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THE PREISER PUZZLE: CONTINUED FRUSTRATING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND HABEAS CORPUS REMEDIES FOR STATE PRISONERS

Martin A. Schwartz*

Fifteen years ago in *Preiser v. Rodriguez*¹ the United States Supreme Court attempted to resolve the potential overlap in federal remedies that are available to state prisoners. Constitutional claims asserted by state prisoners against state prison officials fall within the literal terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (section 1983),² yet may also fit within the congressional grant of federal court habeas corpus jurisdiction over federal claims asserted by state prisoners.³ As a result, federal courts must often determine whether a

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   Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

   *Id.*

3. Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction covering attacks upon state and federal custody is granted by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982). Specific habeas corpus jurisdiction covering attacks on state court judgments is also granted by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). See *Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Servs.*, 458 U.S. 502, 508 n.9 (1982). While section 2254 may apply to only post-trial attacks on state court judgments, pre-trial habeas petitions ‘‘are properly brought under . . . 28 U.S.C. section 2241, which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.’’ *Dickerson v. Louisiana*, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987). *Accord Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky.*, 410 U.S. 484, 503-04 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (section 2254 applies only to an individual who is in custody pursuant to a conviction in state court, while section 2241(c)(3) allows the federal courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus before judgment is given).

   Section 2254(a) is the provision typically overlapping with section 1983 and provides that:

   The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

The state prisoner's claim may be asserted under section 1983 or only in a federal habeas corpus proceeding after state remedies have been exhausted. Preiser resolved that claims seeking immediate or speedier release from confinement could only be brought as habeas corpus proceedings, while other types of prisoner claims might be brought under section 1983.

The resolution of this issue is important to state prisoners, their attorneys, the states, and the state and federal judicial systems. Because state prisoners must exhaust state remedies before commencing a federal habeas corpus proceeding but not a section 1983 action, the Supreme Court in Preiser 4. The issue may also arise in the context of constitutional claims asserted by persons in state custody other than state prisoners, such as those confined pursuant to a judgment of civil contempt, mental patients, and juvenile delinquents. See infra notes 478-99 and accompanying text. Federal prisoners in federal custody may not seek relief against federal prison officials under section 1983 because these officials do not act under color of state law within the meaning of section 1983. See M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES AND FEES § 5.6 (1986). The issue may arise, however, whether a federal prisoner must proceed pursuant to the grant of federal court habeas corpus jurisdiction over federal prisoners, under section 2241, or whether relief may be sought pursuant to another remedial device, such as a mandamus proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982), or a declaratory judgment action, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982). See, e.g., Del Raine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1987) (federal prisoner's claim to expunge disciplinary sanction is within habeas corpus where objective is to enhance prospects for parole); Dees v. Murphy, 794 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1986) (federal prisoner must exhaust federal habeas corpus remedies before bringing a civil rights action under section 1983 attacking conviction); In re United States Parole Comm'n, 793 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (federal prisoner is not restricted to habeas corpus relief when his claim that parole action was unconstitutional will not automatically alter his sentence); McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982) (validity of prisoner's habeas petition is dependent upon determination, on remand, that disciplinary proceedings are reasonably likely to lengthen his imprisonment); Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976) (prisoner who is challenging the duration of a sentence may not bring a claim under section 1983, nor may she seek release by a writ of mandamus; the sole remedy is habeas corpus). See also Monk v. Secretary of Navy, 793 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (if the effect of a declaratory judgment is to release a prisoner or affect a new trial, the action will be construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus even if release was not requested). Because these decisions typically analogize to the principles established by Preiser and its progeny, they are appropriately referred to in the context of analyzing federal remedies for state prisoners.

5. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) provides that:
An Applicant for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
Id. See infra notes 71-102 and accompanying text discussing the comparative exhaustion rules.

recognized that this issue has "considerable practical importance." The issue took on added significance when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, which authorizes courts to award attorneys' fees in section 1983 actions. There is, however, no similar congressional authority for judicially awarded fees in federal habeas corpus proceedings.

Due to the increase in civil rights filings by state prisoners, federal courts have been faced with the civil rights—habeas corpus issue in myriad and novel contexts. The lower federal courts, however, have received insufficient guidance from the United States Supreme Court. *Preiser*, the only Supreme Court decision to extensively analyze the issue, is ambiguous and leaves open more questions than it answers. Additionally, the Supreme Court has resolved only two other section 1983—habeas corpus disputes. Those decisions are also incomplete and in significant respects unclear. The lower

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9. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 236-57 and accompanying text.
federal court decisions are not surprisingly in disarray, with jurists frequently bemoaning the difficulties and frustrations they encounter in attempting to solve *Preiser* puzzles.14

This Article organizes and reviews the extensive decisional law that has developed during the fifteen years since *Preiser*, with the hope of adding clarity to this difficult area. It attempts to determine the preferred approach with regard to the many instances where the case law is conflicting. A good deal of groundwork must be laid before specific issues are addressed. Part I commences with an overview of the section 1983 civil rights and federal habeas corpus remedies. Part II analyzes the distinctions between the two remedies. Part III undertakes an analysis of the Supreme Court precedent. Part IV discusses three fundamental issues that the Supreme Court has failed to resolve. Part V discusses the relationship between the *Preiser* issue and *Younger v. Harris*15 abstention.

The remainder of the Article focuses on specific issues that arise in *Preiser* analyses. Part VI categorizes various areas where the *Preiser* issue has arisen and analyzes the responses of the lower federal courts. Part VII reviews the major procedural issues that arise out of the section 1983—federal habeas corpus overlap, such as *res judicata* questions and statute of limitation problems. The Article concludes with observations concerning the vast body of law in this area.

I. SECTION 1983 AND FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: AN OVERVIEW

Section 1983’s major purpose is to provide a remedy to enforce the fourteenth amendment.16 Section 1983 complaints must allege that a person


The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "the demarcation line between civil rights actions and habeas corpus petitions is not always clear." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974). See also I. Sensenich, supra note 10, at 19 ("The determination of whether an action is habeas corpus or civil rights can be difficult.").


acting under color of state law deprived the claimant of a federal right. 17 The statute grants an injured party the right to sue in an action at law or in equity and it provides a basis for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. 18

The Congress that adopted the 1871 Act decided that a federal remedy for constitutional deprivations was necessary because state authorities were either unwilling or unable to control the widespread violence of the Ku Klux Klan against blacks and their supporters. 19 Section 1983 did not provide a remedy against the Ku Klux Klan itself, but against those persons representing a state who were unable or unwilling to enforce the state law. 20 More
specifically, congressional debates show that the section 1983 remedy was strongly motivated by a grave concern that state courts were deficient in protecting federal rights.21

Congress's distrust for state fact finding processes impacts significantly upon the Supreme Court's contemporary interpretation of section 1983. This distrust underlies the Supreme Court's related rulings in Monroe v. Pape22 that state judicial remedies need not be exhausted in order to commence a section 1983 action and that unconstitutional conduct by state and local officials is redressable under section 1983, even if the same conduct violates state law for which a state court remedy exists.23 Section 1983 supplements the state remedy, and the latter need not be sought first and refused prior to invoking a section 1983 claim.24 That same distrust for state fact finding processes provided a significant basis for extending the Monroe holding in Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents.25 In Patsy, the Court stated that Congress did not intend that state administrative remedies be exhausted before a person could commence an action under section 1983.

The Monroe decision in 1961 provided the initial impetus for the modern explosion of section 1983 litigation in general, and of state prisoner actions under section 1983 in particular.26 Until the early 1960's, the lower federal courts had applied the "hands-off" doctrine to prisoner grievances.27 Cooper
v. Pate,\textsuperscript{28} decided in 1964, marked the end of the hands-off approach and began a new wave of prisoners' constitutional rights litigation.\textsuperscript{29} Since Cooper, prisoners have asserted a wide variety of constitutional claims under section 1983 that test virtually every aspect of prison life under the Constitution.\textsuperscript{30}

While section 1983 developed into a meaningful remedy for state prisoners, federal habeas corpus rights were also expanded.\textsuperscript{31} The habeas corpus writ has ancient common law roots as a device designed to provide "swift judicial review of alleged unlawful restraints of liberty."\textsuperscript{32} Congress extended federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over state prisoners in 1867.\textsuperscript{33} Habeas corpus is a

local governmental officials began to flow into the federal courts."\textsuperscript{34}). Other legal developments that contributed significantly to the tremendous increase in section 1983 litigation include Congress's authorization in 1976 of attorneys' fee awards in 1983 actions, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), and the Court's 1978 decision in Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which overruled Monroe on municipal immunity and therefore subjected municipalities to section 1983 liability.

27. See Zeigler, \textit{Federal Court Reform of State Criminal Justice Systems: A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine From A Modern Perspective}, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 31, 56 (1985) (under the "hands-off" doctrine, "[s]ome courts held that they lacked jurisdiction; others held that their hearing prison cases would improperly interfere with the internal administration of state prisons."); Comment, \textit{Proper Forum, supra} note 6, at 1365-66.

28. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam). The state prisoner in Cooper alleged "that solely because of his religious beliefs, he was denied permission to purchase certain religious publications and denied other privileges enjoyed by other prisoners." \textit{Id}. The district and circuit courts held that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court ruled that "the complaint stated a cause of action and it was error to dismiss it." \textit{Id}. (citations omitted).

29. Zeigler, \textit{supra} note 27, at 56-57; Comment, \textit{Proper Forum, supra} note 6, at 1370.

30. See Lay, \textit{supra} note 10, at 936 n.4. "Prisoner grievances relating to conditions of confinement, food, privacy, heat, mail, hair length, work details, segregation from the prison population, religious practices, and rehabilitation have all become issues of federal litigation under section 1983." \textit{Id}. See generally I. SENSENICH, \textit{supra} note 10 (surveys constitutional claims arising under section 1983 which tested aspects of prison life under the Constitution).

While the Supreme Court no longer takes the position that an "iron curtain" separates prisoners from the United States Constitution, it also takes the position "that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974)). Moreover, Supreme Court prisoners' rights decisions frequently stress that "[p]rison administrators, therefore, should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) and cases cited therein. \textit{See also} Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 585 (1984) (jail's blanket prohibition on contact visits is a reasonable, nonpunitive response to legitimate security concerns, consistent with the fourteenth amendment). To a significant extent the hands-off approach has been replaced by a standard of broad deference.


controversial remedy because of the tension and friction that results when federal courts review state court convictions. The language of the congressional grant of federal court habeas corpus jurisdiction over state prisoners has not changed significantly since its original enactment, but the judicial interpretation of this jurisdiction continually undergoes change. Early in this century habeas corpus was available only to challenge the sentencing tribunal’s jurisdiction. Habeas corpus is now available to anyone in state custody who asserts that his confinement violates any provision of the United States Constitution. The doctrine was narrowed somewhat in Stone v. O’Brien (1923) A.C. 603, 609 (H.L.). The writ was inscribed in English law in the 17th century. Flannery, Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 107. For a discussion of the history of the writ see 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4261, at 588 (1981) [hereinafter Wright, Miller & Cooper]; Developments in the Law, Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1042-45 (1970) [hereinafter Developments]. The writ is given explicit recognition and protection in the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."). It was incorporated into the first congressional grant of federal court jurisdiction. Fay, 372 U.S. at 400 (citing Act of September 24, 1789, C.20, § 14, Stat. 81-82). While the Supreme Court typically describes the writ in lofty terms, see, e.g., Fay 372 U.S. at 400 ("perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England . . . ."); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939) ("There is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired."); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1869) ("only sufficient defense of personal freedom"); Ex parte Bollman and Swartout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) ("that great writ"), not all agree, with some describing it as the "Greatly Abused Writ." Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 365 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Hill, J., specially concurring), quoted in Robbins, Whither (or Wither) Habeas Corpus?: Observations on the Supreme Court’s 1985 Term, 111 F.R.D. 265, 266 (1986).


34. "There is an affront to state sensibilities when a single federal judge can order discharge of a prisoner whose conviction has been affirmed by the highest court of a state." Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 32, § 4261, at 600; C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 53, 344 (4th ed. 1983). See also Robbins, supra note 32, at 266 (discussing the controversy over the writ of habeas corpus); Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 991 (1985) (theorizes that the writ of habeas corpus is better explained as providing a federal forum in which to enforce federal rights that may be unpopular with the states).

35. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 32, § 4261, at 597.


37. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (fourteenth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (claim of racial discrimination in selection of grand jury); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (claim of lack of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). While section 2254(a) of Title 28 is not limited to federal constitutional claims but encompasses any violation of federal law, federal statutory claims asserted by state prisoners in a federal habeas corpus proceeding are exceedingly rare. "Few situations can be imagined in which a state prisoner has a federal nonconstitutional claim, and the problem has been virtually unlitigated in recent years." Developments, supra note 32, at 1070. Federal habeas corpus is available only for
Powell, which excluded fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims from the scope of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. Stone, however, was based in part upon the majority's view that the exclusionary rule is "not a personal constitutional right" but instead, "a judicially created remedy."

The increased availability of section 1983 claims in the early 1960's coincided with the Supreme Court's expansion of the parameters of federal habeas corpus in three 1963 decisions, Jones v. Cunningham, Fay v. Noia, and Townsend v. Sain. In Jones, the Supreme Court liberalized the requirement that the federal habeas corpus petitioner be "in custody" by holding that a person released on parole is "in custody" for the purpose of federal habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that while parolees are not physically confined, parole restrains one's liberty in a way not shared by the public. Following the Jones decision, courts broadened the "in custody" definition to include prisoners released on probation or on one's own recognizance, and in situations where a detainer has been imposed. Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated that a person serving consecutive sentences is "in custody" under both sentences and may challenge either the sentence presently being served or the subsequent sentence. While the

claims based upon federal law. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) (federal courts have no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct "wrongs of constitutional dimension").

39. Id. at 486. Justice Brennan expressed the fear in his dissenting opinion in Stone that the Court's decision would extend beyond exclusionary rule claims. Id. at 516-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These fears have "not been realized." Robbins, supra note 32, at 292. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
43. 371 U.S. at 236-43 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982)).
44. Jones, 371 U.S. at 240.
46. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973). Release on bail constitutes sufficient custody. See Reimnitz v. State's Attorney, 761 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1985); Delk v. Atkinson, 665 F.2d 90, 93 (6th Cir. 1981); Capler v. City of Greenville, Miss., 422 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1970); Zeigler, supra note 27, at 94-95 n.319; Developments, supra note 32, at 1075 n.26. ("The conditions attached to the release on bail should be the determinant.").
49. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968) (overruling McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934)). Cf. Ward v. Knoblock, 738 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1984) (one who is incarcerated on an unrelated charge is not in custody for the purpose of challenging a previous sentence already served, since liberty is not restrained by the prior sentence, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985). One need only be in custody when the habeas corpus proceeding is commenced. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238-40 (1968); Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 32, § 4262, at
Court has not entirely dispensed with the custody requirement, Jones marked a new era of "in custody" interpretation.

608. See also Tinder v. Paula, 725 F.2d 801 (lst Cir. 1984) (where probation expired before the habeas corpus proceeding was commenced, petitioner was not in custody and could not challenge a delinquency adjudication in the habeas corpus proceeding). Habeas proceedings will not be held moot when the habeas petitioner is unconditionally discharged from custody after commencement of the habeas proceeding if statutory collateral consequences flow from the conviction being attacked. Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237-38. Accord Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (a state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until his release and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it has prevented him from doing). Cf. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982) (unnecessary release mooted proceeding where petitioners attacked only their sentences and alleged only nonstatutory collateral consequences). Carafas is based in part upon the fact that release is not the sole remedy that may be granted by a federal habeas corpus court. 28 U.S.C. section 2244(b) refers to "release from custody or other remedy." See Peyton, 391 U.S. at 67; Carafas, 391 U.S. at 239.

50. Federal courts consistently hold that federal habeas corpus may not be relied upon to challenge a "fine only" conviction because the imposition of a fine does not place one "in custody." See, e.g., Lillies v. New Hampshire, 788 F.2d 60 (lst Cir. 1986) (fine and suspension of driver's license is not custody); Battiste v. City of Baton Rouge, La., 732 F.2d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 1984) (fine is not custody); Tinder v. Paula, 725 F.2d 801, 804 (lst Cir. 1984) (dicta) ("habeas is not available as a remedy for fine-only convictions. . . ."); Spring v. Caldwell, 692 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1982) (fine followed by issuance of warrant to compel payment of fine not custody); Duvallon v. Florida, 691 F.2d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 1982) (fine only conviction is not custody), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1073 (1983); Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404, 407 (7th Cir.) (fine only conviction is not custody), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979); Russell v. City of Pierre, S.D., 530 F.2d 791, 792 (8th Cir.) (fine is not custody), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); Westberry v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623, 624-25 (5th Cir. 1970) (fine and revocation of driver's license is not custody). Accord Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (parties not "incarcerated or otherwise restrained" cannot meet the habeas corpus custody requirement). See also Harts v. Indiana, 732 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1984) (one year suspension of driver's license is not a severe enough restraint on liberty to constitute custody). Cf. United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970) (incarceration for refusal to pay fine; habeas proceeding considered on the merits), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971). Even severe collateral consequences do not constitute "custody." Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1987) (revocation of medical license is not custody); Ginsberg v. Abrams, 702 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (petitioner's removal from the bench, revocation of his license to practice law, and disqualification as a real estate broker or insurance agent did not place him in custody); Hanson, 591 F.2d at 407 (collateral consequences from a fine only conviction are "not severe enough to put the convicted person in custody . . ."); Kravitz v. Pennsylvania, 546 F.2d 1100, 1102 (3d Cir. 1977) (custody requirement not met if habeas corpus petition filed after petitioner had been unconditionally released). But see Connor v. Pickett, 552 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir. 1977) (implying that collateral consequences may be sufficient to satisfy the custody requirement); Thistlethwaite v. City of N.Y., 497 F.2d 339, 443 (2d Cir.) (dictum) (imposition of fine may be sufficient to satisfy custody requirements if there are possible collateral consequences), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974). The Supreme Court cases relied upon in Connor and Thistlethwaite deal with mootness, not custody. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787-88 (1969); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 579-80 n.3 (1969); Sibron, 392 U.S. at 51-58; Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237-38; Ginsberg v. New York 390 U.S. 629, 633-34 n.2 (1968). See Hanson, 591 F.2d at 406-07. One difficult issue discussed in Part VI, infra, is whether, given the unavailability of federal habeas corpus to test a fine only or expired sentence conviction, such convictions may be attacked under section 1983. See infra notes 318-44 and accompanying text.
The Preiser Puzzle simplifies the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement for state prisoners. Originally, the exhaustion requirement was imposed so that relations between the federal and state courts would not be unnecessarily disturbed. The exhaustion requirement, codified by Congress in 1948, effectuates federal-state comity. The statute now requires a prisoner to exhaust state remedies which are not "ineffective" in protecting the prisoner's rights. This policy affords state courts the initial opportunity to correct

52. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886). This doctrine required exhaustion of "all state remedies available, including all appellate remedies in the state courts . . . ." Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944).
Section 2254(b) provides that an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted on behalf of a state prisoner, i.e., "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court," unless the petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982). Under subdivision (c) of section 2254, available state remedies have not been exhausted if the habeas petitioner "has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1982). The statutory exhaustion requirement presupposes the existence of an adequate state remedy, Young, 337 U.S. at 239, and does not require one to exhaust futile state remedies, as where the highest court in the state previously rejected petitioner's contention. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 32, § 4264, at 648; Thompson v. Reivitz, 746 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1103 (1985). The mere claim that the state courts will not be sympathetic to a petitioner's constitutional claim will not excuse exhaustion, because one significant assumption behind the exhaustion requirement is that the state courts are as "equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution" as the federal courts. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1981) (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886)). This is consistent with the Supreme Court's view that the state courts are as competent to decide federal constitutional claims as the federal courts. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 417 n. 37 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611, reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884). Many strongly believe, however, that federal courts are "more likely to apply federal law sympathetically and understandingly than are state courts." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 514 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting ALI, Study of Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, 166 (1969)); M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction, Tensions in the Allocation of Federal Power 2-3 (Bobbs-Merril 1980); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977). Competing authorities on the issue are discussed and analyzed in Yackle, supra note 34, at 1022-24.
constitutional errors and balances federalism interests against the need to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a federal remedy in all cases of restraint or confinement in violation of federal law.

Fay compromised some federalism interests in favor of making federal habeas corpus available to state prisoners. The Fay Court held that the exhaustion requirement does not encompass state remedies that a petitioner could have had but failed to pursue, and are no longer available when the federal petition was filed, unless the petitioner had "deliberately by-passed" the available state remedies. The ruling in Fay was a rough counterpart to the holding in Monroe v. Pape that the existence of a state judicial remedy does not defeat a section 1983 claim for relief.

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55. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971) (per curiam) (citing Fay, 372 U.S. at 438). The Court has described "comity" as a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.


56. Braden, 410 U.S. at 490 (quoting Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, (1923) A.C. 603, 609 (HL)). A leading article describes the interests protected by the exhaustion requirement in more detail:

The significant interests protected by the exhaustion requirement are of two types. First, exhaustion preserves the role of the state courts in the application and enforcement of federal law. Early federal intervention in state criminal proceedings would tend to remove federal questions from the state courts, isolate those courts from constitutional issues, and thereby remove their understanding of and hospitality to federally protected interests. Second, exhaustion preserves orderly administration of state judicial business, preventing the interruption of state adjudication by federal habeas proceedings. It is important that petitioners reach state appellate courts, which can develop and correct errors of state and federal law and most effectively supervise and impose uniformity on trial courts.

Developments, supra note 32, at 1094 (footnotes omitted), quoted in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 n.13 (1973); Braden, 410 U.S. at 490-91. See also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982) ("The exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state court's role in the enforcement of federal law. . . .").


58. The Court in Fay ruled that "deliberate bypass" refers to a decision made by the petitioner rather than petitioner's counsel. Id. at 439. Fay also reaffirmed the holding in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, reh'g denied, 345 U.S. 946 (1953), that a state court ruling does not preclude a federal court habeas determination, and ruled that the exhaustion requirement does not require that one seek review in the United States Supreme Court. Fay, 372 U.S. at 422.


60. See Comment, Proper Forum, supra note 6, at 1367. The analogy between Monroe and Fay is not perfect because, unlike Monroe, Fay did not eliminate the exhaustion of state remedies requirement from federal habeas corpus but rather gave the requirement a liberal interpretation.
Townsend v. Sain also de-emphasized the significance of state remedies. The Townsend Court held that even where the state court made a factual determination, the federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding may receive evidence and make findings of fact. Furthermore, the Townsend Court held that where a factual dispute exists, an evidentiary hearing must be held by the federal habeas court if the applicant did not, either at the time of trial or in a collateral proceeding, receive a full and fair hearing in state court.

Of these three 1963 Supreme Court decisions, Fay had the greatest impact upon federal habeas corpus proceedings, although this impact was short lived. Wainwright v. Sykes, decided in 1977, rejected Fay's sweeping language and, while Wainwright did not explicitly overrule Fay, it rendered Fay nearly obsolete. Nevertheless, Jones, Fay, and Townsend opened federal habeas corpus proceedings to state prisoners. Following these three decisions, large numbers of habeas corpus petitions were filed by state prisoners.

The enhanced availability of section 1983, the demise of the hands-off doctrine, and the liberalization of federal habeas corpus set the stage for the 1973 confrontation in Preiser v. Rodriguez. These legal developments encouraged prisoners to file section 1983 civil rights actions and federal habeas corpus proceedings in increasing numbers. Inevitably, controversies arose over whether or not the prisoner had selected the proper remedy. Before proceeding to Preiser, however, a comparison of section 1983 and

62. 372 U.S. at 318.
63. Id. at 312. Townsend listed circumstances in which federal evidentiary hearings are mandatory. Id. at 313. These were codified by Congress in 1966 in modified form by 28 U.S.C. section 2254(b) (1982). See C. Wright, supra note 34, § 53, at 333-39.
64. 433 U.S. 72, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977).
federal habeas corpus remedies is needed to evaluate what is at stake when a court is called upon to determine the proper remedy.

II. SECTION 1983 VERSUS FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS—THE STAKES

Since a violation of federally protected rights by a state or local official is within the "literal terms" of both section 1983 and federal habeas corpus, there is a potential overlap in the two remedies. This hardly means that they are fungible. On the contrary, several significant differences in the remedies render the resolution of a Preiser v. Rodriguez puzzle by a federal court of crucial importance.

The custody and exhaustion requirements that state prisoners must satisfy in order to commence a federal habeas corpus proceeding are not applicable to section 1983 claims. The custody requirement, however, is relatively insignificant because of the Supreme Court's liberalized definition of custody. In addition, the section 1983—habeas corpus issue normally arises in cases brought by confined state prisoners who are clearly in custody.

The exhaustion requirement under the federal habeas corpus doctrine lies at the heart of the section 1983—habeas corpus conflict. In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner must exhaust all state judicial and administrative remedies before bringing suit; there is no such prerequisite under section 1983. The section 1983 remedy exists, in part, because of congressional mistrust for the "factfinding processes of state institutions." Congress believed that federal courts were less susceptible than state courts to local prejudice and defects in the fact finding processes. Congress also wanted to provide immediate access to the federal judicial system despite state laws to the contrary.

To assess the significance of state remedies in relation to the section 1983 remedy requires consideration of both Congress's 1980 amendment to the Civil Rights of the Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), and the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor. In Patsy, the Supreme Court partially relied upon the 1980 CRIPA amendment to reject the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement. CRIPA created a specific, limited exhaustion requirement for

68. Id. at 488.
69. Id. at 475.
70. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
72. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 506.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 504.
77. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 507-16.
section 1983 actions brought by adult state prisoners. The courts have
discretion to continue an action for up to ninety days if the Attorney General
or the court determines that a "plain, speedy, and effective" system of
administrative review exists in a particular jurisdiction and that exhaustion
is "appropriate and in the interests of justice."78 Congress found that the
largest group of section 1983 suits were prisoner actions79 and the limited
exhaustion requirement was adopted, therefore, to relieve the burden on
federal courts by diverting some of these suits back through state and local
institutions.80 The Court in Patsy found that CRIPA would have been
unnecessary had there been a general exhaustion requirement in section 1983
actions, and that in enacting this specific provision for adult state prisoners,
Congress had created an exception to the no-exhaustion rule.81

The limited exhaustion requirement delineated in CRIPA has not signifi-
cantly altered the general no-exhaustion rule established by Monroe and
Patsy. CRIPA does not require that state prisoners who assert proper claims
for relief under section 1983 first exhaust either state judicial or administrative
remedies. CRIPA instead allows a court discretion to continue an action for
no more than ninety days pending resort to administrative remedies that
satisfy the statutory criteria.82 Thus, CRIPA intrudes into the section 1983
no-exhaustion rule in a small way. Moreover, CRIPA is apparently invoked
infrequently, given the relatively few decisions discussing the statutory pro-
vision.83 This is partly due to the fact that the provision may be invoked

78. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1982). The Supreme Court has described section 1997e as an
"extraordinarily detailed exhaustion scheme." Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509-10. "[A]n inmate must
not only commence the grievance procedure but must appeal the grievance within the ninety-
day period to the highest level available to him within said ninety-day period." Mavlick v.
Central Classification Bd., 659 F. Supp. 24, 27 (E.D. Va. 1986). The provision authorizes only
a continuance, not a dismissal. Francis v. Marquez, 741 F.2d 1127-28 (9th Cir. 1984); Kennedy
v. Herschler, 655 F.2d 210, 212 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). The court may dismiss, however,
if the prisoner fails to make reasonable, good faith efforts to pursue administrative remedies
following the continuance of the action. Lay v. Anderson, 837 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1988); Rocky
v. Vittorie, 813 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1987). Section 1997e is limited to actions by adults
convicted of a crime and thus does not cover juvenile delinquents. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 510 n.10;
NEWS 832, 840-41. While the legislative history of the Act refers at times to federal court
actions, see, e.g., S. REP. No. 897 supra, at 15, the statute itself is not so limited and has been
applied by at least one state court. Ode v. Smith, 118 Misc. 2d 617, 461 N.Y.S.2d 684, 687

79. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 515.
80. Id. at 509. See Lay, supra note 10, at 936.
81. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 515.
83. One court, however, which frequently invoked the "CRIPA stay provision," found that
during 1983, the year in which it began to continue section 1983 actions so that administrative
remedies might be exhausted, the number of such complaints filed by inmates decreased by
35% and that "approximately 92 percent of all grievances filed were resolved within the
(4th Cir. 1986). In Goff v. Menke, 672 F.2d 702, 706 (8th Cir. 1982), the court, in an opinion
only when the Attorney General has certified, or the court finds, that a particular state's inmate grievance procedures are plain, speedy, and effective. In addition, few states have adopted procedures that comply with the CRIPA statutory requirements.

The doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor is also an important factor to consider when assessing the significance of state remedies in section 1983 actions. In both Parratt and Hudson v. Palmer the plaintiff prisoners asserted due process claims in federal court section 1983 actions. The Supreme Court ruled in both cases that when one is deprived of property from a "random and unauthorized act," rather than the enforcement of an "established state procedure," due process is satisfied if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation state court remedy.

While the parameters of this doctrine are not definitively settled, circuit courts have confined the doctrine to claims of procedural due process. If
Parratt and Hudson are applied to substantive constitutional claims, the doctrine would overturn the holding in Monroe v. Pape,91 that the federal section 1983 remedy is independent of any available state remedies.92 The Parratt-Hudson doctrine is reconciled with Monroe when the doctrine is limited to claimed violations of procedural due process.

When one's procedural due process claim is rejected by a federal court because of the availability of an adequate state court remedy, the claim is defeated on the merits rather than for failure to exhaust state remedies.93 This is because Parratt and Hudson neither eliminate nor limit the right to commence a federal section 1983 action without exhausting state judicial remedies. Rather, these cases hold that having properly commenced the action, a procedural due process claim may be without merit under those circumstances where the available state judicial remedies provide due process. Thus, the Parratt-Hudson doctrine has not altered the strong no-exhaustion rule that governs section 1983 claims.

Unlike section 1983, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction requires state prisoners to exhaust adequate state remedies before bringing a habeas corpus proceeding.94 Contrary to Congress's mistrust for state fact finding that F.2d 1252, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1500 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986); Conway v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 758 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 390 (1986); Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 338 (5th Cir. 1984). See also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 541 n.4 (1984) (Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun concurring in part and dissenting in part) (join the opinion of the Court upon the understanding that the Court's holding does not apply to conduct that violates a substantive constitutional right).


92. This is a result not intended by the Parratt court. See Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 1984).


94. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1982). Given the fact that the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement is rooted in principles of comity, the requirement is characterized as a “doctrine of abstention,” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419 (1963), and is not “jurisdictional.” Id. at 434-35. Accord Granberry v. Greer, 107 S. Ct. 1671, 1673 (1987) (“[F]ailure to exhaust state remedies does not deprive an appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of a habeas corpus application.”); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (while the exhaustion requirement is “to be strictly enforced, [it is not jurisdictional]”), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984); Bradburn v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“the requirement of exhaustion is not jurisdictional but is merely a matter of comity” (quoting McGee v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 1206, 1210 (5th Cir. 1984))), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 167 (1987). Where the state does not raise petitioner’s failure to exhaust in the district court and raises it for the first time in the court of appeals, the appellate court must exercise discretion . . . to decide whether the administration of justice would be better served by insisting on exhaustion or by reaching the merits of the petition forthwith.” Granberry, 107 S. Ct. at 1673. See, e.g., Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying Granberry in a Preiser context; exhaustion required even though not raised by defendants in district or circuit courts). “The appellate court is not required to dismiss for nonexhaustion notwithstanding the state’s failure to raise it, and the
underlies the section 1983 no-exhaustion rule, the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement reflects congressional respect for state remedies and a belief that state authorities should be given the first opportunity to correct constitutional errors. The Supreme Court requires strict enforcement of the exhaustion requirement in federal habeas corpus proceedings. A petitioner must present the substance of his claim in state court and seek review in the highest court in the state. In Rose v. Lundy the Supreme Court adopted the complete exhaustion rule. Pursuant to this rule "mixed petitions," that is those containing exhausted and unexhausted claims, must be dismissed unless a petitioner relinquishes the unexhausted claims. While the Court recognized that the mixed petition problem was not covered by the federal habeas corpus statute, and that in all likelihood Congress had never considered the problem, the Court required complete exhaustion to further the policies of the exhaustion rule. The complete exhaustion rule will not only reduce piecemeal litigation, but will also give state courts more opportunities to resolve constitutional questions. The Rose Court thus viewed the rule as a way to promote the principle of comity that underlies the exhaustion requirement.

court is not obligated to regard the state's omission as an absolute waiver of the claim." Granberry, 107 S. Ct. at 1674. The court in Peterson v. Murante, 673 F. Supp. 664, 670 (W.D.N.Y. 1987), neglecting Granberry, improperly treated the Preiser issue as one of "subject matter jurisdiction."

95. See supra notes 72-74.
96. See supra notes 53-56.

100. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
101. The Court, however, acknowledged that by deleting unexhausted claims, a petitioner could risk forfeiting consideration of the unexhausted claims under the abuse of the writ rule set forth in 28 U.S.C. section 2254 Rule 9(b) (1982). Rose, 455 U.S. at 520-21. The Rose decision "gives petitioners the option either of going back to state court to exhaust the claims not previously presented to that forum before returning to federal court, or of resubmitting a new petition to the federal court containing only exhausted claims." Rosenberg, Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus: From Great Writ to Exceptional Remedy, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 597, 628-29 (1985).
102. Rose, 455 U.S. at 518-19. "A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving the courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error." Id.
103. Id. at 519. This will enable the state courts to become more familiar and perhaps more " hospitable toward federal constitutional issues." Id.
The exhaustion requirement in federal habeas corpus proceedings typically means that a significant delay will occur before there is review of federal claims. While time itself is very important for a prisoner, it is not the only factor involved. A state prisoner who has been unsuccessful in the state court system must institute a federal habeas corpus proceeding encumbered by the adverse state court determinations. While res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to federal habeas corpus proceedings, federal habeas courts are required to give substantial deference to state findings of fact. Federal courts presume the state findings of fact are correct and set them aside only if they are "not fairly supported by the record." The effect of a combined reading of the exhaustion and deference rules is that, in most cases, if an issue was not raised in state court a prisoner cannot obtain federal court jurisdiction and, in many cases, if an issue was decided in the state court, the decision is given great weight and the prisoner is unable to obtain federal habeas corpus relief.

Even if deference to state fact finding was not required, the exhaustion requirement places a federal habeas corpus petitioner at a tremendous strategic disadvantage. A federal court grant of the writ in a particular case constitutes an implicit statement that the state court system has been a less vigilant enforcer of the Constitution than the federal court. This is contrary to the Supreme Court's assumption that state courts are as competent and sensitive in interpreting the United States Constitution as the federal courts.

The negative state fact finding and adverse legal determinations inherent in federal habeas corpus proceedings are responsible for the fact that very few federal habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners are granted. The small percentage of writs granted, the fact that many of the petitions filed are frivolous pro se petitions, and the sensitive and controversial nature


105. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985) ("state court findings of fact are to be accorded the presumption of correctness"); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 551 (1981) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d)(8) (1982)). The federal habeas corpus court has the power to receive evidence and try the facts anew. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 310-12 (1963). The court will do so, however, only if the habeas petitioner "did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding." Id. at 312-13. Townsend sets forth guidelines for determining whether a full and fair hearing was provided in state court, and these guidelines were substantially codified by Congress in 1966 in 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) (1982). Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313.

106. Robbins, supra note 32, at 276.

107. See supra note 54.

108. A leading authority estimates from available studies that no more than 4% of the federal habeas corpus petitions are granted. Wright, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3261, at 601. See also Pagano, supra note 97, at 32 ("the success rate for habeas petitions is fairly low . . .").

109. See supra note 108.

110. Wright, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 4261, at 588; Yackle, supra note 34, at 1010 ("habeas petitions often lack merit . . ."); Soloff, Litigation and Relitigation: The
of the writ contribute to the burdens facing state prisoners who petition for habeas corpus relief. Justice Jackson, for example, acknowledged that the infrequent meritorious application is prejudiced by being buried with the usual worthless claims because "[h]e who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search."111 Judge Friendly referred to federal habeas corpus as "a gigantic waste of effort" because the remedy produces no result in the overwhelming majority of cases and a good result only rarely.112

Judicial attitudes like these place a federal habeas corpus petitioner at a disadvantage compared to a section 1983 claimant. This attitudinal factor should be considered in evaluating the distinction between the availability of a section 1983 remedy as compared to a federal habeas corpus remedy. So as not to overstate the difference in this regard, there has been wide concern over the huge increase in section 1983 filings generally and by prisoners specifically,113 which include a large number of frivolous pro se complaints.114

While some complain that section 1983 has already exceeded its historical bounds,115 state prisoner section 1983 claims do not come to federal court with the same negative connotations as the federal habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners. Section 1983 was enacted in part because of Congress's distrust for the adequacy of state fact finding,116 thereby creating a type of de facto presumption in favor of federal court review of state action that is allegedly unconstitutional. Moreover, these claims need not come to federal court burdened by adverse state court fact findings and legal rulings because exhaustion of state remedies is not required to commence a section 1983 action.

Another major distinction between section 1983 and federal habeas corpus is the potential relief awarded in each proceeding. Release from custody lies at the heart of the habeas corpus remedy. That relief, however, is not available in a civil rights action.117 On the other hand, while damages are

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Uncertain Status of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 297, 298 n.4 (1978) ("the feeling that there are too many frivolous petitions....").


113. See supra note 10 (statistics indicating increase in section 1983 filings).

114. "[I]t is generally agreed that most prisoner rights cases are frivolous and ought to be dismissed under even the narrowest definition of frivolity." I. Sensenich, supra note 10, at 10.


116. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.

117. See Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150, 153 (1st Cir. 1984); Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730, 731 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc), rev'd sub nom.
an important section 1983 remedy, they are not available in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Hence, habeas corpus does not even attempt to compensate for past sufferings; rather the habeas remedy begins where the section 1983 remedy leaves off. By releasing a defendant from custody, habeas corpus can prevent only future injury. Thus, the habeas corpus and section 1983 damages remedies do not overlap. They are mutually exclusive, yet complementary remedies that together operate to render the injured party whole.

Additionally, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act of 1976, which added court ordered attorneys’ fees to the list of remedies.
available in civil rights actions.\textsuperscript{121} By contrast, there is no statutory authorization for awarding attorneys' fees in federal habeas corpus proceedings.\textsuperscript{122} This distinction is substantial. Congress authorized fee awards in section 1983 actions because a "vast majority of victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal counsel . . . [and therefore] are unable to present their cases to the courts."\textsuperscript{123} Consistent with this statutory purpose, there is a strong presumption that a prevailing plaintiff should recover a fee.\textsuperscript{124} Thus, a prevailing section 1983 plaintiff recovers an attorney's fee unless special circumstances render an award unjust.\textsuperscript{125}

Section 1983's no-exhaustion rule and statutory fee authority are the two major distinctions between the two remedies and generally render section 1983 more desirable than federal habeas corpus to state prisoners. Other

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\textsuperscript{122} Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987); Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1114 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 737 F.2d 261 (1984). See also Rutledge v. Sunderland, 671 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir. 1982) (petitioner was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees in a successful habeas corpus suit absent statutory authority for such an award). When a suit, nominally brought under section 1983, terminates in a consent decree providing available relief only in a habeas corpus proceeding, the proceeding will be treated as a habeas corpus proceeding and the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 is inapplicable. Larsen v. Sielaff, 702 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).

\textsuperscript{123} H.R. REP NO. 1158, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976). The mandate that counsel be assigned to indigent federal habeas corpus petitioners when "an evidentiary hearing" is required, 28 U.S.C. section 2254 (1982), somewhat mitigates the lack of statutory fee authority in federal habeas corpus proceedings, although in fact, hearings are held infrequently. See infra note 129. Discretionary authority for appointment of counsel in civil actions, which of course encompasses section 1983 actions, is provided for in 28 U.S.C. section 1915(d) (1982). Under this provision, "[b]road discretion lies with the district judge . . . ." Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986). For an analysis of the pertinent factors see, e.g., Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir. 1982) (petitioner was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees in a successful habeas corpus suit absent statutory authority for such an award). When a suit, nominally brought section 1983, terminates in a consent decree providing available relief only in a habeas corpus proceeding, the proceeding will be treated as a habeas corpus proceeding and the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 is inapplicable. Larsen v. Sielaff, 702 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).

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advantageous aspects of the section 1983 remedy include the right to trial by jury on legal claims, the potential availability of a broad spectrum of relief, including class action relief and money damages, and the applicability of the federal discovery rules. On the other hand, federal habeas corpus has some advantages over section 1983. While res judicata fully applies to section 1983 actions, traditional principles of res judicata do not apply to federal habeas corpus proceedings. Additionally, the relative simplicity of the federal habeas corpus proceeding, a summary proceeding with infrequently held hearings, has obvious advantages for pro se habeas corpus petitioners. While federal habeas corpus law is not simple, given the various nuances of such concepts as custody, exhaustion, and presumption of correctness of state fact finding, federal habeas corpus is less complex and more contained than the multi-dimensional section 1983 litigation. State prisoners who litigate section 1983 claims typically must address several complex issues, including the distinction between state law wrongs and federal constitutional torts, proximate cause, the meaning of municipal custom or policy, common law immunities, the eleventh amendment, res judicata and collateral estoppel, abstention doctrines, and the computation of damages for violations of constitutional rights.

The following chart contains a summary of important distinctions between section 1983 and federal habeas corpus remedies.

126. These and other distinctions are set forth on the annotated chart on infra pages 108-11.
127. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); M. Schwartz & J. Kirklín, supra note 4, at 193-96. The Supreme Court has held that administrative res judicata applies to section 1983 claims to the extent that "federal courts must give the agency's fact-finding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State courts." University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 3227 (1986).
129. "Of 8,534 petitions filed in the statistical year ending June 30, 1985, only 114 habeas cases proceeded to a hearing, with 102 of the hearings lasting one day or less." Robbins, supra note 32, at 266 (citing Annual Report to the Director of the United States Courts 1985 at 149, 328 (1985)).
130. But see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 530 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Court's rule of complete exhaustion "will serve to trap the unwary pro se prisoner who is not knowledgeable about the intricacies of the exhaustion doctrine . . . .").
131. See S. Nahmond, supra note 16; M. Schwartz & J. Kirklín, supra note 4.
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<th><strong>Assigned Counsel:</strong></th>
<th>Only at the discretion of the court. 132</th>
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<td>Statutory authorization to award fees to a prevailing party. 134</td>
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<th><strong>FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS</strong></th>
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<td>&quot;[C]ounsel must be appointed for qualified indigents when a hearing is required; the court may appoint counsel at an earlier stage if it deems appointment desirable.&quot; 133</td>
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<td>No statutory authorization. 135</td>
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<td>The federal class action rule apparently does not apply but the court in narrow circumstances may order class habeas relief by applying an analogous representative procedure. 137</td>
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132. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). See, e.g., Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1986) (in making decision whether or not to appoint counsel, court should consider certain factors, such as substance of the indigent’s claim); Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981) (district courts have broad discretion to appoint counsel for indigents, and will not be reversed without a showing of fundamental unfairness which would impinge upon due process rights). However, some courts appoint counsel only in special or exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986) (inmate failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances in his case concerning denial of proper medical care and access to the law library to justify appointment of counsel); Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984) ("only upon a showing of special circumstances ... "); Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (while appointment of counsel not required absent exceptional circumstances, decision cannot be based upon the unavailability of counsel).

133. Hodge, 802 F.2d at 60 (citing Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 8(c) and Advisory Committee Notes). It is more difficult for an indigent prisoner to secure counsel in a civil rights action than in a habeas corpus proceeding. I. SENSENICH, supra note 10, at 23. While 28 U.S.C. section 1915(d) (1982), which authorizes the assignment of counsel to indigents, contains no provision for compensating assigned counsel, compensation is available to assigned counsel in habeas corpus proceedings under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. section 3006A(g) (1982).

134. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.

135. See supra note 122.

136. S. NAHMONG, supra note 16, at 32.

137. See, e.g., Cox v. McCarthy, 829 F.2d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1987) (dicta) ("[A] class action may lie in habeas corpus."); Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 1982) (class action suits are permissible in habeas corpus proceedings), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
## SECTION 1983 HABEAS CORPUS

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<td>Damages</td>
<td>Available</td>
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<td>Not well suited for institutional reform litigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exhaustion</td>
<td>Generally not required except for limited, specific requirements under CRIPA.</td>
<td>Stringent exhaustion of state remedies requirement.</td>
<td>The major vehicle of prisoners' rights litigation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Rules of Civil Procedure</td>
<td>Applicable</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
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Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); Bijele v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1975) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 does not apply to habeas corpus proceeding); United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1126 (2nd Cir. 1972) (while precise provisions of Rule 23 are not applicable to habeas corpus proceedings, an analogous procedure may be employed), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975). See also Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir. 1973) (class action suit may provide appropriate method to litigate a group of claims where the class would avoid duplication of judicial effort); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1972) (prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be treated as a class action where relief sought is of an immediate benefit going to a large and amorphous group); Faheem-EI v. Klinicar, 600 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (habeas corpus claims may be maintained as representative actions even though they may be restricted in scope and availability); Adderly v. Wainwright, 58 F.R.D. 389, 400 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (appropriate to petition for a writ as a class action even though the Supreme Court has not yet decided this issue). The Supreme Court has never determined whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 applies to habeas corpus proceedings. Schall, 467 U.S. at 261 n.10; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n.6 (1979); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 30 (1976); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294 n.5, reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 1025 (1969).

138. See supra note 118.
139. See supra note 119.
140. See supra notes 71-93.
141. See supra notes 94-103.
144. Blackmun, supra note 19, at 21.
145. See Zeigler, supra note 27, at 81 (reversal of a conviction under habeas corpus acts indirectly rather than directly on prison official's treatment regarding prisoner's rights).
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<tr>
<th>SECTION 1983</th>
<th>FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Jury Trial:</strong></td>
<td>Available when &quot;legal relief&quot; sought.(^{146})</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pendent Claim Jurisdiction:</strong></td>
<td>May be asserted in accordance with general principles of pendent jurisdiction.(^{148})</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Plenary v. Summary Proceeding:</strong></td>
<td>Plenary action.(^{150})</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Trial Discovery:</strong></td>
<td>Discovery rules are applicable.(^{152})</td>
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147. 28 U.S.C. section 2243 (1982) provides that: "[t]he court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require." Id.
148. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974) (a claim may be pendent to non-insubstantial constitutional claims). However, a state law claim that is pendent to a section 1983 claim when asserted against the state or state officials, may be defeated by the eleventh amendment. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121-23 (1984).
149. Mosley v. Moran, 798 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1986); United States ex rel. Hoover v. Franzen, 669 F.2d 433, 445 (7th Cir. 1982).
153. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 1025 (1969). In Harris, the Court found that the discovery rules as written are ill suited to habeas corpus proceedings. Id. at 296. Courts often disallow discovery in habeas corpus proceedings. Zeigler, supra note 27, at 83.
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<tr>
<td>Release from Confine-ment:</td>
<td>Not available.(^{154})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Res Judicata</em> and Collat-eral Estoppel:</td>
<td>Applicable.(^{156})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous Litigation of Exhausted and Unexhausted Claims:</td>
<td>Permitted.(^{158})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chart shows that in any given case section 1983 or federal habeas corpus may each present relative advantages and disadvantages. From an overall standpoint, however, state prisoners and their attorneys view section 1983 as the preferred remedy. In the typical *Preiser* battle the prisoner advocates the availability of section 1983, while the state claims that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy after state claims are exhausted.\(^{160}\) These battle lines reflect that whatever advantages federal habeas corpus presents in a particular case, they pale by comparison because of section 1983's no-exhaustion rule and statutory fee authorization. Indeed, even though there was no fee authority when *Preiser v. Rodriguez*\(^{161}\) was decided, the exhaustion rule itself caused the plaintiff prisoners to demand the availability of section 1983, while the state urged habeas corpus as the exclusive remedy.

### III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: *PREISER, WOLFF, AND GERSTEIN*

Despite the crucial significance of the section 1983—habeas corpus distinction, the Supreme Court has analyzed the issue in only three cases.\(^{162}\) Of

\(^{154}\) See cases cited in *supra* note 117.
\(^{156}\) See *supra* note 128.
\(^{157}\) Id.
\(^{158}\) *Preiser*, 411 U.S. at 499 n.14. See *infra* notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
\(^{159}\) See *supra* notes 100-03 and accompanying text. The distinction between section 1983 and habeas corpus with respect to simultaneous litigation of exhausted and unexhausted claims is observed in *Faheem-El v. Klinca*, 600 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
\(^{160}\) Occasionally, however, a party takes a contrary position. See, e.g., *Brennan v. Cunningham*, 813 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1987) (plaintiff prisoner sought to employ habeas corpus while defendant warden claimed section 1983 was proper remedy); *Dickerson v. Walsh*, 750 F.2d 150, 153 n.6 (1st Cir. 1984) (Commonwealth advocated use of section 1983 rather than a habeas corpus petition). In *Brennan*, the use of habeas corpus could have protected the plaintiff from the preclusive effect of an adverse state court judgment.
those three cases, the Court has given it plenary consideration only once, in Preiser v. Rodriguez. Preiser, however, is filled with ambiguities and unresolved questions.

Two pre-Preiser decisions began a trend toward unclear and confusing Supreme Court precedent in this area. In Johnson v. Avery, a prisoner alleged in federal court that he had been transferred to a maximum security building for violating a prison regulation that prohibited inmates from assisting in the preparation of another inmate’s legal papers. The district court treated the prisoner’s motion for law books and a typewriter as a petition for habeas corpus, held the prison regulation void, and ordered the prisoner released from disciplinary confinement. The Sixth Circuit, however, held the regulation valid and reversed the judgment of the district court. The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the state regulation was inconsistent with the right of prisoners to petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court said nothing about the section 1983-habeas corpus issue and its disposition of the case stated only that “[t]he judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” By not disagreeing with the district court’s procedural treatment of the case, the Supreme Court seemed implicitly to accept its treatment of the case as a habeas corpus proceeding.

In Wilwording v. Swenson, a prisoner challenged the living conditions and disciplinary measures he was subjected to while he was confined in maximum security. In a per curiam opinion, the Court stated only that these claims are “cognizable in federal habeas corpus,” as well as under section 1983, and that “[s]tate prisoners are not held to any stricter standard of exhaustion than other civil rights plaintiffs.” Neither Johnson nor Wilwording provided assistance to lower courts to help reconcile the section 1983—habeas corpus overlap.

By the time Preiser was litigated in the lower federal courts, the section 1983—federal habeas corpus conflict had become an increasingly important

165. Id. at 484 (citing 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966)).
166. Id. at 485 (citing 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967)).
167. Id. at 490.
169. Id.
170. 404 U.S. at 251 (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)).
171. Id. at 251 (citing Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968)). The Court in Houghton did not discuss the section 1983—federal habeas corpus issue, but assumed that a prisoner’s claim based upon the confiscation of his legal materials was a proper section 1983 claim for which exhaustion of state remedies was not necessary. The Preiser Court, after noting that conditions of confinement could be tested under section 1983, stated that “[t]his is not to say that habeas corpus may not also be available to challenge such prison conditions.” 411 U.S. at 499 (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) and Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971)). See infra notes 369-96 and accompanying text.
THE PREISER PUZZLE

and recurring issue. In 1971 the Second Circuit stated in *Preiser* that "[s]tate prisoners are increasingly resorting to the Civil Rights statutes in order to circumvent the [exhaustion] requirements of [the habeas corpus statute]." When the case was reheard by the Second Circuit *en banc*, Judge Mansfield lamented that "state prisoners' habeas petitions have been dressed up in a [section] 1983 suit of clothes." Judge Lumbard, dissenting, continued the play on words, stating that "it is becoming the fashion for state prisoners to bring these [section 1983] suits." Given these concerns, it was not surprising that the Supreme Court chose to review the issue in *Preiser*.

*Preiser* was a case consolidated from three separate individual actions. In two of the cases, plaintiffs Rodriguez and Kritsky claimed that they had been deprived of good-time credits in violation of procedural due process. In the third suit, plaintiff Katzoff challenged the deprivation of his good-time credits on substantive constitutional grounds. In each case, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordered the good-time credits restored, and ordered each plaintiff released because restoring these credits had entitled the plaintiff to immediate release. After consolidating the three district court cases and rehearing them *en banc*, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district courts and found the utilization of section 1983 a proper means of relief in each case.

The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, reversed the judgment of the appellate court. The Court acknowledged that whether state prisoners can utilize section 1983 "even though the federal habeas corpus statute . . . clearly provides a specific federal remedy" is "of considerable importance to prisoners throughout the country."

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175. *Id.* at 86 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).

176. Plaintiff Rodriguez alleged "that he had received no notice or hearing on the charges for which he had ostensibly been punished. Thus, he contended that he had been deprived of his good-conduct-time credits without due process of law." *Preiser*, 411 U.S. at 478. Similarly, plaintiff Kritsky alleged "that his summary punishment had deprived him of his good-time credits without due process of law." *Id.* at 481.

177. Plaintiff Katzoff claimed that he had been unconstitutionally deprived of good-time credits for making derogatory comments about prison officials in his diary. *Preiser*, 411 U.S. at 480.

178. The district court proceedings in the three cases are summarized in *Preiser*, 411 U.S. at 477-88.


practical importance" because of the different exhaustion rules attached to the two remedies. The Court then described the specific issue to be resolved: may state prisoners who have challenged the duration of their confinement on grounds of an unconstitutional deprivation of good-time credits, where restoration of those credits would result in their immediate or speedier release, seek equitable relief pursuant to section 1983, or are they limited to the specific remedy of habeas corpus? The Court ruled that when state prisoners challenge the very fact or duration of their imprisonment, seeking the determination that they are entitled to immediate or speedier release from that imprisonment, their sole federal remedy is habeas corpus. Thus, the Court held that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy when a state prisoner (1) challenges the fact or duration of confinement and (2) seeks immediate or speedier release.

The Preiser Court reasoned that when a claim comes within the literal terms of both section 1983 and federal habeas corpus, Congress must have intended that the "specific" federal habeas corpus statute would control over the "general" section 1983 remedy and become the "exclusive" federal remedy. According to the Court, this furthers congressional intent by preventing state prisoners from circumventing the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement by the simple expedient of labeling a claim under section 1983 that is actually within the scope of habeas corpus.

Given this analysis, the critical determination is whether or not the state prisoner's claims are within the scope of federal habeas corpus. The Preiser Court, however, did not definitively resolve this issue, but limited its discussion primarily to claims that come within the "essence," "core," or "heart" of habeas corpus. The essence of habeas corpus, as the Court saw it, is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and the writ's traditional function is to secure release from that illegal custody. Under this formulation, the claims of the plaintiffs in Preiser fell squarely within the "core" of habeas corpus because, by contesting the

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181. Id. at 477.
182. Id. at 482.
183. Id. at 500.
185. Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 397 (3d Cir. 1987) ("A primary concern underlying the Preiser decision is the prevention of 'end-runs' around the requirement that state prisoners exhaust state remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus relief.").
186. 411 U.S. at 484, 489, 498.
187. Id. at 484. The Preiser Court stated that while there are several forms of habeas corpus, it was concerned only with the common law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which is the writ used to inquire into the legality of detention in order to determine whether the petitioner
deprivation of good-time credits, the prisoners had attacked the legality of their custody and claimed entitlement to release from confinement.\textsuperscript{188} The plaintiffs were thus required to proceed pursuant to the federal habeas corpus statute which required that they exhaust the adequate state remedies available in state courts.\textsuperscript{189}

In \textit{Preiser}, the plaintiffs were contesting administrative, not judicial, action. The issue thus became whether or not the prisoners were required to exhaust their state administrative remedies before they sought relief in federal court. While the state argued that exhaustion of administrative remedies was required,\textsuperscript{190} the plaintiffs countered that the statutory exhaustion requirement had generally been construed by courts to apply to attacks on state court convictions in order to avoid friction with state judicial systems, not administrative systems.\textsuperscript{191} The Court rejected that contention and concluded that the exhaustion requirement extended to state administrative challenges\textsuperscript{192} and required that both "the state prison administration and the state courts" be given "the opportunity to correct the errors committed in the State's own prisons . . . ."\textsuperscript{193} Strong considerations of comity require giving a state judicial system the first opportunity to correct its own errors. These considerations also require giving states the first opportunity to correct errors made in the internal administration of prisons.\textsuperscript{194} States have a strong interest in should be released. \textit{Id.} See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 393 n.5 (1963) (habeas corpus has other functions besides inquiry into illegal detention in order to seek a prisoner's release and Blackstone names four such functions: \textit{habeas corpus ad respondendum; ad satisfaciendum; ad prosequendum, testificandum, deliberandum; ad faciendum et recipiendum}). The Court gave several examples of the use of the writ to challenge the legality of detention:

- whether the petitioner's challenge to his custody is that the statute under which he stands convicted is unconstitutional, as in \textit{Ex parte Siebold}, 100 U.S. 371 (1880) . . . ; that he is unlawfully confined in the wrong institution, as in \textit{In re Bonner}, 1451 U.S. 242 (1894), and \textit{Humphry v. Cady}, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); that he was denied his constitutional rights at trial, as in \textit{Johnson v. Zerbst}, [304 U.S. 458 (1938)]; that his guilty plea was invalid, as in \textit{Von Moltke v. Gillies}, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); that he is being unlawfully detained by the Executive or the military, as in \textit{Parisi v. Davidson}, 405 U.S. 34 (1972); or that his parole was unlawfully revoked, causing him to be reincarcerated in prison, as in \textit{Morrissey v. Brewer}, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)—in each case his grievance is that he is being unlawfully subjected to physical restraint, and in each case habeas corpus has been accepted as the specific instrument to obtain release from such confinement.

\textit{Preiser}, 411 U.S. at 486.

188. 411 U.S. at 487.

189. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1982) (applicant has not exhausted his state court remedies if he has right under state law to raise question presented).


193. \textit{Id.} at 497.

administering their prisons, and because most potential litigation involving state prisoners arises out of daily occurrences in state prisons, those claims may be most efficiently and properly handled by state administrative bodies and state courts. State agencies and courts are, for the most part, familiar with the grievances of state prisoners and, according to Preiser, are better able to deal with those grievances, both physically and practically.195

The Preiser Court's determinations that habeas corpus is the appropriate vehicle to seek restoration of good-time credits, and that the exhaustion requirement encompasses administrative remedies, were sufficient to resolve the controversies before the Court. Had the Court stopped there, much of the later ambiguity may have been avoided. The Court, however, went further and in dicta discussed several other issues. Those statements, while incomplete and in some respects unclear, have had considerable influence on the lower federal courts in five recurring situations.

(1) Requests for speedier release: The Court observed that even if the petitioners had not been entitled to immediate release, but only to shorter terms of confinement in prison, habeas corpus would have been the appropriate and exclusive remedy because their claims would still be "within the core of habeas corpus in attacking the very duration of their physical confinement itself."196 A prisoner's attack on either the fact or the duration of confinement is within the "core" of habeas corpus because the attack goes directly to the constitutionality of his or her physical confinement and seeks either immediate release or the shortening of the confinement.197 This dicta in Preiser became law in the Court's subsequent decision in Wolff v. McDonnell.198

McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 361 n.1 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1003 (1980). The Fifth Circuit construed Preiser to mean that "not only state habeas remedies but federal ones as well must be exhausted before a Section 1983 action based upon them may proceed." Hernandez v. Spencer, 780 F.2d 504, 505 (5th Cir. 1986); Harvey v. Andrist, 754 F.2d 569 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1126 (1985); Jackson v. Torres, 720 F.2d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1983); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 1981). Neither section 2254 nor Preiser, however, requires the exhaustion of federal remedies.

195. 411 U.S. at 492. The Court observed that "[w]hat for a private citizen would be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with his tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the prisoner, a dispute with the State." Id. States have argued that, in most instances, state judicial facilities are closer to the state prison where the prisoner is confined than the nearest federal court is. Therefore, the state court is in a better position to insure greater cooperation by state personnel, such as sheriffs and prison officials, than the federal courts. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc) (Mansfield, J., concurring). See also id. at 86 (Lumbard, J., dissenting) (hearing in state court is less expensive than in federal court because prisoners are not moved as far and there is less risk of escape).

196. 411 U.S. at 487-88. The Court relied in part upon the holding in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) "that a prisoner may attack on habeas the second of two consecutive sentences while still serving the first." 411 U.S. at 487.

197. 411 U.S. at 489.

(2) Challenges to convictions and sentences: Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded in Preiser that state prisoners challenging their convictions and sentences on federal constitutional grounds are limited to a habeas corpus proceeding, following exhaustion of adequate state remedies, and that section 1983 cannot be utilized. The Court accepted that concession, stating that a challenge to a conviction is at the “core of habeas corpus . . . .” Although the Preiser Court stated that a challenge to a conviction or sentence that seeks either immediate or speedier release may be made only in a habeas corpus proceeding, it did not specifically discuss, nor did it ever resolve, whether a challenge to a conviction or sentence may be made in a civil rights action when a prisoner does not seek immediate or speedier release from confinement, as where a prisoner seeks damages for an unconstitutional conviction or sentence.

(3) Challenges to conditions of confinement: The Preiser Court stated that a section 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who makes a constitutional challenge to the conditions of prison life, but not to the fact or length of his or her custody. Other than providing four examples of cases involving challenges to prison conditions, the Court provided no guidance to help lower courts define what a condition of prison life is. For example, does a challenge to a condition of prison life include an alleged denial of a hearing procedure? Is a claim that a prisoner is confined in the wrong institution a challenge to prison conditions? The Court’s failure to define a challenge to prison conditions has contributed to the difficulties in resolving some of the section 1983—habeas corpus conflicts.

(4) Claims for damages: The Court indicated that a prisoner’s claim for damages would be within the scope of section 1983 because a state prisoner seeking damages is attacking something other than the fact or length of the confinement, and is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy release. Habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy

199. 411 U.S. at 489.
200. Id. See also id. at 507 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (similarly, where prisoners allege that deprivation of good conduct time will cause them to be in confinement past conditional release date, claim falls within “core” of habeas corpus).
201. The issue was left open in Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984). See also Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The Court has never expressly decided whether and in what circumstances § 1983 can be invoked to attack collaterally criminal convictions.”). The issue has generated a good amount of lower court litigation. See infra notes 291-317 and accompanying text.
204. See infra notes 421-35 and accompanying text discussing prisoner procedural due process claims.
205. See infra notes 397-420 and accompanying text.
206. 411 U.S. at 494.
for damages.\textsuperscript{207} Thus, \textit{Preiser} states that a state prisoner’s damages claim may be brought under section 1983 without any requirement that the prisoner exhaust state remedies.\textsuperscript{208}

\textit{Preiser}, however, does not resolve whether all state prisoner damage claims may be brought under section 1983, including those that grow out of the fact or duration of confinement, or only those based upon challenges to the conditions of confinement. The \textit{Preiser} Court, for example, left open whether or not a section 1983 claim for damages may be based upon an unconstitutional conviction or sentence\textsuperscript{209} or the denial of good-time credits.\textsuperscript{210} Moreover, \textit{Preiser} does not resolve the fundamental issue of whether or not the nature of a prisoner’s claim, the relief sought, or both, determine whether a claim may be asserted under section 1983. The Supreme Court’s failure to determine this issue leaves a major deficiency in its decisional law and is a prime reason for the lower courts’ frustrations.\textsuperscript{211}

(5) \textit{Multiple claims}: The \textit{Preiser} Court stated that when a state prisoner asserts multiple claims, one or more of which are properly within section 1983, the prisoner may assert the section 1983 claim in federal court at the same time he or she exhausts state remedies on the habeas corpus claim. The Court provided the following example:

If a prisoner seeks to attack both the conditions of his confinement and the fact or length of that confinement, his later claim . . . is cognizable only in federal habeas corpus, with its attendant requirement of exhaustion of state remedies. But . . . that holding in no way precludes him from simultaneously litigating in federal court, under [section] 1983, his claim relating to the conditions of his confinement.\textsuperscript{212}

The Supreme Court applied this \textit{dicta} in \textit{Wolff v. McDonnell}\textsuperscript{213} and it generally has been followed by the lower federal courts. When a state prisoner alleges “simultaneous claims,” the federal courts typically allow litigation of the section 1983 civil rights claim, while dismissing or continuing the habeas corpus claim because this claim requires a prisoner to exhaust state remedies.\textsuperscript{214}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{207} Id. (emphasis in original).
\item \textsuperscript{208} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{209} See supra note 201, and infra notes 291-317 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{210} See infra notes 362-68 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{211} See supra note 14.
\item \textsuperscript{212} 411 U.S. at 499 n.14. See also id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Under [the majority's] approach, state correctional authorities have no added incentive to withdraw good-time credits, since that action cannot, standing alone, keep the prisoner out of federal court.").
\item \textsuperscript{213} 418 U.S. 539, 553-54 (1974). See infra notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{214} Faheem-El v. Klinkar, 814 F.2d 461, 465 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 681-82 (9th Cir. 1984); Moorish Science Temple of Am. v. Smith, 693 F.2d 987, 989 (2d Cir. 1982); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981) ("The failure to exhaust state remedies provides a proper basis for dismissing some, but not all, of Tarter’s claims."); Delaney v. Giarrusso, 633 F.2d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1151 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
\end{itemize}
Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in *Preiser* criticized the Court for creating “a perplexing set of uncertainties and anomalies.”\(^2\) The decision, Brennan stated, was unmanageable because the “new-found” concept of “core of habeas corpus” is essentially “ethereal.”\(^2\) Moreover, the majority’s holding that the federal habeas corpus statute required exhaustion of state administrative remedies, in addition to the exhaustion of state judicial remedies, ignores the fact that the principle of federalism embodied in the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement is designed to protect the orderly administration of state judicial systems.\(^2\)

Justice Brennan predicted that the Court’s decision would result in “extreme inefficiency” because many prisoners’ claims would be under simul-
taneous consideration in two forums, even though the same questions of fact and law are involved in both proceedings.\textsuperscript{218} This in turn would have serious \textit{res judicata} consequences,\textsuperscript{219} the ramifications of which the majority failed to consider. In addition, Brennan believed the decision created an "anomaly":

If the prisoner is confined in an institution that does not offer good-time credits, and therefore cannot withdraw them, his prison-conditions claims could always be raised in a suit under [section] 1983. On the other hand, an inmate in an institution that uses good-time credits as reward and punishment, who seeks a federal hearing on the identical legal and factual claims, would normally be required to exhaust state remedies and then proceed by way of federal habeas corpus. The rationality of that difference in treatment is certainly obscure. Yet that is the price of permitting the availability of a federal forum to be controlled by the happenstance (or stratagem) that good-time credits are at stake.\textsuperscript{220}

Justice Brennan believed that the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement was limited to those instances in which a prisoner's claim related to the conviction or sentence or would otherwise "interrupt a state proceeding or jeopardize the orderly administration of state judicial business."\textsuperscript{221} By contrast, prisoners' attacks on state administrative actions were "the stereotypical situation in which relief under [section] 1983 is authorized."\textsuperscript{222}

The Supreme Court further addressed the section 1983—habeas corpus issue in \textit{Wolff v. McDonnell.}\textsuperscript{223} The plaintiffs in \textit{Wolff} raised a number of legal claims, but the one that provoked discussion of the \textit{Preiser} issue was the prisoners' claim that due process required certain procedures in prison disciplinary cases that could result in the forfeiture of good-time credits. The complaint was filed under section 1983 and sought the following relief: (1) restoration of good-time credits; (2) submission of a plan by prison authorities for hearing procedures under the due process clause whenever the possibility of withholding or forfeiture of good-time credits existed; and (3) damages for civil rights deprivations resulting from the use of the allegedly unconstitutional procedures.\textsuperscript{224}

The Court analyzed each form of relief separately. The section 1983 claim for the restoration of good-time credits sought speedier release and was thus "foreclosed under \textit{Preiser}."\textsuperscript{225} The claim for damages, however, could be asserted under section 1983 because "\textit{Preiser} expressly contemplated that claims properly brought under § 1983 could go forward while actual resto-

\textsuperscript{218} \textit{Id.} at 511.
\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Id.} Justice Brennan observed that a ruling in either the state or federal court proceeding might be binding in the other. \textit{Id. See also} Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 n.12 (1974).
\textsuperscript{220} 411 U.S. at 509-10 (footnote omitted).
\textsuperscript{221} \textit{Id.} at 521.
\textsuperscript{222} \textit{Id.} at 522.
\textsuperscript{223} 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
\textsuperscript{224} \textit{Id.} at 553 (footnote omitted).
\textsuperscript{225} \textit{Id.} at 554.
ration of good-time credits is sought in state proceedings.\footnote{Id. At this point, the Court cited to footnote 14 in Preiser, dealing with the simultaneous litigation of section 1983 claims while state remedies are being exhausted on habeas claims. The Court stated in its own footnote that "[o]ne would anticipate that normal principles of res judicata would apply in such circumstances." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 554 n.12.} While some lower courts and commentators have expressed confusion as to whether the prisoner was seeking damages for the denial of good-time credits or for the denial of procedural due process rights,\footnote{See infra note 367 for competing authorities.} the decision states that the damages were sought for the "deprivation of civil rights resulting from the use of the allegedly unconstitutional procedures"\footnote{Wolff, 418 U.S. at 553 (emphasis added). Damages may be awarded for procedural due process violations in accordance with the principles set forth in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).} and that the damages claim "required determination of the validity of the procedures employed for imposing sanctions, including loss of good time . . . ."\footnote{Wolff, 418 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added). Most lower federal courts have read Wolff to authorize a section 1983 damages claim for a procedural due process violation. See infra cases cited in note 297.}

After recognizing that Preiser would not bar a declaratory judgment regarding the procedural due process requirements as a predicate to a damages award,\footnote{418 U.S. at 555.} the Wolff Court moved to the plaintiffs' claim for prospective equitable relief. The Court concluded that Preiser would not preclude a section 1983 litigant "from obtaining by way of ancillary relief an otherwise proper injunction enjoining the prospective enforcement of invalid prison regulations."\footnote{Id.} This sentence is ambiguous. On the one hand, it could be read as a relatively narrow rule pursuant to which a claim for prospective relief enjoining an invalid procedural prison regulation lies under section 1983, provided that the claim is considered ancillary to (presumably) a claim for monetary relief. On the other hand, the sentence could be read as broadly announcing that when a claim for prospective relief is ancillary to a claim for monetary relief, prospective relief may be sought under section 1983 to enjoin the enforcement of any invalid prison regulation, and not just those that violate procedural due process requirements.

Both the limited and broad aspects of the Court's pronouncement seem unwarranted. First, there was no reason to limit the holding regarding prospective relief to ancillary claims. Under the Preiser analysis, if an inmate's claim is not within the core of habeas corpus and is within the scope of section 1983, it may be asserted under section 1983 regardless of whether it is "ancillary" to another section 1983 claim. Second, it was inappropriate for the Wolff Court to broadly sanction the use of section 1983 to enjoin all invalid prison regulations, because at this point in its opinion the Court was concerned only with the plaintiffs' attack on prison regulations on procedural due process grounds. Moreover, read literally, the
Court’s holding would encompass even those prison regulations that affect the fact or duration of confinement and thereby sanction the use of section 1983 in cases that the Preiser Court determined to be within the core of habeas corpus.

The Wolff Court, therefore, should have refrained from interjecting the concept of “ancillary claims” into the opinion and should have ruled specifically and clearly that section 1983 is available when a prisoner seeks to enjoin allegedly invalid prison regulations on procedural due process grounds and seeks neither immediate nor speedier release. There is some indication that this is what the Court in fact intended. The Court stated that it was proper for the lower courts to determine the validity of procedures revoking good-time credits and fashion appropriate remedies for any constitutional violations, “short of ordering the actual restoration of good-time already cancelled.”

The only other Supreme Court decision to resolve a Preiser issue is the Court’s 1975 decision in Gerstein v. Pugh. In that case, the plaintiffs were pre-trial detainees who claimed, under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, that they could not be detained without a judicial determination of probable cause and an opportunity to contest that determination. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief. In a terse footnote the Court, citing Preiser and Wolff, ruled that these claims were within the scope of section 1983:

Gerstein thus seems to be consistent with a reading of Wolff that allows a prisoner to contest under section 1983 the procedures that are required by the United States Constitution, so long as neither immediate nor speedier release is sought.

The Supreme Court decisions in Preiser, Wolff, and Gerstein surprisingly resolve few issues regarding the section 1983—federal habeas corpus conflict. A combined reading of the three decisions leads to the following conclusions when state prisoners assert federal constitutional claims: (1) requests for immediate or speedier release may be asserted only in a federal habeas corpus proceeding after adequate state remedies are exhausted; (2) conditions of confinement may be contested under section 1983; (3) at least some claims for damages may be asserted under section 1983; (4) at least some procedural due process claims that seek relief other than immediate or speedier release may be asserted under section 1983.

232. Id. (footnote omitted).
234. Id. at 107 n.6 (citation omitted).
IV. THREE UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Preiser, Wolff, and Gerstein left many specific issues unresolved. Given the variety of prisoners' claims before the federal courts, this is not unusual. What is unusual is that fifteen years after Preiser, many fundamental aspects of the relationship between section 1983 and federal habeas corpus still remain unresolved. This is unfortunate because lower courts need guidance on the fundamental issues in order to untangle many of the specific nuances.236

The most critical issue left unanswered by the Supreme Court is whether the section 1983—habeas corpus issue should be resolved on the basis of the nature of a prisoner's claim, the specific relief requested, or both. The great weight of authority, following the Fifth Circuit's lead, holds that the propriety of utilizing section 1983 may not be determined solely on the basis of the relief sought, and that habeas corpus is the exclusive initial remedy where the cause of action contests the validity of a prisoner's confinement.237 In the most prevalent application of this principle, courts commonly hold that a claim for damages based upon an allegedly unconstitutional conviction may not be asserted under section 1983 without satisfying the state exhaustion

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235. See generally I. SENSENICH, supra note 10.

236. See infra notes 268-531 and accompanying text for discussion of the specific issues.

237. The Fifth Circuit cases include Hernandez v. Spencer, 780 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1986); Jackson v. Torres, 720 F.2d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The relief sought by the prisoner or the label he places upon the action is not the governing factor."); Williams v. Dallas County Comm'r, 689 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 (1983); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981); Courtney v. Reeves, 635 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981); Delaney v. Giarrusso, 633 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981); Johnson v. Hardy, 601 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1979); Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1978); Robinson v. Richardson, 556 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1977); Watson v. Briscoe, 554 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1977); Grundstrom v. Darnell, 531 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1976); Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d. 385 (5th Cir.), adhered to, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). In its most recent decision on this issue, the court stated that because the Preiser issue "cannot be determined on the basis of the relief nominally sought," the Fifth Circuit has focused on the "'scope of the relief' actually sought." Serio v. Members of State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir. 1987). Other cases reaching this result include Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1987); Crump v. Lane, 807 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1986); Monk v. Secretary of Navy, 793 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1986); McKinnis v. Mosley, 693 F.2d 1054 (11th Cir. 1982); Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982); Franklin v. Webb, 653 F.2d 362, 364 (8th Cir. 1981) ("The district court correctly focused on the nature of the complaint rather than the relief sought . . . ."); Johnson v. Hardy, 601 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1979); Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979); Christianson v. Spalding, 593 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Wash. 1983); Barnes v. Wolff, 586 F. Supp. 312 (D. Nev. 1984); Thibadoux v. Jones, 505 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Derrow v. Shields, 482 F. Supp. 1144 (W.D. Va. 1980).
requirement. As a corollary principle, "habeas corpus is the exclusive initial cause of action where the basis of the claim goes to the constitutionality of the state court conviction."238

The focus on the nature of the claim rather than on the relief sought is a result of the courts' desire to prevent state prisoners from circumventing the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement.239 If courts were to determine the proper course of action by focusing solely on the type of relief the plaintiff requested, state prisoners would be able to attack their convictions or sentences under section 1983 without exhausting state remedies by simply seeking a form of relief other than release from confinement, such as damages.240 A favorable federal court ruling on the damages claim could then be used to obtain release in a collateral state court proceeding because the state court would be bound by the federal ruling under normal principles of res judicata.241 This stratagem would undermine the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement.242

There are a few decisions that either explicitly or implicitly focus on the specific relief requested rather than on the nature of the prisoner's claim.243

238. Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc). See infra notes 291-317 and accompanying text.
240. See Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1982) ("Indeed, to hold otherwise [.i.e., allow the nature of the relief sought to control] would be to substantially undermine the exhaustion of remedies requirement, for anyone who could state a viable civil rights claim could subvert it by postponing a claim for release until his substantive rights had been adjudicated in a federal forum.").
241. Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1258 (8th Cir. 1987); Christianson v. Spalding, 593 F. Supp. 500, 504 (E.D. Wash. 1983); Thomas v. Dietz, 518 F. Supp. 794, 797 (D.N.J. 1981). Federal court judgments are entitled to preclusive effect in the state courts and "the decisions that focus directly on the effects of federal question judgments leave no doubt that federal rules measure at least most res judicata questions." 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4468, at 656 (1981). "There would be no authority under which a person serving a term in a prison resulting from the criminal conviction could be retained in custody under that conviction once there was an authoritative determination that the conviction could not stand." Chancery Clerk v. Wallace, 646 F.2d 151, 157 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981). See also Deakins v. Monaghan, 108 S. Ct. 523, 533 (1988) (White, J., concurring) ("A judgment in the federal damages action may decide several questions at issue in the state criminal proceeding.").
242. Note, The Aftermath of Preiser and Wolff, supra note 6, at 763. Another reason that has been given for not focusing on the relief requested is that “[a] federal court has the inherent power to fashion appropriate relief” and “is not constrained by the pleader’s request for relief.” Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 30 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982). While this principle is generally correct, Fed. R. Crv. P. 54(c), it has little relevance in the present context since a federal court has no power to order release under section 1983. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
243. Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1986); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1171 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1985) (although plaintiff complained about manner in which conviction was obtained, section 1983 was proper because plaintiff "did not ask for reversal of his conviction
The main justification for relying upon the relief requested is that *Preiser, Wolff*, and *Gerstein* appear to take this approach.\(^2\) Even putting aside the fact that allowing the form of relief to control would enable prisoners to sidestep the exhaustion requirement, there is a pragmatic difficulty in focusing on the specific relief requested. The great majority of section 1983 prisoner cases are brought *pro se*.\(^2\) Many *pro se* complaints are unclear and confusing\(^2\) and it is not always easy, or perhaps even possible, to determine what relief a prisoner is seeking.\(^2\) In one case, for example, the district court upon considering a prisoner’s confusing *pro se* complaint stated:


247. Magistrate Bagwell has observed that “[d]emands for relief in prisoner §1983 cases are notoriously unlawyerlike (one in my court once demanded: ‘Let me out and give me a ticket to California!’) It is usually impossible to tell from the demand for relief whether the case seeks legal or equitable relief . . . .” Bagwell, supra note 246, at 26. See Serio v. Members of Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1987); Hernandez v. Spencer, 780 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 1986); Moorish Science Temple of Am. v. Smith, 693 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1982); Richards v. New York, 597 F. Supp. 689 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1066 (1986); Thibadoux v. Jones, 505 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (memorandum decision). In Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), the Court observed that “[j]ails and penitentiaries include among their inmates a high percentage of persons who are totally or functionally illiterate, whose educational attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is limited.” Id. at 487 (footnote omitted). Undoubtedly, at least in part because of this sad reality, the Supreme Court has adopted the rule that prisoner *pro se* complaints are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers . . . .” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, *reh’g denied*, 405 U.S. 948 (1972). Accord Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980) (“Such a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”).
[The best judgement I can make . . . is [that] the plaintiff is seeking a declaration of an earlier determination of his jail term, and although he alleges he is entitled to damages for false imprisonment, it seems clear the plaintiff actually seeks an earlier release from confinement.]

The second major issue the Supreme Court decisions leave unresolved is whether section 1983 may be used to attack a conviction when federal habeas corpus is not available because, for example, the individual commencing the proceeding is not in custody. The issue arises most frequently in cases involving "fine only" convictions and in cases where a state criminal defendant's sentence has expired by the time the federal proceeding is commenced. Lower court decisions conflict on whether section 1983 may be utilized when habeas corpus is unavailable. Some courts have held that Congress intended habeas corpus to provide the exclusive federal remedy for those seeking to attack state court judgments of convictions. Therefore, "convictions not subject to question in habeas are immune from collateral inquiry by the federal courts." Other courts, however, have held that Preiser was based upon the necessity of reconciling competing, overlapping remedies. Further, when federal habeas corpus is not an available remedy, a claim may be asserted under section 1983 if the claim comes within its contours. While the issue is one of congressional intent, there is no indication that Congress actually considered the issue when either the federal habeas corpus statute or section 1983 were enacted.
A third major issue the Supreme Court has failed to resolve is whether habeas corpus and section 1983 might both be available in some instances. *Preiser* and *Wolff* establish that when a prisoner’s claim is within the “core” of habeas corpus, because he seeks immediate or speedier release, habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. But the Court has not considered the import of finding a prisoner’s claim within the scope, though not necessarily at the core, of habeas corpus. Will the availability of habeas corpus always preclude resort to section 1983? If the Court’s primary concern is to insure that the federal habeas exhaustion requirement is not circumvented, section 1983 should be unavailable whenever a claim comes within federal habeas corpus. Nevertheless, there is *dicta* in *Preiser* indicating that both remedies might be available to contest conditions of confinement. In addition, the *Wolff* Court stated that there are circumstances where the same violation of constitutional rights might be redressed under either form of relief.

In prison condition cases, courts have established that section 1983 is available to contest conditions of confinement, but whether habeas corpus is also available is less clear. In this situation, therefore, the question is not whether the availability of federal habeas corpus precludes resort to section 1983, but simply whether federal habeas corpus is an alternative remedy to section 1983. The issue of dual remedies also arises in prison transfer cases, though not in the same manner as the prison condition cases. In this situation, the decisions establish that habeas corpus is available when an inmate contests a prison transfer or seeks transfer to a different institution, but it is unclear whether section 1983 is available as well.

The Supreme Court’s failure to resolve the three fundamental issues discussed in this section has contributed significantly to the difficulties that lower courts continue to experience in attempting to resolve many of the specific *Preiser* issues. Before turning to the specific issues, however, a discussion of the relationship between the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement and the doctrine of *Younger v. Harris* abstention is necessary. Each of these doctrines relies heavily upon similar principles of federalism and comity. Because of this connection, federal courts asked to resolve difficult section 1983—habeas corpus questions, for which Supreme Court

253. 411 U.S. at 499. The availability of section 1983 “is not to say that habeas corpus may not also be available to challenge such prison conditions.” *Id.*

254. *Wolff*, 418 U.S. at 579. Following this sentence, the Court cited three cases preceded by the signal “Cf.,” namely Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, *reh'g denied*, 405 U.S. 948 (1972), and Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971). *See also* Huggins v. Isenbarger, 798 F.2d 203, 204 (7th Cir. 1986) (claim that the reasons given for parole denial are too broad “may be raised in 1983 litigation as well as habeas corpus”).

255. *See infra* notes 384-96 and accompanying text.

256. Justice Brennan has taken the position that a state prisoner who attacks the conditions of confinement may utilize section 1983 or federal habeas corpus. *Preiser*, 411 U.S. at 504-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

257. *See infra* notes 397-420 and accompanying text.

precedent is either non-existent or ambiguous, often rely upon a combined reading of the principles and rationales of Preiser and Younger.259

V. THE YOUNGER-PREISER CONNECTION—DOUBLE BARREL COMITY

The Court made clear in Preiser that comity, which requires a “proper respect for state functions,” underlies both the exhaustion rule in state prisoner federal habeas corpus proceedings and the Younger abstention doctrine.260 The Younger doctrine generally forbids a federal court from granting relief that interferes with a pending state court criminal proceeding.261 Underlying the doctrine is the federalism notion that national government will fare best if states are allowed to carry out their judicial functions free from federal court interference.262 Younger abstention assumes that a federal constitutional claim may be litigated as effectively in the pending state court proceeding as it would be in a federal court proceeding. This assumption is made because state courts are obligated to enforce the United States Constitution and are presumed to be as competent as the federal judiciary to do so.263

In the typical Younger situation, the federal court plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief against a pending state criminal proceeding. The Supreme Court has determined that the Younger doctrine also applies when state court proceedings have been completed and the relief sought in federal court would overturn the state court judgment. In these circumstances “an entire trial has already taken place” and federal relief would be a “direct aspersion on the capabilities and good faith of state appellate courts.”264

259. See infra note 265.
260. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 491 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). See also Felder v. Estelle, 693 F.2d 549, 551, 553-54 (5th Cir. 1982) (state may therefore waive the exhaustion requirement).
262. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
263. See supra note 54.
The Supreme Court has yet to resolve whether the Younger doctrine could also serve to bar a section 1983 action for damages for alleged constitutional violations arising out of a state criminal proceeding.\textsuperscript{265}

In attempting to resolve section 1983—federal habeas corpus conflicts, federal courts commonly rely upon the principles and rationale underlying the Younger doctrine or upon a combined reading of Preiser and Younger.\textsuperscript{266} They do this largely because many state prisoner claims, even if they could be said to be outside the scope of federal habeas corpus and within section 1983, are defeated by application of the Younger doctrine if the relief requested involves federal court intrusion into state criminal proceedings.\textsuperscript{267} The potential interplay between the principles and rationale of Preiser and Younger must thus be kept in mind in order to determine the appropriate disposition of many of the difficult section 1983—federal habeas corpus controversies.

VI. THE SPECIFIC ISSUES—PREISER IN THE LOWER COURTS

The lower court Preiser cases are difficult to classify. The section 1983—habeas corpus issue arises in such varied contexts that not all cases fit neatly into discrete compartments. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s failure to determine whether the dispositive factor is the nature of the claim or the nature of the relief sought, and the disagreement and confusion on this point in the lower courts,\textsuperscript{268} make it impossible to group the cases solely by reference to these factors.

\textsuperscript{265} See Deakins v. Monaghan, 108 S. Ct. 523 (1988); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923-24 (1984) (“We therefore have no occasion to decide if a Federal District Court should abstain from deciding a section 1983 suit for damages stemming from an unlawful conviction.”); Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The Court has never expressly decided whether and in what circumstances section 1983 can be invoked to attack collaterally state criminal convictions.”). The lower court decisions are in conflict on this issue. See M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 4, at 254 n.80. See also infra notes 302-11 and accompanying text. In Deakins, the Supreme Court recently ruled that a “District Court has no discretion to dismiss rather than to stay claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the [pending] state proceeding.” 108 S. Ct. at 529.


267. See Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 849 (1st Cir. 1978) (“This case dramatically diagrams the pitfalls that snare or nearly snare litigants and courts alike when a constitutional claim is brought in federal court that involves an ongoing state prosecution.”).

268. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
We have attempted to solve the classification problem in the following manner. First, categories have been established for the most recurring and significant issues. In addition, we will follow the majority view, which focuses upon the nature of the claim rather than the specific relief requested, and discuss the specific issues initially by reference to the nature of the claims asserted. After all of the specific claims are discussed, we will separately discuss the significance of the form of relief requested. Finally, separate treatment is given to the applicability of *Preiser* to the state courts.

The lower court decisions are organized in the following fashion:

A. Nature of the Claim:
   1. Challenges to convictions and sentences—generally
      (a) claims for damages for unconstitutional conviction or sentence when a prisoner is in custody;
      (b) "fine only" and expired sentence convictions.
   2. Challenges to pre-trial custody, probation, parole, and good-time credit determinations.
   3. Challenges to conditions of confinement.
   4. Challenges to the place of confinement.
   5. Procedural due process claims.
   6. Challenges to post-conviction review proceedings.
   7. Challenges to extradition.
   8. Challenges to detainers.
   9. Other confinements: civil contempt, juvenile delinquents, and mental patients.

B. Nature of the Relief Requested:
   1. Declaratory relief.
   2. Expungement.
   3. Class relief.

C. *Preiser* in the State Courts

A. Nature of the Claim

1. Challenges to convictions and sentences—generally

The *Preiser* opinion contains *dicta* that a state prisoner's challenge to a conviction or sentence "is limited to habeas corpus" and is within "the core of habeas corpus . . . ."269 Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion agreed that attacks on the validity of a conviction or sentence are plainly directed at the fact or duration of confinement and prisoners, therefore, can proceed only on a habeas corpus petition.270 These statements reflect the undisputed proposition that a state prisoner's request for immediate or speedier release based upon the unconstitutionality of the conviction or sentence may be

269. 411 U.S. at 489.
270. *Id.* at 507 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
made only through a federal habeas corpus proceeding following exhaustion of state remedies. The lower federal courts have faithfully adhered to this principle and have found federal habeas corpus to be the exclusive remedy to attack a conviction or sentence with respect to a wide variety of claimed constitutional errors.

A prisoner's complaint might not explicitly attack the constitutionality of the conviction. Upon analysis, however, courts might find that the nature of the claim asserted in fact constitutes such an attack and prayer for release. In this situation, as in the case of an express prayer for immediate or speedier release, habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. In Robinson v. Richardson, for example, the Fifth Circuit found that a prayer for an injunction against discrimination in jury selection was at the core of habeas corpus because "resolution of the plaintiff's claims in his favor will result in a finding that his conviction is constitutionally invalid, and his release from prison will necessarily follow from such a finding."
The Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell presents a special section 1983—federal habeas corpus problem when a state inmate contests a conviction on fourth amendment grounds. In Stone, the Supreme Court determined that a state court criminal defendant who was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate a fourth amendment exclusionary rule claim in state court may not litigate this claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Absent the unusual situation where a state court did not afford a fair opportunity to litigate an exclusionary rule claim, federal habeas corpus is not available to test the exclusionary rule issue. In these circumstances there is no overlap with section 1983. However, it does not necessarily follow that section 1983 is available to litigate the fourth amendment claim. In fact, in at least one instance, section 1983 is not available to test the fourth amendment issue even though habeas corpus also is not available. Where the inmate contests a conviction on fourth amendment grounds and seeks immediate or earlier release, the utilization of section 1983 would allow the prisoner to circumvent the rule in Stone as well as the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement by simply substituting the label "section 1983" for "habeas corpus." That result is disfavored by most courts.

Whether a state prisoner may assert a federal court claim for damages under section 1983 based upon an allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure of evidence employed in securing a conviction is a more difficult question. This is an issue that suffers from the lack of Supreme Court guidance on the basic relationship between section 1983 and federal habeas corpus, including whether section 1983 should be available when federal habeas corpus is not. This basic issue has arisen most frequently in the context of challenges to "fine only" and expired sentence convictions, and the courts have come to different conclusions. The majority position is that federal habeas corpus is the exclusive method to attack any conviction or sentence. As a result, section 1983 is not available to attack "fine only" or expired sentence convictions even where habeas corpus also is not available. Under this view, section 1983 would not be available when damages

278. The circuit courts of appeals routinely reject claims that the state courts did not provide a full and fair hearing to litigate fourth amendment claims. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 32, § 4263, at 620-21. "Indeed most of the opinions of the courts of appeals merely announce the conclusion that the prisoner had a full and fair opportunity for a hearing without discussion of what this means or what occurred in the particular case." Id. at 622.
279. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
280. See infra notes 319-45 and accompanying text.
281. See infra note 328.
are sought for a conviction allegedly resulting from a violation of the exclusionary rule. In addition, it has been persuasively argued that "allowing a prisoner to bring a federal [section] 1983 suit on a Fourth Amendment claim might well permit circumvention of Stone, since a prisoner could secure a federal determination of the search and seizure issue and use a favorable decision to affect release in state habeas corpus."²⁸²

On the other hand, the few courts which have determined that the section 1983 remedy should be available when federal habeas corpus is not, and which thus allow section 1983 to be used to attack "fine only" and expired sentence convictions,²⁸³ presumably would also allow a section 1983 claim for damages for an exclusionary rule violation. The Fifth Circuit in Delaney v. Giarrusso,²⁸⁴ tentatively stated without analysis that a prisoner who claims a fourth amendment violation and is precluded from federal habeas relief under Stone "may then be able to press his claim for damages under section 1983 in the federal courts after showing that he has exhausted his state-court remedies . . . ." But in the very same sentence the court took away what it granted, stating that "the defendants may be able to invoke collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense if . . . the state courts [determined] that there was no violation of . . . Fourth Amendment rights."²⁸⁵

The collateral estoppel issue is probably a significant reason why the interplay of Stone and Preiser has arisen so infrequently. Even absent the requirement imposed by Delaney that state remedies be exhausted before the section 1983 claim is filed, a ruling on the fourth amendment claim in the state criminal trial will normally operate to preclude a section 1983 claim. The Supreme Court's decision in Allen v. McCurry²⁸⁶ provides an instructive example of how collateral estoppel can be used to avoid the difficult interplay of Stone and Preiser. McCurry was a defendant in a Missouri criminal proceeding who moved to suppress evidence under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. The motion was denied and McCurry was ultimately convicted. He then commenced a federal court section 1983 action for damages based upon an alleged fourth amendment violation. Applying the full faith and credit statute,²⁸⁷ the Supreme Court ruled that the preclusive effect of the state court judgment must be determined by reference to the Missouri law of preclusion. If a claim for damages arising out of the fourth

²⁸². See Note, The Aftermath of Preiser and Wolff, supra note 6, at 751 n.66. See also Feaster v. Miksch, 846 F.2d 21 (6th Cir. 1988) (Younger doctrine requires stay of section 1983 claim for damages based upon fourth amendment violation).
²⁸³. See infra note 325.
²⁸⁴. 633 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1981).
amendment would be barred under Missouri law, the federal section 1983 claim would be barred as well, so long as the state proceedings provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the federal claim.

In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court specifically rejected McCurry's argument that "since Stone v. Powell had removed McCurry's right to a hearing of his fourth amendment claim in federal habeas corpus, collateral estoppel should not deprive him of a federal judicial hearing of that claim in a [section] 1983 suit." The Court reasoned that Stone "concerns only the prudent exercise of federal-court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2254" and, therefore, had "no bearing on [section] 1983 suits or on the question of the preclusive effect of state-court judgments." More fundamentally, McCurry's argument assumed incorrectly that every violation of a federal right may be litigated in a federal district court, "regardless of the legal posture in which the federal claim arises." Stone's virtual elimination of federal habeas corpus as a remedy for exclusionary rule claims provides a compelling reason for recognizing the section 1983 damages remedy. Nevertheless, collateral estoppel is an obstacle to the efficacy of the section 1983 remedy in this context. It is not, however, the only obstacle. The right of state inmates to seek section 1983 damages for exclusionary rule violations raises the broader question of whether a section 1983 claim for damages ever may be based upon an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence. It is this question to which we now turn.

a. Damages claims for unconstitutional conviction or sentence when prisoner is in custody

Having learned from Preiser that prisoners may not secure immediate or speedier release from confinement by challenging the constitutionality of their convictions or sentences under section 1983, but having also read in Preiser that "a damages action by a state prisoner could be brought under [section] 1983 in federal court without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies," many prisoners tried a different stratagem. They began to seek damages under section 1983 based upon claims that their convictions or sentences were unconstitutional because, for example: they were denied effective assistance of counsel; their right to a speedy trial was violated; their jury was selected in an unconstitutional manner; evidence was uncon-
stitutionally introduced; exculpatory evidence was withheld; or they entered involuntary guilty pleas.292

When asserted by confined prisoners, the lower federal courts generally have viewed these claims for damages as an attempted "end around" the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement. To allow a state prisoner to test the constitutionality of a conviction without exhausting state remedies would frustrate the federalism concerns that underlie the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement because a state prisoner could simply "state a viable civil rights claim . . . by postponing a claim for release until his substantive rights have been adjudicated in a federal forum."293 The state prisoner could then go to state court and assert the federal finding of an unconstitutional conviction as the basis for securing release or reduction in the sentence.294

In order to prevent this from occurring, the lower federal courts have rather consistently ruled that a state prisoner may not seek damages under section 1983 for an unconstitutional conviction or sentence, at least until state remedies have been exhausted.295 To reach this result, it is necessary to (1)
reject a literal reading of the broad dicta in Preiser concerning damages, (2) read Wolff v. McDonnell\(^{296}\) as having authorized the section 1983 damages claim for violations of procedural due process rights,\(^{297}\) and (3) conclude, as most courts do, that the relief sought does not itself control the section 1983—federal habeas corpus issue.\(^{298}\)

In the leading case of Fulford v. Klein,\(^{299}\) the Fifth Circuit, after finding that a section 1983 claim for damages could not be asserted to test the constitutionality of a conviction prior to exhausting state remedies, concluded that "habeas corpus is the exclusive initial cause of action where the basis of the claim goes to the constitutionality of the state court conviction." While the Fulford Court expressly declined to determine whether a section 1983 claim for damages may be based upon an unconstitutional conviction or sentence after state remedies have been exhausted, most courts have indicated that they would allow the damages claim following the exhaustion of state remedies.\(^{300}\) Requiring that state remedies first be exhausted, however, not only delays the damages claim but invariably dooms it to failure, because the state court ruling normally will operate to collaterally estop the section 1983 claim.\(^{301}\)

\(^{296}\) 418 U.S. 539 (1974).

\(^{297}\) See supra notes 223-32 and accompanying text. The lower federal courts typically read Wolff to allow a section 1983 claim for damages for the violation of procedural due process rights rather than for the deprivation of good-time credits. See, e.g., In re United States Parole Comm'n, 793 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Monk v. Secretary of Navy, 793 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir.), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc); Barnes v. Wolff, 586 F. Supp. 312 (D. Nev. 1984).

\(^{298}\) See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.

\(^{299}\) 529 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).

\(^{300}\) See Crump v. Lane, 807 F.2d 1394, 1395, 1401 (7th Cir. 1986) (damages for denial of parole release: "Before Crump may properly maintain a 1983 action for damages arising out of his allegedly illegal confinement, he must first exhaust his state court remedies . . . ."); Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1986); Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1985); Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982); Burgess v. Brown, 652 F. Supp. 1426 (W.D.N.C. 1987). See also Davis v. Rendell, 659 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1981) (section 1983 claim for damages permitted where there was only a remote possibility that there was anything left to exhaust which would affect the conviction after defendant pleaded nolo contendere).

The claim for damages may also run into *Younger v. Harris*\(^{302}\) abstention problems. In fact, the Supreme Court, which has never determined whether a section 1983 damages claim may be based upon an allegedly unconstitutional conviction,\(^{303}\) has described the issue in abstention terms, i.e., whether a district court should "abstain from deciding a section 1983 suit for damages stemming from an unlawful conviction pending the collateral exhaustion of state court attacks on the conviction itself."\(^{304}\)

The lower federal court cases conflict over whether *Younger* abstention applies to federal claims for damages.\(^{305}\) There are several indications that if faced with the issue, the Supreme Court may well apply *Younger* to claims for damages. First, the Court has ruled that the *Younger* doctrine applies not only to federal court relief against pending state proceedings, but also to federal relief that would overturn state court judgments.\(^{306}\) While this holding is not dispositive of the *Younger*-damages issues, it is significant because the damages claim is most likely to arise after state proceedings are completed. Until that time, the criminal defendant might not have suffered the actual injury that provides a basis for a claim of compensatory damages.\(^{307}\)

Moreover, the Court has indicated that a claim for damages based upon the unconstitutionality of state practices is, in effect, a request for a declaratory judgment of the constitutionality of the practices. In *Fair Assessment Real Estate Association v. McNary*,\(^{308}\) the Court ruled that a section 1983 claim for damages based upon an allegedly unconstitutional state tax scheme was barred by principles of comity and federalism because the federal court would first have to determine the constitutionality of the tax practice or policy in order to determine whether plaintiffs were entitled to damages.\(^{309}\)

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503 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In *Conner*, the court, after finding the judge and prosecutor protected by absolute immunity, stated that "it is not equally clear that the dismissal of Conner's damages claims against the police officers was correct." 552 F.2d at 587. Police officers generally are entitled to qualified good faith immunity. *Malley v. Briggs*, 475 U.S. 335 (1986); *Pierson v. Ray*, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).


303. See *supra* note 265.


305. See M. *Schwartz & J. Kirklin*, *supra* note 4, § 12.7, at 253 n.80.


309. *Fair Assessment* dealt with the principles of federalism and comity that underlie the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). By basing its ruling on principles of comity and federalism, the Court in *Fair Assessment* was able to avoid the issue of whether or not a claim for damages was barred by section 1341, which prohibits a federal court from "enjoin[ing], suspend[ing] or restrain[ing] the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
The Court stated, "[t]he recovery of damages under the Civil Rights Act first requires a 'declaration' or determination of unconstitutionality of a state tax scheme that would halt its operation." This analysis is significant to the Younger-damages issue because for Younger purposes the Supreme Court generally equates federal injunctive and declaratory relief.

Several lower federal court decisions have relied at least in part upon the policies of the Younger doctrine to conclude that a section 1983 claim for damages may not be based upon an unconstitutional conviction. In Guerro v. Mulhearn, the First Circuit provided the following analysis:

Despite the difference in the form of the relief being sought, a suit for damages under section 1983 may also have a substantially disruptive effect upon contemporary state criminal proceedings, and may also undermine the integrity of the writ of habeas corpus. Where the federal court, in dealing with the question of damages caused by violation of civil rights, would have to make rulings by virtue of which the validity of a conviction in contemporary state proceedings would be called in question, the potential for federal-state friction is obvious. The federal rulings would embarrass, and could even intrude into, the state proceedings.

The court in Guerro also recognized, however, that constitutionally protected rights may be denied prior to trial and might be irrelevant to the criminal conviction or sentence. For example, false arrests, illegal searches and seizures, or wiretaps, may constitute compensable wrongs while not "undergirding the validity of the criminal conviction to which it might be related."

Guerro thus properly emphasized the distinction between claims for damages that implicate the constitutionality of state convictions, and claims for damages based upon allegedly unconstitutional law enforcement practices which do not implicate the constitutionality of convictions. The former types of claims clash with the federalism policies behind Preiser and Younger while the latter types of claims do not.

313. 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974).
314. Id. at 1253 (footnote omitted).
315. Guerro, 498 F.2d at 1253. See also Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
316. 498 F.2d at 1253.
317. It is settled that state prisoner damages claims that do not stem from the constitutionality
b. "Fine only" and expired sentence convictions

Because a petitioner must be "in custody" in order to commence a federal habeas corpus proceeding, an individual who is not in custody may not test the constitutionality of a state court conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding. While recent Supreme Court decisions have substantially liberalized the concept of "custody," courts still require a showing that a habeas corpus petitioner is subject to some form of serious restraint of liberty. Thus, the right to institute a federal habeas corpus proceeding is denied to those subject to "fine only" convictions, as well as to those who have been fully discharged following expiration of their terms of imprisonment, or parole.

of a conviction or sentence or otherwise relate to the fact or duration of confinement may be asserted under section 1983. See Mack v. Verelas, 835 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1987); Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984); Bodeker v. Dyson, 544 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1977); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1254 (1st Cir. 1974); Rogers v. Fuller, 410 F. Supp. 187 (M.D.N.C. 1976).

319. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
320. Battieste v. Baton Rouge, 732 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984); Spring v. Caldwell, 692 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1982); Waste Management of Wis. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1060 (1980), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981); Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979); Russell v. City of Pierre, 530 F.2d 791 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Westberry v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1970) (fine and revocation of driver's license are not custody). In Hanson, the Court held "that the ordinary collateral consequences or civil disabilities flowing from a fine-only conviction, although they may be restraints on liberty, are not severe enough to put the convicted person in custody within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute." 591 F.2d at 407. Based upon this reasoning, "a corporate petitioner can never secure habeas corpus review . . . because a corporation's entity status precludes it from ever being incarcerated or otherwise held in custody." Waste Management, 614 F.2d at 140. That an arrest warrant has been issued because of failure to pay a fine does not satisfy the custody requirement, Caldwell, 692 F.2d at 994, although custody would exist if a petitioner was incarcerated for failure to pay the fine. See Duvalion v. Florida, 691 F.2d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 1982). The Caldwell court stated, in dictum, that "different factors must be considered" in cases of indigence or inability to pay the fine. 692 F.2d at 999 n.6.
322. Tinder v. Paula, 725 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1984). The Tinder court ruled that requiring restitution payment as a pre-condition for probation release did not constitute "custody." Restitution, like a fine, is not a serious restraint on liberty and the possibility that probation will be extended because of a failure to satisfy the court ordered restitution is not sufficient to place the individual in custody. Id.
323. Siano v. Justices, 698 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983). See also Tinder, 725 F.2d at 803 (dicta). As the First Circuit has stated:

After the expiration of a term of imprisonment, parole or probation, however, the
The question thus arises whether one who is not in custody and therefore unable to contest the constitutionality of a conviction or sentence in a federal habeas corpus proceeding may do so in a federal court section 1983 action. Judge Newman has described the competing arguments:

It might be contended that Congress, in enacting the habeas corpus remedy, not only intended it to be the exclusive vehicle for district court collateral inquiry into the validity of state convictions but also intended that those convictions not subject to a habeas remedy, i.e., without custody consequences, should be immune from district court collateral inquiry. In the absence of helpful legislative history, it seems at least as plausible to argue that the unavailability of habeas corpus to attack a sentence involving only a fine is a sufficient reason for permitting collateral inquiry via §1983.32

Recent case law is inconclusive as to which route courts are likely to take. Some courts have ruled that when a conviction cannot be attacked in a federal habeas corpus proceeding because the petitioner is not in custody, the conviction may be attacked in a federal court section 1983 action.325 Proponents argue that section 1983 should be available because when federal habeas corpus is not available, the more specific habeas corpus remedy cannot be said to preempt the more general section 1983 remedy.326 Since Preiser was based upon a perceived necessity to reconcile potentially overlapping federal remedies, if the remedies do not in fact overlap, there simply state no longer has special supervisory authority over the person. Thus, a sentence that has been fully served does not satisfy the custody requirement of the habeas statute, despite the collateral consequences that generally attend a criminal conviction.

Tinder, 725 F.2d at 803. If one is in custody when the habeas corpus proceeding is commenced but is subsequently released, the proceeding is not moot so long as statutory collateral consequences flow from the contested conviction. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 234-35 (1968). Cf. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982) (expiration of sentence rendered attack on sentence moot where no demonstration of statutory collateral consequences). A proposed American Bar Association standard would eliminate the custody requirement entirely and permit a collateral attack upon a conviction “even though the applicant has completely served the challenged sentence” or “even though the challenged sentence did not commit the applicant to prison but was rather a fine, probation or suspended sentence.” IV ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 22-2.3 (1982 Supplement).

324. Pueschel v. Leuba, 383 F. Supp. 576, 581 (D. Conn. 1974). The court in Pueschel did not resolve the issue but decided the case on collateral estoppel grounds. Id. at 578.

325. Battieste v. Baton Rouge, 732 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Staton v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 909 (1982); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1978); Conner v. Pickett, 552 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1977); Freeman v. Fuller, 623 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D. Fla. 1985). See also Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 1981) (dictum). The Fifth Circuit, in Battieste, recognized that it was in conflict with its prior decision in Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1978), but stated that “Cavett has never been subsequently cited by this court in support of the district court's position [prohibiting the use of section 1983 by one not ‘in custody’ to challenge a conviction] and is in direct contravention of the other cases of this circuit ... cited in this opinion.”

Battieste, 732 F.2d at 441 n.1.

326. Schwartz, Challenging State Convictions, supra note 6, at 290.
is no need to reconcile these remedies. In addition, the Fifth Circuit has argued that:

In *Fulford* we held that once a state conviction is final 'habeas corpus is the exclusive initial cause of action where the basis of the claim goes to the constitutionality of the state court conviction.' (citation omitted) Of course this bow to the integrity of state judicial administration is unnecessary where a Section 1983 plaintiff is ineligible for habeas relief for reasons having nothing to do with the merits of his contention that his conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.227

Two circuit courts have argued persuasively that Congress did not intend that section 1983 be available to attack the constitutionality of a conviction even when federal habeas corpus is not available because the criminal defendant is not in custody.228 In *Hanson v. Circuit Court*, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that because Congress intended for habeas corpus to provide "not only the exclusive federal remedy for those in custody, but also the exclusive federal remedy for all who seek to attack state court judgments of convictions," convictions not subject to habeas attack "are immune from collateral inquiry by the federal courts."229 The *Hanson* court adopted the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in *Cavett v. Ellis*230 that a plaintiff's section 1983 action was not meant to be a substitute for habeas corpus when there is no custody present. Courts have authority to grant habeas corpus relief to persons in custody pursuant to judgments of state courts, but have refused to extend habeas relief to those not in custody. The *Cavett* court refused to make a petitioner's section 1983 action the "greater writ" by indirectly avoiding the custody requirement of section 2254.231 To rule otherwise "would be to expand the scope of section 1983 beyond that contemplated by Congress."232 Viewing federal habeas corpus as the exclusive federal remedy to attack state court convictions is consistent with federal court principles of federalism and comity.233

In *Waste Management of Wisconsin v. Fokakis*,234 the Seventh Circuit applied its holding in *Hanson* to a corporation that had been subject to a

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227. Conner v. Pickett, 552 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir. 1977). See also supra note 325 for a description of Fifth Circuit decisional law.


230. 578 F.2d 567, 569 (5th Cir. 1978). *Cavett* appears to have been overruled by *Battieste*, 732 F.2d at 441 n.1. See supra note 325.


233. Id. at 410.

"fine only" conviction. The corporation had argued that because corporations could never satisfy the habeas custody requirement, they would be deprived of their only federal remedy if they were not permitted to utilize section 1983 to attack a conviction. The Seventh Circuit found the corporation's argument foreclosed by the holding in Hanson that section 2254 is "the sole avenue of collateral attack of state convictions." Like Hanson, Waste Management stressed principles of federalism, and found that attacking the validity of state court convictions in a collateral federal court proceeding is an extraordinary intrusion on the independent functioning of the state judicial system. The court further found that the federal habeas corpus statute represented the balance Congress struck between an individual's interest in freedom from unlawful intrusions on his or her physical freedom and the state courts' interest in freedom from federal interference with final state court judgments. To allow individuals who are not in custody, and whose personal interests are not as compelling as those who are in custody, to contest their convictions in a federal section 1983 action would upset this balance.

The Waste Management Corporation had relied upon the Eighth Circuit's decision in McCurry v. Allen, to support its argument that section 1983 should be available when federal habeas corpus is not. The Seventh Circuit found that its decision in Hanson precluded it from accepting Waste Management's attempt to analogize from McCurry. Moreover, after Waste Management was decided, the Supreme Court reversed McCurry, thereby lending further support to the validity of the Waste Management decision.

In McCurry, the Supreme Court found no authority to support the Eighth Circuit's position "that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court, regardless of the legal posture in which the federal claim arises. Neither the Constitution nor section 1983 supports such a conclusion."

335. Id. at 141.
336. Id. at 140.
337. Id. at 140-41.
338. Id. at 141.
339. 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
340. 614 F.2d at 141. In McCurry, the Eighth Circuit ruled that a state court's rejection of a criminal defendant's fourth amendment claim in a suppression hearing did not preclude a section 1983 claim for damages based upon that fourth amendment violation. The McCurry court allowed the section 1983 claim because the doctrine of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976), precluded the litigant from bringing the fourth amendment claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. McCurry, 606 F.2d at 799. To allow otherwise would have left the litigant no other forum in which to bring his claim. See supra notes 277-91 and accompanying text for a thorough discussion of Stone.
341. 614 F.2d at 141.
343. The Court also held that the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), governs the preclusive effect of state court judgments in federal section 1983 actions. 449 U.S. at 99. See supra notes 286-90 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the Supreme Court specifically stated that it was not likely that the 42nd Congress, which drafted the original version of section 1983, considered it a substitute for federal habeas corpus, "the purpose of which is not to redress civil injury, but to release the applicant from unlawful physical confinement . . . particularly in light of the extremely narrow scope of federal habeas relief for state prisoners in 1871."  

If faced with the issue, this author believes the present Supreme Court would disallow the use of section 1983 to challenge "fine only" and expired sentence convictions. In the context of ambiguous legislative intent, the Court's paramount concern for principles of federalism and comity would probably lead it to agree with the Seventh Circuit that "direct review by the United States Supreme Court is sufficient to preserve the role of the federal courts as the ultimate guardians of federally guaranteed rights."

2. Challenges to pre-trial custody, probation, parole, and good-time credit determinations

The decisions in Preiser and Wolff establish that a state prisoner who asks a federal court to order immediate or earlier release must bring a federal habeas corpus proceeding rather than a section 1983 claim. Thus, habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy to assert claims seeking release from pre-trial custody, immediate or speedier release on parole, or a restoration or recalculation of good-time credits. Similarly, habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to contest reincarceration resulting from the revocation of parole. In Smallwood v. Board of Probation and Parole, the Eighth

344. 449 U.S. at 104-05.
345. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404, 411 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979)). Even if section 1983 is found to be available to attack fine only and expired sentence convictions, such attacks would be countered with several other significant non-merit defenses, such as collateral estoppel, judicial or prosecutorial immunity, or by the Younger abstention doctrine. See supra note 301.
349. 411 U.S. at 486 (dictum) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 474 (1972)).
350. 587 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1978).
Circuit concluded that a request for an order compelling reconsideration of a decision denying parole is, in effect, a request for release from confinement and, therefore, within the scope of habeas corpus and not section 1983.351

In Alexander v. Johnson,352 the Fourth Circuit stated that a prisoner could not contest the requirement that he pay the costs of assigned counsel in order to be released on parole under section 1983. The court held that this claim came instead within the scope of habeas corpus because the prisoner was seeking to be relieved of a restraint which would hasten his release on parole. Similarly, in Drollinger v. Milligan,353 the Seventh Circuit determined that a constitutional challenge to certain conditions of probation was within the exclusive scope of habeas corpus. While such a claim might seem to challenge conditions of confinement, and thereby come within the parameter of section 1983, the court held that this was not so. Since the terms of probation include not only its length, but also specifies prohibited and required conduct while on probation, and since “probation is by its nature less confining than incarceration, the distinction between the fact of confinement and the conditions thereof is necessarily blurred.”354 In this context, eliminating a condition of probation diminishes the extent of custody; “figuratively speaking, one of the ‘bars’ would be removed from the cell.”355 Therefore, an attempt to secure release from custody, even if partial, falls within the traditional function of habeas corpus and is not actionable under section 1983.356

There is authority stating that an injunction mandating immediate parole review or reconsideration of a decision denying parole falls within the exclusive scope of habeas corpus.357 This argument appears to be erroneous, however, because such relief does not constitute a determination that a prisoner is entitled to immediate or speedier release. As discussed below in conjunction with procedural due process claims,358 a claim that certain procedures or criteria be followed or that a speedier parole determination be made requires neither immediate nor speedier release but, instead, leaves that decision with the relevant officials. These procedural-type claims, therefore, are commonly held to be within the scope of section 1983.359 In Walker

351. See also Brown v. Vermillion, 593 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1979) (request for new parole release hearing construed as request for release from confinement).
352. 742 F.2d 117, 118 (4th Cir. 1984).
353. 552 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1977).
354. Id. at 1225. Accord Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 998 (5th Cir. 1987) (concurring opinion).
355. Drollinger, 552 F.2d at 1225.
356. Id.
358. See infra notes 421-35 and accompanying text.
359. See, e.g., Faheem-El v. Klincair, 814 F.2d 461, 465 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987) (challenge to policy of denying all parolees any consideration for release on bail pending final parole revocation hearing lies under section 1983); In re United States Parole Comm’n, 793 F.2d 338
the prisoner claimed that he had been given insufficient reasons for the denial of his parole application, that the Board erroneously regarded his sentences as consecutive rather than concurrent, and that he was not allowed to review the entire record. Because he contested only the manner in which parole was denied, and because he did not seek release on parole but only a rehearing in accordance with due process, leaving the ultimate release decision within the Board’s discretion, the court found that the claims could be asserted under section 1983.

A number of decisions deal with the question of whether or not a section 1983 claim for damages may be asserted based upon an allegedly unconstitutional denial of good-time credits or parole. Resolution of this issue depends in part upon whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Wolff v. McDonnell recognized a section 1983 damages claim for the denial of good-time credits or whether it recognized a section 1983 damages claim only for the deprivation of procedural due process rights. Most of the lower federal courts have read Wolff, as this author does, to recognize a section 1983 damages claim for the deprivation of due process, and not for the loss of good-time credits. In a cogent analysis of the issue, the Fifth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court in Wolff:
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authorized the district court to examine the constitutionality of the state prison procedure, and to award damages which were incidental to an invalid proceeding. Since the district court was expressly forbidden to enter an injunction concerning the merits of the issue before the state administrative body (i.e., the proper length of confinement), however, it follows as a matter of logic that the district court was similarly prohibited from awarding damages for excessive confinement.1

This reading of Wolff is consistent with the majority view that the nature of the claim asserted, rather than the specific relief requested, is the most important factor in resolving the section 1983—federal habeas corpus conflict.2 It follows, most lower federal courts have concluded that prior to exhaustion of state remedies, a section 1983 claim for damages does not lie to contest the deprivation of good-time credits3 or the denial or revocation of parole.4 Of course, a section 1983 claimant who awaits the exhaustion of state remedies must face the danger of being precluded by that state court determination.5

3. Challenges to conditions of confinement

In Preiser, the Supreme Court referred to its prior decisions that upheld "the right of state prisoners to bring federal civil rights actions to challenge the conditions of their confinement."6 Preiser's discussion of challenges to

Corrections, 514 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1975), is unclear as to whether the court recognized the section 1983 damages claim for the violation of procedural due process rights or for the revocation of good-time credits.

64. Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (1977) (en banc).

65. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.


68. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Claims for damages against parole officials might be defeated by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. See M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 4, at § 7.6.

conditions of confinement, although *dicta*, reflects the uncontestable proposition that state prisoners may contest the conditions of their confinement, as opposed to its fact or length, under section 1983.\(^\text{370}\) State prisoners have in fact utilized section 1983 "to contest a broad range of prison conditions"\(^\text{371}\) and, since *Preiser*, numerous Supreme Court cases have either explicitly or implicitly recognized the propriety of a state prisoner's use of this remedy to attack such conditions.\(^\text{372}\)

An attack on segregated or other disciplinary confinement falls within section 1983 because it does not seek release from confinement, but only a change in the conditions of confinement.\(^\text{373}\) In *Wright v. Cuyler*,\(^\text{374}\) the Third Circuit distinguished between furloughs and the good-time credits at issue in *Preiser*. The *Wright* court ruled that a prisoner could challenge the state's failure to admit him into the home furlough program under section 1983 because he had challenged the conditions of his confinement, rather than attacked the ultimate duration of confinement.\(^\text{375}\)

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371. As Judge Lay of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, "*[p]risoner grievances relating to conditions of confinement, food, privacy, heat, mail, hair length, work details, segregation from the prison population, religious practices, and rehabilitation have all become issues of federal litigation under section 1983."


374. 624 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1980).

375. The court reasoned that:

> although a prisoner's total number of days actually spent behind bars can technically be reduced by the number of days during which he is out of prison on
There are some situations, however, where a challenge to conditions of confinement is so intimately connected to the length or fact of confinement that it is found to be encompassed by habeas corpus. In *Brennan v. Cunningham*, the prisoner challenged his removal from a work release program. The prisoner argued that the claim was within federal habeas corpus, presumably in order to avoid the preclusive effect of an adverse state court determination. The inmate's claim appeared, like the claim in *Wright*, to challenge conditions of confinement. Under the applicable state law, however, participation in a work release program is so closely related to an inmate's pending release that it could be asserted in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Where a challenge to prison conditions is derivative of the length of confinement, it may be asserted only in a habeas corpus proceeding and not under section 1983. The Sixth Circuit addressed this issue in *Dixon v. Alexander*. In *Dixon*, the prisoner sought to enforce a plea bargain pursuant to which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Despite this agreement, the State Department of Corrections refused to treat the prisoner as eligible for parole. The Sixth Circuit ruled that the claim to enforce the plea agreement was a habeas corpus claim that should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies.

Furloughs, it cannot be said that occasional short furloughs such as these reduce the duration of confinement in the same way as did the good time credits at issue in *Preiser*, where the credits would have had the effect of terminating the prisoner's sentence at an earlier calendar date. We therefore hold that the eligibility or lack of eligibility for temporary home furloughs in Pennsylvania is a condition of one's confinement, which may be challenged directly in a section 1983 action without resort to habeas corpus and its attendant requirement for exhaustion of state remedies.


376. 813 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).

377. *See supra note* 160.

378. The state work release program "considers for admission only those inmates who are within eight months of parole." 813 F.2d at 4. The *Brennan* court also stated that even if the claim was characterized as a challenge to conditions of confinement, it could be asserted either under section 1983 or in a habeas corpus proceeding. *Id.* at 4. *See infra* notes 382-96 and accompanying text.

379. 741 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1984).

380. We previously questioned whether a claim of entitlement only to be considered for parole is within habeas corpus. *See supra* notes 357-61 and accompanying text.
The prisoner in *Dixon* argued that his status as a prisoner not eligible for parole denied him the possibility of work release and other privileges accorded to prisoners "being 'held with the possibility of parole.'"381 The court acknowledged that while normally a prisoner could challenge the constitutionality of prison conditions under section 1983, this prisoner's claims related to conditions of confinement that were "simply derivative of the possibility-of-parole claim, i.e., the length of his confinement . . . [and were] . . . completely subsumed by the possibility of parole claim."382 Thus, under these specific circumstances, the conditions of confinement claim could not be asserted under section 1983.383

*Brennan* and *Dixon* aside, state prisoner condition of confinement claims may almost always be asserted under section 1983. The question then arises whether or not these claims are also within the scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.384 This issue can be especially important where the inmate's conditions claim has been rejected by the state court and the inmate seeks to avoid the preclusive effect of the state judgment by seeking relief in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.385

Habeas corpus was at one time available only to seek release from custody386 and it was considered "an inappropriate method for challenging prison conditions."387 However, in its 1969 decision in *Johnson v. Avery*,388 the Supreme Court seemed to agree with the district court's treatment of the prisoner's challenge to his transfer to maximum security for preparing legal papers in violation of prison regulations as a petition for habeas corpus. In *Wilwording v. Swenson*389 the Supreme Court, citing *Johnson*, stated that a state prisoner's challenge to "living conditions and disciplinary measures while confined in maximum security . . ." is "cognizable in habeas corpus," as well as under section 1983.

381. 741 F.2d at 125.
382. Id.
383. See also Stevens v. Heard, 674 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1982) (challenges to denial of adequate medical care and emergency reprieves arise out of challenge to legality of detainers and are within the scope of habeas corpus).
384. The number of prisoner habeas corpus petitions challenging prison conditions appears to be small. Turner, *supra* note 245, at 612 n.20.
385. See *supra* notes 376-78 and accompanying text.
387. Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir. 1974). The *Willis* court noted that [t]his restrictive view was premised primarily upon the same belief that gave rise to the more general 'hands off' doctrine, that is, that prisoner complaints relating to conditions of confinement could only be addressed to those prison authorities who had responsibility for those conditions.
The Supreme Court in *Preiser* followed *Johnson* and *Wilwording* and recognized that habeas corpus may “be available to challenge such prison conditions.” 390 The Court was far from committal, however, stating that “[w]hen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.” 391 It then specifically disclaimed any intent to explore the limits of habeas corpus as an alternative remedy to a section 1983 claim. 392 More recently, the Court explicitly left open whether habeas corpus may be used to review the constitutionality of conditions of confinement. 393

In contrast to the Supreme Court’s noncommittal stance, the weight of circuit court authority supports the use of federal habeas corpus to test the constitutionality of conditions of confinement. 394 When a federal court finds a condition of confinement to be unconstitutional, it may order release from the unconstitutional custody “subject to imposition of the potential lawful custody.” 395 The prisoner’s duration of confinement is thereby not affected.

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391. *Id.* (citing *Rodriguez*, supra note 32, at 1084). Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in *Preiser* takes the position that a state prisoner who attacks conditions of confinement may utilize section 1983 or federal habeas corpus. 411 U.S. at 504-06, 508 (Brennan, J., dissenting). *See also* Wolff v. *McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974) (“The Court has already recognized instances where the same constitutional rights might be redressed under either form of relief.”).
392. 411 U.S. at 300 (“But we need not in this case explore the appropriate limits of habeas corpus as an alternative remedy to a proper action under § 1983.”).
394. See *Brennan* v. *Cunningham*, 813 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987); Coates v. Smith, 746 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1984); Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, reh’g denied, 737 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1984); Jackson v. Carlson, 707 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Yeager v. Wilkinson, 464 U.S. 861 (1983); McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982); Ali v. Gibson, 631 F.2d 1126 (3d Cir. 1980) (implicit holding), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981); Warren v. Cardwell, 621 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1980); Streeter v. Hopper, 618 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980); Roba v. United States, 604 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1979); Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J., concurring); Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720, 726 n.7 (7th Cir. 1975); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1974); Workman v. Mitchell, 502 F.2d 1201, 1209 n.9 (9th Cir. 1974). *Contra* Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1979) (dismissing petition challenging terms and conditions of confinement); United States v. Sisneros, 599 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1979) (refusing to vacate sentence where trial court failed to advise defendant of possibility that special parole term could be lifetime); Cook v. Hanberry, 592 F.2d 248 (5th Cir.) (alleged mistreatment of prisoner not grounds for release from prison), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 932 (1979); Rhodes v. Craven, 425 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1970) (habeas corpus not proper remedy for prisoner who sought access to legal books); Granville v. Hunt, 411 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1969) (no allegation of facts showing either discrimination or conspiracy). The Fifth Circuit decision in *Granville* appears to be superceded by its more recent decision in *Streeter*, 618 F.2d 1178. The Ninth Circuit decisions in *Rhodes* and *Crawford* appear to be superceded by the decision in *Warren*, 621 F.2d 319.
by the judicial relief. Current decisional law thus takes the correct position that condition of confinement claims may be asserted by state prisoners either under section 1983 or federal habeas corpus.396

4. Challenges to the place of confinement

There are two types of prisoner challenges to the place of confinement: (1) intra-prison challenges to solitary, segregated, or other disciplinary confinement seeking transfer back to the general prison population; and (2) inter-prison challenges to confinement in the present institution seeking transfer to another institution. The first type of claims generally are treated as attacks on the conditions of confinement within the scope of section 1983.397 Whether these claims are also within the scope of habeas corpus depends upon whether or not habeas may be employed to contest conditions of confinement.398

396. See supra note 394.
397. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (challenging solitary confinement), reh’g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1986) (challenging relocation of prisoners within same facility), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2462 (1987); McKinnis v. Mosely, 693 F.2d 1054, 1057 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Even if McKinnis prevails on all of his claims and receives all the relief he demands, the duration of his sentence will not be shortened by one moment.”); Campbell v. McGuider, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (pre-trial detainee facility); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc) (segregated confinement), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
398. See supra notes 384-95. For cases holding that federal habeas corpus is available to prisoners who seek release from solitary or disciplinary confinement and transfer back to the general prison population, see, e.g., Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1111-12, reh’g denied, 737 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1984), as having “held that habeas corpus provided the exclusive remedy for obtaining an order compelling release from administrative detention.” Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1103 n.24. In Boudin, however, habeas corpus was the exclusive remedy and federal habeas corpus was not available because “[t]he prison officials were not acting under color of state law for the purposes of Boudin’s complaint.” Boudin, 732 F.2d at 1112 n.2. A transfer of a state prisoner within a prison does not work a deprivation of a liberty interest unless the state law specifies that transfers will not occur absent specified substantive predicates. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (“It is plain that the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence.”).
It is established that the second type of claim may be asserted in a federal habeas corpus proceeding because a claim of unlawful confinement in the wrong institution is a claim of unlawful physical restraint. The more difficult issue is whether or not such a claim also may be asserted under section 1983. In Humphrey v. Cady, a pre-Preiser case, the Supreme Court stated that the petitioner's claim that he was unlawfully committed to a state prison rather than a mental hospital was properly brought within the scope of federal habeas corpus. With respect to the use of section 1983, the Court stated ambiguously that "some or all of petitioner's claims may be entitled to be treated as claims for relief under ... section 1983, in which case no exhaustion is required." The few lower court decisions on this issue have reached different results.

Of the decisions taking the position that section 1983 is available, one was decided pre-Preiser, another contains virtually no analysis, and two others are limited to their specific circumstances. In Villa v. Frazen, a prisoner was placed in a state medical facility following his conviction and sentencing. He claimed that he was receiving inadequate treatment and sought transfer to an adequate state medical facility. Under these specific circumstances, the district court found that the prisoner's claim could be asserted under section 1983 because his request did "not necessarily involve release from the state's custody, but rather placement in any constitutionally sufficient facility." The court read the plaintiff's complaint to contest the "conditions rather than the propriety of his custody."

A similar approach was taken in Swansey v. Elrod, where prisoners sought transfer to another institution. While recognizing that there was

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400. In dicta, the Preiser Court stated that a prisoner's claim "that he is unlawfully confined in the wrong institution" is a grievance "that he is being unlawfully subjected to physical restraint" for which federal habeas corpus is available. 411 U.S. at 486 (citing In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894) and Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972)).

401. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).

402. The Court's recognition that the claim was properly asserted in a federal habeas proceeding is implicit in its discussion of the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement. Preiser cites Humphrey as an example of a habeas corpus proceeding. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 486.

403. Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 516 n.18.


408. Id. at 234 (emphasis in original).

409. Id.

authority stating that habeas corpus was the proper remedy for prisoner challenges to the location of incarceration, the court found that the requested transfer was an incidental form of relief which was requested only if the conditions could not be corrected in the present place of confinement. If the conditions could be corrected in the existing institution the constitutional violations could be rectified without the necessity of transfer to another institution. Under these circumstances the court construed the complaint as an attack on the conditions of confinement within the scope of section 1983. Villa and Swansey are limited by their specific circumstances and, thus, do not answer the general question as to the availability of section 1983 to contest confinement in a particular penal institution.

Three other district court decisions take the contrary position and hold that prisoner claims for the right to be transferred to another institution fall within the scope of habeas corpus and not section 1983. This position is supported by dicta in the Preiser opinion. While the Court did not specifically state that habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy in these circumstances, the fact that it regards the relief as a form of release from confinement indicates that it views the claim as being within the "core" of habeas corpus and, therefore, beyond the scope of section 1983. Under this view, habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy to seek a transfer to another institution, except perhaps where a prisoner's request for transfer is merely incidental to an attack on prison conditions.

There is, however, a strong argument that section 1983 should be available to secure transfer to a different penal facility, at least when such a transfer would not bring about a loss of the state's jurisdiction to confine. Under these circumstances, the transfer would not result in either immediate or speedier release from confinement, but merely change the geographical location of confinement. Viewed in this light, the claim is analogous to an attack upon the conditions of confinement.

The significance of section 1983 to contest confinement in a particular prison has been greatly diminished as a result of three Supreme Court decisions. In each case the Court recognized, without discussion, that section 1983 was the appropriate remedy for a prisoner allegedly deprived of procedural due process rights arising from the transfer from one institution to another. In Montanye and Meachum, the Court ruled that "absent

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412. The Court stated that when a prisoner claims, "that he is unlawfully confined in the wrong institution, ... his grievance is that he is being unlawfully subjected to physical constraint, and ... habeas corpus has been accepted as the specific instrument to obtain release from such confinement." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 486 (1973). See supra note 398.


414. The availability of section 1983 to litigate prisoner procedural due process claims is discussed in the text, Section A(5) infra, at p. 70-74.
some right or justifiable expectation rooted in state law that he will not be transferred except for misbehavior or upon the occurrence of other specified events," the transfer of a prisoner does not work to deprive him of a protected liberty interest.415 Because "[c]onfinement in any of the State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose," prison transfers do not deprive a prisoner of a liberty interest created directly by the Constitution.416 The Olim court extended the rationale of Meachum and Montanye, which involved intra-state transfers, to inter-state transfers.417

The liberty interests protected by procedural due process may be created by the Constitution or by state law, while "substantive due process rights are created only by the Constitution."418 Therefore, while Meachum, Montanye, and Olim deal with procedural due process claims, those cases support the conclusion that inmates have no substantive due process right to be confined in any particular penal facility. These decisions have thus drastically limited the constitutional claims that prisoners may lodge against inter-prison transfers.419

5. Procedural due process claims

A substantial portion of federal court prisoners' rights litigation consists of claims involving administrative procedural protections, including stan-

415. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-26; Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242.
417. "Just as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State." Olim, 461 U.S. at 245.

Prison transfers can create serious harm. As one expert has observed:

Few things cause a prisoner greater grief. Such a transfer may send him far from home, family, and lawyers. Equally important, it may move him out of a prison where he has learned how to survive, what can get him into trouble, which guards and inmates to avoid, which are friends and allies; he may be in a useful educational or other program that is not available to him elsewhere or may have worked himself into a good job.

419. See Turner, supra note 245, at 630 (after Meachum and Montanye, most section 1983 prison transfer cases are summarily dismissed). A prisoner who has been transferred from a prison to a mental hospital is deprived of a protected liberty interest. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), the Court recognized, in the context of a section 1983 procedural due process claim, that the transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital works a deprivation of liberty as defined by the Constitution because "involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual." Id. at 493 (citations omitted). Additionally, a prisoner who asserts that a prison transfer was in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right states a proper constitutional claim. See Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242, 244 n.* (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to transfers "not otherwise violative of the Constitution . . ."); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1098 n.13 (7th Cir. 1982); McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1979); Hohman v. Hogan, 597 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1979); Garland v. Polley, 594 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1979); Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 229 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 916 (1979); Haymes v. Montanye, 547 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1976).
dards, notice and a hearing, and reasons for adverse determinations. These claims arise out of a wide variety of circumstances including the denial or revocation of good-time credits, denial or revocation of parole, revocation of probation, prison classification, denial of work release or home furloughs, segregated confinement, and transfers to other prisons.\footnote{420}

In \textit{Preiser}, two of the three plaintiffs claimed that they were denied their right to procedural due process when their good-time credits were revoked.\footnote{421} The district court ordered the good-time credits restored, which entitled the prisoners to immediate release on parole.\footnote{422} While the Court held that this relief was within the exclusive domain of federal habeas corpus, the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in \textit{Wolff v. McDonnell}\footnote{423} and \textit{Gerstein v. Pugh}\footnote{424} provide substantial, if not conclusive, support for the proposition that procedural due process claims that do not seek immediate or speedier release from prison may be asserted under section 1983.\footnote{425}

The overwhelming weight of lower federal court authority supports this conclusion.\footnote{426} In \textit{Williams v. Ward},\footnote{427} Judge Friendly persuasively presented

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{421} Plaintiff Rodriguez asserted that he received no notice or hearing on the charges for which he had been punished and plaintiff Kritsky alleged that his summary punishment deprived him of good-time credits without due process of law. \textit{Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 478, 481 (1973).}
\item \footnote{422} \textit{Id.} at 481.
\item \footnote{423} 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
\item \footnote{424} 420 U.S. 103 (1975). \textit{See supra} notes 223-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of \textit{Wolff} and \textit{Gerstein}.
\item \footnote{426} Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078 (3d Cir. 1985), \textit{cert. denied}, 475 U.S. 1028 (1986);
a rationale in support of the availability of section 1983 to contest the constitutionality of prison procedures:

Although the relief sought by petitioner [i.e., procedures employed on applications for parole release] may improve his chances for parole, the question of his release and of the length of his confinement still lies within the sound discretion of the [parole] board, unlike Preiser where the restoration of good-conduct-time credits would have resulted automatically in the shortening of the prisoners' confinement.428

Prisoner claims that contest the absence or the sufficiency of the standards used by prison officials in making determinations, challenge the manner in which those determinations are made and, if successful, do not automatically terminate or shorten the length of confinement.429 Most courts, therefore, properly treat these claims as procedural due process claims that may be asserted under section 1983.430

There is a minority view that a claim for procedural protections is within the scope of habeas corpus because the procedural relief sought "[is] preparatory to the ultimate relief sought . . . release from confinement itself."431

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428. Id. at 1150. See also Huggins v. Isenbarger, 798 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1986); In re United States Parole Comm'n, 793 F.2d 338, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1028 (1986); Walker v. Prisoner Review Bd., 694 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1982); Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 852 n.4 (1st Cir. 1978); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 1974); McCray v. Dietz, 517 F. Supp. 787 (D.N.J. 1980); Haymes v. Regan, 394 F. Supp. 711, 713 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd as modified, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975). Judge Friendly also took the position that a request for new procedural protections is a remedy outside the scope of federal habeas corpus. Williams, 556 F.2d at 1150-51. But see Huggins, 798 F.2d at 204.

429. See In re United States Parole Comm'n, 793 F.2d 338, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (federal prisoner's challenge to parole release guidelines is not within the exclusive scope of federal habeas corpus).


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This view, however, misses the essential points: (1) that a prisoner who seeks procedural protections is not asking for immediate or speedier release; and (2) that the adjudication of the sufficiency of the procedural due process requirements does not attack the constitutionality of a prisoner’s confinement.432 In addition, as one commentator has observed, “[t]he ‘ultimate object’ ellipsis provides no guidance, for every prisoner hopes at some point to secure his freedom.”433

Some courts, principally in the Fifth Circuit, have taken a middle position and allow facial attacks on state procedures within the scope of section 1983. These courts, however, disallow claims for deficient procedures in a particular prisoner’s case unless brought in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.434 These courts support this middle position as a “workable balance between Preiser and Wolff,” and an acknowledgement that it is often difficult to determine “from the usual petition not only precisely what relief is sought but also what would be the result of that relief.”435 This reasoning fails to recognize, however, that when procedural due process relief is sought, “as applied” procedural challenges, like facial procedural challenges, do not seek or require adjudications of entitlement to immediate or speedier release because

ultimate relief this petitioner seeks is release,” in order to find the constitutional challenge to a state's post-conviction procedures within federal habeas corpus. The section 1983—federal habeas corpus distinction in the context of challenges to post-conviction procedures is discussed, infra notes 436-37 and accompanying text.

432. However, if the procedural relief requested will for “all intents and purposes” be tantamount to ordering release on parole, the claim might properly be considered one for habeas corpus. Thomas v. Dietz, 518 F. Supp. 794, 796 (D.N.J. 1981).

433. Comment, Proper Forum, supra note 6, at 1382.

434. Serio v. Members of State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Pfeiffer, 821 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1987); Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1984); Jackson v. Torres, 720 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1983); Keenan v. Bennett, 613 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Hardy, 601 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1979); Watson v. Briscoe, 554 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1977); Christianson v. Spalding, 593 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Wash. 1983); Derrow v. Shields, 482 F. Supp. 1144 (W.D. Va. 1980). But see Williams v. McCall, 531 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1976) (claim of denial of interview to particular applicant for parole is within the scope of section 1983).

In Staton v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 909 (1982), the court ruled that while claims of deficient procedures as applied to particular cases generally are within the scope of habeas corpus, section 1983 was available in the case at bar because the plaintiff had been released on parole and could not obtain effective relief in a habeas corpus proceeding. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.

435. Serio v. Members of State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1987); Derrow v. Shields, 482 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (W.D. Va. 1980). The Fifth Circuit employed similar reasoning in Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation and Parole Bd., 509 F.2d 820 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 998 (1975). The Leonard court allowed plaintiffs to challenge the use of disciplinary records to determine parole release and other classifications in a section 1983 class action because “the specific and concrete effect of such an injunction on the status of each prisoner is highly speculative.” Id. at 824. The court did not decide the section 1983—habeas corpus issue for the named plaintiff, noting only that the effect of granting the requested relief on the named plaintiff might be different than the effect on the class. Id. at 824 n.5. See infra notes 520-24 and accompanying text.
they leave the question of release with the appropriate prison officials. Thus, section 1983 should be available for both facial and "as applied" procedural due process claims, so long as these claims do not seek immediate or quicker release.

6. Challenge to post-conviction review procedures

Some prisoners have sought to challenge the constitutionality of a state's post-conviction review procedures in federal court. The prevailing view is that such claims are not within the jurisdiction of federal habeas corpus because this remedy is intended to provide a vehicle for contesting the constitutionality of state custody and does not authorize review of state post-conviction proceedings. An attack on the constitutional adequacy of a post-conviction proceeding is not an attack on the fact or duration of confinement because, even if successful, the prisoner would not be entitled to immediate or speedier release but only to enhanced post-conviction procedures.

Because challenges to state post-conviction procedures are not within federal habeas corpus, there is obviously no section 1983—habeas corpus overlap to be reconciled. Moreover, there is no reason to exclude these constitutional claims from section 1983. The prisoners in such cases seek procedural due process protections from the federal courts, and thus the claims should be a proper subject of a section 1983 suit.

In Qualls v. Shaw, for example, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the prisoner's request for

436. Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1986); Vail v. Procunier, 747 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1984); Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1984); Mitchell v. Wyrick, 727 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1984); Williams v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 990 (1981); Rheauark v. Shaw, 547 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1977); Qualls v. Shaw, 535 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1976); Bradshaw v. Oklahoma, 398 F. Supp. 838, 843 (E.D. Okla. 1975); Stokley v. Maryland, 301 F. Supp. 653 (D. Md. 1969).


438. The Bradshaw court stated that complaints alleging defects in state post-conviction proceedings did not raise federal constitutional questions because "[t]here is no federal constitutional requirement that the state provide a means of post conviction review of state court convictions." Bradshaw, 398 F. Supp. at 843. This overly broad statement ignores the fact that errors of constitutional magnitude may occur in the course of post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (constitutional right of indigent to assigned counsel on appeal from judgment of conviction); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (constitutional right of indigent to trial transcript necessary to take appeal).

439. Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1986) (ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral post-conviction action); Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1985) (failure to preserve police "street files"); Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1984) (denial of transcript needed to appeal); Rheauark v. Shaw, 547 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1977) (denial of trial transcript needed to appeal); Qualls v. Shaw, 535 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1976) (denial of records to appeal).

440. 535 F.2d 318, 319 (5th Cir. 1976).
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certain court records, allegedly necessary to institute collateral proceedings, was within section 1983 because, even if the prisoner prevailed in the action, "the court's opinion would not impinge in any manner on the validity of his criminal conviction, and therefore habeas corpus is not an appropriate remedy . . . ." 441

The First Circuit, on the other hand, has reached the opposite result. In Dickerson v. Walsh,442 a prisoner challenged the constitutionality of the state's post-conviction review procedure. In an unusual twist, the prisoner asserted the claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding but the state advocated the use of section 1983.443 The court found that the claim could be asserted only in a habeas corpus proceeding after state remedies had been exhausted because (1) the "ultimate relief" sought was release, and (2) considerations of comity required that the state have the first opportunity to correct its own criminal procedures.444 As noted above, the "ultimate relief" rationale is not persuasive and comity, by itself, should not suffice to place a claim within federal habeas corpus, especially where, as in Dickerson, the state itself advocated the use of section 1983.445

In Kirby v. Dutton,446 the Sixth Circuit specifically and persuasively rejected the analysis of Dickerson. The Kirby court reasoned that to come within the scope of habeas corpus

the petition must directly dispute the fact or duration of the confinement. Though the ultimate goal . . . is release from confinement, the result of habeas review of the specific issues before us [i.e., denial of effective assistance of counsel in the post-conviction proceeding] is not in any way related to the confinement.447

It is true that granting the procedural relief requested will enable the prisoner to pursue and perhaps enhance the chances of immediate or speedier release. Any release, however, would not derive from the federal court order, 

441. See also Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239, 242 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984) (claimed denial of a transcript needed to appeal might be "characterized as a species of the conditions of confinement cases").
442. 750 F.2d 150, 152 (1st Cir. 1984).
443. Id. at 153 n.6. See supra note 161.
444. 750 F.2d at 153-54. See also Borning v. Cain, 754 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985) (viewed claim of denial of effective direct appeal in state court as a result of inadequate access to law library as attack on constitutionality of conviction).
446. 794 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1986).
447. Id. at 248 (citation omitted, emphasis in original). Accord Qualls v. Shaw, 535 F.2d 318, 319 (5th Cir. 1976).
but from a state court determination of the post-conviction proceeding. In this respect, challenges to state post-conviction procedures are analogous to procedural due process claims against prison administrative determinations. The one major difference between challenges to prison administrative determinations and post-conviction review procedures is that the latter may require federal court relief against the state judicial system, thereby bringing the claim within the potential grasp of Younger v. Harris abstention. The fact that a claim is within section 1983 does not of course mean that it is appropriate to grant relief that operates against a pending state judicial proceeding. A forceful argument can be made that Younger abstention normally should preclude federal court relief that interferes with state post-conviction proceedings. Under current Supreme Court decisional law, Younger may require abstention because the state is a party to these proceedings and especially important state interests concerning the proper functioning of a state's criminal justice system are implicated.

The Seventh Circuit's decision in Palmer v. City of Chicago demonstrates how Preiser and Younger abstention interact in this area. In Palmer, the plaintiffs in subclass A had been convicted of felonies and sentenced in state court while the plaintiffs in subclass B were charged with felonies and were awaiting trial. The complaint sought injunctive relief to restrain the concealment and destruction of police "street files." The Palmer court found that the subclass A plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief to preserve the "street files" did not challenge the fact or duration of their confinement and thus fell within section 1983. The court noted, however, that once a

448. Rheuark v. Shaw, 547 F.2d 1257, 1259 (5th Cir. 1977). As the Seventh Circuit has stated:

To argue that the provision of the transcript might have resulted in a successful appeal of Lumbert's murder conviction, a new trial, and possible acquittal, and thereby would have indirectly affected the fact of his confinement, is to speculate in a Palsgrafian fashion that provides too tenuous a basis for the determination whether an action properly is characterized as an exclusive habeas corpus action.

Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1984).


450. See supra note 261.

451. 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1985).

452. For a discussion of the interaction of Preiser and Younger, see supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text.

453. The complaint specifically sought the following injunctive relief:

(a) to restrain the defendants from continuing their alleged practice of concealing exculpatory evidence contained in 'street files'; and (b) to preserve the existing street files, in order that the plaintiffs can meaningfully proceed with their post-conviction remedies and felony trials in Illinois state court, as well as their attempt under section 1983, to obtain a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and damages.

755 F.2d at 569. A "street file" is a police investigative working file. Id. at 564.

454. Id. at 573. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), espoused a doctrine which required a realistic threat of future injury in order to have standing to obtain prospective relief. Under that doctrine, the subclass A plaintiffs were found to be without standing to challenge the concealment of exculpatory evidence contained in the street files because it was too speculative that they would be subjected to this practice in the future.
prisoner obtained his "street file," any subsequent attack upon the fact or duration of his imprisonment in federal court would be limited to habeas corpus relief. The subclass B plaintiffs who were awaiting trial did not fare as well. The court denied their claims for injunctive relief because they fell within the *O'Shea v. Littleton* branch of the *Younger* doctrine, which forbade federal courts from granting relief that would require an "ongoing federal audit" or "major continuing intrusion" into the daily conduct of state criminal proceedings.

In sum, while challenges to the constitutionality of state post-conviction review procedures are not within the jurisdiction of federal habeas corpus and should be within the scope of section 1983, these claims will normally be denied under *Younger* abstention principles.

### 7. Challenges to extradition

It has been settled since 1885 that prior to being removed to the demanding state, a prisoner may employ a writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of extradition under the extradition clause of the Constitution and its implementing statute. In *Brown v. Nutsch*, the Eighth Circuit concluded that

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455. 755 F.2d at 573.
457. *Id.* at 500, 502. Judge Cudahy, in dissent, "fail[ed] to see how ordering the preservation of the files can in any way interfere with ongoing state proceedings." 755 F.2d at 582 (Cudahy, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).

> A Person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.


The Supreme Court has stated that the extradition clause contemplates

a summary and mandatory executive proceeding. Once the governor has granted extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive.


The *Doran* Court held that "once the governor of the asylum state has acted on a requisition for extradition based on the demanding state's judicial determination that probable cause
federal habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy prior to extradition. The court stated:

Prior to his removal to the demanding state, the charged party can only challenge his confinement by the asylum state authorities through the writ of habeas corpus. This would require exhaustion of state remedies. A section 1983 action is not available.460

This analysis is consistent with Preiser's central theme that when federal habeas corpus is available as a remedy, section 1983 is not. The specific habeas corpus remedy overrides the more general section 1983 remedy. The Brown court also recognized the settled rules that "[o]nce the prisoner has been returned to the demanding state, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to challenge his confinement upon grounds arising from conduct in the asylum state,,"461 and that a prisoner may not "attack the validity of his conviction in the demanding state on the basis of improper extradition."462

Brown is in accord with the prevailing view in other circuit courts of appeals which agree that a prisoner who has been returned to the demanding state may assert a violation of the extradition safeguards guaranteed by the extradition clause and its implementing statute pursuant to section 1983.463
Because habeas corpus is not available in these circumstances, to rule otherwise would effectively foreclose a prisoner "from any method of enforcing the extradition safeguards recognized by the availability of the writ of habeas corpus in the asylum state." 464

The Preiser issue has not been discussed in the decisions dealing with the availability of section 1983 after removal of a prisoner to the demanding state. 465 Rather, these decisions have focused on whether the extradition clause and its implementing statute create rights that a prisoner may enforce. The prevailing view in the federal appellate courts is that these provisions do create judicially enforceable federal rights. 466

8. Challenges to detainers

Constitutional challenges to the imposition of detainers that affect the duration of confinement are within federal habeas corpus and not section 1983. 467 By contrast, challenges to detainers that affect only the conditions of confinement may be asserted under section 1983. 468

464. Brown, 619 F.2d at 763. This part of Brown, however, relied in part upon the Eighth Circuit's decision in McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1980), which was subsequently reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Allen rejected the Eighth Circuit's view that "every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court . . . ." 449 U.S. at 103. A more persuasive reason for recognizing the availability of section 1983 in this context is that if federal habeas corpus is not available, there is no overlap with section 1983 and no Preiser puzzle to solve.

465. But see Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 1987) (claim challenging validity of extradition which was carried out does not lie under section 1983 but "is a thinly disguised version of his unresolved habeas petition").

466. See supra note 463. Violations of the procedural rights set forth in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, supra note 458, provide a basis for a section 1983 claim only when they also constitute violations of federal law. Giano v. Martino, 673 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); United States v. Pennsylvania State Police, 548 F. Supp. 9, 16 (E.D. Pa. 1982). One authority has held "that the conviction of a fugitive for the crime for which he was extradited bars any action that he might otherwise have under Section 1983." Martin v. Sams, 600 F. Supp. 71, 72-73 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). A few decisions take the minority view that the extradition clause and its implementing statute were designed to benefit only the states and not the individual. See, e.g., Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (dictum); Giano v. Martino, 673 F. Supp. at 94.

467. Veneri v. Missouri, 734 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1984); Mokone v. Fenton, 710 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1983); Stevens v. Heard, 674 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1982). It has been noted that "[a] detainer is a warrant filed against a person already in custody with the purpose of insuring that, after the prisoner has completed his present term, he will be available to the authority which has placed the detainer." Note, Developments, supra note 32, at 1081 n.44. See also United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 358 (1978); Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 222 n.2 (5th Cir. 1987). The United States Supreme Court has ruled that failure to accord a prisoner the procedural protections afforded by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is actionable under section 1983 because the Agreement is a federal law within the meaning of section 1983. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981).

468. Stevens, 674 F.2d 320.
In *Veneri v. Missouri*, the Eighth Circuit ruled that a claim for injunctive relief to remove a detainer in the form of a parole violation warrant is cognizable only in a habeas corpus proceeding and not under section 1983 because removal of the detainer affected the length of confinement. In *Mokone v. Fenton*, a prisoner who had been incarcerated in New Jersey was the subject of a detainer based upon a New York State court conviction. The prisoner sought injunctive relief to prohibit his transfer from New Jersey to New York after the conclusion of his New Jersey sentence on the ground that his New York conviction was invalid. The Third Circuit ruled that the claim sought speedier release and was within federal habeas corpus because the prisoner sought release from future confinement. The court observed in a footnote that section 1983 relief would be available where a detainer results in adverse prison conditions.

The Fifth Circuit carefully analyzed a series of detainer—conditions issues in *Stevens v. Heard*. In *Stevens*, a prisoner who had been convicted and confined contested two detainers that had been lodged against him as a result of two other convictions. The sentences for the other convictions would not begin to run until he had served his present sentence. The prisoner claimed that the detainers were "improperly lodged against him because the sentences which the detainers represent should have already run," and that he had been denied adequate medical care, emergency reprieves, and the opportunity to participate in various prison programs because of the outstanding detainers. He sought, *inter alia*, expungement of the detainers, promotion to the status of "State Approved Trusty, Class III," an award of "retroactive overtime," adequate medical care, damages for the denial of "emergency reprieves," and an injunction prohibiting the prison officials from considering the existence of any detainer in determining eligibility for prison programs.

The Fifth Circuit ruled that: (1) the request to expunge the detainers clearly challenged future confinement and, therefore, could be raised only in a habeas corpus proceeding; (2) the requests for promotion to the specified trusty status and application of retroactive overtime also should be raised in a habeas proceeding because, if granted, they would have the effect of shortening the prisoner's confinement; (3) the claims for "emergency reprieves" and adequate medical care were within the scope of habeas corpus because they too would require the court to determine the validity of the

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469. 734 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1984).
470. 710 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1983).
471. *Id.* at 1002 n.12 (dictum).
472. 674 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1982).
473. *Id.* at 323.
474. *Id.*
475. *Id.* at 323-24. For a discussion of expungement as a form of relief, see *infra* notes 504-18 and accompanying text.
detainers;[474] but, (4) the request to enjoin prison officials from considering the detainers in determining eligibility for prison programs was within section 1983 because it did not contest the validity of the detainers but rather "the practice of considering any detainers in determining eligibility for prison programs, such as work release or trusty programs."[475] Stevens thus correctly recognized the distinction between challenges to detainers that may affect the fact or duration of confinement, which fall within the exclusive domain of habeas corpus, and those that relate to conditions of confinement, which are within the scope of section 1983.

9. Other confinements: civil contempt, juvenile delinquents, mental patients

The same principles that govern the section 1983—habeas corpus distinction for state prisoners also apply to constitutional claims asserted by those who have been held in civil contempt,[478] juvenile delinquents,[479] and mental patients.[480] Because federal habeas corpus relief is available to contest custody growing out of civil proceedings,[481] the potential overlap with section 1983 applies whenever a person in "civil custody" asserts a constitutional claim that affects the fact or duration of confinement. As the Fourth Circuit has stated, "[a]lthough Preiser involved a criminal prison term, its holding is equally applicable to imprisonment for civil contempt."[482]

Claims by mental patients warrant separate discussion. It is well established that federal habeas corpus is available to seek release from a mental insti-

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476. The Stevens court also ruled that the claim for damages relating to these claims "should be brought only after he has sought habeas relief in state court to determine the validity of the detainers." 674 F.2d at 324. This is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's position, which reflects the majority view, that the nature of the relief sought should not control the section 1983—federal habeas corpus issue. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.

477. 674 F.2d at 324.


482. Leonard, 804 F.2d at 840 n.2.
tution. Thus, when this relief is sought, habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy. The Supreme Court, without discussing the Preiser issue, has impliedly sanctioned the use of section 1983 by mental patients who seek damages for unconstitutional confinement in mental institutions, or who contest the conditions of confinement in such institutions, or who challenge the procedures surrounding civil commitment. Lower federal court decisions that discuss the section 1983—habeas corpus issue have sanctioned the use of section 1983 to contest the procedures or standards employed in determining whether or not an individual should be committed to a mental institution.

The most extensive analysis of the Preiser issue in the civil commitment context is contained in the Fifth Circuit's decision in Chancery Clerk v. Wallace. In that case, the plaintiffs lodged a constitutional challenge against procedures the state employed to involuntarily commit individuals to state mental institutions. The court ruled that involuntarily confined patients may challenge the constitutionality of those procedures under section 1983 because the challenge is not a claim "which ask[s], or, if successful, would result in automatic release from confinement." The court acknowledged, however, that when the patient's claim does seek release from confinement, federal habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy and section 1983 may not be employed.

One commentator has argued that the restraints imposed by civil commitment "such as physical confinement or required regular visits to a doctor, are essentially similar to imprisonment or parole in their effect on the petitioner." Note, Developments, supra note 32, at 1073 n.5.


489. 646 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1981).

490. Id. at 157.

491. The Chancery Clerk court stated: Specific challenges to the constitutionality of confinement in state institutions fall within the ambit of habeas corpus procedures, 28 U.S.C. 2254(a). This statutory
The Chancery Clerk court’s analysis distinguished challenges to civil commitment from challenges to state court convictions. Once a court determines that a criminal conviction is unconstitutional, there is no authority for continuing to retain the defendant in custody. The court observed, on the other hand, that involuntary commitment is not final, like a criminal judgment would be, but is part of a continuing process and that a patient is entitled to release only when he or she is no longer mentally ill.\footnote{492} The Chancery Clerk court cited no authority to support those statements and at least some of the broad pronouncements that accompanied the court’s conclusion are of questionable validity.\footnote{493} The results reached by the Chancery Clerk court nevertheless, were correct, namely: (1) that a mental patient’s request for release from confinement is exclusively within federal habeas corpus; and (2) that, like prisoners, mental patients who seek procedural protections are contesting neither the fact nor the duration of their confinement and, therefore, may assert those claims under section 1983.

**B. Nature of Relief Requested**

We have seen that either the nature of the relief sought or the nature of the claim asserted may bring a claim within the exclusive purview of federal habeas corpus. A claim for immediate or speedier release is, under Preiser and its multifarious progeny, within the exclusive realm of federal habeas corpus. Additionally, a claim that brings into question the validity of con-

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\footnote{492} The court reasoned as follows:

[By] contrast, there can be no absolute right to be released from confinement in a mental institution for a person found to have been committed under procedures which violate the inmate’s civil rights. Equating the invalidity of a criminal conviction with a finding that involuntary commitment procedures are invalid overlooks a salient and controlling consideration. A criminal conviction results in a final and settled binding judgment. Confinement of those who are victims of mental illness is not a final and binding event; it is part of a process. There is no sentence and there is no specific duration of confinement. A person who has been involuntarily confined for mental illness is entitled to release when he or she is no longer mentally ill. The law also recognizes there can be confinements of the mentally ill under most summary procedures when it is necessary to protect a person from self injury or injury to others.

\footnote{493} Chancery Clerk implies that a state may continue to confine an individual who has been confined in violation of her procedural due process rights. Other than in emergency circumstances, however, a state may not summarily confine an individual in a mental institution. See,\footnote{e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-96 (1980) (requiring notice and a hearing when a prisoner is transferred to a mental hospital); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427-29 (1979) (due process requires that standard of proof in civil commitment proceeding be greater than preponderance of the evidence standard); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (commitment to a mental hospital works a “massive curtailment of liberty”).}
finement, though not requesting immediate or speedier release, falls within federal habeas corpus under the majority view which focuses on the nature of the claim rather than on the specific relief requested.\textsuperscript{494} We have seen that most courts take the position that claims for damages that implicate the constitutionality of confinement may not be asserted under section 1983 until the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement has been satisfied.\textsuperscript{495}

Examination of three specific types of claims for relief warrant separate treatment: declaratory relief, the expungement of records, and class action relief.

1. **Declaratory relief**

A request for a declaratory judgment that a conviction, sentence detainer, or denial of good-time credits is unconstitutional calls into question the validity of the fact or length of confinement and may be asserted only in a habeas corpus proceeding.\textsuperscript{496} For example, in \textit{Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird},\textsuperscript{497} the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that his constitutional right to receive exculpatory \textit{Brady}\textsuperscript{498} materials had been violated. The court ruled that this claim was outside the scope of section 1983 and within federal habeas corpus because the \textit{Brady} claim called into question the constitutionality of the conviction. While the plaintiff did not specifically request release from confinement, declaratory relief in plaintiff's favor would show that release was required.\textsuperscript{499}

\textsuperscript{494} See \textit{supra} notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{495} See \textit{supra} notes 291-317 and accompanying text. As previously discussed, the section 1983 damages claim might be barred by \textit{res judicata} if a person first exhausts all of his or her state remedies. See \textit{supra} note 301 and accompanying text.

There is a split of opinion on whether a declaratory judgment that a conviction is unconstitutional may be issued under section 1983 when the federal court plaintiff is not in custody, as in cases of expired sentence and fine only convictions. \textit{Compare} \textit{Cavett v. Ellis}, 578 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1978) (declaratory judgment under section 1983 available) \textit{with} \textit{Hanson v. Circuit Court}, 591 F.2d 404 (7th Cir.) \textit{cert. denied}, 444 U.S. 907 (1979) (section 1983 action unavailable). For a full discussion of the availability of section 1983 to test constitutionality of a conviction when the federal plaintiff is not in custody, see \textit{supra} notes 319-45 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{497} 723 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1984).
\textsuperscript{498} \textit{Brady v. Maryland}, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
\textsuperscript{499} \textit{Ybarra}, 723 F.2d at 682.
On the other hand, in *Wolff v. McDonnell*, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal court may issue a declaratory judgment under section 1983, "as a predicate to a damage award" based on the unconstitutionality of the procedures used in a prison disciplinary case. There is no reason, however, to allow a declaratory judgment only when it is a predicate to a damages award. Other language in *Wolff* supports the conclusion that a declaratory judgment determining the constitutionality of prison administrative procedures may be sought under section 1983.

Under the majority approach, which focuses on the nature of the prisoner's claim, a request for declaratory relief that a conviction, sentence, or denial of good-time credits is unconstitutional may not be litigated under section 1983 because the relief implicates the fact or length of confinement. Conversely, prisoner claims for declaratory relief which do not implicate the fact or length of confinement, such as those which contest procedural deficiencies or the conditions of confinement, may be asserted under section 1983.

2. Expungement

It is established that the federal courts have the inherent power to order the expungement of arrest records, convictions, and other records relating to criminal proceedings, and that this may be an appropriate form of equitable relief under section 1983. There are circumstances, however,

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502. See supra note 496.


where a state prisoner’s request to expunge a record may be made only in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. A request to expunge a record of conviction, detainer, or prison disciplinary record which, if granted, will terminate or shorten confinement, may be made only in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.\(^5\) In *Crow v. Kelly*,\(^6\) the Eighth Circuit considered a petition for mandamus to order the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to remove the prisoner’s state court conviction and arrest record that the petitioner claimed were unconstitutional. The *Crow* court ruled that the petitioner must first exhaust state remedies, because the prayer for relief implicated the constitutionality of a state court conviction and comity required that the state authorities be given the first opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of the conviction.\(^7\)

In *Stevens v. Heard*,\(^8\) the Fifth Circuit ruled that the prisoner’s request to expunge two detainers that had been lodged against him as a result of two convictions must be asserted in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. The sentences for those two convictions were not to begin until the prisoner had completed his present sentence. Stevens urged, however, that the later two sentences should have started to run when the convictions were entered.\(^9\) The court determined that habeas corpus was the exclusive remedy because Stevens’s request “clearly” challenged any future confinement arising from the two convictions.\(^10\)

Two Seventh Circuit decisions written by Judge Posner analyzed requests to expunge prison disciplinary records. In *McCollum v. Miller*,\(^11\) three federal prisoners sought to have their disciplinary infractions expunged because they were concerned that the infractions might delay their release on parole. Under federal regulations, it is within the Parole Board’s discretion to determine whether a disciplinary infraction should delay parole.\(^12\) The section 1983—habeas corpus *Preiser* issue was not directly involved because the case involved federal rather than state prisoners. However, the *McCollum* court’s analysis is pertinent to the *Preiser* issue in the context of state prisoners. If the court had determined that habeas corpus was the appropriate remedy for federal prisoners because the expungement related to the duration of confinement, then it would also be the appropriate remedy for state prisoners.

\(^5\) Del Raine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1987); Larsen v. Sielaff, 702 F.2d 116 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Stevens v. Heard, 674 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1982); McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982); Crow v. Kelley, 512 F.2d 752 (8th Cir. 1975).

\(^6\) 512 F.2d 752 (8th Cir. 1975).

\(^7\) The *Crow* court cited *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), preceded simply by a “cf.” signal. 512 F.2d at 755 n.6. The *Crow* opinion did not address whether the requested expungement would affect confinement.

\(^8\) 674 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1982).

\(^9\) *Id.* at 321.

\(^10\) *Id.* at 323-24.

\(^11\) 695. F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982).

\(^12\) 28 C.F.R. § 2.36(b) (1987).
This would preclude state prisoners from utilizing section 1983 for a similar challenge.

In fact, the McCollum court analyzed the issue by reference to Preiser principles but did not definitively resolve it. The court found the case somewhat similar to the procedural due process—parole release cases which take the position that section 1983 is the appropriate remedy because, while the procedures sought might enhance the prisoner's chances for parole, the release decision remains with the parole board. The court indicated, on the other hand, that the procedural due process cases might be distinguishable because the McCollum regulations, which specifically authorized the Parole Board to consider disciplinary infractions, made it “likely, though not certain, that getting a disciplinary finding expunged will accelerate a prisoner's eligibility for parole and hence the date when he is paroled.”

The Seventh Circuit asserted that the availability of habeas corpus should depend upon the probability that expunging the disciplinary infraction will shorten the period of confinement. The record was not sufficiently developed on this point, so the court remanded the action to the district court for a determination of the probable impact of an expungement on the length of imprisonment.

In the Seventh Circuit's subsequent decision, Larsen v. Sielaff, the court observed that while expungement of prison disciplinary records had been ordered in at least one section 1983 case, albeit without discussion, it was more commonly ordered in habeas corpus proceedings. Moreover, the court ruled that federal habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy where, as in Larsen, "the plaintiff wants to expunge the disciplinary proceeding from his record in order to shorten his present or future imprisonment."

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513. The McCollum court quoted from the decision in Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977). For a full analysis of the procedural due process cases, see supra notes 421-35 and accompanying text.
514. 695 F.2d at 1047.
515. "The McCollom court concluded:

If the evidence developed on remand shows that the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings against these three inmates are reasonably likely to delay their parole and thus lengthen their imprisonment, then presumably, by analogy to Preiser, their suits can be maintained as habeas corpus proceedings.

Id. A Lexis search uncovered no proceedings on remand.
517. McKinnis v. Mosely, 693 F.2d 1054, 1055 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). In McDonnell v. Wolff, 483 F.2d 1059, 1064 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Eighth Circuit stated that it would be appropriate for the district court to order the expungement of prison misconduct determinations that were arrived at in violation of procedural due process rights. The Supreme Court did not specifically address the expungement issue, but did state that the district court could fashion "appropriate remedies" for any constitutional violations other than the actual restoration of good-time credits. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
3. Class action relief

There are few cases that discuss the effect of a class action on the Preiser issue. This perhaps is due to the fact that the section 1983—habeas corpus puzzle should be solved in the same manner in both class and individual actions. It seems apparent that if the relief sought by a class of inmates requires a determination of the validity of the fact or duration of confinement, under Preiser the claim could not be litigated under section 1983, but only in a habeas corpus proceeding. There may be cases, however, where the named plaintiff's claim implicates the validity of the fact or duration of confinement though the claims of the class do not. In Leonard v. State Probation and Parole Board, the plaintiffs challenged the use of disciplinary records to determine whether or not a prisoner was eligible for parole release, work release, and other classifications. The Fifth Circuit found that at least insofar as the unnamed class members were concerned, the action was properly brought under section 1983 because "the specific and concrete effect" of class injunctive relief on each prisoner's fact or length of confinement "is highly speculative."

With respect to named plaintiff Leonard's individual claims, the court recognized that because the effect of injunctive relief in his particular case might be different than its effect on the class "[a]rguably, the principle stated in Preiser may affect the relief to which Leonard would, individually, be entitled in this case." The Leonard court found it unnecessary to reach this point because the court ruled against the plaintiffs on the merits. It did determine, however, that the fact that Leonard might not be entitled to relief under section 1983 did not mean that he could not represent a class of prisoners seeking relief under section 1983.
The Leonard court's distinction between the individual and class claims resulted from its emphasis on the probable impact of the relief requested upon the fact or duration of confinement. Because this impact may well differ for the named plaintiff and the class, a court faced with a Preiser issue in a class action context should inquire into whether or not the individual and class claims require a separate analysis.

C. Preiser in the State Courts

Because the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over section 1983 claims, the issue may arise whether a state prisoner may proceed under section 1983 or must proceed by a state habeas corpus proceeding. This raises the basic question of whether or not Preiser principles apply to state court actions. The decision in Preiser does not directly apply to state court proceedings. The Supreme Court in Preiser plainly viewed the case as requiring the reconciliation of two federal court remedies and relied heavily upon the federalism—comity concerns that underlie the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement. These concerns, which are implicated when a federal court is asked to grant relief that affects the fact or duration of state confinement, are simply not present when a state prisoner seeks relief in state court.

This does not necessarily mean that all state prisoner constitutional claims may be asserted in a state court section 1983 action. For one thing, certain state prisoner constitutional claims are not within the scope of section 1983. We have seen, for example, that release from confinement is not a form of relief available under section 1983. In addition, even where a prisoner does not seek release from confinement, but seeks only monetary relief, there is substantial authority that Congress intended federal habeas corpus as the


The fact that the effect of the relief upon the named plaintiff significantly differs from the effect upon the class may raise questions as to whether or not the plaintiff is a member of the class which she seeks to represent, whether the plaintiff is an adequate class representative, and whether the named plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), (4). That the named plaintiff must be a member of the class she purports to represent is not explicitly mentioned in Rule 23 but is generally thought to be "self-evident." 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1761, 132-33 (1986).

524. The distinction drawn by the Leonard court between the individual and class claims seems similar to the Fifth Circuit's distinction between facial procedural due process challenges, which it finds to be within the scope of section 1983, and individual "as applied" procedural due process claims, which it holds are not within section 1983. See supra notes 434-35 and accompanying text. In both the class action and procedural due process contexts, the Fifth Circuit's distinction is based upon the probable impact of the requested relief on the fact or duration of confinement.


526. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
exclusive congressional remedy to attack state convictions. Under this view, a state court section 1983 claim would not lie to contest the constitutionality of a state court conviction. It is also arguable that the states have sufficient interests in requiring that claims relating to the fact or duration of confinement be asserted in a state court habeas corpus proceeding, the procedure historically employed to resolve such claims, rather than in a civil rights action.

Few state court decisions discuss the section 1983—state habeas corpus issue. Those that do rely upon Preiser to resolve the conflict. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court has ruled that the revocation of good-time credits may not be challenged under section 1983 because Preiser held that the proper method by which a prisoner could challenge the revocations as a violation of due process is through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Three other state courts have ruled, consistent with Preiser, that section 1983 is available to contest the conditions of confinement.

527. See supra notes 291-317 and accompanying text.
528. M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 4, at 191 (citing, Steinglass, supra note 525, at 513-14). Professor Steinglass distinguishes state court attacks on convictions and sentences, where the state interest in requiring the utilization of habeas corpus is greatest, from attacks on administrative action, where he argues that the state interest in requiring resort to habeas corpus is insufficient to outweigh the interest in making section 1983 available to vindicate constitutional wrongs. Steinglass, supra note 525, at 514.
529. William v. Davis, 386 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1980); State v. Lincoln, 3 Haw. App. 107, 643 P.2d 807 (1982); Beaver v. Chaffee, 2 Kan. App. 2d 364, 579 P.2d 1217 (1978); Mitchem v. Melton, 167 W. Va. 21, 277 S.E.2d 895 (1981). Courts have relied upon Preiser to hold that requests for good-time credits must be made in a state habeas corpus proceeding rather than in a declaratory judgment action, Polsgrove v. Bureau of Corrections, 549 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); that a challenge to a disciplinary penalty that may affect eligibility for parole is within the scope of state habeas corpus, Calkins v. May, 97 Idaho 402, 545 P.2d 1008 (1976); that a prisoner’s claim for wrongful detention of his money is not within state habeas corpus, Foster v. Maynard, 222 Kan. 506, 565 P.2d 285 (1977); and that state administrative remedies must be exhausted before resort is made to a state habeas corpus proceeding, In re Muszalski, 52 Cal. App. 3d 125, 125 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1975).
530. Williams v. Davis, 386 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1980); State v. Lincoln, 3 Haw. App. 107, 643 P.2d 807 (1982); Beaver v. Chaffee, 2 Kan. App. 2d 364, 579 P.2d 1217 (1978); Mitchem v. Melton, 167 W. Va. 21, 277 S.E.2d 895 (1981). Courts have relied upon Preiser to hold that requests for good-time credits must be made in a state habeas corpus proceeding rather than in a declaratory judgment action, Polsgrove v. Bureau of Corrections, 549 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); that a challenge to a disciplinary penalty that may affect eligibility for parole is within the scope of state habeas corpus, Calkins v. May, 97 Idaho 402, 545 P.2d 1008 (1976); that a prisoner’s claim for wrongful detention of his money is not within state habeas corpus, Foster v. Maynard, 222 Kan. 506, 565 P.2d 285 (1977); and that state administrative remedies must be exhausted before resort is made to a state habeas corpus proceeding, In re Muszalski, 52 Cal. App. 3d 125, 125 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1975).
531. Williams v. Davis, 386 So. 2d 415, 417 (Ala. 1980).
VII. PROCEDURAL ISSUES: RES JUDICATA AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The section 1983—federal habeas corpus dichotomy has given rise to specific procedural problems concerning res judicata and the statute of limitations. While principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are generally applicable in federal court section 1983 actions, it is settled law that res judicata does not apply in federal habeas corpus proceedings. The Preiser issue has given rise to three specific preclusion issues: (1) the effect of a state court habeas corpus ruling on a federal court section 1983 claim; (2) the effect of a federal court federal habeas corpus ruling on a section 1983 claim; and (3) the collateral estoppel impact of a federal habeas corpus ruling that favors a state inmate upon the prior state criminal conviction and adverse state habeas corpus determination.

If a claim is found to be within the scope of federal habeas corpus, a prisoner must first exhaust state remedies. Once the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, a prisoner may not only pursue the federal habeas corpus remedy in order to secure immediate or quicker release, but may also be able to seek damages in federal court under section 1983. If a prisoner seeks relief under section 1983, an issue may arise as to the preclusive effect of the state habeas corpus ruling on the section 1983 claim.

The little authority that exists takes the position that a state court habeas corpus ruling may be entitled to preclusive effect in a federal section 1983 action. This is the position taken by Justice Brennan in his Preiser dissent, in dictum in Wolff v. McDonnell, and in the one circuit court decision that has given the issue serious consideration. The Ninth Circuit determined in Silverton v. Department of Treasury that there is no reason to give state habeas corpus decisions less preclusive effect than any other state court

532. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
533. One caveat is that the prisoner's claim must be within the scope of section 1983.
534. "[I]f traditional principles of res judicata are applicable to suits under 1983 . . . the prior conclusion of the state court suit would effectively set at naught the entire federal court proceeding." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
535. "[O]ne would anticipate that normal principles of res judicata would apply in such circumstances." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 529, 555 n.12 (1974) (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499 n.14, where the Court expressly contemplated simultaneous litigation of claims properly brought under section 1983 in federal court while fact or length of confinement claims are litigated in state court habeas corpus proceedings).
537. 644 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
decision because state habeas corpus courts should be presumed to apply appropriate constitutional standards, at least where there was a full and fair hearing.\footnote{538}

Under the full faith and credit statute,\footnote{539} the extent to which the state habeas decision is entitled preclusive effect in a federal section 1983 action depends upon the state law of preclusion.\footnote{540} Thus, in \textit{Rullo v. Rodriguez},\footnote{541} the court ruled that a New York state court denial of a habeas corpus petition barred a federal section 1983 claim where the prisoner sought to litigate the same constitutional claim in each proceeding. The state court ruling barred the section 1983 claim because, under New York's law of preclusion, differences in legal theory and remedy do not deprive the initial ruling of \textit{res judicata} effect.\footnote{542}

A federal habeas corpus ruling also may be entitled to preclusive effect in a federal section 1983 action.\footnote{543} In \textit{Williams v. Ward},\footnote{544} Judge Friendly concluded that a judgment in a federal habeas corpus proceeding may be entitled to preclusive effect in a section 1983 action as to the issues litigated and determined in the habeas corpus proceeding.\footnote{545} Unlike federal habeas corpus proceedings which are exempt from \textit{res judicata}, there is no counterpart rule that exempts the determinations in federal habeas proceedings from preclusive effect in section 1983 actions.\footnote{546}

\footnote{538. The \textit{Silverton} court stated: that because of the nature of a state habeas proceeding, a decision actually rendered should preclude an identical issue from being relitigated in a subsequent section 1983 action if the state court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the issue to be heard and determined under federal standards . . . . The mere difference in the form of relief is unimportant. 
\textit{Id.} at 1347.

\footnote{539. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).


While not discussing the issue in terms of preclusion, \textit{dicta} in \textit{Imbler v. Pachtman}, 424 U.S. 409, 428 n.27 (1976), indicates that a ruling in favor of a state prisoner in a federal habeas corpus proceeding should not operate in his favor in a section 1983 suit because “using habeas corpus as a ‘door opener’ for a subsequent civil rights action would create the risk of injecting extraneous concerns into that proceeding.” \textit{Id.} There may be other reasons for finding offensive collateral estoppel inapplicable to the ruling in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See \textit{Garza v. Henderson}, 779 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying offensive collateral estoppel effect to federal habeas corpus ruling in federal court section 1983 action because defendants in the 1983 action were not parties to the habeas corpus proceeding).


\footnote{545. The fact that the remedies sought in the two proceedings are different “does not alone suffice to differentiate the underlying claims.” \textit{Williams}, 556 F.2d at 1154.

\footnote{546. \textit{Allen v. McCurry}, 449 U.S. 90, 98 n.12 (1980). Because the \textit{Williams} court had doubts as to whether the claims in the two sections were identical, it decided to rest its decision on the merits rather than \textit{res judicata}. \textit{Williams}, 556 F.2d at 1155.

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If a state court habeas corpus ruling is adverse to the prisoner, but the prisoner subsequently prevails in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, there is authority that the federal judgment would "relieve him of the collateral estoppel effect of the state judgment with respect to an ancillary civil rights claim." In fact, offensive collateral estoppel might attach to a federal habeas corpus ruling in the prisoner's favor in a subsequent section 1983 action.

Under the majority view, which focuses on the nature of the claim rather than the specific relief sought, a claim for damages that calls into question the validity of the fact or duration of confinement may not be litigated under section 1983 until state remedies have been exhausted. When a claim is within federal habeas corpus and a state prisoner has failed to exhaust state remedies, the proper disposition is normally dismissal of the federal proceeding. There is a danger, however, that while a prisoner is pursuing state remedies, the statute of limitations may be running on the section 1983 damages claim. The courts uniformly agree that some action must be taken by the federal district court to guard against the running of the limitations period. The courts do not agree, however, on the nature of the appropriate action.

There are a number of circuit court decisions which instruct the district courts to decide whether, in light of the applicable state statute of limitations rules, the section 1983 action should be dismissed without prejudice or held in abeyance pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Some courts take

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547. Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982); Thomas v. Dietz, 518 F. Supp. 794, 799 (D.N.J. 1981); Comment, Collateral Estoppel, supra note 120, at 1502-03. The Hamlin court reasoned that "[w]hen applicable, the doctrine [of collateral estoppel] precludes relitigation; however, if relitigation of the substantive issues is not precluded the doctrine does not prevent a grant of any appropriate remedy." Hamlin, 664 F.2d at 32.

548. But see supra note 543.

549. See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.


551. Because there is no federal limitations period for section 1983 claims, the federal courts borrow the governing period from state law that applies to state personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).


553. Serio v. Members of State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1987); Borning v. Cain, 754 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985); Jackson v. Torres, 720 F.2d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1983); Clark v. Williams, 693 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1982); Williams v. Dallas County Comm’rs, 689 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 (1983); Franklin v. Webb, 653 F.2d 362, 364 (8th Cir. 1981); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 1981); Watson v. Briscoe, 554 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1977); Connor v. Pickett, 552 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir. 1977); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc); See also Jones v. Shankland, 800 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 2177 (1987); Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1985); Courtney v. Reeves, 635 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981).
the position that the section 1983 action should be stayed, while others hold that the claim should be dismissed without prejudice. In determining whether to dismiss or to stay the action, the state's tolling rules are a crucial consideration, because if the state rule tolls the section 1983 claim during the pendency of the federal habeas corpus proceeding, there is no need to hold the section 1983 action in abeyance. A state limitations provision that tolls the limitations period for an imprisoned individual 'protect[s] plaintiff against a statute of limitations bar as to any civil rights claims which he may eventually wish to assert after full pursuit of habeas corpus relief.'

VIII. CONCLUSION

The Preiser opinion ranged far beyond the specific issue presented to the Court and suggests a noble intent on the part of the Justices to assist the lower federal courts in resolving future section 1983—federal habeas corpus conflicts. Given the seemingly endless situations where the need to choose between section 1983 and habeas corpus arises, it is not surprising, and


In Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1985), the court stated that the correct disposition was to stay the section 1983 action, but nevertheless affirmed the district court's dismissal without leave "'to refile his section 1983 claim if and when he establishes, through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, that he was denied [his constitutional rights.]'" Id. at 516. For a discussion of Hadley, see Jones v. Shankland, 800 F.2d 77, 82-83 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 905 (1987).

In a case involving the Younger doctrine, the Supreme Court recently ruled that "even if the Younger doctrine requires abstention here, the District Court has no discretion to dismiss rather than to stay claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the [pending] state proceeding." Deakins v. Monaghan, 108 S. Ct. 523, 529 (1988).


557. Crump v. Lane, 807 F.2d 1394, 1401 n.8 (7th Cir. 1986); Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93, 97 (7th Cir. 1986); Hernandez v. Spencer, 780 F.2d 504, 505 (5th Cir. 1986); Williams v. Dallas County Comm'rs, 689 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935 (1983); Grundstrom v. Darnell, 531 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1976); Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir 1977) (en banc); Still v. Nichols, 412 F.2d 778 (1st Cir. 1969).

"Preiser should not be faulted, for failing to forecast all or even most of the specific issues. The Supreme Court is at fault, however, for failing to establish a meaningful framework and guidance for resolving the myriad of section 1983—habeas corpus controversies. Fifteen years after Preiser, several fundamental questions concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the interplay between the section 1983 and habeas corpus remedies remain unresolved. "Core," "essence," or "heart" of habeas corpus is not a sufficiently instructive concept when the right to present a federal constitutional claim to a federal court is at stake. As a result, litigators and the lower federal courts have been trapped in a quagmire of confusing and inconsistent case law. This is particularly unfortunate because clarity is so important when the issues are the appropriate federal remedial device to secure redress for a constitutional violation and the steps necessary to secure access to that remedy.

The fault does not lie entirely at the Court's doorstep. Theoretically, the solution to any Preiser puzzle, involving as it does the need to reconcile overlapping federal remedies, should be found in congressional intent. But such intent does not always exist and Congress has shown no inclination to clear the waters. The courts are thus left to speculate as to what Congress thought about issues it did not think about at all. When congressional intent is not available, perhaps the best a court can do is to attempt to determine whether, in a particular case, Congress's desire to provide immediate access to the federal courts under section 1983, or its concerns for federalism and comity underlying the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement, should prevail.\textsuperscript{559}

This Article has attempted to sort out the issues, analyze the case law, identify the trouble spots, and suggest solutions. Fifteen years of uncertainty and confusion is long enough. It is up to Congress and the Supreme Court finally to provide the rosetta stone for solving Preiser puzzles.

\textsuperscript{559} See Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1262 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., dissenting).