Conservative think tanks and discourse on immigration in the U.S.

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CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND DISCOURSE ON IMMIGRATION IN THE U.S.

A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

March 2010

BY

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Conservative Think Tanks and Discourse on Immigration in the U.S.

Emily Langerak

Table of Contents:

Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................. 3
Chapter 2: Our Nation’s Discourse on Immigration through History .......... 16
Chapter 3: Think Tanks in Policy Debate and Public Discourse .................. 39
Chapter 4: The Heritage Foundation .................................................. 56
Chapter 5: The Cato Institute ............................................................ 74
Chapter 6: The American Enterprise Institute ........................................ 92
Chapter 7: Conservative Think Tanks and Immigration Discourse:
            Dressing ideology and old narratives in scholarly robes ............. 113

Works Cited ................................................................................. 134

Appendices:

Appendix B: Cato Institute List of Pieces on Immigration, July 1, 2005 – December 31, 2008
Chapter 1: Introduction

Since I first spent time abroad at the age of 11 and experienced what it’s like to be an outsider, I have been fascinated by the ways in which people view, represent and react to outsiders. This has translated into a central, long-standing concern for me: barriers to cross-cultural understanding. I was drawn toward cultural Anthropology as an undergraduate student, and its focus on representation of “others.” The question of how we view and represent others has become increasingly relevant as globalization has broken down both physical and virtual barriers, increasing flows of information, material and also people, bringing “others” into our presence. As scholars such as Arjun Appadurai (2006) have argued, the forces of globalization have heightened anxiety over this presence. In some parts of the world, this anxiety has played out through ethnic violence. There are more subtle forms, however, through which this anxiety manifests itself, such as the contemporary backlash against immigration in the United States.

Immigration is an issue that has sparked heated debate throughout the history of the United States, and in the age of globalization, it is as active as ever. Many different strands of logic and motivation have been woven into the debate at various stages of U.S. history, creating narratives that frame the immigration debate. Over time these narratives have become deeply embedded in our national discourse on immigration. These old narratives continue to be used to elicit specific reactions to immigration and policy reforms. Some narratives glorify our immigrant past, reminding us that we are a “nation of immigrants” who have realized the American dream, open to all who seek it through hard work. Other narratives evoke fear of outsiders, suggesting that newcomers may “flood” our nation, overwhelming our economy and culture, and threatening our democratic principles.
These old narratives are replayed over and over again in our national discourse on immigration. Pro- and anti-immigration groups mobilize specific narratives that further their causes. These messages are conveyed through lobbyists and media, influencing policymakers and the public. Vocal and clearly biased groups such as these, however, are not the only actors perpetuating immigration narratives in order to influence the debate and advocate particular policy outcomes. Think tanks, which engage in public policy research and analysis, also play an active role in this debate.

Though think tanks’ precise amount of influence in U.S. policymaking is difficult to measure, think tanks endeavor to set the policymaking agenda and define the terms used in debates over policy issues. Think tanks actively maintain ties with influential media and policymakers, who turn to think tank scholars for their “expert” opinions on policy. They compile reports, write op-eds, host seminars and disseminate easily digestible outlines of policy issues and recommendations. Their work is presented as scholarly, citing data and statistics to support their arguments and policy stances. They tend to avoid categorization (in most cases) as interest groups or lobbyists, being seen instead as research-based institutions.

Beginning in the 1960’s, conservatives sought to counter the “liberal establishment,” with think tanks playing a key role in this effort. Since then, conservative think tanks have proliferated and successfully employed the tactics noted above to rise in prominence in Washington and the media. Multiple scholars have cited think tanks as active players in a conservative effort to control the U.S. policy agenda. A study conducted on a yearly basis by Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting has found that conservative think tanks are consistently cited in major news outlets two to three times as frequently as their progressive counter-parts (Dolny 2008).
As the contemporary immigration debate has raged in the U.S., I've found myself baffled by the visceral backlash against immigration, wanting to understand the forces that perpetuate and justify this anger. How is it that old anti-immigration narratives, many of which have been debunked repeatedly, continue to be recycled into our discourse, and taken as serious contemporary concerns? Part of the answer, I believe, lies in the work of prominent conservative think tanks. Through seven chapters, I will identify some of the common immigration narratives that have arisen over U.S. history, summarize the role think tanks play in policymaking and public discourse, and examine and compare the immigration literature of three prominent conservative think tanks – the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the American Enterprise Institute.

Ultimately, I will demonstrate that these three think tanks repackage and mobilize particular immigration narratives in their “scholarly” work, and actively promote specific ideologies. I would like to see immigrants welcomed into our national community without bias and prejudice. Countering arguments of avowedly anti-immigration groups is necessary for reaching this goal. Equally, if not more, important, however, is critically examining the work of influential actors whose anti-immigration bias is couched in academic tones. This is why I have chosen to undertake the research presented in this paper. An overview of the chapters and methodology for my research of the case study think tank literature follows.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of immigration policy and common narratives about immigration in the United States. The chapter briefly outlines the major policies on immigration from the birth of the United States to the present and the numbers and demographics of immigrants through different periods of U.S. history. The main focus of the chapter, however, is an examination of the various narratives that have made up our nation’s discourse on
immigration through different periods of U.S. history. The chapter provides the basis for comparison between language, narratives and arguments used by my case study think tanks, and those used by others, both contemporary and in the past, in arguing for specific policies or commenting on immigration in the United States.

Chapter 3 addresses the role of think tanks in public discourse and the policymaking process, highlighting why think tank literature is worthy of study. Addressing the context out of which think tanks grew, the different types of think tanks that arose from different periods, and how these different types of think tanks filled particular roles for policymakers and the public, the chapter demonstrates the importance of think tanks in shaping policy and public discourse in the United States. The chapter also discusses the more or less unified conservative push in the 1970’s to establish think tanks to counter the liberal establishment. Finally, it provides an overview of the role that think tanks play within the contemporary anti-immigration movement.

Chapters 4 – 6, the case studies of the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the American Enterprise Institute, open with an institutional overview including the history of the institution, size of staff, scope of work, sources of revenue, tactics for gaining influence, and a brief background on each of the main scholars writing about immigration for the think tank. The bulk of each case study chapter is dedicated to the interpretive analysis of the think tank’s work on immigration. While space constraints did not allow me to discuss every piece in detail, I provide an overview of their literature, and select illustrative examples to examine in-depth. The structure for these case study chapters will be further elaborated below in the methodology section. Chapter four examines the Heritage Foundation, which presented the most alarmist view of immigration; chapter five focuses on the Cato Institute, whose work was the most affirmative of immigration; and chapter six covers the American Enterprise Institute, whose work was a mix
of alarmist, neutral and affirmative messages about immigration.

Finally, I dedicate chapter 7 to conclusions and analysis of the overall landscape of my case study think tanks’ immigration policy stances. I compare the literature and specific narratives used by these three prominent conservative think tanks to show that they do repackage and mobilize old immigration narratives, under the guise of scholarly work, to advance particular ideologies.

Methodology: Selection of Think Tanks

In choosing which conservative think tanks to review, I wanted first to limit the choices to those that have some influence on the nation’s discourse on policy. While it is difficult to measure influence, and every think tank boasts their prominence in political and media circles, the number of citations in the news media provides a reasonable indicator. A 2000 study by Andrew Rich and R. Kent Weaver which measured citations of think tanks in six national newspapers between 1991 and 1998 noted that media visibility is a primary goal for think tanks whose “principle mission is to produce and promote their expertise among policymakers” (Rich and Weaver 2000, 81). This, they argued, helps in gaining influence among policymakers and also in gaining funding for their work.

Michael Dolny completed similar yearly studies for the national media watch group, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR). Dolny tracked think tank references in major U.S.-based newspapers, radio and T.V. transcripts accessible through Nexis databases. Each year Dolny measured the number of stories that referred to each think tank found on lists compiled by the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), Project Vote Smart and the University of Michigan library Political Science Resources. These think tanks were ranked by number of references and assigned a political orientation by FAIR based on their published work, personnel
and media comments. False positives were corrected for cases where a think tank’s name appeared in text without referring to the think tank’s work (Dolny 2008).

Both Rich and Weaver’s and Dolny’s studies used the Nexis database to measure citations. Because Rich and Weaver’s study did not cover the time period I am examining (mid-2005 through December 2008) and did not include as broad a sample of media sources, I chose to identify my case study selections based on Dolny’s rankings. I limited my choices to those think tanks that, between the beginning of 2005 and the end of 2007 (the 2008 study was not yet available), consistently ranked among the top 10 think tanks (across the political spectrum) in number of media citations. This restriction resulted in the set of think tanks shown in Table 1.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think Tank</th>
<th>2007 Ranking</th>
<th>2006 Ranking</th>
<th>2005 Ranking</th>
<th>Three Year Average Ranking</th>
<th>Political Orientation, per Dolny</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brookings</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Centrist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Heritage Foundation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>Centrist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Enterprise Institute</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaiser Family Foundation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>Centrist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAND Corporation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>Centrist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cato Institute</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>Conservative/Libertarian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dolny 2006, 2007, 2008. Note that only 8 think tanks were consistently ranked within the top 10 for every year.

It may be noted that each of the four conservative think tanks on this list also ranked on average within the top 10 when results of Dolny’s studies going back through 1999 were considered, further strengthening the evidence that they are all influential think tanks. Of these
four, I conducted a preliminary review of the literature found on their websites related to immigration and written between July 2005 and December 2008 to be sure that each think tank addressed the issue of immigration and had identifiable policy recommendations for immigration reform.

Based on this preliminary review, I chose to exclude the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Not only did CSIS have a very small body of literature related to immigration (I found only 15 items posted in the selected timeframe), that which it did have appeared to fit with James Smith’s characterization of CSIS as a think tank that “sees its utility in the process less in terms of providing ammunition for the debate about policies than in serving as a broker for discussion and accommodation” (Smith 1991, 210). This was evident when looking at the CSIS writing on immigration done by Sidney Weintraub, the Simon Chair in Political Economy at CSIS, who wrote the vast majority (11 articles) of the selected timeframe's literature on immigration from CSIS. Weintraub’s interest in immigration was primarily in how the issue affected U.S. – Mexico relations. His commentary was never prescriptive for policy, but rather examined the issue from a more disinterested academic viewpoint, focusing on how the debate was framed by policymakers and why certain policymakers pursued specific points of immigration policy. Apart from Weintraub’s work on political economy, immigration only appeared within CSIS’s global population projects, the focus of this work being a concern with honing research and statistical methodology in projecting population growth from immigration in developed countries around the world. Because their concern with immigration did not advocate specific policy prescriptions, I believed CSIS would be a poor case for my study.

Based on the selection criteria above, my sample was thus limited to three prominent conservative think tanks: The Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and the
Cato Institute. A general comparison of these three think tanks is provided in Table 1.2.

### Table 1.2. General comparison of selected think tanks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Heritage Foundation</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>$43,392,990</td>
<td>Individuals: 57.6% Foundations: 30.4% Corporations: 4.6% Program Revenue: 0.2% Other Income 7.2%</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Enterprise Institute</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>$32,533,000</td>
<td>Individuals: 39.7% Foundations: 19% Corporations: 18.7% Conferences, Sales and Other Revenue: 23%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>limited government, private enterprise, individual liberty and responsibility, vigilant and effective defense and foreign policies, political accountability, and open debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cato Institute</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>$22,324,000</td>
<td>Individuals: 78.2% Foundations: 13.2% Corporations: 2% Program Revenue: 4% Other Income: 2.6%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>limited government, free markets, individual liberty, and peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For each think tank, I intended to analyze every immigration-related item they posted to their website within the selected timeframe of July 2005 through December 2008. Given the complexity of the think tanks' websites and the wide variety of tactics they engage in, this was not as simple a task as I first thought. In general, I considered the think tank's individual scholars’ work to be representative of the think tank’s position, though there are certainly exceptions, particularly with the American Enterprise Institute, which are discussed in chapter 6 and the conclusion. I determined that events and lectures, as well as blog postings related to immigration, would be excluded from my selection for each think tank. Events and lectures commonly bring in outsiders to comment on policy issues, meaning that the views found within these items would not necessarily reflect the think tank's own views. Blog posts (particularly for
the Cato Institute) were so prolific, short (usually containing very little relevant content), and often simply reiterated narratives and arguments used in other pieces by the same authors (pieces that were included in my study), that I felt their value to be low, and that they should not be given the same weight as other types of pieces such as longer opinion pieces, research papers, policy briefs, etc. I therefore excluded them.

The Heritage Foundation was the easiest think tank for determining relevant pieces, as they dedicate an area of research to “immigration, citizenship and border security” and post in this section any of their relevant work, in chronological order (and searchable by year). Excluding lectures and a few “web memos” of little immigration-related content, the number of pieces posted between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008 was 86 for the Heritage Foundation.

The Cato Institute also dedicates an area to immigration and labor markets, with 26 U.S. immigration-related items posted between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008. However, a good deal of their work (28 items, though 17 overlap with the 26 posted in their section on immigration and labor markets) on the immigration issue is found within Cato’s Center for Trade Policy Studies (found at www.freetrade.org). In total in these two sites, and removing the overlapping pieces, the Cato Institute had 38 pieces posted in the selected timeframe.

The American Enterprise Institute was the most difficult for finding relevant pieces for my study, as they do not dedicate an area of research to immigration, and therefore their immigration-related pieces were dispersed within many other areas of research. AEI does have a search function for searching their entire website. I searched for “immigration” OR “immigrant” and sorted the 3170 returned results by relevance. Starting with the “most relevant” (meaning the piece with the greatest number of incidences of “immigration” or “immigrant” within its text), I kept all that fell within the timeframe of July 1, 2005 – December 31, 2008 that dedicated at least
a paragraph within the piece to immigration in the U.S., and that were not duplicates. By result #250, each result had only 1 incidence of “immigration” or “immigrant,” not enough to meet my 1 paragraph minimum requirement. Results 261 – 3170 were not examined at all. After removing duplicate items, the resulting sample was 63 items. Any pieces which, upon first reading, really did not focus on immigration, either by having too few references to immigration or by discussing the politics of Washington and immigration reform rather than the immigration issue itself, were excluded from my set. With these pieces removed, the final set was 48 pieces from AEI.

Methodology: Analysis of Think Tank Literature

In his discursive analysis of magazine covers and accompanying articles on immigration (since 1965), Leo Chavez (2001) identified visual techniques and key icons/imagery used to convey messages about immigration (14). His work was aimed at “making explicit some of the codes, conventions, and rules that are typically implicit” when one reads magazine covers (16). Chavez categorized each magazine cover as affirmative (celebrating immigrants, or appealing for compassion for immigrants), alarmist (suggesting “problems, fears, or dangers raised by immigration”), or neutral (either balanced between alarmist and affirmative, or not obviously either one) (21-22). Though Chavez’s work was primarily interpretive in nature, he also used this categorization system quantitatively to generalize the overall sentiment toward immigrants in different time periods since 1965.

I employed a similar methodology by identifying key phrases, arguments, and other techniques used by each of the three think tanks in their pieces on immigration. For each think tank, I conducted an interpretive analysis of their literature on immigration. I analyzed their arguments, policy proposals, and use of language by asking a number of questions: What
language and narratives did each think tank use in their pieces on immigration policy? Which of the three themes I’ve identified did they emphasize? Did the language and arguments present an alarmist, somewhat alarmist, neutral, somewhat affirmative or affirmative message about immigration? What interests and priorities did the positions of each think tank reflect?

I used interpretive analysis to draw illustrative examples of each think tank’s work, to demonstrate the ways that they prioritize certain narratives I identified, and to relate their work to old American narratives about immigration. Though my work is primarily interpretive, analyzing think tank pieces individually, I also conducted a simple quantitative analysis. My interpretive work allowed me to categorize individual pieces of think tank literature on a scale from alarmist to affirmative. Much like Chavez did, this helped to generalize about each think tank’s overall sentiment toward immigration and stance on immigration policy based on both the interpretation of their language and the percentages of their work that conveyed each tone.

I worked on one think tank at a time, reading through its pieces from the selected timeframe two to three times, in chronological order. The first time through, I simply read and highlighted passages that contained relevant narratives or arguments. After reading through all pieces and getting a sense of the think tank's set of pieces as a whole, I went back and read through each piece a second time, coding each piece for tone and for thematic concern. Each piece could be coded with only one tone, but could have up to all three thematic concerns.

Tone was determined by considering the tone of individual narratives and arguments within the piece, and considering both the intensity of the tone of each narrative and argument and the number of narratives and arguments with a given tone. If a piece contained primarily affirmative narratives, the piece would be coded as “affirmative” (and the corresponding method for coding as “alarmist”); a piece containing mostly affirmative and a few alarmist narratives, or
containing primarily narratives that were somewhat affirmative would be coded “somewhat affirmative” (and the corresponding method for coding as “somewhat alarmist”); pieces containing either primarily neutral (neither alarmist nor affirmative) narratives, or containing a balance between number of alarmist and affirmative narratives was coded as “neutral.”

In writing each case study chapter, I re-read most pieces. If a given piece's coding, upon the third reading, seemed inaccurate given my coding scheme, I would re-code the piece. This was typically as a result of my coding guidelines becoming more refined as I worked through each think tank's set of pieces. For example, I would sometimes encounter a new narrative or argument and initially consider it to be a certain tone, but after reading more pieces with the same narrative determine that the coding should be other than initially determined. Ultimately I re-coding very few pieces (fewer than two or three per think tank).

The intensity or vividness of each narrative’s use, as well as whether its use was prominent, or simply an occasional reference, were also considered when coding pieces and when evaluating each think tank’s overall tone on immigration. For example, a think tank may use a very vivid alarmist or affirmative narrative only occasionally, but the impression of this narrative may have been so strong as to dominate my impression of their stance on immigration. Some less vivid, or bland, narratives may have been repeated so frequently as to be considered dominant features of the think tank’s work.

The three thematic concerns – national security, economics, and national identity – provided a framework within which to organize the narratives employed by each think tank, and helped to demonstrate each think tank's priorities based on the number and tone of pieces within each thematic concern. Within each thematic concern, I identified a set of narratives common to each think tank, and addressed each think tank’s use of these narratives in the same order within
each chapter, for ease of comparison. The narratives will be introduced at the end of Chapter 2, organized in the same way as each case study chapter, and the conclusion’s final comparison.

One final note: Due to the large number of citations within the case study chapters and the high number of pieces written by many authors, the pieces cited within these chapters are not included in the Works Cited list at the end of the paper; rather, the complete lists of pieces for each think tank are provided as appendices, with pieces ordered by author last name, then by date. In-text citations include author last name and complete date, to easily identify the piece.

It is now time to examine the historical context out of which each of these narratives, and our country’s broader discourse on immigration, arose.
Chapter 2: Our Nation’s Discourse on Immigration through History

Since its beginning, the U.S. has had a conflicted relationship with immigration. Immigrants have been welcomed to this country, the “Golden Door” of liberty and opportunity, to escape oppression and contribute to our economy and the vitality of our democracy. Simultaneous, however, has been a mistrust, suspicion or dislike of newcomers and popular sentiment that often calls for restricting immigration, denying benefits to non-citizens, increasing requirements for citizenship, and making laws that stipulate admitting only “desirable” or “fit” immigrants. Needless to say, the issue has created a complicated push and pull between these opposing sentiments through the nation’s history, resulting in generally liberal immigration policies punctuated by periods of restrictionism.

As Daniel Tichenor (2002) has shown, the successful passage of immigration legislation has always relied on a complex interplay of factors, and does not simply reflect the nation’s sentiment toward immigrants and immigration at the time. In order to understand the discourse on immigration in the U.S. through its history, we must look beyond the policies of the time and examine immigration debates and arguments in their historical context. In this chapter, I will provide an overview of the arguments and debates on immigration through the nation’s history, drawing out themes and tracing historical roots of immigration narratives used today. I will first provide some theoretical background relevant to our nation’s immigration debate and address the approach I will use in providing this overview of the immigration debate.

Ever since the rise of the nation-state system, both sovereignty and identity have been preoccupations of nations and the people living within them. Benedict Anderson (1991) traced the rise of these preoccupations in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread*
Anderson contended that all nations are *imagined* political communities. They are imagined, he argued, because no nation however small will consist of individuals who all know each other, yet in each individual’s mind is the belief that each belongs to the same community, a “deep, horizontal comradeship” (16). Not only is the community aspect of the nation imagined, but the nation is also imagined by its members to be both limited and sovereign. Though only imagined, national sovereignty and community have become powerful motivators, eliciting nationalistic passions within nations, including the United States. Immigrants, particularly those present illegally, are often conceived of and portrayed as living outside the imagined community, challenging national identity through demographic change and cultural influences, and in the case of illegal immigrants, challenging sovereignty through disregard of the nation’s borders and laws.

In *Fear of Small Numbers*, Arjun Appadurai (2006) examined the transitions brought about by globalization, and the anxieties over national identity, national sovereignty, and distribution of public goods, among others, produced by these transitions. As flows of finance capital, populations, and information have broken down the borders between nation-states, compromising the sovereignty states such as the U.S. have had over and within their borders, reassertions and redefinitions of national identity and anxieties over the influx of outsiders and strength of minorities have become more common. Appadurai cited an “emerging repertoire of efforts to produce previously unrequired levels of certainty about social identity, values, survival and dignity,” the most extreme examples of which were the large-scale ethnic violence during the 1990s in places like India, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia (7, 9). Appadurai noted less extreme examples of these efforts, such as “passport-based national identities; census-based ideas of majority and minority; media-driven images of self and other; constitutions which

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1 First published in 1983.
conflate citizenship and ethnicity” (90). I would argue that contemporary nativism in the U.S. is in part a manifestation of the anxieties of which Appadurai wrote.

Multiple scholars have written of the importance of framing the immigration policy debate and controlling the narratives and terms used within these debates. In *Border Games: Policing the U.S. - Mexico Divide*, Peter Andreas (2000) examined the politics behind U.S. - Mexico border enforcement: all part of a public performance in which shaping the perceptions of Congress, the media, the public, and others is ultimately more important than the effectiveness of the border policing (9). As demonstrated by Andreas, the way that policy is perceived by a particular audience, whether it be legislators, the media or the public, can be as important if not more so for policy advocates than the actual effectiveness of the policies they are advocating. George Lakoff and Sam Ferguson (2006) argued that framing has been key to the immigration debate and immigration policy in the U.S. By framing immigration in terms such as “illegals,” “border security,” and “the immigration problem” among others, certain actors in the debate effectively constrain the terms of the debate, public perception of the issues, and the potential policy outcomes (Lakoff and Ferguson 2006). Scholarly work examining use of these frames in recent decades will be discussed below.

In order to examine the nation’s discourse on immigration, I have divided our history into four time periods: 1) the first hundred years, in which immigration policies were determined by states and localities, ending with the 1875 court ruling that brought immigration policy under the purview of the federal government; 2) the 1880s to 1924, the years of federal regulation leading up to the National Origins Act of 1924; 3) 1924 to 1965, the years when immigration was based on national origins quotas, and 4) 1965 to the present, wherein immigration has been based on a seven category preference system, with emphasis on family reunification. This division is not to
suggest that there was uniformity of sentiment and policy regarding immigration within each
time period – each period was dynamic, with changing historical and social contexts. This
division is simply to provide organization and structure to the examination of immigration
discourse through U.S. history, and because each was marked by a distinct overall policy
approach to immigration, this division seemed logical.

Within each time period, I will examine the general policy and demographic trends and
relevant major legislation. Most importantly, however, will be an extensive discussion of the
major concerns regarding immigration during the period – what drove the national discourse,
what historical circumstances were relevant to the discourse – and specific examples of pro- or
anti-immigration narratives, arguments, and events.

The First 100 Years

Until 1875, immigration policy fell under each state’s control. Apart from the brief Alien
and Sedition Acts of 1798, there were no federal-level policies governing immigrant inflows
(Tichenor 2002, 46). States and localities set their own immigration policies, whether they aimed
at actively recruiting immigrants to settle in their states, or restricting immigration of certain
groups. For the most part, immigration was encouraged during this period, and it was generally
easy for white male immigrants to acquire the rights of citizenship (48). The nation required
immigration to meet the needs of its budding economy, yet it also feared potential authoritarian
or radical influences of foreigners that might threaten its delicate, newly established political
system. Though America’s asylum ideal drove Americans to want to share their nation with all
who desired individual liberty, Americans were also concerned with the various social ills they
associated with immigrants – crime, poverty, and disease (63).
Though immigrant admission numbers were not tracked until the 1820s, the number of persons applying for legal permanent residence increased dramatically between 1820 and the 1870s, indicating that immigration was encouraged during this period (United States 2009, 6). Fewer than 200,000 immigrants arrived in the 1820s, whereas well over 2 million arrived per decade in the 1850s and 1860s. The vast majority of immigrants during this time came from northern European countries, with Ireland, Germany and the United Kingdom being the top sending countries in each decade. Chinese immigration did increase dramatically after 1850 (after the Gold Rush), not exceeding 50 per decade prior to 1850, to over 100,000 in the 1870s (United States 2009, 6). However great this increase, the percentage of total immigration made up by Chinese never rose above 4% in this period (Tichenor 2002, 90).

Because most U.S. immigration in the first 100 years originated in northern Europe, nativism in this time focused more on foreign influence on the nation’s political system and character than on the racial and cultural make-up of the newly arrived immigrants, though there were elements of both. Patterns of nativism in this period, as well as the developing conceptions of ourselves as a nation, “opened channels” for future xenophobia (Higham 1963, 11). Nativism in this century flared up most intensely during wartime and periods of particularly high immigration (Fry 2007, 38).

As John Higham (1963) described, the oldest forms of nativism in the country were directed against Catholic immigrants and the authoritarian influence they were seen to carry through their Catholicism. The principle of individual liberty, he argued, was “imbedded in the national culture,” and Americans tended to see the authoritarian structure inherent to Catholicism as a threat to this central principle (6). That vast numbers of Catholic immigrants were arriving from Europe stoked fears of a Catholic conspiracy to “subvert American institutions” (6).
Higham provided a graphic example of these fears in an 1871 political cartoon depicting a wave of Catholic bishops cleverly drawn to look like crocodiles washing ashore to threaten, in this case, the American institution of education (see central section of figures, after 212).

Authoritarian tendencies were not the only influences of foreigners that Americans saw as a potential threat to their young and cherished political system. Fear of radical foreign elements, particularly French revolutionaries in the 1790s and German Marxists in the 1850s, fueled periods of xenophobia and nativism (Higham 1963, 8-9). The 1790s saw the short-lived Alien and Sedition Acts, which increased foreigners’ residency period before acquiring citizenship to 14 years, required all aliens to register with the federal government, and gave the federal government the power to round up and detain, during times of war, foreign adult males determined to be enemies of the nation (Tichenor 2002, 54). The nativism of the 1850s was fueled primarily by anti-Catholic sentiment, but also included fear of influence by the European Marxist revolutions of 1848 (Higham 1963, 7, 9). The American Party of the 1850s unified a divided country against these foreign influences (Tichenor 2002, 61).

While nativist concerns were not uniform over the nation’s first century, the founding fathers of the nation did debate most of the concerns that characterized nativism in this period. Thomas Jefferson expressed concern about immigrants’ loyalties, specifically citing Old World monarchy²; consequently, though Jefferson advocated broad rights for immigrants, he also encouraged restraint in immigrant admissions, in the interest of maintaining a republican government (Tichenor 2002, 51). Other leaders of the time cautioned against extending certain rights to immigrants, calling for longer periods of citizenship prior to allowing the foreign-born to serve in government – a period to allow them to shed “foreign attachments” that might

² In “Notes on the State of Virginia” Jefferson (1782) cautioned that immigrants will “bring with them the principles of the governments they leave,” thereby jeopardizing the harmony of our governing principles and “common consent”.

21
influence their actions in government (51). Still others expressed concern over losing cultural homogeneity that they saw as strengthening the nation’s civic spirit (52). Benjamin Franklin, though he generally encouraged European immigration for its role in growing the economy (51), also attacked the cultural influence of Germans, claiming that they were “Germanizing us instead of our Anglifying them” (as quoted by Tichenor 2002, 50).

This last concern shows the beginnings of what John Higham (1963) named a third prominent form of nativism (after anti-Catholic and anti-radical) – that of racial nativism. Although not the dominant form of nativism in the first 100 years of the nation, this form does have its roots in the Anglo-Saxon American identity formed in the early years of the nation (9). Though the first century on the one hand brought into being an Anglo-Saxon national identity, it simultaneously saw the development of an “inclusive nationality, at once diverse and homogeneous, ever improving as it assimilated many types of men into a unified, superior people” (21).

1875 – 1924: The Years of Increasing Exclusions

The period beginning in 1875, when immigration policy was brought under the purview of the federal government, was marked by a series of laws excluding the immigration of various undesirables. New groups of immigrants were coming to the U.S. in large numbers, shifting toward immigration from southern and eastern European countries. This period started with a number of exclusions aimed at the Chinese population, but over the course of these five decades immigration policies broadened to limit other Asians, southern and eastern Europeans, political radicals and various others deemed unfit for membership in the American community. A growing mistrust of foreign-born people brought about by the first world war and the rise of social science
expertise that supported theories of racial hierarchy culminated in the National Origins Quota Act of 1924, which heavily favored immigration from northern and western Europe.

The number of legal permanent residents per decade rose from 2.7 million in the 1870s to 8.2 million in the first decade of the 20th century, and did not drop below 3.6 million in any other decade of the period (United States 2009, 6-9). Of the 8.2 million in the peak decade, half came from the top three sending countries of Italy, Russia and Hungary, with only 2.3 million from the “traditional” sending countries of northern and western Europe and only half of those from the countries that dominated immigration in the first 100 years, Ireland, Germany and the United Kingdom (United States 2009, 6). Despite the increase in immigration levels, the percentage of the population that was foreign-born remained stable during this period (between 13.2 and 14.7%) (Daniels 2004, 5).

Immigration narratives used in this period both echoed narratives from the first 100 years, and added new narratives to the country’s discourse on immigration. The old narratives of immigrants being a blessing to the American economy and seeking opportunity in our land of liberty continued to be used by parties who favored immigration. So too opponents of immigration used the old narratives linking immigrants with poverty, disease, and other ills, and questioning their loyalties and abilities to cherish republican principles. New narratives were brought into the mix as well: concern that native workers were being displaced by immigrant workers, and this narrative’s corollary, that immigrants were doing the work native workers were unwilling to do; linking immigrants with acts of terrorism and concern for national security; comparing influxes of undesirable groups to “invasions” and questioning their capacity for assimilation; and finally, certain immigrant groups were deemed racially inferior to “traditional”

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3 Included in this calculation are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom
immigrant groups.

During the late 1800s, European immigrants were primarily the targets of anti-radical nativism. Both the Haymarket Square bombing, the U.S. entry into the First World War, and the first Red Scare sharpened the perception of foreign-born Europeans as potential threats to American democracy and liberty, but also linked them to material threats to national security. When six immigrants were charged for the bombing in Haymarket Square during a labor protest in 1886, “nationalist hysteria” ensued, reviving a latent nativism that tagged the foreign-born as potential internal threats (Higham 1963, 54). Fear of foreigners’ split loyalties between the United States and their home countries was heightened during WWI, when German-Americans were cast into suspicion, putting pressure on the community to Americanize and prove their patriotism — “Schmidt” became “Smith” and sauerkraut became “liberty cabbage” (Fry 2007, 47). Those Germans seen as a serious threat were sent to internment camps (Fry 2007, 48). After WWI and the Bolshevik Revolution, fear of communist foreign elements led to the Palmer raids of 1920: deportation of hundreds of “alleged alien radicals” (Tichenor 2002, 142).

In terms of immigrants’ role in the economy, this period introduced a now-familiar split between the interests of employers and those of native-born laborers. Employers built upon the older narrative of immigration filling the needs of our economy with new narratives about immigrants seeking only to better their situation through the opportunity offered in America (Daniels 2004, 32). Further, many argued that immigrants filled jobs that native, white workers were unwilling to do, rather than displacing native-born workers (Daniels 2004, 34). Labor representatives worried, on the contrary, that low-skilled immigrants were corroding the system of worker rights for which they struggled (Tichenor 2002, 122). During this period, much of the labor-related immigration discourse focused on the Chinese population in the American West.
Since the 1850s, when Chinese began coming to the U.S. in large numbers, the Chinese immigrant population had been the target of intense nativism. In addition to being seen as part of a new form of slavery that benefited employers and undermined worker rights, white Americans also saw Chinese as racially inferior, culturally unassimilable, and incapable of self-governance (Daniels 2004, 18). The debate on how to deal with Chinese immigration raged in the West for decades prior to the Chinese Exclusion Act being passed at the federal level in 1882 (Tichenor 2002, Ch 4). Though fear of Japan's military prowess and lobbying by Western agricultural employers prevented exclusion of Japanese and Mexican immigrants (127, 146), the exclusion of Chinese immigration marked the beginning of the shift toward racially-based immigration policies that dominated the early 1900s.

A new commission to investigate and recommend immigration policies, the rise of social science applications to policy, and the dominance of theories of racial hierarchy in the early 1900s combined to usher in a series of policies aimed at restricting certain types of immigrants. The Immigration Act of 1907 created the Dillingham Commission, whose reports drew heavily on the work of social science “experts” (Tichenor 2002, 128). Eugenicist theories dominated research of the time, detailing a racial hierarchy in which certain nationalities were deemed more fit for incorporation into the American community than others. After multiple presidential vetoes, a literacy test for immigrants was instituted in 1917 (by overriding yet another veto), in an effort to limit immigration from southern and eastern European countries (133-141). When the literacy test failed to restrict enough immigration from these newer source countries, restrictionists pushed for another of the Dillingham Commission’s recommendations, instituting a National Quota Law in 1921, which capped immigration from each country (Tichenor 2002, 142-3). In

4 In the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907, the U.S. agreed to exempt Japanese from segregation in San Francisco, in return for restricted migration of Japanese living in Hawaii to the continental U.S., and Japan’s discouragement of labor migration to the U.S. (Tichenor 142).
1924, the National Origins Act altered the quota’s calculations to greatly favor immigration from “traditional” source countries – 84% would come from western and northern Europe, with only 12% coming from the less desirable Southern and Eastern European countries (145). Additionally, the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924 expanded Chinese exclusion to ban nearly all immigration from Asia, with the exception of Filipinos (Reimers 1992, 6).

1924 – 1965: Life and Death of National Origins Quotas

The four decades between 1924 and 1965 began with the restrictionist and discriminatory National Origins Quota system, and ended with a restructured immigration system open to all races and based on preferences such as family ties, job skills and refugee status rather than national origin. Through World War II, immigration laws remained racist and discriminatory (Daniels 2004, 97), but changes in thinking on race, the crisis of displaced persons after WWII, and the dynamics brought about by the Cold War led to a much more welcoming system at the end of this period. Even as political leaders in the country began to recognize the need for America to welcome a more diverse set of immigrants, and as eugenicist notions of racial hierarchy fell out of popularity, the American public consistently favored restriction over expansion, instituting an elite-mass split over immigration, in which the public favors restricting immigration and policymakers favor expanding immigration, that persists today (Tichenor 2002, 182). At the end of this period, and despite popular restrictionist attitudes, Great Society reformers in the national government managed to pass the expansionist Immigration Reform Act of 1965 (215).

After implementation of the national origins system, and with the Great Depression and second World War, overall immigration dropped dramatically in the 1930s and 1940s, and shifted
to favor immigration from Western and Northern Europe, with Ireland, Germany and the United Kingdom again among the top four European sending countries (Italy, however, was the fourth) in this period (United States 2009, 8). Though still half the number of immigrants arriving in the 1910s, by the 1960s, immigration levels had again risen to over 3 million, nearly the 4.3 million of the 1920s. Mexican immigration, which was not subject to the same restrictions under the quota system, increased dramatically in the 1920s, and by the 1960s, Mexico was the largest single source of immigrants (United States 2009, 8-9). Although Congress had outlawed Asian contract labor, under the Bracero Program, which existed between 1942 and 1964, tens of thousands of Mexican laborers were contracted annually in the 1940s and hundreds of thousands annually in the 1950s (Tichenor 2002, 210).

The main narratives of this period again included both recurring narratives and new ones. While not new, recurring narratives were often aimed at different populations of immigrants than in past periods. Many of the narratives used to express concern in past periods over Chinese and other “unfit” immigrants shifted in this period to Mexican immigrants and contract laborers. Economic need for labor provided by Mexicans was pitted against negative impacts on American labor. Concern over public health, disease, crime, and political and cultural assimilation was then aimed at the Mexican “invasion.” National security was again invoked during World War II and the Cold War to restrict certain immigrants’ rights and exclude immigrants on the basis of their ideology. New narratives introduced in this period portrayed the Mexico-U.S. border as out of control, equated the concept of illegal immigration with Mexicans, and warned of the threat of non-white immigrants’ fertility.

Immigration policy and the arguments that drove it in this period were influenced greatly by world events. Eugenicist theories of racial hierarchy were discredited in part because of their
association with Nazism in Europe (Tichenor 2002, 217). The Second World War again affected the nation’s attitudes toward immigrants, with the 1940 Alien Registration Act placing all resident aliens under suspicion (Fry 2007, 54). Upon U.S. entry into the war, immigrants from Axis countries (Japan, Germany and Italy) were targets of nativism; the racially and culturally distinct Japanese were interned, with Germans and Italians treated with less severe restrictions (Fry 2007, 56-7). The crisis of displaced persons after the war, which ultimately led to admittance of large numbers of refugees from low-quota countries, played a role in breaking down the walls of the quota system (Daniels 2004, 109). Global dynamics of the Cold War created opposing influences in U.S. immigration policy; many called for welcoming policies to “win the hearts and minds” of the world and live up to our designation as the land of liberty, while immigration from communist countries again heightened fear of the “enemy within,” leading to the 1950 Internal Security Act (Tichenor 2002, 178, 189).

In addition to the Displaced Persons Acts opening the door for further immigration from “non-traditional” source countries, changes in thinking on race influenced the nation’s attitudes to reject the restrictive national origins quotas based on theories of racial hierarchy. Social science experts called upon by President Truman’s immigration commission widely discredited eugenicist theories (Tichenor 2002, 198). The push to remove “second-class citizenship” grounded in the Civil Rights movement also influenced policymakers’ attitudes toward the national origins quota system (215). Chinese exclusion was repealed in 1943 (Reimers 1992, 14) and even though the 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act reaffirmed the quota system, it did make all races eligible for immigration and naturalization (20). Even though attitudes about race shifted to favor racial equality during this period, American resentment of new, racially and culturally different immigrants continued.
Because Filipinos were exempted from the Asian exclusions in place during the first part of this period, nativists rallied in the 1930s to limit their quota to a meager 50 persons per year, and to provide incentives for Filipinos to return to the Philippines and foreswear their right to return (Daniels 2004, 71). Based in California, the anti-Filipino movement associated Filipinos with “vice and crime” and “aggressive sexuality” (Daniels 2004, 68). Proponents of strict limits on Filipino immigration pointed to Filipinas’ dangerous fertility, arguing that Filipinos could rapidly out-breed whites (Daniels 2004, 69). The arguments for restricting Filipino immigration were both racial and economic, much as the arguments against the Chinese in the past.

A new group of low-skilled laborers in this period drew the same arguments used against the Chinese in the last period; Mexican immigrants caught the attention of Congress for the first time (Sheridan 2002, 4). In 1924, the Border Patrol was established, but their primary concern was preventing entry of Asians and Southeastern Europeans through Mexico, rather than preventing entry of native Mexicans (Tichenor 2002, 172). Mexican labor was crucial to the powerful agricultural industry of the West, which used the old argument that they did the work that white men would not do, were powerless, and were easily expelled, and therefore posed little threat of becoming permanent members of American society (170-1). For all these reasons, and despite being seen as racially inferior to whites, Mexicans avoided the racially-based exclusions of the last period and were not subject to the strictly limiting quotas of the National Origins Quota system. But as the population of Mexican laborers grew, the American public increasingly viewed them as labor competition and threatening labor conditions (working like “slaves”), public health nuisances (carrying disease and living in unsanitary conditions), and as politically unassimilable (Sheridan 2002, 6, Reimers 1992, 52).

In the late 1920s as Mexican immigration was rising significantly, restrictionists, who
argued that Mexican labor created a “Mexican peon” caste which was un-American (Sheridan 2002, 14), pushed for quotas on Mexican immigrants. As noted above, quotas were not implemented, which in the Depression years led to great resentment of the Mexican laborer population and a repatriation campaign which sent an estimated 400,000 Mexicans and Mexican-Americans back to Mexico (Reimers 1992, 7). The flow of workers from Mexico remained low until World War II, when employers’ demand for labor helped to establish the Bracero guestworker program in 1942 (39). At the same time, public concern over crime associated in the press with Mexican youth, resulted in the Zoot Suit riots in Los Angeles in 1943, when American servicemen violently lashed out against Mexican youth (Fry 2007, 57). Despite popular anti-Mexican sentiment, numbers of both Mexican guestworkers and legal immigrants continued to rise through the 1940s and 1950s (Tichenor 2002, 210). Illegal immigration from Mexico rose concurrently, popularizing the notion of a “wetback invasion” (Reimers 1992, 49). Soon, “wetback” – an allusion to illegal entry by swimming across the Rio Grande – was equated with “illegal” (58). In 1954, the INS launched Operation Wetback, which apprehended and deported thousands, and encouraged thousands more to leave voluntarily (53). The INS declared the “wetback problem” solved, and illegal immigration largely slipped off the national agenda for the remainder of this period (Tichenor 2002, 225).

1965 – Present: High Immigration and New Restrictionism

Increasing legal and illegal immigration and the shifting demographics of newly arrived immigrants led to broad public concern over immigration in this period. Yet even with public opinion increasingly favoring restrictive immigration policies, reforms instituted in this period were widely expansionist. The widening split between the policymaking elite and the mass
public, along with increased media coverage of illegal immigration led to a modern restrictionist movement that flourished in the mid-1990s, and an active public discourse over immigration.

Once again, economic concerns about immigrants displacing native workers, eroding worker conditions, and immigrant use of public benefits combined with fear of split loyalties and invasion by a flood of newcomers who disobey the law to produce overwhelmingly alarmist narratives about immigration. Familiar questions about the assimilative capacity of the nation now shifted to focus on cultural assimilation more than political assimilation, and narratives of the porous border were accompanied by newer concerns for national sovereignty and talk of the “reconquest” of the Southwest. Immigrants’ high numbers and high fertility were portrayed as a threat to our environment and national culture by restrictionists, while immigrant advocates introduced human rights concerns to dissuade deportations yet call for reform to decrease illegal immigration. All the while, both the oldest narrative of the U.S. as a refuge for the world’s oppressed and concern over our ability to absorb newcomers remained prominent in the national discourse.

Numbers of new legal permanent residents between 1966 and 2007 was four times what the nation received between 1924 and 1965 (United States 2009, 5). Cold war anticommunist concerns and newer human rights concerns led to high rates of refugee admissions (Tichenor 2002, 222-3). Restructured rules favoring family reunification brought in high numbers of Asian, Latin American and Caribbean immigrants, who comprised 77% of total legal immigration in this period (United States 2009, 8-11). Numbers of unauthorized immigrants living in the U.S. also rose dramatically during this period. While estimates of the unauthorized population’s size in the U.S. are contentious, the Pew Hispanic Center estimated that the population of unauthorized immigrants rose from 3 million in 1980 to 10.3 million in 2004 (Passel 2005, 10).
Annual estimated arrivals of unauthorized immigrants rose from 140,000 annually in the 1980s to 450,000 annually between 1990-1994, to 750,000 annually between 1995 - 1999 (Passel 2005, 6).

Admission of refugees and immigrants from Third World countries reflected how our nation saw itself as helping the world by inviting immigrants to our land of opportunity (Chavez 2001, 84, 114). Public discourse at times lauded the multicultural and multi-ethnic makeup of our country, portraying it as invigorating and enriching (Chavez 2001, 120). Yet the demographic shift and various economic downturns also fed “anti-alien feelings” (Tichenor 2002, 238). Scholars like Peter Brimelow warned, “there are limits to the absorptive capacity of U.S. society” (1995, 270) and sought some solution for America “without permanently altering its demography and politics” (266).

Media coverage and public concern over illegal immigration swelled during this period (Tichenor 2002, 229). Concerns over job displacement, erosion of working conditions, and use of public benefits mixed with newer concerns raised by ethnic lobbies and human rights advocates about the creation of a “vulnerable subclass,” raising debates over employer sanctions and increased border enforcement (229-30). Despite public opinion favoring restriction of legal immigration and a “crackdown” on illegal immigration, policy reforms of this period were primarily expansive (242-3). The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 aimed at addressing the problem of illegal immigration. The reform legalized 3 million undocumented immigrants, imposed sanctions against employers who hire undocumented workers and increased border enforcement efforts (Cooper and O’Neill 2005, 3). The Immigration Act of 1990 increased the legal limit of immigrant admissions by 40% and reaffirmed the preferences of family reunification and employment-based immigrant admissions, which favored immigration
from Latin America and Asia (Tichenor 2002, 244).

The expansionist policies of this period led to new restrictionist movements and discourses (Tichenor 2002, 221, 245). The debate over IRCA introduced to the national discourse the term “amnesty” in relation to legalization of unauthorized immigrants, refocused concern on porousness of U.S. borders, and introduced the term “illegals” as a noun referring to unauthorized immigrants. Concerns over the impact of high immigration levels on natural resources drove John Tanton to form the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) in 1979 (Tichenor 2002, 237). They advocate for “more traditional rates” of immigration, a number they put at 300,000\(^5\) (http://www.fairus.org/site/PageNavigator/about/). Sixteen years later, with the support of FAIR, the Center for Immigration Studies, a Washington think tank, was founded in an effort to counter the prevailing policy research that favored high levels of immigration (Tichenor 2002, 279). Both groups remain active in pushing for restrictive immigration policies and will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

The mid-1990s witnessed a strong backlash against immigration. Economic uncertainty and a “large and sustained inflow” of immigrants, primarily culturally and ethnically distinct from the majority white population, led to widespread discontent with immigration levels (Muller 1997). The famous Proposition 187 (also called the “Save Our State” initiative by its proponents), denying public benefits to illegal immigrants and requiring all agencies to report suspected illegal immigrants to authorities, was passed by California voters in 1994 (Lennon 1998). Ultimately declared unconstitutional by the courts, passage of the initiative demonstrated the strong anti-immigration sentiment of the mid-1990s.

Much of the discourse of this most recent period focused on immigration’s negative

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\(^5\) Annual numbers of persons obtaining legal permanent resident status has not been below 300,000 since 1965, and exceeded 300,000 in 38% of the years between 1820 and 1965 (United States 2009, 5).
effects on the nation. Immigration opponents cited IRCA’s failure to curb illegal immigration in their opposition to newly proposed legalization measures. Policy analysts argued over how many new legal immigrants could be anticipated under various proposed legalization reforms, often citing large numbers to convey overwhelming and negative effects of legalization (examples will be covered further in case study chapters). Metaphors used by the L.A. Times at the time of Proposition 187 portrayed the nation as a house being inundated with uninvited guests – the dangerous flood of immigration (Santa Ana 2002) – and public discourse in California at the time “fabricated the immigrant as enemy” (Mehan 1997, 249). Magazine coverage from this era raised concerns about demographic changes, population growth, economic competition, immigrant assimilation and the “‘reconquest’ of the Southwest by Mexicans” (Chavez 2001, 126). Samuel Huntington’s 2004 book, Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity, presented current immigration (with emphasis on that from Mexico) as challenging things near and dear to American identity: our culture core, creed, English language, and patriotism.

Specifically with regard to illegal immigration from Mexico, the discourse of this period was alarmist, portraying a state of crisis. Magazine covers depicting Mexican immigration into the United States since 1965 conveyed themes of invasion, war, loss of control, and danger (Chavez 2001, Ch 8). Restrictionists used the “threat of attack” narrative to sow fear of overwhelming influxes of outsiders (Stefancic and Delgado 1996, 149). The U.S.-Mexico border as “out of control” and therefore a threat to our nation’s sovereignty was the focus of much greater concern in this period. “Porous borders” were linked in discourse to influxes of “disease, disruption and crime” (Chock 1994, 45). The need for stable borders in order to maintain national sovereignty, particularly in the era of globalization, heightened the public cry for

**Conclusion**

Affirmative immigration narratives were strong at the inception of the nation, and remain today, often romanticizing our history and contributing to our national identity. **Idealistic immigration narratives** are as old as the republic and have been consistently echoed in narratives about the “land of opportunity.” We as a nation see ourselves as a refuge for the oppressed people of the world. With people from different nations arriving in our country, we laud the nation’s assimilative capacity and our status as a “nation of immigrants.” We see ourselves as a melting pot, strengthened by the addition of new elements that invigorate our democracy and enrich our national culture.

While affirmative immigration narratives may be old and powerful, negative or alarmist immigration narratives quickly gained salience, and now seem to dominate the national discourse on immigration. The remainder of this chapter provides an overview of the discursive threads that are woven into the rhetoric of restrictionism. It examines reconstituted versions of old nativist discourse, as well as new themes emerging from contemporary anxieties. Core concepts that structured the analysis and coding of my case studies in chapters 4-6 are presented here in bold.

Immigration has often been presented as an **uncontrollable force**, both in historical and contemporary nativist discourse. Discussed in terms of “waves” and “floods” or other types of **water imagery**, immigration is commonly portrayed as dangerously overwhelming our nation in ways that we cannot stop or control. With the establishment of the Border Patrol in 1924, the threat of “**porous borders**” raised concern for national security and national sovereignty. The
border with Mexico is portrayed as out of control, bringing the threat of invasion (war imagery), disease (health), crime and lawbreaking, and dangerous foreign elements (terrorism). The “enemy within” narrative is also old, starting out as fear of ideological influence on American institutions, then transitioning to fear of material threat, and now linked to terrorism and national security. More recently, questions of how to address the growing population of unauthorized immigrants has raised the debate of whether to grant amnesty to legalize this population (or portions of this population) or focus on increasing enforcement efforts to decrease the size of this population.

Immigration's effects on the economy have long been central to the immigration debate. Immigrants have been welcomed for their benefits to the economy since the early days of the nation. Soon, however, the value and effects of low-skilled immigrants was questioned, with low-skilled immigrants being blamed for eroding working conditions, depressing wages, and displacing native workers. Concern over the costs immigrants impose has been expressed through worry over immigrant poverty levels. The initial exclusion of “those likely to become a public charge” now plays out in debates over immigrant use of public benefits.

Alarmist narratives are perhaps most strong when they concern immigration's effects on our national identity, both political and cultural. Originally focusing on immigration’s effects on our political system, the nation’s sovereignty is now portrayed as under threat from immigrants who settle here without our explicit welcome (people who immigrate illegally).

While past debates about assimilation of immigrant groups focused primarily on whether immigrants were capable of embracing American political institutions, the presence of non-traditional immigrants opened the debate to questions of racial hierarchy and cultural assimilability. “Unassimilability” has been used as grounds for exclusion of certain groups
throughout the nation’s history, and the question of whether immigrant groups are assimilating quickly enough remains prominent in contemporary immigration discourse.

Concerns first raised by the founding fathers of the nation over the political assimilation and loyalties of immigrants have become concern over “dual allegiance,” coming out in talk of “hyphens” and “ampersands.” The earliest “hyphens” of concern were German-Americans and Irish-Americans, but loyalty of foreign-born was questioned during WWI and WWII. Today we see the same criticisms of “ampersands” – those immigrants who want to have it both ways and be both American and Mexican, not pledging full allegiance to the United States (Huntington 2004, 204, 209). This has translated into a contemporary debate about how to clarify the value of citizenship, identifying who is fully a part of our national community and making clear that those outside are clearly outside, without the benefits of belonging.

The character of arriving immigrants has always been questioned in public discourse. Crime and poverty, as well as drunkenness, crowded housing, squalor, high fertility rates, and myriad other ills, have throughout American history been associated with immigrant populations. Today’s immigrants receive praise for their work ethic and desire to improve their lot in life, yet they also face scrutiny based on claims that they are poor, low-skilled, poorly educated, and have a culture of crime and welfare use. Excluding undesirable immigrants was long a focus of immigration policy. The concept of “fitness” has been used to determine political, ideological, economic, physical, cultural and racial eligibility for inclusion. Which immigrants we welcome into our national community and which we exclude remains a prominent feature of immigration discourse.

In sum, many of the narratives and arguments about immigrants and immigration used in the earliest years of our nation are still used today. As circumstances change, the details may
shift, with old fears directed against new groups, yet the basic themes come back to inform and frame the debate over and over again. Think tanks play a role in repackaging and perpetuating these old immigration narratives. The following chapter examines this role, and more generally, how think tanks influence policymaking and public discourse.

Before moving on, however, following is a brief outline of the narratives to be addressed within each of the three themes, and presented in the same structure in chapters 4 - 6.

**National Security:**
- Uncontrollable forces and water imagery
- Porous borders
- War imagery
- Health
- Lawbreaking (criminals, terrorists, lawbreakers)
- Amnesty
- Enforcement

**Economics:**
- Water imagery and narratives of overwhelming forces
- Costs immigrants impose vs. benefits to the economy
- Value and effects of low-skilled immigrants

**National Identity:**
- Sovereignty
- Value of Citizenship
- Assimilation
- Dual Allegiance
- Character of arriving immigrants
- Excluding undesirable immigrants
- Idealistic immigration narratives
Chapter 3: Think Tanks in Policy Debate and Public Discourse

Think tanks influence policy debate, not only among policymakers, but among the general public as well. Different types of think tanks have arisen in different periods over the past century, employing a range of tactics for influencing policy debate, and filling particular roles for policymakers and the public. The work of think tanks has become increasingly relevant in policy debates in the U.S., and for a number of reasons, conservative think tanks in particular have played an important role in this discussion. This chapter examines the roles think tanks play in policy debates and the policymaking process, describing the different types of think tanks in the U.S. and the central role of these organizations in the conservative movement of the 1970s. Finally, the chapter looks at how some think tanks fit into the contemporary network of anti-immigrant activists in the United States.

The role of think tanks in the public policy-making process can be challenging to decipher, and measuring the exact amount of influence they exert over public policy is quite difficult, as a number of scholars of think tank behavior have concluded (for example, Abelson 2004, 226; Ricci 1993, 2). Though there is general agreement that the exact effect of think tanks on public policy is an elusive measure, these scholars tend to agree that think tanks play a role in shaping public policy and the debates that surround policy issues, making think tanks’ work worthy of study. In this chapter I argue that by way of 1) their role as “experts” in their policy areas, and 2) their access to influential policymakers and news media, think tanks help to set the agenda, define the terms of the policy debates, and frame the public discourse in the United States.
Think Tank Roles in the Policy Debate

The term “think tank,” originally a military term used to describe “a secure room where plans and strategies could be discussed,” is now applied to any number of policy research institutions within a widely varying set (Smith 1991, xiii). Scholars who study think tanks tend to avoid strictly defining the term, though James McGann (1995) noted that most use the term “to describe institutions that engage in the research, evaluation and analysis of public policies and programs,” and use the term interchangeably with “public policy research institution” (3). The characteristics of these institutions are not uniform. They vary greatly in size, scope of work, amount and sources of funding, target audience and tactics for reaching that audience, ideological underpinnings, and orientation toward academic research or political advocacy. Scholars categorize their many roles differently, though David Ricci (1993) offered one of the broadest and most succinct set: knowledge roles, policy process roles, and mobilization roles (163-6).

Think tanks assume knowledge roles by acting as sources of information and analysis. Ricci (1993) identified two core knowledge roles: working credibly (in an academic, scholarly way) and “research brokering” (163). When based on data and scientific analysis, the work of think tank scholars is seen to be objective and professional, i.e. credible. Whether or not their work actually is objective is beside the point, David Ricci argued. “The credibility role exists whether or not it is performed well”. Think tanks also act as “research brokers” by reviewing, digesting and repackaging academic work related to policy issues, making it accessible and relevant for policymakers (163). R. Kent Weaver (1989) noted similar roles for think tanks in producing books and brief analyses to evaluate specific policy proposals, often popularizing certain policies and preventing enactment of others (568). Through playing these knowledge
roles, think tanks offer “expert” opinion on policy issues.

In *Policy*, H.K. Colebatch (1998) outlined the role of both expertise and experts in policy activity, arguing that expertise is a basis for participation in policy (18) and that experts play an important role in shaping policy debate (99). While expertise, both inside and outside of government, is only one basis of participation described by Colebatch, he argued that expertise plays a key role not only in “generating responses” to policy problems, but also in “framing the problem in the first place” (20). Colebatch defined “knowledge workers” as any so-called experts with “specialist knowledge” about particular policy issues. Though these knowledge workers (such as consultants, think tank fellows, academics, etc.) are commonly not policymakers and therefore “have no formal standing in the process,” Colebatch argued that they nonetheless exert influence over “the terms of the debate: what is regarded as normal, what is taken as a problem, and what possible answers to the problem” exist as options (99).

The implications of think tanks’ knowledge roles reach beyond policymaking circles to the policy debates taking place in the larger society. Called upon by the media, think tanks’ expert opinions are broadcast to a wide audience. Under the “trappings of academe” as Trudy Lieberman (2000) put it, think tanks “convey a sense of knowledge rather than ideology” to the public through their visibility in the media (37). The public takes their evaluation of policy, under the guise of scientific rigor, as impartial and authoritative analysis in the larger policy debate.

Second, think tanks are active in the *policy process*, not only in evaluating policy, but also in producing policy ideas, participating in the policy communities involved in enacting policy, and serving as a recruitment source for government personnel. Ricci (1993) described think tankers’ active cultivation of “issue networks” of interested parties – lobbyists, bureaucrats, congressional staff, members of the media, etc – through events such as policy-related symposia
and conferences. Once established, think tank fellows step into knowledge roles within these communities of influential people (165). Weaver (1989) identified think tanks as sources of policy ideas and proposals. Specific proposals that advance a think tank’s ideology are promoted within its policy community (568). However, there are some policy ideas aligned with a think tank’s ideological bent whose time has not yet come. In this case a think tank may work to popularize the idea, making the political atmosphere more amenable to related policy proposals over the long term. Finally, think tanks serve as a source of personnel for government agencies, bureaus, commissions, etc, and a home for government officials waiting in the wings when their parties are not in power (Ricci 1993, 166; Weaver 1989, 569). This revolving door maintains a think tank’s influence within the elite circles of policymakers.

In *Top-Down Policymaking*, Thomas Dye (2001) claimed that think tanks, along with other policy planning organizations, do more than simply influence the terms of the debate. Dye argued that, using the money from large foundations (channeled from wealthy individuals and corporations), think tanks “turn money into policy options” (47). Operating as the central coordinating bodies in this process, think tanks endeavor to “develop a consensus among national elites, the mass media, interest groups, government officials, and political leaders” (41). Because, according to Dye, elites are the primary shapers of the policymaking process, manufacturing consensus among elites is a powerful tool for influencing policy.

Third, think tanks master influence peddling not only among elites, but also among the masses, mobilizing public opinion to support their aims. Ricci (1993) described this activity as playing *mobilization roles*. As mentioned above, the media commonly calls on think tank scholars and fellows to comment on policy issues. Donald Abelson (2004) described how think tanks actively maintain connections with people in the media for just this purpose (Abelson
2004, 215) and R. Kent Weaver (1989) argued a similar point, disparagingly referring to think tanks’ prominence in the media as “punditry” (569). Ricci split mobilization roles into two types: long-term, in which think tanks publish more scholarly work to cultivate the next generation of educated ideologues, and short-term mobilization, promoting current policy ideas through television and radio appearances, and publishing op-eds in major media outlets (Ricci 1993, 164).

In *Slanting the Story: the Forces that Shape the News*, Trudy Lieberman (2000) traced the relationship between think tanks (specifically right-wing think tanks, which will be further examined below) and the media in building public support for particular policies. Lieberman contended that conservative think tanks have successfully translated their messages into the now-prevalent format of soundbite journalism (9). Hungry for what think tanks can feed them, the media has been complicit in disseminating these institutions’ messages, popularizing them among the public (5).

### Types of Think Tanks in the U.S.

How and to what extent think tanks promote their agendas through knowledge, policy process and mobilization roles depends greatly on the type of think tank and the model of public policy research it follows. While there is some variation in how scholars categorize American think tanks, most scholars identify at least three common types or models, all still active in the U.S. today. Each of these models emerged from a specific time period in American history, leading most scholars to describe them in terms of “generations”. The first generation, composed of academic-oriented policy research institutions, arose in the first few decades of the 20th Century; the second generation which emphasized contract research, emerged in the post-World
War II era; and the third generation defined by advocacy- or ideologically-driven institutions, came out of the mid-1970s. Though the generations may have introduced their typical models of policy research during specific time periods, newer think tanks may also be categorized using this generation-based model.

The first-generation think tanks developed as a means for applying scientific research to social policy issues. Oriented toward academic study of public policy issues, R. Kent Weaver (1989) referred to institutions of this model as “Universities without students” (564). Though the Russell Sage Foundation, started in 1907, is considered the first of this generation, scholars typically point to the Brookings Institution, formed in 1927, as the think tank that best exemplifies this type of think tank. Brookings’ model, wherein academics supply “empirical, scholarly and objective analysis of public policy issues in the social sciences,” remains one that many institutions strive toward to this day (McGann 1995, 48). Funded primarily by private foundations, corporations and individual donations, these institutions focus more on changing the long-term “climate of elite opinion” than on pushing specific legislative initiatives, producing book-length studies more than policy briefs (Weaver 1989, 564).

The second-generation think tanks, government contract research institutions, came into being in the post-WWII era in response to the nation’s Cold War security needs, and the domestic war on poverty (Smith 1991, xv). Many scholars cite the RAND Corporation, founded in 1948, as the epitome of this generation of think tanks. Based on the research and development model, these institutions also strive for more academic objectivity in their research (McGann 1995, 49). Many of these organizations are closely tied to specific government agencies, and receive much of their funding from government contracts, putting potential strain on their ability to remain objective (Weaver 1989, 566). The Hudson Institute and Urban Institute are both examples of
government contract research institutions (Abelson 2004, 221; McGann 1995, 78).

The third generation is that of advocacy-oriented think tanks. Funded similarly to the first generation of think tanks, this group diverges from academic policy research institutes because it tends to represent specific constituencies. Driven more by ideological and partisan interests than academic research, this type of think tank works to promote a particular policy agenda (McGann 1995, 74). Thus these institutions rely on “aggressive salesmanship” and brief policy papers that put the right “spin” on existing research, rather than publishing long academic research papers (Weaver 1989, 567). The Heritage Foundation, founded in 1973, is considered the “quintessential advocacy think tank;” the success of its tactics has spurred the growth of an entire set of think tanks of the advocacy model (Abelson 2004, 221). Advocacy think tanks have proliferated at an unprecedented rate for the think tank industry. According to McGann (1995), between the mid-1970s and 1990, 55 new think tanks were established, compared to only 57 think tanks of the two previous generations combined (45).

Getting an accurate count of think tanks in the U.S. today is difficult. Small regional, state, and even local think tanks are becoming common, addressing a range of issues, and not always registering on the national scene. That the term “think tank” is not well-defined adds to the difficulty, as the line between “interest group” and “think tank” can be hard to draw. The National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA, located in Japan) world directory of think tanks listed 92 in the United States, while Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government listed just over 100. Columbia University listed 83, Project Vote Smart 104, and James McGann listed over 200 (1995 figure, McGann 1995, 32), yet all of these lists exclude at least a couple of think

tanks that I can list off the top of my head. The actual number of think tanks operating in the U.S. could be well over 200, a testament to how popular the think tank model of influencing policy debates has become.

As we have seen, the “think tank model” is actually many models, as think tanks have widely varying characteristics. McGann (1995) identified additional characteristics that help to define a think tank’s “strategy and structure” (26). Think tanks can be diversified, covering a number of policy issues, or specialized, focusing on just one (27). They can be academic or policy oriented (scholarly examination of policy issues vs. advocacy bordering on lobbying), partisan or non-partisan (avowedly of one political orientation or concertedly objective), and can target different audiences (McGann noted academic vs. policy maker constituencies) (27-29). McGann noted additional sets of characteristics, but the ones listed above are most relevant in defining my three case study think tanks: The Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).

All three of my case study think tanks are diversified, covering a broad range of policy issues. Their level of partisanship and policy orientation, however, is something that scholars do not completely agree on. Every scholarly appraisal I have consulted considers the Heritage Foundation to be advocacy/policy-oriented, and no one disagrees that Cato is a libertarian (and therefore partisan) think tank, but this is about as far as the consensus goes. McGann (1995) classified AEI as Academic Diversified (more or less following the first generation model), Cato as an Advocacy tank (third generation), and Heritage as a Policy Enterprise, basically an advocacy think tank “with new product lines and innovative marketing techniques” (75).

R. Kent Weaver (1989) also identified the Heritage Foundation as an advocacy think tank, and similarly to McGann (1995), noted its innovative tactics for reaching the policymaking
audience (Weaver 1989, 567). Much like McGann, Weaver considered AEI to follow a more academic than advocacy model, classifying AEI as a conservative “university without students” (Weaver 565). The two scholars diverged, however, when it came to the Cato Institute. Whereas McGann considered Cato to have an advocacy orientation, Weaver cited Cato as the libertarian version of the “university without students,” implying that its focus was on rigorous research and academic principles (Weaver 1989, 565).

James Smith (1991) and David Ricci (1993) did not assign these think tanks to categories, yet they both presented arguments that show Cato and AEI as more involved in marketing and advocacy than Weaver implied. Both of their arguments involve the politicization of think tanks and the conservative movement of the 1970s, to which I now turn.

The Conservative Intellectual Infrastructure

The proliferation of advocacy think tanks noted above grew out of a particular historical and political climate in Washington. David Ricci (1993) described how the intense increase in information available in Washington beginning in the 1970s stoked demand for information that policymakers and their staffers could view as reliable, "legitimate" data and for analysis of policy issues. Think tanks happily filled this demand. Their style of basing policy advice on data appealed to what Ricci called the "New Class" of policymakers, who valued scientific analysis of social issues. This helped raise think tank scholars to the level of "experts," and their analysis as "expertise," within policy communities (Ch 8).

James Smith (1991) and David Ricci (1993) both argued that this demand for scientific analysis of social policy issues beginning in the 1970s accompanied a strong politicization of think tank work. Recognizing the value in having “experts” support their interests through the
“legitimate” avenue of think tank work, ideologues rushed to establish institutions to represent their particular ideologies.

The 1970s was also a time when conservative leaders perceived a need to counter liberal policies that had been put in place over the previous decades, particularly in the “New Deal” and “Great Society” eras. These conservative leaders also recognized that ideas were crucial to policymaking and that think tanks could play an important role in disseminating and popularizing their ideas. James Smith (1991) traced the historical and ideological backgrounds of major think tanks, and showed that many conservative think tanks arose out of a concerted effort to counter the “Liberal Establishment” of major media, universities, most of the nation’s foundations, and research institutions (169). In the 1960s, a new set of conservative activists began to dominate the Republican Party. These new leaders, Smith claimed, “understood the power of mass communication. They also believed passionately in the power of ideas” (168). Thus they began “building an intellectual infrastructure,” which involved heavy funding of ideologically conservative think tanks and the establishment of additional ones (170). The primary beneficiaries of this effort included the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Heritage Foundation, and the Cato Institute (170).

Much like Smith, David Ricci (1993) described the rise of the right and proliferation of right-wing think tanks in the 1970s as a deliberate response to the liberal policies and institutions that dominated in the 1950s and 1960s (Ch 7). The leaders of the “New Right” called upon corporations, wealthy individuals and conservative foundations to invest in conservative think tanks and fund the formation of new ones as part of their strategy to “play the power game even

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10 Whereas Weaver considered both AEI and Cato to be academic-oriented, Smith’s argument implies that each of these think tanks were instrumental in shifting the public policy disposition in the U.S. to favor conservative policies. To me, this interpretation seems an argument to view all three of my case studies, and not just the Heritage Foundation, as at least somewhat advocacy-oriented.
more successfully” than the liberals had done over the previous decades (155). The strategy did succeed. Conservative think tanks flourished in the 1970s and 1980s, and excelled at “ideological jousting,” mobilizing a rightward shift in the U.S. during those years (199-200).¹¹

In addition to shifting both mass and elite preferences in the policy debate, specific policy victories in the past few decades have been attributed to the conservative network to which think tanks are central. Trudy Lieberman (2000) argued that the success of the conservative network’s tactics in dominating the media, shaping public opinion and the policy agenda has led to many conservative policy victories, such as opposing Head Start, derailing Clinton’s health care reform, remaking Medicare, and weakening the FDA. By convincing the media (and thereby the public) that the policy solutions they wanted to see were “the only reasonable and feasible ones to society’s problems,” well-financed conservative think tanks successfully manipulated policy (3).

Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado (1996) described conservative think tanks as a central part of the “propaganda machine” (144) of what they present as a unified and hyper-organized conservative force in No Mercy: How Conservative Think Tanks and Foundations Changed America’s Social Agenda. Through “thematic coherence” of issues (141), manipulation of the media, effective use of money (of which they have more than the liberals), and fostering conservative thinkers and policy experts, the right has, according to Stefancic and Delgado, beaten the left in setting both the economic and social agenda in this country. Their book laid out the tactics used in this victory, focusing on specific campaigns (including immigration reform in California, official English, tort reform, and attacks on affirmative action, welfare and the poor).¹¹

¹¹ Ricci (1993) focused specifically on AEI’s role and that of the Heritage Foundation in mobilizing this rightward shift. Although he argued that Heritage went further than AEI in its advocacy of conservative ideology, Ricci also noted that AEI shifted its tactics during this era, favoring compilations of essays and the publication of periodicals – formats that more closely resemble advocacy-oriented think tanks – over more academic-oriented book-length studies (161).
and highlighting the roles that think tanks have played in securing victory.

There is general consensus among scholars of think tank work that conservative think tanks as a group have been influential in Washington, though scholars have also noted that variations exist within this group. While some themes such as limited government are common to most conservative think tanks, different sub-currents exist within conservatism, sometimes guiding these institutions to emphasize differing priorities. Despite the varying priorities, the conservative network has been surprisingly deft at finding ways to unify its factions against common enemies.

James Smith (1991) identified four different strands among right-wing think tanks: “libertarians and classical liberals, Burkean traditionalists, “new” conservatives and militant anti-communists” (170). The common enemy of these strands, according to Smith, was “intellectual error” – resulting in multiple points in history when thinking turned away from moral imperatives and toward rational approaches to science, political decision-making and structuring society (171). Despite their differences, the conservative counter-establishment attacked “rationalism, ‘moral relativism,’ and the liberal obsession with scientific and technical solutions,” advocating a return to “fundamental ideals and principles” (172).

Similarly, David Ricci (1993) identified three different types of activists within the New Right: business leaders, evangelicals, and neoconservatives. These groups did not have identical priorities. For business leaders, the priority was making government more friendly to American business (156), whereas for evangelicals, it was re-establishing the role of morality in policy (158). The neoconservatives saw three things wrong with America – government bureaucracy, the underclass, and a crisis of authority – all of which were perpetuated by what the neoconservatives saw as a common conservative enemy – a “new class” of liberals (159). By
identifying an enemy common to each strand of conservative, Ricci argued, neoconservatives managed to synthesize the efforts of the various strands of the New Right. This new vision ultimately resulted in the tremendous growth of AEI and then the formation of the Heritage Foundation, two think tanks that leant themselves well to this synthesized effort to fight the New Class of liberals (160-1).

Even with rifts within the movement, the conservative network has often been able to consolidate its ranks against common enemies and effect policy outcomes. At times, however, different segments of the movement have conflicted with each other. The years 2005 through 2008 saw no consolidation among conservatives toward immigration reform, despite prevalent calls from the public, a Republican president in favor of immigration reform, and much debate among policymakers about passing immigration reform. Though consensus has been elusive, a number of conservative think tanks have played an important role within a visible anti-immigration movement.

The Conservative Anti-Immigration Movement

As described above, think tanks fill certain roles within networks of policymakers, media, foundations, and other organizations involved in policy communities. In the May/June 2007 NACLA Report on the Americas, Solana Larsen (2007) wrote on the network of organizations that comprise the anti-immigrant right in the United States. Tracing the connections between the various actors in this network, Larsen argued that the major organizations in this network “all advocate restricting legal immigration and deporting undocumented immigrants” and were all directly or indirectly linked to hate groups (Larsen 2007, 14). Larsen plotted the networks’ components in a field whose leanings ranged all the way from those hate groups to mainstream
conservatism. The mainstream groups were associated with more innocuous opposition to immigration—wall building and national security concerns—while the hate groups were associated with “politically incorrect” reasons for opposing immigration—cultural supremacy and nativism (Larsen 2007, 17).

In contrast with some of the vocally nativist groups, two think tanks that focus on immigration, the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) and the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR – not to be confused with Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, cited in the methodology section) put, in Larsen’s view, a “respectable face on bigotry” (Larsen 2007, 15). Framing their arguments for “a mainstream audience,” these think tanks do what think tanks do—rely on their image of credibility to gain influence in immigration policy circles and the media. They issue policy analyses, articles and op-eds urging restrictionist immigration policies and are called upon to testify in Congress. Taking a brief look at these think tanks’ literature on immigration will help to identify the ways that anti-immigrant or alarmist viewpoints on immigration can be conveyed through sanitized and objective-sounding arguments.

In spite of its small staff of about 25, FAIR nonetheless maintains a presence in the national news media and its spokespersons have testified in Congress on issues from alien gang removal to guest worker programs. They prepare legislative reform agendas for Congress, pocket reference books on “How to Win the Immigration Debate” and bullet-point backgrounders for the public or policymakers (http://www.fairus.org/site/PageNavigator/issues/publications/). In “Immigration 101,” FAIR emphasized data and statistics, citing reputable entities such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the National Academy of Sciences, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform and the Department of Education to summarize the social and population problems of immigration in the U.S. The problems of immigration emphasized by FAIR focus
primarily on costs of infrastructure, health care, schooling, and public assistance, and also cite problems of crime, overcrowded housing, urban sprawl, low skill and education levels, poor English, and negative effects on wage depression and unemployment (Federation for American Immigration Reform 2000, 7-8). FAIR also cited numerous polls indicating public support for reducing immigration (8).

CIS is also a small think tank with 15 staff and 7 fellows. Its funding comes from a mix of foundation support, individuals, funding from the Combined Federal Campaign12, and contract work with government agencies (http://www.cis.org/About). It claims to have the second highest number of media citations of immigration-focused think tanks from 2003-2008, after Pew Hispanic Center. Representatives of CIS reportedly testified before House or Senate committees 50 times between mid-2005 and the end of 2008 (http://www.cis.org/Testimony). Their backgrounder papers and articles focus on fertility rates, out-of-wedlock births, and population impacts of immigrants; effects of immigration on American workers and African Americans; crime and gangs; effects on national identity and civic culture; becoming American and patriotic assimilation; security and terrorism (http://www.cis.org/BackgroundersandReports).

Other actors within this network, such as the Minuteman Project, right-wing media pundits like Lou Dobbs, and politicians like Tom Tancredo and Pat Buchanan, are up front and outspoken about their reasons for opposing immigration. In contrast, the most vocal of the anti-immigrant think tanks couch their language and arguments in objective-sounding terms. As Solana Larsen (2007) argued, FAIR and CIS “pretend in their literature and lobbying that they are making their case based on economic studies, environmental and social effects, when their conclusions are actually based on ideological elements” (15). The more vocal actors within this

12 The Combined Federal Campaign is a program through which federal employees make donations to support “eligible non-profit organizations that provide health and human service benefits throughout the world” (http://www.opm.gov/CFC/).
network and even these specialty think tanks (while couching their language in more objective tones) are rather transparent in their anti-immigration stances, and consequently more easily countered. The ideas put forth by these actors filter into the work of larger, more mainstream think tanks also linked to the anti-immigration movement. In turn, think tanks such as The Heritage Foundation, Hudson Institution and Manhattan Institute all help to disseminate their message to a wider national audience.

Of course, not all conservative think tanks take a restrictionist position on immigration, and not all use the same language or have the same priorities. Sometimes what’s best for business is to maintain high levels of low-skilled laborers, and libertarian ideals call for letting market forces, not government, regulate the movement of labor. Principles of limited government and low tax rates are challenged by calls for stronger regulation of immigration, increased enforcement of immigration laws and tightened border security. The think tanks I will examine as case studies — The Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute and The American Enterprise Institute — illustrate some of these differences within the broad coalition of conservatives.

Conclusion

Each of my case studies focuses on a prominent conservative think tank that has excelled in tactics for gaining influence in policy debates. These organizations are not identical in model or ideology, but each has learned how to effectively cultivate an authoritative voice in policymaking circles and market their ideas to multiple audiences. Each one is diversified, covering a broad range of topics, with immigration being just one among many. Each chapter will begin with a general overview of the think tank, then examine the narratives as outlined at the end of the previous chapter, and conclude with an assessment of the think tank’s depictions of
immigrants and overall portrayal of immigration. By looking at three of the largest, most highly
cited and visible conservative think tanks, we can better understand how think tanks use their
scholarly work to actively promote ideology, strategically employing new and repackaging old
immigration narratives.
Chapter 4: The Heritage Foundation

The Heritage Foundation, founded in 1973 and located in Washington, D.C., is one of the most prominent conservative think tanks in the U.S. It is heavily-funded, operating in 2007 on $48 million, with revenues of $26 million from individual donors, $17 million from foundations, and $2 million from corporations\(^{13}\). Its staff as of 2008 consisted of 47 executive and management staff, 40 fellows, and 168 other staff (policy analysts; research assistants; public, media and government relations staff; fundraisers; etc), all dedicated to the mission of formulating and promoting “conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense” (http://www.heritage.org/about/).

Heritage takes on both domestic and foreign issues, from agriculture to ballistic missile defense and the Iraq war. It has 22 primary domestic issues areas, including immigration, citizenship and border security. Woven into their analyses, they claim, are the ideas and values of the nation’s Founding Fathers (http://www.heritage.org/About/aboutHeritage.cfm). Issues are not simply opined about by Heritage staff; research and ideas are actively marketed to Congress, the Executive Branch and news media. Events, lectures, backgrounder papers, special reports and web memos are among the tools for such outreach.

This very organized system for marketing ideas made the Heritage Foundation an excellent research subject. They are prolific, and, one of their primary areas of work being “immigration, citizenship and border security,” have quite a bit of literature on immigration. Between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008, 86 items were posted (excluding events and

\(^{13}\) From the 2007 Annual Report: http://www.heritage.org/About/upload/AnnualReport07.pdf
Heritage Lectures, which invite guest lecturers to come to the Heritage Foundation to talk). For people who do not have time to scour through every piece on this topic, the Heritage Foundation conveniently developed a “Required Reading” section of six pieces that clearly outline their main concerns and policy stances. Five of these six pieces were written within the selected timeframe, and therefore were included in my study.

Many different Heritage scholars have authored pieces on immigration. A small number have contributed significantly to the body of works included in my study, and a brief introduction to these key scholars is appropriate (all based on their “Expert” profiles found at http://www.heritage.org/experts/). James Jay Carafano, PhD came from a military background and specializes in homeland security, counterterrorism and defense. Carafano is the director of Heritage's Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies and is a prolific author at the Heritage Foundation, yet most of his work does not focus on immigration. Robert Rector is a Senior Research Fellow in Domestic Policy and specializes in welfare, poverty and marriage, though a fair amount of his work does focus on immigration. Matthew Spalding, PhD directs Heritage's B. Kenneth Simon Center for American Studies and specializes in constitutional history, the Founding Fathers and citizenship. A majority of Spalding's work also focused on immigration during the selected timeframe. Kris Kobach was a visiting scholar at the Heritage Foundation during the selected timeframe and wrote a number of the pieces included in my study. He is a law professor and was the Attorney General's chief adviser on immigration law from 2001-2003 (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Immigration/wm1513.cfm).

Of the 86 pieces posted during the selected timeframe, national security was a thematic concern in nearly three quarters, economic effects were a concern in nearly half, and national identity (either cultural or political) was a concern in roughly a quarter (see Table 4.1). These
numbers suggest that national security is the Heritage Foundation's main concern in regard to immigration, though the three themes were equally represented within the “required readings,” each being a main concern in 4 pieces.

Table 4.1. Thematic concern of Heritage Foundation pieces on immigration between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic Concern</th>
<th>Thematic Concern (Number of Pieces)*</th>
<th>Thematic Concern (Percentage of 86 Pieces)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>73.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identity</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24.42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Any given piece could have multiple areas of concern, thus numbers add to greater than 86 and percentages add up to greater than 100%.

Heritage Foundation pieces' tones lay overwhelmingly on the alarmist end of the scale, with more than three quarters of the pieces being either “alarmist” or “somewhat alarmist” and the “alarmist” category had the largest number of pieces (see Table 4.2). Of the five “required readings,” four were alarmist and the fifth was somewhat alarmist.

Table 4.2. Tone of Heritage Foundation pieces between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Tone (Number of Pieces)</th>
<th>Tone (Percentage of 86 Pieces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I now turn to a detailed examination of the common narratives within the three main thematic concerns – national security, economics, and national identity.
National Security

“A disorganized and chaotic immigration system encourages the circumvention of immigration laws and is a clear invitation to those who wish to take advantage of our openness to harm this nation”
(Meese and Spalding 3/1/06)\textsuperscript{14}

With three quarters of their pieces focusing, at least in part, on national security, it is clear that the Heritage Foundation considers security a priority, and immigration as a potential threat to it. In fact, in the May 10, 2007 backgrounder on “essential requirements” for immigration reform, Edwin Meese III and Matthew Spalding wrote, “The First Priority: National Security” (5/10/07). Heritage Foundation scholars associate immigration with uncontrollable forces, porous borders, terrorism, loss of sovereignty, law breaking, absconding and fraud. Though some concern was raised over legal immigration, most of this concern stemmed from illegal entry and illegal visa overstays. Whereas some narratives used by the Heritage Foundation on the themes of economics and national identity were positive, their pieces on national security did not contain one instance of a positive narrative.

When reading the Heritage Foundation’s pieces on immigration, one is repeatedly reminded of the potential threat from \textit{uncontrollable forces} of sheer numbers of immigrants entering the country. \textbf{Water imagery}, such as the “tide of unauthorized workers” (Johnson 3/31/06), the “overflow of undocumented migrants pouring over our borders,” (Johnson 12/19/05), and the “flood of illegal entrants” (Carafano 11/28/05, Kochems 3/10/06), consistently implied a nation succumbing to the uncontrollable and damaging forces of illegal immigration. Heritage Foundation scholars repeatedly referred to the need to “stem the tide” (Johnson 12/19/05) or “slow the flow” (Mulhausen 7/17/06). These calls go hand-in-hand with the concept of a dangerously porous border, through which these tides of migrants flow.

\textsuperscript{14} All Heritage Foundation pieces cited within this chapter are listed in Appendix A.
Securing our porous borders was a common theme in Heritage Foundation pieces. Portrayed as “crucial to American national security” (Meese and Spalding 3/1/06) and conflated with terrorism – the “border will always need to be secured against terrorists and transnational criminals” (Carafano 11/28/05) – border security was a centerpiece of many pieces, and testimony before Congressional committees. Kris Kobach testified before the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation on the importance of border security, stating that “terrorist enemies” would start relying on “sneaking across the border,” and pointing to the “importance of physical barriers on our border in the war on terrorism” (Kobach 7/7/06).

War imagery was not explicitly used very frequently, yet immigration was implicated as a national security threat in ways similar to the threat of war. Immigrants crossing the border were likened to the threat of an invading force. In one piece, for example, the Customs and Border Patrol was referred to as a “front-line, down-in-the-trenches agency that is fighting on perhaps the most important front in this new type of war” (Carafano et. al. 9/6/06). Both the process of illegal immigration and illegal immigrants themselves were portrayed as national security threats in multiple pieces, including testimony before Congress. In September 2005, James Carafano testified before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, advocating for enforcement of immigration laws to “combat transnational threats” (Carafano 9/13/05). Kobach referred to “alien terrorists” in his above-noted testimony (Kobach 7/7/06), and again in bold letters reminded readers of the “alien terrorist threat” in a web memo a year later (Kobach 6/19/07).

Heritage Foundation scholars focused a great deal on eliminating or, at the very least, reducing the illegal immigrant population. Meese and Spalding wrote, “from a national security
perspective, preventing illegal entry and reducing unlawful presence in the United States is an imperative” (5/10/07, 2). Whereas most other pieces either implicitly or explicitly equated illegal immigrants with national security threats, one piece did state that most illegal immigrants themselves were not a direct security threat (Kane and Johnson 3/1/06). Yet they claimed that the fact of unlawful presence was a “profound security problem” (Kane and Johnson 3/1/06). And while most scholars admitted that it would be impractical to round up and deport all illegally present individuals, the need to reduce the size of this population to achieve national security imperatives remained a primary concern and objective of comprehensive immigration reform for Heritage Foundation scholars.

Echoing very old concerns about the types of immigrants being admitted, “security, criminal, and health screening measures” were sometimes listed as necessary for any applicants for legal entry (for example, Carafano 7/24/06; Carafano et. al. 9/7/06, 3; Meese and Spalding 5/10/07, 3). In a piece lauding one specific proposed temporary visa program, Kirk Johnson noted that visas would only be issued “after the applicant passes a medical exam” (Johnson 5/19/06). Heritage scholars never really stated why health screening measures would be important, nor focused on this aspect, and in fact, in many pieces the requirements for screening included only criminal and security background checks. Though Heritage scholars did not emphasize this point of health implications for the nation, their mention of health screening measures added yet another dimension to the types of threats imposed on the U.S. by immigration, and associated immigration with illness and loss of vitality in the nation.

Illegal immigrants were repeatedly portrayed as criminals, terrorists, law breakers and absconders, associated with sneaking across the border and committing fraud. For example, arguing against the Senate’s Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform
Act of 2007, Kobach and Spalding warned that certain provisions would be an “open invitation” to “sneak in” and provide “fraudulent” documents to gain the system (Kobach and Spalding 5/23/07). Along with referring to illegal immigrants as law breakers and absconders, linking them to potential criminal and national security threats added to the sense that they had broken laws before and would therefore sneakily conspire to exploit our generosity and erode our sovereign system through fraudulent documents and lies. When adding “stealth amnesty” or “stealth open borders” to the rhetoric (as Heritage Foundation scholars did in multiple pieces’ titles and subsections), they implied that politicians were scheming right along with illegal immigrants.

Although legalization would serve the goal of reducing the illegal population, a key, frequently repeated Heritage Foundation narrative was “no amnesty.” Heritage Foundation scholars were convinced that allowing undocumented workers to legalize would encourage further illegal immigration, pointing to the failure of IRCA (the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986) to support this. Kobach and Spalding warned against a “massive amnesty” that would “dwarf the amnesty that the United States granted – with disastrous consequences – in 1986” (Kobach and Spalding 5/23/07, 1). They went on to outline the ways that particular legislation would be “amnesty for ‘absconders,’” “amnesty for gang members,” and “reverse justice” (2-3). Scholars also argued that “amnesty” for illegal immigrants would be fundamentally unfair to those potential immigrants who had applied and waited for legal opportunities to come to this country.

Rather than amnesty, Heritage Foundation scholars called for ramped up enforcement as an antidote to illegal presence, which they saw as undermining of the rule of law. Illegal entry and presence, they implied, was an affront to our system, and the failure to enforce immigration
laws further eroded that system. “Disregarding the intentional violation of the law in one context because it serves policy objectives in another undermines the rule of law” (Meese and Spalding 5/10/07, 4). To reinstate the “rule of law,” Heritage Foundation scholars repeatedly called for increased enforcement of immigration laws, registration and screening of immigrants, surveillance of any immigrants on temporary visas, and detention and removal of any unlawfully present individuals. Carafano argued that the capacity to “detain and remove individuals as fast as legally possible” before they abscond was “an essential component of deterring further illegal immigration” (Carafano 7/21/06, 1), while Meese and Spalding called for “special intensity on finding and deporting illegal immigrants who have committed crimes” (Meese and Spalding 5/10/07, 4). If border security and internal enforcement were not coordinated, Carafano argued, there would be “potential gaps for human smugglers and absconders to exploit” (Carafano 7/21/06).

The Heritage Foundation’s pieces that focused on security were fairly unwaveringly on the alarmist end of the scale in their portrayal of illegal immigrants, with 51 of the 63 pieces being either alarmist or somewhat alarmist (Table 4.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Tone (Number of National Security Pieces)</th>
<th>Tone (Percentage of 63 National Security Pieces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>47.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At best, and very uncommonly, scholars portrayed the illegal immigrants associated with security threats as “at-risk” victims in need of assistance in returning home. Carafano called for people to “donate money out of humanitarian concern” that would be dedicated to this purpose.
The number of alarmist or somewhat alarmist pieces buried these few sympathetic portrayals, leading to an overwhelming sense that immigration threatened our national security.

**Economics**

“Low-skill immigrants tend to be poor and to have children who, in turn, add to America’s poverty problem, driving up governmental welfare, social service, and education costs.” (Rector, 10/25/06, 1)

The Heritage Foundation pieces that focused on economic concerns tended to reiterate the same mantra over and over: yes, our economy needs immigrants, but the fiscal costs must not outweigh the benefits. With high-skill immigrants, they repeatedly argued, this is the case; with low-skill immigrants, it is not. Not surprisingly, the two pieces I determined to be affirmative of immigrants both focused on the overwhelming benefit to the economy of high-skill immigrants. While most Heritage Foundation pieces called for immigration policies to be “as market-based as possible” (a nod to the fact that our market demands low-skill immigrants), an overwhelming focus on the vast number of immigrants arriving, immigrants’ demographics, and propensity to take advantage of means-tested benefits demonstrated that the pieces concerned with economics were more alarmist than affirmative.

Robert Rector, (as noted previously, a senior Heritage fellow in domestic policy studies who focuses on welfare and poverty), wrote the majority of pieces that focus primarily on economic effects of immigration. He authored one “required reading” piece titled “Amnesty and Continued Low-Skill Immigration Will Substantially Raise Welfare Costs and Poverty” (5/16/06) which outlines many of the arguments and characterizations related to economics found within the Heritage Foundation’s pieces. The piece argued that immigrants, with an emphasis on
Hispanic immigrants, are generally poorly educated (especially illegal aliens), low-skilled, working for low wages, welfare users, raising their large number of children (many born out of wedlock) in poverty and crime, and costing more in services than they pay in taxes (Rector 5/26/06). Citing “fiscal, social, and political implications,” Rector argued against amnesty, and for eliminating most categories of family visa allotments.

As with security concerns, economic concerns focused a great deal on the overwhelming forces of high numbers of immigrants arriving, often employing water imagery to vividly depict the threat. Rector’s pieces, while pointing out that illegal immigrants typically had lower education and skill levels, focused primarily on how legislation that included amnesty programs would raise the number of low-skilled immigrants. Focusing on the proposed Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA) in 2006, Rector argued that over 20 years, CIRA would result in 103 million legal permanent residents, compared to the 19 million anticipated over 20 years under then-current law (Rector 5/15/06, 1). Rector calculated this estimate based on the number expected to receive amnesty, additional permanent work visas, his estimated number of new “guest workers” who would eventually apply for legal permanent residence (a feature of CIRA), and the numbers of permanent visas that would be given to the spouses, siblings, parents, adult children and their families (numbers whose previous caps would be removed under CIRA) of the newly legalized and new guest workers (4-6). Drawing on water imagery, Rector argued that there would be a “flood of legal immigrants” under CIRA (4). Comparing the potential levels of immigration (should CIRA be enacted) to the “great migration” of the late 1800s and early 1900s, Rector estimated that the earlier migration would be dwarfed by that allowed under CIRA, warning that the number of “foreign born persons would rise to over one quarter of the U.S. population” which, he argued, would change the “character of the nation” (8).
Rector, as well as other Heritage scholars, often argued about whether the costs immigrants imposed on taxpayers outweighed their benefits to the economy. All of the new legal immigrants brought in as a result of CIRA, Rector noted, would eventually be eligible for public benefits, and under the family preference system would bring in even greater numbers of low-skilled immigrants (Rector 5/15/06). For Rector (and this was said in both a special report, and before the House Subcommittee on Immigration), a “massive inflow of both legal and illegal low-skill immigrants” would translate into “massive costs on the U.S. taxpayer” (Rector 5/21/07, Rector and Kim 5/22/07). This, he argued, amounted to “transnational welfare outreach” (Rector and Kim 5/22/07). Other Heritage scholars echoed these concerns over immigrant use of public benefits and costs to taxpayers. Carafano proposed that states “close loopholes that allow unlawfully present persons to benefit from public welfare programs” (Carafano 6/26/07). Kobach argued that the DREAM Act (Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors), which would extend benefits such as in-state tuition rates to immigrants who arrived illegally before age 16, would be a “gift to illegal aliens” (Kobach 9/13/07, 3).

Called into question by this line of reasoning were the value and effects of low-skilled immigrants. In addition to all the public services they use, this “flood of low-skill, low-educated migrants” pay little in taxes (Beach 6/26/07). Rector produced a detailed report that measured the fiscal cost of low-skill immigrants, based on estimated amounts of taxes paid and benefits used, calculating that the average annual deficit of low-skill immigrant households was $19,588 (Rector and Kim 5/22/07, 1). Rector called the process of increasing the number of low-skill, low-educated immigrants who pay little in taxes “importing poverty.” This phrase was picked up and repeated by Meese and Spalding in their “Essential Requirements for Immigration Reform” backgrounder, which warned (bullet-pointed in bold), “Don’t import poverty” (Meese and
Despite the two affirmative pieces about high-skill immigrants’ benefits to the economy and one piece that argued that both low-skill and high-skill benefit the economy (the real threat from immigration, they said, was security) (Kane and Johnson 3/1/06), the pieces concerned with economics were overall more alarmist (nearly 75% of pieces were either alarmist or somewhat alarmist) than affirmative or neutral (Table 4.4). The use of water imagery to imply uncontrollable forces, the focus on overwhelming numbers, the characterization of immigrants as prone to poverty, and the emphasis on low-skilled immigrants’ use of public goods and fiscal costs, all conveyed a message of threat from increased immigration.

Table 4.4. Tone of Heritage Foundation Pieces Concerned with Economics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Number of Economics Pieces</th>
<th>Percentage of 41 Economics Pieces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Identity

“Continued large-scale immigration without effective assimilation threatens social cohesion and America’s civic culture and common identity”
(Meese and Spalding, 5/10/07)

Immigration’s effects on sovereignty, the value of citizenship, and concern over immigrants' assimilation, potential dual allegiance, their character and qualities, and excluding undesirable immigrants from our national community dominated the Heritage Foundation's pieces concerned with national identity. Though at times Heritage Foundation scholars drew upon idealistic immigration narratives, the more alarmist concerns dominated. These concerns relate to our nation’s political system and our nation’s social or cultural character, both of which
are essential components of how we view ourselves as a national community.

One of the Heritage Foundation’s recurring narratives was that of sovereignty. In three of the five required reading pieces, scholars implied that sovereignty was threatened when people chose to migrate to the United States illegally, without the invitation of the American people (Meese and Spalding 3/1/06; 5/10/07, 6). In fact, the first-listed “Principle of Immigration” in their March 1, 2006 Backgrounder was “Consent of the Governed,” which asserted that no person has the “right to American residency or citizenship without the consent of the American people” (Meese and Spalding 3/1/06).

Implications of this assertion are two-fold. First, it implies that our political system, so intimately linked to our national identity, is threatened by immigrants who come to the United States without our consent. Even Robert Rector expressed concern about the implications of immigration on American sovereignty, stating, “Under the current system, decisions about who will live in the U.S. and who will become a citizen tend to be made unilaterally by foreigners” (Rector, 5/16/06, 13). Illegal immigration, this assertion implies, erodes our control over our own system, allowing outsiders to take control of our decisions. Secondly, it implies that we as a people have the right to determine what type of person will become a part of our national community, and who will be denied that opportunity. Taken in conjunction with the Heritage Foundation’s numerous negative depictions of the low-skilled population of illegal (and particularly Mexican) immigrants, it is easy to interpret this assertion as a way of stating that we don’t want these types of people to be a part of our national community.

The Heritage Foundation repeatedly called for strengthening citizenship as an integral part of comprehensive immigration reform, implying that the value of citizenship was threatened by immigration. Meese and Spalding stated that strengthening citizenship “requires
clarifying the distinction between citizens and non-citizens and creating a deliberate and self-confident policy that assimilates immigrants and new American citizens” (5/10/07, Executive Summary). This implies that we need to clarify any blurred lines there may be between who is a part of our national community and who is not, between who is entitled to the benefits of citizenship and who is not. The population of illegal immigrants was impugned here as a threat to this distinction, and thereby a threat to the value of our citizenship.

**Assimilation** of those who we choose to invite as permanent members of our national community, according to Heritage Foundation scholars, is imperative. After all, this “nation of immigrants” is more accurately “a nation where immigrants are Americanized” (Meese and Spalding 3/1/06, 2). Meese and Spalding argued that we should “recognize English as the national language,” and teach new immigrants our common language, the country’s political principles, and the responsibilities of self-government (5/10/07, 6). Matthew Spalding outlined these concerns in his piece, “Making Citizens: the Case for Patriotic Assimilation” (5/16/06). Spalding explored the visions, principles, and concerns of the Founding Fathers of the nation, and applied these to the contemporary immigration situation. Echoing themes from Peter Brimelow (1995) and Samuel Huntington (2004), Spalding argued, “It should be a concern when large numbers of immigrants from the same country, speaking the same foreign language, and with many of the same habits live in enclaves isolated from American society” (Spalding 3/16/06, 13). This argument informed multiple pieces’ calls for reform; “patriotic assimilation” was often cited as a necessary component of reform (for example, Carafano 5/16/06; Kane 2/27/07; Meese and Spalding 5/10/07, 6). Spalding and Carafano argued, “patriotic assimilation is the key to the long-term success of any immigration policy” (1/24/07).

A closely related concern, often repeated, was that of immigrants’ potential dual
allegiance. Again echoing arguments by Samuel Huntington, Spalding cited “the growing problem of ‘dual allegiance’” (3/16/06, 12). He further argued that “the concept of allegiance should be promoted as a central part of the public rhetoric of citizenship” (14). Later he carried this argument into one of the “required readings,” arguing that “exclusive allegiance” should be a condition of citizenship (Meese and Spalding 5/10/07, 6). This discussion reiterated the imperative to actively assimilate permanent residents into Americans, and implied a threat in having people in our midst who are not fully committed to our national community.

As noted above, Heritage Foundation scholars implied that some types of immigrants, depending on their character and qualities, should not be invited to join our national community as citizens or permanent residents. Rector, for example, argued that low-skilled, poorly educated, primarily Mexican immigrants are “prone to poverty and welfare dependence” (5/16/06, 11) and “may assimilate the higher crime rates that characterize the low-income Hispanic population” of the U.S. (7). Rector went on to argue, “if such laborers are granted citizenship and permanent residence, their employment is likely to generate negative externalities that impose costs on the rest of society” (Rector 5/16/06, 13). In another piece, Rector warned that this eventuality “would transform the United States socially, economically, and politically,” altering “the character of the nation” (Rector 5/15/06, 8). Yet Heritage Foundation scholars also admitted without hesitation that America’s economy needs low-skilled labor.

For the low-skilled, poorly-educated laborers that our economy needs, the Heritage Foundation developed a way of excluding undesirable immigrants from permanency while still benefiting from their labor – they advocated a temporary worker program that was “truly

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15 Huntington (2004) developed a conception of immigrants today as deceptive cheaters, “falsely swearing” allegiance when becoming citizens (209) and practicing “bigamy” by holding dual citizenships, a practice detrimental to the “vitality of democracy” (212).
temporary.” As Meese and Spalding outlined in their Backgrounder, “Permanent Principles and Temporary Workers”, a truly temporary program meant one that would not be “indefinitely renewable,” and would ensure that workers returned to their home countries at the end of the program, thereby not creating “de facto permanent residents” (3/1/06, 3). In addition to the fiscal benefits of keeping low-skilled workers outside of the national community (they would not be eligible for most public benefits), a truly temporary program would certainly clear up any blurred lines “between citizen and non-citizen (and between immigrant and non-immigrant),” thereby strengthening the process of naturalization and citizenship (Meese and Spalding, 3/01/06, 3). By maintaining a truly temporary workforce, we could clearly identify this group as outside the national community, and therefore not entitled to many of the benefits of membership.

Heritage Foundation scholars did, at times, echo the old idealistic immigration narratives that we are “a nation of immigrants,” welcoming those who seek “the American Dream” (see Spalding 3/16/06), and that immigrants have contributed to “strengthening our social capital, deepening or national patriotism, and expanding our general economy,” (Meese and Spalding 5/10/07, 1). Despite this, with the theme of national identity, like the other themes, their pieces conveyed much more caution than optimism, with over 90% of the 21 pieces concerned national identity having either an alarmist or somewhat alarmist tone (Table 4.5). Immigration was portrayed as posing a threat to sovereignty, to value of citizenship, to the cohesion of our national community, and to the stability of the character of our nation.

Table 4.5. Tone of Heritage Foundation Pieces Concerned with National Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Tone (Number of National Identity Pieces)</th>
<th>Tone (Percentage of 21 National Identity Pieces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

71
Conclusion

Taken as a whole, the Heritage Foundation’s pieces on immigration had an overwhelmingly cautionary tone (being primarily alarmist and somewhat alarmist), focusing on problems and threats created by the contemporary immigration system and situation in the country. Though their pieces did occasionally echo the old positive immigration narratives that immigrants are good for America, immigrants expand the U.S. economy, and that we are a “nation of immigrants,” their depictions of immigrants and immigration were much more frequently negative. Immigrants were repeatedly referred to as law breakers, criminals, absconders, national security threats, low-skilled, poorly educated high school dropouts, unwed mothers with high fertility rates, persistently welfare-dependent, and associated with deception and fraud. While these depictions were usually of illegal immigrants, low-skilled and/or Hispanic legal immigrants were also subjected to negative portrayals.

Based on the portrayals described in the previous pages, I would characterize the Heritage Foundation as conveying a fairly alarmist attitude toward immigration and immigrants. As noted above, more than 75% of the 86 pieces were either alarmist or somewhat alarmist (Table 4.2). Taken together, the Heritage Foundation's message about immigration appeared to be that, although immigrants can and have benefited this “nation of immigrants,” immigration poses multiple and potentially serious threats to the nation's security, economy and identity; it must be controlled and monitored, and immigration law must be carefully crafted and relentlessly enforced. Subsequently, Heritage Foundation scholars advocated mainly restrictionist and punitive policies including: border security and ramped up enforcement before any increase in temporary visas, better systems for screening and monitoring immigrants, restructuring the visa system to favor high-skill immigrants and drastically reduce low-skill and family reunification
visas, cracking down on illegal immigrant use of public benefits, detention and removal rather than amnesty, “clarifying” birthright citizenship to prevent “anchor babies,” making English the national language, and actively assimilating new immigrants.

The alarmist tone and harsh policy stances of the Heritage Foundation put them in rather stark contrast with the Cato Institute, to which I now turn.
Chapter 5: The Cato Institute

The Cato Institute, also located in Washington, D.C., was founded in 1977, and is dedicated to “limited government, free markets, individual liberty, and peace” (www.cato.org/about.php). While it professes on its website to dislike the label of “conservative” (the institution seems more comfortable with the “libertarian” label), it arose from the conservative effort to invest in policy research\(^{16}\) and shares the core conservative principles of limited government and free markets embraced by other prominent conservative think tanks. Driven by different priorities, however, the Cato Institute argues for less restrictive immigration policies than the Heritage Foundation.

Ninety-five full time employees, seventy adjunct scholars and twenty fellows, plus interns, operate on the $24 million of revenue (2007 figures) generated by individual contributions (77%), foundational support (13%), corporate donations (2%), and program and other income (8%) (http://www.cato.org/about/reports/annual_report_2007.pdf). Cato has 13 primary research areas: education and child policy; energy and environment; finance, banking & monetary policy; foreign policy and national security; government and politics; health, welfare, & entitlements; immigration and labor markets; international economics and development; law and civil liberties; political philosophy; regulatory studies; tax and budget policy; and telecom, internet & information policy. In keeping with its mission to “increase the understanding of public policies” based on its principles, Cato hosts forums and conferences in addition to publishing books, studies, briefing papers and the Cato Journal (www.cato.org/about.php). Though not as frequently cited in major media as The Heritage Foundation, Cato nonetheless has

\(^{16}\) James Smith, while noting its libertarian thrust, lumped the Cato Institute with the other think tanks that emerged as part of a conservative effort to counter the liberal establishment (Smith 1991, 170).
ranked in the top 10 think tanks cited for the past four years (see Table 1.1).

Cato has the strongest free market stance of the think tanks I am examining, focusing their concerns with immigration almost exclusively on reforming immigration policy to address the labor needs of the U.S. economy. They dedicate a section of their website to immigration and labor markets, with 26 immigration-related items posted between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008. However, a good deal of their work (28 items, though 17 overlap with the 26 posted in their section on immigration and labor markets) on the immigration issue is found within Cato’s Center for Trade Policy Studies (found at www.freetrade.org).\(^\text{17}\) Daniel Griswold is the author of 23 of Cato’s 38 pieces written between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008. Griswold is the Director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies, and focuses on globalization, trade and immigration (http://www.cato.org/people/daniel-griswold). Other main authors of Cato’s pieces on immigration were Jim Harper and Alan Reynolds. Harper is the director of Information Policy Studies, focusing on “adapting law and policy to the unique problems of the information age” (http://www.cato.org/people/jim-harper). Alan Reynolds is a Senior Fellow and nationally syndicated columnist focusing on economic research (http://www.cato.org/people/alan-reynolds).

It should be noted that although the Cato Institute produced fewer than half as many pieces on immigration as the Heritage Foundation during the selected 3.5 year timeframe, the Cato Institute does have an operating budget half that of the Heritage Foundation, and its staff is less than half that of the Heritage Foundation as well. It may be fair to say that immigration was not necessarily less of a priority for the Cato Institute than the Heritage Foundation, despite its

\(^{17}\) One piece included in my sample was not included on either the Cato.org or the freetrade.org site. I sought out Alan Reynolds’ (Cato scholar) 5/18/06 criticism of Robert Rector’s (Heritage Foundation scholar) calculations for predicted numbers of new immigrants from the Hagel-Martinez bill in 2006 because Rector dedicated one of his pieces as a response to Reynolds’ criticism. This piece was published at townhall.com and I felt it important to include in my sample of Cato pieces, despite it not being included on Cato’s website.
less robust set of literature. What the Cato Institute lacked in bulk, its scholars made up in consistency of message and enthusiastic writing. Table 5.1 shows that over 75% of the Cato Institute’s pieces were more affirmative of immigrants and immigration than they were alarmist.

Table 5.1. Tone of Cato Institute Pieces between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Tone (Number of Pieces)</th>
<th>Tone (Percentage of 38 Pieces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>35.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40.54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An example of their affirmative views can be found in the opening statement from the Center for Trade Policy Studies section on immigration:

> The overriding impact of immigrants is to strengthen and enrich American culture, increase the total output of the economy, and raise the standard of living of American citizens. Immigrants are advantageous to the United States for several reasons…[18]

As for the consistency of their message, nearly ninety percent of Cato’s pieces had economics as a thematic concern (Table 5.2). While security was a concern in 60% of Cato’s pieces, and national identity in 16%, it is clear that immigration’s impact on economics is their top priority.

Table 5.2. Concern of Cato Institute Pieces between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic Concern</th>
<th>Thematic Concern (Number of Pieces)*</th>
<th>Thematic Concern (Percentage of 38 Pieces)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>89.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>60.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identity</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.79%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Any given piece could have multiple areas of concern, thus numbers add to greater than 38 and percentages add up to greater than 100%.

Even Cato’s arguments concerning security and national identity seemed to be driven primarily by a desire to conform immigration law to the needs of our economy. Cato pieces

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seemed to me to be driven by the following narrative: the economy needs low-skilled workers; currently undocumented immigrants, the majority from Mexico, meet this need; undocumented immigrants from Mexico have a PR problem in the U.S. (as seen in Heritage Foundation pieces), and thus need an image makeover if the American public is to accept the needed reform of legally allowing much higher numbers of foreign low-skilled workers into the U.S. Cato scholars thus spent a great deal of effort presenting data and narratives that demonstrate immigration's positive effects on the U.S., and actively countering the negative depictions common in public discourse, such as many of those perpetuated in Heritage Foundation pieces. I now turn to a detailed look at Cato Institute pieces’ concerns, employing the same tripartite structure of national security, economics, and national identity.

National Security

“Comprehensive immigration reform…would free the Homeland Security Department to focus its resources on identifying and apprehending terrorists and criminals rather than waste billions of tax dollars chasing after peaceful, hardworking people seeking better jobs”  (Griswold, 5/16/07)  

Cato pieces on the whole did not portray immigrants as threats to our national security. Rather than equating incoming immigrants with an “uncontrollable flood,” Cato scholars associated migrants with a natural, circular flow. The uncontrollable forces to Cato scholars were not immigrants themselves, but the powerful laws of supply and demand in the labor market. Our expensive systems for damming the natural flow of labor to meet the labor market’s needs were seen as the real threat, causing “pervasive consequences” for “peaceful, hardworking” undocumented workers and citizens alike.

Like the Heritage Foundation, Cato also used water imagery and narratives of

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19 All pieces written by Cato scholars and cited within this chapter are listed in Appendix B.
uncontrollable forces in relation to immigration’s implications for national security. Cato’s use of water imagery was much more benign than that of Heritage Foundation scholars. Rather than depicting immigrants themselves as the threatening waves flooding our country, Cato described “consequences” and “humanity” (e.g. Griswold 10/30/06) flowing. Referring to “consequences” deflects the threat from immigrants to underlying circumstances that cause migration; using the term “humanity” replaces the more threatening imagery of hostile and uncontrollable waves with a positive term that emphasizes commonality between all people. Cato also emphasized the naturalness and traditional nature of a “circular flow” of workers between the United States and Mexico (Griswold 3/7/07). As opposed to Heritage Foundation’s unnaturally rising tide of Mexican immigrants flowing over our natural borders, Cato’s imagery suggests that the flow is natural while the border and immigration laws are the unnatural barriers to this beneficial rhythm (ebb as well as flow) of migration.

To Cato Institute scholars, the uncontrollable forces in the immigration equation were not immigrants choosing to come here against our will and to our detriment, but rather larger forces to which immigrants were simply responding. As Daniel Griswold wrote repeatedly, “powerful trends in America’s workforce” drove immigration, not immigrants’ choices alone (10/5/05). The labor market, not illegal immigration, was the force too big to control, and we shouldn’t put taxpayer resources into the futile attempt at controlling it. This argument will be examined further below, but in relation to national security, Cato presented illegal immigration not as a threat to our security, but rather as a sign that our immigration laws were simply out of step with reality.

In keeping with Cato’s presentation of the movement of labor as natural and efforts to limit this movement as futile at best and simply wrong at worst, Cato did not talk about the
border as porous, broken or otherwise defective. Cato scholars wrote of the border as interrupting the traditionally circular flow of workers (Griswold 3/7/07; 5/16/07) and disrupting trade. Jim Harper called a particular border enforcement effort an “attack on American transportation, travel and trade” (1/30/08). Initiatives to enhance border security were written about as wasteful of taxpayer resources, and also as having perverse humanitarian consequences. In October 2006, Daniel Griswold criticized legislation that would add 700 miles of fencing to the border, calling this a “wall to nowhere” that would exacerbate the problems of smuggling and deaths at the border, among others (Griswold 10/30/06). Arnold Kling depicted the increasing porousness of borders in general as a more or less natural phenomenon in the age of the internet and outsourcing (Kling 4/3/06).

There was a distinct lack of war imagery in Cato Institute pieces on immigration. Cato Institute fellows called for a distinction between terrorists (the “real threats”) and “peaceful, hard-working” illegal immigrants. By repeatedly referring to illegal immigrants as “peaceful,” Cato scholars combated the image of immigrants as an invading and threatening force. The closest they came to equating our nation’s immigration situation with war was to say that terrorists could find cover and easier access to fraudulent documents when the illegal population is large (and went on to use this in arguing that the undocumented should be legalized) (Griswold 10/5/05). Much like their argument against ramping up border security, Cato fellows argued that the war on terrorism suffers when resources are devoted to cracking down on peaceful economic immigrants.

Rather than depicting illegal immigrants as law-breakers and criminals, Cato scholars portrayed illegal immigrants as innocent victims of a system out of step with economic reality. Jim Harper wrote in his report on the E-Verify program that “otherwise honest, hardworking and
law-abiding people come to the United States without documentation,” depicting the act of illegal crossing as more a matter of ignoring administrative protocol than criminal offense and blatant disregard for American law. Not only was the image of the “peaceful, hard-working” immigrant prominently featured in their pieces, multiple scholars jabbed at the idea of illegal immigrants as criminal threats. Making this idea appear farcical, Daniel Griswold wrote of enforcement efforts that “busted janitors and raided chicken processing plants” (Griswold 8/28/07) and “would declare millions of janitors, dry-wallers, gardeners, and retail clerks to be ‘aggravated felons’” (Griswold 4/27/06).

Another common theme in Cato pieces was the “perverse and deadly consequences” of enforcement (Griswold 10/25/05). Border enforcement efforts, Griswold claimed, forced the flow of migrants into more remote and dangerous crossing places. The outcomes, he argued, were that more people died trying to get here, and those that arrived were more likely to stay, due to the dangers and costs involved (Griswold 4/27/06). “How many more will die before we fix a broken system?” asked Griswold (10/25/05). Griswold advocated for legalization not only to bring the currently undocumented under the rule of law (a prominent concern in Heritage Foundation pieces), but also to bring them under the protection of the law (see Griswold 5/16/07; 8/28/07), further implying that undocumented immigrants were victims.

Cato scholars presented the use of the term “amnesty” as a smear by immigration opponents, commonly using it in quotation marks (for example, Griswold 8/11/06, 3/7/07). In arguing against immigration opponents, Alan Reynolds claimed that they “use the word ‘amnesty’ to mean any proposal that fails to imprison or deport all the 12 million men, women and children thought to live in the United States without having lined up in the proper multiyear queues” (Reynolds 5/27/07). Reynolds was not only taking a jab at those who used the term
“amnesty” to smear reform initiatives, but also implied, as Harper above, that immigration violations are not criminal, more a matter of failing to dot “i”s and cross “t”s.

Ultimately, Cato scholars saw little threat to our national security from most illegal immigrants themselves. Of the 23 Cato pieces concerned with security, 18 were more affirmative than alarmist, 4 were neutral, and only one was somewhat alarmist (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3. Tone of Cato Pieces Concerned with National Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Tone (Number of National Security Pieces)</th>
<th>Tone (Percentage of 23 National Security Pieces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>47.83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though Cato scholars did not see a security threat from immigrants themselves, they did suggest at multiple points that the nation would be more secure and prosperous if immigration law matched the realities of demand for foreign low-skilled workers. A system that doesn’t provide adequate legal channels for these workers creates “more permanent and less circular migration, smuggling, document fraud, deaths at the border, artificially depressed wages and threats to civil liberties” (Griswold 5/15/06). From reading the Cato Institute pieces, one is taught that these “perverse consequences” would be virtually eliminated were our system reformed to allow enough legal workers to meet our economy’s demands, and that until such reform is instituted, our efforts to thwart these consequences are doomed to fail.

Economics

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20 The somewhat alarmist was a piece by Jim Harper on the E-Verify system, which claimed that expanded use of E-Verify would drive more illegal immigrants to “collude” with employers and “deepen the minor identity frauds they commit” (Harper 3/30/08).
“Demand for low-skilled labor continues to grow in the U.S. while the domestic supply of suitable workers inexorably declines – yet U.S. immigration law contains virtually no legal channel through which low-skilled immigrant workers can enter the country to fill that gap.”
(Griswold 5/15/06)

Like Heritage Foundation scholars, Cato Institute scholars focused much of their discussion of immigration’s economic effects on low-skilled immigrants. Unlike Heritage Foundation scholars, however, Cato’s scholars argued overwhelmingly that low-skilled immigrants were critical to the U.S. economy, and that their benefits greatly outweighed any costs they imposed. Among their messages: we need low-skilled immigrants, they have buoyed our sluggish population growth, their contributions to the economy outweigh their costs, and they fill an important gap in the labor market. The forces of demand for low-skilled labor are far too strong to legislate against, and any efforts to enforce law that does not accept this principle will be costly and ineffective. As with national security, the real threat to our economy and public coffers is a system trying desperately to work against the reality of labor market supply and demand.

Cato scholars did address narratives of overwhelming forces and use water imagery in reference to the numbers of immigrants and their effect on our economy. In contrast to Heritage Foundation scholars, Cato scholars repeatedly argued that America’s economy was not being overwhelmed by vast numbers of low-skilled immigrants. On the contrary, immigrants were praised for having “saved the United States from a population implosion”21 (Griswold 5/16/07), as “an expanding population confers real blessings on our country” (Griswold 10/11/06). The movement of workers from Mexico to the United States was depicted as a natural flow, its “historically circular” nature benign, if not beneficial, to the U.S. economy (Griswold 3/7/07).

21 Griswold cited U.S. Census Bureau statistics to argue that, even with immigration, since 2000, U.S. population growth has slipped from the 20th century average of 1.32% to slightly below 1% (Griswold 5/16/07).
Cato scholars took Heritage Foundation scholars to task for their predictions that vast floods of immigrants would arrive as a result of the Hagel-Martinez bill of 2006. Calling Robert Rector’s calculations\textsuperscript{22} “patently absurd” (Reynolds 5/18/06) and “fantastic” (Griswold 7/11/06), Cato scholars supported the “far more credible and objective study” put out by the Congressional Budget Office, which estimated less than one tenth the number of immigrants projected by Robert Rector (Griswold 7/11/06). To Cato, additional immigrants were to be welcomed as a boon to our growing economy, not feared as an overwhelming force.

Like Heritage Foundation scholars, Cato scholars discussed whether the costs immigrants imposed on U.S. taxpayers outweighed their benefits to the economy. But while Heritage Foundation scholars felt that high-skilled immigrants were to be welcomed, but low-skilled immigrants were to be strictly limited due to the costs they imposed on American taxpayers, Cato Institute scholars consistently argued that the economic benefits of low-skilled immigrants outweighed any costs they may impose. In January of 2007, Michael Tanner argued that Mexican immigrants were not coming to the U.S. in order to take advantage of our welfare system, and that in fact, immigration actually benefits social security in the short term by increasing taxes paid into the social security system (Tanner 1/10/07). In August of that year, Daniel Griswold countered the common anti-immigration argument that state and local governments were overburdened by influxes of immigrants from South of the border, stating that the “increased economic activity” of Hispanics “far exceeds the costs to state and local governments” (Griswold 8/28/07).

Cato’s discussions of costs focused more on the costs of enforcing immigration law, as well as the costs to the economy of restricting free movement of labor and goods. Despite greatly

\textsuperscript{22} Rector calculated that CIRA’s measures would result in 103 million new legal permanent residents, as compared to 19 million under then-current law (Rector 5/15/06).
increased spending on border enforcement, Daniel Griswold argued in multiple pieces, enforcement efforts continued to fail and waste taxpayer resources (see Griswold 8/11/06; 10/30/06, for example); without reform, he argued, we “will waste billions of dollars more trying to enforce an unenforceable law” (Griswold 5/22/07). Jim Harper’s argument (noted above) that increased border control hampered travel and trade was echoed in other pieces, where the costs of losing low-skilled immigrants were enumerated – a crippled economy and lower real wages for American families (for example, Griswold 4/27/06).

Whereas the Heritage Foundation pieces repeatedly warned against “importing poverty” in the form of low-skilled workers, Cato’s pieces emphasized the value of low-skilled workers to our economy and celebrated these workers. Echoing old narratives, Daniel Griswold offered a contemporary argument that low-skilled workers complemented the American workforce and took jobs that American workers, who were both aging and becoming more educated, did not want (Griswold 10/5/05; 4/27/06; 10/11/06, to name a few). These immigrant workers were “productively employed” (Griswold 1/1/06), did the “honorable work” of picking lettuce and scrubbing floors (Griswold 4/27/06), and were “crucial to filling that gap between demand and supply on the lower rungs of the labor ladder” (Griswold 3/7/07). Clearly, as Griswold claimed, “the value of an immigrant to American society should not be judged solely on his or her fiscal impact” (Griswold 5/21/07).

Much of Cato scholars’ writing worked hard to glorify the role of low-skilled immigrants in our economy, and to counter critics’ language that portrayed them as threatening. One reason that comprehensive reform had not been passed was that, as Alan Reynolds wrote, people on all sides of the issue had a “pathological fear of change” (Reynolds 5/27/07). In this same month, Daniel Griswold started using the term “dynamic economy” (3/7/07; 3/17/07; 3/20/07; 3/27/07)
in his writing, putting a positive spin on change, and implying that the natural state of the economy was to be in flux, requiring flexibility in our economic policies.\footnote{In fact, Griswold’s main criticism of the Bracero temporary worker program in the 1950s, which he commonly cited as evidence that temporary worker programs crowd out illegal immigration, was that it was not flexible enough.} The term “dynamic” also appeared on Cato’s main immigration page: \url{http://www.cato.org/researcharea.php?display=7}. Griswold continued to employ the imagery of dynamic change, writing of our “dynamic country that continues to create ample opportunity for workers, native-born and immigrant alike” (Griswold 8/28/07) and our “dynamic labor market” (4/27/08).

Not surprisingly, 26 of the 34 pieces concerned with economics were more affirmative than alarmist (Table 5.4).

Table 5.4. Tone of Cato Pieces Concerned with Economics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Tone (Number of Economics Pieces)</th>
<th>Tone (Percentage of 34 Economics Pieces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41.18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The two somewhat alarmist pieces were both written by Steven Hanke, an expert in monetary policy, and focused more on Mexico’s economic policies than U.S. immigration policy. I had categorized them as “somewhat alarmist” because both accused Mexico of having poor economic policies that result in “labor dumping,” a term that seemed to me to convey a negative image of the low-skilled workers coming into the U.S. from Mexico. These two somewhat tangential pieces seemed out of step with the remaining 32 pieces concerned with economics. Cato scholars overwhelmingly emphasized both low- and high- skilled immigrants’ benefits to our economy, taking on critics of increased immigration, and pushing for immigration law that
reflected “the realities” of the labor market.

**National Identity**

“[Scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Victor Davis Hanson] and others contend that, unlike previous immigrant groups, Mexican migrants retain close ties to their nearby homeland, dominate other immigrant groups in sheer numbers, and concentrate geographically into insular, Spanish-speaking communities that slow their assimilation. On closer examination, none of these concerns are serious enough to warrant increased restrictions on migration from Mexico.”

(Griswold 10/5/05)

In general, Cato scholars had very little to say about immigration in terms of national identity. What little they said was mainly to praise immigrants for their hard work, the important role they played in the economy and their communities, their continuing ability to assimilate, and for affirming our ideals as a nation of immigrants. Yet though they advocated legalization of the currently undocumented, their concern remained primarily with meeting the U.S. labor market’s needs for low-skilled workers, and they did not go so far as to advocate for automatic permanent resident status, nor a path to citizenship for undocumented workers.

There was little if any discussion related to national sovereignty within Cato’s pieces. Cato scholars seemed not to be concerned with the impact those who came might have on our sovereignty or way of life, but they did seem concerned with the impact of the systems we set up to prevent them from coming or staying. In other words, the threat to our way of life was not from illegal immigration itself, but from our own government’s response to illegal immigration. Jim Harper repeatedly attacked government systems proposed to combat illegal immigration such as REAL ID and E-Verify. Harper portrayed the REAL ID system as, at best, entrusting our personal information to an incompetent government, and at worst, a stepping stone toward government invasion of privacy and “tighter and tighter control of every American” (2/7/08). Dubbing it “Franz Kafka’s solution to illegal immigration” (3/6/08), Harper argued the same of
the E-Verify system, writing that it would “erode the freedoms of the American citizen, even as it failed to stem illegal immigration” (3/30/08).

In keeping with their view that immigration is driven by market forces rather than by individual decisions, Cato scholars did not raise the Heritage Foundation concern that foreigners were making decisions (who should be allowed to join our national community) that should be made by citizens. Decisions about who came should, they seemed to believe, be made by the market, and therefore Cato scholars were concerned about government making these decisions, as noted above.

The extent to which Cato scholars discussed immigrants’ assimilation was only as far as to refute arguments that immigrants were not assimilating quickly enough into the American mainstream. In October of 2005, Daniel Griswold countered common arguments made by immigration opponents, stating that immigrants today are assimilating and learning English enough to not be a concern, and that their rate of arrival (and therefore necessary absorption into American society) was actually lower than that of other immigrant ethnic groups that were arriving in the late 1800s (Griswold 10/5/05). A year and a half later he argued that many undocumented workers were already “valuable members of their workplaces and communities,” implying that these immigrants had successfully adapted to life in the United States and were already benefiting their communities (Griswold 5/16/07).

While Cato scholars did refute assimilation concerns, I found no mention, refutation or otherwise, of the concern of dual allegiance and transnationalism raised, at times, by Heritage Foundation scholars. They did seem to display a high level of comfort with transnational communities, however. As noted above, Cato scholars referred to the traditionally circular nature of migrants from Mexico. Alan Reynolds wrote that living and working abroad was a normal
state of affairs for Americans, who retain their citizenship when doing so (5/27/07). Additionally, Arnold Kling described an ideal world with no economic borders (all immigration would be legal), a system he dubbed “transnational libertarianism” (4/3/06). These comments together suggested that to Cato scholars, dual allegiance and transnationalism were not the issues of concern that they were for Heritage Foundation scholars.

Cato scholars did exert some effort toward giving a positive image of the qualities and character of arriving immigrants (most of whom were low-skilled). In contrast to Heritage Foundation scholars’ concerns about the influx of welfare- and crime-prone immigrants, Cato scholars took care to portray these same immigrants in a positive light. The phrase “peaceful, hard-working” was used too many times to count, as was the term “honest.” Griswold referred to undocumented workers as people “whose only desire is to earn an honest day’s pay for an honest day’s work” (5/10/06), and Jim Harper wrote, “otherwise honest, hardworking and law-abiding people come to the United States without documentation” (3/6/08). In two separate pieces, Daniel Griswold explicitly countered common criticisms of undocumented immigrants, citing evidence to show that they were unfairly blamed for many ills such as traffic congestion, school overcrowding, and crime (10/11/06, 5/16/07). Echoing Griswold’s claim that many undocumented immigrants were already valuable members of their communities, Jim Harper concluded that undocumented immigrants would be a credit to this country if we let them come legally (Harper 3/6/08).

I found no explicit or implied concern over letting low-skilled immigrants into, and no call for excluding undesirable immigrants from, our national community in Cato scholars’ pieces. Though Cato scholars did at times suggest that a temporary worker program would be valuable, there was little insistence that this program be “truly temporary” as advocated by
Heritage Foundation scholars. When temporary programs were mentioned, Cato scholars seemed less concerned with them being “truly” temporary, advocating a very flexible, renewable temporary visa program (Griswold 8/28/07). Alan Reynolds criticized those worried about who may or may not become citizens, writing, “discussions about criteria for getting a temporary work visa need not be confounded with who may or may not get a green card, much less with the few who may become citizens” (5/27/07). While Cato scholars did not advocate automatic permanent resident status for all undocumented workers (this would not be an essential component of reform that would allow immigration to be as market-driven as possible), they also did not fixate on ways to keep “truly temporary” those who would be legalized into temporary worker programs.

Cato pieces incorporated idealistic immigration narratives of the United States as an “immigrant nation” (Griswold 5/16/07) into their appeal for reform. Griswold called for reform that would “uphold our best values as a nation open to peaceful, hardworking immigrants” (7/11/06). Given the number of times “peaceful, hardworking” was used to describe the low-skilled population of undocumented immigrants, and not just high-skilled H1-B visa applicants, this call suggested that our nation should open its gates to all. The U.S. was referred to as a “bastion of freedom” (Shapiro 4/1/08) and the Czech Republic, not allowed to participate in the Visa Waiver Program, “languishes outside the gate” of open opportunity (Griswold 1/26/07). Griswold’s mention of our “dynamic culture” (8/28/07) and “dynamic society” (4/27/08) played to the notion that our national identity is to be a nation of many identities and cultures, that cultural change is part of what makes us America, and not an unwelcome force.

It would be difficult to say whether these idealizations of immigration’s role in shaping our national identity, along with their positive portrayals of new immigrants’ assimilation,
character, and qualities reflect a strong belief that immigration was a true benefit to our national identity, or if they were primarily used to counter critics’ cultural concerns in order to promote what seemed to me to be Cato’s main objective – an immigration system run on a model of market-based demand and supply. Their relative silence on these concerns (only 6 pieces had national identity as a main concern) indicated that their priorities lay elsewhere. Yet with two thirds of their 6 pieces concerned with national identity being affirmative, it was clear that the message they wanted to convey about immigration’s effects on national identity was positive (Table 5.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Tone (Number of National Identity Pieces)</th>
<th>Tone (Percentage of 6 National Identity Pieces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66.67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Conclusion

The story that Cato scholars appeared to be telling during these years of immigration reform debate is that immigration law didn’t match the realities of the labor market and the needs of the American economy. In a battle between policy and market forces, market forces would win out unless large amounts of money and government bureaucracy were marshaled to enforce policy. Therefore the best solution, consistent with principles of limited government and individual liberty, was to make immigration law conform to market reality. This required legalization of undocumented immigrants already here, flexibility and renewability of temporary work visas, no cumbersome labor laws governing temporary worker conditions, and the ability to
increase the numbers of temporary workers allowed in legally to meet our growing economy’s needs, allowing the flow of workers to maintain its “historically circular” nature.

For this kind of reform to be instituted, Americans must have a positive view of the immigrants who come to this country to work. Cato scholars seemed to have undertaken a PR campaign within their pieces to counter the negative **depictions of immigrants**, specifically low-skilled ones, found in the news media, in the work of other think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, and the language of some politicians. In Cato pieces, immigrants were not criminals, terrorists, or welfare-dependent burdens, but “men and women who only want to work and help their families” (Griswold 1/1/06) and who help to grow our economy. They were portrayed as “peaceful” and “hardworking,” doing the honorable jobs that American workers no longer wished to do, but that continued to be demanded at an increasing rate in the American economy. To alleviate fears of change from immigration, Cato scholars highlighted immigrants’ desirable qualities and used the term “dynamic” to put a positive spin on these changes.

Whereas with the Heritage Foundation concerns about and portrayals of immigration’s effects on the nation led them to promote more restrictive and punitive policies, the Cato Institute’s portrayals and arguments seemed to be driven by their desired policy: an immigration system as in sync with free-market principles as is politically salable in the United States. I now turn to my final case study, the American Enterprise Institute, whose scholars used both Heritage Foundation and Cato Institute arguments.
Chapter 6: The American Enterprise Institute

The American Enterprise Institute (AEI), also located in Washington, D.C., is the oldest of the think tanks in my study, founded in 1943 as the American Enterprise Association and renamed in 1960 (Smith 1991, 270). Their stated purposes are “to defend the principles and improve the institutions of American freedom and democratic capitalism” (www.aei.org/about/). In the 1970s AEI built alliances with neoconservative Irving Kristol, and has through the years hosted many prominent conservative scholars, including Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle, Newt Gingrich, John Bolton and Paul Wolfowitz (Smith 1991, 271; http://www.aei.org/scholars/). AEI’s three main research areas are economic policy studies, foreign and defense policy studies, and political and social studies (www.aei.org/research/).

Operating in 2007 on $31.3 million, they had a full time staff of 190 (administrators and scholars), in addition to 100 adjunct scholars scattered around the country (http://www.aei.org/about/). According to their 2008 annual report, 29% of their revenue came from individuals, 27% from foundations, and 18% from corporations (http://www.aei.org/docLib/20081205_2008AnnualReportweb.pdf). The remaining revenue came from conferences, book sales and other revenue. Though their website did not provide figures for how much was spent on outreach activities, AEI boasted investment in “marketing, government relations, academic relations, media contacts, and publications” - investment that appears in the form of newsletters, conferences, their website and various policy issue publications (www.aei.org/about/). According to Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting’s annual survey of think tank media citations, AEI consistently came in ranking within fourth place between 2005 and 2007 (see Table 1.1).
Unlike the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute, AEI does not dedicate a research area (or even subcategory) to immigration. Their 48 writings on immigration between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008 were a hodgepodge of commentaries written by various AEI scholars, filed under multiple research areas. More than either the Heritage Foundation or the Cato Institute, AEI scholars had divergent opinions about immigration in America and how immigration reform should be structured. A contingent of scholars seemed to echo Heritage Foundation scholars (Newt Gingrich, a senior fellow and former Speaker of the U.S. House; David Frum, a resident fellow who researches “political, generational, and demographic trends”; and Lawrence Lindsey, a visiting scholar who “has held leading positions in government, academia, and business”), another contingent posited arguments similar to Cato scholars (Kevin Hassett, Senior Fellow and Director of Economic Policy Studies, who also writes a weekly column for Bloomberg; Jose Enrique Idler, a National Research Initiative fellow; and Nicholas Eberstadt, the Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy, who focuses on political economy and demographics)\(^{24}\). Yet even these scholars more commonly used neutral tones than Heritage Foundation and Cato Institute scholars, and raised counter-arguments within their pieces.

One thing that can be said of AEI’s divergent writings on immigration is that overall, along with concern for the health of the U.S. economy, there was a much greater emphasis on security and cultural issues than seen with Cato, and AEI pieces had the largest percent concerned with national identity. Almost equally represented were concerns with border control and security issues, immigration's effects on the economy and distribution of public goods, and concerns about national identity and cultural change (Table 6.1).

\(^{24}\) All scholar profile information was collected at \url{http://www.aei.org/scholars}, except information on Jose Enrique Idler, found at \url{http://www.aei.org/article/23516}
Table 6.1. Thematic Focus of AEI Pieces between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic Concern</th>
<th>Thematic Concern (Number of Pieces)</th>
<th>Thematic Concern (Percentage of 48 Pieces)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>54.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>60.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National ID</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>56.25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Any given piece could have multiple themes, thus numbers add up to greater than 48 and percentages add up to greater than 100%.

Across all areas of concern, their pieces ranged broadly from alarmist to affirmative, with the bulk of pieces falling in the middle range. Over a third of the pieces had a neutral or balanced tone, and overall only slightly more pieces were on the affirmative end than alarmist (Table 6.2).

Table 6.2. Tone of AEI Pieces between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Tone (Number of Pieces)</th>
<th>Tone (Percentage of 48 Pieces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within each of the three themes AEI scholars were split, with some presenting more alarmist narratives akin to those presented by Heritage Foundation scholars, and some presenting more affirmative ones, similar to Cato Institute pieces. To demonstrate this divergence, I have selected two illustrative quotes for each section of concern outlined below: national security, economics, and national identity.

**National Security**

Alarmist: “Our national security and the safety of our citizens are at stake” (Gingrich 4/26/06)\(^{25}\)

Affirmative: “A fence tells the world we are greedy about our success, and wary of sharing it. It fundamentally changes our image in the world, turning the hope of our neighbors into animosity” (Hassett 10/2/06)

\(^{25}\) All AEI pieces cited in this chapter are listed in Appendix C.
The pieces concerned with national security within AEI's set incorporated many narratives familiar from both Heritage Foundation pieces and Cato Institute pieces. AEI scholars wrote of a benign “influx” as well as threatening “waves” of immigrants, associated both porous and “militarized” borders with security threats, referred to the “festering” problem of illegal immigration, linked crime and gangs to immigrants, and argued for the U.S. to bring illegal immigrants under both the rule and protection of the law. A new concern was also raised by multiple AEI scholars: that our security may be at greater risk if other nations perceived the U.S. as “cracking down” on immigration and maintaining restrictive policies.

AEI scholars used water imagery and narratives of uncontrollable forces in both benign and alarmist ways. Jagdish Bhagwati wrote of the “influx” fueled by American demand that we simply can’t keep out (though rather than fear this influx, Bhagwati suggested we embrace it) (3/28/06). Peter Skerry and James Wilson noted the American public’s demand to stop the “free flow of illegal aliens,” suggesting that the migration was uncontrolled but not uncontrollable (5/18/06). Adding different imagery to the cache of water images, Newt Gingrich referred to the “explosion” of illegal immigration, implying a more sudden and perhaps sinister nature to the uncontrollable force of illegal immigration (4/26/06).

It was not only illegal immigration that AEI scholars portrayed as an overwhelming and uncontrollable force, however. Lawrence Lindsey warned that, should massive legalization be instituted, immigrants who had always followed the rules and applied to enter legally would be “swamped by the tsunami of newly legalized people seeking documentation” and left unassisted by our inefficient immigration bureaucracy (5/22/06). Edward Blum wrote a series of pieces focused on immigration’s impact on voting districts, and expressed concern over “waves of noncitizen Hispanic immigration” diluting the votes of non-Hispanic citizens (due to assigning
representation based on the number of people living in a district, rather than the number of citizens) (8/6/07). The majority of AEI scholars’ uses of uncontrollable forces imagery portrayed these uncontrollable forces as threatening and potentially harmful to our nation. This threat of uncontrollable forces did translate into concern over porous borders, though only among some AEI scholars.

AEI scholars diverged on the question of whether or not addressing the porousness of the border should be a priority, as seen in both their stated arguments and in the language they used to discuss the border. As could be predicted by his position noted above, Bhagwati’s depiction of border control efforts was of “draconian enforcement at the border” (3/28/06). Skerry and Wilson referred to our “leaky boundary,” and argued that, though a wall was essential to fix the leaks and “stem the tide,” the southern border should not be considered a terrorist threat (5/18/06). Norman Ornstein, on the other hand, did link failed border control with terrorist threats (5/17/06), referring later to “border threats” (7/26/06), and our “porous borders” (5/2/07). Securing the border, Fred Thompson argued, was one of government’s “most basic responsibilities for its citizens,” and should be addressed before engaging in any discussion of immigration reform (5/18/07). Newt Gingrich, however, provided the most alarmist and most often repeated views of porous borders, arguing that “America control its borders for national security reasons” (4/9/06), linking the Mexican border with Al-Qaeda terrorist threats and portraying border control as “a matter of national survival” (4/26/06).

AEI scholars' only use of war imagery was in questioning whether or not we should avoid the impression of militarizing the border. Of the two instances in which AEI scholars raised this question, both acknowledged that a militarized border could raise tensions with our neighbors to the south. Skerry and Wilson stated explicitly that we should not be concerned
about giving this impression (5/18/06), and Norman Ornstein went on to argue in his piece that a secure border was essential for security, suggesting a similar opinion to Skerry and Wilson (Ornstein 5/17/06). Though their discussion of a militarized border framed the issue of immigration with war imagery, these two pieces' use of this message were less direct and alarmist than in the Heritage Foundation pieces, not portraying immigrants as an invading force. However, the AEI literature did not make the extensive effort of Cato Institute scholars in combating the image of immigrants in such harsh terms.

As with war imagery, AEI pieces had few references to potential health implications of immigration. In two instances, AEI scholars referred to immigration as a “festering problem” (Noriega and Davy April '07) or an issue “that has festered” (Ornstein 5/2/07), as if the immigration situation in this country was a wound that had become infected and required treatment. But only Newt Gingrich actually associated immigrants with health concerns, writing that immigration reform should include “strategies to achieve greater safety, health, prosperity and freedom” (4/9/06). These few references did give the impression that a loss of vitality or illness in our society had resulted from immigration, yet the limited number of references demonstrates that this was not a major concern of AEI scholars.

Unlike Heritage Foundation pieces, AEI pieces did not use the terms “law breakers,” “rule breakers,” “criminals” or “terrorists” to refer to illegal immigrants. Yet some scholars did raise concerns of crime, gangs, and erosion of the rule of law in relation to immigrants, while other scholars tried to assuage fears of immigrants as terrorist threats and echoed some arguments posed by Cato Institute scholars. Though David Frum wrote that “many Americans…associate immigration with crime and disorder,” implying that the opinion was others’ and not his, he went on to note that illegal immigrants convicted of felonies were
crowding California’s jails (3/28/06). Skerry and Wilson noted Americans’ “deep fears” that “illegal aliens” were “committing crimes, filling our prisons and populating gangs” but then argued that “most do not do these things” (5/18/06). Multiple AEI scholars asserted that criminal background checks were essential for any potential immigrants or temporary workers (Noriega and Davy April ’07, Gingrich 4/9/06 and 4/26/06, Skerry and Wilson 5/18/06).

Newt Gingrich referred to “lawless ‘don’t ask, don’t enforce’ cities and states,” effectively associating immigrants with a pervasive state of lawlessness and complicity with law breaking on the part of some jurisdictions (4/26/06, 7). Echoing a common theme from Heritage Foundation pieces, Gingrich also argued that “amnesty for those who have successfully broken the law long enough” would be unacceptable. Other AEI scholars similarly argued that those who had broken the law should pay a penalty (Idler and Villareal 12/2/05; Noriega and Davy April ’07), and that turning “a blind eye toward illegal residents erodes the rule of law” (Idler 3/9/06). So to a limited extent, AEI scholars did associate immigration with criminality, law breaking and erosion of the rule of law.

Found in other AEI scholars’ pieces on immigration, though, were more affirmative arguments. Ben Wattenberg and Jagdish Bhagwati both made a point to state that immigrants (“Mexicans” in Wattenberg's piece “illegal immigrants” in Bhagwati's) were not security or terrorist threats (Wattenberg 4/18/06; Bhagwati 3/28/06). Bhagwati blamed conflation of immigration with national security problems on “panic over security post-9/11” (3/28/06). He went on to echo Cato Institute scholars in arguing that a major problem with having a population of illegal immigrants was that they were not afforded the protection of the law (3/28/06). Even Newt Gingrich at one point wrote more like Cato Institute scholars, blaming the “dishonest system” (as opposed to law-breaking immigrants) for our illegal population (4/26/06). On
immigration's impact on crime and the rule of law, AEI scholars diverged. While I've presented multiple instances of AEI scholars associating immigration with crime and erosion of the rule of law, few scholars argued as fervently as Heritage Foundation scholars that this association was justified. Yet few argued as fervently as Cato Institute scholars that this association was baseless.

A few AEI scholars introduced an additional association between immigration and national security threats, namely a foreign relations component to enforcement and border policies. As demonstrated in the quote by Kevin Hassett at the beginning of this section, some AEI scholars raised concerns about how our immigration and border enforcement policies would be seen in the rest of the world. Hassett's quote suggests that a restrictive immigration policy, by increasing animosity, could jeopardize our security (10/2/06). Ben Wattenberg further argued that “immigrants are our best publicists” abroad, that their success and welcome in this country were key to our image abroad, and that a crackdown on immigrants would be viewed unfavorably by “observers around the world” (4/18/06).

Overall, AEI scholars presented divergent messages regarding immigration's implications for national security. Newt Gingrich and periodically other AEI scholars echoed many of the Heritage Foundation's more alarmist arguments, while Jagdish Bhagwati, Ben Wattenberg and a smattering of other AEI scholars presented arguments more closely resembling the Cato Institute's immigrant-affirming position. Most pieces, however, fell somewhere between these two extremes, with AEI scholars mentioning security concerns in passing, but neither actively promoting nor dismissing these concerns. The alarmist imagery and language was rarely as pointed as that used by Heritage Foundation scholars, and the arguments used to counter alarmist narratives were rarely argued as insistently as in Cato Institute pieces. This is reflected in the numbers, where the vast majority of pieces fell in the middle range of tones (neutral or only
somewhat affirmative or alarmist) (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3. Tone of AEI Pieces Concerned with National Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Tone (Number of National Security Pieces)</th>
<th>Tone (Percentage of 26 National Security Pieces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>46.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economics

Alarmist: “The huge immigration surge is straining schools, hospitals, and other social services...They start poor and they stay poor, so the taxes they pay do not begin to cover the costs of the services they consume” (David Frum 3/28/06)

Affirmative: “Although there are some costs associated with immigration...the general results are increased productivity and a nation that continues to become more prosperous every day” (Jose Enrique Idler 4/5/06)

AEI pieces used all the main narratives of both the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute when it came to immigration's effects on the U.S. economy. Vast numbers of arriving immigrants were portrayed as both overwhelming and buoying the economy; both costs and benefits were argued to outweigh the other by different scholars; and low-skilled immigrants were said both to harm (increase poverty) and help (complement the native workforce).

Like both the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute, AEI scholars used water imagery and narratives of overwhelming forces to address the issue of large numbers of immigrants arriving and their effect on our economy. While some expressed concern about these effects, more commonly their discussions were affirmative, with scholars more often than not arguing that large numbers of new immigrants had a positive effect on the economy. David Frum was the main scholar concerned with immigrant numbers' negative effects on the economy,
writing in 2006 that a proposed guestworker program would “bring millions more low-wage workers” (4/20/06), in 2007 associating the “sheer scale of the immigration surge” with “ominous warning signs” (6/25/07), and arguing in 2008 that immigration was driving an “expansion of the bottom” (9/7/08).

Frum, however, was the only scholar who prominently featured these economic concerns. More commonly, and much like Cato Institute scholars, AEI scholars portrayed this “immigration surge” as good for the U.S. economy. Jose Enrique Idler wrote that the “massive flows of immigrants” (despite raising national security, cultural and political questions) had a positive impact on the economy (4/5/06). Later Idler argued that we need immigrants to fill the gap in U.S. population expansion in order to buoy our GDP (4/26/06). Roger Noriega purported that we should accommodate a “natural ebb and flow of legal foreign workers” (12/8/08). Using some common water imagery and narratives similar to both Heritage Foundation and Cato Institute pieces, AEI pieces alternated between the somewhat alarmist and somewhat affirmative in their portrayal of the impact of high immigration rates on the U.S. economy.

When it came to discussing the costs immigrants impose on U.S. taxpayers, few AEI scholars even mentioned the issue. Those that did again fell on both sides of the debate, some arguing that immigration's benefits to the economy outweighed any costs, and others citing costs to advocate more restrictive policies. Jose Enrique Idler stated that immigration came with “some costs” but that overall the effect of immigration on the economy was positive (4/5/06). Similarly, Kevin Hassett argued that rather than imposing overwhelming costs on society, the “net effect is that society gains when people move to the U.S.” (4/3/06). Ben Wattenberg stated that, because immigrants were on average young, they “will pay into Social Security and Medicare for 40 years before getting a nickel back” (4/18/06). These scholars did not argue as
fervently and persuasively as Cato Institute scholars; Wattenberg's argument was the closest AEI scholars came to a point-by-point refutation of the claims made about immigrants' costs to taxpayers.

More impassioned were those who emphasized the costs immigrants imposed on taxpayers. In March of 2006, David Frum wrote that immigrants were “straining schools, hospitals, and other social services,” arguing that the taxes paid by immigrants did not cover the costs of the social services they used (3/28/06). More than two years later, Frum cited “roads, schools, hospitals and prisons” in arguing that immigration imposed higher local taxes on U.S. taxpayers (9/7/08). Peter Skerry and James Wilson averred that any immigrants (it is unclear if they were writing only of those currently here illegally, or all immigrants) seeking to become citizens “should pay fees to help defray the costs they have imposed on public services” (5/18/06). And adding a new type of cost to the list, Edward Blum impugned immigrants who became naturalized yet failed to learn English for costing taxpayers money through the provision of bilingual assistance at polling places during elections (4/25/07). While few AEI pieces mentioned costs to taxpayers, those that did again were not unified under a common message. On this narrative, however, the more alarmist pieces seemed to carry more weight, being argued more fervently than the pieces that conveyed an affirmative message.

When addressing the value and effects of low-skilled immigrants in particular, AEI scholars did seem rather balanced, despite again diverging on the issue. The earliest piece in the set laid out a series of positive effects of low-skilled immigration on the U.S. economy. Jose Enrique Idler and Monica Villareal argued that low skilled laborers kept costs of products and services low, and drove the economy through their consumption, further arguing that “industries and consumers in the country will benefit” from a legal flow of low-skilled workers (12/5/05).
Some months later, Kevin Hassett wrote that although low-skilled immigrants drove down wages, their overall effect was positive, as they increased the “beneficial diversity of the workforce” and complement the skill set of native workers (4/3/06). Idler posed a similar argument shortly thereafter, writing that although low-skilled immigrants may compete with native low-skilled workers, they led to an overall stronger economy (4/5/06). Though Newt Gingrich did not focus on economic effects of immigration, he did echo one of the oldest positive narratives in describing today's immigrants: that they “come in search of economic opportunity” (4/9/06). Building on this sentiment, Kevin Hassett later argued that the “folks with the courage and the wherewithal to move are among the best and the brightest,” resulting in a “generally high caliber of our immigrants,” increasing our competitive advantage (10/2/06). Douglas Besharov pointed out that the Hispanic poverty rate had been falling, which he called “a testament to their work effort and the opportunities they have found” (9/27/07).

On the other hand, though, Besharov noted that the “influx [of immigrants] has resulted in a higher U.S. poverty rate,” with African Americans suffering most from the influx of low-skilled immigrants (9/27/07). In keeping with his stances on immigration's impact on the economy, David Frum had mostly alarmist things to write about today's low-skilled immigrants. In March '06 he wrote that these immigrants were taking our jobs and drove down wages (3/28/06); in June '07 he wrote that low-skilled immigrants arrived poor, remained poor and exacerbated problems such as social spending and wage depression (6/25/07); in September '08, Frum referred to immigrants as “wage competitors,” stating that immigration “hurts lower America” and also lamented the high poverty rate among post-1970 immigrants and their children (9/7/08). Lawrence Lindsey took a novel approach to the question of low-skilled immigrants' value, calling them “‘volume' immigrants” who would not be buying homes and
helping us out of the housing crisis; he argued that we should have “targeted immigration” to encourage the “high-end” immigrants who would buy homes, thereby helping the housing market recover (6/9/08).

So while a few AEI scholars made concerted efforts to argue the benefits of low-skilled immigrants, other scholars balanced their affirmative narratives with alarmist ones. Low-skilled immigrants were portrayed as complementing the native workforce, being opportunity seekers (in the grand tradition of immigrants in the United States), and driving the economy. They were also portrayed as wage competitors who took native workers’ jobs, entrenched in poverty, and lacking the beneficial capital that high-skilled workers injected into U.S. markets.

Overall, AEI pieces were pretty well balanced between alarmist and affirmative when discussing immigration's impact on the economy. Though the number of affirmative and somewhat affirmative pieces with the economy as a concern was twice the number of alarmist and somewhat alarmist pieces (12 vs. 6, see Table 6.4), as noted above, the arguments for immigration's negative economic effects were more forcefully presented than the affirmative arguments. In other words, the number of pieces with an affirmative tone was to a degree balanced by the intensity of tone in the more alarmist pieces.

Table 6.4. Tone of AEI Pieces Concerned with Economics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Tone (Number of Economics Pieces)</th>
<th>Tone (Percentage of 29 Economics Pieces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
National Identity

Alarmist: “Vast foreign-born communities, unable to speak English and unfamiliar with our history or democratic vocation, would change this country in unacceptable ways” (Noriega and Davy April '07)

Affirmative: “[D]espite alarms that 'some' immigrants (code language for Mexicans) are failing to assimilate or are positively resisting assimilation, the evidence points in the opposite direction” (Nicholas Eberstadt 4/19/07)

AEI had a higher percentage of pieces concerned with national identity than either the Heritage Foundation or the Cato Institute, and there was no shortage of quotable narratives within this set. These narratives again included many used by both Heritage Foundation and Cato Institute scholars, expressing both praise and concern over immigrant assimilation, glorifying immigrants' work ethic and role in shaping our national identity, but also projecting fear over potential changes immigrants may bring. AEI scholars did express an additional concern over immigration's long-term effects on the U.S. political system and the strength of the Republican Party.

Like Cato Institute scholars, AEI scholars on the whole had little to say relating immigration to loss of sovereignty. Newt Gingrich was the only scholar who indicated this concern, likening amnesty to anarchy (he used Arnold Schwarzenegger's words here) in order to associate immigration with loss of control of our governmental system (4/26/06). In the same piece Gingrich wrote that the number of work visas allowed should be determined by U.S. political bodies, not “dictated by the presence of people working in this country illegally and by the pressures of foreign government” (4/26/06).

While Gingrich was the only AEI scholar concerned that decisions about who would be allowed to come to the U.S. might be made by people other than the U.S. government, a few other scholars relayed concern about immigration's effects on our political system. Edward Blum
raised the alarm that “waves of noncitizen Hispanic immigration” would “dilute the strength of the voters in non-Hispanic districts” (8/6/07). Blum echoed this same concern in January 2008 (1/14/08). David Frum, John Fortier and Duncan Currie all speculated that the long-term effects of high Hispanic immigration would trend the electorate more Democratic. While Fortier took a more academic look at this question (Fortier 6/18/08), and Currie argued that the “steady inflow” of “low-income, low-education immigrants” had and would benefit the Democrats (Currie 11/24/08), Frum warned that immigration, through importing future citizens who would remain poor and increase levels of inequality in the U.S., could lead to radical changes such as “populist redistributionism,” (7/3/06), or at the very least, would “overwhelm conservative ideals of self reliance, limited government and national unity” (9/7/08). Four of the five scholars who examined the effects of immigration on sovereignty did so in rather alarmist tones.

A small number of AEI scholars argued that immigrants were assimilating at a reasonable rate. Nicholas Eberstadt pointed out that America had been able to take in “high and continuing inflows of immigrants from the Third World, but without (as yet) the symptoms of cultural indigestion” experienced by the European Union, and dismissed assertions that “some” immigrants were failing to assimilate (4/19/07). Kevin Hassett lauded immigrants' assimilation, declaring that the “amazing thing is how quickly the children of immigrants melt into the great pot” (10/2/06). Nick Schulz, in a piece describing Ben Wattenberg's style, praised Wattenberg's confidence that “Americans can absorb – and assimilate – immigrants coming in the millions” (7/31/08). These, however, were the few examples of AEI scholars expressing pure faith in the ability of immigrants to assimilate into U.S. society. More scholars, and with much greater frequency, took a cautionary tone toward immigrant assimilation.

Though few AEI scholars argued that immigrants today were failing to assimilate into
American society, most who raised the issue of assimilation cautioned that policymakers must make a concerted effort to assimilate new immigrants. Newt Gingrich called up glorifying images of the “tapestry of diversity that covers and enriches our nation” yet in the same piece he warned that failed policy could result in the weakening of our foundation and the “disintegration of American values” (Gingrich and Ciamarra 3/11/07). This followed his argument that “we accept only those who want to embrace American values and culture” (Gingrich 4/26/06) and his very Heritage Foundation-like description of “patriotic immigration” in which new citizens become “politically integrated and assimilated into American society” (4/9/06). “The cultural struggle over the future of America—and the very definition of America—underlies the immigration fight,” wrote Gingrich nearly two years later (1/16/08).

Along similar lines, Jose Enrique Idler asserted that “measures have to be taken so that new immigrants are integrated into national life—economically, culturally, and politically” (3/9/06). Failed policies, like those of the past two decades, as argued by David Frum, were responsible for the existence of “a large population that will remain ill educated, incompletely fluent in English, and significantly poorer than the rest of the country” (7/3/06). Even Ben Wattenberg, who argued that immigration and assimilation were key to American greatness and was praised for his faith in America's assimilative capacity, neglected to argue forcefully in his piece that assimilation was working (4/18/06). When it came to discussions of assimilation, AEI pieces were more alarmist than affirmative, though affirmative messages were definitely conveyed about America's ability to absorb immigrants.

Unlike Heritage Foundation scholars, with one exception AEI scholars expressed no concern over immigrants' potential dual allegiance. Newt Gingrich, in the one exception, quoted Theodore Roosevelt as stating that immigrants would be welcomed as equal Americans,
provided they became “in every facet an American, and nothing but an American...There can be no divided allegiance here” (4/26/06). Though this quoted statement implied a fear that immigrants could retain allegiances to their home countries, Gingrich's piece did not go on to argue this, nor express an explicit worry over dual allegiance. His main concern was that we develop and maintain policies and systems for assimilating new immigrants into Americans.

When it came to the question of how the character and qualities of immigrants might impact our national identity, AEI scholars again presented divergent narratives. Kevin Hassett pointed out, much like Cato Institute scholars, that many illegal immigrants had become “productive members of their communities” (4/3/06). Multiple AEI scholars portrayed immigrants as enterprising and industrious opportunity seekers. Newt Gingrich referred to “hard-working” people who “seek a better life” (4/9/06); Jose Enrique Idler wrote that immigrants had brought “hard work, opportunity and prosperity” to this country (4/26/06); Lawrence Lindsey argued that most immigrants “come here to work hard and make a better life for themselves” (5/22/06); Kevin Hassett claimed that those who came to this “land of opportunity” were the “folks with the courage and wherewithal to move” (10/2/06). Ben Wattenberg cited Mexican-American GI's proportionately high rates of receiving Congressional Medals of Honor to demonstrate their value to America (4/18/06).

In contrast to some of these positive narratives, many AEI scholars (and often the same ones) also expressed concern over the qualities of today's immigrants. As noted above, many scholars associated immigration with higher rates of crime and gang violence in our communities (Frum, Gingrich, Skerry and Wilson, Noriega and Davy). Some scholars also worried (again, as described above) that today's immigrants remain poor (Frum 7/3/06; 6/25/07) and expressed concern about the ramifications of this: a “new permanent underclass” must be avoided, wrote
Idler (Idler 3/9/06). Edward Blum and Roger Clegg worried that immigrants would take advantage of (and thereby implied that they could potentially perpetuate and strengthen) “our bizarre system of racial and ethnic preferences” (Blum and Clegg 5/4/06).

These more negative narratives about immigrants' impact on our national community translated into some discussion about desirable and undesirable immigrants, and concern over who should be allowed to join. Skerry and Wilson argued that visa numbers should be increased for “desirable immigrants” (but failed to note what makes immigrants “desirable”) (5/18/06). Noriega and Davy contended that any temporary worker program must accommodate the “dual intent” of becoming a permanent resident, but that the program should not be an automatic route to citizenship; anyone desiring this route must “demonstrate their potential contribution as citizens” (April ‘07). Ben Wattenberg offered a more generous solution to illegal populations, stating that the “road to citizenship should be open” after paying an appropriate penalty for illegal entry (4/18/06).

Yet many others worried about this type of open road, and even about the temporariness of any temporary worker program. Jose Enrique Idler argued that “opening the guest worker door for illegal immigrants...might end up leading to a new mass settlement” (3/9/06). David Frum echoed Idler, raising concern about “a 'guestworker' plan that would bring millions of low-wage workers into the country more or less permanently” (4/20/06). Driving the point home two months later (and implying a certain amount of duplicity on the part of temporary workers), Frum argued that “there is nothing less temporary than a temporary worker” (7/3/06). These concerns echo the Heritage Foundation’s more vigorous calls for keeping temporary workers “truly” temporary, and also suggest that these AEI scholars are wary of letting certain kinds of immigrants into our national community.
Tied into these discussions of temporary workers were a few concerns over the value of citizenship and its meaning. While Idler argued that “naturalization needs to become both more common and meaningful” (3/9/06), Newt Gingrich contended that evaluation of potential citizens (he did not exclude temporary workers from this potential pool) should be selective (4/26/06). “To become an American citizen,” Gingrich wrote, “means becoming an American in values, culture, and historic understanding” (4/26/06). This explicit statement, and that by Idler, imply that the meaning of citizenship has been eroded in recent decades of immigration, and must be reasserted.

Overall, AEI pieces concerned with national identity were quite evenly spread in their tone (Table 6.5). Though many common affirmative narratives appeared in these pieces, many scholars whose pieces were on the affirmative side did cite the importance of cultural and political assimilation, implying concern over the potential failure of assimilation. Despite idealistic immigration narratives of American greatness from immigration, America's assimilative capacity, or the industriousness of immigrants, most affirmations in AEI pieces were accompanied by caution, an insistence that immigration's continued success was contingent upon careful policy for determining who would be allowed to come, and incorporating those who did come into American society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Tone (Number of National Identity Pieces)</th>
<th>Tone (Percentage of 27 National Identity Pieces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

The set of pieces written by AEI during the sample period echoed nearly all the narratives used by both Heritage Foundation and Cato Institute scholars. Unlike either the Heritage Foundation or the Cato Institute, however, there was no driving, central narrative to which all or even most AEI scholars subscribed. AEI scholars did not, on the whole, labor to repeat vivid *depictions of immigrants* through imagery and language such as Cato's “hard-working, peaceful” immigrants or Heritage's “absconders.” Few AEI scholars argued the extremes of either Cato Institute's pro-immigration narratives or the Heritage Foundation's consistently cautionary tone. AEI scholars tended, on the whole, to cover the middle ground of the conservative spectrum, or present both sides of an argument, sometimes focusing their discussions more on what was being said in the debate on immigration rather than stating it as their own opinions.

In every category of concern (security, economics, national identity), according to the numbers, the tone leaned slightly to the affirmative, with a neutral tone always claiming the largest number of pieces. Yet the intensity and vividness of some of the more alarmist imagery and language contradict the numbers to a certain extent, leading in my view, the preceding narrative about AEI pieces to feature the alarmist instances as prominently as the neutral or somewhat affirmative tone of the overall set of pieces.

Individual scholars did not necessarily maintain a consistent tone among their own pieces, though a number did tend to lean toward either alarmist or affirmative. Each scholar appeared to have their own agenda (or lack thereof), with few actually promoting specific policy prescriptions for immigration reform.

For all these reasons, it is impossible to draw a clear narrative, tone, or policy agenda
from AEI’s set of pieces on this issue. Within these pieces immigrants were both praised and
impugned, welcomed both warmly and contingently, and in some cases not really welcomed at
all. It is difficult to say whether this divergence was due to the fact that there was no research
area dedicated to immigration, to the model AEI follows as a think tank, or to some other as yet
unidentified reason.
Joe Feagin (1997) called the racism of modern nativism “old poison in new bottles”. I believe the metaphor is apt for conservative think tanks’ presentation of immigration as an issue. Narratives that frame immigration a certain way, and that elicit predictable responses from the American public and policymakers, can poison objective analysis of contemporary immigration policy, and taint the perception of immigrants in the U.S. The accusations leveled against immigrants throughout history in the form of common narratives can be debunked again and again, yet they continue to be repackaged and fed back to us to serve specific interests. This is particularly insidious when the accusations are presented as reasonable concerns, backed up with data and statistics that lend authority to prejudice.

Of course, old narratives are not always employed to bias us against immigrants, as seen in the preceding analysis. And there are entirely different ways of thinking about immigration as an issue than the ways in which it has been framed by the think tanks in this study, many of which are also bolstered by our country’s immigration narratives. I imagine I could easily have dissected pro-immigrant advocacy groups’ or liberal think tanks’ work and found the same amount of framing employed to serve their interests. The point is that immigration discourse in the U.S. is enmeshed in a long history of love/hate relationships, rendered in vivid narratives that to this day bias our impressions of immigrants and reactions to proposed immigration policy reform. New issues have emerged, and think tanks have helped to elaborate and structure their presence in the immigration debate.

My desire to see immigrants welcomed into our national community without prejudice, coupled with my passion for accurate representation of “others” and deepened cross-cultural
understanding, drove me to try to “un-package” some of the repackaged narratives that interfere with this desire. And so I turn to the focused questions of this attempt.

By examining mainstream conservative think tanks’ writings on immigration, can we demonstrate that they use their “scholarly” work to actively promote ideology through strategic use of old immigration narratives? Now that each think tank’s work has been described, it is time to compare the three side by side to compare and contrast the overall tone of each think tank’s body of work on immigration. I will compare their work narrative by narrative, just as the previous three chapters have been organized, starting with narratives related to national security. I will conclude with a succinct description of each think tank’s overall narrative and tone on the issue of immigration in the U.S. during the timeframe examined. This chapter’s detailed comparison of the three think tanks will demonstrate that some prominent, contemporary conservative think tanks do repackage and mobilize particular immigration narratives in their “scholarly” work, and actively promote specific ideologies.

National Security

Each of the three think tanks used narratives of uncontrollable forces, often deploying water imagery, in relation to immigration’s implications for national security. They did so, however, in very different ways. Heritage Foundation scholars used water imagery to depict a nation succumbing to the uncontrollable and damaging flood of illegal immigrants, referring to the “overflow,” “flood” and “tide” of illegal immigrants and calling for policies that would “stem the tide” and “slow the flow.” Cato Institute scholars, on the other hand, wrote of the natural, traditional, circular flow of workers between the United States and Mexico. To Cato Institute scholars, the uncontrollable forces were not immigrants but rather the natural forces of the
market which demand immigrant labor; thus immigration policy should accommodate market
demand and the natural ebb and flow of workers that would satisfy this demand. AEI scholars
paralleled both Heritage and Cato scholars, referring, like Heritage, to an alarming “explosion”
and “tsunami,” as well as using benign descriptors, like Cato, with verbs like “influx” being
common. The majority of AEI scholars’ uses of uncontrollable forces imagery did portray
immigrants as threatening and potentially harmful to our nation, thus situating their work closer
to Heritage than Cato.

Though not uniform in their use, each of the three think tanks also used the porous borders frame. Heritage Foundation scholars linked porous borders with terrorist threats,
arguing that the border and physical barriers must be “secured against terrorists and transnational
criminals.” To Cato Institute scholars, the border was viewed as interrupting the traditionally
circular flow of workers and disrupting trade. The “wall to nowhere” proposed to seal the porous
border would only exacerbate the problems of smuggling and deaths at the border as well as
waste taxpayer resources. AEI scholars referred to our “leaky boundary,” a relatively benign
designation, yet were split on whether our southern border’s control was “a matter of national
survival.”

The Heritage Foundation was the only think tank in my study that used explicit war imagery. A few Heritage Foundation pieces likened immigrants crossing the border to the threat
of an invading force, referring to the struggle to control immigration as “this new type of war”
and linking immigration enforcement to combating “transnational threats.” The Cato Institute
pieces lacked war imagery completely, and Cato scholars worked to distinguish between the
“real threats” of terrorism and “peaceful, hard-working” illegal immigrants, actively countering
imagery of immigrants as an invading force. AEI scholars too did not directly portray immigrants
as an invading force, yet some did raise the issue of whether or not the U.S. should “militarize” the border, likening it to a war zone. These pieces did not suggest that a militarized border was needed, however, but rather worried about how a militarized border might be seen by our neighbors to the south.

Though none of the three think tanks actively argued that immigrants threatened the physical health of our nation, the Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute both indirectly echoed this very old concern. Heritage Foundation scholars repeatedly listed “security, criminal, and health screening measures” as necessary for any potential immigrants, implying that, if not properly screened, they could pose a health threat, just as they could pose other security and criminal threats. The American Enterprise Institute's limited number of references demonstrated that this was not a major concern of AEI scholars, yet some scholars referred to the “festering problem” of immigration, as though it was a wound that had become infected and required treatment. Cato Institute scholars, on the other hand, made no reference to health implications of immigration to the U.S.

The three think tanks all engaged in discussion of whether illegal immigrants were criminals, terrorists, and lawbreakers. Illegal immigrants were repeatedly portrayed in Heritage Foundation pieces as lawbreakers, “alien terrorists” and “absconders.” The need to reduce the size of this population was argued to be a national security imperative and reinstating the “rule of law” featured prominently in Heritage Foundation pieces. In contrast, Cato scholars portrayed the same population as innocent victims of a system out of step with economic reality, rather than lawbreakers or terrorists. They advocated for legalization not only to bring the currently undocumented under the rule of law, but also to bring them under the protection of the law. Some AEI scholars argued that turning “a blind eye toward illegal residents erodes the rule
of law” while others shared Cato concerns that illegal immigrants were not afforded the protection of the law. AEI scholars both implied the innocence of illegal immigrants by citing the “dishonest system” and indicted immigrants for “committing crimes, filling our prisons and populating gangs.”

Use of the word “amnesty” was contentious among the three think tanks. Heritage Foundation scholars frequently repeated the “no amnesty” frame, arguing that “amnesty for ‘absconders,’” and “amnesty for gang members” was unacceptable and would only encourage further lawbreaking. This frame portrays illegal immigrants as law-breakers; any legalization efforts were depicted as condoning criminal behavior. AEI scholars too employed this frame, likening amnesty to anarchy, and arguing against “amnesty for those who have successfully broken the law long enough.” Cato scholars, on the other hand, cited use of the term “amnesty” by immigration opponents as a smear intended to preclude reasonable legalization measures. Legalization, they argued, was a necessary component of successful immigration policy reform, allowing people who had become productive members of their communities to remain so.

The different ways that the three think tanks wrote of enforcement efforts paralleled these divisions. Heritage Foundation scholars repeatedly called for registration, screening and surveillance of any legal immigrants, and detention and removal of illegal immigrants, contributing to their overall portrayal of immigrants as untrustworthy, law-breaking and potentially threatening individuals. Cato Institute scholars, in contrast, wrote of the “pervasive and deadly consequences” of enforcement, further suggesting that illegal immigrants were innocent victims of our broken immigration system. AEI scholars brought a broader international perspective into the debate. Worried that increased enforcement and restrictive immigration policy, by increasing the animosity of “observers around the world,” could jeopardize our
security, to AEI scholars, immigration’s potential security implications were not restricted to what happened within our borders.

Overall, the link drawn between immigration and national security varied greatly among the three think tanks. The narratives of each align with the tone of their pieces concerned with national security, as shown in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1. Comparison of Think Tank Tones Concerned with National Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone of Pieces Concerned with National Security</th>
<th>Heritage Foundation Percentage (number of pieces). 63 pieces total</th>
<th>Cato Institute Percentage (number of pieces). 23 pieces total</th>
<th>American Enterprise Institute Percentage (number of pieces). 26 pieces total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>33.33% (21)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>3.85% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>47.62% (30)</td>
<td>4.35% (1)</td>
<td>19.23% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>19.05% (12)</td>
<td>17.39% (4)</td>
<td>46.15% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>30.43% (7)</td>
<td>19.23% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>47.83% (11)</td>
<td>11.54% (3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Heritage Foundation’s pieces fell heavily on the alarmist end of the scale, with 51 of the 63 pieces being either alarmist or somewhat alarmist, and the remaining 12 being neutral (Table 7.1). This matched their portrayal of a nation with unsecured borders being flooded by potentially threatening lawbreakers. The Heritage Foundation’s prescriptions for this situation were to seal the porous border, offer no “amnesty” and ramp up enforcement efforts to send home those here illegally.

Cato Institute pieces fell heavily on the affirmative end of the scale, with 18 of their 23 pieces being either affirmative or somewhat affirmative, 4 pieces being neutral, and only one being somewhat alarmist (Table 7.1). These numbers reflected their efforts to portray contemporary immigration as non-threatening, immigrants as innocent victims, and the border as unnecessarily tight. Because the problem to Cato scholars was a system out of step with reality,
their solution involved changing the law to reflect reality, so the border could be more open, costly and dangerous enforcement efforts could be curtailed, and peaceful immigrants could easily bring their labor to our economy.

American Enterprise Institute pieces fell across the spectrum of tones, reflecting their broad range of narratives on the national security theme. No unified narrative emerged among AEI pieces; AEI contributors echoed both Heritage and Cato concerns. When examining the issues and potential solutions, AEI scholars raised concerns not just over immigration’s internal security implications, but also how others in the world would view our immigration policy. Numerically, in fact, AEI pieces tipped slightly toward the affirmative end of the spectrum, with 8 pieces being either affirmative or somewhat affirmative, 6 being either alarmist or somewhat alarmist and the remaining 12 being neutral (Table 7.1).

**Economics**

While scholars used water imagery and narratives of overwhelming forces to convey potential security threats to our nation, these images were also used to describe immigration's effects on our economy. Heritage Foundation scholars warned that the “flood of low-skill, low-educated migrants” and the potential “flood of legal immigrants” could overwhelm our economy with disastrous consequences. Cato scholars portrayed this influx as positive, stating that it has “saved the United States from a population implosion”. Moreover, they depicted movement of workers from Mexico to the U.S. as a natural flow, its “historically circular” nature benign, if not beneficial, to the U.S. economy. To Cato, additional immigrants were to be welcomed as a boon to our growing economy, not feared as an overwhelming force; freeing their movement between the U.S. and sending countries would be a welcome reform. While some AEI scholars warned of
the “sheer scale of the immigration surge” and subsequent “expansion of the bottom,” more often than not they argued that new immigrants had a positive effect on the economy. Much like Cato scholars, some argued that we should accommodate a “natural ebb and flow of legal foreign workers”.

As with other issues, think tank scholars disagreed on whether the costs immigrants imposed on U.S. taxpayers outweighed their benefits to the economy. Scholars at the Heritage Foundation emphasized the “massive costs on the U.S. taxpayer” of both legal and illegal low-skilled immigrants, and disparaged policies that encouraged this type of immigrant as “transnational welfare outreach.” On the other hand, consistent with their positive portrayals of immigrants, Cato scholars argued that the economic benefits of low-skilled immigrants outweighed any costs they may impose. Rather than the immigrants themselves, to Cato scholars, enforcement efforts were the real waste of taxpayer resources. AEI scholars again were split, some arguing that the “net effect is that society gains when people move to the U.S.” and others arguing that immigrants were “straining schools, hospitals, and other social services,” and therefore they “should pay fees to help defray the costs they have imposed.”

Closely linked to the discussion of immigration's costs is the question of the value and effects of low-skilled immigrants. Heritage Foundation scholars framed high levels of low-skilled immigration as “importing poverty,” and warned their audience to avoid this. Repeatedly arguing against low-skilled immigration, it was clear that Heritage Foundation scholars found little value, and even potential economic disaster, in allowing this population permanent entrance. Cato scholars again took a positive view of low-skilled workers, stating that they complemented the American workforce by taking jobs that American workers did not want. They further argued that the natural state of the economy was to be in flux and that instituting policy to
allow low-skilled workers to come and go as needed would benefit our “dynamic economy.”

Some AEI scholars also contended that low-skilled immigrants were valuable, keeping the costs of products and services low and driving the economy through their consumption. Yet others asserted that they took our jobs and were “wage competitors,” that low-skilled immigrants had a high poverty rate, and the U.S. should institute “targeted immigration” to encourage more valuable “high-end” immigrants.

Table 7.2. Comparison of Think Tank Tones Concerned with Economics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone of pieces concerned with Economics</th>
<th>Heritage Foundation Percentage (number of pieces). 41 pieces total</th>
<th>Cato Institute Percentage (number of pieces). 34 pieces total</th>
<th>American Enterprise Institute Percentage (number of pieces). 29 pieces total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>48.78% (20)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>6.9% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>26.83% (11)</td>
<td>5.88% (2)</td>
<td>13.79% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>17.07% (7)</td>
<td>17.65% (6)</td>
<td>37.93% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>2.44% (1)</td>
<td>35.29% (12)</td>
<td>24.14% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>4.88% (2)</td>
<td>41.18% (14)</td>
<td>17.54% (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Heritage Foundation pieces concerned with economics again fell much more often on the alarmist end than the affirmative, with 31 of their 41 pieces being either alarmist or somewhat alarmist (Table 7.2). Their overwhelming impression that immigrants potentially threatened our country, laid out in their pieces on national security, was reinforced through a framework that presented immigrants as flooding our economy, placing massive costs on taxpayers, and bringing poverty with them.

Cato Institute pieces on economics also matched the tone of their pieces on national security, being much more affirmative than alarmist (Table 7.2). Low-skilled immigrants, according to Cato’s narrative, have been a boon to and a natural complementary component of our economy. This portrayal reinforced the positive impression they presented in pieces on
national security, further demonstrating that immigrants’ entry into the U.S. should not be restricted due to national security or economic concerns.

AEI’s discourse again spread more evenly across the spectrum of tones than either the Heritage Foundation or Cato Institute (Table 7.2). But while the alarmist narratives some scholars employed were vivid, more commonly scholars wrote in a neutral or even affirmative way about immigration’s effects on our economy. AEI scholars were split on whether we should limit low-skilled immigrants to prevent an “expansion of the bottom” or make it easier for the U.S. to accommodate the “natural ebb and flow.” These two are not mutually exclusive, as a temporary worker program could allow a flexible flow of workers, yet be structured to prevent a permanent settlement of low-skilled immigrants (this will be noted below). However, the language used did give two very different impressions of how threatening low-skilled immigrants were to our economy.

**National Identity**

Among concerns related to national identity was immigration's potential impact on national sovereignty. Heritage Foundation scholars asserted that no person had the “right to American residency or citizenship without the consent of the American people” thereby implying that illegal immigrants threatened our sovereignty by making decisions that should be made by us alone. To Cato scholars, decisions about who came to the U.S. should be made by the market, and trying to prevent this through costly and invasive government programs constituted the real threat to our sovereignty. On this point AEI scholars more often considered immigration to be a threat, arguing that outsiders should not determine how many and which immigrants were allowed, worrying that large numbers of Hispanic non-citizens would “dilute the strength of the
voters in non-Hispanic districts” and that the “steady inflow” of “low-income, low-education immigrants” had and would benefit the Democrats and lead to “populist redistributionism.” The number and type of immigrants allowed into the U.S. posed potential threats to our nation's sovereignty and the nature of our political system, according to both Heritage and AEI scholars.

Multiple scholars from both the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute were concerned that immigration was eroding the value of citizenship. Heritage Foundation scholars called for strengthening citizenship which “requires clarifying the distinction between citizens and non-citizens” implying that we must clearly distinguish between who is a part of our national community and who is not. The reader was advised that permanent residents, non-citizen immigrants and illegal immigrants inhabited a gray area, being present and enjoying many of the benefits of citizenship without actually being citizens, nor truly a part of the national community. Heritage Foundation scholars made it clear that this gray area was problematic. Cato scholars expressed no such concern, seeming perfectly comfortable with people coming and going as the economy's needs dictated. AEI scholars again made some mention of Heritage's concern, noting that “naturalization needs to become both more common and meaningful” implying that the meaning of citizenship, or being a part of our national community, had been eroded through immigration in recent decades and must be reasserted.

All three think tanks agreed that assimilation of immigrants was important to the success of immigration, though they differed on how serious a concern this was and whether or not immigrants were assimilating successfully. Our “nation of immigrants,” Heritage scholars asserted, was more accurately “a nation where immigrants are Americanized.” Heritage scholars called for “patriotic assimilation” (deliberate assimilation policies) and even called for English to be recognized as the national language. Similarly, some AEI scholars echoed this call, arguing
that the “very definition of America” is at the heart of the immigration debate, and therefore assimilation is imperative. Yet other AEI contributors marveled at how well “children of immigrants melt into the great pot” and expressed faith in America’s ongoing ability to assimilate immigrants. Cato scholars contended that immigrants were assimilating and learning enough English and that they were “valuable members of their workplaces and communities.” Agreeing that assimilation was necessary, Cato posts portrayed immigrants as successfully having reached that goal.

Related to the issue of citizenship is the concern expressed by some such as Samuel Huntington (2004) that immigrants may maintain dual allegiance, their allegiance being split between their home country and their adopted home. A small group of Heritage Foundation scholars cited “the growing problem of ‘dual allegiance’” and called for “exclusive allegiance” to be a condition of citizenship, suggesting that, in order to be a part of our national community, one must be loyal to our community exclusively. Exclusive allegiance here was, in my interpretation, the antidote to the “enemy within” who may harm our nation by serving an outside allegiance. This concern was noted only once in AEI pieces, and Cato scholars made no mention of it at all, not even to counter this fear, suggesting that though it may be an old concern (and well-publicized, thanks to Huntington), it may not be a priority concern in all policy-making circles.

As in the past, current debate includes questions of the character and qualities of arriving immigrants, whether or not they are worthy of our welcome, and whether their presence would change the existing composition of our nation. Citing concern over altering “the character of the nation,” Heritage Foundation scholars suggested that some types of immigrants (namely the poor, low-skilled, and poorly educated) should not be invited to join our national
community as citizens or permanent residents. Cato Institute scholars actively combated the idea that immigrants could be anything but beneficial to our nation. The same immigrants called into question by Heritage scholars were portrayed by Cato scholars as “peaceful, hard-working” people who are unfairly blamed for many ills. A number of AEI scholars took the same view as Cato scholars, noting the “generally high caliber of our immigrants” who “come here to work hard and make a better life for themselves.” But some AEI scholars warned that, if not properly controlled and managed, immigration could result in a “new permanent underclass,” implying that certain types of immigrants could negatively alter our nation.

While none of the three think tanks recommended excluding undesirable immigrants in the ways that past immigration laws had, certain proposals seemed aimed at keeping undesirable immigrants from becoming part of our national community. Heritage Foundation scholars emphasized the importance of making any temporary worker program “truly temporary.” By ensuring that temporary workers were not eligible for permanent status as part of the program, and that they returned home after their temporary employment in the U.S., a low-skilled workforce could be maintained outside the national community, reserving permanent resident visas for higher skilled and more desirable immigrants while still meeting our economy's need for low-skilled labor. Some AEI scholars also expressed concern about “a 'guestworker' plan that would bring millions of low-wage workers into the country more or less permanently” while others argued that the “road to citizenship should be open” including to guestworkers. Cato scholars did not emphasize that a temporary worker program must be truly temporary, nor did they advocate offering citizenship as a potential path for these workers. Cato’s support of a temporary worker program aligned with their emphasis on market-driven immigration, which would involve much more fluid borders, and a continuously changing (“dynamic”) population of
workers. Should a temporary worker program be sufficiently flexible, it could prove as close an option to open borders, in terms of labor market flexibility, as anything that was politically feasible.

Despite some of the rather disparaging discussion of immigrants, all three think tanks employed idealistic immigration narratives in their pieces. These old narratives make us feel patriotic, glorify past immigration and praise our ability to assimilate peoples from different nations into one great nation. While making us feel good about immigration, these narratives contrast contemporary immigration with the idealized golden age of immigration. Heritage Foundation scholars did, albeit rarely, employ the “nation of immigrants” narrative, and remind us that immigrants come seeking “the American Dream,” often “strengthening our social capital, deepening or national patriotism, and expanding our general economy.” Cato scholars too referred to our “immigrant nation,” a “bastion of freedom” in the world, and called on policymakers to “uphold our best values as a nation open to peaceful, hardworking immigrants.” Additionally, Cato Institute pieces referenced our “dynamic culture,” implying that cultural change from immigration is part of what makes us America, and not an unwelcome force (as it may be seen by the public and scholars such as Peter Brimelow and Samuel Huntington). AEI scholars wrote of the “tapestry of diversity that covers and enriches our nation” and noted that immigrants have brought “hard work, opportunity and prosperity.” While all three used these idealistic narratives, Heritage Foundation scholars and some AEI scholars used them typically as a lead-in to caution about immigration and contrast between past immigration that made us great and contemporary immigration that threatened our national community.

Not surprisingly, depictions of immigrants varied greatly among the three think tanks. With a small number of exceptions, Heritage Foundation scholars portrayed immigrants in quite
alarmist ways, referring to them as “absconders,” “lawbreakers,” and giving the impression that they were criminals, national security threats, and welfare-dependents, who engage in deception and fraud. In contrast, in Cato pieces, immigrants were “peaceful, hard-working” and “honest” people who “only want to work and help their families.” They were portrayed as a boon to our economy, doing the honorable (though low-skilled) work that American workers no longer wished to do. AEI scholars again presented divergent depictions of immigrants. Though they did use language like “hard-working” and “permanent underclass” to describe immigrants, they did not work to repeat this language like Heritage and Cato scholars, rather, it cropped up in more or less isolated instances.

Table 7.3. Comparison of Think Tank Tones Concerned with National Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone of pieces concerned with National Identity</th>
<th>Heritage Foundation Percentage (number of pieces) 21 Total</th>
<th>Cato Institute Percentage (number of pieces)</th>
<th>American Enterprise Institute Percentage (number of pieces)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>38.10% (8)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>18.52% (5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>52.38% (11)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>14.81% (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>9.52% (2)</td>
<td>33.33% (2)</td>
<td>25.93% (7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>22.22% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>66.67% (4)</td>
<td>18.52% (5)</td>
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</table>

None of the Heritage Foundation’s 21 pieces concerned with national identity were either affirmative or somewhat affirmative, and only 2 were neutral (Table 7.3). Though Heritage Foundation scholars periodically employed idealistic immigration narratives, the overall impression they gave was that current immigration threatened our sovereignty, the value of our citizenship, and the culture and character of our nation. Their prescriptions for countering this threat were instituting policies and programs to assimilate those new immigrants we accept as members of our national community, and a “truly temporary” program for the vast majority,
whose labor we need but whose permanence we do not want.

Only six Cato pieces were concerned with national identity, and two thirds of these were affirmative (Table 7.3). Apart from praising the character and successful assimilation of contemporary immigrants and promoting the idealistic imagery of a “dynamic culture”, Cato’s affirmation was less about the immigrants themselves and more about a system in which immigrant labor could move freely. Cato scholars did not specifically advocate permanence for the immigrants they praised, demonstrating that their main agenda in affirming immigrants was promoting their free market ideology.

AEI pieces again ranged somewhat evenly across the spectrum of tones with slightly more on the affirmative side (Table 7.3). As with their pieces concerned with economics, the more vivid narratives AEI scholars used were not representative of the majority of pieces concerned with national identity. Some scholars did echo Heritage’s alarmist concerns about assimilation, the value of citizenship, and the character of the nation. Additional concerns were raised about immigration’s impact on our political system and the strength of conservative ideology. Yet other scholars framed the issue more positively, echoing Cato’s praise and advocating a broad welcome.

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that the way immigrants are portrayed in the policy-making debate depends heavily on the ideology and motives of the entity doing the portraying. With both Heritage Foundation and Cato Institute pieces, it is clear that they carefully selected and repeated specific imagery to shape the reader’s impression of the immigration situation, what the real “problems” were, and what the solutions should be. The Heritage Foundation and Cato Institute each presented a more or less unified internal front to push a specific agenda. At times they
seemed to be responding to each other, recognizing the common narratives used by the other side and developing narratives intended to diminish the effects of the other side’s framing. American Enterprise Institute pieces, on the other hand, did not homogenize discourse to frame a specific ideological line. This impression is supported by constructing an analysis of the overall tone of each think tank’s pieces. Both the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute’s posts fell heavily on one end of the scale (Table 7.4). Nearly 80% of the Heritage Foundation’s pieces were either alarmist or somewhat alarmist and only 3.5% were either affirmative or somewhat affirmative. Cato pieces lay heavily on the affirmative end, with 75% of pieces either affirmative or somewhat affirmative, and only 8% being somewhat alarmist (with no pieces being fully alarmist). AEI pieces were much more evenly distributed across tones, with over a third having a neutral tone, a third being either affirmative or somewhat affirmative, and slightly less than a third being alarmist or somewhat alarmist (Table 7.4). Consistent with the varying tones of their pieces, each think tank’s narratives relayed a very different story of immigration’s effects on the U.S.

Table 7.4. Comparison of Think Tank Tones Across all Concerns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone of pieces (across all concerns)</th>
<th>Heritage Foundation Percentage (number of pieces) Total = 86</th>
<th>Cato Institute Percentage (number of pieces) Total = 38</th>
<th>American Enterprise Institute Percentage (number of pieces) Total = 48</th>
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<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>40.70% (35)</td>
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<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>38.37% (33)</td>
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<td>17.44% (15)</td>
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<td>Somewhat Affirmative</td>
<td>1.16% (1)</td>
<td>35.14% (13)</td>
<td>20.83% (10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>2.33% (2)</td>
<td>40.54% (15)</td>
<td>12.5% (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If one were to rely solely on Heritage Foundation pieces for information on immigration policy, one would likely conclude that, while we are a “nation of immigrants,” immigrants also
bring with them multiple and potentially serious threats, and thus their entry into our national community must be carefully controlled and monitored. Implicitly conceptualizing the U.S. as both static and vulnerable, Heritage Foundation pieces expressed great concern about protecting America and Americans from these threats (terrorism, criminality, cultural change, degradation of America’s founding principles). They advocated preventing and punishing the illegal entry of those who may pose some threat to the U.S., increase rates of welfare use or taxes for social services, or not fully embrace American principles. To reduce these threats, Heritage scholars seemed willing to sacrifice freedoms (privacy, freedom of labor markets, freedom from harassment by enforcement officials) in order to crack down on immigrant flows. Their primary concerns seemed to be immigration’s impact on a static set of founding principles and the privileged lives of citizens.

If one were to rely solely on Cato Institute pieces, one would conclude that immigrants are “peaceful, hard-working” boons to our economy, that our policy is out of step with reality, and that our borders should be more or less open to all those who seek economic opportunity here. Concerned that immigration policies align with principles of the free market and limited government, Cato contributors were unwilling to sacrifice individual privacy in order to monitor and enforce immigration law. They too were concerned with use of taxpayer money, but saw enforcement efforts, rather than immigrants themselves, as the biggest threat to low taxes.

With the American Enterprise Institute, there was no unified, coherent ideology shaping the overall discourse. Individual scholars tended to fixate on certain ideological concerns (such as Newt Gingrich’s concern that immigrants embrace American values and speak English, or Edward Blum’s concern that immigration was hindering the representative function of our democracy) but within a generally conventional framework, scholars wrote about immigration as
they wished. As a reader, I had the impression that most AEI scholars just happened to think of something they wanted to write about related to immigration and then wrote it (or that immigration was one small facet of a larger issue that concerned them more). It is unclear whether the American Enterprise Institute’s ideological priorities lie in issues unrelated to immigration, and therefore immigration does not merit the effort of a unified response, or that their lack of ideologically-unified response implies that they follow more of a “university without students” model than an advocacy think tank model. It should be noted that although AEI lacked a unified message on immigration, the narratives and arguments they employed did not diverge from a relatively narrow range of ideas; AEI contributors all advocated variants of the status quo. Their “university without students” did not raise radical or profoundly innovative approaches to the immigration debate.

My study shows that old immigration narratives continue to be employed in new ways to elicit predictable responses favoring a given ideology. When Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation wishes his audience to oppose the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA), he draws upon old narratives of the U.S. being flooded with undesirable immigrants, and backs his position with newly-calculated predictions of the numbers and demographics that could be expected under CIRA. When Daniel Griswold of the Cato Institute wants to convince his audience to favor more open borders, he uses the old narrative that immigrants do the work that native-born Americans do not want to do, citing current statistics about our aging workforce and increasing levels of education among the native-born population. When David Frum of the American Enterprise Institute wishes his audience to support restricting low-skilled immigration, he raises the old concern of immigration radicalizing our government, pointing to the high poverty levels of post-1970 immigrants to support his fear of inequality leading to “populist
redistributionism.” These innovative uses of old narratives influence policymaking and public opinion, thanks to the role these think tanks play in the nation’s immigration discourse.

As shown in chapter 3, many scholars have asserted that think tanks influence the policymaking debate, and that to a certain extent they push ideological agendas, so my point is not a new one. Rather, this study is one more piece of evidence that we must critically examine the “expert opinions” presented by think tank scholars and question the objectivity of the work they present as scholarly. The alarmist narratives in these pieces were not the rants one finds on anti-immigrant websites, from Pat Buchanan, Lou Dobbs or Glenn Beck. Nor were the affirmative narratives what one would hear from “pro-immigrant” advocacy groups. Yet their use of old immigration narratives, couched in academic tones, may impact how Americans view immigrants, the scope of the problems with our immigration system, and the parameters for addressing these problems as much if not more than those of any avowedly anti- or pro-immigration groups. Overtly ideological messages are easily recognizable and therefore more easily deflected than messages that appear to be scholarly. When ideologically-driven messages are masked in a cloak of objectivity, there is a danger that the public and policymakers will be lulled into passively accepting them.

The three think tanks I examined have great exposure in the media and access to the policymaking community in Washington. Their scholars are often tapped to provide “expert opinion” in these spheres, as think tank work is given a prestige by virtue of the “scholarly” model out of which think tanks arose and on which many are still based. Passed as being reliable and authoritative, a go-to source for background on policy proposals and issues, the think tank may have influence where other media falter. Media consumers and policymakers are trained to value the opinion of experts as rigorous and more or less objective, meaning that when we hear
“expert opinion” we hear reliable statistics and arguments based on fact, worthy of shaping our understanding of the issue at hand.

My study clearly demonstrates that think tank work can be driven greatly by ideology and that the narratives they use to write about immigration should be examined as critically as those of any clearly biased pro- or anti-immigrant advocacy group. I would hate to think that think tanks’ clearly biased work, laced with old immigration narratives employed to elicit predictable responses, goes unexamined. Our immigration system and laws clearly need to be evaluated and reforms need to be made. My hope is that this evaluation can be undertaken with full awareness and consideration of the biases and prejudices that continue to infuse our nation’s immigration debate. This paper represents one small step toward that goal.
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<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>WebMemo #1524</td>
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<td>09/13/05</td>
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<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>Security</td>
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<td>04/04/06</td>
<td>Immigration Enforcement and Workplace Verification: Sensible Proposals for Congress</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Security, Economics</td>
<td>Executive Memorandum #999</td>
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<td>By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.</td>
<td>05/16/06</td>
<td>Senate Immigration Plan Fails to Deliver Comprehensive Border Security</td>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>Security, Economics, National ID</td>
<td>WebMemo #1080</td>
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<td>Integrating Immigration, Customs, and Border Enforcement Should Be a Priority</td>
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<td>Security</td>
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<td>Immigration Enforcement: A Better Idea for Returning Illegal Aliens</td>
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<td>Carafano</td>
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<td>A Border Security Strategy for Bush and Calderon: Improve Cooperation Between the U.S. and Mexico</td>
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<td>Security, National ID</td>
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<td>Illegal Immigration Alternatives: How States Should Respond</td>
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<td>WebMemo #1526</td>
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<td>Carafano</td>
<td>By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Diem Nguyen</td>
<td>04/28/08</td>
<td>The United States and Mexico: Helping One Another, Helping Ourselves</td>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>Security, Economics</td>
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<td>Security, Economics</td>
<td>WebMemo #2119</td>
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<td>Carafano</td>
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<td>Strengthening the Visa Waiver Program: A Memo to President-elect Obama</td>
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<td>The AgJOBS Act: Immigration Amnesty Revived</td>
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<td>09/06/06</td>
<td>Better, Faster, and Cheaper Border Security</td>
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<td>Security</td>
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<td>By Wes Dyck, William W. Beach, and James Sherk</td>
<td>06/01/07</td>
<td>The Senate's Workplace Immigration Enforcement Proposal: Too Much Federal Meddling</td>
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<td>Security, Economics</td>
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<td>The Senate Compromise on Immigration: A Path to Amnesty For Up to 10 Million</td>
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<td>Security, Economics</td>
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<td>Immigration Reform or Central Planning?</td>
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<td>Sponsorship: The Key to a Temporary Worker Program</td>
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<td>By Tim Kane, Ph.D., and Kirk A. Johnson, Ph.D.</td>
<td>03/01/08</td>
<td>The Real Problem With Immigration... and the Real Solution</td>
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<td>Kobach</td>
<td>By Kris W. Kobach</td>
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<td>Senate Immigration Law Would Disrupt Local Law Enforcement</td>
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<td>Security</td>
<td>Testimony</td>
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<td>By Kris W. Kobach</td>
<td>08/14/08</td>
<td>The Senate Immigration Bill Rewards Lawbreaking: Why the DREAM Act Is a Nightmare</td>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>Security, Economics</td>
<td>Backgrounder #19840</td>
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<td>By Kris W. Kobach</td>
<td>06/19/07</td>
<td>The Senate Immigration Bill: A National Security Nightmare</td>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>WebMemo #1513</td>
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<td>Kobach</td>
<td>By Kris W. Kobach, D.Phil., J.D.</td>
<td>06/26/07</td>
<td>The Senate Amnesty Bill: A Muddled Legal Mess</td>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>Security, Economics</td>
<td>WebMemo #1522</td>
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<td>Kobach</td>
<td>By Kris W. Kobach</td>
<td>09/13/07</td>
<td>A Strong Amnesty: Time to Wake Up from the DREAM Act</td>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>Security, Economics</td>
<td>Backgrounder #20090</td>
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<td>03/08/08</td>
<td>House Border Security Bill Falls Short</td>
<td>Alarmist</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Backgrounder #1919</td>
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<td>Carlafano</td>
<td>By James Baker McNell and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.</td>
<td>12/18/08</td>
<td>Fixing Border Security and Immigration: A Memo to President-elect Obama</td>
<td>Somewhat Alarmist</td>
<td>Security, Economics, National ID</td>
<td>Special Report #33</td>
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<td>By Jena Baker McNell and Matt A. Mayer</td>
<td>10/08/08</td>
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<td>03/01/06</td>
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<td>Where We Stand: Essential Requirements for Immigration Reform</td>
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<td>Building a Better Border: What the Experts Say</td>
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<td>Help Wanted: Administration Proposes Needed Changes in the H-2A Visa Program</td>
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<td>05/15/08</td>
<td>Senate Immigration Bill Would Allow 100 Million New Legal Immigrants over the Next Two Decades</td>
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<td>Amnesty and Continued Low Skill Immigration Will Substantially Raise Welfare Costs and Poverty</td>
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<td>Rector</td>
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<td>Amnesty Will Cost U.S. Taxpayers at Least $2.6 Trillion</td>
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<td>&quot;Merit-Based&quot; Immigration Under S 1348: Bringing In the High-Tech Waitresses</td>
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<td>The Fiscal Cost of Low-Skill Immigrants to the U.S. Taxpayer</td>
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<td>How Reforms in Mexico Could Make the U.S. More Secure</td>
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<td>Davis-Bacon Wages in Senate Immigration Bill Would Keep Immigrants in the Underground Economy</td>
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<td>Secure Bonds: A Better Solution Than Burdensome Workplace Immigration Enforcement</td>
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<td>Next Steps for Immigration and Border Security Reform: Restructuring the Work Visa</td>
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<td>Making Citizens: The Case for Patriotism</td>
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<td>Undeniably Amnesty: The Cornerstone of the Senate's Immigration Proposal</td>
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<td>State of the Union 2007: A Renewed Call for Immigration Reform</td>
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<td>Without immigration reform border fence will be 'fence to Qualified Countries</td>
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Appendix C: American Enterprise Institute Pieces on Immigration, July 1, 2005 - December 31, 2008

(Received by Last Name, then date)