

Spring 6-8-2018

## Toward Pay Equity: A Motivational Intervention to Reduce Gender Differences in Salary Negotiations

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Toward Pay Equity: A Motivational Intervention to  
Reduce Gender Differences in  
Salary Negotiations

A Dissertation

Presented in

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The Department of Psychology

DePaul University

By

Mary Margaret Keegin

April 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2018

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## **Acknowledgements**

First and foremost, I would like to thank my dissertation chair, Alice Stuhlmacher, for her patience and guidance. I would also like to thank my grandparents, my parents, my sister Catherine, my close friends, and my co-workers for their genuine interest and support of this pursuit. Finally, I would like to thank Malcolm – words don't capture how grateful I am to have had you stick with me through this process.

## **Biography**

The author was born in Muskegon, Michigan, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 1990. She graduated from Grand Haven High School, and received her Bachelor of Science degree with Honor in Psychology from Michigan State University in 2012. She received her Master of Arts degree in Industrial/Organizational Psychology from DePaul University in 2014.

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## **Abstract**

A persistent wage gap exists between women and men in the United States (Catalyst, 2015; Hegewisch, Ellis, & Hartmann, 2015). Although the reasons behind the wage gap are extremely complex, one of the methods through which pay equity may be reached could involve altering the way people approach their goals at the bargaining table, especially since women tend to underperform relative to men in salary negotiations (Mazei, Hüffmeier, Freund, Stuhlmacher, Bilke, & Hertel, 2015). Salary negotiations represent a critical piece of the pay equity puzzle, particularly when individuals are starting their careers. If equally qualified men and women begin their careers negotiating different starting salaries, what may begin as a small difference in pay snowballs to a significant difference in lifetime earnings, and that does not account for other factors like promotions or bonuses. The present study found evidence that supports the use of a motivational intervention for salary negotiations derived from regulatory focus theory (RFT) to reduce gender differences in salary negotiation outcomes. Specifically, women in the role of a job candidate who were told to consciously frame a salary negotiation as an opportunity and instructed to use an eagerness strategy (i.e., focus on attaining one's aspiration salary value) achieved better negotiated outcomes (i.e., first offer, starting salary) compared to a condition where no specific strategy was assigned. There was also a main effect of the eagerness strategy on first offers and final negotiated salary. The current research also integrated the existing literature on gender differences in negotiation. Women in the eagerness strategy condition anticipated less backlash (i.e., social penalties

due to violations of traditional gender role norms) for negotiating compared to the control condition. Lastly, priming job candidates' regulatory strategy (i.e., eagerness strategy versus control condition) was tested for its role in subjective outcomes such as feelings of satisfaction with the negotiation and perceptions of one's counterpart. Individuals in the eagerness strategy condition did not differ in their satisfaction with negotiated outcomes (i.e., salary), the negotiation process, perceptions of their own competence, and perceptions of their counterpart compared to the control condition.

## Introduction

Negotiation represents a process that occurs in a variety of contexts. Individuals engage in negotiation when they discuss their salary and benefits at a new job, bargain with sellers at antique shows, conduct business-to-business transactions, and allocate domestic responsibilities. As such, it is important that people are effective at conducting negotiations, whether they be formal or informal, to attain desired goals and outcomes.

An area of increasing research concerns the role of self-regulation as a mechanism through which negotiators execute their bargaining strategy and achieve their goals (Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 2005; Appelt, Zou, Arora, & Higgins, 2009; Appelt & Higgins, 2010). Broadly, self-regulation comprises a set of cognitive processes that guide an individual's thoughts, behaviors, and emotions while pursuing desired end states, or goals (Bandura, 1991; Kanfer, 1990). Within the last decade, negotiation scholars have begun examining the role of regulatory focus, which describes the manner in which individuals pursue their goals using either *approach* focused mindsets that view tasks as opportunities for advancement and growth, thus framing the pursuit of goals in terms of gains, or *avoidance* focused mindsets that view tasks as responsibilities, duties, or obligations and thus frame goal pursuit in terms of avoiding losses (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998; Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001). Recent research applying regulatory focus to negotiation has found that there may be general advantages to adopting the gain framing common to the promotion focus, while the loss avoidance

strategy common to the prevention focus could be advantageous under different circumstances (e.g., individuals have very high goals) (Galinsky et al., 2005; Trotschel et al., 2013). One interesting arena where some theories of self-regulation have been applied but have yet to incorporate recent developments in the literature concerns gender differences in negotiation.

Women in particular may benefit from an intervention that could alleviate distractions to goal pursuit during negotiation. Since women still only hold 5.2% of Fortune 500 CEO positions and are only earning an estimated \$0.82 for every dollar paid to men, organizations and scholars alike must consider opportunities to help qualified women achieve equal outcomes relative to their male counterparts (Catalyst, 2017; Hegewisch, Ellis, & Hartmann, 2015). Women do not report setting any less ambitious career goals compared to men, yet they are less likely to hold senior management positions, have people directly reporting to them, and report feeling less satisfied with their careers compared to men (Ely, Stone, & Ammerman, 2014).

Women's lower average performance in salary negotiations compared to men is often cited as a contributing factor to the gender pay gap (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; Bowles & McGinn, 2008; Kulik & Olekalns, 2012; Mazei et al., 2015). One of the biggest reasons why a self-regulation intervention may be preferable to other interventions is that women are not overtly instructed to alter their behavior in any way. Rather, the way in which individuals are instructed to pursue their goals is manipulated such that women's tendency to fear or avoid stereotypically masculine-typed negotiations (e.g., salary negotiation) can be

reduced by changing the way negotiation strategies are framed. The current research differs from other interventions to reduce gender differences in negotiation, which have largely placed the burden on women negotiators to adjust their behavior. In one study, Amanatullah and Morris (2010) found that women who use assertive bargaining tactics receive harsher social penalties (i.e., backlash) and negotiate worse deals compared to women who negotiate using more relational tactics (i.e., negotiating on behalf of someone). The authors' advice for women was to enhance the perception of the advocacy role across negotiations by couching requests in terms of how it may benefit others (e.g., the organization, subordinates). Others have recommended that women "lean in" and negotiate more often, defying traditional female prescriptions for behavior by enhancing their ambition and commitment (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Sandberg, 2013).

### **Negotiation**

Negotiation can be defined as the "deliberate interactions of two or more complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine the terms of their interdependence" (Walton & McKersie, 1965, p. 3) or "the process by which people with conflicting interests determine how they are going to allocate resources or work together in the future" (Brett, 2007, p. 1). A key trait of negotiations is that they are inherently interdependent (or perceived as such), meaning that the desires or goals of one party influence what the other party can have, and vice versa. Negotiation is an especially compelling research topic given that it has applications in both formal (e.g., negotiating roles for a new work

project) and informal settings (e.g., negotiating household chores), meaning that most people will be engaged in a negotiation during some time in their lives, and would benefit from understanding how to negotiate successfully (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). However, there are a few core characteristics that define negotiation differently from other forms of conflict resolution. Specifically, negotiations involve parties (i.e., individuals or groups) that have, or perceive to have, conflicts of interest, are engaged in communication (face-to-face or other mediums), are able to make compromises by making offers and counteroffers to one another, are part of a negotiation voluntarily (i.e., not by coercion), the parties' outcomes are determined jointly, and mixed-motives exist such that both parties' are motivated to compete for their own best interest as well as cooperate with one another (Rubin & Brown, 1975; Schelling, 1960). At a more granular level, negotiations are defined as either distributive or integrative in terms of their structure.

### **Distributive versus integrative negotiations**

One critical distinction made in negotiation research is the structure as either distributive or integrative. In *distributive* negotiations, the interests of the negotiating parties are in direct opposition to one another, where the gains achieved by one party are directly proportional to the losses incurred by their counterpart (de Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007; Walton & McKersie, 1965). One example of a distributive negotiation would be a buyer-seller, single-issue structure for the price of a car. The price that the seller receives for the car is directly proportional to the money the buyer must spend (i.e., lose). Contrary to



distributive negotiations, integrative negotiations typically involve multiple issues where negotiators' interests may still be opposed, but the priorities may differ across topics and trade-offs are possible (Walton & McKersie, 1965).

In a classic example of an integrative negotiation, two sisters are discussing who should get an orange, eventually agreeing to split the orange in half; each sister throwing out the part of the orange they didn't want (Follett, 1924). At first blush, it would appear that this is a distributive negotiation (i.e., if one sister gets the orange, the other gets nothing; therefore, the best option would be to split the orange in half to distribute the resource evenly). However, if the sisters had negotiated effectively, they would have discovered that one wanted the rind of the orange for its zest in making a cake, while the other wanted the inside of the fruit for juice. To truly maximize the distribution of the resource (i.e., the orange), and get what they truly desired (i.e., the rind or the fruit itself, respectively), the sisters would have needed to communicate openly to identify their positions and interests.

As you can imagine, many real-world negotiations are integrative in nature, but may not be perceived as such by the parties involved due the strong tendency to believe that most negotiation scenarios involve a finite set of goods or resources, and therefore one party's gain is the other's loss. This is called the "fixed-pie bias" (de Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). The fixed-pie bias can create a set of expectations that lead negotiators to engage in ineffective negotiation tactics that may lead to impasse (i.e., no deal), or an inefficient distribution of resources like the story of the sisters and the orange.

Negotiated agreements can therefore be evaluated as *Pareto efficient*, no other agreement exists that would make either party better off without sacrificing outcomes of the other parties involved, or *Pareto inefficient*, where there are unexplored alternative deals that would benefit one party without hurting the other (Raiffa, Richardson, & Metcalfe, 2002).

One setting where negotiation skills are often put to the test in a high-stakes environment is in salary negotiations. In salary negotiations, newly hired employees must balance their desire to maximize their starting salary while minimizing the potential of offending their new employer by coming across as too demanding. On the other side of the table, employers must maximize their desire to satisfy the new employee's desire for a competitive salary while minimizing consequences for a salary that is too high. Individuals involved in salary negotiations may possess a *reservation value*; the minimum salary the employee would accept or the maximum salary the employer would offer, the *target value*; the salary both employee and employer would respectively view as acceptable, and the *aspiration value*; the maximum salary the employee would like to receive or the minimum salary the employer would like to offer (Walton & McKersie, 1965). In setting these values, both parties decide on a value that would constitute their *opening offer* during the negotiation. The opening offer could be different from the reservation, target, or aspiration values, but is typically more effective when it is close to the aspiration value (de Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007). One other value that may affect a salary negotiation is the BATNA (i.e., best alternative to a negotiated agreement), for example, another job offer (for the

candidate) or job candidate (for the hiring manager) exists. Negotiators often consider their reservation, target, and aspiration values in conjunction with their BATNA.

It is important to note that goals in negotiation go beyond economic values, and also include subjective outcomes. For example, negotiators are more likely to report a desire to work with their counterpart in the future when they report feeling more satisfied with the final terms of the negotiation, trust their counterpart, and feel their negotiation experience was a fair process (Curhan, Xu, & Elfenbein, 2006).

Therefore, an important skill in negotiation is planning (i.e., setting goals) and executing a strategy so negotiators can get what they desire (i.e., attain their goals) and feel satisfied with economic and interpersonal outcomes. One area of the literature that has been applied to understand this process is self-regulation. I will first broadly describe self-regulation, the process that drives goal selection and attainment, and then discuss a more specific theory of self-regulation, called regulatory focus theory.

### **Self-regulation**

*Self-regulation*, or the cognitive process through which individuals monitor and guide their thoughts, behaviors, and emotions over time in the selection and pursuit of goals (Bandura, 1991; Kanfer, 1990). A goal is defined as “the object or aim of an action” (Locke & Latham, 2002, p. 705), such as the attainment of a specific level of performance on a task within a pre-determined amount of time. Goals direct behavior in that “they direct attention and effort

toward goal-related activities and away from goal irrelevant activities” (Locke & Latham, 2002, p. 705), provide an energizing function such that individuals who set goals commit more effort towards goal-attainment, improve persistence over time on goal-related activities, and affect cognition such that individuals are cued to apply preexisting or closely related knowledge and skills to goal-relevant tasks and plan strategies for goal-attainment. Self-regulation is activated when individuals, consciously or unconsciously, recognize a discrepancy between their current state and a desired state (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Goals are a representation of these desired end states to the individual, and guide the focus of self-regulatory activities (Vancouver & Day, 2005).

Although theoretical descriptions of the forces that activate and perpetuate self-regulation differ, they typically include the interdependent concepts of *goal choice* and *goal striving*. Goal choice is a process through which individuals select one or more goals whereas goal striving is the process through which individuals engage in the execution of strategies in the pursuit of attaining the goals they set (Diefendorff & Lord, 2008). Other researchers have broken down goal choice into the distinct processes of goal *establishment* (i.e., the adoption, adaptation, or rejection of goals) and *planning* (i.e., the preparation to pursue a goal) (Vancouver & Day, 2005). Lastly, *goal revision*, or the process of changing or abandoning goals, may be utilized as goal pursuit unfolds across time and contexts (Austin & Vancouver, 1996).

Theoretical frameworks developed to describe self-regulation have generally fallen into three camps: structure, phase, and content (Diefendorff &

Lord, 2008). Content theories of self-regulation, of which this research focuses (i.e., regulatory focus theory), are not as interested in specific mechanisms through which self-regulation occurs but rather *how* the activities or goals that individuals pursue affects self-regulatory processes and outcomes (c.f., Grant & Dweck, 1990). The current research emphasizes a theory from this family: Regulatory focus theory (i.e., RFT). In the following sections, I will describe regulatory focus theory and how it has been examined within the context of negotiation.

### **Regulatory focus theory**

Regulatory focus theory (RFT) is a content theory of self-regulation that serves to explain the mechanisms through which individuals monitor their cognition, affect, and behavior during goal striving (Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998; Higgins et al., 2001). This operates through two coexisting concepts: Promotion focus and prevention focus. Both foci relate to approach motivation wherein individuals strive to reduce the gap between their current and desired states. RFT states that a single task in which an individual sets a goal may be accomplished through the employment of strategies that reflect either promotion *or* prevention focus. In general, *promotion* focused individuals ensure goal achievement while accomplishing gains while *prevention* focused individuals ensure goal achievement while minimizing losses. As an example, two individuals may set the same goal (e.g., to receive an A in a college course), but one may view this goal as an opportunity to improve their class rank (i.e., promotion focus) and utilize eagerness strategies (e.g., focusing on studying

course materials), while the other views this goal as a requirement to maintain their standing in a degree program (i.e., prevention focus) and utilize vigilance strategies (e.g., minimizing information that is forgotten) to accomplish the goal.

A *promotion* focus theoretically stems from a desire for individuals to fulfill nurturance needs. Nurturance needs represent an individual's needs for growth, achievement, and accomplishment. Promotion focused goals typically revolve around *ideals* (i.e., hopes and aspirations) and opportunities for personal growth. Additionally, a promotion focus is a motivational condition that drives goal striving behaviors based on the presence and absence of positive outcomes. Promotion focused individuals adopt goal-striving strategies that are characterized by "eagerness" behaviors (e.g., working consistently on project tasks, accumulating points in a game) (Higgins, 1997, Higgins et al., 2001).

A *prevention* focus stems from a desire to fulfill security needs. Security needs represent an individual's desire to fulfill their desires for protection, safety, and responsibility (i.e., the "ought" self). Individuals with a prevention focus concentrate on *ought* goals that are related to duties, responsibilities, and obligations. A prevention focus drives goal-striving behaviors based on the presence and absence of negative or undesired outcomes. Prevention focused individuals adopt goal-striving strategies that are characterized by "vigilance" behaviors (e.g., avoiding work that is unrelated to the current project, making as few errors as possible) (Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998; Higgins et al., 2001).

Individuals can be primed to adopt a prevention or promotion focus based on situational framing (Higgins et al., 2001). For example, an individual may be

generally prevention focused, but primed for a promotion focus while playing a video game where ideal, promotion-focused goals are set (e.g., accumulating a certain number of experience points to get to a new level in the game), and players are instructed to attain these goals by going on missions that help them achieve experience points (i.e., utilize eagerness strategies).

A second important factor in RFT relates to the concept of *regulatory fit*, which suggests that congruence between chronic regulatory focus and the manner in which a goal is pursued enhance goal pursuit and task performance.

### **Regulatory fit**

Based on RFT, a promotion focused individual enacts eagerness strategies during goal pursuit while a prevention focused individual enacts vigilance strategies. However, what happens when a promotion focused individual enacts a vigilance strategy (i.e., attain non-loss over a loss) or a prevention focused individual enacts an eagerness (i.e., attain gains over non-gains) strategy, either due to the salience of norms in a goal striving context or through direct instructions? According to *regulatory fit theory*, a direct offshoot of regulatory focus theory, individuals experience fit, a sensation of “feeling right”, when there is a match between their regulatory focus orientation (i.e., promotion or prevention) and the manner of pursuing a goal using eagerness or vigilance strategies. Fit is enhanced for promotion focused individuals when they pursue goals using an eagerness compared to vigilance strategy, whereas prevention focused individuals experience greater fit when they employ a vigilance compared to an eagerness strategy (Higgins, 2000). This feeling of fit increases the

perceived value of goal pursuit and intensifies goal pursuit (Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004; Higgins, 2000; Higgins 2006). For example, Freitas and colleagues (2002) demonstrated that participants experienced greater task engagement (i.e., the extent to which participants thought a task was interesting and enjoyable) when the task instructions denoted fit with their chronic regulatory focus; promotion focused participants were more engaged when the task involved circling matching shapes (i.e., a task that elicits an eagerness strategy) versus crossing out mismatched shapes (i.e., a task that elicits a vigilance strategy) while prevention focused participants were more engaged when the task involved crossing out mismatched shapes versus circling matching shapes (Freitas, Liberman, Salovey, & Higgins, 2002). Regulatory fit also positively influences task performance, goal completion, and subjective feelings of satisfaction (Keller & Bless, 2006; Park, Van Dyne, & Ilgen, 2013; Spiegel, Grant-Pillow, & Higgins, 2004).

**RFT in organizational psychology.** In a meta-analysis by Lanaj, Chang, and Johnson (2012), the role of regulatory focus was examined within an organizational context as a mediating process that links more distal factors such as goal orientation and personality to work-related outcomes such as task performance and organizational citizenship behaviors (i.e., OCBs). This comes from recommendations suggesting that distal traits predict performance through self-regulatory processes (Kanfer, 1990; 1992). Regulatory focus was examined meta-analytically and explained incremental variance in task performance after controlling for nine other predictors (learning goal orientation, performance-



approach goal orientation, performance-avoid goal orientation, self-efficacy, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, openness, agreeableness). These nine predictors explained 41% of the variance in task performance. Regulatory focus explained an additional 13% of the variance in task performance.

Regulatory focus was also ranked the fourth most predictive variable for task performance in terms of relative importance, following conscientiousness, self-efficacy, and learning goal orientation.

Specifically, Lanaj et al., (2012) found that a promotion focus is positively associated with approach temperaments, including extraversion ( $\rho = .36$ ), positive affectivity ( $\rho = .39$ ), the behavioral activation system ( $\rho = .45$ ), learning goal orientation ( $\rho = .47$ ), performance approach goal orientation ( $\rho = .40$ ), and self-efficacy ( $\rho = .24$ ). Promotion focus was also positively associated with task performance ( $\rho = .38$ ), OCBs (i.e., organizational citizenship behaviors) ( $\rho = .30$ ), and innovative performance ( $\rho = .28$ ).

Prevention focus was positively associated with avoidance temperaments, such as neuroticism ( $\rho = .21$ ), negative affectivity ( $\rho = .23$ ), behavioral inhibition system ( $\rho = .39$ ), and performance-avoid goal orientation ( $\rho = .26$ ). Prevention focus was also positively associated with conscientiousness ( $\rho = .32$ ), and safety performance ( $\rho = .51$ ).

Promotion and prevention foci are theoretically distinct and statistically orthogonal to one another rather than two ends of a single, bipolar continuum (Higgins, 1997). Theoretically, an individual could, on average across situations, utilize vigilance (prevention) and eagerness (promotion) strategies during goal

attainment, although this effect has not yet been empirically tested. Similar to non-linear or curvilinear relationships found in other research (c.f., Ferris et al., 2011), there may be a number of work-related contexts where a focus on both prevention and promotion would yield optimal outcomes. Indeed, one of the strongest statistical relationships with both promotion *and* prevention focus in the meta-analysis by Lanaj, Chang, and Johnson (2012) was conscientiousness, a Big 5 personality variable that consistently predicts important work-based outcomes such as task performance. Therefore, when both approach and avoidance-oriented goal strategies are employed, motivation strength and performance may be optimized (Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001; McCrae & Lockenhoff, 2010).

In relation to regulatory fit, Wallace and Chen (2006) found that a promotion focus enabled productivity when operationalized as working quickly, but was negatively related to safety performance, operationalized as compliance with safety-related rules and regulations. A prevention focus resulted in higher safety performance but lowered productivity. Similarly, a study by Crowe and Higgins (1997) found that prevention-focused participants outperformed promotion-focused participants on a task requiring accuracy, whereas promotion-focused participants outperformed prevention-focused participants on a task requiring creative solutions.

### **Regulatory focus theory in negotiation**

RFT has been applied to negotiation research within the last decade, consistent with the broader trend to incorporate theories of self-regulation in the organizational psychology literature. Regulatory focus research in negotiation has

examined its effects on several negotiation variables, including self-set goals (e.g., reservation, aspiration, or target value), opening first offers, size and frequency of concessions, and economic outcomes (e.g., value claimed by individual negotiators, value created at the dyad level). Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, and Mussweiler (2005) examined the role of regulatory focus within the context of goal striving in negotiations. In Study 1, the authors found that recruiters with a chronic promotion focus achieved better outcomes for themselves (i.e., the agreed-upon salary for the candidate was lower) in a two-party, distributive salary negotiation compared to chronically prevention focused individuals ( $r = -.40, p < .05$ ). Promotion focus led to a stronger focus on target values ( $r=.44, p < .05$ ) in the negotiation compared to prevention focus; however, this was only examined for individuals in the recruiter role. In Study 2, negotiators with a promotion focus made more extreme, self-serving opening offers compared to prevention focused negotiators; this effect was also examined only for those in a buyer role. In the last study, Galinsky and colleagues (2005) demonstrated that dyads with a collective promotion focus were more likely to achieve Pareto efficient outcomes compared to dyads with a collective prevention focus in an integrative bargaining scenario.

Regulatory fit has also been examined within the context of negotiations to explain the tendency for negotiators in certain roles, namely buyer or seller, to utilize different strategies. Appelt, Zou, Arora, and Higgins (2009) found an effect for role as a buyer or seller on strategies employed during negotiation and perceptions of fit with the buyer or seller role. They suggested that buyers tended

to experience fit when they adopted a prevention focus due to the desire to ensure non-loss against loss (i.e., pay as little as possible) whereas sellers experience fit when they adopt a promotion focus due to the desire to ensure gains against non-gains (i.e., receive the highest price). Appelt and Higgins (2010) measured participants' regulatory focus (i.e., promotion or prevention), and manipulated their strategy (i.e., eagerness or vigilance) and role (i.e. buyer or seller) in a distributive price negotiation to examine the influence of fit on negotiated outcomes. Specifically, they measured the influence of focus-strategy fit and role-strategy fit, finding that buyers and prevention-focused individuals felt greater fit when utilizing vigilance strategies, while sellers and promotion-focused individuals felt greater fit when utilizing eagerness strategies. Negotiators experiencing fit planned to make more demanding offers. Additionally, men were more likely to adopt gain frames (i.e., view the negotiation as an opportunity to create value, minimize loss, attain resources, and maintain resources), experienced greater subjective feelings of fit, and planned to make higher demands compared to women (Appelt & Higgins, 2010).

The prevention-focused buyer and promotion-focused seller finding stands in line with previous research that has found buyers focus on the money they must pay as a loss versus sellers, who focus on the money to be received as a gain (Carmon & Ariely, 2000; Monga & Zhu, 2005; Neale et al., 1987). Subsequently, buyers and sellers frame negotiations differently. Similarly, recruiters or employers are potentially prevention-focused while candidates are promotion-focused within the context of salary negotiations (Galinsky et al., 2005). As such,

the negotiator role dictates the strategy choices; namely, buyers will adopt a vigilance strategy that ensures non-losses (i.e., spending only as much money as is necessary) while sellers will adopt an eagerness strategy that ensures gains (i.e., receiving as much money as possible) (Higgins, 2000). Therefore, buyers' goal of minimizing losses is optimized by a vigilant strategy, while sellers' goal of maximizing gains is optimized by an eagerness strategy.

Building on this research, Shalvi and colleagues (2013) found an interesting effect such that buyers who are chronically prevention focused are more averse to engaging in negotiation compared to promotion focused buyers; prevention focused buyers were significantly more likely than promotion focused buyers to exit a negotiation when confronted with a simulated counterpart that engaged in a tough negotiation strategy (i.e., was less willing to concede and made demanding offers) compared to a soft strategy. However, when prevention focused buyers were informed of the potential for integrative agreements, they were more likely to reach mutually beneficial negotiated agreements compared to promotion focused buyers. Additionally, Trötschel and colleagues (2013) used a distributive price negotiation established from prior research (c.f., Galinsky et al., 2005) and found that prevention focused parties who set high goals were more resistant to concession-making compared to their promotion focused counterparts, regardless of whether the counterpart held high or low goals.

More nuanced than broad meta-analytic evidence about regulatory focus on performance (c.f., Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2012), negotiation research might suggest that chronically prevention focused individuals are at an advantage as a

seller in distributive buyer-seller negotiations. However, Ten Velden, Beersma, and de Dreu (2009) offer a slightly different take on regulatory focus theory by contextualizing promotion and prevention focus to negotiation in their operationalization of negotiator motivation. Specifically, they defined appetitive competitors, who are motivated to win from their counterpart, a relative gain, versus aversive competitors, who are motivated to avoid losing from their counterpart (a relative non-loss). These concepts are distinct from promotion focus and prevention focus because appetitive and aversive competition specify desired end states (i.e., winning or not losing to the counterpart) whereas regulatory foci do not, although they are generally characterized by a concern for accomplishment and obtaining a positive event (i.e., promotion focus) or safety and avoiding a negative event (i.e., prevention focus). Ten Velden et al. (2009) found a main effect such that aversive competitors made lower initial demands compared to appetitive competitors in a buyer-seller negotiation, and this effect was mediated by feelings of anxiety. Based on earlier research (c.f., Ten Velden, Beersma, & de Dreu, 2008), aversive competitors are more likely to settle than appetitive competitors and are more likely to feel satisfied by an even split in a negotiation compared to appetitive competitors.

Collectively, this research suggests that negotiators' chronic regulatory focus can influence negotiated outcomes such that promotion focused individuals achieve better negotiated outcomes, likely through more demanding initial offers and lower resistance to negotiating (Galinsky et al., 2005, Shalvi et al., 2013). The role of a negotiator as buyer or seller (or as employer/recruiter or candidate)

should be in line with the strategies employed (i.e., prevention focused buyers and promotion focused sellers) to enhance perceptions of fit, which serve to increase the magnitude of goal pursuit (Appelt et al., 2009; Appelt & Higgins, 2010). Lastly, negotiators who are chronically prevention focused could overcome a potential disadvantage in distributive buyer-seller negotiations by enhancing their perception of integrative potential and setting high goals (Trötschel et al., 2013; Ten Velden Beersma, & de Dreu, 2009). Taken together, these effects are expected to be replicated in the current paradigm such that negotiators primed with an eagerness strategy will attain greater economic outcomes in the form of the final negotiated salary, make higher first offers, and report feeling more satisfied with the negotiation. Perceptions of fit will mediate the relationship between primed regulatory strategy and these outcomes.

One arena that RFT has not yet been applied is within the gender differences in negotiation literature. Recent research has suggested gender differences in the tendency to adopt gain or non-loss frames, and experiences of regulatory fit (c.f., Appelt & Higgins, 2010). Given evidence that there are gender differences in negotiation outcomes, especially in salary negotiations (i.e., largely a distributive negotiation context), interventions informed by RFT seem promising.

### **Gender differences in negotiation research**

Gender differences in negotiation have been examined for many decades. Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999) conducted the first meta-analysis of gender effects in negotiation outcomes, showing a small but significant effect for a

negotiation advantage favoring men. An update and expansion of that meta-analysis by Mazei et al. (2015) found even larger and more variable effect sizes (ranging from Hedges  $g$  of -2.07 to  $g$  of 2.14) than the 1999 study. Situations that were predicted to advantage men were compared to situations that were predicted to advantage women. When women negotiators were in situations that were favorable to the female gender role (i.e., clear bargaining range, previous negotiation experience, negotiating on behalf of another person), their outcomes equaled or exceeded those of male negotiators. Additional research has found that gender differences are eliminated if negotiations are framed as a learning situation rather than diagnostic of ability (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001) or potential negotiations are re-framed as opportunities to “ask” rather than negotiate (Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007). However, in situations that are masculine-stereotyped (e.g., salary negotiations) or otherwise induce feelings of a lack of fit with the negotiator role, women are still disadvantaged compared to men (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bear & Babcock, 2012; Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007).

Amanatullah and Morris (2010) found that women’s lower outcomes in a negotiation for entry-level salary compared to men was explained by their fear of being judged as too demanding or aggressive, and thus violating prescriptive gender stereotypes requiring women to be warm and agreeable (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Women are often justified in expecting these reactions to their behavior in negotiations, as they are often penalized for engaging in assertive negotiation tactics (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; Bowles et al., 2007; Small et al., 2005). As



a result, women likely experience the self-fulfilling prophecy of negotiating worse outcomes. The existence of beliefs that women are worse negotiators compared to men results in negotiation counterparts treating women differently, and women end up behaving in a manner that confirms these beliefs due to the fear of backlash for violating gender stereotypes (Kennedy & Kray, 2015). For example, Bowles, Babcock, and Lai (2007) conducted a series of compensation negotiation studies which revealed that female negotiators employing traditional negotiation tactics received penalties in the context of short term outcomes where counterparts were less likely to grant their salary requests and long-term outcomes where counterparts reported less willingness to work with them in the future compared male negotiators.

Gender stereotypes associate men with agentic qualities such as competence, ambition, assertiveness, and competitiveness while women are associated with communal qualities such as warmth, caring, emotive, and supportive (Eagly & Kite, 1987). These stereotypes, according to *social role theory*, arise from women's traditional role as homemakers and men's traditional role as breadwinners, which still holds true today even as women comprise 47% of the U.S. labor market (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). Many negotiation contexts subsequently associate agentic qualities with success, and characterize negotiations as masculine in nature (Bowles & Kray, 2013). Women may attempt to engage in stereotypically masculine behaviors (e.g., assertive or demanding offers) during a negotiation, but this often results in sanctions from the counterpart in the form of negative perceptions of the assertive woman negotiator.

Bowles and colleagues (2007) had participants read a transcript of a conversation between an employer and a man or woman job candidate about a job offer. The job candidate either did not negotiate, used moderate language to negotiate (i.e., “I would like to get paid at the top of that range”) or used strong language to negotiate (i.e., “I think I should be paid at the top of that range. This is really important to me; I think I deserve it.”). The male candidate was evaluated similarly by participants across all conditions. For the female candidate who negotiated using moderate or strong language, participants reported feeling significantly less interested in working with her, and perceived her as being more demanding and less likable. This study illustrates the Catch-22 for women negotiators, who often feel they must choose between economic gains or positive social perceptions. Additionally, women are more likely than men to be targets of deception in negotiation, thus leading them to make deals under false pretenses that result in worse outcomes (Kray, Kennedy, & Van Zant, 2014). Another recent study found that men insisted on receiving higher salaries from a woman hiring manager compared to a man hiring manager as a result of men experiencing higher implicit threat (Netchaeva, Kouchaki, & Sheppard, 2015). Lastly, a study by Kray and Haselhuhn (2012) found that men experiencing threat to their masculinity were more likely to use unethical bargaining tactics; this effect was not present for women.

In line with these findings, women are more likely to report a greater dislike of negotiating (Kray & Babcock, 2006), report lower negotiation self-efficacy (Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993), and are more likely to anticipate what

is known as *backlash*, or negative evaluations of their likability, if they engage in agentic behaviors that would improve perceptions of their negotiation competence (Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004). A recent study by Williams and Tiedans (2015) reinforced the backlash concept, finding that women's likability ( $d = -.28$ ) and hireability ( $d = -.58$ ) is harmed by overt displays of dominance (e.g., in the form of direct demands), both of which have direct implications for negotiation. In addition to these effects of backlash, Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Glick, and Phelan (2012) describe how women's fear of backlash can inhibit self-regulatory processes in their *backlash avoidance model*, which incorporates RFT.

### **Integrating RFT into gender and negotiation research**

According to the backlash avoidance model (i.e., BAM), when women fear backlash for violating gender stereotypes, they are more likely to enter a cautious, evaluative, and preventative self-regulatory mode to avoid backlash that subsequently detracts from the ability to engage in unconstrained goal pursuit (Rudman et al., 2012; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Thus, fear of backlash primes a prevention focus, and women's ability to engage in effective self-promotion (i.e., "pointing with pride to one's accomplishments, speaking directly about one's strengths and talents, and making internal rather than external attributions for achievements") behaviors declines, even in situations that require it (i.e., negotiation) for success (Rudman, 1998, p. 629). In a structural equation model of their theory, Rudman and colleagues (2012) found that fear of backlash negatively predicted acute promotion focus and positively predicted acute prevention focus. Following this, regulatory focus predicted success in self-

promotion; the direct path from fear of backlash to self-promotion was significant, thus indicating partial mediation by regulatory focus. Indeed, women's fear of backlash mediated gender differences in a salary negotiation study by Amanatullah and Morris (2010). According to BAM, fear of backlash for successful performance can hurt women negotiators' outcomes rather than actual differences in women's and men's negotiation abilities.

Based on the recent additions to the negotiation literature concerning RFT and gender differences in framing and perceptions of fit in distributive buyer-seller negotiations (Appelt & Higgins, 2010) and the extant research on gender differences in negotiation, an integration of BAM and RFT could inform an intervention designed to improve women's negotiation success in arenas where they are still traditionally disadvantaged. Specifically, an intervention could be designed to minimize women's fear of backlash in a context where gender differences exist: salary negotiations. By incorporating research on regulatory fit, the BAM may be adapted such that women negotiators who experience fit between their role in a salary negotiation as a candidate (i.e., promotion focus) and goal pursuit strategy (i.e., eagerness) may report less fear of backlash compared to women who experience a misfit between their role as a job candidate and goal pursuit strategy (i.e., vigilance) or women in a control group; this runs contrary to the BAM's model where fear of backlash instigates an acute promotion or prevention focus. Due to the research on fit and promotion focus generally, women may overcome fear of backlash in a salary negotiation and

engage in more assertive negotiation tactics when they experience *role-strategy* fit in anticipation of the actual negotiation.

Role-strategy fit may serve as a mechanism through which women can feel justified in adopting goal pursuit strategies in negotiation. Therefore, women who experience role-strategy fit as a result of being primed to enact eagerness strategies are predicted to be more objectively (i.e., economically) and subjectively (i.e., feeling satisfied, reduced fear of backlash) successful compared to women in a control group. “Eager” negotiators are those who focus on attaining their aspiration values in a negotiation. Priming an eager negotiator in a salary negotiation would look like an overt focus on reaching one’s aspiration salary. Therefore, women primed to be eager job candidates in a salary negotiation may achieve better economic outcomes compared to women in a control group.

Similarly, women who are primed to be eager job candidates may make higher first offers compared to women in a control group. Other research has demonstrated that negotiators who make higher first offers in distributive settings (i.e., salary negotiations) often claim more value compared to negotiators who make lower first offers (Buelens & Van Poucke, 2004). One explanation for this “first offer effect” is that a counterpart becomes cognitively anchored to the salary negotiations. If women employ an eagerness strategy where they focus on setting and attaining a higher aspiration value, this may have downstream effects by minimizing the perception of risk for negotiating for a competitive salary. Women with an eagerness strategy may be more likely to initiate first offers, increase the value of first offers, resist counteroffers, and attain a higher negotiated salary

compared to using no particular strategy. Overall, negotiators with an eagerness strategy are predicted to make higher first offers compared to those in a control group as they are likely cognitively “anchored” to their aspiration salary rather than an arbitrary salary value (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001).

In addition to the influence on economic outcomes of the negotiation, it is also expected that women using an eagerness strategy will report lower expectations of backlash compared to women in a control group. Theoretically, priming women to enact eagerness strategies may induce a general promotion focus. Previous research has established a relationship between a promotion focus and positive temperaments and emotional states, and prevention focus and neutral or slightly more negative emotional states (e.g., anxiousness) (c.f., Higgins et al., 2001). Focusing on implementing an eagerness strategy could manifest as positive feelings about an upcoming salary negotiation, thus reducing fear of backlash and anxiety related to negotiating. As a result, women using an eagerness strategy may report lower expectations for social backlash compared to women in a control group. In addition, it is expected that anticipated backlash could mediate the relationship between gender and negotiated outcomes, thus replicating predictions from the BAM.

Lastly, women who use an eagerness strategy are expected to report greater feelings of satisfaction with the negotiation and final negotiated salary. Similar to the logic described regarding anticipated backlash, the eagerness strategy prime may enhance positive feelings in addition to serving as a means through which desired goals are more likely to be attained in the negotiation. As

seen in previous research, individuals who attain their goals in negotiation report feeling more satisfied (Curhan et al., 2006). If negotiators who use an eagerness strategy attain higher negotiated salaries on average compared to negotiators who do not use any particular strategy, it is likely they also report greater feelings of satisfaction. As a result, it is expected that women who use an eagerness strategy will report greater subjective feelings of satisfaction with the negotiation compared to women who don't use any particular strategy.

To elicit the strongest effects of these predictions, the current research will utilize trained male confederates to play the role of a hiring manager in a salary negotiation. This approach is similar to previous research that used experimental manipulations aimed at reducing gender differences in negotiation (Stevens et al., 1993; Tellhed & Björklund, 2011). Since the gender of one's negotiation counterpart influences behavior, controlling for this effect as much as possible will present a clearer picture of the influence of an eagerness strategy on gender differences in a salary negotiation.

## Hypotheses

Regulatory focus was predicted to relate to negotiation strategies, perceptions, and outcomes, and produce distinct gender differences when manipulated. The following hypotheses describe these predictions in greater detail.

Hypothesis 1A. The eagerness strategy will lead to negotiating significantly higher final salaries compared to no specific strategy.

Hypothesis 1B. The eagerness strategy will lead to significantly higher first offers compared to no specific strategy.

Hypothesis 1C. The eagerness strategy will lead to significantly higher average feelings of negotiation satisfaction compared to no specific strategy.

Hypothesis 2. Women will report significantly higher chronic prevention focus compared to men.

Hypothesis 3A. There will be an interaction between gender and strategy on negotiated outcome such that women who use an eagerness strategy will negotiate significantly higher final salaries compared to women who use no specific strategy.

Hypothesis 3B. There will be an interaction between gender and strategy on first offers such that women who use an eagerness strategy will negotiate significantly higher first offers compared to women who use no specific strategy.

Hypothesis 3C. There will be an interaction between gender and strategy on subjective outcomes such that women who use an eagerness strategy will report



significantly higher negotiation satisfaction compared to women who use no specific strategy.

Hypothesis 4A. Women will report significantly higher anticipated negotiation backlash compared to men.

Hypothesis 4B. Women who use an eagerness strategy will report significantly lower anticipated negotiation backlash compared to women who use no specific strategy.

Hypothesis 5. Anticipated negotiation backlash will mediate the relationship between gender and final negotiated salary.

### **Method**

This research utilized a 2 (eagerness strategy, free choice strategy) X 2 (male, female) between-subjects factorial design to examine male and female participants in a salary negotiation regarding their expectations of backlash, their negotiated outcomes (i.e., first offer and final negotiated salary), and negotiation satisfaction (i.e., terms of the negotiation, overall feelings of satisfaction and competence following the negotiation, feelings about the negotiation process, and feelings about the negotiation counterpart).

The following sections describe the proposed participant sample, scales and measures for use including the negotiation simulation and intervention materials, and the procedures of the research protocol.

### **Research Participants**

The current research required a sample size of 130 participants total per the power analysis tool G\*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). In

G\*Power, the following a priori assumptions were used to determine sample size given: confidence level (i.e., 95%), power (i.e., .90), predicted effect size (i.e.,  $d=.20$ ), and proposed analyses which include ANCOVAs of at most a 2 X 2 design, and mediation. The confidence interval was set at 95% in line with standards for null hypothesis significance testing (Coolican, 2014). The predicted effect size was estimated using a combination of Cohen's (1992) standards for small effect sizes (i.e.,  $d=.10$ ) and the existing research which has reported similar analyses where the effect size of gender on economic negotiation outcomes (i.e., in distributive settings such as salary negotiations) is typically between  $d=.1$  and  $d=.3$  (Mazei et al., 2015). The relationship between regulatory focus and economic negotiation outcomes has previously been estimated at  $d=.3$  (Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2013).

Participants were drawn from two sources. The first source of participants was through DePaul's research participant pool and the second source was from campus recruiting of non-research pool participants.

### **Procedure**

Participants were recruited through the research participant pool or campus recruitment efforts were directed to a lab on the Lincoln Park Campus. Participants were asked to read and sign an informed consent document which outlined the requirements for their participation (i.e., 18 years of age or older, ability to speak, read, and write English fluently) and notified that they could end their participation at any time (Appendix A). Research participant pool participants were given 1.5 credits for their participation and non-research pool

participants received a \$10 Amazon gift card at the conclusion of the experiment. There were two separate consent forms.

To elicit the strongest control for the hypotheses, the research utilized trained male confederates to play the role of a hiring manager in a salary negotiation. This approach is similar to previous research that has used trained confederates in a paradigm which tests an intervention aimed at reducing gender differences in negotiation (Stevens et al., 1993; Tellhed & Björklund, 2011). Because the gender of one's negotiation counterpart can influence behavior (c.f., Amanatullah & Morris, 2010), controlling for this effect will present a clearer picture of the influence of the regulatory focus manipulation on gender differences in a salary negotiation.

Participants were informed that they would negotiate with another participant and were not informed that a confederate played the role of the hiring manager until the conclusion of the study. Three confederates (i.e., two male undergraduate students and one male graduate student) were trained on the experimental protocol as well as a script that was loosely derived from similar negotiation research that used confederates. The confederates were trained on a script that detailed the offers and counteroffers they were to employ throughout the negotiation depending on the participant's (i.e., job candidate's) behavior, including a payoff table (see Appendix B). Confederates were given explicit instructions about the amount of the first offer and the amount to concede following counteroffers made by the participant. Confederates were to concede different amounts to the participants depending on the legitimacy of the

participant's justifications. Legitimate justifications were directly related to the negotiation instructions that participants were provided (e.g., cost of living, offer from another company) or were otherwise directly job-related (e.g., previous experience related to the job such as an internship, research on the competitive salaries offered by others in the field). Justifications that were not considered legitimate were not directly job-related (e.g., paying off debt).

Confederates were instructed to respond using pre-determined phrases (e.g., "I can't accept that salary. Offers are made based on the market value and what competitors are offering") if the participant reiterated a previously used justification, justified their offer or counteroffer using a mix of legitimate and illegitimate justifications, or used an irrelevant justification (i.e., non-job related). Additionally, the confederate was informed to resist the participant on at least two other occasions if the participant continued producing legitimate justifications with subsequent counteroffers beyond the first few exchanges.

Confederates received at least two hours of training prior to interacting with participants. All confederates were instructed to alert the experimenter in the event they knew a participant.

After signing the informed consent form, an experimenter instructed the participants to complete the pre-negotiation questionnaire. Participants responded to two scales, which measured their chronic regulatory focus and negotiation self-efficacy.

**Pre-negotiation questionnaire.** The pre-negotiation materials included the following (in order): The Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (see Appendix C)

and the Negotiation Self-Efficacy (i.e., DSE and ISE) scales (see Appendix D). Next, participants were instructed to read information about the upcoming negotiation, which included the experimental manipulation of regulatory focus.

**Negotiation instructions and manipulation.** Participants were assigned to the role of a job candidate and received written information which described that they were entering a final salary negotiation for a new job. This paradigm was adapted from “The Bonus” (c.f., Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). The negotiation instructions described the job candidate’s background and interests to serve as reasonable justifications during the negotiation (e.g., previous job experience), as well as an alternative to reaching a negotiated agreement (i.e., another job offer with a salary of \$55,000) as well as a salary that served as a high target (\$70,000). All participants received the same background information about the negotiation.

Regulatory focus, the major study variable, was manipulated such that male and female participants were randomly assigned to either the manipulation condition (i.e., instructed to adopt an eagerness strategy for the salary negotiation) or a control condition (i.e., instructed to adopt any strategy for the salary negotiation) (see Appendix E). The eagerness strategy includes a focus on one’s aspiration value (i.e., the maximum salary one wishes to attain from the salary negotiation) and framing the salary negotiation as an opportunity to maximize one’s own outcomes. Conversely, the participants in the control condition could adopt any strategy, which includes an emphasis on the importance of setting a strategy (i.e., specific offers or behaviors that could be effective depending on the

expected behavior of one's counterpart) in salary negotiations. Participants were given ten minutes to prepare and write down their negotiation strategy.

Prior to negotiating, participants completed four items which measure the extent to which they viewed the upcoming negotiation as an opportunity to avoid losses or achieve gains, and anticipated backlash items, which asks the participant to identify the offer (e.g., \$65,000) which would induce negative reactions from the hiring manager (see Appendix F).

Next, the confederate (i.e., hiring manager) was moved to the same room as the participant (i.e., job candidate). The experimenter then instructed the participant and the confederate to begin the negotiation. Participants had up to fifteen minutes to negotiate with the confederate acting as the hiring manager. First offers were recorded by research assistants. If the confederate (i.e., hiring manager) made the first offer, this was noted and the participant's (i.e., job candidate's) counteroffer (i.e., first offer in the negotiation) was recorded.

**Post-negotiation questionnaire.** The post-negotiation questionnaire included the final agreed-upon salary value, the Subjective Value Inventory (Appendix G), experienced backlash items (Appendix H), and demographic items (Appendix I). Given that the experiment required deception, participants were fully debriefed and asked to sign a form to receive credit (Research Participant Pool) or receive a \$10 gift card (non-Research Participant Pool) (Appendix J).

## **Measures**

**Regulatory focus.** The Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (i.e., RFQ) was developed to measure an individual's chronic regulatory focus (Higgins et al.,

2001). The RFQ taps into the prior success that an individual has had in terms of prevention or promotion; people who have successfully used eagerness strategies (i.e., indicative of promotion focus) in the past will likely use eagerness strategies in new situations while people who have successfully used vigilance strategies (i.e., indicative of prevention focus) in the past will likely use vigilance strategies in new situations. The RFQ has 11 items on a 5-point Likert-type scale.

Individuals who have had previous success with eagerness strategies will have a higher promotion score and individuals with previous success with vigilance strategies will have a higher prevention score. An individual can score high on both, on one, or on neither scale. Previous research (Grant & Higgins, 2003; Higgins et al., 2001) has reported Cronbach's alphas of .73 for promotion focus items and .80 for prevention focus items and test-retest reliability of .79 and .81, respectively. Both sub-scales were also significantly related to achievement motivation (Grant & Higgins, 2003; Higgins et al., 2001).

**Negotiation self-efficacy.** The Distributive and Integrative Self-Efficacy (i.e., DSE and ISE) scales measure a negotiator's confidence in their ability to utilize strategies that are specific to distributive or integrative negotiations (Sullivan, O'Connor, & Burris, 2006). Task specific (rather than general) measures of self-efficacy are more predictive of behavior because they target the beliefs associated with engaging in particular behaviors for a given activity (Bandura, 1997). The DSE and ISE each evaluate four tactics that are enacted in either distributive or integrative negotiations (e.g., gaining the upper hand or exchanging concessions), and ask participants to rate their confidence in using

each tactic successfully in a negotiation on a 100-point scale where 0=no confidence and 100=full confidence across each of the tactics. Previous research reported internal consistency (i.e., Cronbach's alpha) between .80 and .90 across the two scales, divergent validity (i.e., low correlation coefficients) with a general measure of self-efficacy, and evidence of predictive validity such that the DSE significantly predicted the use of distributive tactics in negotiation and the ISE significantly predicted the use of integrative tactics in negotiation (Sullivan et al., 2006).

**Manipulation check.** Four manipulation check items followed the administration of the negotiation information. Using a 7 point Likert-type scale ranging from 1= "Strongly Disagree" to 7= "Strongly Agree", participants rated the extent to which they viewed the negotiation as a chance to create value, minimize losses, attain resources, and maintain resources. The "create value" and "attain resources" items were expected to be rated higher for participants primed for an eagerness strategy compared to participants in the control condition. These items were used in previous research (c.f., Appelt & Higgins, 2010) where the "minimize losses" and "maintain resources" items were reverse-scored and combined with the other two items to create an average "gain framing" score; however, their study reported a Cronbach's alpha of .66. For the current research, the two eagerness items and two vigilance items were combined separately from one another.

**Anticipated backlash.** Participants completed two items measuring anticipated backlash: "How much do you think you can reasonably ask for



without the hiring manager's perceiving you to be a pushy person?" and "How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without causing the hiring manager to punish you for being too demanding?" (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010).

Participants responded with the dollar value threshold at which they expect to incur negative social consequences; thus, a lower score indicates greater anticipation of backlash. Previous research has found these items to be highly correlated, thus participants' responses will be averaged to form an overall score for anticipated backlash (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010).

**Negotiation subjective value.** The Subjective Value Inventory (i.e., SVI) includes 16 items measuring four distinct but related sub-scales on perceptions in negotiation (Curhan et al., 2006). Items are evaluated on 7-point Likert-type scales. These include four instrumental outcomes items (i.e., feelings about the terms of the deal such as whether the economic outcome was desirable, balanced, and consistent), four "self" items (i.e., feelings about the self, such as the extent to which participants feel they lost face or felt competent in the negotiation, and feel satisfied they behaved appropriately), four process items (i.e., feelings about the negotiation process such as whether participants feel they have been heard and treated fairly), and four relationship items (i.e., feelings about the relationship participants had with their negotiation counterpart, positive impressions of the counterpart, and whether they had a solid relationship to work together in the future). In line with previous research using the SVI, participants' scores across the items will be averaged to create a global score of satisfaction with the negotiation. The four-factor structure of the SVI was established in Curhan et al.

(2006) and found that the SVI significantly predicts negotiators' desire to work together in the future.

**Experienced backlash.** The Experienced Backlash scale includes 6 items related to the participant's willingness to work with their negotiation counterpart at work or socially (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013). Items are evaluated on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = "Not at all" to 7 = "Extremely". A higher average score across the items indicates greater social acceptance of the counterpart and therefore less backlash compared to lower average scores. Amanatullah and Tinsey (2013) reported a Cronbach's alpha of .93 using the scale within an undergraduate student sample. Previous research has shown that experienced backlash moderates the relationship between gender and negotiated outcomes such that women tend to experience greater backlash compared to men for negotiating assertively. As a result, experienced backlash is negatively correlated with women's economic or financial outcomes in negotiation compared to men's.

**Demographics.** Lastly, participants responded to the following demographic items: gender (0=male, 1=female), race/ethnicity (1=White, 2=African American/Black, 3=Hispanic, 4=Asian, 5=Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, 6=American Indian, 7=Two or More Races), age (reported numerically), and previous negotiation experience (1="No previous experience", 2="Little experience", 3="Some experience", 4="Quite a bit of experience", or 5="Extensive experience").

## Results

The hypotheses for this study were evaluated using 2X2 factorial ANCOVAs, one-way ANOVAs, and mediation analyses using Preacher and Hayes' (2004) methodology. Gender (male, female) and experimental condition (i.e., eagerness strategy, control condition) were the independent variables. Economic outcome (i.e., salary), first offers, anticipated backlash, and subjective outcomes (job candidate's global scores on the SVI) were dependent variables. Anticipated backlash was also examined as a mediator between gender and final negotiated salary.

The total sample size analyzed consisted of 130 participants. As a first step, the data was checked to examine outliers, missing data, descriptive statistics, and reliability statistics for all study variables. Three cases were excluded due to participants either knowing the confederate or not completing all study measures. There were sixty-five men and sixty-five women who participated: 63.8% White (n=83), 8.5% Black (n=11), 11.5% Hispanic (n=15), 10% Asian (n=13), 0.8% Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander (n=1), and 5.4% two or more races (n=7), with a mean age of 20.19 ( $SD=2.73$ ). Final negotiated salary ranged from \$55,000 to \$70,000, first offers ranged from \$55,000 to \$85,000, and anticipated backlash ranged from \$45,000 to \$92,500. A summary of descriptive statistics and correlations for all major study variables is presented in Table 1. Correlations did not significantly differ based on which of the three confederate hiring managers negotiated or based on participant type (research pool versus \$10 gift card).

Reliability analyses on sub-scales of the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (i.e., promotion focus and prevention focus), the Negotiation Self-Efficacy items, the anticipated backlash items, the experienced backlash items, and the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI) showed Cronbach's alpha exceeded .80 for each scale; therefore, all scales were included in relevant hypothesis testing.

Previous negotiation experience was significantly correlated with final negotiated salary ( $r = .19, p < .05$ ) and negotiation satisfaction ( $r = .26, p < .01$ ), and was therefore entered as a covariate for the appropriate analyses. Previous negotiation experience was also significantly correlated with age ( $r = .35, p < .01$ ).

Although no formal hypotheses were tested regarding negotiation self-efficacy, it was significantly correlated with gender ( $r = -.36, p < .01$ ), age ( $r = .26, p < .01$ ), previous negotiation experience ( $r = .34, p < .01$ ), and anticipated backlash ( $r = .35, p < .01$ ).

The manipulation check items revealed that participants in the eagerness strategy condition did not statistically significantly differ in mean responses to the two items indicating a "gain frame" compared to the participants in the control condition  $F(128) = .03, p = .85$  ( $M = 5.63$  ( $SD = 1.19$ ) and  $M = 5.66$  ( $SD = .73$ ), respectively), suggesting that development of an eagerness strategy does not produce a stronger gain focus in and of itself.

Data was found to meet assumptions for ANCOVA, ANOVA, and mediation analysis. Specifically, data met assumptions of normality, independence, and homogeneity of variance. The residuals of each dependent variable given each condition of the independent variables was examined using

normal and detrended normal q-q plots, histograms, and box plots. Although the final negotiated salary variable was bi-modally distributed, the data appeared normal within each level of the independent variables (e.g., male, female, no strategy assigned, eagerness strategy).

Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations of major study variables

Variable Name	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Gender	-	-	-												
2. Condition			-0.05	-											
3. Age	20.19	2.73	-0.04	0.00	-										
4. Ethnicity	-	-	0.04	0.05	0.15	-									
5. Experience	2.11	1.07	-0.14	-0.02	0.35**	0.31**	-								
6. Negotiation Self-Efficacy	57.47	19.32	-0.36**	-0.12	0.26**	-0.08	0.34**	(.93)							
7. Prevention Focus	3.16	0.74	0.10	0.06	-0.09	0.03	-0.07	-0.04	(.85)						
8. Gain Frame	5.65	0.99	-0.12	-0.02	0.03	-0.19*	0.27*	0.41**	-0.17	-					
9. Loss Frame	5.19	0.99	0.09	-0.01	-0.02	-0.05	0.16	0.14	-0.04	0.59**	-				
10. Anticipated Backlash	68573.00	7529.89	-0.26**	0.26**	0.04	-0.07	0.05	0.18*	-0.09	0.07	0.05	(.89)			
11. First Offer	65723.08	5022.45	-0.12	0.35**	0.06	0.05	-0.01	-0.07	-0.05	-0.12	-0.11	0.36**	-		
12. Final Negotiated Salary	62003.85	3203.98	-0.28**	0.32**	0.08	0.11	0.19*	-0.02	-0.09	0.01	-0.06	0.49**	0.25**	-	
13. SVI Composite	4.79	0.92	0.10	0.08	0.14	0.22*	0.26**	0.02	0.08	0.15	0.21*	-0.09	-0.16	0.24**	(.89)

Note:  $n = 130$ , \*  $p < .05$ , 2-tailed \*\*  $p < .01$ , 2-tailed, Cronbach's alpha reported on the diagonal where applicable. Gender (0=male, 1=female), Condition (0=no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy)

Scales: Previous negotiation experience (1-5), Negotiation Self Efficacy (1-100), Prevention Focus (1-5), Gain/Loss Frame (1-7), Anticipated Backlash (U.S. dollars), SVI (1-7)

Hypothesis 1A predicted that participants with an eagerness strategy would negotiate significantly higher salaries compared to participants with no specific strategy. The ANCOVA included experimental condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the independent variable, previous negotiation experience as a covariate, and final negotiated salary as the dependent variable. The analysis revealed a statistically significant main effect which supports the hypothesis  $F(1, 128)=14.79, p < .01, d=.67$  (see Figure 1). Participants with an eagerness strategy negotiated a higher average final salary ( $M=63,000.00, SD=3,187.33$ ) compared to participants with no specific strategy ( $M=60,944.44, SD=2,886.44$ ). Therefore, Hypothesis 1A was supported.

Hypothesis 1B predicted that participants with an eagerness strategy would make significantly higher first offers compared to participants with no specific strategy. The one-way ANOVA included experimental condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the independent variable and first offer (i.e., dollar value) as the dependent variable. The analysis revealed a statistically significant main effect which supports the hypothesis  $F(1, 128)=18.15, p < .01, d=.75$  (see Figure 2). Participants with an eagerness strategy condition made higher average first offers ( $M=67,432.84, SD=4,881.00$ ) compared to participants with no specific strategy ( $M=63,904.76, SD=4,539.13$ ). Therefore, Hypothesis 1B was supported.

Hypothesis 1C predicted that participants with an eagerness strategy would report significantly higher negotiation satisfaction compared to participants with no specific strategy. The one-way ANOVA included experimental condition

(i.e., 0=no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the independent variable and SVI composite (i.e., average across all SVI items) as the dependent variable. The analysis did not reveal a statistically significant main effect  $F(1, 128)=0.72$ ,  $p=.40$ ,  $d=.15$ . Participants with an eagerness strategy were only slightly more satisfied with the negotiation ( $M=4.87$ ,  $SD=0.98$ ) compared to participants with no specific strategy ( $M=4.73$ ,  $SD=0.84$ ). Therefore, Hypothesis 1C was not supported. However, negotiation satisfaction was significantly correlated with final negotiated salary ( $r=.24$ ,  $p < .01$ ) and previous experience ( $r=.26$ ,  $p < .01$ ).

Table 2 illustrates the descriptive statistics across experimental condition for Hypotheses 1A, 1B, and 1C below.

*Table 2. Descriptive statistics by experimental condition across dependent variables*

Condition		N	M	SD
Final Salary	Control	63	60944.44	2886.44
	Eagerness	67	63000.00	3187.33
First Offer	Control	63	63904.76	4539.13
	Eagerness	67	67432.84	4881.08
Subjective Value	Control	63	4.73	0.84
	Eagerness	67	4.87	0.98

Hypothesis 2 predicted that women would be significantly more prevention focused compared to men. Prevention focus items were completed prior to the negotiation instructions (and experimental manipulation) were presented to participants. The one-way ANOVA included participant gender (i.e., 0=male, 1=female) as the independent variable and average score across the



prevention focus sub-scale items as the dependent variable. The analysis did not reveal a statistically significant main effect  $F(1, 128)=1.36, p=.25, d=.20$ . Women were slightly more prevention focused ( $M=3.23, SD=.78$ ) compared to men ( $M=3.08, SD=.69$ ). Therefore, Hypothesis 2A was not supported.

Hypothesis 3A predicted that women with an eagerness strategy would negotiate significantly higher salaries compared to women with no specific strategy. The two-way, factorial ANCOVA included participant gender (i.e., 0=male, 1=female) and condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the independent variables, previous negotiation experience as a covariate, and final negotiated salary as the dependent variable. The omnibus test was statistically significant  $F(4,125)=7.76, p < .01$ . The interaction term between participant gender and condition was not statistically significant  $F(1,125)=0.16, p=.69$ . The sequential, Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparison of women with an eagerness strategy ( $M=62,281.25, SD=512.72$ ) to women with no specific strategy ( $M=60,000.00, SD=504.89$ ) revealed that there was a statistically significant mean difference in final negotiated salary  $F(1, 124)=10.05, p < .01, d=.76$  (see Figure 3). Therefore, Hypothesis 3A was supported.

Hypothesis 3B predicted women with an eagerness strategy would make significantly higher first offers compared to women with no specific strategy. The two-way, factorial ANOVA included participant gender (i.e., 0=male, 1=female) and condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the independent variables and first offer dollar value as the dependent variable. The omnibus test was statistically significant  $F(3,126)=6.80, p < .01$ . The interaction

term between participant gender and condition was not statistically significant  $F(1,126)=0.55, p=.46$ . The sequential, Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparison of women with an eagerness strategy ( $M=66,562.50, SD=820.48$ ) to women with no assigned strategy ( $M=63,696.97, SD=807.96$ ) revealed that there was a statistically significant mean difference in first offers  $F(1, 125)=6.19, p < .01, d=.63$  (see Figure 4). Therefore, Hypothesis 3B was supported.

Hypothesis 3C predicted that women with an eagerness strategy would be significantly more satisfied with the negotiation compared to women with no specific strategy. The two-way, factorial ANOVA included participant gender (i.e., 0=male, 1=female) and condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the independent variables and satisfaction with the negotiation (i.e., mean scores on the SVI composite) as the dependent variable. The omnibus test was not statistically significant  $F(3,126)=.94, p=.42$ . Therefore, the interaction term between participant gender and condition was not statistically significant  $F(1,126)=0.69, p=.41$ . Women with an eagerness strategy ( $M=4.89, SD=.16$ ) had about the same reported overall satisfaction with the negotiation as women with no specific strategy ( $M=4.89, SD=.16$ ). Therefore, Hypothesis 3C was not supported.

Table 3 illustrates the descriptive statistics by experimental condition for women in Hypotheses 3A, 3B, 3C and 4B.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics for gender by experimental condition across dependent variables

Variable	Condition	Women			Men		
		N	M	SD	N	M	SD
Final Salary	Control	33	60000.00	2318.40	30	61983.33	3122.45
	Eagerness	32	62281.25	3578.47	35	63657.14	2667.26
First Offer	Control	33	63696.97	4304.68	30	64133.33	4847.56
	Eagerness	32	66562.50	4838.94	35	68228.57	4851.23
Subjective Value	Control	33	4.89	0.91	30	4.56	0.74
	Approach	32	4.90	0.99	35	4.84	0.99
Anticipated Backlash	Control	33	64556.67	4512.53	30	68836.67	8641.27
	Eagerness	32	68722.50	4698.66	35	71997.00	9183.22

Hypothesis 4A predicted that women would indicate greater anticipated backlash for negotiating (i.e., the average across the two anticipated backlash items would be lower for women) compared to men. Anticipated backlash was measured after the negotiation instructions (and experimental manipulation) were completed, but before participants negotiated with the hiring manager. This hypothesis was tested using a one-way ANOVA which included participant gender (i.e., 0=male, 1=female) as the independent variable and anticipated backlash (i.e., mean across two anticipated backlash items) as the dependent variable. The main effect of gender on anticipated backlash was statistically significant  $F(1,126)=9.15, p < .01, d=.54$ . Women anticipated greater backlash for negotiating (i.e., they anticipated greater backlash at a lower threshold value for the negotiated salary) ( $M=66,607.54, SD=5,027.97$ ) compared to men ( $M=70,538.38, SD=9,008.75$ ). Therefore, Hypothesis 4A was supported.

Hypothesis 4B predicted that women with an eagerness strategy would anticipate significantly less backlash for negotiating (i.e., the average across the two anticipated backlash items would be higher) compared to women with no specific strategy. Anticipated backlash was measured after the negotiation instructions (and experimental manipulation) were completed, but before participants negotiated with the hiring manager. This hypothesis was tested using a two-way, factorial ANOVA which included participant gender (i.e., 0=male, 1=female) and condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the independent variables and anticipated backlash (i.e., mean across two anticipated backlash items) as the dependent variable. The omnibus test was statistically significant  $F(3,126)=6.24, p < .01$ . The interaction term between participant gender and condition was not statistically significant  $F(1,126)=.16, p=.69$ . The sequential, Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparison of women with an eagerness strategy ( $M=68,722.50, SD=1,237.32$ ) to women with no specific strategy ( $M=64,556.67, SD=1,218.42$ ) revealed that there was a statistically significant mean difference  $F(1, 125)=5.76, p < .01, d=.90$ . Therefore, Hypothesis 4B was supported.

Hypothesis 5 predicted that the effect of gender on final negotiated salary would be explained (i.e., mediated) by anticipated backlash. Anticipated backlash was measured after the negotiation instructions (and experimental manipulation) were completed, but before participants negotiated with the hiring manager. Hypothesis 3C was tested using the Preacher and Hayes (2004) method for simple mediation where gender (0=male, 1=female) was entered as the independent

variable, anticipated backlash was the mediator, and final negotiated salary was the dependent variable. Anticipated backlash was found to fully mediate the relationship between participant gender and final negotiated salary. The indirect effect was  $-.752.95$  with a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval between  $-1274.93$  and  $-305.90$  (*Bootstrap SE*=245.09); since the confidence interval does not include zero, this is considered a statistically significant effect. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was supported.

### **Discussion**

The current research examined the effect of an experimental manipulation of regulatory focus on gender differences in a salary negotiation; namely, the amount of a job candidate's first offer, the final negotiated salary, overall satisfaction with the negotiation, and anticipated social backlash for negotiating. The results of this study are promising in that they generally indicate that anyone may be able to improve their salary negotiation outcomes if they consciously adopt an eagerness strategy where they focus on their aspiration value and mindfully frame the negotiation as an opportunity rather than an obligation. Women in particular can benefit from adopting an eagerness strategy to attain a higher starting salary and reduce feelings of anticipated backlash for negotiating to achieve their aspiration value in negotiations. Previous research has already demonstrated that sellers who employ an eagerness strategy compared to a vigilance strategy (i.e., a focus on avoiding losses) fare better in buyer-seller negotiations (Galinsky et al., 2005; Appelt & Higgins, 2010). The current

research replicated this effect, and extended RFT by integrating the influence of gender effects.

Regulatory focus theory predicts that individuals who enact strategies (i.e., an eagerness strategy) that aligns with the general orientation of the role they occupy (i.e., a job candidate looking to maximize their starting salary) will exhibit increased feelings of fit (Appelt & Higgins, 2010). The exact mechanism through which the influence of regulatory fit increases negotiated outcomes is theorized to be due to one's enhanced ability to focus on aspiration value, which provides an anchoring effect and increases resistance to making concessions (Galinsky et al., 2001). In the current study, participants in the eagerness strategy condition did not experience significantly greater fit with their role (i.e., higher average "gain frame" scores) compared to participants in the control condition. The enactment of any strategy likely enhances feelings of fit with one's negotiator role as it focuses attention on behaviors that are expected to result in positive outcomes.

The current study did not replicate a previously found gender difference in chronic prevention focus, although women were slightly more prevention focused compared to men (Appelt et al., 2009). Chronic prevention focus was also unrelated to anticipated backlash, first offers, final negotiated salary, and negotiation satisfaction. Salary negotiations represent "strong" situations whereby norms for behavior wash out individual differences such as chronic prevention focus. The development of an eagerness strategy may further reinforce certain negotiation behavior. Therefore, whether someone is chronically prevention or promotion focused is not as relevant as is the type of strategy (eagerness or vigilance) and

associated behaviors that are the strongest determinant of success in salary negotiations.

There was no statistically significant interaction between gender and experimental condition on final negotiated salary, first offer, or negotiation satisfaction. However, men still statistically significantly outperformed women in the negotiation. Men outperformed women by an average of \$1,375.89 in the eagerness condition. Men outperformed women by an average of \$1,983.33 in the control condition. This may be driven in part by the fact that men made significantly higher first offers compared to women (see Table 3). Previous research has demonstrated that first offer values explain a significant amount of variance in final negotiated outcomes such as salary (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Therefore, the effect of the gender difference in first offer value likely exacerbated gender differences in final negotiated salary. Additionally, this finding confirms existing research on gender differences in negotiation, which shows there is a small but persistent performance effect in favor of men in negotiation (Mazei et al., 2015). In particular, men tend to outperform women in single-issue negotiations (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). From a role congruity perspective, behavioral norms in salary negotiations (e.g., making assertive offers or counter-offers, resisting concessions) elicit a strong association with masculinity (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Therefore, men who enact these behaviors in a salary negotiation are perceived as adhering to those norms. As a result, they encounter less resistance and feel emboldened to ask for more compared to women. In addition, the use of a male confederate in the role of the hiring

manager may have further strengthened the stereotypes associated with salary negotiations as a traditionally masculine domain.

Although it would be ideal to “level the playing field” completely, the fact that the eagerness strategy produced a significant main effect on final negotiated salary was a positive outcome of this research. Strong contextual cues for acceptable negotiation behaviors were likely instigated through the instructions to focus on an aspiration value in the eagerness strategy. In addition, the bargaining range (\$55,000 to over \$70,000) was obvious and participants had a clear alternative to a negotiated agreement (i.e., job offer from another company). The clarity of the boundary conditions for this negotiation and power generated by the job candidate’s alternative likely enhanced participants’ expectations that negotiating assertively would lead to a high starting salary.

Women significantly improved their negotiation outcomes in the eagerness strategy condition compared to the control condition (i.e., no strategy assigned). On average, women in the eagerness strategy condition negotiated final salaries that were \$2,281.25 higher compared to women in the control condition. Although men in the eagerness strategy condition also improved relative to men in the control condition, it was by a smaller margin (\$1,673.81) compared to the difference between women in each experimental condition.

In alignment with the Backlash Avoidance Model (BAM), women who experienced a reduction in anticipated backlash negotiated higher starting salaries. The BAM suggests that the positive effect of reducing anticipated backlash stems from its impact on self-regulation such that attention which would typically be



devoted towards setting and attaining goals in a negotiation is inhibited by a preoccupation with avoiding negative social outcomes for enacting behaviors that violate gender stereotypes, such as women assertively and confidently negotiating for a high starting salary (Rudman et al., 2012). In the current research, it is likely that the clarity of expectations in terms of the focus on attaining the aspiration value in the eagerness condition served as a cognitive anchor, which replicates previous research (Galinsky et al., 2001). In addition, these situational factors likely reduced women's feelings of ambiguity regarding norms for behavior. Previous research has found that gender effects in negotiation tend to wash out in contexts which clearly delineate boundary conditions such as the bargaining range and generate power through the strength of alternatives to a negotiated agreement (i.e., BATNA) (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Mazei et al., 2015). In tandem, these factors likely contributed to women's relative success in the eagerness condition compared to the control condition.

The effect of the eagerness strategy to improve women's negotiation outcomes may also be explained through role congruity theory. For female negotiators, gender-role incongruence in the form of occupying a role within a distributive negotiation setting, such as a salary negotiation, can elicit social backlash, inhibit women's negotiating behavior, and diminish women's negotiation performance (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bear & Babcock, 2012; Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007). In the present research, women did anticipate greater backlash compared to men, regardless of experimental condition (see Table 3). An eagerness strategy may implicitly cue

women to think about justifications that enhance the legitimacy of producing a higher first offer in the negotiation, such as providing concrete, objective examples of their accomplishments. In the present research, women did, in fact, report lower anticipated backlash and produced higher initial first offers in the eagerness condition by an average of \$2,865.53 compared to women in the control condition. This likely provided an anchor against which the confederate acting as the hiring manager would base subsequent counter-offers.

Negotiation satisfaction was not statistically significantly influenced by the use of an eagerness strategy or gender, although men and participants in the control condition were slightly less satisfied with their negotiated outcomes compared to women and participants in the eagerness condition (see Table 3). Negotiation satisfaction was significantly, positively correlated with previous negotiation experience and final negotiated salary. This is dissimilar from some previous research which has suggested a “winner’s curse” where negotiators who achieve the best outcomes feel less satisfied with their negotiation outcomes (Curan et al., 2006). Given the experimental context of this study and the simplicity of the negotiation paradigm, it may more difficult to induce participants’ feelings of psychological realism and emotional commitment to the outcomes of the negotiation. Alternatively, it may be the case that enacting an eagerness strategy is motivating but stressful. People may use more mental resources and feel more stressed when adopting the eagerness strategy as it is not aligned with their typical approach, even though they objectively perform better by achieving a higher starting salary. These feelings of stress or depletion of

mental resources could result in similar feelings of satisfaction when compared to participants in control condition.

Ultimately, there should be no gender difference between women's and men's starting salaries (when there is commensurate previous job experience and other job-related factors), but the current research at least provides a starting point for the implementation of a motivation-focused intervention where everyone, especially women, can improve their salary negotiation performance by adopting an eagerness strategy.

### **Strengths and Limitations**

Salary negotiations represent a dynamic context, where inter-organizational norms and expectations can vary greatly. Often, salary negotiations can occur through various mediums of communication over a period of time (e.g., over the phone, email, in person) depending on the uniqueness and significance of the role to an organization (e.g., entry-level versus senior leader). The current research was conducted using an experimental laboratory context that captured cross-sectional and self-reported data from a population of undergraduate students which limits generalizability. However, the current research is benefitted by a largely naïve population of negotiators. Testing an intervention that could be used within this population is critical to preventing small gender differences in starting salary from cumulating over time. Indeed, gender differences in negotiation performance diminish as women gain experience in negotiation settings, when the bargaining range is clear, and the opportunity to negotiate is presented overtly (Mazei et al., 2015).

Similarly, using a trained confederate limits the conclusions that can be drawn in terms of how individuals in the experimental condition may have reacted depending on the behavior of their counterpart. Although there was a script which dictated rules for the confederate's reaction to a participant's potential offers and justifications, a certain degree of improvisation was required to create a sense of realism. For example, confederates were instructed to resist the job candidate's offer at least twice throughout the negotiation; the content of this resistance was not specifically scripted. In a paradigm involving two participants, impasses would have likely occurred more frequently (there were no impasses in the current study), or the participant in the job candidate role may have walked away given their BATNA (another job offer). However, given the largest gender effects typically exist in mixed-gender negotiations, finding support for several hypotheses in this context (female job candidates paired with a male hiring manager) may help women determine the best opportunity to consciously focus on implementing an eagerness strategy.

An alternative explanation for the overall improvements to negotiation outcomes based on the enactment of an eagerness strategy may be derived from construal level theory. Instructing participants to outline their negotiating strategy explicitly (e.g., specific offers and justifications, planned reactions and counteroffers based on counterpart's behavior) may instigate a higher construal level, i.e., a focus on interests or *why* negotiators want something compared to a low construal level focus on positions, i.e., *what* negotiators want. Activation of a high construal level has been previously shown to positively relate to integrative

bargaining outcomes (Wening, Keith, & Abele, 2016). It may also be the case within a salary negotiation that an eagerness strategy activates a high construal level for the negotiator, and forces them to think from the perspective of a hiring manager about providing justifications that demonstrate *why* they deserve a certain salary.

Lastly, the definition of the current experimental manipulation as an inducement of a participant's promotion focus or orientation to achieve gains may conceptually overlap with goal-setting theory such that the explicit instructions in the eagerness strategy condition could alternatively be interpreted as instructions to set a specific goal (i.e., aspiration salary value) and set a strategy to achieve that goal, which specifies the means through which one will achieve an instrumental negotiation outcome such as starting salary. Although this is possible, the overarching conclusions of this research remain the same and should focus on the positive benefits of enacting the eagerness strategy in salary negotiations.

### **Implications and Future Directions**

The current research supports the value of a regulatory focus intervention that could be easily implemented within organizations who utilize salary negotiations in order to aid in improving the likelihood that male and female job candidates will be able to achieve starting salaries that are more equitable.

Women, especially those with little previous negotiation experience, can improve their negotiation outcomes by consciously employing strategies to focus their attention on their aspiration value in salary negotiations. Importantly, this was

shown to result in higher first offers, better negotiated outcomes, and reduced feelings of anticipated social backlash for negotiating compared to using no particular strategy.

This study also provides additional evidence to support the existing literature on gender differences in negotiation, and provided a novel theoretical application of regulatory focus theory in the form of an intervention, adding to the existing evidence-based recommendations to improve women's negotiation outcomes.

Future experimental research should replicate and extend the use of the eagerness strategy with participants rather than confederates in the hiring manager role. It may be the case that there are interesting interactions between a job candidate and hiring manager's gender such that women may be more successful when paired with a woman hiring manager compared to a man due to further reductions in anticipated backlash for negotiating assertively as has been suggested by previous research (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013). Additionally, it would be important to determine whether the eagerness strategy intervention influences experienced backlash. For example, women who use an eagerness strategy may anticipate less backlash and negotiate higher salaries at the expense of experienced backlash in the form of a hiring manager's perceptions of her likability. Downstream effects of decreased likability may influence women's advancement in the workplace or at least hinder their initial reputation when they are starting out in a new job as has been demonstrated by previous research (Williams & Tiedans, 2015).

Given that many organizations require job candidates to report their previous salary, it is likely that the eagerness strategy intervention is less impactful when a hiring manager possesses this knowledge. Therefore, replications of this research within professional samples should factor this into research design. Additionally, organizational samples would likely increase the importance of age and previous negotiation experience on negotiation outcomes, and should therefore be taken into consideration.

The present research focused exclusively on main effects and interactions of the eagerness intervention and gender on negotiation outcomes. Future research could benefit from integrating the use of negotiation process variables such as number of concessions, and the use and content of justifications to better understand the influence of using an eagerness strategy to improve negotiation outcomes. Perhaps the use of an eagerness strategy increases resistance to concessions and improves the quality of justifications through the planning process that is employed.

Lastly, it will be important for future research to examine how the use of multiple interventions could equalize women's negotiation outcomes. For example, women who use an eagerness strategy as well as emphasize an advocacy role (c.f., Amanatullah & Morris, 2010) could achieve better negotiation outcomes compared to using either tactic alone.

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## **Appendix A. Informed Consent Form – Psychology Research Pool and Non-Research Pool**

### **ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH – Research Pool**

#### **Starting a New Job Study**

**Principal Investigator:** Mary Keegin, M.A., Graduate Student

**Institution:** DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA

**Department (School, College):** Psychology, College of Science and Health

**Faculty Advisor:** Alice Stuhlmacher, Ph.D., Psychology, College of Science and Health

#### **What is the purpose of this research?**

We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more about how people interact when discussing terms of employment such as salary. This study is being conducted by Mary Keegin, M.A., a graduate student at DePaul University as a requirement to obtain her Doctoral degree. This research is being supervised by her faculty advisor, Alice Stuhlmacher, Ph.D. There may be other people on the research team assisting with the study.

We hope to include about 130 people in the research.

#### **Why are you being asked to be in the research?**

You are invited to participate in this study because you can speak, read, and write fluently in English. You must be age 18 or older to be in this study. This study is not approved for the enrollment of people under the age of 18.

#### **What is involved in being in the research study?**

If you agree to be in this study, being in the research involves engaging in a salary negotiation as a specific type of interaction. We are interested in people's behavior and how they perceive themselves and others in these situations.

This is the procedure for the study.

- First, you will complete a questionnaire on a computer that contains items asking about your life experiences and how confident you are using different tactics in negotiations.
- Next, you will read detailed instructions and information concerning a salary negotiation and your priorities taking on the role of a job candidate. You will be asked to plan your strategy and write it down for review by the research team.
- After this, you will complete a questionnaire on a computer about your planned goals and expectations of your counterpart.
- Then you will negotiate with your counterpart in person, who is another student taking on the role of a hiring manager.
- Finally, you will receive another questionnaire on a computer that will ask you about your experiences from the negotiation in terms of how satisfied you felt with your outcomes, how the negotiation process went, how your counterpart behaved, how confident you feel following the negotiation, your perceptions of your counterpart, and demographic items (gender, ethnicity, age, and previous negotiation experience).

Importantly, all data in this study will be kept confidential. Your name will not be stored in a way that can be linked to the data. Furthermore, all data will only be used for research purposes. You have been randomly assigned (with a random number generator) to one of two groups. In order to

not influence you before or during the negotiation, we will tell you more about the different conditions at the end of the experiment.

**How much time will this take?**

This study will take about 60 minutes of your time in total.

- The first part of the study, which includes the questionnaires, reading the negotiation instructions, and planning your strategy, will take approximately 30 minutes.
- You will have time to negotiate with your counterpart for up to 15 minutes.
- The final set of questionnaire items will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.

**Are there any risks involved in participating in this study?**

Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would encounter in daily life. As in your daily interactions, you may feel unsure about the best course of action in negotiating or uncomfortable about answering certain questions. You do not have to answer any question you do not want to.

**Are there any benefits to participating in this study?**

You will not personally benefit from participating in this study.

We hope that what we learn will help other researchers, negotiators, employees, and policy makers in improving equity in salary negotiations.

**Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study?**

You will be given 1.5 psychology subject pool credits for participation in the research. At the end of the survey you will be asked to write down your subject pool number. You must provide your subject pool number in order to be given credit.

**Are there any costs to me for being in the research?**

You are responsible for any costs related to getting to and from the location where you will participate in the research.

**Can you decide not to participate?**

Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate. There will be no negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you decide not to participate or change your mind later and withdraw from the research after you begin participating. Your decision whether or not to be in the research will not affect your standing with DePaul University.

**Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the information collected for the research be protected?**

The research records will be kept and stored securely. Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write about the study or publish a paper to share the research with other researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. We will not include your name or any information that will directly identify you. We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that you gave us information, or what that information is. However, some people might review or copy our records that may identify you in order to make sure we are following the required rules, laws, and regulations. For example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board may audit the files. If they look at our records, they will keep your information confidential.

**Who should be contacted for more information about the research?**

Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study or you want to get additional information or provide input about this research, you can contact the researcher, Mary Keegin, [mkeegin@depaul.edu](mailto:mkeegin@depaul.edu) or Dr. Stuhlmacher, [astuhlma@depaul.edu](mailto:astuhlma@depaul.edu), 773-325-2050 in the Psychology department of DePaul University.

This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review Board (IRB). If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you may contact Susan Loess-Perez, DePaul University's Director of Research Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by email at [sloesspe@depaul.edu](mailto:sloesspe@depaul.edu).

You may also contact DePaul's Office of Research Services if:

- Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team.
- You cannot reach the research team.
- You want to talk to someone besides the research team.

*You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.*

**Statement of Consent from the Subject:**

I have read the above information. I have had all my questions and concerns answered. By signing below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Printed name: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

**ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH – Non-Research Pool**

**Starting a New Job Study**

**Principal Investigator:** Mary Keegin, M.A., Graduate Student

**Institution:** DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA

**Department (School, College):** Psychology, College of Science and Health

**Faculty Advisor:** Alice Stuhlmacher, Ph.D., Psychology, College of Science and Health

**What is the purpose of this research?**

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This is the procedure for the study.

- First, you will complete a questionnaire on a computer that contains items asking about your life experiences and how confident you are using different tactics in negotiations.
- Next, you will read detailed instructions and information concerning a salary negotiation and your priorities taking on the role of a job candidate. You will be asked to plan your strategy and write it down for review by the research team.
- After this, you will complete a questionnaire on a computer about your planned goals and expectations of your counterpart.
- Then you will negotiate with your counterpart in person, who is another student taking on the role of a hiring manager.
- Finally, you will receive another questionnaire on a computer that will ask you about your experiences from the negotiation in terms of how satisfied you felt with your outcomes, how the negotiation process went, how your counterpart behaved, how confident you feel following the negotiation, your perceptions of your counterpart, and demographic items (gender, ethnicity, age, and previous negotiation experience).

Importantly, all data in this study will be kept confidential. Your name will not be stored in a way that can be linked to the data. Furthermore, all data will only be used for research purposes. You have been randomly assigned (with a random number generator) to one of two groups. In order to not influence you before or during the negotiation, we will tell you more about the different conditions at the end of the experiment.

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- You will have time to negotiate with your counterpart for up to 15 minutes.
- The final set of questionnaire items will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.

**Are there any risks involved in participating in this study?**

Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would encounter in daily life. As in your daily interactions, you may feel unsure about the best course of action in negotiating or uncomfortable about answering certain questions. You do not have to answer any question you do not want to.

**Are there any benefits to participating in this study?**

You will not personally benefit from participating in this study.

We hope that what we learn will help other researchers, negotiators, employees, and policy makers in improving equity in salary negotiations.

**Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study?**

You will receive \$10 as an Amazon gift card for completing the study.

**Are there any costs to me for being in the research?**

You are responsible for any costs related to getting to and from the location where you will participate in the research.

**Can you decide not to participate?**



Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate. There will be no negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you decide not to participate or change your mind later and withdraw from the research after you begin participating. Your decision whether or not to be in the research will not affect your standing with DePaul University.

**Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the information collected for the research be protected?**

The research records will be kept and stored securely. Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write about the study or publish a paper to share the research with other researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. We will not include your name or any information that will directly identify you. We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that you gave us information, or what that information is. However, some people might review or copy our records that may identify you in order to make sure we are following the required rules, laws, and regulations. For example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board may audit the files. If they look at our records, they will keep your information confidential.

**Who should be contacted for more information about the research?**

Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study or you want to get additional information or provide input about this research, you can contact the researcher, Mary Keegin, [mkeegin@depaul.edu](mailto:mkeegin@depaul.edu) or Dr. Stuhlmacher, [astuhlma@depaul.edu](mailto:astuhlma@depaul.edu), 773-325-2050 in the Psychology department of DePaul University.

This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review Board (IRB). If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you may contact Susan Loess-Perez, DePaul University's Director of Research Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by email at [sloesspe@depaul.edu](mailto:sloesspe@depaul.edu).

You may also contact DePaul's Office of Research Services if:

- Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team.
- You cannot reach the research team.
- You want to talk to someone besides the research team.

***You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.***

**Statement of Consent from the Subject:**

I have read the above information. I have had all my questions and concerns answered. By signing below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Printed name: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix B. Confederate Script and Payoff Table

### Confederate Script – Starting a New Job Study

#### Instructions:

Introduce yourself to the participant.

You should try to elicit a first offer from the participant; say “I would like to start by hearing you discuss your desired starting salary.”

Confederate hiring managers will always open with the same starting offer of \$55,000 (no justification), but **ONLY IF** participants are exceptionally resistant to making the first offer.

If the counterpart asks for justification about your initial offer, reply “This is the standard starting salary for this position at A&B Inc.”

#### First counter-offer

1. If the participant immediately counters with **no justification**, ask:

“Can you tell me a little bit more about why you think our company would benefit from paying you that amount?”

2. If the counterpart counters **with a legitimate justification (see examples on next page)**, make a concession to \$58,000.

Concede \$2,000 if participants require prompting for a legitimate justification

If the participant asks you for justification based on your counter-offer, reply “A&B Inc. has a salary range they are willing to offer new hires in this position, and I think this amount is fair given that you are a recent college graduate with little previous work experience.”

#### Remaining counter-offers

3. If the participant **justifies** their previous offer **with the same justification (no elaboration or additional details) or a justification that is mixed or irrelevant (e.g., needing to pay off their debts)**, resist them.

a. For subsequent counter-offers **where the participant provides a new, legitimate justification**, increase the offer by \$2,000.

4. If the participant does **NOT provide justification** or any other reasoning, or simply reiterates the previous offer, state

“I’d like to hear why you feel you’re worth \$X (whatever the participant’s offer is)”.

If, after prompting, the participant **provides justification**, increase the offer by \$1,000.

For subsequent counter-offers with **NO justification**, *resist the offer*. Then, prompt the participant about why they feel they are worth that amount and increase the offer by \$1,000 only if they continue providing reasonable justifications or they elaborate on previous justifications (i.e., not just “because that’s what I want”).

First Offer	
With justification	\$3,000

Justifies after prompting	\$2,000
<b>Remaining Offers</b>	
Legitimate justification	\$2,000
Justifies after prompting OR reiterates same justification, with additional detail	\$1,000
Reiterates same justification (no additional detail)	<i>Resist</i>
Mixed justification	<i>Resist</i>
Irrelevant justification	<i>Resist</i>

**Responses to various justifications**

Utilize **at least two** of these responses (not listed in any particular order) to resist the participant's continued counter-offers:

<b>Legitimate Participant Justifications</b>	<b>Confederate Response</b>
· Graduated from prestigious university	· We adjust our offers based on the cost of living in the area
· High cost of living expenses	· We usually re-negotiate your pay after the first year depending on good performance <b>(AVOID)</b>
· Heard of offers up to \$70k	· Offers are made based on the market value and what competitors in the area are offering
· Increased job commitment/satisfaction	· A&B Inc. expects that you will have an excellent opportunity to launch your career at this salary
· Feels market value is higher than what is being offered	· I am required by A&B Inc. to agree to salaries within specific ranges for new employees at your level
· Has received a job offer from another organization	· I just don't know if that salary accurately reflects your level of education and previous experience

**Examples of illegitimate participant justifications:**

- Something they make up that is unrelated to job-relevant skills or experience (e.g., childcare expenses, health issues and related expenses)
- Based on their information, but is not job-related (e.g., need to pay off their debt)



## **Appendix D. Negotiation Self-Efficacy Scale (Sullivan et al., 2006)**

**Instructions:** Please rate the extent to which you feel confident you could enact the following behaviors in the upcoming negotiation on a scale of 0=not confident at all to 100=completely confident.

1. Persuade the other negotiator to make most of the concessions.
2. Convince the other negotiator to agree with you.
3. Gain the upper hand against the other negotiator.
4. Prevent the other negotiator from exploiting your weaknesses.
5. Establish rapport with the other negotiator.
6. Find tradeoffs with the other negotiator.
7. Exchange concessions with the other negotiator.
8. Maximize the interests of the other negotiator and yourself.

\*First 4 items constitute Distributive Self-Efficacy and the last 4 make up Integrative Self-Efficacy

## **Appendix E. Negotiation Simulation and Regulatory Strategy Prime**

**(adapted from Galinsky et al. 2002)**

**Instructions:** You will have ten minutes to read through the information concerning the upcoming negotiation and prepare a strategy.

You are taking on the role of a job candidate that is finalizing the terms of employment with an organization, A&B Inc., from whom you have received a job offer. You are a recent graduate of a prestigious university and already have an offer from another well-respected organization in your field with a starting salary of \$55,000. You are very interested in negotiating for a starting salary of at least \$60,000 since you must pay for living expenses that are higher in the city where the A&B Inc. is located, and you are trying to pay off your debt within five years by making higher payments per month. You have also recently heard that salaries of up to \$70,000 have been offered to others in your field.

Today, you will get fifteen minutes to negotiate with A&B Inc.'s hiring manager about your starting salary. Think about your goal for the upcoming negotiation by identifying your target value (i.e., the salary you would ideally like to settle on), your reservation value (i.e., the lowest salary you would be willing to agree to), and your aspiration value (i.e., the highest salary you feel the hiring manager would still agree to).

### **Eagerness Strategy:**

Negotiators also use strategies to prepare and to negotiate. Today you will use an eagerness strategy. To do this, think about the different ways you could maximize your gains in the negotiation. You are asked to concentrate on the

highest salary you could attain. Therefore, during the negotiation, you should focus your efforts on attaining a salary of \$70,000, or the highest salary you have heard of someone attaining at your level of experience in your field. Your strategy can include specific offers or behaviors you think are effective depending on how you expect your counterpart to behave.

Think about how you could apply this strategy and briefly describe your strategy using the space provided. Feel free to use another sheet of paper to write notes if you'd like.

**Control Condition:** Negotiators use strategies to prepare and to negotiate. Strategies can include specific offers or behaviors you think are effective depending on how you expect your counterpart to behave. Consider referencing your target value, reservation value, and aspiration value when creating your strategy.

Think about how you could apply your strategy and briefly describe your strategy using the space provided. Feel free to use another sheet of paper to write notes if you'd like.

## **Appendix F. Manipulation Check Items and Anticipated Backlash**

### **Perceived Fit (Appelt & Higgins, 2009)**

**Instructions:** Please rate the extent to which you view the upcoming negotiation as a chance to:

1. Create value
2. Minimize losses
3. Attain resources
4. Maintain resources

7 point Likert-type scale (1= “Strongly Disagree”, 7= “Strongly Agree”)

### **Anticipated Backlash (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010)**

**Instructions:** Based on the instructions for your role in the upcoming negotiation, please indicate a dollar value in reaction to the following items:

1. How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without the hiring manager’s perceiving you to be a pushy person?
2. How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without causing the hiring manager to punish you for being too demanding?



## Appendix G. Subjective Value Inventory (Curhan et al., 2006)

**General Instructions:** For each question, please circle a number from 1-7 that most accurately reflects your opinion. You will notice that some of the questions are similar to one another; this is primarily to ensure the validity and reliability of the questionnaire. Please simply answer each question independently, without reference to any of the other questions.

**Important:** If you encounter a particular question that is not applicable to your negotiation, simply circle “NA.” Even if you did not reach agreement, please try to answer as many questions as possible.

### Instrumental Outcome

1. How satisfied are you with your own outcome—i.e., the extent to which the terms of your agreement (or lack of agreement) benefit you?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NA
Not at all			Moderately			Perfectly	

2. How satisfied are you with the balance between your own outcome and your counterpart(s)'s outcome(s)?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NA
Not at all			Moderately			Perfectly	

3. Did you feel like you forfeited or “lost” in this negotiation?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NA
Not at all			Moderately			A great deal	

4. Do you think the terms of your agreement are consistent with principles of legitimacy or objective criteria (e.g., common standards of fairness, precedent, industry practice, legality, etc.)?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NA
Not at all			Moderately			Perfectly	

### Self

5. Did you “lose face” (i.e., damage your sense of pride) in the negotiation?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA  
Not at all Moderately A great deal
6. Did this negotiation make you feel more or less competent as a negotiator?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA  
It made me feel *less* competent It did not make me feel more or less competent It made me feel *more* competent
7. Did you behave according to your own principles and values?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA  
Not at all Moderately Perfectly
8. Did this negotiation positively or negatively impact your self-image (your impression of yourself)?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA  
It *negatively* impacted my self-image It did not positively or negatively impact my self-image It *positively* impacted my self-image

### **Process**

9. Do you feel your counterpart(s) listened to your concerns?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA  
Not at all Moderately Perfectly
10. Would you characterize the negotiation process as fair?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA  
Not at all Moderately Perfectly
11. How satisfied are you with the ease (or difficulty) of reaching an agreement?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA  
Not at all satisfied Moderately satisfied Perfectly satisfied
12. Did your counterpart(s) consider your wishes, opinions, or needs?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA  
Not at all Moderately Perfectly

### **Relationship**

13. What kind of “overall” impression did your counterpart(s) make on you?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA

<b>Extremely <i>negative</i></b>				<b>Neither negative nor positive</b>				<b>Extremely <i>positive</i></b>	
14. How satisfied are you with your relationship with your counterpart(s) as a result of this negotiation?									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7		NA	
Not at all			Moderately			Perfectly			
15. Did the negotiation make you trust your counterpart(s)?									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7		NA	
Not at all			Moderately			Perfectly			
16. Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with your counterpart(s)?									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7		NA	
Not at all			Moderately			Perfectly			

## Appendix H. Experienced Backlash (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013)

**Instructions:** Please use the following scale to rate these items:

1= "Not at all"      2      3      4      5      6      7= "Extremely"

1. How interested would you be in working with your counterpart at [organization]?
2. If you were the project manager on a work assignment, how likely would you be to ask your counterpart to be part of the project team?
3. Is your counterpart the type of person you like to work with?
4. How interested would you be in interacting socially with your counterpart?
5. If your counterpart invited you out for a fun activity after work, how likely would you be to go with her/him?
6. Is your counterpart the type of person you like to socialize with?

## Appendix I. Demographic Items

1. What is your gender? Male=0, Female=1
2. What is your ethnicity? White=1, Black/African American=2, Hispanic=3, Asian=4, Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander=5, Two or more races=6
3. What is your age? Continuous numerical response
4. Please rate the extent to which you have previous experience in negotiations. 1="No previous experience", 2="Little experience", 3="Some experience", 4="Quite a bit of experience", or 5="Extensive experience"

## Appendix J. Participant Debriefing Information

### Debriefing Information

The purpose of the present study is to test an intervention to reduce gender differences in salary negotiation outcomes, and examine other factors that may impact the effectiveness of the intervention. For example, one of our hypotheses states that priming individuals to view a salary negotiation in gain framing terms (e.g., viewing the negotiation as an opportunity rather than an obligation), or a “promotion focus”, may reduce previously observed gender differences in salary negotiations. Specifically, we are interested in examining how women may improve their salary negotiation outcomes and feel more satisfied with their negotiated outcomes if they are primed to adopt a promotion focus in a salary negotiation compared to a control group.

We randomly assigned participants to a neutral condition or a priming condition for regulatory focus, where individuals in the neutral condition simply developed a strategy of any kind for achieving their desired salary, and individuals in the priming (or “promotion focus”) condition developed a specific strategy aimed at framing the negotiation in terms of gains to maximize their final negotiated salary.

We also used deception in this research. You were told you were negotiating with another student taking on the role of the hiring manager in the negotiation. You were actually negotiating with a trained confederate. We did not inform you of this prior to the negotiation in order to remove the possibility that your behavior and responses to survey items would be impacted by this knowledge in a way that would confound the experimental manipulation.

We hope that this research will aid in establishing support for recommendations to organizations, individuals, and policy makers to improve salary negotiation equity. Your participation is greatly needed and appreciated in order for this to be accomplished. We ask that you do not share the details of the study with other individuals who may participate in order to ensure the accuracy and honesty of the responses.

You no doubt understand that it is important to have a similar environment for everyone who participates in the study. Because of this, we ask your help in not revealing information about this study to others who may be involved or might participate in this study in the future. This is very important so that we are able to compare across people and so participants enter the study with the same information.

If you would like to know more information about the theories supporting the present research, see the following published research articles, available to current DePaul students through PsychInfo on the library website:


Mazei, J., Hüffmeier, J., Freund, P. A., Stuhlmacher, A. F., Bilke, L., & Hertel, G. (2015). A meta-analysis on gender differences in negotiation outcomes and their moderators. *Psychological Bulletin*, *141*(1), 85.

Rudman, L. A., Moss-Racusin, C. A., Glick, P., & Phelan, J. E. (2012). 4 reactions to vanguards: Advances in backlash theory. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, *45*, 167-226.


If you want a paper copy of this debriefing, please ask the experimenter. If you would like to know more information or have any questions about the research, feel free to contact the primary investigator on the project:

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**Figure 1. Main effect of strategy on final negotiated salary**




**Figure 2. Main effect of strategy on first offer**





**Figure 3. Interaction of gender and strategy on final negotiated salary**



**Figure 4. Interaction of gender and strategy on first offer**

