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Reciprocity: An Antecedent to Fraud Compliance and Unethical Behavior

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Reciprocity: An Antecedent to Fraud Compliance and Unethical Behavior

A Dissertation

Presented in

Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

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July 16, 2021

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It has been an incredible journey pursuing my PhD, with it seeing some the most consequential events in my life. There have been lifelong friendships formed, children born, family members lost, tears of joy, tears of sadness, sleepless nights, a global pandemic, and career achievements. To borrow Charles Dickens' words, "It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of light, it was the season of darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair."

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In my case, I never outgrew this. I just learned to appreciate how truly lucky I am to have had you as my dad. You were a gentle genius.

You taught me how to bait a hook and throw it in the pond across the street from our house. We would watch the ripples float out as the bobber hit the water.

You could walk me through a complicated statistics problem...even though you hadn't touched that type of math in 25 years.

If an appliance broke in my house...You knew exactly how to fix it. Car issues...You were on it. Computer problem...no problem. If I had trouble with someone or something, you had the right advice to solve the riddle.

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You gave this inspirational gift to everyone you met. This was your calling and why you were a beloved teacher, coach, and therapist. Through your compassion, wisdom, and humor you helped others find happiness, engagement, purpose and intention in their lives.

Your students loved you. Your positive outlook on life was contagious and impacted thousands of people. The comments on your Rate my Professor page are filled with testimonials of how you changed students' lives.

Your teaching was not the only inspirational part of your life. You fought a heroic battle against cancer for four years. It was much more difficult than others realized. You taught an all-day class, every Saturday. Most weeks you would not be able to get out of bed for two days after teaching. Despite your struggles, you continued to help people.

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basis with all the nurses, techs, janitors, and doctors. Mom and I would joke that you actually liked being there because you would often hold counseling and coaching sessions for the very people who were supposed to be taking care of you. Despite your struggles, you continued to help people.

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Your example gives everyone a possibility to live into.

Biography

Charles Edward Drehmer was born in Chicago, Illinois, November 30, 1980. He graduated from Hinsdale Central High School, received his Bachelor of Science from DePaul University in 2003, his Master in Business Administration from the DePaul University in 2004, and his Master of Arts in Psychological Science from DePaul University in 2016.

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Abstract

There is a constant stream of headlines in the news about fraud schemes swindling people out of their hard-earned money. When analyzing these schemes, it can be difficult to see why these scams work so well time after time. Often, the potential payoff to the victim is farfetched or even impossible to a third party looking at the situation after the fact. Why would someone comply with a fraudulent request with such an implausible benefit to themselves or maybe even seemingly no benefit? One of the tools utilized by unscrupulous scam artists is the social norm of reciprocity. Simply stated, the social norm of reciprocity is that we feel obligated to repay those who have provided a favor to us. This dissertation will investigate reciprocity and its power to influence people to comply with requests, where there are clear red flags they should run or at least ask clarifying questions to avoid being taken advantage of.

Keywords: reciprocity, fraud, ethics, persuasion, influence

Introduction

Imagine you are trading in your car at a car dealership. The woman behind the desk offers you a free “homemade” cookie when you sit down to discuss the value of your trade-in. You look down to see a store brand cookie container in the garbage can and believe the cookie you received was from this package, but you do not say anything. The woman offers you less than you thought you would get, but you accept her offer without asking any questions or conducting any other research to verify the value of your trade-in. After you drive home in your new car, you question how much you received for your old car. You check the internet and call some other dealerships to discover you received 30% less than what you could have gotten from other dealers. Why did you accept her offer when there were signs of her being untrustworthy? Did the “free homemade cookie” influence your decision to accept the initial offer and not ask any questions?

Reciprocity is used ethically every day to influence behavior and is the lubricant for exchange of goods and services. There is nothing untoward about being offered a free sample at the grocery store, even though it can influence a customer’s buying behavior. While reciprocity can be used ethically to shape behavior, there are also countless stories where reciprocity is used in nefarious ways as a key component in people falling victim to scams and swindles. The concept of reciprocity is why you have heard of the phrase, “there is no such thing as a free lunch.”

Why do gifts work to influence people’s behavior even if it is to their detriment? Can a person not just act against their own self-interest, but be persuaded to act

unethically, with seemingly no upside, just because they received a gift? Can the power of an unsolicited favor keep people from even asking clarifying questions, even when they know something is not quite right? FINRA Investor Education Foundation aims to protect potential investors against fraud. They recognize reciprocity as a tactic used by unscrupulous fraudsters as a way to gain compliance and recommend the simple protective step of asking questions (Kieffer & Mottola, 2017). Are there boundaries to the power of reciprocity, in that someone will refuse to act against their self-interest even when faced with the pro-social norm?

This paper will aim to consolidate what is known about reciprocity even when this norm is contrary to consumers' interests. It will explore how current theoretical models explain the dark side of reciprocity. The dissertation will seek to identify gaps in these theories that do not adequately capture why someone would comply with a fraudulent request with no benefit to themselves. Lastly, the study will investigate if these decision models adequately explain why someone would be convinced to behave unethically, putting themselves in legal jeopardy, with no apparent incentive.

Normative Models

One possible reason why people follow the norm of reciprocity even when doing so is contrary to their interests is that people are being rational when they follow the norm of reciprocity. Normative models state that we make rational decisions to maximize our benefit. For example, a situation could have minimal risk or vulnerability compared to the potential benefit to a consumer. Even if the benefit is farfetched or improbable, a rational actor would calculate the expected value to determine if the expected utility of

the initial favor and potential benefit is worth the risk of being taken advantage of. Another consideration that needs to be taken into account is the definition of benefit. Someone could be making a rational decision to achieve their goal and the goal may not necessarily be based on self-interest.

This section will review the literature on whether following the norm of reciprocity might be a rational decision based on a normative decision process.

Normative decision models contend we are rational beings and will make decisions that are optimal and will result in the most good. Goodness can be described as achieving our goal or alternatively, “what achieves our goals best, on the whole” (Baron, 2000). The decision to reciprocate can help a decision maker achieve their goal.

Rational decision-making theory has its roots in the work of Pierre de Fermat and Blaise Pascal’s probability functions where they developed the concept of calculating probabilities for chance events (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006; Edwards, 1982). In 1660, Pascal went on to show that the consequences of being wrong can outweigh the likelihood of being wrong with his “wager” on the existence of God (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). This work led to the first rational decision model, expected value theory, which states that a choice should equal the probability weighted average of possible values for a variable (McFall, 2015). An individual could weigh the different ways in which to reciprocate and choose the option with the highest probability of achieving their goal.

In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli drew on expected value theory to develop expected utility theory, which incorporated subjective value. Bernoulli suggested that individuals

account for risk and assign a subjective value to desires and fears of each possible outcome (Baron, 2000). This allows decision makers to select the option with the greatest subjective expected utility, allowing for risk aversion (McFall, 2015). Ramsey (1926) added to the utility theory literature by contending personal beliefs account for part the subjective probability equation. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) used expected utility theory to develop game theory, in which individuals would maximize rewards based on objective probabilities. Savage (1954) extended Von Neumann and Morgenstern's work to include subjective probabilities. In a reciprocity context, expected utility theory suggests an individual would calculate the expected value that comes from reciprocating. This calculation is made by multiplying the probability of achieving their goal from reciprocating by that the value of achieving their goal. This expected value is then compared to the expected value from not reciprocating. The option that has the highest expected value would then be chosen.

Simon (1955, 1956) contributed to the decision making literature with his concept of bounded rationality, which says that rational choice does not require maximizing utility. Rather, Simon states individuals often times do not have the ability to process all the information and optimal choices are not necessarily required to reach their goal. In other words, decision makers will make a decision that satisfies their goal, as opposed to maximizing utility. Simon further states that alternatives are evaluated sequentially until one meets the minimum threshold, unlike other rational models, such as Becker's (1976) rational choice theory, that suggest all alternatives are considered prior to a choice being made. When someone is faced with the option to reciprocate, they may not consider all

the options available, but instead move forward with the first option they believe will help them achieve their goal.

Ben-Haim (2006) extends the work of Simon's bounded rationality with info gap decision theory. Info gap decision theory takes into account what the decision maker doesn't know or can't know as opposed to the limits of human information processing like Simon's bounded rationality. Ben-Haim's theory says decision makers consider their goals, options, and boundaries of their knowledge. The decision maker considers how wrong their knowledge can be for option alternatives and still achieve their goal. The robustness for how wrong the decision maker can be, with the goal still being met, is the determinant for the decision (Schwartz, Ben-Haim & Dacso, 2011).

Traditional normative models contend decisions are made by weighing the costs, benefits, and alternatives in order to maximize the decision maker's benefit. How then can these models explain why people follow the norm of reciprocity even when doing so is contrary to their interests? One possible explanation lies in how the decision maker's benefit and interests are defined. Baron (2000) stated rational decisions are made in order to achieve our goals best, on the whole. Perhaps these two concepts can be squared if the decision maker's goal is one of fairness or inequality aversion and not maximizing their resources. There is very strong evidence from numerous experiments that refutes that people's goal can only be grounded in self-interest (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fehr & Gächter, 1998; Halali, Bereby-Meyer and Meiran, 2014). The evidence suggests that people can be motivated to reciprocate by other factors such as fairness and inequality aversion in a social context.

Further, traditional rational choice theory (Becker, 1976) may seem to only take outcomes into account, regardless of whether the decision is selfish or altruistic. The other party's intentions behind their decision could also be a determining factor in how the outcome is evaluated and determine how to reciprocate (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006).

Punishing another party, at an expense to oneself, is a form of negative reciprocity (Fehr & Gächter, 1998; Halali et al., 2014). Although this pattern would not fit traditional self-interest normative models, it would fit a normative model when the goal is that of fairness. There have been numerous studies that have shown people's willingness to sacrifice their own wellbeing to achieve fairness or to punish those who behave unfairly in simple laboratory games starting with Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze's (1982) ultimatum game. The ultimatum game is played by two players dividing a certain sum of money between themselves. The first player (proposer) starts with the entire sum of money and makes an offer, in which the second player (responder) can accept or reject. If the offer is accepted the money is divided according to the offer. If the offer is rejected, neither party gets any money (Rand Tarnita, Ohtsuki & Nowak, 2013). A rational self-interested proposer is expected to offer the minimum they believe the responder will accept. The rational self-interested responder is expected to take anything greater than zero.

There have been many experiments (e.g., Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; Gächter, 2004; Guth, Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982; Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986; Nowak, Page and Sigmund, 2000; Rand et al., 2013; Wallace, Cesarini, Lichtenstein & Johannesson, 2007) that use the ultimatum game paradigm with substantially the same findings. These findings consist of two robust, consistent and clear

results that diverge from the expected rational self-interested models. One, many responders reject low, but nonzero offers. Proposals that are greater than zero and less than 20 percent of the total are rejected 40 to 60 percent of the time. Two, many proposers offer more than the minimum amount to avoid rejection. The vast majority of proposers offer between 40 and 50 percent of the total amount to the responder. These results demonstrate that both the proposer and responder are not acting in a self-interest wealth maximization rational manner. They each have other oriented considerations for fairness and reciprocity.

The results for the ultimatum game can be interpreted as the responder's goal is not one of wealth maximization but fairness (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Fehr, 2000; Guth, Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982;). The decision to reject the low offer can be viewed as a rational decision in order to achieve their goal of fairness or inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Fehr (2000) suggests there are two types of people, self-interested types and reciprocal types. There are circumstances that refute the traditional self-interest theory. For example, when there is a strong incentive for people to free ride, a self-interest model would suggest nobody would cooperate (Fehr & Gächter, 1998). However, if there is an opportunity to punish free riding behavior, reciprocal types will strongly punish the free rider even when the punishment comes at a high cost to the punisher (Fehr & Gächter, 1998). This threat of punishment encourages potential free riders to cooperate. Fehr & Gächter (1998) concluded there are two categories most people fall into; reciprocal types and selfish types. They based these two categories based on the results of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), Gächter and Falk (1997), Miller (1997), Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter (1998), Fehr and Falk (1999) and Abbink,

Irlenbusch and Renner (2000). These studies utilized one-shot games where between 40% and 60% of the participants exhibited reciprocal behavior. There were also between 20% and 30% of the participants who behaved only in a selfish manner. The vast majority of the participants fell into exclusively either the reciprocal or selfish category (Fehr & Gächter, 1998).

Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) contend people reciprocate not only for self-centered reasons but also to reduce inequality. Both studies explained the pattern of other oriented fairness results as rational through a utility function. Incorporated in this utility function is a person's pecuniary payoff as well as their payoff relative to others (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Fehr & Schmidt's (1999) model not only incorporates increases in utility when material resources increase for an individual but also decreases in overall utility with the inequality of allocation of resources. Other oriented fairness is not a universal trait. Their utility function also contains a selfish variable, in which it's possible for a person to not care about inequality when they are only self-centered (Gächter, 2004).

Falk and Fischbacher's (2006) theory of reciprocity also explains reciprocity decisions as rational but differs from that of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in that other's underlying intentions are incorporated in the model, not just the consequences of the action. Reduction of inequality is not the driving factor to reciprocate. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) show identical offers are perceived and reciprocated differently depending on the underlying intention of the offer. The main determinant of the respondent's rewarding and punishing behavior is based on perceived kindness or unkindness (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006).

Falk and Fischbacher's (2006) evaluated perceived kindness of proposers in the in an ultimatum game scenario via a questionnaire study. The 111 participants were asked to imagine themselves as responders in the ultimatum game. They had to rate how kind or unkind the proposer was, on a scale of -100 to +100, when they offered them different proportions from a total sum of 10 Swiss Francs. The first task asked responders to rate the kindness of the proposer for all 11 possible combinations of dividing the 10 Swiss Francs. The options ranged from keeping 10 francs and giving 0 to giving 10 francs and keeping 0. The results showed that kindness perceptions monotonically increased as the offer increased. Giving away all 10 francs had an average kindness rating of +72.2 and keeping all 10 francs was rated at -95.4. The results also showed that an offer of 5 francs was considered an equitable share and the reference point for a fair versus unfair offer. Offers that were less than 5 were negative and perceived as unkind while offers of 5 or greater were positive and rated as kind.

The other tasks in the survey were identical in nature to the first task, just differing in that the choice sets available to the proposer consisted of a smaller number of options, e.g., the proposer could only offer 2, 5 or 8 francs. There were nine different choice sets the participants had to rate the kindness of proposer. The magnitude of the kindness ratings changed considerably based on the choice set available to the proposer. For example, when the choice set only gave the proposer the options of giving 0, 1 or 2 francs away, responders rated their kindness at -88.8, -56.4 and -9.1 respectively. When all 11 options were available to the proposer, responders rated their kindness of giving away 0, 1 and 2 francs as -95.4, -84.5 and -71.9 respectively. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) contend this is evidence that the outcome is not the only factor driving the

perceived kindness but rather the fairness intention, determined by the choices available to the proposer. Further, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) say that when the responder has no alternative in choosing how many francs to give away, they cannot signal any intention and the perceived kindness is not zero. This is evidence that both outcomes and intentions of the proposer are important in reciprocity decisions.

Falk and Fischbacher's (2006) have shown similar findings of consideration for the perceived kindness of the proposer in the ultimatum game, gift-exchange game, reduced best-shot game, competitive market games, dictator game, sequential prisoner's dilemma, and centipede game. In each of these games, participants have the ability to act selfishly resulting in a greater monetary payoff for themselves, although this was not always the case. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) demonstrated in these games that kindness is derived from the consequences and the intention of the action. The same consequences were interpreted and reciprocated differently, based on the underlying intention. When the intention of the action was perceived as being kind, participants were more likely to reciprocate, even if that was to their own detriment. Further, participants were not reciprocating only if their actions reduced inequity, in fact the reciprocation could lead to greater inequity when the original giver's actions were viewed as kind.

Another line of research suggests reciprocal behavior has its roots in evolution. Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter (2002) coin the term "strong reciprocity" where individuals are likely to voluntarily help others, when treated fairly, and punish cheaters, even if this behavior does not benefit them individually. Fehr et al. (2002) also demonstrated that strong reciprocators also tend to punish someone when they treat a third party unfairly. The authors contend strong reciprocity makes cooperation among

humans more likely, even if it is costly to the giver (e.g., food sharing and collective action). This results in the group being better suited to survive and pass on their genes to future generations.

Purkayastha (2004) investigated reciprocal behavior in the context of gift giving. Like, Fehr et al. (2002), Purkayastha contends reciprocal behavior, such as gift giving, is rational and has evolved as an evolutionary process. Gift giving can lead to trust and cooperation among group members, creating greater wellbeing and increasing chances of reproductive success, even if the result seemingly does not make sense at the individual level. When a person receives a gift, even if the good is useless to the receiver, the gift's symbolic value creates an obligation for the recipient to reciprocate. The recipient appreciates the symbolic value of the gift. The recipient's return gift need not match the monetary value of the original gift. Purkayastha argues the total value of the return gift needs to be equal to the original gift's monetary and symbolic value. The return gift value is also comprised of monetary and symbolic value. This combination of symbolic value and substantive value allows for an easier exchange of gifts back and forth, resulting in greater cooperation, trust, resources and ultimately better chances or reproductive success.

Purkayastha (2004) postulates that this reciprocal behavior maps onto the public goods literature. Public goods in this context can be thought of as the collective good. A gift is similar to a private contribution to the public good. When a person gives someone else a gift it can be interpreted as a contribution to the public good. The recipient then reciprocates to the public good by giving a gift to the original giver. The larger group benefits from the goodwill (gift exchange) of the individuals.

Griskevicius & Kenrick (2013) also argue reciprocation is rational decision based on an evolution perspective. They contend a fundamental evolutionary motive of behavior is making friends. Friends can create groups that allow them to teach skills to each other, provide support and accomplish tasks that cannot be completed by one individual. This group dynamic allows the for cultivation of more resources, increasing their chances for reproductive success. People will make a rational decision to reciprocate in order to create or keep friendships. Individuals will reciprocate a favor by spending resources on a gift to give the favor giver. Giving up these resources for the benefit of another can seemingly be against their individual interest, but rational if their goal is to make and keep friends and ultimately create a system of shared resources and support to increase the chances of reproductive success.

Ethical Decision Making

An additional possible reason why people follow the norm of reciprocity, even when doing so is contrary to their interests, is that people's behavior is being influenced by ethics, more specifically people will reciprocate because they follow an ethical standard to repay a favor even when doing so violates other ethical standards. This section will review the literature on whether following the norm of reciprocity might be based on an ethical decision, which makes a person vulnerable to violating other ethical standards and puts them in jeopardy of being taken advantage of when they follow the norm.

Gintis, Henrich, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr (2008) define the term strong reciprocity as "a propensity, in the context of a shared social task, to cooperate with others similarly

disposed, even at personal cost, and a willingness to punish those who violate cooperative norms, even when punishing is personally costly” (p. 3). Gintis et al. assert that ethical behavior is not necessarily a path towards personal gain. Instead, humans behave ethically and morally because we enjoy acting ethically and are uncomfortable when acting unethically. The authors explain this behavior from an evolutionary perspective in that as homo sapiens were emerging, groups with altruist members were more likely to survive than groups comprised of selfish members. Losses at the individual level from altruistic behavior were more than made up for by the overall group’s performance. This has embedded a pattern of reciprocal behavior in humans today to behave ethically by helping others, even at the cost of one’s own personal gain.

Price (2008) contends that reciprocating positive behavior has its roots in evolution, although his explanation is very different than that of Gintis et al. (2008). Price argues that prosocial ethical behavior is a maladaptive response to current social situations. Our hunter-gatherer ancestors did not encounter many strangers and our brains have not advanced to distinguish between strangers and close acquaintances, so we treat everyone we encounter as if they are a close contact or family member when deciding to repay a favor. Along this line of logic, Price also argues individuals behave ethically in anonymous situations because our caveman ancestors did not have many experiences with being anonymous. This could create conditions that make someone susceptible to being taken advantage of by following the norm of reciprocity because repaying favors to close contacts and friends is the ethical to do.

Early theorists such as Bronislaw Malinowski, Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-Strauss agreed that receiving a gift created a strong moral obligation to repay the gift,

creating a pattern of reciprocity (Komter, 1996). They believed gifts and favors are the “moral cement” of society (Komter, 1996). Building on the notion of ethical and moral obligations in a business context are shareholder theory and stakeholder theory.

Shareholder theory suggests managers at a corporation have an ethical responsibility to maximize shareholders’ profits above anything else (Friedman, 1970; Tangpong & Pesek 2007). Shareholders are the owners of the company, and they provide the employment to the manager, setting up a reciprocal obligation. This goal of maximizing shareholder value is the guiding principle, above anything else, even when this decision has otherwise ethically questionable consequences, by other ethical standards, on other stakeholders, such as vendors, customers, partner companies and employees.

A competing theory to shareholder theory is stakeholder theory, which argues managers make decisions based on the interest of all stakeholders including shareholders, customers, employees, and suppliers (Tangpong, Li & Hung, 2016). The norm of reciprocity is viewed as the foundation for stakeholder theory and reciprocity is a moral norm in our society (Sama & Shoaf, 2008; Tangpong et al., 2016). Managers are tasked with balancing the interests of all parties when making business decisions, often leading to ethical dilemmas (Evan & Freeman, 1988; Tangpong & Pesek 2007). Ironically, the moral forces that shape the norm of reciprocity can play a role in determining the course of action managers take when weighing the interests of the different stakeholders, potentially leading to decisions that are ethically questionable by other standards or even illegal putting themselves in jeopardy (Tangpong et al., 2016). The moral obligation created by the norm of reciprocity can compromise or override other ethical considerations in the decision-making process (Tangpong et al., 2016).

Tangpong et al. (2016) conducted an experiment on the relationship between the moral obligation created by reciprocity and its influence on questionable decisions and unacceptable behavior when viewed in the context of other ethical standards. They hypothesized under the conditions of reciprocity; the original receiver is more likely to engage in ethically questionable behavior when requested from the original giver. The 266 participants partook in a role-playing scenario by reading vignettes based on an antitrust lawsuit between two large software companies. In the scenario, company W is considering a mutually beneficial relationship with Company X. Company Y already has a business relationship with Company W. Company X and Company Y are competitors. A top official from Company Y approaches an official from Company W and asks that they not form a partnership with Company X. The participants were asked to assume the role as the official at Company W, where they had to make a Yes or No decision to comply with the request. Agreeing with this request would be a violation of anti-trust laws and unethical. This creates a conflict of competing ethical standards; one to repay a favor and the other to treat all parties fairly and not violate anti-trust laws.

Tangpong et al. (2016) randomly assigned participants to four different conditions: control, reciprocity, environmental uncertainty, and reciprocity x environmental uncertainty. Participants in the reciprocity condition read additional information that their company has an established give and take relationship with Company Y. The two companies have attempted to repay what the other has provided and have not harmed each other. If you agree to Company Y's request to not partner with Company X, Company Y will provide greater support in the future. The environmental uncertainty condition had participants read that the market is unpredictable and changes

rapidly due to customer preferences and evolving technology. The reciprocity x environmental uncertainty condition combined the previous two messages. The control condition simply asked if you would enter into the deal with Company X or find a different company to replace Company X.

Tangpong et al.'s (2016) results showed individuals in the reciprocity condition were more likely to comply with the unlawful request than the control condition because by doing so they were following the ethical standard of repaying a favor. Participants in the environmental uncertainty condition were not more likely to comply with the request than the control condition. The group with the highest rate of compliance with the unethical request was the reciprocity x environmental uncertainty condition. The authors explained that environmental uncertainty is a moderator that strengthens reciprocity's impact on unethical request compliance.

Umphress, Bingham and Mitchell (2010) also investigated the malevolent effects of reciprocity in a business context but differ from Tangpong et al. (2016) in that they considered positive feelings about reciprocity a moderator for strengthening the relationship between employees who identify strongly with their company and unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB). The authors defined UFB as containing two elements. First, UFB is "either illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community" (Jones, 1991, p. 367). Second, UFB is pro-organizational behavior that is not requested by superiors nor is it in the job description (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Umphress et al., 2010). This again sets up a conflict between two ethical standards. Individuals who have strong feelings of reciprocity feel an ethical obligation to "repay" their company for their

employment and group belonging by participating in UFB versus doing the right thing for the greater society.

Umphress et al. (2010) argue employees who have strong reciprocity beliefs and who identify with the company have a greater tendency to act in favor of the ethical standard of “repaying” their employer by committing UFB that benefits the company rather than behave ethically for society. Again, we see a paradoxical ethical pattern caused by reciprocity; some employees feel ethical pressure to act in the company’s interest because the company provides them with employment, even when the act is unethical potentially putting their livelihood in jeopardy.

According to social identity theory, someone’s identity is shaped by their membership in social groups (Tajfel, 1982; Umphress et al., 2010). A person’s employer can be considered a social group. An individual will view their social group’s success and failures as their own. (Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Umphress et al., 2010). Additionally, social exchange theory would suggest employees will regulate their behavior to align with the company in order to maintain their self-image of being part of the organization (Hogg, Terry & White, 1995). Also, Clark and Mills (1979) demonstrated individuals have different levels of how much they subscribe to reciprocity beliefs. Individuals with high levels of reciprocity belief feel more compelled to reciprocate to others, including their employer (Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage & Rohdieck, 2004). This strong belief in reciprocity can be the ethical standard people use to make decisions even though it often conflicts with other ethical standards.

Umphress et al. (2010) conducted two experiments that tested the relationship between UPB, strong feelings of organization identification and strong reciprocity beliefs. The first study had 224 participants answer three survey measures to determine organizational identification (Mael & Ashforth, 1992), positive reciprocity (Eisenberger et al., 2004) and willingness to engage in UPB (Umphress et al., 2010). The results did not show a relationship between organizational identification and UPB. Although, the results did yield a significant interaction effect between organizational identification x positive reciprocity beliefs in predicting UPB. Individuals who had a strong organizational identification and strong positive reciprocity beliefs were more likely to engage in UPB. The results were not significant for individuals with weak reciprocity beliefs. These results suggest the ethical standard to reciprocate can override other ethical standards in some people.

Umphress et al. (2010) second experiment utilized the same survey measures as the first study but did so at two points in time. This time delay in this experiment was to ensure participants' responses were not influenced by common method bias. 148 participants completed the organizational and reciprocity beliefs surveys first and then the UPB measure four weeks later. The pattern of results was identical to that of the first study. Umphress et al.'s (2010) work demonstrates the problematic effects of combining strong organizational identification and strong beliefs in reciprocity. Under these conditions an employee feels the ethical duty to reciprocate value to company in exchange for their employment, even if it compromises other ethical standards. This sets up a potentially problematic situation that can get people in trouble when others,

including the law, judge their actions by ethical standards other than the obligation to reciprocate.

The intersection of ethics and reciprocity is not just in the business world. Politics is ripe with corruption stories that are the result of gifts, money and favors being bestowed on politicians in return for favorable legislation for the favor giver (Susman, 2008). This exchange is not always a direct bribe asking for a quid-pro-quo. The favor can be the result of a longer-term relationship where the lobbyist has built up relationship capital with the lawmaker over time. This puts the lawmaker in an ethical dilemma when they are put in a place to make policy decisions in favor of the lobbyist due to the norm of reciprocity versus what is best for their constituents. The reciprocation of the lobbyist's favors may have wide ranging and costly ramifications to the public (Susman, 2008).

Nearly seventy years ago, Senator Paul Douglas (1952) addressed the potential ethical problem of gifts and favors in politics. Douglas' message still rings true today:

Today the corruption of public officials by private interests takes a more subtle form. The enticer does not generally pay money directly to the public representative. He tries instead by a series of favors to put the public official under such a feeling of personal obligation that the latter gradually loses his sense of mission to the public and comes to feel that his first loyalties are to his private benefactors and patrons. What happens is a gradual shifting of a man's loyalties from the community to those who have been doing him favors. His final decisions are, therefore, made in response to his private friendships and loyalties rather than to the public good. Throughout this whole process,

the official will claim, and may indeed believe, that there is no causal connection between the factors he has received and the decisions which he makes (p. 15).

Butterfield, Treviño, and Weaver (2000) contend moral awareness is the first step needed to influence people to behavior ethically. There are many decisions that people face that do not come with bright red flags that indicate an ethical dilemma. The authors demonstrated that the salience of moral or ethical norms via moral language can trigger a moral schema leading to more ethical behavior.

Social Normative Decision Models

Another possible reason why people follow the norm of reciprocity even when doing so is contrary to their interests is that people are using a normative decision process based on social interaction. More specifically individuals may be concerned about making the choice that is in line with others' expectations or behavior, irrespective of the monetary, ethical or health consequences downstream. The "right" decision, in this context, is either based on social expectations of what others believe is the right thing to do, known as injunctive appeals or based on how others are behaving, known as descriptive appeals (Cialdini, 2007; Jacobson, Mortensen & Cialdini, 2011, White & Simpson, 2013). The decision is not based on self-interest or morals. There is a subtle, but important, distinction from the injunctive and descriptive norms discussed in this section and the ethical standards in the previous section. The injunctive and descriptive norms are based on the perception of others' expectations, and behavior and not necessarily what the decision maker internally believes is right. Both injunctive and descriptive norms are unlikely to influence a person's behavior unless the norm is salient

at the time of behavior (Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990; Kallgren, Reno & Cialdini, 2000). The focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al, 1990) posits there are often competing norms present in a given situation that could influence behavior. One specific norm will only shape behavior, when the situation activates that specific norm. Injunctive norms have been more successful in producing prosocial behavior in a wider range of settings than descriptive norms (Reno, Cialdini & Kallgren, 1993).

Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) state humans are motivated to create and maintain relationships. We will actively monitor and engage in behaviors that others approve of in order to gain social approval. This is in line with the focus theory of normative conduct, that when the expectation for social approval is salient, the injunctive norm to align with other's expectations. Attending to the expectations of how others think we should act, as opposed to our own impulses, takes cognitive effort and self-regulation (Baumeister, Dewall, Ciarocco & Twenge, 2005; Jacobson, Mortensen & Cialdini, 2011; Morris, Hong, Chiu & Liu, 2015). This viewpoint would be in line with the notion that people do not follow injunctive norms due to heuristics and instead involve strategic considerations requiring cognitive effort (Morris et al., 2015). One of the ways to attend to these injunctive norms to gain social approval, in order to build bonds with others, is through the reciprocating favors.

The power of pro-social behavior of acting in a way that others expect, specifically the need to repay a favor, can cause someone to be blind to downstream unethical or fraudulent consequences. It is not the ultimate outcome that is considered when making the decision, but rather how the immediate action of repayment is perceived by others that is salient. Individuals will outwardly express and behave as if

they trust another person because they believe they must give them the benefit of the doubt when it comes to their trustworthiness, even if they privately believe human nature is to lie and cheat (Dunning, Anderson, Schlosser, Ehlebracht & Fetchenhauer, 2014). People will go along just to get along due to injunctive norms; even when it should be clear they are involved in a scam.

Asch (1951) found participants avoided social disapproval when they conformed to incorrect majority answers when they had to state them publicly. Research on self-discrepancy theory suggests people will feel guilt, anxiety and agitation when they envision themselves not living up to social obligations (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Shah & Friedman, 1997; Roney & Sorrentino, 1995). Individuals will behave in ways in order to not experience this agitation. A common social obligation is to reciprocate favors. This section will review the literature on whether following the norm of reciprocity might be due to a normative decision process based on the need to adhere to injunctive norms, in line with the focus theory of normative conduct.

The power of reciprocity appealing to injunctive norms is even present when the beneficiary of the initial favor is not the target being asked to comply, but rather a cause or in general. Goldstein, Griskevicius and Cialdini (2011) conducted a study on hotel towel reuse rates. They measured towel reuse rates using three different messages on signs hanging on the towel racks. The first was sign was about saving the environment and reusing the towel (standard), the second was that the hotel had already made a donation to an environmental charity on their behalf and asked them to repay the favor by reusing the towel (reciprocity by proxy) and the third sign promised to make a donation on their behalf if they reused their towel (incentive by proxy). There were 634 instances

where guests could have potentially reused their towel. The results showed there was no difference in towel reuse between the standard sign (35.1%) and incentive by proxy sign (30.7%). However, towel reuse rate was significantly higher for the reciprocity by proxy sign (45.2%). than both of the other signs.

Goldstein et al. (2011) conducted a follow up study with 263 new participants. The participants each saw one of the three towel reuse signs from the previous study and then answered questions about the hotel management's trustworthiness; hotel management's caring about protecting environment, their sense of obligation to reuse the towels, and the extent to which they personally endorsed the norm of reciprocity. The results demonstrated no difference in the perceived trustworthiness or concern for the environment by hotel management as a function of which sign the participants had seen. Participants who viewed the reciprocity by proxy sign reported a greater sense of obligation to the hotel's management to reuse their towel than the participants who saw the other signs. Also, participants in the reciprocity by proxy condition, personal endorsement of the reciprocity norm was significantly correlated with their sense of obligation to reuse the towel. The other two groups' endorsements of reciprocity were not correlated with their sense of obligation to reuse the towel. Goldstein et al. (2011) contend the results demonstrate behavior was driven not by appeals to save the environment, but rather in order to repay the favor of the donation made on their behalf. The act of the favor activated the injunctive norm that others have an expectation for them to repay the favor by hanging up their towel.

Brockenholt and van der Heijden (2007) analyzed what caused people to comply with insurance regulations. They found a strong predictor of compliance was the

perceived beliefs of their friends and family, considered social control and not government regulations. Cialdini (2007) contends this is a prime example of injunctive norms at work in the decision process. The expected disapproval of their close acquaintances for not abiding by the insurance regulations drove the decision to comply.

Dunning et al. (2014) investigated the role of injunctive norms within the trust game. The trust game is the same paradigm utilized by Halali et al. (2014) and developed by Berg, et al. (1995). Dunning et al. investigated trust and injunctive norms and not reciprocity explicitly, although parallels can be drawn to reciprocity. Their work should be drawn upon in future reciprocity research.

According to Dunning et al. (2014) people trust strangers much more than what a typical economist would deem as rational, although their explanation is not because people are using heuristics. The authors contend individuals are being rational, but the decisions are not about the best financial outcome, instead individuals are considering what others think they should do. This is not an ethical decision to do what is right vs wrong but driven by adhering to others' expectations. In addition, behaving in ways that are congruent with how they should behave, people are able to avoid feelings of guilt and anxiety.

Dunning et al. (2014) provided evidence of their assertions in which the participants took on the role of the first mover in the trust game. The first experiment had 38 participants answer a series of questions in three different scenarios. The first scenario asked participants how many winning balls would have to be in an urn, containing 100 total balls, in order for them to gamble \$5 to win \$10. The second set of questions was

framed as them being the original giver in a trust game scenario. They could either keep \$5 or give it to the receiver in which it would be quadrupled to \$20. The receiver could then give \$10 back or keep the \$20 for themselves. Participants indicated what they “wanted” to do and what they “should” do in this situation using a seven-point scale with the higher poles being want to give or should give and the low being want to keep and should keep. Next, they rated how giving the \$5 would make them feel along 14 emotions and repeated the same rating for keeping the money. Participants also estimated the percentage of receivers would return \$10 versus keep all the money. The last scenario asked participants if they would rather receive \$5 or gamble on a coin flip where they would receive \$10 if they won and nothing if they lost.

The results of Dunning et al. (2014) demonstrated people trusted too much in relation to their expectations about other’s trustworthiness. Seventy-one percent of participants decided to give their \$5 to other person on the trust game while predicting only 52.5% of receivers would return \$10. In contrast, participants required 63.8% of the balls in the urn to be winners to gamble \$5 to win \$10. The authors also discounted descriptive norms as an explanation for this pattern of behavior as participants thought only 48.6% of other participants would trust the givers to return money. Descriptive norms are modeling your behavior off how others behave (Kallgren , Reno & Cialdini, 2000). Further evidence for injunctive norms being the driving force of behavior were the “want” and “should” ratings for giving/ keeping the money. Participants were indifferent in “wanting” to trust the receiver with a rating at the midpoint ($M = 3.97$) while the average participant indicated they should trust the other person ($M = 5.50$). An analysis of emotions was conducted by taking difference scores of trusting versus not

trusting for emotions associated with content and then agitation. Participants were more content when trusting versus not trusting although agitation was a better predictor of trusting behavior. Participants experienced more agitation when thinking about not trusting versus trusting the receiver. These findings should be tested in a reciprocity context. Feelings of “should trust” are more predictive of behavior than “want to trust”. When an individual does a favor for someone else, and then asks for some form of repayment, the norm of reciprocity says the receiver is obliged to repay the favor. The original giver creates conditions where the original receiver feels as if they “should trust” the giver and repay the favor, even if they may not “want to” reciprocate.

The act of refusing a request can be a norm violation resulting in agitation for the refuser (Ackerman & Kenrick, 2008; Anderson & Dunning, 2014). Flynn and Lake (2008) explored the likelihood of others to comply with requests from a social cost perspective from both the help seeker and help giver’s perspective. They found that help-seekers often do not take into consideration the pressure put on the potential helper to not violate the norm of benevolence by refusing the request for help (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Flynn & Lake, 2008). This discounting of the helper’s feelings results in an underestimation in the likelihood potential helpers comply with requests. These conclusions raise interesting questions regarding the power of reciprocity and the conditions in which it is easiest to employ by the original favor giver? Does providing a favor first make it easier to ask for a return favor? Does the original favor giver see it harder for the norm of benevolence harder to violate in the refusing the request? Does an initial favor give permission to the first mover to ask for something in return? In other

words, reciprocity might be a moderator for adherence to the injunctive norm of benevolence.

In one experiment, Flynn and Lake (2008) randomly assigned 63 participants to either the help seeker or help giver roles. Participants read four different helping scenarios from the perspective of their respective role (e.g., asking a roommate to provide feedback on a paper vs. having your roommate ask you for feedback). Next, they answered questions including three about the discomfort the potential helper would feel if they refused to comply with the request. The results showed the participants in the help giver role rated the social cost of saying no significantly higher than those in the help seeker role. The authors contended this is evidence for higher than expected compliance rates with potential help givers. The injunctive norm/ social cost of saying no, drove them to say yes. One could contend the reason an individual will comply with a request, in a reciprocity scenario, is due to the injunctive norm. The social expectation to say “yes” and the social cost of saying “no” to repay a favor, is what drives an individual to comply.

Flynn and Lake (2008) ran an additional experiment that shed light on injunctive norms and compliance. The next study was conceptually the same to the previous experiment, but also included a social cost variable by direct versus indirect requests for help (e.g., A woman needs help carrying a stroller down the subway stairs by catching your eye vs explicitly asking for help). The results showed the potential helpers complied with the requests more when asked directly than when asked indirectly. An opposite pattern was observed when help seekers predicted compliance of the potential helper, although the difference in this condition was not significant. Flynn and Lake believe this

is even more evidence that potential helpers pay more attention to the social cost/injunctive norms of saying no than those who ask the favor. The social pressure to comply with the request is more intense for direct requests than indirect requests. As in the previous experiments conducted by Flynn and Lake (2008), the results of this study points to the power of injunctive norms and the pressure it puts people under to say “yes” when asked for a favor. The question remains if adding the element of reciprocity to this context would increase the compliance rates when someone is asked directly to repay a favor.

Rationale

The literature review outlined many theories that could explain why a person would reciprocate a favor, even when doing so is against their self- interest. Possible explanations for this type of behavior were categorized into three categories: normative models, ethical decisions and social normative decision models. These models were applied in specific contexts of reciprocity and are not universal. The aim of this dissertation is to shed light on which theory receives the most support for why someone would move forward with an agreement that is clearly not to their benefit, just because they received an unsolicited favor.

Normative models suggest people are rational actors and will make decisions that result in the most good for themselves. People’s interpretation of goodness can be contextual and not necessarily based on maximizing utility or financial outcomes. The research reviewed in this paper contends people’s goal when deciding to reciprocate could be based on fairness or inequality reduction and will make rational decisions to

realize their goal. These explanations are plausible in the contexts of their respective experiments. While the findings are informative, they fall short of offering a universal explanation of reciprocal behavior at the cost of their self-interest. These studies did not offer the opportunity for dialogue between the favor giver and receiver, that is typical in consumer situations. Some of the studies utilized simulated games, without a real person on the other side. The underlying theory of punishing someone in the name of fairness via negative reciprocity, at your own expense, cannot be applied to someone who has been given a favor and then asked to agree to something they know is disadvantageous to them. There may be other theoretical explanations why someone would move forward with a disadvantageous agreement, after receiving a favor.

The second section of the literature review reviewed studies on ethical decision making and how it can lead to someone to act against their own interests when faced with reciprocity. In certain circumstances, people will make decisions based on ethical and moral grounds, irrespective of the consequences or their detriment. It is possible that when someone receives help or a favor, they will feel an ethical obligation to reciprocate. Some have argued the norm of reciprocity stems from evolution. We feel an ethical responsibility to help others because groups whose members helped each other and were not selfish survived and passed those traits onto future generations. There are ample examples of the intersection of ethics and reciprocity in our daily lives. The situation where someone feels indebted to someone else due to a favor can present an ethical dilemma. There is ethical pressure to return the favor, even though the act of returning the favor can be unethical, putting the favor returner in potential jeopardy. This dissertation will add to the body of the reciprocity and ethics literature by testing the

limits and boundary conditions in which someone would violate their ethics because they received an unsolicited favor.

The final category covered in the literature review was social normative decision models and reciprocity. Injunctive norms say people will behave in ways that others think they ought to. In the context of reciprocity, others have an expectation favors will be repaid. This could lead to someone satisfying this expectation by reciprocating behavior that is against their self-interest. There is currently a gap in the literature with no published studies, to the author's knowledge, that investigate injunctive norms and direct reciprocity that results in the return favor being detrimental to the second mover. This dissertation will attempt to fill this gap.

The theories and studies outlined in the literature review shed light on what is known about why people act against their self-interest in the context of reciprocity. This dissertation contributes to the decision making and consumer behavior literature by exploring the gaps that exist about reciprocating behavior that is detrimental to the reciprocator. Several questions will be explored in this dissertation. Why would someone not ask clarifying questions, when they are faced with a request that is clearly fraudulent and/or disadvantageous to them? Does trust level of the original favor giver impact reciprocal behavior? What are the boundary conditions in which someone would violate their ethics because they received a favor? These questions are important to explore in order to develop a better understanding about the dark side of reciprocity. Further understating could help create interventions for people to make better decisions including avoiding being fraud victims.

Experiment 1

In experiment 1, participants were asked to sign a bogus consent form, which states they owe a \$10 research fee for taking part in the experiment. Half of the participants received an unsolicited gift consisting of a can of Diet Coke and small bag of pretzels (favor condition) when they arrive at the lab. The other half did not receive any gift (no favor condition). Any questions a participant asked were inconspicuously written down by the researcher. The researcher also recorded if the participants sign the bogus consent form. The participant then answered questions about the bogus consent form process and attitude towards the researcher. Following the predictions of the norm of reciprocity, focus theory of normative conduct and salient injunctive norms, the following hypotheses were developed.

Statement of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Participants assigned to the favor condition will sign the bogus consent form, with the \$10 research fee, more often than participants assigned to no favor condition.

This hypothesis was based on the well-established norm of reciprocity that people feel an obligation to repay a favor to those that provided a favor to them (Gouldner, 1960). Favors generate a sense of obligation in the receiver (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966). Cialdini (2009) has demonstrated that this obligation will make it more likely for a favor receiver to say “yes” to a request from a favor giver. The predicted results are contrary to what traditional normative models, such as Becker’s (1976) rational choice theory, would predict. In this experiment, the researcher is asking for compliance from participants by requesting they sign a bogus consent form that obligates them to pay \$10.

Hypothesis II: Participants assigned to the favor condition will be less likely to ask questions about the \$10 research fee than participants assigned to no favor condition.

Hypothesis III: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the researcher as cooperative, the more likely they will be to sign the bogus consent form with the \$10 research fee.

Hypothesis IV: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the researcher as cooperative, the less likely they will be to question the bogus consent form with the \$10 research fee.

Hypotheses II, III and IV were developed based on previous research that injunctive norms influence behavior due to social expectations (Jacobson, Mortensen & Cialdini, 2011; White & Simpson, 2013). Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) demonstrated people are motivated to create and maintain relationships and will consciously adapt their behavior to gain social approval.

The premise of focus theory of normative conduct is that when an expectation for social approval is salient, individual will adjust their behavior to align with others' expectations (Cialdini et al, 1990). The expectation in this case is to be cooperative and not question a request of the researcher who just provided a favor to the individual. There would be a social cost to being viewed as uncooperative by questioning the researcher's request, which influences people to comply with a request that is disadvantageous to them without asking any questions.

Hypothesis V: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will sign the bogus consent form with the \$10 research fee more than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is expected that there will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in participants who believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative relative to participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative.

Hypothesis VI: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will question the bogus consent form with the \$10 research fee less than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is expected that there will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in participants who believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative relative to participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative.

Hypotheses V and VI were developed based on the focus theory of normative conduct and the norm of reciprocity. An injunctive norm must be salient to change behavior (Cialdini et al., 1990; Kallgren et al., 2000). Attending to injunctive norms takes cognitive effort, which can lead to ignoring downstream consequences (Jacobson et al., 2011; Morris et al., 2015). When there is a salient expectation to be viewed as cooperative, it will magnify the effects of the norm of reciprocity. In this case, participants who receive a favor and rate being perceived as cooperative as important will repay the favor by not questioning and moving forward with a disadvantageous agreement more than participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative and repay the favor.

Hypothesis VII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher are no more likely to sign the bogus consent form, with the \$10 research fee, than participants who have a low level of trust in the researcher.

Hypothesis VIII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher are not less likely to question the \$10 research fee, than participants who have a low level of trust in the researcher.



Hypotheses VII and VIII are consistent with the focus theory of normative conduct, self-discrepancy theory and the norm of reciprocity. The focus theory of normative conduct says people will behave in pro-social ways that others around them expect, as long as those expectations are salient. The norm of reciprocity demonstrates

when someone does a favor for someone else there is an expectation that favor will be returned. Dunning et al. (2014) showed people will outwardly behave in ways that show they trust others, when in fact, they privately feel they should not. Asch (1951) found people will conform their public behavior to fit others' expectations to avoid social disapproval, even when they knew what they were saying out loud was false.

Self-discrepancy theory demonstrates people will feel agitated and anxious when they do not live up to social obligations and will alter their behavior to avoid these feelings (Higgins, 1987; Higgins et al., 1997; Roney and Sorrentino, 1995). Based on the previous research on the theory normative conduct, self-discrepancy theory and the norm of reciprocity participants who do not trust the researcher will not question the \$10 research fee or refuse to sign the disadvantageous agreement more frequently than participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher. Figure 1 is a chart that displays the types of models that experiment 1 attempts to support and refute.

Figure 1

Experiment 1's Hypotheses' Models of Interest

Models Supported	Models Refuted
 <p data-bbox="456 1444 683 1514">Social Normative Decision Models</p>	 <p data-bbox="1019 1478 1273 1507">Normative Models</p>

Note. These are the hypotheses' predictions, not results

Method

Participants

There were 123 undergraduate student participants (79 female; mean age 19.9 years) from a large Midwestern private university who completed the study in exchange for course credit. They were recruited from an experimental management system hosted and administered by the psychology department of that university.

Study design

The experiment utilized a 2 (Reciprocity: favor, no favor) \times 1 (Research fee: \$10.00) between-subjects design.

Procedure

The experimental data collection was conducted in the Psychology Department laboratories of a supervising faculty member of the large Midwestern private university. Participants believed they were taking part in a “consumer decision survey study” as stated in the psychology department’s experimental management registration system when they signed up. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions. Upon arriving, the researcher said, "Thank you for coming in. Please have a seat. Hold on one second while I grab something." The researcher returned from the other side of the room a few seconds later.

In the favor condition, the researcher returned with two cans of Diet Coke and two small bags of pretzels. They handed the can of pop and package of pretzels to the participant and said, "I got a Diet Coke and snack for myself and thought you would like something too." If the participant refused the Diet Coke and/ or pretzels, the researcher insisted they take it saying, "Keep it, you can have them later or give them to a friend.”

In the no favor condition, the researcher returned and began the experiment.

Next, every participant was asked to read a bogus informed consent form which included a \$10.00 research fee (Appendix A). Within the bogus consent form there was a section labeled "How much is the research fee?" Within this section the following text was in 16pt bold and red font, "You will be charged a \$10.00 research fee for your participation in this experiment. You will see the fee added as a student activity fee on your tuition account." The description in the experiment in the registration system did not mention anything about a fee. There was not actually any fee charged, and they were debriefed as to such at the completion of the experiment. The rest of the consent form was in black 10pt font.

If the participant questioned the terms of the bogus consent form, the researcher said "I am only running the experiment and are not familiar with the terms of the form." If the participant refused to sign the form, the researcher debriefed the participant as to the true nature of the experiment and told them there is no research fee. The researcher then asked the participant to sign the true consent form and ask if they would continue with the survey questions. The participant was also informed they were free to leave with no negative consequences and would still receive their participation credit regardless of whether continuing with the experiment or not.

If the participant signed the original consent form, the researcher informed them the form they just signed is bogus. The researcher debriefed the participant as to the true nature of the experiment and told them there was no fee and ripped the bogus consent form in half in front of them. The researcher then asked the participant to sign the true

consent form and ask if they would continue with the survey questions. The participant was also be informed they were free to leave with no negative consequences and would receive their participation credit regardless of whether they continued with the experiment or not.

The researcher inconspicuously timed and recorded how long it took the participant to read each of the consent forms. The researcher also recorded if the participant questioned the research fee on the bogus consent form.

Participants were then asked to complete a survey with questions about the bogus consent form process and demographics (Appendix B).

Results

Hypothesis I: Participants assigned to the favor condition will sign the bogus consent form, with the \$10 research fee, more often than participants assigned to no favor condition.

A Fisher's exact test, and not a chi-square test of independence, was performed to examine the relation between receiving a favor and signing the bogus consent with a \$10 research fee because there were zero participants who did not sign the bogus consent form in the favor condition. The results did not support Hypothesis I and indicated a non-significant increase in the rate participants signed the bogus consent form for those who received a favor 100% (61/61) compared to 97% (60/62) who did not receive a favor ($p = .496$, Fisher's exact test).

Hypothesis II: Participants assigned to the favor condition will be less likely to ask questions about the \$10 research fee than participants assigned to no favor condition.

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between receiving a favor and questioning the \$10 research fee on the bogus consent form. The relation between these variables was significant, $\chi^2 (1, N = 123) = 7.3, p = .007$. The results support Hypothesis II that participants who received a favor of a can of Diet Coke and bag of pretzels were less likely to question the \$10 research fee on the bogus consent form that obligates them to pay \$10 than participants who did not receive the favor.

Hypothesis III: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the researcher as cooperative, the more likely they will be to sign the bogus consent form with the \$10 research fee.

Hypothesis V: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will sign the bogus consent form with the \$10 research fee more than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is expected that there will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in participants who believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative relative to participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative.

Model without the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict signing a bogus consent form with a \$10 research fee. The outcome of interest is signing the bogus consent form (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, No), importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7). The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant ($p = .211$) indicating the model is correctly specified. Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 93.507 and the Nagelkerke R squared = .166. The results did not support Hypothesis III. The model resulted in all the IVs as not significant. Receiving a favor $\beta = 17.898, SE = 4881.334, Wald = 0.00, p = .997$. importance of being perceived as cooperative $\beta = -.212, SE = .533, Wald = .158, p = .691$,

and trust in the researcher $\beta = -.977$, $SE = 1.006$, $Wald = .942$, $p = .332$. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 1. Logistic regression results are presented in Table 2.

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Predictor Variables for Signing \$10 Form- Without Interaction

Measure	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3
1. Receiving a favor			-		
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative	5.53	1.41	.000	-	
3. Trust in researcher	5.71	1.17	.000	-.061	-

Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust in researcher: 1- Not at all to 7- Completely

Table 2

Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Signing of \$10 Form- Without Interaction

Variable	Signing of \$10 bogus consent form		
	β	<i>SE</i>	<i>OR</i> [95% <i>CI</i>]
Constant	10.60	7.12	
Receiving a favor	17.90	4881.33	59313401.77 [.000, -]
Importance of being perceived as cooperative	-0.21	0.53	0.81 [.28, 2.30]
Trust in researcher	-0.97	1.01	0.38 [.05, 2.71]

Note. $R^2 = .23$ (Nagelkerke).

A separate model was run to test for an interaction between receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative.

Model with the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as

cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict signing a bogus consent form with a \$10 research fee. The outcome of interest was signing the bogus consent form (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, No), importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7) and the interaction of receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant ($p = .936$) indicating the model is correctly specified. Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 16.055 and the Nagelkerke R squared = .229. The model resulted in all of the IVs to be not significant. Receiving a favor from the researcher $\beta = 15.00$, $SE = 22027.12$, Wald = .000, $p = .999$. importance of being perceived as cooperative $\beta = -0.212$, $SE = .533$, Wald = .158, $p = .691$, Trust in the researcher $\beta = -0.977$, $SE = 1.006$, Wald = .942, $p = .332$.

The results did not support hypothesis V. The interaction of IVs receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative was also not significant $\beta = 0.495$, $SE = 3858.648$, Wald = .000, $p = 1.00$. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 3 Logistic regression are presented in Table 4.

Table 3

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Predictor Variables for Signing \$10 Form- With Interaction

Measure	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4
1. Receiving a favor			-			
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative	5.53	1.41	.000	-		
3. Trust in researcher	5.71	1.17	.000	-.061	-	
4. Receiving a favor * Importance of being perceived as cooperative			-.974	.000	.000	-

Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust in researcher: 1- Not at all to 7- Completely

Table 4

Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Signing \$10 Form- With Interaction

Variable	Signing of \$10 bogus consent form		
	β	<i>SE</i>	<i>OR</i> [95% CI]
Constant	10.60	7.12	
Receiving a favor	15.00	22027.12	3267699.17 [.000, -]
Importance of being perceived as cooperative	-0.21	0.53	0.81 [.28, 2.30]
Trust in researcher	-0.98	1.01	0.38 [.05, 2.71]
Receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative	0.50	3858.65	40189.16 [.000, -]

Note. $R^2 = .23$ (Nagelkerke).

Hypothesis IV: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the researcher as cooperative, the less likely they will be to question the bogus consent form with the \$10 research fee.

Hypothesis VI: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will question the bogus consent form with the \$10 research fee less than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is expected that there will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in participants who believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative relative to participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative.

Model without the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict questioning a \$10 research fee on a bogus consent form. The outcome of interest is questioning the \$10 research fee on the bogus consent form (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, No), importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7). The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant ($p = .211$)

indicating the model is correctly specified. Additionally, the $-2 \log\text{-likelihood} = 93.507$ and the Nagelkerke $R^2 = .166$. The results did not support Hypothesis IV. The model resulted in the IV trust in the researcher $\beta = .358$, $SE = .263$, $Wald = 1.860$, $p = .173$ and importance of being perceived as cooperative $\beta = .266$, $SE = .208$, $Wald = 1.640$, $p = .200$ as not significant. Controlling for importance of being perceived as cooperative, and trust in the researcher, the predictor variable, receiving a favor was significant and found to contribute to the model $\beta = -1.654$, $SE = .612$, $Wald = 7.312$, $p = .007$, further evidence supporting Hypothesis II. The estimated odds ratio indicated that receiving a favor resulted in a decrease of 80.9% in the likelihood of questioning the \$10 research fee on the bogus consent form, $\text{Exp}(\beta) = .191$, 95% CI (.058, .634). The correlation matrix is presented in Table 5. Logistic regression results are presented in Table 6.

Table 5

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Predictor Variables for Questioning \$10 Fee- Without Interaction

Measure	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3
1. Receiving a favor			-		
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative	5.53	1.41	-.066	-	
3. Trust in researcher	5.71	1.17	-.127	-.145	-

Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust in researcher: 1- Not at all to 7- Completely

Table 6*Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Questioning \$10 Fee- Without Interaction*

Variable	Questioning of \$10 bogus research fee		
	β	SE	OR [95% CI]
Constant	-4.71	1.84	
Receiving a favor	-1.65	0.61	0.19 [.058, .634]*
Importance of being perceived as cooperative	0.27	0.21	1.31 [.87, 1.96]
Trust in researcher	.36	0.26	1.43 [.86, 2.39]

Note. $R^2 = .17$ (Nagelkerke). * $p < .01$.

A separate model was run to test for an interaction between receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative.

Model with the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict questioning a \$10 research fee on a bogus consent form. The outcome of interest was questioning the \$10 research fee (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, No), importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7) and the interaction of receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant ($p = .210$) indicating the model is correctly specified. Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 93.340 and the Nagelkerke R squared = .168. The model resulted in all of the IVs to be not significant. Receiving a favor from the researcher $\beta = -3.102$, $SE = 3.758$, Wald = 0.681, $p = .409$, Importance of

being perceived as cooperative $\beta = 0.231$, $SE = 0.221$, $Wald = 1.095$, $p = .295$, Trust in the researcher $\beta = 0.347$, $SE = 0.263$, $Wald = 1.740$, $p = .187$.

The results did not support hypothesis VI. The interaction of IVs receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative was also not significant $\beta = 0.239$, $SE = 0.604$, $Wald = 0.156$, $p = .692$. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 7. Logistic regression results are presented in Table 8.

Table 7

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Between Predictor Variables for Questioning \$10 Fee- With Interaction

Measure	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4
1. Receiving a favor			-			
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative	5.53	1.41	.329	-		
3. Trust in researcher	5.71	1.17	.077	-.088	-	
4. Receiving a favor * Importance of being perceived as cooperative			-.986	-.354	-.101	-

Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust in researcher: 1- Not at all to 7- Completely

Table 8*Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Questioning \$10 Fee- With Interaction*

Variable	Questioning of \$10 bogus research fee		
	β	<i>SE</i>	<i>OR</i> [95% CI]
Constant	-4.44	1.94	
Receiving a favor	-3.10	3.76	0.05 [.000, 71.06]
Importance of being perceived as cooperative	0.23	0.22	1.26 [.82, 1.94]
Trust in researcher	0.35	0.26	1.42 [.85, 2.37]
Receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative	0.24	0.60	1.27 [.39, 4.15]

Note. $R^2 = .17$ (Nagelkerke).

Hypothesis VII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher will be equivalent in their likelihood to sign the bogus consent form, with the \$10 research fee, to participants who have a low level of trust in the researcher.


Two one-sided tests (TOST) were conducted using a binary logistic regression to test for equivalency between participants who have low levels of trust in the researcher and participants who have high levels of trust in the researcher, in their likelihood to sign the bogus consent form. The outcome of interest is compliance in signing the bogus consent form (Yes, No) The predictor variable is level of trust participants had in the researcher (High, Low). Participants rated their level of trust in the researcher on a scale of 1 being very low to 7 very high. Participants who indicated their level of trust in the researcher as a 1, 2, 3 or 4 will be considered to have low trust in the researcher, while participants who answer with a 5, 6 or 7 will be considered to have high trust in the researcher. The TOST utilized a 90% confidence interval to produce two .05 alpha level tests. The effect size was determined by the conventional Cohen's *d* medium effect size

of .499. This effect size was calculated into odds ratios that provides a lower equivalence bound of .405 and upper equivalence bound of 2.472. In order for the two levels of trust to be significantly equivalent, the $\exp(\beta)$ and the lower and upper bound would need to fall within the parameters of the lower and upper odds ratio equivalence bounds of 90% CI [.405, 2.472.]

The results did not support Hypothesis VII. The model did not find the two groups of low trust and high trust significantly equivalent in their likelihood to sign the bogus consent form $\exp(\beta) = 1.125$, 90% CI [.476, 2.661]. See Figure 2.

Figure 2

TOST Equivalency Test- Likelihood to Sign \$10 Form for High vs Low Levels of Trust



Note. Effect size for boundaries based on Cohen's $d = .499$, 90% CI

Hypothesis VIII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher will be equivalent in their likelihood to question the \$10 research fee in the bogus consent form, to participants who have a low level of trust in the researcher.


A TOST was conducted using a binary logistic regression to test for equivalency between participants who have low levels of trust in the researcher and participants who

have high levels of trust in the researcher, in their likelihood to question the \$10 research fee in the bogus consent form. The outcome of interest is questioning the \$10 research fee (Yes, No) The predictor variable is level of trust participants had in the researcher (High, Low). Participants rated their level of trust in the researcher on a scale of 1 being very low to 7 very high. Participants who indicated their level of trust in the researcher as a 1, 2, 3 or 4 will be considered to have low trust in the researcher, while participants who answer with a 5, 6 or 7 will be considered to have high trust in the researcher. The TOST utilized a 90% confidence interval to produce two .05 alpha level tests. The effect size was determined by the conventional Cohen's *d* medium effect size of .499. This effect size was calculated into odds ratios that provides a lower equivalence bound of .405 and upper equivalence bound of 2.472. In order for the two levels of trust to be significantly equivalent, the $\exp(\beta)$ and the lower and upper bound would need to fall within the parameters of the lower and upper odds ratio equivalence bounds of 90% CI [.405, 2.472.]

The results did not support Hypothesis VIII. The model did not find the two groups of low trust and high trust significantly equivalent in their likelihood to question the \$10 research fee in the bogus consent form $\exp(\beta) = 1.433$, 90% CI [.386, 5.323]. See Figure 3.

Figure 3

TOST Equivalency Test- Likelihood to Question \$10 Fee for High vs Low Levels of Trust



Note. Effect size for boundaries based on Cohen's $d = .499$, 90% CI

Experiment 2



Experiment 2 used a procedure identical to that of experiment 1, except the research fee listed on the bogus consent form was now \$89.56 (Appendix C) and three additional demographic questions were added the survey (Appendix D). The larger fee was used to see if the magnitude of the fee impacts the power of reciprocity for people to question or move forward with a disadvantageous agreement. Prior research has shown smaller requests have a greater compliance rate than similar larger requests (Freedman & Fraser, 1966; Petrova et al., 2007, Sherman, 1980).

The fee in experiment 2 was almost nine times greater than in experiment 1. One might argue a fee of \$10 is worth the one study credit a psychology pool participant receives for participating in the study. A fee of nearly \$90 would be much harder for a college student to justify for one study credit, given no fee is ever charged to participate

in studies as a psychology student pool participant and no fee was mentioned in the registration system when they signed up to participate in the study. Figure 4 is a chart that displays the types of models that experiment 2 attempts to support and refute.

Figure 4

Experiment 2's Hypotheses' Models of Interest

Models Supported	Models Refuted
 <p data-bbox="456 716 683 779">Social Normative Decision Models</p>	 <p data-bbox="1024 747 1273 774">Normative Models</p>

Note. These are the hypotheses' predictions, not results

Statement of Hypotheses

Hypothesis I: Participants assigned to the favor condition will sign the bogus consent form, with the \$89.56 research fee, more often than participants assigned to no favor condition.

Hypothesis II: Participants assigned to the favor condition will be less likely to ask questions about the \$89.56 research fee than participants assigned to no favor condition.

Hypothesis III: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the researcher as cooperative, the more likely they will be to sign the bogus consent form with the \$89.56 research fee.

Hypothesis IV: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the researcher as cooperative, the less likely they will be to question the bogus consent form with the \$89.56 research fee.

Hypothesis V: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will sign the bogus consent form with the \$89.56 research fee more than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is expected that there will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in participants who believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative relative to participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative.

Hypothesis VI: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will question the bogus consent form with the \$89.56 research fee less than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is expected that there will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in participants who believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative relative to participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative.

Hypothesis VII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher are no more likely to sign the bogus consent form, with the \$89.56 research fee, than participants who have a low level of trust in the researcher.

Hypothesis VIII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher are not less likely question the \$89.56 research fee, than participants who have a low level of trust in the researcher.

Method

Participants

There were 120 undergraduate student participants (87 female; mean age 20.0 years) from a large Midwestern private university who completed the study in exchange for course credit. They were recruited from an experimental management system hosted and administered by the psychology department of that university.

Study design

The experiment utilized a 2 (Reciprocity: favor, no favor) \times 1 (Research fee: \$89.56) between-subjects design.

Procedure

The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, with the exception of the research fee being increased to \$89.56 and answering three additional demographic questions at the end of the survey.

Results

Hypothesis I: Participants assigned to the favor condition will sign the bogus consent form, with the \$89.56 research fee, more often than participants assigned to no favor condition.

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between receiving a favor and signing the bogus consent form. The relation between these variables was significant, $X^2(1, N = 120) = 5.78, p = .016$. The results supported Hypothesis I. Participants who received a favor of a can of Diet Coke and bag of pretzels were more likely to sign a bogus consent form that obligates them to pay \$89.56 than participants who did not receive the favor.

Hypothesis II: Participants assigned to the favor condition will be less likely to ask questions about the \$89.56 research fee than participants assigned to no favor condition.

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between receiving a favor and asking questions about a \$89.56 research fee bogus consent form. The predicted relation between these variables was not significant, $X^2(1, N = 120) = 0.534, p = .465$. The results did not support Hypothesis II. Participants who received a favor of a can of Diet Coke and bag of pretzels were no less likely to ask questions about the \$89.56 research fee than participants who did not receive the favor.

Hypothesis III: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the researcher as cooperative, the more likely they will be to sign the bogus consent form with the \$89.56 research fee.

Hypothesis V: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will sign the bogus consent form with the \$89.56 research fee more than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is

expected that there will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in participants who believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative relative to participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative.

Model without the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict signing a bogus consent form with a \$89.56 research fee. The outcome of interest is signing the bogus consent form (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, No), importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7). The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant ($p = .615$) indicating the model is correctly specified. Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 113.021 and the Nagelkerke R squared = .179. The model resulted in the IV trust in the researcher as not significant $\beta = .200$, $SE = .160$, $Wald = 1.558$, $p = .212$. Controlling for importance of being perceived as cooperative, and trust in the researcher, the predictor variable, receiving a favor was significant and found to contribute to the model $\beta = 1.151$, $SE = .490$, $Wald = 5.506$, $p = .019$, further supporting Hypothesis I. The estimated odds ratio indicated that receiving a favor resulted in an increase of 216.0% in the likelihood for signing the bogus consent form, $Exp(\beta) = 3.160$, 95% CI (1.209, 8.263). The results also supported Hypothesis III. Controlling for receiving a favor and trust in the researcher, the predictor variable, importance of being perceived as cooperative, was also significant and found to contribute to the model $\beta = .348$, $SE = .150$, $Wald = 5.389$, $p = .020$. The estimated odds ratio indicated that for every unit increase in the importance of being perceived as cooperative, there is an increase of 41.6% in the likelihood for signing the bogus consent

form, $\text{Exp}(\beta) = 1.416$, 95% CI (1.056, 1.899). The correlation matrix is presented in Table 9. Logistic regression results are presented in Table 10.

Table 9

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Predictor Variables for Signing \$89 Form- Without Interaction

Measure	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3
1. Receiving a favor			-		
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative	5.15	1.56	.065	-	
3. Trust in researcher	5.28	1.48	.070	-.162	-

Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust in researcher: 1- Not at all to 7- Completely

Table 10

Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Signing of \$89 Form- Without Interaction

Variable	Signing of \$89 bogus consent form		
	β	<i>SE</i>	<i>OR</i> [95% CI]
Constant	-1.99	1.04	
Receiving a favor	1.15	.49	3.16 [1.21, 8.26]*
Importance of being perceived as cooperative	0.35	0.15	1.42[1.06, 1.90]*
Trust in researcher	0.20	0.16	1.22 [.892, 1.68]

Note. $R^2 = .18$ (Nagelkerke). * $p < .05$.

A separate model was run to test for an interaction between receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative.

Model with the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict signing a bogus consent

form with a \$89.56 research fee. The outcome of interest is signing the bogus consent form (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, No), importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7) and the interaction of receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant ($p = .431$) indicating the model is correctly specified. Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 112.990 and the Nagelkerke R squared = .179. The model resulted in the following IVs as not significant; Receiving a favor from the researcher $\beta = 1.408$, SE = 1.556, Wald = 0.819, $p = .366$, Trust in the researcher $\beta = 0.201$, SE = 0.161, Wald = 1.562, $p = .211$. Controlling for receiving a favor and trust in the researcher, the predictor variable, importance of being perceived as cooperative, was significant and found to contribute to the model $\beta = 0.366$, SE = 0.183, Wald = 3.983, $p = .046$. The estimated odds ratio indicated that for every unit increase in the importance of being perceived as cooperative, there is an increase of 44.2% in the likelihood for signing the bogus consent form, $\text{Exp}(\beta) = 1.442$, 95% CI (1.007, 2.065).

The results did not support Hypothesis V. The interaction of IVs receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative was not significant $\beta = -0.055$, SE = 0.314, Wald = .031, $p = .86$. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 11. Logistic regression results are presented in Table 12.

Table 11

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Predictor Variables for Signing \$89 Form- With Interaction

Measure	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4
1. Receiving a favor			-			
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative	5.15	1.56	.555	-		
3. Trust in researcher	5.28	1.48	.056	-.113	-	
4. Receiving a favor * Importance of being perceived as cooperative			-.949	-.572	-.036	-

Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust in researcher: 1- Not at all to 7- Completely

Table 12

Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Signing of \$89 Form- With Interaction

Variable	Signing of \$89 bogus consent form		
	β	<i>SE</i>	<i>OR</i> [95% CI]
Constant	-2.08	1.17	
Receiving a favor	1.41	1.56	4.09 [.19, 86.39]
Importance of being perceived as cooperative	0.37	0.18	1.44 [1.07, 2.07]*
Trust in researcher	0.20	0.16	1.22 [.892, 1.68]
Receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative	-0.06	0.31	0.95 [.51, 1.75]

Note. $R^2 = .18$ (Nagelkerke). * $p < .05$.

Hypothesis IV: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the researcher as cooperative, the less likely they will be to question the bogus consent form with the \$89.56 research fee.

Hypothesis VI: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will question the bogus consent form with the \$89.56 research fee less than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is

expected that there will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in participants who believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative relative to participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative.

Model without the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict questioning the \$89.56 research fee on the bogus consent form. The outcome of interest is questioning the \$89.56 research fee (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, No), importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7). The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant ($p = .939$) indicating the model is correctly specified. Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 161.330 and the Nagelkerke R squared = .053. The results did not support Hypothesis IV. The model resulted in all the IVs as not significant. Receiving a favor $\beta = -.254$, $SE = 0.373$, $Wald = 0.465$, $p = .495$. importance of being perceived as cooperative $\beta = -.246$, $SE = .129$ $Wald = 3.630$, $p = .057$, and trust in the researcher $\beta = -.022$, $SE = 0.133$, $Wald = .027$, $p = .869$. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 13. Logistic regression results are presented in Table 14.

Table 13

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Predictor Variables for Questioning \$89 Fee- Without Interaction

Measure	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3
1. Receiving a favor			-		
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative	5.15	1.56	-.008	-	
3. Trust in researcher	5.28	1.48	.021	-.275	-

Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust in researcher: 1- Not at all to 7- Completely

Table 14*Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Questioning \$89 Fee- Without Interaction*

Variable	Questioning of \$89 bogus research fee		
	β	SE	OR [95% CI]
Constant	1.44	0.87	
Receiving a favor	-0.25	0.73	0.78 [.37, 1.61]
Importance of being perceived as cooperative	-0.25	0.13	0.78 [.61, 1.01]
Trust in researcher	0-02	0.13	0.98 [.76, 1.27]

Note. $R^2 = .053$ (Nagelkerke).

A separate model was run to test for an interaction between receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative.

Model with the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict questioning the \$89.56 research fee on a bogus consent form. The outcome of interest is questioning the \$89.56 research fee (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, No), importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7) and the interaction of receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant ($p = .818$) indicating the model is correctly specified. Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 161.310 and the Nagelkerke $R^2 = .053$. The model resulted in the all the IVs being not significant; Receiving a favor from the researcher $\beta = -0.071$, $SE = 1.342$, Wald = .003, $p = .958$, Trust in the researcher $\beta = -0.021$, $SE = 0.133$, Wald = 0.025, $p = .874$. Importance of being perceived as cooperative $\beta = -0.230$, $SE = 0.169$, Wald = 1.841, $p = .175$.

The results did not support Hypothesis VI. The interaction of IVs receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative was not significant $\beta = -0.036$, $SE = 0.249$, $Wald = 0.020$, $p = .887$. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 15. Logistic regression results are presented in Table 16.

Table 15

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Predictor Variables for Questioning \$89 Fee- With Interaction

Measure	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4
1. Receiving a favor			-			
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative	5.15	1.56	.622	-		
3. Trust in researcher	5.28	1.48	.048	-.180	-	
4. Receiving a favor * Importance of being perceived as cooperative			-.961	-.650	-.044	-

Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust in researcher: 1- Not at all to 7- Completely

Table 16

Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Questioning \$89 Fee- With Interaction

Variable	Questioning of \$89 bogus research fee		
	β	<i>SE</i>	<i>OR</i> [95% CI]
Constant	1.36	1.05	
Receiving a favor	-0.07	1.34	0.93 [.07, 12.94]
Importance of being perceived as cooperative	-0.23	0.17	0.80 [.57, 1.11]
Trust in researcher	0-.02	0.13	0.98 [.76, 1.27]
Receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative	-0.04	0.25	0.97 [.59, 1.57]

Note. $R^2 = .053$ (Nagelkerke).


Hypothesis VII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher will be equivalent in their likelihood to sign the bogus consent form, with the \$89.56 research fee, to participants who have a low level of trust in the researcher.

A TOST was conducted using a binary logistic regression to test for equivalency between participants who have low levels of trust in the researcher and participants who have high levels of trust in the researcher, in their likelihood to sign the bogus consent form. The outcome of interest is compliance in signing the bogus consent form (Yes, No). The predictor variable is level of trust participants had in the researcher (High, Low). Participants rated their level of trust in the researcher on a scale of 1 being very low to 7 very high. Participants who indicated their level of trust in the researcher as a 1, 2, 3 or 4 will be considered to have low trust in the researcher, while participants who answer with a 5, 6 or 7 will be considered to have high trust in the researcher. The TOST utilized a 90% confidence interval to produce two .05 alpha level tests. The effect size was determined by the conventional Cohen's *d* medium effect size of .499. This effect size was calculated into odds ratios that provides a lower equivalence bound of .405 and upper equivalence bound of 2.472. In order for the two levels of trust to be significantly equivalent, the $\exp(\beta)$ and the lower and upper bound would need to fall within the parameters of the lower and upper odds ratio equivalence bounds of 90% CI [.405, 2.472.]

The results did not support Hypothesis VII. The model did not find the two groups of low trust and high trust significantly equivalent in their likelihood to sign the bogus consent form $\exp(\beta) = 1.956$, 90% CI [.933, 4.097]. See Figure 5.

Figure 5

TOST Equivalency Test- Likelihood to Sign \$89 Form for High vs Low Levels of Trust



Note. Effect size for boundaries based on Cohen's $d = .499$, 90% CI

Hypothesis VIII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher will be equivalent in their likelihood to question the \$89.56 research fee in the bogus consent form, to participants who have a low level of trust in the researcher.


A TOST was conducted using a binary logistic regression to test for equivalency between participants who have low levels of trust in the researcher and participants who have high levels of trust in the researcher, in their likelihood to question the \$89.56 research fee in the bogus consent form. The outcome of interest is questioning the \$89.56 research fee (Yes, No) The predictor variable is level of trust participants had in the researcher (High, Low). Participants rated their level of trust in the researcher on a scale of 1 being very low to 7 very high. Participants who indicated their level of trust in the researcher as a 1, 2, 3 or 4 will be considered to have low trust in the researcher, while participants who answer with a 5, 6 or 7 will be considered to have high trust in the researcher. The TOST utilized a 90% confidence interval to produce two .05 alpha level tests. The effect size was determined by the conventional Cohen's d medium effect size of .499. This effect size was calculated into odds ratios that provides a lower equivalence

bound of .405 and upper equivalence bound of 2.472. In order for the two levels of trust to be significantly equivalent, the $\exp(\beta)$ and the lower and upper bound would need to fall within the parameters of the lower and upper odds ratio equivalence bounds of CI [.405, 2.472.]

The results did not support Hypothesis VIII. The model did not find the two groups of low trust and high trust to be significantly equivalent in their likelihood to question the \$89.56 research fee in the bogus consent form $\exp(\beta) = .721$, 90% CI [.379, 1.371]. See Figure 6.

Figure 6

TOST Equivalency Test- Likelihood to Question \$89 Fee for High vs Low Levels of Trust



Note. Effect size for boundaries based on Cohen's $d = .499$, 90% CI

Discussion- Experiments 1 and 2

The aim of Experiments 1 and 2 was to explore people's susceptibility to comply with a fraudulent request in the context of reciprocity. More specifically, to investigate

the impact of small unsolicited favors on complying with and questioning fraudulent requests. Additionally, underlying factors such as the importance to be perceived as cooperative, trust in the requester and the dollar amount of the fraudulent request were considered in how they may contribute to compliance and questioning of the unscrupulous request.

The results indicate that a small favor does make people more susceptible to a subsequent fraudulent request. In the \$89.56 condition, the unsolicited favor led people to be more compliant and susceptible to paying the unwarranted fee. The \$10 condition did not show a significant increase in compliance rates, although this result does not provide evidence against the power of reciprocity. In fact, there was 100% compliance in the favor condition. An explanation for the non-significant result could be the compliance rate was also high in the no favor condition, with 97% of the participants signing the \$10 bogus consent form, which masked any reciprocity effects. These results are consistent with past reciprocity findings that favors generate a sense of obligation in the receiver and make it more likely they will comply with a subsequent request (Cialdini, 2009; Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; Gouldner, 1960).

The hypotheses predicting that a small favor would make it less likely for someone to ask questions about a subsequent fraudulent request saw mixed results. The \$10 condition resulted in individuals who received a favor questioning the \$10 research fee significantly less than those who did not receive a favor. In fact, individuals who received a favor were almost four times less likely to question the fee than those who did not receive a favor, with the questioning rates being 6.56% and 24.19% respectively. These results are consistent with previous research on injunctive norms and the focus

theory of normative conduct, in that when an expectation for social approval is salient, individuals will adjust their behavior to align with others' expectations (Cialdini et al, 1990; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; White & Simpson, 2013). The expectation in this case is to go along to get along and not question the request of the researcher who just provided the individual with an unsolicited favor.

The \$89.56 research fee scenario did not see the same pattern of results as the \$10 fee scenario. There was no significant difference in the questioning rates between the favor and no favor conditions with the \$89.56 research fee. Questioning rates were higher in the \$89.56 scenario than the \$10 scenario, with the \$89.56 fee resulting in 51.67% of individuals questioning the fee who did not receive a favor and 45.00% who did receive a favor. This pattern of results suggests there could be boundary conditions to the focus theory of normative conduct. The magnitude of a request could impact the power of injunctive norms on an individual's behavior. These results shed light on a troubling phenomenon that small stakes fraud is less likely to be questioned and more likely to succeed than similar but larger attempts to defraud someone. Future research is needed to investigate these boundary conditions and find interventions to make people less susceptible to small stakes fraud.

An additional goal of Experiments 1 and 2 was to investigate underlying reasons why individuals might move forward with a fraudulent request, such as importance to be perceived as cooperative and their level of trust in the researcher. Again, there were mixed results when comparing the \$10 and \$89.56 scenarios when investigating if the importance to be perceived as cooperative led to compliance in signing the bogus consent form. The \$10 condition did not see a significant relationship between compliance rates

and how important it was to be perceived as cooperative. This could be due to the little variance in compliance rates, with 121 out of 123 signing the bogus consent form.

In the \$89 condition, importance to be perceived as cooperative was found to be significant in predicting compliance with signing the bogus consent form. These results are consistent with the focus theory of normative conduct and self-discrepancy theory (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Higgins, 1987; Higgins et al., 1997; Roney and Sorrentino, 1995; White & Simpson, 2013). The need to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher demonstrates the salience of the need for approval and adhere to social obligations. This motivated participants to adapt their behavior to comply with the request by signing the bogus consent form, that clearly obliged them to pay a fee that they should not have to, in order to gain the social approval (avoid disapproval) of the researcher.

Experiments 1 and 2 also predicted a magnification of reciprocity effects from an interaction with the importance to be perceived as cooperative on compliance and questioning the request to sign the bogus consent form. The results of the experiments did not support these predictions. Injunctive norms need to be salient to change behavior (Cialdini et al., 1990; Kallgren et al., 2000) In these experiments the requester was somewhat passive in the request by handing the consent form to the participant and letting them read and sign it on their own. Future studies may want to manipulate the salience of the expectation to sign the form. The researcher could point to the signature line and ask for the participant to sign. It would also be recommended to not use the \$10 amount where there was 100% compliance regardless of condition.

Four equivalency tests investigated the role trust had in compliance and questioning of the fraudulent request to sign a bogus consent form. Dunning et al. (2014) demonstrated that people will behave in ways that show they trust another person, when privately they do not due to social pressure as predicted by the focus theory of normative conduct and self-discrepancy theory. Experiments 1 and 2 postulated that based on the need to adhere to injunctive norms and outwardly adapt one's behavior to social expectations, individuals who had low trust in the researcher would be equivalent in their compliance and questioning rates to those who had high levels of trust. Contrary to what was expected, the two groups were not statistically equivalent in compliance and questioning rates. Limitations for these hypotheses were small sample sizes for TOST equivalency tests. The data was dichotomized into groups of high and low levels of trust. Future research should manipulate the actions of the requester to create conditions of being trustworthy and not trustworthy and then test for compliance and questioning rates.

Experiments 1 and 2 utilized an undergraduate student sample. Future fraud and reciprocity studies should employ other real-life situations, with a sample more diverse than just undergraduate college students.

Experiment 3




Experiment 3 investigated if people will violate a certain ethical standard in order to satisfy a competing ethical standard of giving back to someone who has given to them. Tangpong et al. (2016) demonstrated that individuals are vulnerable to committing unethical acts due to satisfying the ethical standard to give back to others, although there was always a potential benefit beyond satisfying the obligation to return a favor. The obligation creates conditions where the original favor receiver is under social pressure to

reciprocate and can be potentially exploited to comply with an unethical request (Cialdini, 2009).

This experiment was built on Tangpong et al. (2016) and test the vulnerability of individuals to commit an unethical act when there is no other benefit than to satisfy the obligation to repay a favor. This pattern of behavior would be consistent with injunctive norms and the focus theory of normative conduct in that downstream consequences of actions being blinded due to attending to others' expectation to return the favor. The expected disapproval of not adhering to the requester's request, when the requester and requestee are together, is salient and will drive compliance, with no consideration for the ramifications in committing fraud or and unethical act. Figure 7 is a chart that displays the types of models that experiment 3 attempts to support and refute.

Figure 7

Experiment 3's Hypotheses' Models of Interest

Models Supported		Models Refuted
 <p>Social Normative Decision Models</p>	 <p>Ethical Decision Making Models</p>	 <p>Normative Models</p>

Note. These are the hypotheses' predictions, not results

Statement of Hypotheses

Hypothesis Ia: Participants who receive a favor will sign someone else's name to the second consent form, more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis Ib: Participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will be more likely to sign the community service hours form, more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis Ic: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will be more likely to agree to send referrals to them more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis Id: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall, will be more likely to give the contractor a price for the association's roof project, more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

As in the first two experiments, this hypothesis was based on the norm of reciprocity that people feel an obligation to repay a favor to those that provided a favor to them (Gouldner, 1960). The predicted results are contrary to what traditional normative models, such as Becker's (1976) rational choice theory, would predict. In this experiment, the requesters are asking for compliance by the participants to commit in an unethical act.

Hypothesis IIa: Participants who receive a favor will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face by signing someone else's name than participants who did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IIb: Participants who received a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face by signing the community service hours form than participants who did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IIc: Participants who received a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face by agreeing to send referrals to them than participants who did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IId: Participants who received a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face by giving the contractor a price for the association's roof project than participants who did not receive a favor.

The predicted results that a favor will make it less likely to consider downstream negative consequences would support the focus theory of normative conduct. There would be competing norms and the salient norm to reciprocate will influence participants to commit fraud. If the favor does not influence participants to consider negative

consequences of committing fraud, a normative rational decision theory such as expected utility theory would be supported.

Hypothesis IIIa: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and who receive a favor will be more likely to sign someone else's name to the second consent form than participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IIIb: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will be more likely to sign the community service hours form than participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IIIc: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will be more likely to agree to send referrals to them than participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IIId: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and who received a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall will be more likely give the contractor a price for the association's roof project than participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and did not receive a favor.

The predicted results would support the findings of Umphress et al. (2010) that strong reciprocity beliefs are more likely to lead people to act unethically after receiving a favor and asked to perform an unethical act. Umphress et al. (2010) investigated strong reciprocity in the context of an employee committing unethical pro-organizational behavior. This predicted results would extend Umphress et al's. (2010) findings by eliminating any potential employee, employer confounds and demonstrate the ethical standard to reciprocate can override other ethical standards in people who feel an ethical obligation to give back to others who give to them.

Hypothesis IVa: Participants who rate signing someone else's name to the second consent form as unethical and receive a favor will be more likely to sign someone else's name to the second consent form than participants who rate signing someone else's name to the second consent form as unethical and do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IVb: Participants who rate signing a community service hours form for their neighbor, even though the neighbor did not complete the hours, as unethical and receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will be more likely to sign the community service hours form than participants who rate signing the form as unethical and do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IVc: Participants who rate sending referrals to a former co-worker, even though it is against company policy, as unethical and receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will be more likely to send referrals to their former co-worker than participants who rate sending referrals to the former co-worker as unethical and do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IVd: Participants who rate giving a contractor the price necessary to win the bid for the association's roof project as unethical and receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall will be more likely to give the price to the contractor than participants who give the price to the contractor as unethical and do not receive a favor.

This pattern of predicted results would support the norm of reciprocity, even if when the requested return favor is unethical. If the predicted pattern is not observed, it would suggest there are boundary conditions for reciprocity in that unethical requests would moderate the strength of reciprocity.

Hypothesis Va: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the researcher as cooperative, the more likely they will be to sign someone else's name to the second consent form.

Hypothesis Vb: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by their neighbor as cooperative, the more likely they will be to comply with the request to sign their community service hours form, even though the neighbor did not complete the hours.

Hypothesis Vc: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by their former co-worker as cooperative, the more likely they will be to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker, even though it is against company policy.

Hypothesis Vd: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the contractor as cooperative, the more likely they will give the contractor the price necessary to win the bid for the association's roof project.

If the predicted results are observed, it would support the focus theory of normative conduct, in that an individual's behavior will be affected by dispositional factors that are currently salient (i.e., endorsement of being perceived as cooperative is important).

Hypothesis VIa: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will sign someone else's name to the second consent form more than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher.

Hypothesis VIb: Participants receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will be more likely to sign the neighbor's community service hours form than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by their neighbor.

Hypothesis VIc: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will be more likely to send referrals to their former co-worker than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by their former co-worker.

Hypothesis VIa: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will be more likely to give the price to the contractor than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor.

The predicted interaction effect between reciprocity and the importance of being perceived as cooperative is consistent with the focus theory of normative conduct. Prior research on injunctive norms (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; Kallgren et al., 2000) would suggest there will be a magnification effect of the receiving a favor on compliance due to the importance of being perceived as cooperative and the exception to reciprocate are congruent and salient.

Hypothesis VIIa: For individuals who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from the researcher, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted the researcher will be greater than they actually trusted the researcher.

Hypothesis VIIb: For individuals who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted their neighbor will be greater than they actually trusted the neighbor.

Hypothesis VIIc: For individuals who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted their former co-worker will be greater than they actually trusted their former co-worker.

Hypothesis VIId: For individuals who receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall from a contractor, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted the contractor will be greater than they actually trusted the contractor.

Hypothesis VIIa: The difference between how much a participant acted like they trusted the researcher and how much they actually trusted the researcher will be greater for those who received a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels than those who did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis VIIb: The difference between how much a participant acted like they trusted their neighbor and how much they actually trusted their neighbor will be greater for those who received a favor of the neighbor shoveling their driveway than those who did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis VIIc: The difference between how much a participant acted like they trusted their former co-worker and how much they actually trusted their former co-worker will be greater for those who received a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker than those who did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis VIId: The difference between how much a participant acted like they trusted a contractor and how much they actually trusted the contractor will be greater for those who received a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall from the contractor than those who did not receive a favor.

The predicted results for hypotheses VIIa to VIId and VIIa to VIId would be consistent with injunctive norms that individuals will behave in ways that are congruent with the expectations of others and not necessarily what think what is right. Dunning et al. (2014) demonstrated that individuals' behavior will display trust despite the situation not warranting that level of trust.

Method

Participants

There were 150 ‘Master’ Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) worker participants in the United States (66 female; mean age 41.5 years). MTurk workers have achieved a ‘Master’ qualification by consistently demonstrating a high degree of success in a wide range of HITs across a large number of requesters (Amazon Mechanical Turk, 2021). Participants completed the study in exchange for a small amount of money.

The statistical software G*Power version 3.1.9.7 was utilized to determine the sample size needed (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007). The power analysis conducted was run with G*Power using the statistical test analysis of “Means: Difference between two independent means (two groups)” in the program. The parameters used were Cohen’s *d* effect size of .51, alpha level equal to .05, the power level at .80, the allocation ratio was set to 1 for equal group sizes. The Cohen’s *d* effect size of .51 was derived from the data in Tangpong et al.’s (2016) study 1 that investigated ethical compromise and reciprocity. The results of the power analysis suggested a total sample size of 124 (62 per condition).

Study design

The experiment utilized a 2 (Reciprocity: favor, no favor) × 1 (Fraud request to sign someone else’s name) between-subjects design for each of four different scenarios.

Procedure

Participants were recruited via MTurk and given a link to the study hosted on Qualtrics. Participants were randomly assigned to either the favor or no favor conditions for each of the four scenarios. Each scenario started with the participants reading a vignette. Synopses of the four vignettes are below. The full vignettes can be found in Appendix E.

Scenario one synopsis- Bogus consent from/ Diet Coke & pretzels

Favor condition: A participant arrives a research lab to complete a survey study. Upon arriving they are given an unsolicited favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels by a researcher. After the survey is complete, the researcher asks the participant to sign someone else's name to a second consent form.

No favor condition: This is same as the favor condition with the exception of the Diet Coke and bag of pretzels not being given to the participant.

Scenario two synopsis- Neighbor's community service form/ snow shoveling

Favor condition: A participant returns home from work to find their neighbor finding shoveling their driveway after it had snowed. Later, when the participant is taking out their trash, they see their neighbor who asks if the participant would sign a form stating they have completed community service hours that they had not completed.

No favor condition: This is same as the favor condition with the exception that the neighbor does not shovel the participants driveway.

Scenario three synopsis- Sending referrals to former co-worker/ free meal

Favor condition: A participant meets a former co-worker for dinner. The former co-worker pays for the entire meal. After the bill is paid, the former co-worker asks if the participant would send referrals to them even though it is against company policy.

No favor condition: This is same as the favor condition with the exception that the bill for the meal is split between the participant and former co-worker.

Scenario four synopsis- Providing price for contractor to win bid/ free brick work

Favor condition: A participant comes home to find a contractor fixing their brick retaining wall. When the participant tells the contractor they didn't order the work, the contractor says they were doing something at the neighbors and decided to fix the wall free of charge. Later, the contractor asks the participant if they can give them the price they need to be at in order to win the roofing project for the condo association.

No favor condition: This is same as the favor condition with the exception that the contractor does not fix the brick retaining wall.

After participants read their assigned vignette, they will be asked to answer survey questions about their likelihood to comply with the requests, consideration of negative consequences they could face, attitude towards the requester, ethical obligations, etc. (Appendix F).

Results

Hypothesis Ia: Participants who received a favor of a can of Diet Coke and bag of pretzels will be more likely to sign someone else's name to the second consent form, more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare compliance in signing someone else's name to a consent form in favor and no favor conditions. The results did not support Hypothesis Ia. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 5.40$, $SD = 1.86$, $n = 75$) and no favor ($M = 5.56$, $SD = 1.84$, $n = 75$) conditions; $t(148) = 0.53$, $p = .30$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for the likelihood a participant would comply with the request in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 8.

Hypothesis Ib: Participants who received a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will be more likely to sign the community service hours form, more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare compliance in signing a form that stated your neighbor completed community service hours, even though they had not, in favor and no favor conditions. The results did not support Hypothesis Ib. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 5.01$, $SD = 1.95$, $n = 75$) and no favor ($M = 5.32$, $SD = 1.91$, $n = 75$) conditions; $t(148) = 0.80$, $p = .21$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for the likelihood a participant would comply with the request in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 8.

Hypothesis Ic: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will be more likely to agree to send referrals to them more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare compliance in agreeing to send referrals to a former co-worker, even though it is against company policy, in favor and no favor conditions. The results did not support Hypothesis Ic. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 4.33$, $SD = 2.03$, $n = 75$) and no favor ($M = 4.72$, $SD = 1.77$, $n = 75$) conditions; $t(148) = 1.24$, $p = .11$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for the likelihood a participant would comply with the request in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 8.


Hypothesis Id: Participants who received a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall, will be more likely to give the contractor a price for the association's roof project, more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare compliance in agreeing to give the contractor the price necessary to win the association's roof project, in favor and no favor conditions. The results supported Hypothesis Id. There was a significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 3.66, SD = 1.95, n = 75$) and no favor ($M = 4.51, SD = 1.73, n = 75$) conditions; $t(148) = 2.78, p = .003$ (one-tailed). These results suggest that an unsolicited favor will impact the likelihood someone would comply with an unethical request by the favor giver. Specifically, a contractor's unsolicited favor of fixing a small retaining wall made it more likely a participant would give the contractor the price they needed to quote, in order to get the larger roofing project.

The mean scores for the likelihood a participant would comply with the request in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 8.

Figure 8

Means for Likelihood to Comply with Request in Favor and No Favor Conditions



Note. * $p < .01$ (one-tailed)

Hypothesis IIa: Participants who received a favor of a can of Diet Coke and bag of pretzels will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face by signing someone else's name than participants who did not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the likelihood to consider the negative consequences in complying with a request to sign someone else's name to a consent form, in favor and no favor conditions. The results did not support Hypothesis IIa. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 3.04$, $SD = 2.15$, $n = 75$) and no favor ($M = 3.32$, $SD = 2.01$, $n = 75$) conditions; $t(148) = 0.82$, $p = .21$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face if they complied with the request, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 9.

Hypothesis IIb: Participants who received a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face by signing the community service hours form than participants who did not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the likelihood to consider the negative consequences in complying with a request to sign a form that stated your neighbor completed community service hours, even though they had not, in favor and no favor conditions. The results did not support Hypothesis IIb. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 3.88$, $SD = 2.11$, $n = 75$) and no favor ($M = 3.68$, $SD = 2.01$, $n = 75$) conditions; $t(148) = 0.59$, $p = .21$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face if they complied with the request, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 9.

Hypothesis IIc: Participants who received a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face by agreeing to send referrals to them than participants who did not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the likelihood to consider the negative consequences in complying with a request to send referrals to a former co-worker, even though it was against company policy, in favor and no favor conditions. The results did not support Hypothesis IIc. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 3.72$, $SD = 2.08$, $n = 75$) and no favor ($M = 3.48$, $SD = 2.13$, $n = 75$) conditions; $t(148) = 0.70$, $p = .24$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face if they complied with the request, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 9.


Hypothesis II*d*: Participants who received a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face by giving the contractor a price for the association’s roof project than participants who did not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the likelihood to consider the negative consequences in complying with a request to give a contractor the price they needed to be at to win a roofing project for the association, in favor and no favor conditions. The results did not support Hypothesis II*d*. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 4.39, SD = 1.95, n = 75$) and no favor ($M = 4.40, SD = 1.82, n = 75$) conditions; $t(148) = 0.04, p = .48$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face if they complied with the request, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 9.

Figure 9

Means for Consideration of Negative Consequences in Favor and No Favor Conditions



Hypothesis IIIa: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and who receive a favor of a can of Diet Coke and bag of pretzels will be more likely to sign someone else's name to the second consent form than participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and did not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who feel an obligation to give back to others who have given to them to compare the likelihood to comply with a request to sign someone else's name to a consent form, in favor and no favor conditions. Participants indicated how much they agree that they have an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them on a scale of 1-agree strongly to 7-disagree strongly. Participants were considered to feel an ethical obligation to give back to others

if they answered the question with 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this analysis. The results did not support Hypothesis IIIa. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 4.45$, $SD = 2.18$, $n = 22$) and no favor ($M = 5.33$, $SD = 2.00$, $n = 27$) conditions; $t(47) = 1.47$, $p = .07$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel an ethical obligation to give back to others who have given to them, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 10.

Hypothesis IIIb: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will be more likely to sign the community service hours form than participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and did not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who feel an obligation to give back to others who have given to them to compare the likelihood to comply with a request to sign a neighbor's community service hours form, in favor and no favor conditions. Participants indicated how much they agree that they have an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them on a scale of 1-agree strongly to 7-disagree strongly. Participants were considered to feel an ethical obligation to give back to others if they answered the question with 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this analysis. The results did not support Hypothesis IIIb. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 4.69$, $SD = 2.05$, $n = 26$) and no favor ($M = 5.09$, $SD = 2.13$, $n = 23$) conditions; $t(47) = 0.66$, $p = .26$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel an ethical obligation to give back to others who have given to them, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 10.

Hypothesis IIIc: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will be more likely to agree to send referrals to them than participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and did not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who feel an obligation to give back to others who have given to them to compare the likelihood to comply with a request to send referrals to a former co-worker, in favor and no favor conditions.

Participants indicated how much they agree that they have an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them on a scale of 1-agree strongly to 7-disagree strongly. Participants were considered to feel an ethical obligation to give back to others if they answered the question with 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this analysis. The results did not support Hypothesis IIIc. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 4.11$, $SD = 1.89$, $n = 27$) and no favor ($M = 4.14$, $SD = 1.98$, $n = 22$) conditions; $t(47) = 0.05$, $p = .48$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel an ethical obligation to give back to others who have given to them, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 10.

Hypothesis IIIId: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and who received a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall will be more likely give the contractor a price for the association's roof project than participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and did not receive a favor.


An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who feel an obligation to give back to others who have given to them to compare the likelihood to comply with a request to give a contractor the price they needed to be at to win the condo association's roofing project, in favor and no favor conditions. Participants indicated how much they

agree that they have an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them on a scale of 1-agree strongly to 7-disagree strongly. Participants were considered to feel an ethical obligation to give back to others if they answered the question with 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this analysis. The results did not support Hypothesis IIIId. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 3.94$, $SD = 2.06$, $n = 33$) and no favor ($M = 4.38$, $SD = 1.59$, $n = 16$) conditions; $t(47) = 0.74$, $p = .23$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel an ethical obligation to give back to others who have given to them, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 10.

Figure 10

Means for Likelihood to Comply in Favor and No Favor Conditions for Those Who Feel an Ethical Obligation to Give Back to Others Who Have Given to Them



Hypothesis IVa: Participants who rate signing someone else's name to the second consent form as unethical and receive a favor of a diet coke and bag of pretzels will be more likely to sign someone else's name to the second consent form than participants who rate signing someone else's name to the second consent form as unethical and do not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who rate signing someone else's name to a consent form as unethical to compare the likelihood to comply with a request to sign someone else's name to a consent form, in favor and no favor conditions. Participants indicated how ethical it is to comply with the request on a scale of 1-totally unethical to 7- perfectly ethical. Participants were considered to rate compliance with the request as unethical if they answered the question with a 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this analysis. The results did not support Hypothesis IVa. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 5.65, SD = 1.93, n = 61$) and no favor ($M = 5.84, SD = 1.85, n = 61$) conditions; $t(116) = 0.54, p = .30$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel the requested act is unethical, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 11.

Hypothesis IVb: Participants who rate signing a community service hours form for their neighbor, even though the neighbor did not complete the hours, as unethical and receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will be more likely to sign the community service hours form than participants who rate signing the form as unethical and do not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who rate signing a community service hours form for their neighbor as unethical, even though the neighbor did not complete the hours, to compare the likelihood to comply with the request to sign the community service hours form, in favor and no favor conditions. Participants indicated how ethical it is to comply with the request on a scale of 1-totally unethical to

7- perfectly ethical. Participants were considered to rate compliance with the request as unethical if they answered the question with a 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this analysis. The results did not support Hypothesis IVb. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 5.85, SD = 1.45, n = 54$) and no favor ($M = 5.96, SD = 1.67, n = 52$) conditions; $t(104) = 0.36, p = 0.36$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel the requested act is unethical, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 11.

Hypothesis IVc: Participants who rate sending referrals to a former co-worker, even though it is against company policy, as unethical and receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will be more likely to send referrals to their former co-worker than participants who rate sending referrals to the former co-worker as unethical and do not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who rate sending referrals to a former co-worker, even though it is against company policy, as unethical, to compare the likelihood to comply with the request to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker, in favor and no favor conditions. Participants indicated how ethical it is to comply with the request on a scale of 1-totally unethical to 7- perfectly ethical. Participants were considered to rate compliance with the request as unethical if they answered the question with a 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this analysis. The results did not support Hypothesis IVc. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 5.41, SD = 1.86, n = 32$) and no favor ($M = 5.79, SD = 1.40, n = 38$) conditions; $t(68) = 0.98, p = .16$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel the requested act is unethical, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 11.


Hypothesis IVd: Participants who rate giving a contractor the price necessary to win the bid for the association's roof project as unethical and receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall will be more likely to give the price to the contractor than participants who giving the price to the contractor as unethical and do not receive a favor.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who rate giving a contractor the price necessary to win the bid for the association's roof project as unethical, to compare the likelihood to comply with the request to give the contractor the price, in favor and no favor conditions. Participants indicated how ethical it is to comply with the request on a scale of 1-totally unethical to 7- perfectly ethical. Participants were considered to rate compliance with the request as unethical if they answered the question with a 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this analysis. The results did not support Hypothesis IVd. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor ($M = 5.10$, $SD = 1.80$, $n = 20$) and no favor ($M = 5.48$, $SD = 1.58$, $n = 27$) conditions; $t(45) = 0.77$, $p = 0.22$ (one-tailed).

The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel the requested act is unethical, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 11.

Figure 11

Means for Likelihood to Comply in Favor and No Favor Conditions for Those Who Feel it is Unethical to Comply with Request



Hypothesis Va: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the researcher as cooperative, the more likely it will be they will comply with a request to sign someone else's name to the second consent form.

A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher predicted the likelihood a participant would comply with a request to sign someone else's name to a consent form. The importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were recoded to 1 being extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of interpretation, and likelihood to comply was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not comply. The results of the regression indicated that the model explained 15.7% of the variance and that the model was significant, $F(1,148)= 27.52, p < .001$.

The results supported Hypothesis Va. The model found that importance to be perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request to sign someone else's name to a consent form. ($\beta = 0.38, p < .001$) The final predictive model was: $\beta = 3.84 + (0.38 * \text{importance to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher})$

Hypothesis Vb: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by their neighbor as cooperative, the more likely they will be to comply with the request to sign their community service hours form, even though the neighbor did not complete the hours.

A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as cooperative by a participant's neighbor predicted the likelihood a participant would comply with a request to sign their community service hours form, even though the neighbor did not complete the hours. The importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were recoded to 1 being extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of interpretation, and likelihood to comply was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not comply. The results of the regression indicated that the model explained 32.5% of the variance and that the model was significant, $F(1,148) = 71.13, p < .001$.

The results supported Hypothesis Vb. The model found that importance to be perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form. ($\beta = 0.59, p < .001$) The final predictive model was: $\beta = 2.76 + (0.59 * \text{importance to be perceived as cooperative by the neighbor})$.

Hypothesis Vc: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by their former co-worker as cooperative, the more likely they will be to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker, even though it is against company policy.

A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as cooperative by a former co-worker predicted the likelihood that a participant would comply with a request to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker, even though it is against company policy. The importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were recoded to 1 being extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of interpretation, and likelihood to comply was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not comply. The results of the regression indicated that the model explained 24.9% of the variance and that the model was significant, $F(1,148)= 49.02, p < .001$.

The results supported Hypothesis Vc. The model found that importance to be perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request to send referrals to the former co-worker. ($\beta = 0.59, p < .001$) The final predictive model was: $\beta = 2.33 + (0.59 * \text{importance to be perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker})$.

Hypothesis Vd: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the contractor as cooperative, the more likely they will give the contractor the price necessary to win the bid for the association's roof project.

A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor predicted the likelihood a participant would comply with a request to give the contractor the price necessary to win the bid for the association's roof project. The importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were recoded to 1 being extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of interpretation, and likelihood to comply was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not comply. The results of the regression indicated that the model explained 6.7% of the variance and that the model was significant, $F(1,148)= 10.63, p = .001$.

The results supported Hypothesis Vd. The model found that importance to be perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request give the contractor the price necessary to win the bid for the association's roof project. ($\beta = 0.28$, $p = .001$) The final predictive model was: $\beta = 2.92 + (0.28 * \text{importance to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor})$.

Hypothesis VIa: Participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from the researcher and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will be more likely to sign someone else's name to the second consent form than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher.

A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher predicted the likelihood a participant would comply with a request to sign someone else's name to a consent form for those who received a favor from the researcher. The importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were recoded to 1 being extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of interpretation, and likelihood to comply was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not comply. The results of the regression indicated that the model explained 10.6% of the variance and that the model was significant, $F(1,73) = 8.68$, $p = .004$.

The results supported Hypothesis VIa. The model found that importance to be perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request to sign someone else's name to a consent form, for those who received a favor. ($\beta = 0.32$, $p = .004$) The final predictive model was: $\beta = 4.14 + (0.32 * \text{importance to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher})$.

Hypothesis VIb: Participants receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will be

more likely to sign the neighbor's community service hours form than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by their neighbor.

A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as cooperative by a participant's neighbor predicted the likelihood a participant would comply with a request to sign their community service hours form, even though the neighbor did not complete the hours, for those who had received a favor from their neighbor. The importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were recoded to 1 being extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of interpretation, and likelihood to comply was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not comply. The results of the regression indicated that the model explained 29.6% of the variance and that the model was significant, $F(1,73) = 30.76, p < .001$.

The results supported Hypothesis VIb. The model found that importance to be perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request to sign the neighbor's community service hour form, for those who received a favor. ($\beta = 0.58, p < .001$) The final predictive model was: $B = 2.75 + (0.58 * \text{importance to be perceived as cooperative by the neighbor})$.

Hypothesis VIc: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will be more likely to send referrals to their former co-worker than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by their former co-worker.

A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as cooperative by a former co-worker predicted the likelihood that a participant would comply with a request to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker, even though it is against company policy, for those who received a favor from their neighbor. The

importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were recoded to 1 being extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of interpretation, and likelihood to comply was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not comply. The results of the regression indicated that the model explained 23.0% of the variance and that the model was significant, $F(1,73)= 21.78, p < .001$.

The results supported Hypothesis VIc. The model found that importance to be perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request to send referrals to the former co-worker. ($\beta = 0.60, p < .001$) The final predictive model was: $\beta = 2.18 + (0.60* \text{importance to be perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker})$.

Hypothesis VIId: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will be more likely to give the price to the contractor than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor.

A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor predicted the likelihood a participant would comply with a request to give the contractor the price necessary to win the bid for the association's roof project. The importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were recoded to 1 being extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of interpretation, and likelihood to comply was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not comply. The results of the regression indicated that the model explained 3.1% of the variance although the model was not significant, $F(1,73)= 2.36, p = .13$.

The results did not support Hypothesis VIId. It was found that importance to be perceived as cooperative did not significantly predict compliance with the request give the contractor the price necessary to win the bid for the association's roof project. ($\beta =$

0.20, $p = .13$) The final non predictive model was: $\beta = 2.87 + (0.20 * \text{importance to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor})$.

Hypothesis VIIa: For individuals who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from the researcher, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted the researcher will be greater than they actually trusted the researcher.

A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare how much participants acted like they trusted the researcher to how much they actually trusted the researcher, for those who received a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from the researcher.

The results supported Hypothesis VIIa. There was a significant difference in the scores for how much participants acted like they trusted the researcher ($M = 4.57$, $SD = 1.58$, $n = 75$) and how much they actually trusted the researcher ($M = 3.53$, $SD = 1.94$, $n = 75$) conditions; $t(74) = 5.36$, $p < .001$ (one-tailed). These results suggest that participants who receive a favor from the researcher will act as if they trust the researcher more than they actually do.

The mean scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the requester and how much they actually trusted the requester, for participants who received a favor, in each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 12.

Hypothesis VIIb: For individuals who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted their neighbor will be greater than they actually trusted the neighbor.

A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare how much participants acted like they trusted their neighbor to how much they actually trusted their neighbor, for those who received a favor of their driveway being shoveled by their neighbor.

The results supported Hypothesis VIIb. There was a significant difference in the scores for how much participants acted like they trusted their neighbor ($M = 4.31$, $SD =$

1.64, $n = 75$) and how much they actually trusted the researcher ($M = 3.69$, $SD = 1.74$, $n = 75$) conditions; $t(74) = 3.32$, $p < .001$ (one-tailed). These results suggest that participants who receive the favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will act as if they trust their neighbor more than they actually do.

The mean scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the requester and how much they actually trusted the requester, for participants who received a favor, in each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 12.

Hypothesis VIIc: For individuals who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted their former co-worker will be greater than they actually trusted their former co-worker.

A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare how much participants acted like they trusted their former co-worker to how much they actually trusted their former co-worker, for those who received a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker.

The results supported Hypothesis VIIc. There was a significant difference in the scores for how much participants acted like they trusted their former co-worker ($M = 4.84$, $SD = 1.58$, $n = 75$) and how much they actually trusted the researcher ($M = 4.36$, $SD = 1.81$, $n = 75$) conditions; $t(74) = 2.93$, $p = .002$ (one-tailed). These results suggest that participants who receive the favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will act as if they trust their neighbor more than they actually do.

The mean scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the requester and how much they actually trusted the requester, for participants who received a favor, in each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 12

Hypothesis VIIId: For individuals who receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall from a contractor, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted the contractor will be greater than they actually trusted the contractor.


A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare how much participants acted like they trusted a contractor to how much they actually trusted a contractor, for those who received a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall from the contractor.

The results supported Hypothesis VIIId. There was a significant difference in the scores for how much participants acted like they trusted the contractor ($M = 4.48$, $SD = 1.49$, $n = 75$) and how much they actually trusted the contractor ($M = 4.20$, $SD = 1.64$, $n = 75$) conditions; $t(74) = 1.81$, $p = .04$ (one-tailed). These results suggest that participants who receive the favor of free work on their brick retaining wall from the contractor will act as if they trust the contractor more than they actually do

The mean scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the requester and how much they actually trusted the requester, for participants who received a favor, in each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 12.

Figure 12

Means for How Much How Much Participants Acted Like They Trusted Requester vs. How Much the Actually Trusted the Requester for Those Who Received a Favor



Note. * = $p < .001$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .05$ (one tailed)

Hypothesis VIIIa: The difference between how much a participant acted like they trusted the researcher and how much they actually trusted the researcher will be greater for those who received a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels than those who did not receive a favor.

An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the difference between how much participants acted like they trusted the researcher and how much they actually trusted the researcher, for those who received a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from the researcher and those who did not receive a favor. The difference score was calculated by subtracting the score for how much a participant trusted the researcher from how much they actually trusted the researcher.

The results did not support Hypothesis VIIIa. There was no significant effect between the favor and no favor condition, $t(148) = -0.83, p = .20$ (one tailed), despite the favor condition ($M = 1.04, SD = 1.68, n = 75$) having a larger difference between how much they acted like they trusted the researcher and how much they actually trusted the researcher than the no favor condition ($M = 0.83, SD = 1.45, n = 75$).

The mean change scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the requester less how much they actually trusted the requester, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 13.

Hypothesis VIIIb: The difference between how much a participant acted like they trusted their neighbor and how much they actually trusted their neighbor will be greater for those who received a favor of the neighbor shoveling their driveway than those who did not receive a favor.

An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the difference between how much participants acted like they trusted their neighbor and how much they actually trusted their neighbor, for those who received a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway and those who did not receive a favor. The difference score was calculated by subtracting the score for how much a participant trusted their neighbor from how much they actually trusted the neighbor.

The results did not support Hypothesis VIIIb. There was no significant effect between the favor and no favor condition, $t(148) = -0.70, p = .24$ (one tailed), despite the favor condition ($M = 0.61, SD = 1.60, n = 75$) having a larger difference between how much they acted like they trusted their neighbor and how much they actually trusted their neighbor than the no favor condition ($M = 0.44, SD = 1.43, n = 75$).

The mean change scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the requester less how much they actually trusted the requester, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 13.

Hypothesis VIIIc: The difference between how much a participant acted like they trusted their former co-worker and how much they actually trusted their former co-worker will be greater for those who received a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker than those who did not receive a favor.

An independent t-test was conducted to compare the difference between how much participants acted like they trusted their former co-worker and how much they actually trusted their former co-worker, for those who received a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker and those who did not receive a favor. The difference score was calculated by subtracting the score for how much a participant trusted their former co-worker from how much they actually trusted their former co-worker.

The results did not support Hypothesis VIIIc. There was no significant effect between the favor and no favor condition, $t(148) = 0.43, p = .33$ (one tailed). The favor condition ($M = 0.48, SD = 1.42, n = 75$) had a smaller difference between how much they acted like they trusted their former co-worker and how much they actually trusted their former co-worker than the no favor condition ($M = 0.57, SD = 1.21, n = 75$).

The mean change scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the requester less how much they actually trusted the requester, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 13.

Hypothesis VIIIId: The difference between how much a participant acted like they trusted a contractor and how much they actually trusted the contractor will be greater for those who received a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall from the contractor than those who did not receive a favor.


An independent t-test was conducted to compare the difference between how much participants acted like they trusted the contractor and how much they actually trusted the contractor, for those who received a favor free work on their brick retaining wall from the contractor and those who did not receive a favor. The difference score was calculated by subtracting the score for how much a participant trusted the contractor from how much they actually trusted the contractor.

The results did not support Hypothesis VIIIId. There was no significant effect between the favor and no favor condition, $t(148) = -0.88, p = .19$ (one tailed), despite the favor condition ($M = 0.28, SD = 1.34, n = 75$) having a larger difference between how much they acted like they trusted the contractor and how much they actually trusted the contractor than the no favor condition ($M = 0.10, SD = 1.05, n = 75$).

The mean change scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the requester less how much they actually trusted the requester, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 13.

Figure 13

Means for Change Scores for How Much How Much Participants Acted Like They Trusted Requester vs. How Much the Actually Trusted the Requester



Note. Participants rated trust scores on a scale from 1- Not at all to 7- Completely

Discussion- Experiment 3

The aim of Experiment 3 was to build on Experiments 1 and 2 and investigate how ethics play a role in reciprocity and fraud. Specifically, will an original favor receiver violate a certain ethical standard, to satisfy another ethical standard of giving back to others who have given to them. Another objective was to uncover the role trust has on compliance with an unethical request and reciprocity. An additional goal of Experiment 3 was to have results that were generalizable to the general population by testing each hypothesis in a variety of different scenarios.

Hypotheses Ia – Id predicted an initial favor receiver would commit an unethical act by complying with a subsequent request more than individuals who did not receive a favor. While the pattern in each scenario was consistent with expected results, only hypothesis Id had significant results. This is an interesting finding and could be interpreted as consistent with Tangpong et al. (2016). Their study found favors significantly increased compliance with a subsequent unlawful request in a business context. Hypothesis Id was the only scenario where the participant had something to gain by complying. There could be more to gain from a long-term business relationship than the transactional type scenarios in the present experiment, where at least the first three had no payoff beyond satisfying social pressure to repay the favor by complying with an unethical request. These results suggest people will be more susceptible to the norm of reciprocity and committing an unethical act if they have something to gain by doing so. This finding should be explored in future research.

Hypotheses IIa – IIId predicted that receiving a favor would lead to less consideration of negative consequences for complying with the subsequent unethical request. The results were not significant in all four scenarios and contradict what would be expected based on injunctive norms and the obligation to repay a favor, which could result in blinding people to downstream consequences. An alternative explanation for these results would be there are two competing ethical standards, one to not commit a fraudulent/ unethical act and the other to repay a favor. The reciprocity effects were not strong enough to overcome the other ethical standard to not be a party to fraud.

Like the hypotheses Ia- Id, an interesting finding of this analysis is that the fourth scenario, in which the participant had something to gain by complying, had the lowest

levels of considering negative consequences out of the four scenarios, irrespective of favor condition.

The next two sets of Hypotheses looked at compliance rates and ethics. Hypotheses IIIa to III d predicted that of individuals who feel an ethical obligation to give back to others, those who received a favor would be more likely to comply with the unethical request. Hypotheses IVa to IV d predicted of those individuals that rated the request as unethical, compliance would be more likely for participants who received a favor. Contrary to the predictions, all the results were not significant. A possible explanation for these results could be the effects of the ethics views were much stronger and masked any reciprocity effects.

Hypotheses Va to Vd predicted the more important it is for a participant to be perceived as cooperative by the requester, the more likely it will be that they comply with the unethical request. As predicted and consistent with research on injunctive norms and the focus theory of normative conduct, the more important it is to be perceived as cooperative means the expectation to be cooperative is salient. This results in people adapting their behavior and more likely to comply with the unethical request to be perceived as cooperative. Future research should explore individual differences to test if personality characteristics such as agreeableness from Goldberg's (1992) Big Five Personality Inventory, would predict susceptibility to comply with a request to commit an unethical act after receiving a favor.

Hypotheses VIa to VI d were nearly identical to hypotheses Va to Vd with the exception only participants who received a favor were included in the analysis. The

pattern of results was generally the same except for the VIId. Again, this scenario where the participant had something to gain by complying with the unethical request had different results and was not significant. When comparing these results to those of hypotheses Id and Vd, a clearer picture emerges. It is possible the reciprocity effects are stronger in this scenario and mask the effects from the importance to be perceived as cooperative.

Hypotheses VIIa to VIId predicted that for individuals who received a favor, they would act like they trusted the requester more than they actually trusted the requester. Consistent with the hypotheses' predictions, the initial favor receiver acted like they trusted the requester more than they actually trusted them. This maps on to the focus theory of normative conduct and injunctive norms, in that there is an expectation by the requester to be trusted that is salient, individuals adjusted their behavior to align with this expectation, even though privately, they did not trust them as much as their behavior indicated. These findings are also consistent with Dunning et al (2014), who demonstrated individuals behavior indicated they trusted others more than they wanted to trust them.

While previous hypotheses saw mixed results for compliance with a request for an unethical act, the implications for Hypotheses VIIa to VIId's findings are still concerning. In a variety of different settings, the results demonstrate people will act as if they trust an individual, who makes a request for them to act unethically, more than they actually do. Future research should investigate these findings in the context of whistle blowers. In this context, an individual wouldn't be asked to participate in fraud, but only witness it.

Would the need to appear as if they trusted others make it unlikely the fraud gets reported, if the perpetrator requested the individual to keep quiet?

The final set of hypotheses were similar to Hypotheses VIIa – VIId, in that they investigated trust scores for how much participants acted like they trusted the requester to how much they actually trusted them. The sets of hypotheses differed from each other in that the final set of hypotheses' dependent variable was change scores between the reported trust levels and not the actual levels of trust. The change scores were not significantly different between the favor and no favor conditions in any of the four scenarios. This suggests that reciprocity did not increase the outward display of trust from actual trust levels. A limitation of this analysis is it does not capture if a favor increased actual levels of trust. It is possible the trust change scores were not significantly different between favor and no favor conditions, if a favor increased both the actual trust and acted like they trusted levels. Future research should run an analysis that takes this into account.




Experiment 3 faced a limitation that it was conducted entirely online due to the pandemic and social distancing requirements. The experiment asked participants to imagine they were in a scenario by reading vignettes and then answer survey questions about how they would behave. Future studies should utilize a paradigm similar to Experiments 1 and 2 where participants are actually in the scenario making real life decisions akin to a field study.

Experiment 4

Experiment 4, like experiment 3 investigated people violating an ethical standard to satisfy another ethical standard of giving back to someone who has given to you. In addition, this experiment also tested if the explicitness of the requested ethics violation impacts compliance. Injunctive norms suggest as people will behave in ways that align with others' expectations, as long as those expectations are salient (Kallgren et al., 2000). The focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990) postulates there are often competing norms that could shape behavior. This experiment tested the boundary conditions of the injunctive norm to adhere to someone's request when it is also explicit, to the requester and requestee, that the request is unethical. Does the salience of the request being unethical increase the awareness of potential downstream consequences, leading the requestee to deny the unethical request? Figure 14 is a chart that displays the types of models that experiment 3 attempts to support and refute.

Figure 14

Experiment 4's Hypotheses' Models of Interest

Models Supported		Models Refuted
 <p>Social Normative Decision Models</p>	 <p>Ethical Decision Making Models</p>	 <p>Normative Models</p>

Note. These are the hypotheses' predictions, not results

Statement of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1a: Participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from a researcher will comply with an unethical request to sign someone else's more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis Ib: Participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will comply with an unethical request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis Ic: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will comply with an unethical request to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis Id: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall from a contractor will comply with an unethical request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

As in the previous experiments, this hypothesis was based on the norm of reciprocity that people feel an obligation to repay a favor to those that provided a favor to them (Gouldner, 1960).

Hypothesis IIa: Participants will comply with the request to sign someone else's name to a consent form when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than when the request is explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis IIb: Participants will comply with the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than when the request is explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis IIc: Participants will comply with the request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than when the request is explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis IId: Participants will comply with the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project, when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than when the request is explicitly stated as unethical.

If the predicted results are observed the focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990) and would be supported. These results would also be consistent with Butterfield et al. (2000) in that the use of moral language will influence people to act in ethical ways by triggering a moral schema. When the requester explicitly points out the request is unethical, ethics becomes salient to the requestee, which should increase the

chances the unethical request is refused. The predicted results would establish boundary conditions for the norm of reciprocity.

Hypothesis IIIa: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and whether the request to sign someone else's name is explicitly or not explicitly stated as unethical. Specifically, participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. Stated differently, the request being explicitly stated as unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypothesis IIIb: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and whether the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form is explicitly or not explicitly stated as unethical. Specifically, participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. Stated differently, the request being explicitly stated as unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypothesis IIIc: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and whether the agree to send referrals to a former co-worker is explicitly or not explicitly stated as unethical. Specifically, participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. Stated differently, the request being explicitly stated as unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypothesis III d: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and whether the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project is explicitly or not explicitly stated as unethical. Specifically, participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. Stated differently, the request being explicitly stated as unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

The predicted interaction effect between reciprocity and the how explicit the unethical request is, is consistent with the focus theory of normative conduct and moral awareness. Prior research on injunctive norms (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; Kallgren et al., 2000) and moral awareness (Butterfield et al., 2000) would suggest that a request that unethically salient will mitigate the effect of the receiving a favor on compliance.

Hypothesis IVa: Participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from a researcher will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face for signing someone else's name to a consent form than participants who did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IVb: Participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will be consider the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form less than participants who did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IVc: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will be consider the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker less than participants who did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IVd: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall from a contractor will consider the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project less than participants who did not receive a favor.

Like experiment three, the predicted results that a favor will make it less likely to consider downstream negative consequences would support the focus theory of normative conduct. There would be competing norms and the salient norm to reciprocate will influence a person to participate in fraud. If the favor does not influence participants to consider negative consequences of committing fraud, a normative rational decision theory such as expected utility theory would be supported.

Hypothesis Va: Participants who are asked to comply with the explicit unethical request to sign someone else's name to a consent form will be more likely to consider the negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked to agree to a non-explicit unethical request.

Hypothesis Vb: Participants who are asked to comply with the explicit unethical request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form will be more likely to consider the negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked to agree to a non-explicit unethical request.

Hypothesis Vc: Participants who are asked to comply with the explicit unethical request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker will be more likely to consider the negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked to agree to a non-explicit unethical request.

Hypothesis Vd: Participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo

association's roofing project will be more likely to consider the negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked to agree to a non-explicit unethical request.

The predicted results are consistent with Butterfield et al. (2010) in that the use of moral language will influence people to act in ethical ways by triggering a moral schema.

Hypothesis VIa: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and the explicitness of the unethical act that is requested. Specifically, participants will consider the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to sign someone else's name to a consent form less when they receive a favor, and the request is not explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypothesis VIb: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and the explicitness of the unethical act that is requested. Specifically, participants will consider the negative consequence they could face for complying with the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form less when they receive a favor, and the request is not explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypothesis VIc: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and the explicitness of the unethical act that is requested. Specifically, participants will consider the negative consequence they could face for complying with the request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker less when they receive a favor, and the request is not explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypothesis VIId: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and the explicitness of the unethical act that is requested. Specifically, participants will consider the negative consequence they could face for complying with the request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker less when they receive a favor, and the request is not explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypothesis VIIa: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher for participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from the researcher than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis VIIb: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by a neighbor for participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis VIIc: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by a former co-worker for participants who receive a favor of a free meal from the former co-worker than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis VIIId: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor for participants who receive a favor of the contractor fixing the participants brick retaining wall for free than participants who do not receive a favor.

The predicted results would support the focus theory of normative conduct and the norm of reciprocity. The norm of reciprocity says you must give back to those that have given to you. When someone does a favor, the giver can be viewed as being cooperative. There is expectation the receiver be cooperative in return.

Hypothesis VIIIa: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to sign someone else's name to a consent form than participants who are asked to agree to the same unethical request that is not explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis VIIIb: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form to than participants who are asked to agree to the same unethical request that is not explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis VIIIc: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to send referrals to the former co-worker than participants who are asked to agree to the same unethical request that is not explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis VIIIId: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project than participants who are asked to agree to the same unethical request that is not explicitly stated as unethical.

The predicted results are consistent with Butterfield et al. (2010) in that the use of moral language will influence people to act in ethical ways by triggering a moral schema. The salience of the request being unethical will moderate the norm of reciprocity and the desire to be perceived as cooperative by fulfilling the request.

Hypothesis IXa: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of receiving a can of Diet Coke and bag of pretzels and how explicit the unethical act is that is requested. Specifically, participants will find it less important to be perceived as cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor in the importance of being perceived as cooperative.

Hypothesis IXb: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of the neighbor shoveling the participant's driveway and how explicit the unethical act is that is requested. Specifically, participants will find it less important to be perceived as cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor in the importance of being perceived as cooperative.

Hypothesis IXc: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of the former co-worker buying dinner for the participant and how explicit the unethical act is that is requested. Specifically, participants will find it less important to be perceived as cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor in the importance of being perceived as cooperative.

Hypothesis IXd: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of the contractor fixing the participants brick retaining wall for free and how explicit the unethical act is that is requested. Specifically, participants will find it less important to be perceived as cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor in the importance of being perceived as cooperative.

Method

Participants

There were 308 'Master' Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) worker participants in the United States (141 female; mean age 39.3 years). MTurk workers have achieved a 'Master' qualification by consistently demonstrating a high degree of success in a wide range of HITs across a large number of requesters (Amazon Mechanical Turk, 2021). Participants completed the study in exchange for a small amount of money.

The statistical software G*Power version 3.1.9.7 was utilized to determine the sample size needed (Faul et al., 2007). The power analysis conducted was run with G*Power using the statistical test analysis of “ANOVA: Fixed effects, special, main effects and interactions” in the program. The parameters used were Cohen’s *f* effect size of .17, alpha level equal to .05, the power level at .80, the numerator df was set to 1 and the number of groups was 2. The Cohen’s *f* effect size of .17 was derived from the data in Tangpong et al.’s (2016) study 2, that investigated ethical compromise and reciprocity. The results of the power analysis suggested a total sample size of 280.

Study design

The experiment utilized a 2 (Reciprocity: favor, no favor) × 2 (Explicitness of unethical request: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects design for each of four different scenarios.

Procedure

Participants were recruited via MTurk and given a link to the study hosted on Qualtrics. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: favor/ explicitly unethical, favor/ not explicitly unethical, no favor/ explicitly unethical or no favor/ not explicitly unethical, for each of the four different scenarios. Each scenario started with the participants reading a vignette. Synopses of the four vignettes are below. The full vignettes can be found in Appendix G.

Scenario one synopsis- Bogus consent from/ Diet Coke & pretzels

Favor/ explicitly unethical condition: A participant arrives a research lab to complete a survey study. Upon arriving they are given an unsolicited favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels by a researcher. After the survey is complete, the researcher says they know this is wrong, but would the participant sign someone else's name to a second consent form.

Favor/ not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ explicitly unethical condition with the exception the researcher does not say "I know this is wrong."

No favor / explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ explicitly unethical condition with the exception the participant does not receive a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels.

No favor / not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ explicitly unethical condition with the exceptions the participant does not receive a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels and the researcher does not say, "I know this is wrong."

Scenario two synopsis- Neighbor's community service form/ snow shoveling

Favor/ explicitly unethical condition: A participant returns home from work to find their neighbor shoveling their driveway after it had snowed. Later, when the participant is taking out their trash, they see their neighbor who asks if the participant would sign a form stating they have completed community service hours, adding even though they have not done the community service.

Favor/ not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ explicitly unethical condition with the exception the neighbor does not say, "even though I haven't", regarding the community service.

No favor / explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ explicitly unethical condition with the exception the neighbor does not shovel the participants driveway

No favor / not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ explicitly unethical condition with the exceptions the neighbor does not shovel the participant's driveway and the neighbor does not say, "even though I haven't", regarding the community service.

Scenario three synopsis- Sending referrals to former co-worker/ free meal

Favor/ explicitly unethical condition: A participant meets a former co-worker for dinner. The former co-worker pays for the entire expensive meal. After the bill is paid, the former co-worker says, "I know it is against company policy, but any potential customers you can send my way would be much appreciated."

Favor/ not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ explicitly unethical condition with the exception the former co-worker does not say, "I know it's against company policy", regarding sending referrals to them.

No favor / explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ explicitly unethical condition with the exception that the cost of the expensive meal is split between the participant and the former co-worker.

No favor / not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ explicitly unethical condition with the exceptions the former co-worker does not say, "I know it's against company policy" and the cost of the expensive meal is split between the participant and the former co-worker.

Scenario four synopsis- Providing price for contractor to win bid/ free brick work

Favor/ explicitly unethical condition: A participant comes home to find a contractor fixing their brick retaining wall. When the participant tells the contractor, they didn't order the work, the contractor says they were doing something at the neighbor's and decided to fix the wall free of charge. Later, the contractor inquires about the condo association pending roof project and says, "It's probably illegal for you to tell me but, where does my price need to be in order to get the business?"

Favor/ not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ explicitly unethical condition with the exception the contractor does not say, "It's probably illegal for you to tell me", regarding the price needed to win the association's roofing project business.

No favor / explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ explicitly unethical condition with the exception that the contractor did not fix the participant's brick retaining wall.

No favor / not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ explicitly unethical condition with the exceptions that the contractor did not fix the participant's brick retaining wall and the contractor does not say, "It's probably illegal for you to tell me", regarding the price needed to win the association's roofing project business.

After participants read each of their randomly assigned four vignettes, they answered survey questions about their likelihood to comply with the requests, consideration of negative consequences they could face, importance to be perceived as cooperative, etc. (Appendix H).

Results

Hypothesis Ia: Participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from a researcher will comply with an unethical request to sign someone else's more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IIa: Participants will comply with the request to sign someone else's name to a consent form when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than when the request is explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis IIIa: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and whether the request to sign someone else's name is explicitly or not explicitly stated as unethical. Specifically, participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. Stated differently, the request being explicitly stated as unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypotheses Ia, IIa and IIIa were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no favor) \times 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) for likelihood to comply with the request to sign someone else's name to a consent form (1 definitely comply – 7 definitely not comply). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 17. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 18. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis Ia, the analysis did not yield a significant main effect for likelihood to comply with the request to sign someone else's name to the consent form in the favor condition ($M = 5.59, SD = 1.75$) than in no favor condition ($M = 5.86, SD = 1.80$), $F(1,304) = 1.79, p = .18$.

The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly stated as unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis IIa. The likelihood to comply with the request to sign someone else's name to the consent form in explicit condition ($M = 5.72, SD = 1.75$) was not significantly different than the likelihood to comply with the request in the not explicit condition ($M = 5.73, SD = 1.81$), $F(1,304) = 0.003, p = .96$.

Hypothesis IIIa predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request. More specifically participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. The same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request to sign someone else's name to a consent form $F(1,304) = 0.88$ $p = .35$. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor in likelihood to comply with the request.

The means for likelihood of compliance by condition, for all four scenarios, are presented as a graph in Figure 15.

Table 17

Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Bogus Consent Form

Dependent variable	Favor Condition		No Favor Condition	
	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=76)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=78)
Likelihood to comply with request	5.49	5.69	5.95	5.77
(Standard deviation)	(1.74)	(1.76)	(1.73)	(1.87)

Note. Compliance scores: 1- Definitely comply to 7- Definitely not comply

Table 18

Analysis of Variance for Likelihood to Sign Bogus Consent Form by Favor and Explicit Conditions

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>
Favor Condition	5.66	1	5.66	1.79
Explicit	0.01	1	0.01	0.003
Favor Condition *				
Explicit	2.78	1	2.78	0.88
Error	961.15	304	3.16	

Hypothesis Ib: Participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will comply with an unethical request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IIb: Participants will comply with the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than when the request is explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis IIIb: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and whether the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form is explicitly or not explicitly stated as unethical. Specifically, participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. Stated differently, the request being explicitly stated as unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypotheses Ib, IIb and IIIb were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no favor) \times 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) for likelihood to comply with a request to sign your neighbor's community service hours form (1 definitely comply – 7 definitely not comply). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 19. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 20. As predicted in Hypothesis Ib, the analysis yielded the main effect for likelihood to comply with the request to sign the neighbor's form in the favor condition ($M = 4.61$, $SD = 1.94$) than in no favor condition ($M = 5.29$, $SD = 1.79$), $F(1,304) = 10.26$ $p = .002$.

The analysis found no main effect for if the request was explicitly stated as unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis IIb. The likelihood to comply with the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form in explicit condition ($M = 4.99, SD = 1.87$) was not significantly different than the likelihood to comply with the request in the not explicit condition ($M = 4.91, SD = 1.93$), $F(1,304) = 0.14, p = .71$.

Hypothesis IIIb predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request. More specifically participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. The same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form $F(1,304) = 0.78, p = 0.38$. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly reduce the effect from receiving a favor in likelihood to comply with the request.

The means for likelihood of compliance by condition, for all four scenarios, are presented as a graph in Figure 15.

Table 19*Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Neighbor's Form*

Dependent variable	Favor Condition		No Favor Condition	
	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=76)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=78)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)
Likelihood to comply with request	4.55	4.66	5.42	5.16
(Standard deviation)	(1.94)	(1.95)	(1.70)	(1.88)

Note. Compliance scores: 1- Definitely comply to 7- Definitely not comply

Table 20*Analysis of Variance for Likelihood to Sign Neighbor's Form by Favor and Explicit Conditions*

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Favor Condition	35.81	1	35.81	10.26*
Explicit	0.48	1	0.48	0.14
Favor Condition * Explicit	2.74	1	2.74	0.78
Error	1061.18	304	3.49	

Note. * = $p = .002$

Hypothesis Ic: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will comply with an unethical request to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IIc: Participants will comply with the request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than when the request is explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis IIIc: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and whether the agree to send referrals to a former co-worker is explicitly or not explicitly stated as unethical. Specifically, participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. Stated differently, the request being explicitly stated as unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypotheses Ic, IIc and IIIc were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no favor) \times 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) for likelihood to comply with the request of sending referrals to a former co-worker (1 definitely comply – 7 definitely not comply). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 21. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 22. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis Ic, the analysis did not yield a significant main effect for likelihood to comply with the request to send referrals to your former co-worker in the favor condition ($M = 4.86$, $SD = 1.71$) than in no favor condition ($M = 5.07$, $SD = 1.76$), $F(1,304) = 1.18$ $p = .28$.

The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly stated as unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis IIc. The likelihood to comply with the request to send referrals to a former co-worker in explicit condition ($M = 4.97$, $SD = 1.76$) was not significantly different than the likelihood to comply with the request in the not explicit condition ($M = 4.95$, $SD = 1.72$), $F(1,304) = 0.01$ $p = .92$.

Hypothesis IIIc predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request. More specifically participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. The same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request to send referrals to a former co-worker $F(1,304) = 0.15$ $p = .82$. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor in likelihood to comply with the request.

The means for likelihood of compliance by condition, for all four scenarios, are presented as a graph in Figure 15.

Table 21

Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Former Co-Worker

Dependent variable	Favor Condition		No Favor Condition	
	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=76)	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=78)
Likelihood to comply with request	4.84	4.87	5.10	5.04
(Standard deviation)	(1.79)	(1.63)	(1.72)	(1.81)

Note. Compliance scores: 1- Definitely comply to 7- Definitely not comply

Table 22

Analysis of Variance for Likelihood to Send Co-Worker Referrals by Favor and Explicit Conditions

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Favor Condition	3.56	1	3.56	.279
Explicit	.03	1	.03	.917
Favor Condition *				
Explicit	.16	1	.16	.821
Error	918.87	304	3.02	

Hypothesis Id: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall from a contractor will comply with an unethical request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project more often than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis IId: Participants will comply with the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project, when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than when the request is explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis IIIId: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and whether the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project is explicitly or not explicitly stated as unethical. Specifically, participants will comply with the request more often when

the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. Stated differently, the request being explicitly stated as unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypotheses Id, IId and IIId were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no favor) \times 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) for likelihood to comply with the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project (1 definitely comply – 7 definitely not comply). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 23. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 24. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis Id, the analysis did not yield a significant main effect for likelihood to comply with the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project in the favor condition ($M = 4.23$, $SD = 1.90$) than in no favor condition ($M = 4.45$, $SD = 1.86$), $F(1,304) = 1.20$ $p = .27$.

The analysis found a main effect for if the request was explicitly stated as unethical or not, as was predicted by Hypothesis IId. The likelihood to comply with the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project in the explicit condition ($M = 4.60$, $SD = 1.81$) was significantly different than the likelihood to comply with the request in the not explicit condition ($M = 4.08$, $SD = 1.87$), $F(1,304) = 5.99$ $p = .02$. The results suggest the explicitly unethical requests were less likely to be carried out by the participants than the same request that was not stated as explicitly unethical.

Hypothesis IIId predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request. More

specifically participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. The same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project $F(1,304) = 1.99$ $p = .16$. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor in likelihood to comply with the request.

The means for likelihood of compliance by condition, for all four scenarios, are presented as a graph in Figure 15.

Table 23

Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Contractor

Dependent variable	Favor Condition		No Favor Condition	
	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=76)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=78)
Likelihood to comply with request	4.34	4.12	4.87	4.05
(Standard deviation)	(1.89)	(1.91)	(1.81)	(1.83)

Note. Compliance scores: 1- Definitely comply to 7- Definitely not comply

Table 24


Analysis of Variance for Likelihood to Give Contractor Price to Win Condo Roofing Project by Favor and Explicit Conditions

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Favor Condition	4.17	1	4.17	1.204
Explicit	20.74	1	20.74	5.99*
Favor Condition *				
Explicit	6.85	1	6.85	1.979
Error	1051.65	304	3.46	

Note. * = $p = .015$

Figure 15

Means for Likelihood to Comply with Request in Each of the Four Conditions and Scenarios



Hypothesis IVa: Participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from a researcher will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face for signing someone else's name to a consent form than participants who did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis Va: Participants who are asked to comply with the explicit unethical request to sign someone else's name to a consent form will be more likely to consider the negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked to agree to a non-explicit unethical request.

Hypothesis VIa: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and the explicitness of the unethical act that is requested. Specifically, participants will consider the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to sign someone else's name to a consent form less when they receive a favor, and the request is not explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypotheses IVa, Va and VIa were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no favor) \times 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) for how much they considered the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to sign someone else's name to a consent form (1 to great extent – 7 not at all). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 25. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 26. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis IVa, the analysis did not yield a significant main effect for how much they considered the negative consequences they could for complying with the request to sign someone else's name to the consent form in the favor condition ($M = 3.57$, $SD = 2.01$) than in no favor condition ($M = 3.48$, $SD = 2.15$), $F(1,304) = 0.15$ $p = .70$.

The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly stated as unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis Va. How much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to sign someone else's name to the consent form in explicit condition ($M = 3.36$, $SD = 2.10$) was not significantly different than how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request in the not explicit condition ($M = 3.68$, $SD = 2.12$), $F(1,304) = 1.80$ $p = .18$.

Hypothesis VIa predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request. More specifically participants will consider the negative consequences of complying with the request less when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. The same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request to sign someone else's name to a consent form $F(1,304) = 0.45$ $p = .51$. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor in how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request.

The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face if they complied with the request, for all four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 16.

Table 25

Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Bogus Consent Form

Dependent variable	Favor Condition		No Favor Condition	
	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=76)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=78)
Consideration of negative consequence	3.49	3.65	3.23	3.72
(Standard deviation)	(2.11)	(2.08)	(2.10)	(2.17)

Note. Consideration of negative consequences: 1- To great extent to 7- Not at all

Table 26

Analysis of Variance for Consideration of Negative Consequences for Signing Someone Else's Name by Favor and Explicit Conditions

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Favor Condition	0.66	1	0.66	0.146
Explicit	8.05	1	8.05	1.799
Favor Condition *				
Explicit	1.99	1	1.99	0.445
Error	1360.11	304	4.474	

Hypothesis IVb: Participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will be consider the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form less than participants who did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis Vb: Participants who are asked to comply with the explicit unethical request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form will be more likely to consider the negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked to agree to a non-explicit unethical request.

Hypothesis VIb: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and the explicitness of the unethical act that is requested. Specifically, participants will consider the negative consequence they could face for complying with the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form less when they receive a favor, and the request is not explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypotheses IVb, Vb and Vb were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no favor) \times 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) for how much they considered the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request sign the neighbor's community service hours form (1 to great extent – 7 not at all). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 27. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 28. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis IVb, the analysis did not yield a significant main effect for how much they considered the negative consequences they could for complying

with the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form in the favor condition ($M = 3.71$, $SD = 1.94$) than in no favor condition ($M = 3.72$, $SD = 2.07$), $F(1,304) = 0.005$ $p = .95$.

The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly stated as unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis Vb. How much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form in explicit condition ($M = 3.80$, $SD = 2.07$) was not significantly different than how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request in the not explicit condition ($M = 3.63$, $SD = 1.94$), $F(1,304) = 0.54$ $p = .46$.

Hypothesis VIb predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request. More specifically participants will consider the negative consequences of complying with the request less when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. The same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form $F(1,304) = 0.22$ $p = .64$. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor in how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request.

The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face if they complied with the request, for all four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 16.

Table 27

Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Neighbor's Form

Dependent variable	Favor Condition		No Favor Condition	
	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=76)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=78)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)
Consideration of negative consequence	3.74	3.68	3.86	3.58
(Standard deviation)	(1.98)	(1.92)	(2.16)	(1.97)

Note. Consideration of negative consequences: 1- To great extent to 7- Not at all

Table 28

Analysis of Variance for Consideration of Negative Consequences for Signing Neighbor's Form by Favor and Explicit Conditions

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Favor Condition	0.02	1	0.02	0.005
Explicit	2.17	1	2.17	0.538
Favor Condition * Explicit	0.87	1	0.87	0.216
Error	1227.77	304	4.04	

Hypothesis IVc: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will be consider the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker less than participants who did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis Vc: Participants who are asked to comply with the explicit unethical request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker will be more likely to consider the negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked to agree to a non-explicit unethical request.

Hypothesis VIc: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and the explicitness of the unethical act that is requested. Specifically, participants will consider the negative consequence they could face for complying with the request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker less when they receive a favor, and the request is not explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypotheses IVc, Vc and VIc were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no favor) \times 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) for how much they considered the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker (1 to great extent – 7 not at all). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 29. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 30. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis IVc, the analysis did not yield a significant main effect for how much they considered the negative consequences they could for complying with the request to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker in the favor condition ($M = 3.09$, $SD = 1.96$) than in no favor condition ($M = 3.15$, $SD = 1.96$), $F(1,304) = 0.06$ $p = .81$.

The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly stated as unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis Vc. How much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker in the explicit condition ($M = 2.96$, $SD = 1.99$) was not significantly different than how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request in the not explicit condition ($M = 3.28$, $SD = 1.92$), $F(1,304) = 2.03$ $p = .16$.

Hypothesis VIc predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request. More specifically participants will consider the negative consequences of complying with the request less when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. The same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker $F(1,304) = 0.05$ $p = .83$. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor in how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request.

The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face if they complied with the request, for all four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 16.

Table 29

Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Former Co-Worker

Dependent variable	Favor Condition		No Favor Condition	
	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=76)	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=78)
Consideration of negative consequence	2.91	3.28	3.01	3.28
(Standard deviation)	(1.94)	(1.97)	(2.01)	(1.87)

Note. Consideration of negative consequences: 1- To great extent to 7- Not at all

Table 30

Analysis of Variance for Consideration of Negative Consequences for Sending Referrals to Former Co-Worker by Favor and Explicit Conditions

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>
Favor Condition	0.23	1	0.23	0.060
Explicit	7.79	1	7.79	2.028
Favor Condition *				
Explicit	0.19	1	0.19	0.048
Error	1168.34	304	3.84	

Hypothesis IVd: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall from a contractor will consider the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project less than participants who did not receive a favor.

Hypothesis Vd: Participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project will be more likely to consider the negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked to agree to a non-explicit unethical request.

Hypothesis VI d: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and the explicitness of the unethical act that is requested. Specifically, participants will consider the negative consequence they could face for complying with the request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker less when they receive a favor, and the request is not explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.

Hypotheses IVd, Vd and VI d were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no favor) \times 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) for how much they considered the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project (1 to great extent – 7 not at all). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 31. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 32. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis

IVd, the analysis did not yield a significant main effect for how much they considered the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project in the favor condition ($M = 4.18$, $SD = 1.84$) than in no favor condition ($M = 4.26$, $SD = 1.93$), $F(1,304) = 0.15$ $p = .70$.

The analysis found a main effect for if the request was explicitly stated as unethical or not, as what was predicted by Hypothesis Vd. How much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project in the explicit condition ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 1.89$) was significantly different than how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request in the not explicit condition ($M = 4.52$, $SD = 1.84$), $F(1,304) = 8.01$ $p = .005$. The results suggest the explicitly unethical requests were less likely to be carried out by the participants than the same request that was not stated as explicitly unethical.

Hypothesis VIId predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request. More specifically participants will consider the negative consequences of complying with the request less when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. The same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request to

provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project $F(1,304) = 1.94$ $p = .17$. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor in how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request.

The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face if they complied with the request, for all four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 16.

Table 31

Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Contractor

Dependent variable	Favor Condition		No Favor Condition	
	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=76)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=78)
Consideration of negative consequence	3.73	4.62	4.11	4.41
(Standard deviation)	(1.76)	(1.81)	(2.00)	(1.86)

Note. Consideration of negative consequences: 1- To great extent to 7- Not at all

Table 32


Analysis of Variance for Consideration of Negative Consequences for Giving Price to Contractor Necessary to Win Condo Roofing Project by Favor and Explicit Conditions

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Favor Condition	0.52	1	0.52	0.151
Explicit Favor Condition *	27.77	1	27.77	8.014*
Explicit	6.73	1	6.73	1.94
Error	1053.38	304	3.47	

Note. * = $p = .005$

Figure 16

Mean Scores for Consideration of Negative Consequences a Participant Could Face if They Complied with Request in Each of the Four Conditions and Scenarios



Hypothesis VIIa: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher for participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from the researcher than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis VIIIa: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to sign someone else's name to a consent form than participants who are asked to agree to the same unethical request that is not explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis IXa: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of receiving a can of Diet Coke and bag of pretzels and how explicit the unethical act is that is requested. Specifically, participants will find it less important to be perceived as cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor in the importance of being perceived as cooperative.

Hypotheses VIIa, VIIIa and IXa were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no favor) \times 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the

researcher (1 not important – 7 very important). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 33. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 34. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis VIIa, the analysis did not yield a significant main effect for importance to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher in the favor condition ($M = 2.81, SD = 1.81$) than in no favor condition ($M = 2.46, SD = 1.76$), $F(1,304) = 3.02 p = .08$.

The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly stated as unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis VIIIa. The importance to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher in the explicit condition ($M = 2.60, SD = 1.76$) was not significantly different than importance to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher in the not explicit condition ($M = 2.66, SD = 1.82$), $F(1,304) = 0.09 p = .76$.

Hypothesis IXa predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the explicitness of the ethics violation in the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher. More specifically participants would consider the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher less when the requested act is explicitly stated as unethical, and they do not receive a favor. The same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in how important it was for the participant to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher $F(1,304) = 0.127 p = .26$. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor how important it was for the participant to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher.

The mean scores for how important it was for a participant to be perceived as cooperative by the requester, for all four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 17.

Table 33

Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Bogus Consent Form

Dependent variable	Favor Condition		No Favor Condition	
	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=76)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=78)
Importance to be perceived as cooperative	2.89	2.73	2.31	2.60
(Standard deviation)	(1.73)	(1.90)	(1.76)	(1.75)

Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important

Table 34

Analysis of Variance for Importance to be Perceived as Cooperative by the Researcher by Favor and Explicit Conditions

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>
Favor Condition	9.64	1	9.64	3.023
Explicit	0.29	1	0.29	0.092
Favor Condition *				
Explicit	4.04	1	4.04	1.268
Error	969.63	304	3.19	

Hypothesis VIIb: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by a neighbor for participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis VIIIb: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to sign the neighbor's community service hours form to than participants who are asked to agree to the same unethical request that is not explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis IXb: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of the neighbor shoveling the participant's driveway and how explicit the unethical act is that is requested. Specifically, participants will find it less important to be

perceived as cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor in the importance of being perceived as cooperative.

Hypotheses VIIb, VIIIb and IXb were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no favor) \times 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the neighbor (1 not important – 7 very important). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 35. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 36. Consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis VIIb, the analysis yielded a significant main effect for importance to be perceived as cooperative by the neighbor in the favor condition ($M = 4.12$, $SD = 1.63$) than in no favor condition ($M = 3.24$, $SD = 1.68$), $F(1,304) = 22.11$ $p < .001$.

The analysis found no main effect for if the request was explicitly stated as unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis VIIIb. The importance to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher in the explicit condition ($M = 3.53$, $SD = 1.82$) was not significantly different than importance to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher in the not explicit condition ($M = 3.82$, $SD = 1.59$), $F(1,304) = 2.30$ $p = .13$.

Hypothesis IXb predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the explicitness of the ethics violation in the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the neighbor. More specifically, participants would consider the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the neighbor less when the requested act is explicitly stated as unethical, and they do not receive a favor. The same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics

violation in how important it was for the participant to be perceived as cooperative by the neighbor $F(1,304) = 1.39$ $p = .24$. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor how important it was for the participant to be perceived as cooperative by the neighbor.

The mean scores for how important it was for a participant to be perceived as cooperative by the requester, for all four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 17.

Table 35

Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Neighbor's From

Dependent variable	Favor Condition		No Favor Condition	
	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=76)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=78)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)
Importance to be perceived as cooperative	4.09	4.16	2.99	3.49
(Standard deviation)	(1.79)	(1.47)	(1.69)	(1.64)

Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important

Table 36

Analysis of Variance for Importance to be Perceived as Cooperative by the Neighbor by Favor and Explicit Conditions

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Favor Condition	60.12	1	60.12	22.106*
Explicit	6.26	1	6.26	2.300
Favor Condition *				
Explicit	3.77	1	3.77	1.386
Error	826.72	304	2.72	

Note. * = $p < .001$

Hypothesis VIIc: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by a former co-worker for participants who receive a favor of a free meal from the former co-worker than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis VIIIc: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to send referrals to the former co-worker than participants who are asked to agree to the same unethical request that is not explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis IXc: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of the former co-worker buying dinner for the participant and how explicit the unethical act is that is requested. Specifically, participants will find it less important to be perceived as cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor in the importance of being perceived as cooperative.

Hypotheses VIIc, VIIIc and IXc were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no favor) \times 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker (1 not important – 7 very important). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 37. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 38. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis VIIc, the analysis did not yield a significant main effect for importance to be perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker in the favor condition ($M = 3.32$, $SD = 1.68$) than in no favor condition ($M = 3.56$, $SD = 1.76$), $F(1,304) = 1.52$ $p = .29$.

The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly stated as unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis VIIIc. The importance to be perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker in the explicit condition ($M = 3.27$, $SD = 1.65$) was not significantly different than importance to be perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker in the not explicit condition ($M = 3.62$, $SD = 1.78$), $F(1,304) = 3.23$ $p = .07$.

Hypothesis IXc predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the explicitness of the ethics violation in the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker. More specifically, participants would consider the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker less when the requested act is explicitly stated as unethical, and they do not receive a favor. The same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in how important it was for the participant to be perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker $F(1,304) = 0.08 p = .77$. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor how important it was for the participant to be perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker.

The mean scores for how important it was for a participant to be perceived as cooperative by the requester, for all four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 17.

Table 37

Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Former Co-Worker

Dependent variable	Favor Condition		No Favor Condition	
	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=76)	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=78)
Importance to be perceived as cooperative	3.42	3.71	3.12	3.53
(Standard deviation)	(1.71)	(1.81)	(1.58)	(1.76)

Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important

Table 38

Analysis of Variance for Importance to be Perceived as Cooperative by the Former Co-Worker by Favor and Explicit Conditions

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>
Favor Condition	4.50	1	4.50	1.524
Explicit	9.53	1	9.53	3.228
Favor Condition *				
Explicit	0.25	1	0.25	0.084
Error	897.73	304	2.95	

Hypothesis VIIId: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor for participants who receive a favor of the contractor fixing the participants brick retaining wall for free than participants who do not receive a favor.

Hypothesis VIIIId: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association's roofing project than participants who are asked to agree to the same unethical request that is not explicitly stated as unethical.

Hypothesis IXd: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of the contractor fixing the participants brick retaining wall for free and how explicit the unethical act is that is requested. Specifically, participants will find it less important to be perceived as cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is explicitly unethical. Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor in the importance of being perceived as cooperative.

Hypotheses VIIId, VIIIId and IXd were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no favor) × 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor (1 not important – 7 very important). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 39. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 40. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis VIIId, the analysis did not yield a significant main effect for importance to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor in the favor

condition ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 1.64$) than in no favor condition ($M = 3.08$, $SD = 1.65$), $F(1,304) = 3.65$ $p = .06$.

The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly stated as unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis VIIIId. The importance to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor in the explicit condition ($M = 3.08$, $SD = 1.63$) was not significantly different than importance to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor in the not explicit condition ($M = 3.43$, $SD = 1.66$), $F(1,304) = 3.54$ $p = .06$.

Hypothesis IXd predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the explicitness of the ethics violation in the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor. More specifically, participants would consider the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor less when the requested act is explicitly stated as unethical, and they do not receive a favor. The same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in how important it was for the participant to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor $F(1,304) = 2.79$ $p = .10$. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor how important it was for the participant to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor.

The mean scores for how important it was for a participant to be perceived as cooperative by the requester, for all four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 17.

Table 39*Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Contractor*

Dependent variable	Favor Condition		No Favor Condition	
	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=77)	Explicit Ethics Violation (n=76)	Not Explicit Ethics Violation (n=78)
Importance to be perceived as cooperative	3.42	3.45	2.75	3.41
(Standard deviation)	(1.67)	(1.61)	(1.52)	(1.72)


Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important

Table 40*Analysis of Variance for Importance to be Perceived as Cooperative by the Contractor by Favor and Explicit Conditions*

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>
Favor Condition	9.70	1	9.70	3.645
Explicit	9.41	1	9.41	3.537
Favor Condition *	7.43	1	7.43	2.792
Error	808.91	304	2.66	

Figure 17

Mean Scores for Importance to be Perceived as Cooperative by the Requester in Each of the Four Conditions and Scenarios



Discussion- Experiment 4

The aim of Experiment 4 was to build on Experiments 3 and investigate how the explicitness of the ethics violation impacts compliance, the consideration of negative consequences, and the importance of being perceived as cooperative. There were also four different scenarios used to investigate the research questions to have results that could be generalizable. The focus theory of normative conduct suggests there can be competing norms that potentially guide behavior. The norm that is most salient is ultimately the norm that influences the behavior. The explicit conditions in this experiment made it clear to the participant that the requester knew their request was wrong. Would the knowledge that everyone knows the request is wrong, limit the power

of the injunctive norm to comply with the unethical request? Would the fact that ethics were addressed by the requester trigger a moral schema in the participant driving them to act in ethical ways?

The results were largely not significant with a few exceptions which make the findings difficult to interpret. When investigating compliance based on receiving a favor or not, the only significant main effect was for receiving a favor in the neighbor's community service form scenario. This scenario was also the only one which saw a significant main effect for the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the requester when receiving a favor. When looking at the results together, it is possible the type of favor drove these findings. The favor in the neighbor's community service form scenario was the only favor that saved the participant from physical labor (shoveling snow), something that was stated the participant dreaded to do. The other scenarios' initial favors were receiving a snack, free meal, or repair work to a brick wall. Future research should investigate to see if a favor that is reduces the workload for an individual, including physical labor, is more powerful in gaining compliance than receiving an unexpected gift or snack.

The only significant result that was directly related to the explicitness of the ethics violation was the likelihood to consider negative consequences in the contractor scenario. This was the only scenario that stated the requested act was "probably illegal", while the other scenarios stated the request was wrong or against company policy. It is possible the statement that the act is probably illegal drove the differences in the consideration of negative consequences between the explicit and not explicit conditions. Despite this significant difference, the contractor scenario had the lowest rates of consideration of the

negative consequences in every condition when compared to the other scenarios. As discussed in experiment 3, a possible reason for this pattern of results is that the contractor scenario was the only scenario where the participant had something to gain by complying. This should be explored in future research in the context of how explicitly the ethics violation is conveyed.

General Discussion

This dissertation set out to investigate reciprocity and fraud. Would receiving a small initial favor make people more susceptible to being victims of fraud. Would a small initial favor keep people from asking clarifying questions that could identify the fraud? Would receiving a small favor make people more susceptible to being influenced to be a party to fraud? Would a small favor induce people to act against their self-interest? The author drew on theoretical models in three key areas: normative decision models, ethical decision models and social normative decision models to attempt to answer these questions. Four empirical studies were conducted to test the predictions of these theories in the context of reciprocity, fraud, and ethics.

Following the predictions of the norm of reciprocity, injunctive norms and the focus theory of normative conduct, it was hypothesized in experiments 1 and 2 that individuals who received an initial favor would be susceptible to sign a bogus consent form stating they owed a “research fee”, ask less questions about the fee, want to be perceived as more cooperative by the requester, irrespective of their level of trust in the researcher. There are several key takeaways from experiments 1 and 2.

One, small favors do make people more susceptible to complying with a fraudulent request as predicted by norm of reciprocity. This is in line with prior reciprocity findings that the favor creates an obligation to repay the favor (Cialdini, 2009; Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; Gouldner, 1960). The fact that there was 100% compliance in people agreeing to pay a \$10 fee, that they should not have to pay, is alarming. This would suggest that small stakes fraud very rarely gets reported, giving unscrupulous con artists a license to rip people off a few dollars at a time. These findings support AARP's (1994) report that estimates 85% of individuals have been defrauded or deceived in some way with the vast majority going unreported.

Two, when the stakes are small, potential victims are less likely to ask any clarifying questions about the fraud. This is the first study, to the author's knowledge, that has empirically studied the effects of reciprocity and its impact on asking questions of a subsequent request and the findings are consistent with injunctive norms and the focus theory of normative conduct. There is a salient expectation for social approval and not question the requester. The potential victim will adjust their behavior to align with this expectation (Cialdini et al, 1990; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; White & Simpson, 2013). The larger \$89.56 fee condition did not see a significant difference in questioning rates based on favor condition. Like the small stakes' fraud, compliance discussed in the previous paragraph, this finding is also troubling. Providing an initial favor in smalltime fraud is a recipe for a swindler to take advantage of people.

Three, the more important it is for an individual to be perceived as cooperative the more likely they were to comply with the fraudulent request. When the need to be perceived as cooperative is high it can be interpreted as being salient. This maps on to the

focus theory of normative conduct and self-discrepancy theory. It is important to understand what leads people to believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative. Future research directions are discussed below.

Experiment 3 and 4 investigated reciprocity, fraud, and ethics by pitting two ethical standards against each other. One, an ethical standard to not commit fraud and two, the ethical standard to give back to someone who has given to you. Experiment 4 explored if the fraudulent request was explicitly called out as being wrong by the requester would it impact compliance, the importance to be perceived as cooperative and consideration of negative consequences for complying with the request. There are several key takeaways from experiments 3 and 4.

One, the pattern of results between experiments 3 and 4 saw participants comply with unethical requests, in the contractor scenario, at higher rates than the other scenarios. While the differences between scenarios was not part of these experiments, it is worth noting this type of analysis should be conducted in future research. The contractor scenario was the only scenario where the participant had something to gain from complying with the request: a lower price tag for the association's roof project.

Two, experiment 4 found main effects for compliance and importance to be perceived as cooperative when comparing favor vs no favor conditions only in the neighbor's community service form scenario. This scenario was the only one in which the favor reduced the participant's workload by shoveling their driveway. It could be possible that the type of favor (i.e., doing someone else's physical labor vs giving a snack) could impact the power of reciprocity. This scenario also was the only one where

the favor took care of something that was stated the participant “dreaded doing”. The importance of the initial favor, not just monetary considerations, could play a role in the power of reciprocity.

Three, the importance to be perceived as cooperative was found to predict compliance. This is a robust finding that has been observed several times in these experiments. This result is in line with injunctive norms, focus theory of normative conduct and self-discrepancy theory.

Limitations and Future Directions

A limitation to experiments 1 and 2 was it utilized a sample drawn completely from undergraduate college students. This is potentially problematic for two reasons: One, a more diverse sample could make the results more generalizable. Two, the researcher who ran the experiments was older than the student participants. It is possible there could have been authority effects, that have been shown to increase compliance (Cialdini, 2009). Future research should draw on a more diverse participant pool and have multiple and diverse researchers running the experiments that limit the potential authority confound.

Experiments 3 and 4 had each participant read all four scenarios. It is possible participants were conditioned or primed with reciprocity and/ or ethics when reading the second, third and fourth vignettes. This has the potential for their later responses to be biased based on previous vignettes. Future studies should consider having participants only read and answer survey questions from only one scenario.

Experiments 3 and 4 were conducted entirely online via MTurk because the pandemic did not allow for an in-person studies due to social distancing requirements. The experiments utilized vignettes and asked participants to imagine they were in a particular scenario. After reading each vignette they answered survey questions about how they would behave. Future studies should utilize a paradigm similar to experiments 1 and 2 where participants were actually in the scenario, not just imagining themselves in the situation, making real life decisions akin to a field study.

Based on the robust findings that the importance to be perceived as cooperative predicted the likelihood an individual would comply with the fraudulent request, future research should investigate differences in susceptibility to reciprocity and fraud based individual differences, such as people who score high on agreeableness on the Big Five Personality Inventory (Goldberg, 1992).

Conclusion

The Federal Trade Commission had 2.1 million reports of fraud totaling losses of \$3.3 billion in 2020 (Federal Trade Commission, 2021). Although this figure is only a fraction of the total estimated consumer fraud in the United States, with some estimates at over \$100 billion per year (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001). These statistics outline just how prevalent fraud is, with much of the unscrupulous acts never being reported. This dissertation aimed to understand the underpinnings of reciprocity and ethics in the context of fraud. This was first empirical study (to the author's knowledge) to investigate the likelihood to question fraudulent requests in a reciprocity framework. Through the lens of social normative decision models and ethical decision models, several insights were uncovered. It is important to continue this type of research to better understand why

victims fall prey to con artists and to one day influence policy and create interventions to curb the number of people being swindled.

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Appendix A

Experiment 1- Bogus Consent Form

DePaul IRB Approved Protocol # <Approval date> Through <Expire date>
<p><u>ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH</u></p> <p>CONSUMER DECISIONS- SURVEY STUDY</p> <p>Principal Investigator: Charles Drehmer, Graduate Student</p> <p>Institution: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA</p> <p>Department (School, College): Psychology Department, College of Science and Health</p> <p>Faculty Advisor: Jessica Choplin, PhD, Psychology Department</p> <p><u>What is the purpose of this research?</u> We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more about consumer decisions. This study is being conducted by Charles Drehmer at DePaul University, a graduate student at DePaul University as a requirement to obtain his PhD. This research is being supervised by his faculty advisor, Jessica Choplin, PhD.</p> <p>We hope to include about 250 people in the research.</p> <p><u>Why are you being asked to be in the research?</u> You are invited to participate in this study because you are a healthy adult aged 18 years or older. You must be age 18 or older to be in this study. This study is not approved for the enrollment of people under the age of 18.</p> <p><u>What is involved in being in the research study?</u> If you agree to be in this study, you will be randomly assigned to one of two groups. Each group will complete computerized tasks which involve answering survey questions. You will also be asked to provide some basic demographic information.</p> <p><u>How much time will this take?</u> This study will take a total of 30 minutes of your time.</p> <p><u>How much is the research fee?</u> You will be charged a \$10 research fee for your participation in this experiment. You will see the fee added as a student activity fee on your tuition account.</p> <p><u>Are there any risks involved in participating in this study?</u> Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would encounter in daily life.</p> <p><u>Are there any benefits to participating in this study?</u> The results of this study will not directly benefit participants. However, the knowledge gained could produce a benefit to society by informing future research and interventions related to consumer behavior.</p> <p><u>Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study?</u> You will also be given 1 psychology subject pool credit for participation in the research. You must provide your subject pool number in order to be given credit.</p> <p><u>Can you decide not to participate?</u> Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate. There will be no negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you decide not to participate or change your mind later and withdraw from the research after you begin participating.</p> <p>Your decision whether or not to participate in the research study will not affect your grades at DePaul University.</p> <p>Version August 7, 2017 Page 1 of 2</p>

DePaul IRB Approved Protocol # <Approval date> Through <Expire date>
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Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the information collected for the research be protected?

The research records will be kept and stored securely. Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write about the study or publish a paper to share the research with other researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. We will not include your name or any information that will directly identify you.

Your SONA participant number will be collected and logged in a separate file and not be combined with the other data collected from you. This SONA participant file is necessary to ensure you receive credit in the SONA system for participating.

We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that you gave us information, or what that information is. However, some people might review or copy our records that may identify you in order to make sure we are following the required rules, laws, and regulations. For example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board may review your information. If they look at our records, they will keep your information confidential.

Who should be contacted for more information about the research?

Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study or you want to get additional information or provide input about this research, you can contact the researcher, Charles Drehmer, 312.362.8788, cdrehmer@depaul.edu or Faculty Sponsor: Jessica Choplin, 773.325.2052, jchoplin@depaul.edu.

This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review Board (IRB). If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you may contact Susan Loess-Perez, DePaul University's Director of Research Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by email at sloesspe@depaul.edu.

You may also contact DePaul's Office of Research Services if:

- Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team.
- You cannot reach the research team.
- You want to talk to someone besides the research team.

You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.

Statement of Consent from the Subject:

I have read the above information. I have had all my questions and concerns answered. By signing below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.

Signature: _____

Printed name: _____

Date: _____

Appendix B

Experiments 1 & 2 Survey Questions

- 1) How did you feel towards the researcher?
1- somewhat negative, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- very positive
- 2) What was your level of trust in the researcher?
1- very low, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- very high
- 3) Did you feel free to question the researcher?
1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Yes
- 4) Did you feel that you could negotiate the terms of the bogus consent form?
1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Yes
- 5) Did you feel rushed?
1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Yes
- 6) How important was it to you that the consent form be consistent with what you originally understood the costs to be in participating in the experiment?
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very important
- 7) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to the researcher?
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very important
- 8) How important was it to you that you were perceived as trustworthy by the researcher?
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very important
- 9) How carefully did you read the bogus consent form that you received?
1- Did not read, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very carefully
- 10) Did the description and terms of the study in the bogus consent form match the description and terms from the online registration system?
Yes, No, Not sure
- 11) Did you notice the \$10 research fee in the bogus consent form?
Yes, No
- 12) I know what to be looking for when reading and before signing a consent form.
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely
- 13) I feel that I am not expected to read all of the words in a consent form before signing one.
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely

14) In deciding whether to read and sign the bogus consent form, I was influenced by what I had previously read on the experiment registration system.

1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely

15) In deciding whether to sign the bogus consent form, I was influenced by the fact that I felt I was expected to sign the consent form.

1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely

16) In deciding whether to read the bogus consent form, I was influenced by the length of the consent form.

1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely

17) In deciding whether to read and sign the bogus consent form, I was influenced by the fact I was already sitting there to participate in the experiment.

1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely

18) Did you receive a beverage or snack from the researcher?

Yes, No

19) (If answered yes to question 18) In deciding whether to read the bogus consent form, I was influenced by the fact I received a beverage or snack from the researcher.

1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely

* Only participants who answered question 9 with a 1 or 2 will receive the following seven questions.

*20) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because I was lazy.

1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely

*21) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because it was boring.

1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely

*22) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because I have read other consent forms and I presumed that they all read the same.

1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely

*23) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because I presumed that there was nothing problematic in the form because all experiments at DePaul must conform with federal standards and be approved by the IRB (Institutional Review Board).

1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely

*24) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because I didn't think it contained anything important for me to know or agree to.

1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely

*25) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because I have never heard of anyone having a problem with the consent forms they have signed.

1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely

*26) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because it was too long.

1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely

27) Did you sign the bogus consent form?

Yes, No

Demographic questions

1) What is your age? (open ended response)

2) What gender do you identify as?

Female, Male, Non-binary/ third gender, Prefer not to say

Appendix C

Experiment 2- Bogus Consent Form

DePaul IRB Approved Protocol #CD092017PSY-R1 February 1, 2018 Through October 26, 2018
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ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

CONSUMER DECISIONS- SURVEY STUDY

Principal Investigator: Charles Drehmer, Graduate Student

Institution: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA

Department (School, College): Psychology Department, College of Science and Health

Faculty Advisor: Jessica Choplin, PhD, Psychology Department

What is the purpose of this research?

We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more about consumer decisions. This study is being conducted by Charles Drehmer at DePaul University, a graduate student at DePaul University as a requirement to obtain his PhD. This research is being supervised by his faculty advisor, Jessica Choplin, PhD.

We hope to include about 250 people in the research.

Why are you being asked to be in the research?

You are invited to participate in this study because you are a healthy adult aged 18 years or older. You must be age 18 or older to be in this study. This study is not approved for the enrollment of people under the age of 18.

What is involved in being in the research study?

If you agree to be in this study, you will be randomly assigned to one of two groups. Each group will complete computerized tasks which involve answering survey questions. You will also be asked to provide some basic demographic information.

How much time will this take?

This study will take a total of 30 minutes of your time.

How much is the research fee?

You will be charged a \$89.56 research fee for your participation in this experiment. You will see the fee added as a student activity fee on your tuition account.

Are there any risks involved in participating in this study?

Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would encounter in daily life.

Are there any benefits to participating in this study?

The results of this study will not directly benefit participants. However, the knowledge gained could produce a benefit to society by informing future research and interventions related to consumer behavior.

Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study?

You will also be given 1 psychology subject pool credit for participation in the research. You must provide your subject pool number in order to be given credit.

Can you decide not to participate?

Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate. There will be no negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you decide not to participate or change your mind later and withdraw from the research after you begin participating.

Your decision whether or not to participate in the research study will not affect your grades at DePaul University.

DePaul IRB Approved
Protocol #CD092017PSY-R1
February 1, 2018 Through October 26, 2018

Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the information collected for the research be protected?

The research records will be kept and stored securely. Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write about the study or publish a paper to share the research with other researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. We will not include your name or any information that will directly identify you.

Your SONA participant number will be collected and logged in a separate file and not be combined with the other data collected from you. This SONA participant file is necessary to ensure you receive credit in the SONA system for participating.

We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that you gave us information, or what that information is. However, some people might review or copy our records that may identify you in order to make sure we are following the required rules, laws, and regulations. For example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board may review your information. If they look at our records, they will keep your information confidential.

Who should be contacted for more information about the research?

Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study or you want to get additional information or provide input about this research, you can contact the researcher, Charles Drehmer, 312.362.8788, cdrehmer@depaul.edu or Faculty Sponsor: Jessica Choplin, 773.325.2052, jchoplin@depaul.edu.

This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review Board (IRB). If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you may contact Susan Loess-Perez, DePaul University's Director of Research Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by email at sloesspe@depaul.edu.

You may also contact DePaul's Office of Research Services if:

- Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team.
- You cannot reach the research team.
- You want to talk to someone besides the research team.

You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.

Statement of Consent from the Subject:

I have read the above information. I have had all my questions and concerns answered. By signing below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.

Signature: _____

Printed name: _____

Date: _____

Appendix D

Experiment 2- Additional Demographic Questions

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- Nursery, kindergarten, and elementary (grades 1-8)
- High school (grades 9-12, no degree)
- High school graduate (or equivalent)
- Some college (1-4 years, no degree or in process)
- Associate degree (including occupational or academic degrees)
- Bachelor's degree (BA, BS, etc...)
- Master's degree (MA, MS, etc...)
- Doctoral or Professional degree (JD, MD, PhD, etc...)

What was your total household income before taxes during the past 12 months?

- Less than \$10,000
- \$10,000 to \$14,999
- \$15,000 to \$24,999
- \$25,000 to \$34,999
- \$35,000 to \$49,999
- \$50,000 to \$74,999
- \$75,000 to \$99,999
- \$100,000 to \$149,999
- \$150,000 to \$199,999
- \$200,000 or more

What is your race and ethnicity (Check all that apply)

- African American
- American Indian/Alaskan Native
- Asian
- Hispanic/Latino
- Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander
- White
- Other (please specify)

Appendix E

Full Vignettes from Experiment 3

Bogus consent from/ Diet Coke and pretzels

Favor

You agree to volunteer for a survey study at a local university. When you arrive, you meet the researcher running the study and she says, "Thank you for coming in. Please have a seat. Hold on one second while I grab some materials from the next room." When she returns, she is holding a folder, two diet cokes and two bags of pretzels. They hand one of each to you say, "I needed a snack and don't want to be rude and eat in front of you without giving you something." You accept the snack and beverage.

You fill out some paperwork, sign a consent form and take a survey answering questions about consumer electronics.

You finish the survey in five minutes and notify the researcher that you are done with the survey. They thank you for your time and say you are free to go.

While you are packing up your things, including the pretzels the beverage, the researcher says, "Would you mind helping me out? I am really behind on getting data and need to have all my data collected by tomorrow. Can you sign the name 'Morgan Jones' on this consent form? I will complete the survey for Morgan. I just can't have all the signatures in my handwriting."

No favor

You agree to volunteer for a survey study at a local university. When you arrive, you meet the researcher running the study and she says, "Thank you for coming in. Please have a seat. Hold on one second while I grab some materials from the next room." She returns with holding a folder with some papers.

You fill out some paperwork, sign a consent form and take a survey answering questions about consumer electronics.

You finish the survey in five minutes and notify the researcher that you are done with the survey. They thank you for your time and say you are free to go.

While you are packing up your things the researcher says, "Would you mind helping me out? I am really behind on getting data and need to have all my data collected

by tomorrow. Can you sign the name ‘Morgan Jones’ on this consent form? I will complete the survey for Morgan. I just can’t have all the signatures in my handwriting.”

Neighbor’s community service form/ Snow shoveling

Favor

Imagine you work as a supervisor at community center for older adults. It has snowed all day and you dread shoveling your driveway. You return home to see your next-door neighbor, who is in high school, finishing shoveling snow from your driveway and sidewalk.

Later that evening, you are taking your garbage out and run into your neighbor doing the same thing. They say hi and ask how work at the community center is going. You say, it’s is good, despite the long hours and thank them for shoveling your driveway.

Your neighbor then pulls out a piece of paper and says “Can you do me a favor? I am behind on my schoolwork and one of my assignments was to volunteer 15 service hours in the community by tomorrow. Would you mind signing this form saying I volunteered at the community center?”

No favor

Imagine you work as a supervisor at community center for older adults. It has snowed all day and you dread shoveling your driveway. You return home and shovel your driveway and sidewalk.

Later that evening, you are taking your garbage out and run into your neighbor doing the same thing. They say hi and ask how work at the community center is going. You say it’s is good, despite the long hours.

Your neighbor then pulls out a piece of paper and says “Can you do me a favor? I am behind on my schoolwork and one of my assignments was to volunteer 15 service hours in the community by tomorrow. Would you mind signing this form saying I volunteered at the community center?”

Former banking co-workers referrals/ Free meal

Favor

You are a personal banker at a neighborhood bank. You used to refer anyone looking for a mortgage to Terry, the home loan specialist in your branch. Terry left the bank two months ago to work for another mortgage lender. You are now required to refer anyone interested in a mortgage to Jamie, who works in the corporate headquarters in the next state over.

Last week, you met Terry for a nice dinner and drinks to catch up and celebrate Terry’s new job. Terry mentions it has been a struggle to generate new customers in her new

position. When the waiter drops off the check, Terry insists on picking up the entire tab for the expensive dinner.

On your way out, Terry says if you have any ideas on how they can get more customers they could really use it. Hopefully, we can get together for more dinners on an ongoing basis, my treat.

No Favor

You are a personal banker at a neighborhood bank. You used to refer anyone looking for a mortgage to Terry, the home loan specialist in your branch. Terry left the bank two months ago to work for another mortgage lender. You are now required to refer anyone interested in a mortgage to Jamie, who works in the corporate headquarters in the next state over.

Last week, you met Terry for a nice dinner and drinks to catch up and celebrate Terry's new job. Terry mentions it has been a struggle to generate new customers in her new position. When the waiter drops off the check, you divvy up the bill and each pay your portion.

On your way out, Terry says if you have any ideas on how they can get more customers they could really use it. Hopefully, we can get together for more dinners on an ongoing basis.

Homeowner association contractor price request/ Free brick work

Favor

You are the president of a condo association consisting of 30 townhomes. There is a company who has done small maintenance and construction projects for residents in the past.

One day you return home from work to see the owner of the company fixing your small rock retaining wall. You tell the owner; you didn't order this work. They say, don't worry, there is no charge for this work. I was already here doing a project for your neighbor and saw a few stones loose on your wall, so I secured them with some adhesive. It only took about 10 minutes."

The owner then inquires about the project up for bid to replace the roofs for the entire complex and says, Where does my price need to be in order to get the business?

No Favor

You are the president of a condo association consisting of 30 townhomes. There is a company who has done small maintenance and construction projects for residents in the past.

One day you return home from work to see the owner of the company fixing your small rock retaining wall at your neighbors.

The owner then inquiries about the project up for bid to replace the roofs for the entire complex and says, Where does my price need to be in order to get the business?

Appendix F

Experiment 3- Survey Questions

Questions 1- 10- asked after first vignette

- 1) How likely are you to sign Morgan's name to the form?
1- Definitely Sign 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Sign
- 2) How much do you agree that you have an ethical obligation to give back to those that have given to you?
1- Agree Strongly 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7-
- 3) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to sign Morgan's name to the second consent form?
1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation
- 4) While deciding to sign someone else's name to the second form or not, did you think about negative consequences you could face for signing the form?
1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All
- 5) How ethical do you feel it is to sign someone else's name to a consent form?
1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical
- 6) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to the researcher?
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely important
- 7) How awkward would it be to say "no" to the request to sign Morgan's name?
1- Not awkward, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely awkward
- 8) How embarrassed would it be to say "no" to the request to sign Morgan's name?
1- Not embarrassed, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely embarrassed
- 9) How much did you act like you trusted the researcher?
1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely
- 10) How much did you actually trust the researcher?
1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely

Questions 11- 19 asked after second vignette

- 11) How likely are you to sign your neighbor's form?
1- Definitely Sign 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Sign

12) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to sign your neighbor's form?

1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation

13) While deciding to sign your neighbor's form, did you think about negative consequences you could face for signing the form?

1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All

14) How ethical do you feel it is to sign your neighbor's form stating that the volunteer work was completed?

1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical

15) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to your neighbor?

1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely important

16) How awkward would it be to say "no" to the request to sign your neighbor's form?

1- Not awkward, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely awkward

17) How embarrassed would it be to say "no" to the request to sign your neighbor's form?

1- Not embarrassed, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely embarrassed

18) How much did you act like you trusted your neighbor?

1- Not at all , 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely

19) How much did you actually trust your neighbor?

1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely

Questions 20- 28 asked third vignette

20) How likely are you to agree to send referrals to Terry?

1- Definitely Send Referrals 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Send Referrals

21) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to agree to send Terry referrals?

1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation

22) While deciding to agree to send Terry referrals, did you think about negative consequences you could face for doing so?

1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All

- 23) How ethical do you feel it is to agree to send Terry referrals?
1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical
- 24) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to Terry?
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely important
- 25) How awkward would it be to say “no” to the request to send Terry referrals?
1- Not awkward, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely awkward
- 26) How embarrassed would it be to say “no” to the request to send Terry referrals?
1- Not embarrassed, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely embarrassed
- 27) How much did you act like you trusted Terry?
1- Not at all , 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely
- 28) How much did you actually trust Terry?
1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely

Questions 29- 42 asked fourth vignette

- 29) How likely are you to tell the contractor where is roof price needs to be to win the business?
1- Definitely Give Price 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Give Price
- 30) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to give a price to the contractor?
1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation
- 31) While deciding to give the price to the contractor, did you think about negative consequences you could face for doing so?
1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All
- 32) How ethical do you feel it is to give the price to the contractor?
1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical
- 33) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to the contractor?
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely important
- 34) How awkward would it be to say “no” to giving a price to the contractor?
1- Not awkward, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely awkward
- 35) How embarrassed would it be to say “no” to the request to give the contractor a price?
1- Not embarrassed, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely embarrassed

- 36) How much did you act like you trusted the contractor?
1- Not at all , 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely
- 37) How much did you actually trust the contractor?
1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely
- 38) What is your age? (open ended response)
- 39) What gender do you identify as?
Female
Male
Non-binary/ third gender
Prefer not to say
- 40) What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Nursery, kindergarten, and elementary (grades 1-8)
High school (grades 9-12, no degree)
High school graduate (or equivalent)
Some college (1-4 years, no degree or in process)
Associate degree (including occupational or academic degrees)
Bachelor's degree (BA, BS, etc...)
Master's degree (MA, MS, etc...)
Doctoral or Professional degree (JD, MD, PhD, etc...)
- 41) What was your total household income before taxes during the past 12 months?
Less than \$10,000
\$10,000 to \$14,999
\$15,000 to \$24,999
\$25,000 to \$34,999
\$35,000 to \$49,999
\$50,000 to \$74,999
\$75,000 to \$99,999
\$100,000 to \$149,999
\$150,000 to \$199,999
\$200,000 or more
- 42) What is your race and ethnicity (Check all that apply)
African American
American Indian/Alaskan Native
Asian
Hispanic/Latino
Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander
White
Other (please specify)

[End of survey]

Appendix G

Full Vignettes from Experiment 4

Bogus consent from/ Diet Coke and pretzels

Explicit/ Favor

You agree to volunteer for a survey study at a local university. When you arrive, you meet the researcher running the study and she says, “Thank you for coming in. Please have a seat. Hold on one second while I grab some materials from the next room.” When she returns, she is holding a folder, two diet cokes and two bags of pretzels. They hand one of each to you say, “I needed a snack and don’t want to be rude and eat in front of you without giving you something.” You accept the snack and beverage.

You fill out some paperwork, sign a consent form and take a survey answering questions about consumer electronics.

You finish the survey in five minutes and notify the researcher that you are done with the survey. They thank you for your time and say you are free to go.

While you are packing up your things, including the pretzels the beverage, the researcher says, “Would you mind helping me out? I am really behind on getting data and need to have all my data collected by tomorrow. I know it is wrong to do this, but can you sign the name ‘Morgan Jones’ on this consent form? I will complete the survey for Morgan. I just can’t have all the signatures in my handwriting.”

Explicit/ No favor

You agree to volunteer for a survey study at a local university. When you arrive, you meet the researcher running the study and she says, “Thank you for coming in. Please have a seat. Hold on one second while I grab some materials from the next room.” She returns with a folder and hands you some papers.

You fill out some paperwork, sign a consent form and take a survey answering questions about consumer electronics.

You finish the survey in five minutes and notify the researcher that you are done with the survey. They thank you for your time and say you are free to go.

While you are packing up your things the researcher says, “Would you mind helping me out? I am really behind on getting data and need to have all my data collected by tomorrow. I know it is wrong to do this, but can you sign the name ‘Morgan Jones’ on this consent form? I will complete the survey for Morgan. I just can’t have all the signatures in my handwriting.

Non-Explicit/ Favor

You agree to volunteer for a survey study at a local university. When you arrive, you meet the researcher running the study and she says, "Thank you for coming in. Please have a seat. Hold on one second while I grab some materials from the next room." When she returns, she is holding a folder, two diet cokes and two bags of pretzels. They hand one of each to you say, "I needed a snack and don't want to be rude and eat in front of you without giving you something." You accept the snack and beverage.

You fill out some paperwork, sign a consent form and take a survey answering questions about consumer electronics.

You finish the survey in five minutes and notify the researcher that you are done with the survey. They thank you for your time and say you are free to go.

While you are packing up your things, including the pretzels the beverage, the researcher says, "Would you mind helping me out? I am really behind on getting data and need to have all my data collected by tomorrow. Can you sign the name 'Morgan Jones' on this consent form? I will complete the survey for Morgan. I just can't have all the signatures in my handwriting."

Non-Explicit/ No favor

You agree to volunteer for a survey study at a local university. When you arrive, you meet the researcher running the study and she says, "Thank you for coming in. Please have a seat. Hold on one second while I grab some materials from the next room." She returns with holding a folder with some papers.

You fill out some paperwork, sign a consent form and take a survey answering questions about consumer electronics.

You finish the survey in five minutes and notify the researcher that you are done with the survey. They thank you for your time and say you are free to go.

While you are packing up your things the researcher says, "Would you mind helping me out? I am really behind on getting data and need to have all my data collected by tomorrow. Can you sign the name 'Morgan Jones' on this consent form? I will complete the survey for Morgan. I just can't have all the signatures in my handwriting."

Neighbor's community service form/ Snow shoveling

Explicit/ Favor

Imagine you work as a supervisor at community center for older adults. It has snowed all day and you dread shoveling your driveway. You return home to see your next-door neighbor, who is in high school, finishing shoveling snow from your driveway and sidewalk.

Later that evening, you are taking your garbage out and run into your neighbor doing the same thing. They say hi and ask how work at the community center is going. You say, It's is good, despite the long hours and thank them for shoveling your driveway.

Your neighbor then pulls out a piece of paper and says "Can you do me a favor? I am behind on my schoolwork and one of my assignments was to volunteer 15 service hours in the community by tomorrow. Would you mind signing this form saying I volunteered at the community center for 15 hours even though I haven't?"

Explicit/ No favor

Imagine you work as a supervisor at community center for older adults. It has snowed all day and you dread shoveling your driveway. You return home and shovel your driveway and sidewalk.

Later that evening, you are taking your garbage out and run into your neighbor doing the same thing. They say hi and ask how work at the community center is going. You say it's is good, despite the long hours.

Your neighbor then pulls out a piece of paper and says "Can you do me a favor? I am behind on my schoolwork and one of my assignments was to volunteer 15 service hours in the community by tomorrow. Would you mind signing this form saying I volunteered at the community center for 15 hours even though I haven't?"

Non-Explicit/ Favor

Imagine you work as a supervisor at community center for older adults. It has snowed all day and you dread shoveling your driveway. You return home to see your next-door neighbor, who is in high school, finishing shoveling snow from your driveway and sidewalk.

Later that evening, you are taking your garbage out and run into your neighbor doing the same thing. They say hi and ask how work at the community center is going. You say, it's is good, despite the long hours and thank them for shoveling your driveway.

Your neighbor then pulls out a piece of paper and says "Can you do me a favor? I am behind on my schoolwork and one of my assignments was to volunteer 15 service hours in the community by tomorrow. Would you mind signing this form saying I volunteered at the community center?"

Non-Explicit/ No favor

Imagine you work as a supervisor at community center for older adults. It has snowed all day and you dread shoveling your driveway. You return home and shovel your driveway and sidewalk.

Later that evening, you are taking your garbage out and run into your neighbor doing the same thing. They say hi and ask how work at the community center is going. You say it's is good, despite the long hours.

Your neighbor then pulls out a piece of paper and says "Can you do me a favor? I am behind on my schoolwork and one of my assignments was to volunteer 15 service hours in the community by tomorrow. Would you mind signing this form saying I volunteered at the community center?"

Former banking co-workers referrals/ Free meal**Explicit / Favor**

You are a personal banker at a neighborhood bank. You used to refer anyone looking for a mortgage to Terry, the home loan specialist in your branch. Terry left the bank two months ago to work for another mortgage lender. You are now required to refer anyone interested in a mortgage to Jamie, who works in the corporate headquarters in the next state over.

Last week, you met Terry for a nice dinner and drinks to catch up and celebrate Terry's new job. Terry mentions it has been a struggle to generate new customers in her new position. When the waiter drops off the check, Terry insists on picking up the entire tab for the expensive dinner.

On your way out, Terry says, "I know it is against company policy, but any potential customers you can send my way would be much appreciated. Hopefully, we can get together for more dinners on an ongoing basis, my treat."

Explicit /No favor

You are a personal banker at a neighborhood bank. You used to refer anyone looking for a mortgage to Terry, the home loan specialist in your branch. Terry left the bank two months ago to work for another mortgage lender. You are now required to refer anyone interested in a mortgage to Jamie, who works in the corporate headquarters in the next state over.

Last week, you met Terry for a nice dinner and drinks to catch up and celebrate Terry's new job. Terry mentions it has been a struggle to generate new customers in her new position. When the waiter drops off the check, you divvy up the bill and each pay your portion.

On your way out, Terry says, “I know it is against company policy, but any potential customers you can send my way would be much appreciated. Hopefully, we can get together for more dinners on an ongoing basis.”

Non-explicit/ Favor

You are a personal banker at a neighborhood bank. You used to refer anyone looking for a mortgage to Terry, the home loan specialist in your branch. Terry left the bank two months ago to work for another mortgage lender. You are now required to refer anyone interested in a mortgage to Jamie, who works in the corporate headquarters in the next state over.

Last week, you met Terry for a nice dinner and drinks to catch up and celebrate Terry’s new job. Terry mentions it has been a struggle to generate new customers in her new position. When the waiter drops off the check, Terry insists on picking up the entire tab for the expensive dinner.

On your way out, Terry says if you have any ideas on how they can get more customers they could really use it. Hopefully, we can get together for more dinners on an ongoing basis, my treat.

Non-explicit / No Favor

You are a personal banker at a neighborhood bank. You used to refer anyone looking for a mortgage to Terry, the home loan specialist in your branch. Terry left the bank two months ago to work for another mortgage lender. You are now required to refer anyone interested in a mortgage to Jamie, who works in the corporate headquarters in the next state over.

Last week, you met Terry for a nice dinner and drinks to catch up and celebrate Terry’s new job. Terry mentions it has been a struggle to generate new customers in her new position. When the waiter drops off the check, you divvy up the bill and each pay your portion.

On your way out, Terry says if you have any ideas on how they can get more customers they could really use it. Hopefully, we can get together for more dinners on an ongoing basis.

Homeowner association contractor price request/ Free brick work

Explicit/ Favor

You are the president of a condo association consisting of 30 townhomes. There is a company who has done small maintenance and construction projects for residents in the past.

One day you return home from work to see the owner of the company fixing your small rock retaining wall. You tell the owner; you didn’t order this work. They say, don’t

worry, there is no charge for this work. I was already here doing a project for your neighbor and saw a few stones loose on your wall, so I secured them with some adhesive. It only took about 10 minutes.”

The owner then inquires about the project up for bid to replace the roofs for the entire complex and says, It’s probably illegal for you to tell me but, where does my price need to be in order to get the business?

Explicit/ No Favor

You are the president of a condo association consisting of 30 townhomes. There is a company who has done small maintenance and construction projects for residents in the past.

One day you return home from work to see the owner of the company fixing your small rock retaining wall at your neighbors.

The owner then inquires about the project up for bid to replace the roofs for the entire complex and says, It’s probably illegal for you to tell me but, where does my price need to be in order to get the business?

Non-Explicit/ Favor

You are the president of a condo association consisting of 30 townhomes. There is a company who has done small maintenance and construction projects for residents in the past.

One day you return home from work to see the owner of the company fixing your small rock retaining wall. You tell the owner; you didn’t order this work. They say, don’t worry, there is no charge for this work. I was already here doing a project for your neighbor and saw a few stones loose on your wall, so I secured them with some adhesive. It only took about 10 minutes.”

The owner then inquires about the project up for bid to replace the roofs for the entire complex and says, Where does my price need to be in order to get the business?

Non-Explicit/ No Favor

You are the president of a condo association consisting of 30 townhomes. There is a company who has done small maintenance and construction projects for residents in the past.

One day you return home from work to see the owner of the company fixing your small rock retaining wall at your neighbors.

The owner then inquires about the project up for bid to replace the roofs for the entire complex and says, Where does my price need to be in order to get the business?

Appendix H

Experiment 4- Survey Questions

Questions 1- 7- asked after first vignette

- 11) How likely are you to sign your neighbor's form?
2- Definitely Sign 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Sign

- 2) How much do you agree that you have an ethical obligation to give back to those that have given to you?
1- Agree Strongly 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Disagree Strongly

- 3) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to sign your neighbor's form?
1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation

- 4) While deciding to sign your neighbor's form, did you think about negative consequences you could face for doing so?
1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All

- 5) How ethical do you feel it is to sign your neighbor's form stating that the volunteer work was completed?
1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical

- 6) Was it clear you were asked to do something that was wrong?
1- Not clear at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very Clear

- 7) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to your neighbor?
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely important

Questions 8- 13- asked after second vignette

- 8) How likely are you to agree to send referrals to Terry?
2- Definitely Send Referrals 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Send Referrals

- 9) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to agree to send Terry referrals?
1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation

10) While deciding to agree to send Terry referrals, did you think about negative consequences you could face for doing so?

1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All

11) How ethical do you feel it is to agree to send Terry referrals?

1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical

12) Was it clear you were asked to do something that was wrong?

1- Not clear at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very Clear

13) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to Terry?

1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very important

Questions 14- 19 asked third vignette

14) How likely are you to tell the contractor where is roof price needs to be to win the business?

2- Definitely Give Price 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Give Price

15) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to give a price to the contractor?

1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation

16) While deciding to give the price to the contractor, did you think about negative consequences you could face for doing so?

1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All

17) How ethical do you feel it is to give the price to the contractor?

1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical

18) Was it clear you were asked to do something that was wrong?

1- Not clear at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very Clear

19) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to the contractor?

1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very important

Questions 20- 30 asked fourth vignette

20) How likely are you to sign Morgan's name to the form?

2- Definitely Sign 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Sign

- 21) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to sign Morgan's name to the second consent form?
1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation
- 22) While deciding to sign someone else's name to the second form or not, did you think about negative consequences you could face for doing so?
1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All
- 23) How ethical do you feel it is to sign someone else's name to a consent form?
1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical
- 24) Was it clear you were asked to do something that was wrong?
1- Not clear at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very Clear
- 25) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to the researcher?
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very important

Demographic questions

- 26) What is your age? (open ended response)
- 27) What gender do you identify as?
Female
Male
Non-binary/ third gender
Prefer not to say
- 28) What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Nursery, kindergarten, and elementary (grades 1-8)
High school (grades 9-12, no degree)
High school graduate (or equivalent)
Some college (1-4 years, no degree or in process)
Associate degree (including occupational or academic degrees)
Bachelor's degree (BA, BS, etc...)
Master's degree (MA, MS, etc...)
Doctoral or Professional degree (JD, MD, PhD, etc...)
- 29) What was your total household income before taxes during the past 12 months?
Less than \$10,000
\$10,000 to \$14,999
\$15,000 to \$24,999
\$25,000 to \$34,999

\$35,000 to \$49,999
\$50,000 to \$74,999
\$75,000 to \$99,999
\$100,000 to \$149,999
\$150,000 to \$199,999
\$200,000 or more

30) What is your race and ethnicity (Check all that apply)

African American
American Indian/Alaskan Native
Asian
Hispanic/Latino
Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander
White
Other (please specify)

[End of survey]