practitioner described the relationship between the government and higher ed to be less "volatile" than in previous years because now, as more Members of Parliament have college degrees, they have come to understand the various roles of the universities and how they can work side-by-side with the state. However, as another public practitioner described, even with the UoN being the "mother" university of Kenya, "we find that collaboration with Government is not easy. We are sometimes brought into processes when they are too advanced to allow us to make a difference."

Other practitioners felt that, though potentially healthy or harmful, the competition between Kenya's public and private higher ed institutions should morph into a type of "synergy," working together alongside the state to achieve its development aims. One private practitioner explained that "Kenyan private universities need to shed their cocoons of 'I' and 'mine' and join the African concept of 'we-ness.'" Similarly, another private practitioner noted that "people expect too much from the political process" because "there is an inversion of values: political values come first, the cultural a poor second." Because of this, according to the practitioner, "the universities need to become seats of
genuine cultural progress, quite independent of the political process." To this end, another public practitioner wrote that Kenyan publics' greatest obligation now, and for the next twenty-five years, will be to "delink politics from the running of the institutions." Thus, while some respondents noted that the competition between the publics and privates could result in a drop in revenue, student admissions, or an increase in faculty departure, many recognized that there stands ample opportunity for the public higher ed institutions and the private higher ed institutions to work complementarily, and in conjunction with the state, to achieve its development aims.

**Regionalism**

*Endogenous Regionalism and Regional Governance*

Just as human resources and knowledge infrastructure are closely related, so, too, are endogenous regionalism, regional governance, and knowledge infrastructure closely intertwined. Keane and Allison describe endogenous regionalism as a "bottom-up development of organizations and institutions which enable them to be responsive to local needs and conditions," such as having a community participate in the advancement and development of a university or the employment and utilization of local professionals in a campus's long-term advancement and development plans (1990, 902). Regional governance, on the other hand, Keane and Allison describe as "systems of governance autonomous to the supra-politico system, [one] able to make decisions and guide development' (1990, 902).

It is within these two areas that the potential cooperation and collaboration, as well as the tension and hostilities, among the Kenyan state and its higher ed become most apparent. When asked about the connection of the state to its higher ed, one public practitioner wrote that,

"When I arrived [to Kenya], higher education was seen as a threat to the government. I had CID [Criminal Investigation Department, a unit of the Kenya Police] in my classes, monitoring what I said. That era is long gone! The links between government and the public universities are now much more open and cordial. As a result, collaborative research is possible, even if logistics and lack of funding continue to make it a challenge."
Though collaborative research may be possible, however, a private practitioner observed that "the politics of Kenya is dynamic and needs a lot of stabilizing. It is somewhat a personal politics than an ideological politics. Personalities gain precedence more than ideas and ideologies," resulting in "a lot of political influences [reigning] within the Kenyan universities. Having effective and challenging education is becoming difficult because of political interference and loopholes." The practitioner calls for Kenyan universities to "grow to be independent in the real sense of the word." A public practitioner agrees, saying that "the state is suspicious of the higher education institutions so it seeks to muscle and control them. It does not offer opportunities for growth and innovation in these institutions."

Interestingly, another public practitioner maintains that "the state has given enough space for [higher ed institutions] to develop and come up with relevant programs for capacity-building, which can spur development," thus insinuating that there is already ample autonomy between Kenya's higher ed institutions and the state, itself. Such tension and wishes for autonomy nonetheless exist within the realm of Kenyan private higher ed, according to one respondent, who explained that Kenyan private higher ed institutions are in the unique position of having to negotiate "how to let professionals run the universities without interference from the owners—the Board of Trustees—who have no idea how universities should be run and yet want to have control."

Additionally, one private practitioner rallied for the Kenyan state to work alongside its universities to positively affect social change in the country, saying that "the government needs to work hand-in-hand with universities to tap the potential therein and stop the brain drain. This will help change the course of the country in a dynamic and dramatic way. This implies that many new and viable policies need to be put in place and people empowered with what is their due." Relying on the "creative action of its citizens" and not on foreign aid, the respondent explained, will allow Kenya to halt its imports and puts its "indigenous ability to the test so that Kenya can be proud of herself."
Summation

The aforesaid qualitative analysis revealed some patterns and disparities in current Kenyan higher ed practitioners' views toward the intersection of Kenyan higher ed and development, as well as the possible role(s) that Kenyan higher ed institutions—public or private—have in the country's development process. As the analysis revealed, there were some disagreements between the public and private respondents, and it is these disagreements that warrant additional research. The next and final thesis chapter delineates the conclusions we can begin to draw from our qualitative analysis, as well as areas that warrant further research.
Chapter Five:

Conclusions and Recommendations
Qualitative Conclusions

As explained earlier, eight respondents—three from Tangaza College and five from the UoN—participated in my exploratory, qualitative thesis inquiry. With this in mind, though we cannot reach any definitive conclusions about the role(s) of Kenyan higher ed to the country's development process, simply because our respondent sample was so small, based on the qualitative information derived from our thesis questions, we can at least begin to see some small amount of consensus—or disagreement—regarding the issue and also suggest additional follow-up research to undertake.

Codified and Tacit Knowledge

Several respondents stressed that Kenyan higher ed's greatest importance is in its ability to generate and create “hard” knowledge—knowledge that can be of use to the state. No respondent asserted that Kenyan higher ed fails to add any educational contributions to the state, and all alluded to the institutions' abilities to execute research (if given financial resources) and development plans that could be of some good to the country. There was, however, some discrepancy between the knowledge contributions produced by the public higher ed institutions and by the private higher ed institutions, in the views of some respondents, as some practitioners believed that private higher ed institutions are seen as "threats," even though they educate the "whole person" and help to assure that the future leadership of Kenya has been sufficiently inculcated with religious and ethical values. This idea of seeing private higher ed institutions as "threats" also came up in the analysis surrounding endogenous regionalism and regional governance.

Learning Capacity

Both Tangaza and UoN respondents said that their institutions have fostered several linkages with other external firms and non-Kenyan universities and have made contributions that they felt are "helping students to be in touch with the [world] long before their graduation."

Similarly, both public and private respondents remarked that, in some capacities, the Kenyan
state is undermining its higher ed's potential learning capacities in its inadequate staff remuneration, which ultimately leads to a professorial and professional "brain drain." A public respondent noted that Kenyan public higher ed institutions, specifically, fail to "optimally" contribute to the country's development process strictly due to low budgetary allocations for research and because governmental individuals often prefer to work with external "experts," instead of local university professionals, to help link ideas with local, state, federal, or international policy entities.

**Human and Physical Resources**

Human and physical resources were among the most frequently-cited methods from both sets of respondents regarding the ways wherein Kenyan higher ed can contribute, or does contribute, to the country's development efforts. A public practitioner noted that "the state recruits graduates at all levels into its service, [and] we hope that what [the students] have learned at university will inform their work," and detailed that several UoN graduates work in the Ministry of Gender, Provincial Administration, the Ministry of Planning, and the National Bureau of Statistics governmental offices, among others. Another public practitioner stated that "one cannot divorce Kenyan politics and higher education since the two share a lot in terms of human resources, such as many people in government/politics are former university faculty and staff and they stay aligned to higher education actors." Additionally, several respondents also alluded to higher ed faculty and staff serving on think tanks and as consultants to the Kenyan government, which may not necessarily be as beneficial for higher ed as it is for the government. A public respondent, elaborating on this point, explained that "the state often looks to the universities for top managers. A number of permanent secretaries in Kenyan ministries are former university professors. One can only hope that such recruitment is actually mutually beneficial, but it is possible to view it as poaching the best university talent for government service." This "poaching," some respondents felt, was responsible for the decline in academic quality and rigor at some public higher ed institutions, as well as the reason why some practitioners have not
pursued their own Ph.D. work. Additionally, it is interesting to consider the long-term implications of a government that is constantly "poaching" the brightest or most talented from the higher ed community, especially if it means that "second-rate" faculty are left responsible for teaching the students. At the same time, however, in order for the government to devise solutions to Kenya's national challenges, it, too, needs the brightest or most talented citizens available in the country. This potential talent "poaching" between two entities of importance to the state—its higher ed institutions and its actual government—illustrates the very serious, very real implications of a country being forced to negotiate the challenges of professional or professorial "brain drain."

Knowledge Infrastructure

In some ways, knowledge infrastructure and human resources go hand-in-hand. One public respondent wrote that it is not uncommon for public institutions to use their research results to make policy recommendations to the government, and that as higher ed has become more accessible and less "Ivory Tower," "people have become more aware of their dignity and are able to stand up to evils in society. Though much needs to be done to reach perfection, many more people have access to higher education and are able to do well in life." However, a public practitioner was careful to note that "the greatest strength of the public sector is its ability to reach as many students as possible, but it needs to make quality education more than quantity education"—that is, emphasizing the depth and degree of the education it offers, not simply churning out graduates year after year with a dearth of analytical and higher-thinking capabilities. Another public respondent explained that as more people earned university degrees, especially individuals who serve in the government, the resultant tension and suspicion between the government and higher ed decreased significantly, since many governmental individuals have since begun to understand the various roles of the universities and how they can work side-by-side with the state.

Endogenous Regionalism and Regional Governance
Just as human resources and knowledge infrastructure are closely related, so, also, are endogenous regionalism, regional governance, and knowledge infrastructure. It is within the areas of endogenous regionalism and regional governance that the potential cooperation and collaboration, as well as the tension and hostilities, among the Kenyan state and its higher ed institutions become most apparent. Though collaborative research may be possible, a private practitioner observed that "the politics of Kenya is dynamic and needs a lot of stabilizing. It is somewhat a personal politics [more] than an ideological politics," resulting in "a lot of political influences [reigning] within the Kenyan universities. Having effective and challenging education is becoming difficult because of political interference and loopholes." The practitioner called for Kenyan universities to "grow to be independent in the real sense of the word." Interestingly, another public practitioner maintained that "the state has given enough space for [higher ed institutions] to develop and come up with relevant programs for capacity-building, which can spur development," thus insinuating that there is already ample autonomy between Kenya's higher ed institutions and the state, itself.

Additionally, one private practitioner rallied for the Kenyan state to work alongside its universities to positively affect social change in the country, saying that "the government needs to work hand-in-hand with universities to tap the potential therein and stop the brain drain. This will help change the course of the country in a dynamic and dramatic way." Other practitioners felt that, though potentially healthy or harmful, the competition between Kenya's public and private higher ed institutions should be channeled into a type of "synergy," working together alongside the state to achieve its development aims. While some respondents noted that the competition between the public and private higher ed institutions could result in a drop in revenue, student admissions, or an increase in faculty departures, many recognized that there stands ample opportunity for the institutions to work complementarily, and in conjunction with the state, to achieve its development aims.

**The Way Forward: Strengthening SSA and Kenyan Higher Ed**
Overall, my thesis respondents' answers very closely aligned with other experts' opinions, cited throughout my literature review, regarding how higher ed can contribute to a state's development process. In determining “why” my respondents seemed to, by and large, believe in the positive potential that Kenyan higher ed can bring to the country's development efforts, I think many respondents firmly believe that higher ed, though wrought with challenges, can do a lot of good for Kenya's development efforts because many of them have seen an evolution in higher ed over the past few decades. Though many respondents wrote that they felt that the state was initially suspicious of its higher ed institutions, or felt like private higher ed institutions were untrustworthy, as more Members of Parliament have become educated, the state's relationship with higher ed has become more amicable.

Additionally, to be a higher ed practitioner in Kenya, one undoubtedly has to possess some degree of optimism and belief in his or her institution's mission—be it holistic or more traditionally intellect-driven. People working in higher education in Kenya know that there are opportunities for them elsewhere—opportunities that likely pay better, offer better employment security, or give more opportunities to conduct research—yet these educators choose to remain in Kenya, at their institutions, because they believe in the work they are doing, for both the state of Kenya and for the Kenyan people. Simply put, people do not become educators to become rich; they become educators because they want to impart their expertise with others and because they want to make a positive difference in the world. I think this overall feeling of hope towards Kenya’s future, and in her higher ed institutions, explains the resounding optimism that my respondents conveyed, which differed slightly from authors I cited in my literature review. My respondents did not deny the obstacles that Kenya’s public and private higher ed institutions are facing, in relation to poor faculty pay or a lack of research opportunity, for example, but they also noted several strengths of their institutions and ways they feel the institutions will continue to contribute to Kenya for years to come.
Many of the scholars who have written about SSA higher ed have proffered similar solutions to strengthen the institutions as my thesis respondents, with the hopes that strengthening the institutions will lead to a positive “trickle-down” on their societies. Ogom maintains that African higher ed institutions can potentially have a far-reaching role in their state's development, so as long first, universities perform a curricular overhaul to better align the institution, its teachings, and its students' learnings with the state's reality, culture, and “genius, means, needs and collective ambition.” He also suggests that regional collaborations and consortium may help revitalize SSA higher ed (2007, 115).

Ogom also demands a “mission shift” in SSA higher ed to better “accommodate the profound changes taking place both globally and in [local] environments” (2007, 115). My respondents noted this as a key difference between public and private higher ed institutions: namely, that the private higher ed institutions are typically much more responsive to market change than are the public higher ed institutions. As other scholars have noted, SSA higher ed curriculum lacks an alignment with the students' local contexts and heritage. If SSA higher ed curriculum remains in its current form, Ogom asserts that it will continue to be of “limited relevance in the context of rapid social and economic changes in the region” (2007, 117). In other words, until SSA higher ed becomes more attuned to the locals' needs and contexts, as well as their histories and realities, it will likely remain an obsolete vehicle for any sort of social change or development. As Kenyan higher ed institutions continue to foster relationships with other Southern-based higher ed institutions, I believe that their curriculum will become more aligned with the students' local environments. Of course, there are numerous potential benefits for Southern-based higher ed institutions to maintain relationships with those Northern-based, but these should not be the only relationships that Southern-based higher ed institutions maintain.

Similarly, another solution calls for American universities—specifically, Historically Black Colleges or Universities (HBCUs)—to partner with NGOs and higher ed in Africa. Williams uses
George Washington University's Africa Center for Health and Human Security to show how an American university can engage “African communities in a two-way dialogue in order to identify, understand, and respond to African priorities” (2007, 217). Williams outlines ways that the GW-African continent partnership encompasses a long-term investment in the global community and lists several policy and programmatic recommendations that it has fostered, as well as those that similar partnerships could emulate. This argument falls short in its paradigm, however, as it assumes that American universities should be in the “teacher” role to their African development partners. Perhaps the authors surmise that the African partners have more to gain from their relationships with American HBCUs than the opposite, since the argument limits the innovative capacities that African universities or NGOs could play in their respective country's development processes.

To circumvent the myriad aforementioned challenges that plague higher ed in SSA, one might consider looking to more vocationally- or technically-based higher ed options. However, Carnoy articulates that “the research results on non-formal education are not extensive, but those that have appeared indicate that graduates of non-formal education courses have a very different structure of employment and income opportunities than those who take formal education” (1986, 80). Many students and institutions are compelled to pursue non-formal higher ed due to its low cost and job market relevance—as is the case in the US as well, during the current recession—yet “the basic research indicates that non-formal and formal education are not interchangeable” (Carnoy 1986, 80). Though students may be seeking non-formal higher ed as a way to achieve social mobility, “such training fortifies the class division of labor rather than promoting social mobility for lower-social-class groups,” since Global South employers in those economies “consider those with non-formal training less desirable (employable) than those with formal schooling” (Carnoy 1986, 80). In this way, it seems that if higher ed is a route to social mobility, going the “traditional university route” is the best option, and the same seems true for a country to achieve its development aims, as well.
Additional Research Opportunities

Literature and studies specific to Kenyan higher education and development are lacking or are not very accessible to students in the USA. In addition to general information in this content area, my thesis inquiry has revealed that there stands a tremendous research opportunity to further delve into the differences and intricacies between Kenya's public and private higher ed institutions, specifically as they relate to knowledge infrastructure, endogenous regionalism, and regional governance.

Many of the discrepancies, or disagreements, that arose in my respondents' answers stemmed from the differing contributions they asserted that public higher ed institutions could make over private higher ed institutions, or vice-versa, to Kenyan society. Some private practitioners asserted that their institutions' holistic education could help, in the long run, to steer Kenya away from corruption and nepotistic practices in the government. Perhaps researchers could conduct a longitudinal study to trace the careers of various public sector workers to see if there is any noticeable or significant differences in the career trajectories of individuals who received a Kenyan public or a Kenyan private higher ed.

Additional discrepancies came about as respondents described the ways wherein their institutions interacted, or failed to interact, with the Kenyan state—in terms of personnel, financial support, or "synergy," the close collaboration among their institution with other public higher ed institutions, private higher ed institutions, and the Kenyan state to help realize some of the education-specific goals related to Vision 2030. Perhaps a team of researchers could compile the various institutional strengths of all the Kenyan public and private higher ed institutions and afterward, match their strengths with governmental priorities, as outlined in Vision 2030, to see how and where the government could foster a "synergy" to accomplish its goals. Perhaps seeing other higher ed institutions as collaborative partners, not as competitors for student enrollment or revenue, would help to diminish any amounts of disdain Kenya's institutions may be feeling toward each other.

A final content area that warrants further research comes from the issue of Kenyan professional
and professorial "brain drain." The phenomenon, universally, has been well-documented, but I did not read anything specific to Kenyan higher ed, and it could be an interesting foray to consider the different reasons for "brain drain's" occurrence in Kenyan public versus its private higher ed institutions. That is, future researchers could explore what makes Kenyan public and private practitioners stay in the country and at their specific institution. Much has been written about what causes "brain drain"—usually, inadequate financial remuneration and lack of research funding or research opportunities—but a future study could investigate just the opposite: what makes Kenyan tertiary educators remain in their country and at their institution. The researchers could use their data and perhaps present it to Kenya's Ministry of Education, for example, in the hopes that presenting data will help ensure that the state brings about much-needed change, such as more competitive remuneration or more access to research funding, to its practitioners.

In addition to the aforedescribed areas that warrant further research, perhaps DePaul's School of Public Service could partner with Tangaza's Institute of Social Ministry and the UoN's Institute for Development Studies to conduct additional research in Kenya related to the role of the country's higher ed institutions. No one university would "lead" the project, but instead, each would use its institutional and student-specific strengths to contribute accordingly to the effort. DePaul has already collaborated with Tangaza to offer a joint Bachelors of Arts degree program, so minimally, the participating institutions would know that it is, in fact, possible to foster an international collaboration that is beneficial for all involved parties. Of course, the potential project could change each year, in accordance with changes in university leadership or national politics, and participating universities would be able to use the findings in ways that would help to positively affect social change in their respective communities.

**Conclusion**

People often equate higher education, specifically, universities, as manifestations of the pursuit
of intellectual excellence or as gathering places for the best and brightest to challenge the status quo. Improving education is an oft-cited goal of many countries' development efforts—including Kenya, in her most recent Vision 2030 plan for development—yet many scholars and students fall short when they deem only primary or secondary education as the main avenues to realize development. My exploratory research showed that Kenyan higher ed does, in fact, play a role in the country's development process, though exactly how, and when, may necessarily depend on the type of institution—public or private—and its interactions with the state.
Appendix A

The following documents show the cover sheet that I shared with respondents prior to our interview, as well as the actual questions I asked during our conversation.

Date
Interviewee First Name & Last Name
Address Line 1
Address Line 2
City, State, Country
Interviewee e-mail address and/or
Skype username/number
Dear INTERVIEWEE:

Thank you for voluntarily agreeing to participate in this informational conversation regarding the role of Kenyan public or private universities to the country's development efforts. Prior to our interview conversation or e-mails, I ask that you carefully read the following information listed below.

My name is Erin Ashley Mink Garvey, and I am a graduate student in DePaul University's School of Public Service, specifically in its International Public Service program. As part of my graduate coursework, I am required to satisfactorily complete a thesis requirement, and interviewing key Kenyan university officials is one way that I will derive data for my thesis analysis. DePaul University, and Dr. Raphael Ogom, my thesis advisor, are sponsoring and supporting my thesis efforts.

By having this exploratory conversation and interview with you, I want to gain a better impression of Kenyan university officials' expert opinions as to the roles of Kenyan public or private universities to Kenya's national development efforts. From your voluntary participation in this interview, I will be able to derive data that will elucidate if the Kenyan private or public universities play, or do not play, any roles in Kenya's national development efforts, and why or how so.

Again, I sincerely thank you for your time and voluntary participation in this important conversation. Your answers will certainly inform the remainder of my thesis exploration and research.

Should you have any questions, please contact me directly.

With gratitude,

[signed]

Erin Ashley Mink Garvey – School of Public Service, DePaul University
erinashleymink@gmail.com; 312-972-1447
Exploratory Questions for Interviewees

1. What is your expertise at your university? In what areas does your expertise entail?

2. How long have you been working in your specific field of expertise at your university?
   
   1. Have you ever served at any other Kenyan universities in your specific expertise?
   
   2. Have you ever served at any other Kenyan universities in a different area of expertise than your current one? If so, what was your other expertise area?

3. Why did you want to gain a mastery of your specific expertise area in Kenyan higher ed?

4. How aware, or attuned, are you to Kenya's national politics?
   
   1. If you were to describe yourself as being “informed,” “not informed,” or “somewhat informed,” where would you place yourself in regards to your knowledge about Kenya's politics? Why?
   
   2. Do you consider higher ed to be related to Kenya’s politics and development efforts? Why or why not?

5. Have you ever heard of higher ed institutions playing critical roles to a country's developing efforts?

6. Have you ever heard of Kenyan higher ed institutions playing critical roles to Kenya's development efforts?
   
   1. If yes, what was the context wherein you heard this statement? Have you heard this statement specifically in regards to public or private institutions, or to either/both?

7. What is your opinion about Kenyan higher ed institutions playing critical roles to the country's development efforts?
   
   1. Do you think that Kenyan public higher ed institutions play any roles in the country's development efforts? Why or why not?
   
   2. Do you think that Kenyan private higher ed institutions play any roles in the country's development efforts? Why or why not?
   
   3. How do you think the Kenyan state interacts with Kenyan higher ed institutions in regards to the institutions’ abilities to contribute to the country’s development efforts?

   4. Some experts question the ability of higher ed to be a vehicle for development in the developing world because of higher ed’s connections to the original colonizing powers. Others refute this idea and believe that universities, as bastions of intellectual capacity and forward-thinking mindsets, are in prime places to
spur development. Where do you see your own university on this “spectrum” of ability to influence or advance Kenya’s development efforts?

5. For the duration that you have served Kenya’s higher ed, has its role in the country’s development efforts changed at all? How?

   1. If yes, why do you think higher ed’s role has changed?

   2. If no, why do you think higher ed’s role has not changed?

   3. How closely do you feel the Kenyan state is intersected with the country’s higher ed institutions—public and private? Please explain why you feel the state and its universities are or are not closely connected.

8. What do you consider as Kenyan public higher ed institutions’ greatest challenges now, and for the next 25 years? Why?

9. What do you consider as Kenyan private higher ed institutions' greatest challenges now, and for the next 25 years? Why?

10. What do you consider as Kenyan public higher ed institutions' greatest strengths now, and for the next 25 years? Why?

11. What do you consider as Kenyan private higher ed institutions' greatest strengths now, and for the next 25 years? Why?

12. Do you have any questions for me? If yes, please share. If not, thank you very much for your time and cooperation.
Appendix B

The following page shows the original table extracted from Keane and Allison's study on the contributions of Australian universities to the country. It is from this table that I developed my rubric to gauge the impact of Kenyan higher ed institutions on the country's development efforts, based on my respondents' insight.
Table 1. The conceptual framework and its application to the University of the Sunshine Coast

| Part A: conceptual framework | General contributions | USC’s performance | Notes: 1. This scan represents a preliminary investigation of linkages. A more detailed application of the methodology is currently underway (1999). To date aspects of codified knowledge have been surveyed/checked. Interviews and surveys to tap into tacit knowledge commenced in May/June 1999. Source: After Keane, 1998. |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| **Knowledge**               |                       |                   |
| Codified knowledge          | Courses – graduate and post-graduate | Marine science, fine art and electronic arts degrees |
| Tacit knowledge             | Courses that are responsive to local needs | Business and industry collaborative research, e.g. technology diffusion and virtual businesses |
|                             | Research and development | Public lectures and forums |
|                             | Staff networks | VC’s column in local newspaper |
|                             | University/business linkages | Consultation between university and business and industry in course development, e.g. course advisory committee |
|                             | Staff entrepreneurialism | Local preference schemes for admissions |
|                             | Community networks |                   |
| Learning capacity           | Course requirements for industry work experience |                   |
|                             | Lifelong learning |                   |
|                             | Student placements in local businesses |                   |
|                             | Preference schemes for admissions |                   |
| Learning infrastructure     | Land for business park development |                   |
|                             | Community access library |                   |
| Global/local interface      | Internet provider |                   |
|                             | University strategic plan |                   |
|                             | Research taskforce |                   |
|                             | Membership on local boards of university staff and administrators |                   |
|                             | Involvement in local regional and strategic planning processes |                   |
| Factor condition            | Database of staff skills |                   |
| Human resources             | Retention of graduates |                   |
| Physical resources          | Environmentally sustainable campus |                   |
| Knowledge infrastructure    | Lifelong learning |                   |
|                             | Community education |                   |
| Physical infrastructure     |                   |                   |
| Regionalism                 | Community participation in university development |                   |
| Endogenous                  | Employment of local professionals in campus development |                   |
|                             | Focus group workshops during university planning |                   |
|                             | High level of community consultation |                   |
|                             | Employment of local architects in university design |                   |
|                             | Participation in local planning |                   |
| Regional governance         | Local government planning – Sippy Downs Development Control Plan |                   |
| Systems of governance       | Emphasis within DCP for development of a ‘university township’ |                   |
| autonomous to the supra-politico system, able to make decisions and guide development. |                   |

*Source: After Keane, 1998.*
Appendix C

The below table, extracted from the UNESCO article on private higher ed in Kenya, lists degree programs that private Kenyan universities offered, as of 2001. Please note that Tangaza College is part of The Catholic University of Eastern Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Degree programmes offered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Eastern Africa Baraton</td>
<td>Science, technology, business, arts, education, health, theology and religion, humanities and social science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Theological College</td>
<td>Biblical studies, theological study, Christian ministry studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic University of Eastern Africa</td>
<td>Theology, commerce, education, humanities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi Evangelical Graduate School of Theology</td>
<td>Biblical studies, theological, historical studies, educational studies, business administration, sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NEGST) 1980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States International University (USIU)</td>
<td>Accounting, philosophy, political science, psychology, business administration, sociology, and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East African School of Theology</td>
<td>Christian ministry, theology, Bible studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africa Christian College (PACC)</td>
<td>Bible, theological, church ministries, community health, agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Paul's United Theological College</td>
<td>Bible and preaching, Biblical ethics, theological liturgies, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Highlands Bible College</td>
<td>Bible studies, theological studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Major Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Nazarene University (ANU)</td>
<td>Theology, business administration, computer science, mathematics, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daystar University, 1974</td>
<td>Accounting, Bible, business administration, communication, marketing, peace, and reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Methodist University</td>
<td>Technology, basic and health sciences, education, theology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix D

Extracted from Oketch's article, the subsequent table displays enrollment growth at Kenyan public higher ed institutions from 1963 through 2001. Oketch explains that the largest enrollment increment occurred in 1987/88 as a result of a “presidential declaration for double intake,” which called for public universities to admit “twice the number of students that would have been admitted under the stipulated yearly capacity” (2004, 121). Oketch further elaborates that double intake “had serious implications in terms of space and other related services” for Kenyan public higher ed institutions and that, more than anything, the state performed “double intake” “as a means of expanding access to higher education, but was also politically motivated by a government that wanted to look 'developmental' at the expense of capacity at the state institutions. In other words, it was unplanned expansion” (2004, 121).

The other sharp enrollment increase occurred in 1990/91, when the first group of students from the newly-implemented 8-4-4 education system started university. 8-4-4 implies eight years of primary education, four years of secondary, and four years of higher ed, and was a new system that Kenya adopted in 1985 after using the British style, 7-4-2-3 (seven primary, four secondary, two in 'advanced secondary,' and three at the university), for years (2004, 121).
Student Enrollment at Kenya's State Universities:
1963/64-2000/01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Undergraduate</th>
<th>Graduate</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63/64</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64/65</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65/66</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66/67</td>
<td>1,067</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67/68</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68/69</td>
<td>2,056</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>2,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69/70</td>
<td>2,639</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>2,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70/71</td>
<td>3,137</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>3,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71/72</td>
<td>3,243</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72/73</td>
<td>3,680</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73/74</td>
<td>4,936</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>5,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74/75</td>
<td>5,739</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>6,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75/76</td>
<td>5,727</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>6,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76/77</td>
<td>5,486</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>6,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77/78</td>
<td>5,633</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>6,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78/79</td>
<td>6,421</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>7,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79/80</td>
<td>7,292</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>8,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80/81</td>
<td>7,631</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>8,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81/82</td>
<td>7,588</td>
<td>1,542</td>
<td>9,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82/83</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83/84</td>
<td>7,418</td>
<td>1,626</td>
<td>9,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84/85</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85/86</td>
<td>7,608</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>9,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86/87</td>
<td>9,377</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td>11,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87/88</td>
<td>18,883</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>20,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88/89</td>
<td>20,046</td>
<td>1,292</td>
<td>21,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89/90</td>
<td>24,164</td>
<td>1,598</td>
<td>25,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90/91</td>
<td>36,691</td>
<td>1,580</td>
<td>38,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91/92</td>
<td>38,836</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>40,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92/93</td>
<td>38,604</td>
<td>1,606</td>
<td>40,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93/94</td>
<td>37,019</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td>38,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94/95</td>
<td>37,694</td>
<td>2,107</td>
<td>39,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95/96</td>
<td>40,231</td>
<td>2,129</td>
<td>42,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96/97</td>
<td>36,188</td>
<td>1,764</td>
<td>37,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97/98</td>
<td>33,894</td>
<td>2,559</td>
<td>36,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98/99</td>
<td>33,921</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>37,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99/00</td>
<td>33,404</td>
<td>2,597</td>
<td>36,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00/01</td>
<td>32,204</td>
<td>2,751</td>
<td>34,955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Republic of Kenya, statistical abstracts, various years, Nairobi, Government printers.*

**: University of Nairobi, the only university then, was closed for an entire academic year due to student support and participation in a failed military coup against the government of former President Moi.
Appendix E

Featured in Oketch's article, the bar chart below details the growth of Kenyan public and private higher ed beginning in the 1970s. From 1970-1980, Kenya's only public higher ed institution was the University of Nairobi, while its single officially-recognized private higher ed institution was the United States International University (USIU), which was also located in Nairobi.

As the table details, Kenya's higher ed has expanded to include fifteen private and six public higher ed institutions.

Appendix F

The table below, extracted from Oketch's article and based on Kenya's 1998 budgetary allocation estimates from the Ministry of Finance, details the Kenyan government's monetary allocations to its public universities. The values reveal the overall decrease in the amount of public funding Kenyan publics received from 1997 to 1998.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>Percentage Change (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Nairobi</td>
<td>38,700</td>
<td>34,400</td>
<td>-11.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyatta University</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>16,700</td>
<td>-16.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egerton University</td>
<td>91,500</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>-74.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>22,300</td>
<td>-20.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moi University</td>
<td>38,500</td>
<td>27,800</td>
<td>-27.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maseno University</td>
<td>26,600</td>
<td>29,400</td>
<td>14.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 US $ is approximately 70 Kenya Shillings (Ksh.).

References Cited


---. Higher Education in Developing Countries: A Select Bibliography. Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 24 (April 1970).


