Affirmative action and Bolsa Família in Brazil

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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND BOLSA FAMÍLIA IN BRAZIL

A Thesis

Presented in

Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

March, 2018

BY

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To my husband, family, and friends, especially my mother, Beatriz G. Salinas, who has taught me some invaluable lessons, and to my thesis committee, mainly Dr. Michael McIntyre who guided me through this project.
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Abstract

_Bolsa Família_ is an anti-poverty program that has gained a great deal of recognition in Brazil, while affirmative action is a controversial race-based program with less political support. Affirmative action in Brazil though is usually framed in non-racial terms, specifically in the most important piece of Brazilian affirmative action legislation, the _Lei de Cotas Sociais_. Conventional wisdom is thus an artifact of discourse, for both programs are framed in universalistic terms, but disproportionately benefit Afro-Brazilians. A word frequency analysis of newspaper articles is conducted to examine the media’s framing of affirmative action and _Bolsa Família_. The investigation demonstrates that affirmative action is framed racially and _Bolsa Familia_ is discussed from a non-racial perspective. The thesis demonstrates that there is very little discursive overlap in discussions of these programs, despite their similarities, and that this discursive disjuncture enters into the common sense that underlies the politics of the programs.
Chapter 1

Introduction

_Bolsa Família_ is a successful, universalistic, anti-poverty program that has gained a great deal of recognition in Brazil, while affirmative action is a controversial race-based program with less political support and fewer indicators of success. Affirmative action in Brazil though is usually framed in non-racial terms, specifically in the most important piece of Brazilian _affirmative action_ legislation, the _Lei de Cotas Sociais_, or the Law of Social Quotas. Conventional wisdom is thus an artifact of discourse, for both programs are framed in universalistic terms, but disproportionately benefit Afro-Brazilians. This thesis will demonstrate that there is very little discursive overlap in discussions of these programs, despite their similarities, and that this discursive disjuncture enters into the common sense that underlies the politics of the programs.

Brazil imported approximately “3.5-3.6 million”\(^1\) slaves through the Atlantic slave trade, about “38 percent”\(^2\) of all of the slaves brought to the New World, not abolishing slavery until 1888. Many male European settlers who came to the Americas without companions had offspring with indigenous and African women.\(^3\) As a result, the Brazilian elite and the country’s intellectuals were faced with the perception that Brazil was less progressive and modernized due to its racially mixed population. Brazilian scholars, therefore, encouraged European immigration and developed a scientific theory that racial mixture would gradually _whiten_ the Brazilian population. The freed Africans, considered to be a mass population of “illiterate” and “unskilled

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2. Mattoso, _To Be a Slave in Brazil_, 40.
people,” had to mix with the incoming, “higher” and “more advanced” civilization. As Thomas E. Skidmore put it, “Abolitionist believed that miscegenation would gradually and inexorable ‘whiten’ and thereby ‘upgrade’ the Brazilian population.” Not only did the Brazilian nation’s physical attributes have to further align with those of Europe, but so did its culture.

Educated at Columbia University, Gilberto Freyre became an important figure in refuting this scientific racism. Instead of advocating *embranquecimento*, Freyre celebrated Brazil’s racial admixture. In his book, *The Masters and the Slaves*, first published in the 1930s, Freyre utilizes the plantation as the model of economic, social, political, and sexual interaction. Freyre affirms that slaves, although unfree, contributed greatly to Brazilian national customs and traditions due to their close relationship with their masters. Here Freyre prefigures the thesis of *racial democracy*, the notion that Brazil became a site of racial mixing and cultural hybridity. In contrast to the discriminatory and hierarchical race relations of the United States, Freyre portrayed Brazilian race relations as humane and permeable.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, U.S. scholars, or Brazilianists, had a disproportionate amount of influence in Brazil. Prominent Brazilian scholars travelled to the U.S. to complete their doctoral work with these researchers. Many often compared the U.S. with its “‘one drop rule,’ [which] has defined anyone with black ancestors as black,” to Brazil’s color continuum where “[r]acial identity…is not governed by the rigid descent rule.” In a 1970s study, Marvin Harris concluded that Brazilians identified themselves in a diverse and fluid manner that was not

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as simplistic as the black and white racial labels utilized in the U.S. “Racial identity in Brazil is characterized by a high degree of referential ambiguity,” said Harris. His research participants showed no evidence of “orderly [racial] distinctions.”

9 Around the same time, Carl N. Degler published a book in which he claimed that Brazil, unlike the U.S., had “the mulatto…escape hatch.”

Degler asserted that this made the racial hierarchy in Brazil less constraining and harsh than the one in the U.S. He combined such affirmations with the effect of wealth on racial perception. Stanley Bailey explains, “The adage in Brazil that ‘money whitens’ is also presented as support for the primary importance of class over race…It’s one’s class and not one’s race which determines the adoption of subordinate and superordinate attitudes between specific individuals in face-to-face relations.”

11 After conducting a study in rural Brazil, academic Charles Wagley determined that the cause of discrimination and exclusion was social class not race.

12 Later, scholars, including Harris and Wagley, dismissed racial discrimination in Brazil due to the ambiguities found in racial identification. Researcher Emílio Willems has noted, “Contrary to what happens in the United States, [Brazilian] public opinion is strongly opposed to any kind of racial discrimination. Any deviation from what is considered to be the general pattern of race behavior is severely condemned and often violently reproved.”

13 The negation of racial discrimination by scholars therefore contributed to “an ‘establishment mentality’ governed

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by elitist, assimilationist discourse and an ‘indifference to race.’”\textsuperscript{14} Overall, the inferences made by these Brazilianists further perpetuated belief in a Brazilian racial democracy.

There was a reaction to the aforementioned wave of “antiracialism.”\textsuperscript{15} Along with “activists of the emerging negro social movements…and…new generation of demographers with access to ‘hard’ data on racial structuring,”\textsuperscript{16} Professor Florestan Fernandes, a sociologist and leader of “the so-called São Paulo School,”\textsuperscript{17} became one of antiracialism’s most notable opponents. In his book, \textit{The Negro in Brazilian Society}, Fernandes comments on Brazil’s melting pot image and argues that while the country is racially mixed, Afro-Brazilians are marginalized. Fernandes explains that after the abolition of slavery blacks were left to compete in an industrializing environment where they were not given the proper societal tools to progress. Afro-Brazilians “were disadvantaged by their lack of social preparation for free employment, the market economy, and the urban style of life, but also with the limitations stemming from deeply rooted restrictive or negative attitudes.”\textsuperscript{18} Freed slaves had the inability to “economically, socially, and educationally”\textsuperscript{19} protect themselves from a new system that further disregarded them. With the intent to \textit{whiten} Brazil, European immigrants became a new source of labor and employment opportunities for Afro-Brazilians diminished. It was not until 1927 that “the program of subsidized [European] immigration was suspended.”\textsuperscript{20} Fernandes goes on to explore the position of white Brazilians in his book and states, “he clings to the prejudice of having no

\textsuperscript{14} Bailey, \textit{Legacies of Race Identities}, 28.
\textsuperscript{15} Bailey, \textit{Legacies of Race Identities}, 26.
\textsuperscript{16} Bailey, \textit{Legacies of Race Identities}, 28.
\textsuperscript{19} Fernandes, \textit{The Negro in Brazilian Society}, XIV.
prejudice.” Whites accepted the idea of a racial democracy because they did not feel threatened by blacks. Fernandes finds that Brazil will only become a racial democracy when whites accept that they are prejudiced and instead begin to view blacks as their equals from all perspectives. Fernandes recognizes that altering the psychological view, which is “socially patterned and even implanted,” will be the greatest obstacle in the alteration of Brazilian society. Antonio Guimarães, another Brazilian sociologist, adds that Brazil’s military dictatorship, 1974 through 1985, …adopted a racial democracy orientation that became a type of ‘dogma’ or official ‘ideology of the Brazilian state.’ The essence of the military’s take on racial democracy was the negation of racism in Brazil…[and] ‘eventually becomes a racist ideology, that is, a justification of the discriminatory order and of the racial inequalities that really exist.’ It was in this context that the myth of racial democracy came to be viewed most strongly by researchers as a type of legitimizing ideology of the powerful in Brazil and a mystifying ideology for the povo, or nonelite classes.

In contrast to the U.S., where racial discrimination faced some demands for redress, even if the responses were inadequate, racial democracy was utilized in Brazil as a mystifying ideology that excused Brazil from dealing with racial inequality.

In the 1990s, ‘North American students’ continued to compare the U.S. and Brazil’s positions on race. In his book, *Orpheus and Power*, Michael Hanchard outlines the development of a racial hegemony, *racismo mascarado*, in Brazil. He “argue[s] that culturalist (as opposed to cultural) practices have also been an impediment to certain types of counterhegemonic political activities because of their reproduction of culturalist tendencies found in the ideology of racial

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21 Fernandes, *The Negro in Brazilian Society*, XV.
22 Fernandes, *The Negro in Brazilian Society*, XVII.
23 Fernandes, *The Negro in Brazilian Society*, XVII.
democracy…”  In other words, to Hanchard, the myth of racial democracy was so embedded in Brazilian thought that it became a form of common sense and the primary obstacle to the eradication of racial inequalities in Brazil. “When combined with racially discriminatory practices in education, labor markets, and popular culture, Brazilian blacks have been locked in an elliptical pattern of racial oppression, where claims against discriminationary practices are rarely heard and hardly ever address by Brazilian elites.” Hanchard proposes that a civil rights movement, similar to the one that took place in the U.S., should become the “universal standard” by which Brazil and the global community solve their racial inequality struggles.

In reaction to this new orthodoxy, Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant argue that treating race and identity in Brazil like that of the U.S. ignores the specificity of Brazilian racial formations. Bourdieu and Wacquant argue that “instead of dissecting the constitution of the Brazilian ethoracial order according to its own logic,” Hanchard and others simply took U.S. racial formation as a universal template. Bourdieu and Wacquant point to the fact that Brazil recognizes a mixed-race category, and that some who consider themselves black in the U.S. may not necessarily consider themselves black in Brazil. Thus, a civil rights movement like the one Hanchard suggests may not be the best remedy to the social injustices that Afro-Brazilians face. Many theorists, including Peter Fry, Yvonne Maggie, Simone Monteiro, and Ricardo Ventura Santos, also challenge the racialism stage, in addition to the adoption of racial quotas. They


27 Hanchard, Orpheus and Power, 57.


29 Bourdieu and Wacquant, “On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason,” 44.


fear race-targeted approaches will increase racial tensions and do little to change the living conditions of those marginalized. A solution, they claim, is to increase the quality and access to education and health care services.32

At the time Brazilian scholars began critiquing racial democracy, Afro-Brazilians began to mobilize. Several diverse black movement (movimento negro) groups were founded in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in the 1970s, such as the Society for Brazil-Africa Exchange (SINBA), the Institute for Study of the Black Cultures (IPCN), and Unified Black Movement (MNU).33 While “their existence reflected the emergence of differences, and divisions within the movimento over tactical and ideological affinities…Brazilians of African descent [generally demanded] better healthcare, educational, and labor opportunists.”34 In São Paulo on July 7, 1978, after the brutal murder of a black taxi driver in the hands of police, a letter was read outside the municipal theater in front of two thousand people; it read in part,

Today we are in the street in a campaign of denouncement! A campaign against racial discrimination, against police repression, underemployment and marginalization. We are in the street to denounce the very poor quality of life of the Black Community…We invite the democratic sectors of society that support us, creating the necessary conditions for a truthful racial democracy.35

Members of the movimento negro were demanding equal rights for all Brazilian citizens.

In response to upsurge of Afro-Brazilian political subjectivity, the Brazilian government has for the first time started to take race into account as a matter of public policy. Even if some of these policies are framed in race-neutral terms, they have a disparately high impact on Afro-Brazilians. The chapters comprising this thesis will critically analyze both affirmative action, or

33 Hanchard, Orpheus and Power, 119-125.
34 Hanchard, Orpheus and Power, 119-121.
35 Hanchard, Orpheus and Power, 125.
the *Lei de Cotas Sociais*, and *Bolsa Família*. In Chapter 2, the literature review, how these policies emerged and their current achievements will be discussed. Chapter 3 outlines the research method utilized to discover the media’s discursive framing of affirmative action and *Bolsa Família*. Presumably, the exercise will demonstrate that one is racially coded, affirmative action, and the other one not, *Bolsa Família*, even though both are written in racially neutral ways. Chapter 4 analyses both policies’ discourses in depth, taking into account only the sources gathered for this investigation. Chapter 5 discusses how these policies overlap and/or diverge. The final chapter, summarizes the thesis, demonstrates that there is very little discursive overlap in discussions of these programs, despite their similarities, and that this discursive disjuncture enters into the common sense that underlies the politics of the programs.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Affirmative Action: Brief History and Achievements

Despite the turn to democratization, in 1985 Brazil’s black resistance movement was restrained by the hegemonic discourse of racial democracy. As early as the 1970s, activists who fought for federal legal recognition of racism were often called unpatriotic, for racial categorization was associated with the U.S. and imperialism. In response to Afro-Brazilians’ protests, starting in 1984, various Brazilian states created councils to work towards the ‘real emancipation’ of blacks. These councils aimed “to monitor legislation that defended the interests of the black population, suggest projects on their behalf to the state legislature and executive branches, and investigate complaints of racial discrimination and police violence.” In 1985, “President José Sarney proposed, but never successfully [created], a Black Council for Compensatory Action (Conselho Negro de Ação Compensatória) at the federal level.” President Sarney was only able to build and support the Palmares Cultural Foundation (Instituto Fundação Cultural Palmares). Rather than becoming a space for “addressing the more important socioeconomic needs of black people in work, education, and health,” the cultural foundation became a space solely devoted to celebrating Afro-Brazilian history and culture.

The 1988 Brazilian Constitution paved the way for the social inclusion of marginalized groups for it finally “recognized principles of tolerance, multiculturalism, and individual dignity,

37 Telles, Race in Another America, 48-9.
38 Telles, Race in Another America, 48-9.
39 Telles, Race in Another America, 48-9.
41 Telles, Race in Another America, 50.
rights and identities, and became the basis of hundreds of antiracist laws at various jurisdicational levels. Specifically, Article 5 (paragraph 42) made the practice of racism an unbailable crime, subject to imprisonment.”

In this same year, the black movement utilized the anniversary of slavery’s 1888 abolition as an instrument for publicity and protest. “For the black movement, that demonstration would become a historical benchmark for the future of black consciousness and organization in Brazil.”

One result of this Afro-Brazilian uprising, “black elected officials now often recognized their blackness and made race an important issue.”

Despite the fact that Afro-Brazilian leaders were able to make personal progress by self-identifying as black, and that racism was opposed by the Brazilian Constitution, Afro-Brazilians were unable to secure legislative remedies for the many issues confronting marginalized communities.

Afro-Brazilian legislators’ unsuccessful fight to pass laws to benefit their community continued through the 1990s. The black movement worked to emphasize that “blacks were the primary victims of Brazil’s poverty and human-rights abuses, which included street children, trafficking in women, and the violence from the growing drug trade.”

In 1991, Governor Leonel Brizola of Rio de Janeiro created the Extraordinary Secretary for Defense and Promotion of the Afro-Brazilian Population (SEAFRO), “the first and only top-level state government agency concerned with public policy for Afro-Brazilians,” but “opposition in the State Legislature alleged reverse racism. Challenges to the constitutionality of the administrative law creating the Secretariat prevented its being made a permanent agency, and it was abolished in

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42 Telles, *Race in Another America*, 50.
43 Telles, *Race in Another America*, 50.
44 Telles, *Race in Another America*, 50.
45 Telles, *Race in Another America*, 51.
1993, when the 1988 Brazilian Constitution was up for revision, sociologist Florestan Fernandes was a Congressman. Fernandes “introduced an amendment that would have devoted an entire chapter of the constitution to the issue of racial equality, inscribing the principle of affirmative action in the charter itself.” Unsurprisingly, Ferandes’ amendment was defeated, yet, his proposal gained support from some paving the way for future legislation.

It was not until the mid-1990s that affirmative action gained real attention, the same time that witnessed more Afro-Brazilians elected to office. Individuals like Senator Benedita da Silva and Congressman Paulo Paim often proposed bills promoting education, housing, and employment quotas for Afro-Brazilians. “Senator Benedita da Silva,” for instance, “presented Bill of Law 14/95, proposing a 10% quota program for entrance into higher education institutions for socially discriminated ethno-racial sectors, meaning blacks and indigenous people. The bill was not taken to vote.” Similarly, Congressman Paim suggested “Bill of Law 1.239/95” which not only called for the inclusion of the marginalized in different levels of society through a quota system, but also recognized the moral and material debt of Brazilian state to the Afro-Brazilian population by reason of the slave regime and the absence of post-abolition integration measures. Abdias do Nascimento, the first Afro-Brazilian member of Congress in the 1980s, “[introduced to] the Senate in 1997…[a] comprehensive Compensatory Action Bill

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50 Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 798.
committee members raised doubts as to its constitutionality and it was not taken to vote…”
Rejected bills in favor of the Afro-Brazilian community became the norm.

In 1995, the black movement held a demonstration to commemorate the 300-year anniversary of Zumbi dos Palmares’ death, “the legendary leader of the maroon slave community (*quilombo*) that resisted the Portuguese for nearly one hundred years.”

This, along with other campaigns that attempted to highlight racism and oppression, gained the attention of important Brazilian media outlets. “Such activity,” says Edward E. Telles, “seemed to be affecting public opinion. The term ‘racial democracy’ was beginning to fall out of favor in the popular Brazilian lexicon.”

A shift in academia towards the study of race was also becoming more prevalent. Scholars such as Nelson do Valle Silva, Antônio Sérjio Guimarães, and Livio Sansone produced both quantitative and ethnographic studies to highlight racism in Brazil. These scholars’ academic works later interconnected with federal statistical organizations’ research to expose structural racism. “The Brazilian Geography and Statistics Institute (IBGE) and the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) demonstrated with increasingly specific data the extent to which racism was a significant component in the construction of inequality…[These studies] lay the groundwork to justify positive policy measures,” explains Sérgio da Silva Martins.

The black movement’s grievances seemed to be gaining some level of attention from the federal government.

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53 Telles, *Race in Another America*, 53.
54 Telles, *Race in Another America*, 55-6.
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso created the Interministerial Working Group (Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial or GTI) on nearly the same day as the March of Zumbi.\textsuperscript{56} The group was to propose policies that would increase racial inclusion; in 1998 they published a document with their recommendations. However, what had initially seemed like an achievement, ended up being another defeat, for “the government did not create a similar group or mechanism for operationalizing these ideas, and government ministries sought to boycott implementation of the GTI’s recommendations.”\textsuperscript{57} In 1996, President Cardoso also created the National Program for Human Rights (Program Nacional de Direitos Humanos), “which prescribed short-, medium- and long-range goals for women, disabled persons, and indigenous and black persons.”\textsuperscript{58} Specifically, the long term “goals were to repeal all discriminatory laws, improve policies and regulations that seek to combat racial discrimination, and create ‘compensatory policies that socially and economically promote the negro population.’ The federal government thus endorsed the idea of explicit race-based public policies in support of nonwhites.”\textsuperscript{59} The black movement became hopeful that President Cardoso, once a student of Florestan Fernandes and the author of two books on race relations in Brazil, would be successful in realizing his promises through the developed group and program. President Cardoso, however, was unable to gain full support from his colleagues to effectively devise and implement affirmative action policies. The president went as far as to contact distinguished Brazilian scholars, so they could present and provide feedback on policy formulation. Some of these Brazilian scholars, including Jessé Souza, Fabio

\textsuperscript{56} Telles, Race in Another America, 56; Htun, “From ‘Racial Democracy’ to Affirmative Action,” 67.

\textsuperscript{57} Telles, Race in Another America, 56.

\textsuperscript{58} Telles, Race in Another America, 56.

\textsuperscript{59} Telles, Race in Another America, 56.
Wanderbey Reis, and Roberto Da Matta,\(^{60}\) remarkably continued to speak of the theory of racial democracy without any alternative solutions:

[The scholars communicated that racial democracy should be] viewed as a national project or goal to promote racial justice. They also expressed the ideas that race-targeted policies would solidify racial boundaries and perpetuate the idea of race itself. For them, Brazilian popular culture celebrates ambiguity and miscegenation rather than the conceptual separateness of groups, as required to identify beneficiaries of affirmative action. Rather than providing light about how to design policies to include nonwhites, these scholars voiced oblique opposition to affirmative-action policy, denouncing it as an inappropriate replication of U.S. policy.\(^{61}\)

It was clear that influential persons within the Brazilian federal government strongly resisted implementing affirmative action policies. The dialogue ignited by the black movement had a constructive effect on certain sectors of society, however, which began to experiment with various sorts affirmative action anyway.

Local governments, NGOs, privately funded organizations, universities, and churches were some of the first entities to institute affirmative action programs in Brazil. A study conducted by Rosana Heringer, between 1995 through 1999, found 124 affirmative action programs in ten Brazilian capitals, including Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Campo Grande, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, São Luís, São Paulo, and Vitória. Forty of these programs specifically focused on assisting the black population, seventy were dedicated to reducing racial discrimination, and 14 had the intention of reducing racial discrimination without mentioning race.\(^{62}\) In one organization, for example, a Catholic priest from Rio de Janeiro led a


\(^{61}\) Telles, *Race in Another America*, 58.

group to assist black and poor individuals in passing the university entrance exam. Public universities in Brazil are tuition-free if students are able to pass the entrance exam, or vestibular. Only the wealthy or private school attendees have access to preparation courses.\footnote{Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 806-7.} This type of initiative “reflects a compromise in a debate about whether it [affirmative action] should be for the poor in general or blacks in particular.”\footnote{Telles, Race in Another America, 58-9.} In Belo Horizonte, the Municipal Department for Black Community Affairs (SMACOM) was created. It “sought to develop social policies in poor areas, especially in housing and professional training. Participation in its programs was not limited to negros, although SMACOM included programs to combat racial discriminations and valorize black culture and people, particularly women.”\footnote{Telles, Race in Another America, 59.} Further, a São Paulo based NGO, Center for Research on Race Relations in the Workplace (CEERT); led an effort to have panels and meetings with companies on racial and gender equality in the workplace. Although these and other programs emerged throughout Brazil, they lacked support in Congress.

Early 2000, the Afro-Brazilian movement was gaining popularity internationally. The movimento negro used tactics commonly employed by transnational advocacy networks to pressure the Brazilian government in generating change. First, “information politics,”\footnote{Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 16.} activists utilized sources such as the Internet to circulate information about human rights violations in Brazil and to connect with other “international human rights networks…throughout Latin America, the United States, and South Africa.”\footnote{Telles, Race in Another America, 61; Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 802.} Second, the black movement used “symbolic
politics,“68 so that global audiences could make sense of what was occurring in Brazil. In March 2000, Afro-Brazilians, along with the indigenous community, held a demonstration during the 500th anniversary celebration of the Portuguese landing in Brazil. The story spread worldwide. “Military police officers [had] used tear gas, nightsticks and rubber bullets to disperse 2,000 Indian-led demonstrators taking part in a ‘march of the excluded’ in Porto Seguro, the focal point of the official celebrations.”69 Due to the protest, the Brazilian government rescinded their invitations to host the Regional Preparatory Conference for the Third World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, convened by the UN General Assembly.70 Third, the movimento negro called upon actors with “leverage”71 to assist them in increasing awareness of black marginalization in Brazil. Partnerships with “Mundo Afro of Uruguay, the International Human Rights Law Group, the Ford Foundation, and the Southern Education Foundation Comparative Initiative on Human Relations”72 were developed. “These international networks were very effective, in particular the Latin American and Caribbean Strategic Alliance, which brought together about 600 activists in Santiago, Chile, during the [relocated] Regional Preparatory Conference for the Americas [in December 2000].”73 It was during this meeting that “Latin American governments decided to accept ‘El Documento Santiago.’”74 The document was formulated by La Alianza Estratégica de Afro-Latinoamericanos (La Alianza). Formed in 1998 by Afro-Latin Americans and Afro-Caribbeans, 

68 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 16.


70 Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 802.

71 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 16.

72 Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 802.


74 Telles, Race in Another America, 68.
including Afro-Brazilians, the group is based out of Montevideo, Uruguay. The document provides:

- a diagnosis of historical and current discrimination in the region and recommendations for overcoming its consequences. It also affirmed that denying the existence of discrimination and racism at the level of the state as well as society contributes directly to the practices of racism, discrimination, xenophobia, and related forms of intolerance. Finally, the document demanded the designation of effective antiracist policies that “can include” affirmative action.\(^75\)

Overall, the acceptance of this document by the Brazilian state and other Latin American governments allowed the *movimento negro* to exercise “accountability politics.”\(^76\) “[Brazilian] government officials could not help but notice that the black movement was no longer based on a small cadre of activists but rather had developed widespread support.”\(^77\) Moving forward the Brazilian government could no longer ignore racial discrimination, “it was high time for them to seek the proper correctives.”\(^78\)

Global connections had opened the way for Brazil’s participation in the Third World Conference that took place in Durban, South Africa in August 2001. There, Brazilian representatives finally publicly admitted the contemporary consequences of colonialism and slavery. Brazilian media ran an abundance of articles on the event and public interest on the topic of race began to rise.\(^79\) Nations came “together in a spirit of renewed political will and commitment to universal equality, justice and dignity, [they saluted] the memory of all victims of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance all over the world and solemnly

\(^75\) Telles, *Race in Another America*, 68.

\(^76\) Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 16.

\(^77\) Telles, *Race in Another America*, 68.

\(^78\) Telles, *Race in Another America*, 69.

\(^79\) Telles, *Race in Another America*, 71.
[adopted] the Durban Declaration [or objectives] and Programme of Action. Devised by nearly 3,000 NGOs from all continents starting in the year 2000, the Programme of Action “urged” the states attending the conference to implement “practical and workable” policies and legislation, including affirmative action, “to ensure non-discrimination, in particular as regards access to social services, employment, housing, education, [and] health care.” After the conference, Brazilian delegates were hopeful the Brazilian government would fulfill its commitment and develop legislation to benefit the Afro-Brazilian community. Some, however, remained doubtful of the government’s capacity to carry out such a project. The well-known columnist Joaquim Barbosa stated his view:

This is a government at the end of its term with difficulties of getting approval for even items that form part of its political agenda. How are they going to pass affirmative action? The government is going to play to the public, saying it’s going to happen, knowing well that it doesn’t have the slightest chance of doing anything. He also noted that the legal-philosophical principle of affirmative action is the search for the effective implementation of the principle of equality. Affirmative action implies setting aside formal equality and seeking real and material equality. It means breaking the logic by which we are all equal, when in fact, we are not. Such doubt seemed to be widespread.

People were right to be skeptical. Whatever was planned and discussed during the Durban conference came to nothing, at least in the short run.

As a result of national and international pressures, President Cardoso’s administration began instituting various administrative remedies. In 2001, the Ministry of Agrarian Development began a ‘Program of Affirmative Action for Black Men and Women.’

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83 Telles, Race in Another America, 71.

84 Telles, Race in Another America, 72.
reveals that the program aimed to ‘adopt compensatory, special and temporary measures to accelerate the process of building racial equality in the countryside.’ This race-based quota would guarantee “20 percent of all administrative positions in the ministry [were] to be reserved for negros, with this number increasing to 30 percent by 2003; and 30 percent of the ministry’s budget allotted to predominately black rural communities. The program also mandated that all quilombo lands of federal and state lands should be recognized and titled.’ The Ministry of Justice followed by creating a Federal Council to Combat Racism, “with competence to hear complaints.” The council required “20 percent of its high-level staff and consultants, as well as the staff of subcontractors, be black.” The domino effect continued, also in 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Relations offered “20 black students subsidized admission to the Rio Branco Institute.” This “virtually all-white Foreign Diplomacy School” prepares Brazilians for the diplomatic corps. In 2002, President Cardoso created via Presidential Decree No. 4.228 a National Affirmative Action program, “which would study the ways in which government agencies could adopt percentage goals for blacks, women and the handicapped.” This too became a symbolic achievement that did not set any official goals or quotas. The aforementioned administrative decrees, unlike laws, can be seen as temporary or artificial solutions to social

86 Vivian O. Ekey, “The Afro-Brazilian University Experience: How Racial Quota Policy Beneficiaries at the Federal University of Bahia Perceive Racial Quota Debates, UFBA Quota Policy, and Life as Quota Students” (Independent Study Project, University of Maryland, 2010), 11; Telles, Race in Another America, 72; Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 803.
88 Telles, Race in Another America, 72.
90 Telles, Race in Another America, 72.
91 Ekey, “The Afro-Brazilian University Experience,” 11; Telles, Race in Another America, 73; Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 804.
problems. They are easily manipulated by “bureaucratic inertia”\textsuperscript{92} and often do not achieve their initial intent. Laws, on the other hand, are legitimized by “lengthy negotiation” and “political concession.”\textsuperscript{93} As once noted by Telles, “On social issues, not to mention racial issues, Congress is especially sluggish in passing legislation. As of March 2002, up to 130 bills that deal with racial issues are pending in the National Congress.”\textsuperscript{94}

In 2003, the Worker’s Party (\textit{Partido dos Trabalhadores}) candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva became president. “Founded in 1980, the party has deep roots in trade unions, catholic organizations, women’s movements and many other parts of the vibrant Brazilian civil society.”\textsuperscript{95} President Lula’s administration aimed to increase black representation in government; he appointed three Afro-Brazilians to his cabinet, something that had never been done before. They were, “Gilberto Gil…to head the Ministry of Culture; Bendita da Silva…to be the minister for social assistance and promotion; and Marina Silva…to be the minister of the environment.”\textsuperscript{96} Most shockingly, the “Senate elected Paulo Paim [an Afro-Brazilian] as their first vice president [and]…Lula nominated…Joaquim Benedito Barbosa Gomes to the Brazilian Supreme Court, thus becoming the first black person in that position in the 174 years of that court.”\textsuperscript{97} On January 9, 2003, Federal Law No. 10.639 was enacted. It “mandate[ed] the teaching of African and Afro-Brazilian history in school curricula at all levels of education.”\textsuperscript{98} Full implementation of this law

\textsuperscript{92} Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 804.
\textsuperscript{93} Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 804.
\textsuperscript{94} Telles, \textit{Race in Another America}, 61.
\textsuperscript{96} Telles, \textit{Race in Another America}, 61.
\textsuperscript{97} Telles, \textit{Race in Another America}, 61.
\textsuperscript{98} Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 805.
has been difficult “due to [a] lack of resources allocated for its execution.” President Lula’s administration also created a cabinet-level office to fight against racial inequalities in March 2003. The Special Federal Secretariat for Policies Promoting Racial Equality (SEPPVR) promoted affirmative action, recognition of quilombo communities, and the involvement of the Brazilian community in the creation of policies that would combat racism. With the support of the SEPPVR, near the end of his second term in 2010, President Lula signed the Statute for Racial Equality (Estatuto de Igualdade Racial). Federal Deputy Paim first proposed the bill in the year 2000, and it was initially more ambitious for it endorsed “20-percent quotas for negros in public universities, medium and large firms, and municipal, state, and local governments.” Now, the statute is merely a set of rules and legal principles that aim to curb racial discrimination and establish policies to reduce social inequality between different racial groups. The statute does not directly endorse affirmative action policies, but it does, for example, “grant ownership of their land to the inhabitants of quilombos.” Many considered it fell “short of their expectations,” but Federal Deputy Paim said, “[t]he statute is a real step forward and effective weapon, even if it does not come up to our ideals.”

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100 Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 806.  
101 Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 806; Telles, Race in Another America, 74.  
103 Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 805; Telles, Race in Another America, 61.  
106 Annie Gasnier, “Brazil Passes Racial Equality Law but Fails to Endorse Affirmative Action.”
Collaboration and dialogue between the black movement and the federal government increased during President Lula’s time in office. “The educational system and university admissions have been a primary focus of the black movement’s activity in the past decades, whether through the creation of community schools, debates and seminars, or extracurricular teacher training courses.” In the 1990s, for instance, the black movement had “created its own form of affirmative action without quotas: community-based gratuitous University Admissions Preparation Courses for Blacks and Poor People (PVNC).” Centered in Rio de Janeiro, with the assistance of community-based organizations and the backing of the Catholic Church, “free preparatory courses for poor and black students who wanted to pass the entrance exams for public universities [were provided].” As a result, the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro “has offered some 700 tuition grants to PVNC students since 1996.” Other like programs emerged, such as the Steve Biko Institute of Bahia and Educafro, also in Rio de Janeiro. “[Additional] demands, such as fee waivers for the exams, free public transportation for poor students…and student support policies [were incorporated].” These groups witnessed results, but “for the democratization of access to public universities…there is a lot of progress to be made.”

Dialogue between the federal government and the black movement, the work of PVNC groups, and Brazil’s participation in the Third World Conference against Racism, finally resulted

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in the slow spread of affirmative action policies into Brazilian universities. The Durban conference was also able to achieve a shift to “a discourse no longer based on the celebration of ‘mixture’ as an antidote for racism, but rather informed by the need to recognize ‘race’ and ‘racial difference/diversity’ to correct racial inequality.”113 The affirmative action programs introduced within Brazilian universities varied and progressed as race-specific and race-neutral quota systems, and there were in fact overlaps. For example, “On 9 October 2001, the Rio de Janeiro state legislature approved a bill establishing a quota of 40 percent for blacks in the two state universities. The bill followed approval of an earlier initiative introduced by Governor Anthony Garotinho, which created a quota of 50 percent for student coming from public schools.”114 It is important to point out that “These are not exclusive and, more often than not, the same person fills both quotas.”115 Martins says, “The State University of Bahia instituted a similar measure, followed in 2003 by the the University of Brasilia, the Federal University of Alagoas, and the State University of Mato Grosso do Sul...”116

Lilia G. M. Tavolaro examines race discourses that emerged from the implementation of race-specific quotas. Specifically, the scholar studies two of Rio de Janeiro’s public universities, Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ) and the State University of Northern Rio de Janeiro (UENF), and one state university in Brasília, University of Brasilia (UnB). Tavolaro argues that implementation of race-specific quotas gave rise to two very “different institutional discourses of


114 Htun, “From ‘Racial Democracy’ to Affirmative Action,” 71; Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 807, states “Rio de Janeiro’s State Legislative Assembly passed a law creating a quota in the state university system of 40% for ‘blacks and pardos’;” Bailey, *Legacies of Race Identities*, 45, says “Prominent negro politician, academic, and activist Nascimento clarifies the meaning of the negro term: Official Brazilian census data use two color categories for African descendants: preto (literally, “black”) for the dark-skinned and pardo (roughly, mulatto and mestizo) for others. It is now accepted convention to identify the black population as the sum of the preto and pardo categories, referred to as negro, afro-brasileiro, or afro-descendente. In English, “black,” “African Brazilian,” and “people of African descent” refer to this same sum of the two groups [preto and pardo].


race, established through particular circumstances and social and political arrangements that conditioned the formation of the quota policies in these two instances.”

In the instance of Rio de Janeiro’s universities, the racial quota was imposed through the law previously mentioned. It was approved by Rio de Janeiro’s State Legislative Assembly and formulated by State Deputy José Amorim, a member of the conservative Brazilian Progressive Party (Partido Progressista Brasileiro) who had no prior connection to the black movement. Apparently, “he saw the creation of quotas for black people in public universities as an opportunity to accumulate political prestige in a context marked by the intense media coverage of the Durban Conference and affirmative action-related issues.”

 Implemented in mid-2002, while 2003 academic year applications were on the way, university admission counselors scrambled to implement the new policy while “the criteria to identify the beneficiaries of [the racial] quotas [were] still undetermined.” Swiftly, critics argued that if the aim was to promote social justice, universities should recognize “that the socio-economic situation more than race was a major obstacle to entering the university, suggesting that an affirmative policy turned to the poor people would make a more effective measure if the goal was to promote social justice.”

Once more, this argument was backed by the idea of Brazil’s ‘culture of miscegenation’ and “real doubts as to the actual feasibility of a bipolar racial classification given Brazilians’ ‘multiple racial origins.’” Many students felt that the new admissions policy was discriminatory and unconstitutional. Approximately 300 lawsuits were later filed against Rio’s public universities.

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118 Rio de Janeiro’s State Legislative Assembly passed a law creating a quota in the state university system of 40% for blacks. This quota was added to a 50% quota, already in effect, for students coming from public schools.
120 Tavolaro, “Affirmative Action in Contemporary Brazil,” 149.
121 Tavolaro, “Affirmative Action in Contemporary Brazil,” 149.
122 Tavolaro, “Affirmative Action in Contemporary Brazil,” 149.
Even as the universities maintained their pro-racial quota stand, the Governor at the time, 
Rosângela Matheus, proposed a new law. It stated, “the state universities of Rio de Janeiro were 
now to reserve 45% of its places for needy people. Of these 45%, 20% were to be reserved for 
self-declared blacks (negros), 20% for public schools graduates and 5% for ethnic minorities and 
handicaps.”¹²³ Tavolaro quotes Peter Fry:

In fact…at the occasion of the debate that preceded the voting session of Governor 
Matheus’s Bill proposing a new law of quotas, the legislators discourses focused on the 
issues of social inequality to the point that, at times, speaking of blacks became 
synonymous with speaking of poor people…the subordination of categories such as 
‘black,’ ‘public school graduates,’ ‘handicaps’ and ‘ethnic minorities’ to the category 
‘needy’ represented the reconciliation of favorable and opposing stands on quota while 
suggesting that the incorporation of a class-biased approach increased the law’s chances 
of being approved in the Legislative Assembly…the percentage of quotas for black 
decreased from 40% of blacks and browns—whether rich or poor— to 20% of poor blacks, 
the new law was enthusiastically celebrated by black activists by the time it was voted in 
the Assembly…this was a sign of the black movements leaders’ ‘will to give black 
identity a name and make it into a juridical entity’…regardless of the new Law’s actual 
potential to radically change the current situation of the majority of the black poor 
population. The institutionalization of the socio-economic disadvantage position of 
candidates as the main criteria for establishing their eligibility to quotas seems to have 
significantly determined the terms of affirmative action and of the discourses of race 
inside UERJ.¹²⁴

Moreover, at both of Rio de Janeiro’s public universities socio-economic need became the 
central basis by which the race-specific quota was granted to black students and race continued 
to be “a highly disputable category.”¹²⁵ In sum, the race discourse became directly associated 
with Afro-Brazilians’ economic deprivation. This perception of the policy exemplified a 
 systemic social and political ‘class-bias’ amongst Brazil’s elite.¹²⁶

The enactment of a quota system at the University of Brasília (UnB) was an aftereffect of the Durban conference for the university was located in the nation’s capital, the school had been involved in a lot of the conference’s preliminary preparations, and the media had critiqued the university for enrolling predominately *white* students. At the (UnB), the implementation of *race-specific* quotas initially held on to the root of its intent, *race*. The quotas at this university were *not executed as the result of a law generated by a legislative assembly*, rather, “the first proposal of quotas for blacks…was written by two professors of the Department of Anthropology: Professor José Jorge de Carvalho and Professor Rita Laura Segato…[Later] approved by [Conselho de Ensino Pesquisa e Extensão] CEPE in June 2003.”127 Carvalho and Segato suggested prospective students self-identify as “‘black’ (*negro*) instead of ‘afro-descendent’ since in Brazil nearly everyone could claim to descend from Africans,”128 but the oversight council quickly rejected the *self-declaration portion* arguing that this would become be a loophole for frauds. The Committee “suggested that the eligibility to quotas be based on the analysis of the applicant’s phenotype. The rationale behind it was that racial identity is not subjectively chosen anyway, that it is, instead, something imposed by society based on people’s physical characteristics.”129 In the end, the Professors and the Committee members agreed that “20% of [the university’s]…places should be reserved for ‘black’ and ‘brown’ applicants who, besides self-declaring as such, were required to by photographed at the moment of application. Their pictures and application forms were then to be submitted to the evaluation of a Committee

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127 Tavolaro, “Affirmative Action in Contemporary Brazil,” 154-55, “Conselho de Ensino Pesquisa e Extensão (CEPE) consists of one of the superior Councils of the University of Brasília. The Council is presided by the Rector, the vice-rector, the Deans of Undergraduate, Graduate, Research and Continuing Education, [etc…] It is up to the CEPE to regulate the teaching, research and continuing education activities.”


composed by people with ‘expertise in race relations.’”\textsuperscript{130} If a student were to be deemed ineligible for acceptance through the racial quota system, the potential student’s solicitation would be forwarded to the university’s general pool of applications. If a student wanted to appeal their rejection, they could do so in writing and then present their case in front of a panel. Interestingly, a Committee monitor said, ‘We know there will be cases in which one brother will have the application homologated and the other won’t. The evaluation will be based on phenotype, skin color and general characteristics of the black race because these are the factors that trigger prejudice.’\textsuperscript{131} Unlike the two public universities of Rio de Janeiro that utilized socio-economic status “as a defining characteristic of blackness,” the UnB used physical appearance as “the main criterion to define black identity” and to select the beneficiaries of their quota system.\textsuperscript{132}

In addition to the affirmative action policies at the UERJ, UENF, and UnB, “some [affirmative action programs] only target[ed] Afro-Brazilian students from public secondary schools as a way of reaching the neediest,” says Tanya K. Hernández.\textsuperscript{133} Unlike most countries, the most distinguished universities in Brazil, like UERJ, UENF, and UnB, are public. Students who attend private secondary schools have access to \textit{vestibular} preparation courses. On the other hand, students who graduate from public secondary schools frequently have to enroll in private

\textsuperscript{130} Tavolaro, “Affirmative Action in Contemporary Brazil,” 155. Again, Bailey, \textit{Legacies of Race Identities}, 45, says “Prominent negro politician, academic, and activist Nascimento clears the meaning of the negro term: Official Brazilian census data use two color categories for African descendants: \textit{preto} (literally, “black”) for the dark-skinned and \textit{pardo} (roughly, mulatto and mestizo) for others. It is now accepted convention to identify the black population as the sum of the \textit{preto} and \textit{pardo} categories, referred to as negro, \textit{afro-brasileiro}, or \textit{afro-descendente}. In English, “black,” “African Brazilian,” and “people of African descent” refer to this same sum of the two groups \textit{preto} and \textit{pardo}.

\textsuperscript{131} Tavolaro, “Affirmative Action in Contemporary Brazil,” 156.


universities with lower academic standards. “Thus, attendance at public secondary schools is an indicator of low socioeconomic status in Brazil and has become an important class-based criterion in Brazil’s new affirmative action policies in public universities,” says Telles. Hernández also adds, “A few universities award extra points to the entrance examination scores of Afro-Brazilian applicants and public secondary school graduates. Both mechanisms ensure that middle-class Afro-Brazilians, who have also been underrepresented in public universities and affected by racial discrimination, will not be excluded by class or socio-economic considerations.” Overall, these measures are introduced precisely because they will disproportionately benefit Afro-Brazilians.

There was opposition to the implementation of quotas, especially racial, in institutions of higher education. Again, many argued that race-based affirmative action created further divisions amongst the Brazilian people, and that these policies were themselves racist. Telles also explains that, “Although there is some opposition to quotas or affirmative action of any kind, class criteria have become more acceptable than race for redressing Brazil’s enormous social and racial inequalities. Data from the 2010 [Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira] INEP show that class quotas have become more common than race quotas, even though the debate has been almost entirely about race quotas.” In 2010 the INEP also concluded that “49 of 95 federal and state universities had [both race based and non-race based]

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quota systems. In terms of the number of students affected, 45 thousand students were beneficiaries of affirmative action—comprising 11 percent of all students in public higher education. As previously noted, “A few universities use[d] a combination of class and race quotas, and as of 2012, when the University of Brasília [UnB] began to also use class-based criteria, none exclusively use race quotas.”

Attempts towards further inclusion of marginalized communities persisted under President Dilma Rousseff’s administration. Sworn into office as Brazil’s first female President in 2011, she had worked as President Lula’s Minister of Energy and then Chief of Staff. On August 29, 2012, President Rousseff signed the Law of Social Quotas 12.711 (Lei de Cotas Sociais).

The law requires “public federal universities[to] reserve half of their spots for underprivileged students hailing from public schools, disproportionately attended by minorities[the law] will have the widest impact on Afro-Brazilians, who make up more than half of the nation’s population.” Thomas W. Davis adds, “...half of those seats [are to be] partly saved for low-income families (regardless of their race) and for those who declare themselves as black, mixed or indigenous with respect to demographic data [from each state]. Universities only [had until 2016]...to full[y] implement the government’s quota scheme, and the Law itself does not explicitly indicate any sort of termination date and is without any sort of systematic temporary review.” Noteworthy is what is meant by low-income. Half, or fifty (50) percent, of places

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“will be allocated to students with family income equal to or less than 1.5 times minimum wage.”\textsuperscript{144} Income must be “proven by documentation with rules laid down by the institution” and “the criterion of race is self-declaratory.”\textsuperscript{145} It will be up to the federal Ministry of Education, the Special Federal Secretariat for Policies Promoting Racial Equality (SEPPIR), and National Indian Foundation (\textit{Fundação Nacional do Índio} or FUNAI) to monitor the full implementation of the law.\textsuperscript{146} Lastly, within ten years of the enactment of Law 12.711 the Brazilian government will conduct a full review.\textsuperscript{147} Overall, the law ‘seeks to combine considerations of race and social class together.’\textsuperscript{148}

An abundance of controversy surrounded the implementation of the \textit{Lei de Cotas Sociais}, which related to both the race-neutrality and race-specificity of the law. First, similar to what has been argued by Bourdieu and Wacquant, Dilma’s predecessor President Cardoso insisted that a U.S.-influenced affirmative action would not resolve Brazil’s inequalities.\textsuperscript{149} Academics and some university faculty argued that selecting students on grounds other than merit, would lower the standards of Brazilian public university education.\textsuperscript{150} An “…institutional relations coordinator from the University of Campinas [stated] ‘You don’t create capable and creative people by decree.’”\textsuperscript{151} Many also argued that this was the easiest way for the Brazilian government to solve the ineffectiveness of the secondary school system; it “[gave] the


\textsuperscript{146} Müller, “Lei das Cotas: solução ou problema?”

\textsuperscript{147} Müller, “Lei das Cotas: solução ou problema?”

\textsuperscript{148} Llana, “Brazil’s affirmative action law offers a huge hand up.”

\textsuperscript{149} Romero, “Brazil Enacts Affirmative Action Law for Universities.”

\textsuperscript{150} Martins, Medeiros, and Nascimento, “Paving Paradise,” 810.

\textsuperscript{151} Romero, “Brazil Enacts Affirmative Action Law for Universities.”
government an easy way out,” rather, than fixing the root of the problem. White individuals also argued it was “reverse discrimination” by the government. The greatest controversy surrounding the new law concerned race. Who would be entitled to advantage, since determining who is black in Brazil has always been so difficult? As previously noted, critics of the law feared fraud in the self-declaration of blackness.

Those in favor of the Lei de Cotas Sociais argued that educating a nation regardless of race or class is part of democratization for the “dissemination of knowledge in a country [like Brazil]…is still very uneven.” Advocates of the law stressed that it gives the poor, most of whom are Afro-Brazilian, a chance at obtaining an education and in improving their socio-economic status. The Lei de Cotas Sociais also indirectly compensates the black population for historically inflicted disparities. “Brazil is experiencing an extremely positive moment,” said Ms. Bairros, the minister promoting racial equality. “Next, we will seek to extend this concept to other areas, like culture and jobs.”

Research on the impact of the Law of Social Quotas is minimal. Those that view the law from a positive standpoint argue that the law is a good start in creating a change in higher education, but should not be utilized as an excuse to “paralyze or postpone” the development of reforms in primary and secondary education. Brazil has also always dealt with “[e]thnic tensions…and one of the manifestations is the low presence of blacks in the universities…quotas [thus] reduce ethnic tension by allowing multiethnic and multiracial coexistence in the academic

152 Llana, “Brazil’s affirmative action law offers a huge hand up.”
153 Llana, “Brazil’s affirmative action law offers a huge hand up.”
154 Müller, “Lei das Cotas: solução ou problema?”
environment.” As indicated previously, opponents of the law argued that quota students would not be academically up to par with their counterparts, however, the following statistics have been provided:

At the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN), for example, in the period from 2013 to the first half of 2015, the average performance of the quota students is slightly higher than that of non-quota holders. In 2014, at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), of the 3,720 students who dropped out of their courses, 2,758 came from private education. In the previous year, when UFMG adhered to the Quotas Law, the Academic Performance average, with grades ranging from 0 to 5, reached 3.49 among the quota holders, while the other students reached 3.07.

The more visible impact of the Quota Law is that Brazilian universities now starting to gradually reflect their population’s demographic and are gaining a level of “social quality.”

All in all, the Afro-Brazilian fight for the legal recognition of racism in Brazil was a long one. Through the 1990s legislators were unsuccessful in securing any remedies. President Cardoso’s administration publically denounced disguised inequality and attempted to enact reforms to reduce social and racial gaps. During President Lula’s administration, conversations between civil society and the government strengthened. Various types of affirmative action programs emerged, but it was not until 2012 that President Rousseff signed the Law of Social Quotas 12.711. Quotas in education have caused much debate and with the impeachment of President Rousseff in 2016, the future of the law is uncertain. Current President Michel Temer “seems to be embracing a more conservative disposition for his government [and] the country’s business establishment pressuring him to privatize state-controlled companies and cut public

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157 Lewer, “Federais cumprem meta da Lei de Cotas; entenda mitos e polêmicas.”
158 Lewer, “Federais cumprem meta da Lei de Cotas; entenda mitos e polêmicas.”
159 Lewer, “Federais cumprem meta da Lei de Cotas; entenda mitos e polêmicas.”
Many critics have pointed to the lack of Afro-Brazilians in the President’s cabinet. In 2017, “Temer…faced more serious corruption allegations than those made against Rousseff and was even said to have ordered his subordinates to pay bribes. He survived the vote to submit him to a recall.” Despite the turmoil in Brazil’s federal government, many continue to attempt to develop sustainable programs to move the Afro-Brazilian community forward. The predominant response to social divides in Brazil happens to be a race-neutral program discussed in the next section.

2.2 Bolsa Familia: Brief History and Achievements

The “Brazilian Miracle” took place from the late 1960s to the late 1970s. In 1973, “the country was exporting $10 billion worth of goods, up from less than $3 billion in 1968.” However, the so-called “Miracle” was short-lived. Brazilians blamed the 1964 military government appointed technocrats for the economic reverse. “[The technocrats] were blamed for Brazil’s system of indexation. This program attempts to synchronize the entire economy – wages, prices, interest rates, rents – with inflation.” Others held the whole regime responsible for they had taken upon “Pharaonic Projects.” Some of these projects included “the trans-Amazon highway, a massive hydro electric complex at Itaipú on the border with Paraguay and

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Argentina, the Rio Niterói Bridge across Guanabara Bay, and a nuclear power plant.”\textsuperscript{166} At one point Brazil had also been the developing world’s leading oil importer and then,

in the wake of the 1973 Middle East conflict…the bubble…bust. The growth rate tailed off sharply, balance-of-payments deficits ballooned, inflation began to soar, and by the late 1970s the country was mired in a deep recession. Brazil’s foreign debt raced past the $100 billion mark, the largest in the underdeveloped world, and rising interest rates abroad made full service payments unthinkable.\textsuperscript{167}

The military regime slowly started a process for the reinstatement of civilian rule, but in 1984 Brazilians took the streets and demanded presidential elections. Trancredo Neves was elected, however, his death in 1985 “prevented him from taking office as the country’s first civilian ruler in 21 years. He was 75 years old.”\textsuperscript{168}

Brazil’s first civilian government, led by José Sarney, was inaugurated in March 1985.\textsuperscript{169} President Sarney’s economic policies were neither orthodox nor heterodox. They were inconsistent and disastrous, which led to true hyperinflation in Brazil. In February 1986, President Sarney’s administration introduced the Cruzado Plan, which attempted to reduce the country’s consistent inflation by imposing a “price and wage freeze”\textsuperscript{170} among other measures, but by “the end of 1986, as inflation resurged, external accounts collapsed, and real growth sagged.”\textsuperscript{171} All in all, the failure of the economic policies implemented by the Sarney administration did not only cause a “recession by the first half of 1987…but also [decreased]…the political morale of the nation.”\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{166} Page, \textit{The Brazilians}, 20.

\textsuperscript{167} Page, \textit{The Brazilians}, 21.


\textsuperscript{169} Werner Baer, \textit{The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development}, 4\textsuperscript{th} ed. (Westport: Prager, 1995), 105.

\textsuperscript{170} Baer, \textit{The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development}, 154.

\textsuperscript{171} Baer, \textit{The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development}, 149.

\textsuperscript{172} Baer, \textit{The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development}, 173.
Following the failure of three finance ministers and three major economic policies like the Cruzado Plan, in March of 1990, Fernando Collor de Mello assumed the presidency. “He introduced what seemed to be a unique way of dealing with inflation…and of modernizing the country’s economy through drastic liberalization moves,” explains Werner Baer.173 Similar to his predecessors he took wildly from one economic policy to another, all of them ineffective. “Collor provided diversion with his presidential style. He flew military jets, rode jet-powered water skis, and donned T-shirts with political or inspirational messages for his morning jogs.”174 Then, to further aggravate the country’s position, the Collor presidency was short-lived for he was accused of corruption and was ultimately impeached. Itamar Franco took over as an interim President and in June 1993 appointed Fernando Henrique Cardoso as Minister of the Economy. Cardoso did not have experience in finance, but he did understand he had to an end to Brazil’s inflation and change the country’s economic position for the better.175

From 1995 to 2003, Cardoso served as President of Brazil. Samuel Cohn describes him as “a center-right social democrat…implementer of significant semi-neoliberal economic reforms…”176 The President’s prime objective was to keep the Brazil’s high debt low in an effort to keep the country out of an even greater economic crisis. Cardoso called for an “‘Immediate Action Plan.’”177 The plan “called for the creation of a new currency, a reduction in government spending, the privatization of state-owned companies, the continuation of negotiations begun in 1990 to restructure Brazil’s foreign debt, and the opening of the Brazilian market to foreign

177 Baer, The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development, 192.
imports.”178 The strategy also kept state and local governments on check by “allocat[ing] 9 percent of their revenues to clear their debts with the federal government” and cut federal spending by 9 percent and committed to “fight tax evasion” at all levels.179 During his presidency Cardoso implemented “a brilliant series of monetary and fiscal policies that put a stop to Brazil’s chronic double digit inflation, and produced 15 years of relative price stability.”180 This became the era when the predecessors of Bolsa Família, which will be later described, were created. Additionally, Brazil began to build an integrated public health system, including a systematic and effective fight against AIDS. These public health policies will not be the focus of this thesis, however. During this time Brazil developed policies that were simultaneously neoliberal and welfarist.

Overall, the 1990s saw an increase in dialogue on the need to assist the poor through social and economic policies. In Brazil, policymakers discussed “society’s ‘debt to the poor,’”181 meaning that the poor are excluded due to an unjust society and their probabilities of escaping poverty are slim to none; therefore, effective alleviation strategies had to be developed.182 Government officials concluded that in addition to providing income to the poor, education, an “underlying structural source of poverty,”183 had to be addressed. School “enrollment was not sufficient: poor students also needed support to maintain a minimum level of attendance.”184

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182 Linder et al., “The Nuts and Bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program,” 9. “This differs from the United States’ perception, “where 61% believe the poor are poor because ‘they are lazy,’ but where about 70% of the population believes that the poor do have a chance to escape from poverty on their own, if they would only put enough effort into it.”
Specific societal burdens called for more holistic policies. Accordingly, as Anja Linder and other researchers have noted, “The basic premise for linking school attendance to cash assistance was based on demand-side constraints: even if schools are available, poor children cannot always attend due to direct and indirect (opportunity) costs. Cash assistance was seen as an incentive to help counter these demand-side constraints and promote school attendance.”

Therefore, Brazil, similar to other Latin American countries at the time, became particularly fond of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs. These programs provide money to families that actively participate in education and health care services. Young children are often the programs’ target population in the hopes of achieving families’ and the government’s goal of breaking the cycle of poverty, enhancing the next generations’ human capital, and overall building a more sustainable future.

In January 1995, the first two CCT programs were established in Brazil. One, *Bolsa Escola*, by the PT, and the other, Guaranteed Minimum Family Income Program by the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (*Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*; PSDB). The PT’s program was launched in Distrito Federal and the PSDB’s program was introduced in Campinas Municipality. When introduced, the main aim of the *Bolsa Escola* program, managed by the Ministry of Education, was to improve school attendance, reduce child labor, and decrease poverty in the long run. On the other hand, the federal Program for a Guaranteed Minimum Income was to “[provide] co-financing to municipal CCTs… it was not a conditional cash

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transfer program in and of itself, but rather a mechanism for providing financial support to municipalities to enable them to implement such programs...[and] also acted as a gateway for future conditional cash transfer programs.”\textsuperscript{188} These programs were quickly modeled and multiplied.\textsuperscript{189} Linder says, “By 2001 over one hundred municipalities and many states were operating local CCT programs in Brazil, covering around 200,000 families.”\textsuperscript{190} \textit{Bolsa Escola} was followed by the creation of other programs in the same year, namely \textit{Bolsa Alimentação} administered by the Ministry of Health and \textit{Auxílio Gás} overseen by the Ministry of Mines and Energy.\textsuperscript{191} When the PT took office in January 2003 they made it their top priority to continue implementing programs that would end hunger and reduce poverty. During his inauguration, President Lula said, “‘If, by the end of my term of office, every Brazilian has food to eat three times a day, I shall have fulfilled my mission in life.”\textsuperscript{192}

In early 2003, José Graziano da Silva, one of the members of the Brazilian government’s Ministry of Food Security and Fight Against Hunger, “inspired”\textsuperscript{193} the creation of \textit{Fome Zero}. Hall describes the program:

\textit{Fome Zero} thus brought together under one label several existing initiatives; namely, the conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes of \textit{Bolsa Escola} for boosting school attendance, \textit{Bolsa Alimentação} for maternal nutrition and the PETI [\textit{Programa de Eradicação do Trabalho Infantil}] programme against child labour, along with \textit{Auxílio Gás} cooking gas subsidy. However, it also added a new food entitlement scheme, the \textit{Cartão Alimentação}, based on the use of a special credit card for the purchase of selected food items.\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{188} Linder et al., “The Nuts and Bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Program,” 12.
\textsuperscript{189} Linder et al., “The Nuts and Bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Program,” 11.
\textsuperscript{190} Linder et al., “The Nuts and Bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Program,” 11.
\textsuperscript{192} Hall, “From Fome Zero to Bolsa Familia,” 690.
\textsuperscript{193} Hall, “From Fome Zero to Bolsa Familia,” 694.
\textsuperscript{194} Hall, “From Fome Zero to Bolsa Familia,” 695.
Organizations like the IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank supported President Lula’s project in hopes of resolving the long-term unintended consequences of structural adjustment by providing rapid relief to the most vulnerable.

President Lula’s *Fome Zero* project was short lived for it was far more difficult for the federal government to coordinate than initially anticipated. Keeping track of the different state and municipal programs under the *Fome Zero* umbrella was no easy task. *Bolsa Escola*, as previously mentioned, was administered by the Ministry of Education, *Auxílio Gás* by the Ministry of Mines and Energy, and so on. Even the unified database the Lula administration inherited from the Cardoso epoch, Single Registry (*Cadastro Único*), only held the information of “70 per cent of poor families.” The whole system was a jumble; participants’ information, eligibility, and selection processes were often erroneous. The cost of fixing program errors was so high that it became more effective to design a new program. Sergei Soares states, “In spite of the chaos, keep in mind that the federal, state and municipal governments had all recognized poverty as an issue and that poor people deserved social protection in the form of monetary transfers. The conceptual revolution was complete, but some good administrative housekeeping was in order.”

In October of 2003, President Lula’s administration launched a new program, *Bolsa Família*, it unified *Bolsa Escola*, *Bolsa Alimentação*, *Auxílio Gás*, and *Cartão Alimentação*. It is now the largest CCT program in the world. The World Bank became a generous lender and in

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196 Hall, “From Fome Zero to Bolsa Família,” 696.
June 2004 provided Brazil with a “US$572 million sector-wide loan (SWAP) to support Bolsa Família.”200 This money was utilized to assist in the consolidation process, plans for cutting administrative costs and increasing efficiency, identifying candidates for the grant, the promotion of education and health, monitoring, evaluation, and for finding ways to better integrate “federal and sub-national programs.”201 While some Bolsa Família policies and regulations have been modified over time, overall program goals have remained the same. As best noted by Kathy Lindert and other researchers, “The formal objectives of the BFP are to (a) alleviate current poverty and inequality via direct monetary transfers to poor families; (b) break the inter-generational transmission of poverty through incentives for investments in human capital; and (c) help empower beneficiary families by linking them to complementary services.”202

_Bolsa Família_ is governed by the National Citizens Income Secretariat (Secretária Nacional de Renda de Cidadania; SENARC) of the Ministry of Social Development (Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome, MDS). The program is decentralized; in other words, state and/or municipal governments are “responsible for identifying who the poor people are”203 and the federal government is to double-check everything. Municipalities are to enroll a certain percentage of low-income residents into _Bolsa Família_. This quota is established by information gathered from the National Statistics Office. It all depends on the municipalities’ population.204 Soares says, “In short, SENARC establishes rules for deciding who is to get paid and how much, what they have to do to keep getting paid, and what will happen to them if they

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200 Hall, “From Fome Zero to Bolsa Família,” 698.
204 Soares et al., “Cash Transfer Programmes in Brazil;” Linder et al., “The Nuts and Bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program.”
Family composition, ages and income are all taken into consideration when determining grant amounts. “There are specific benefits to families with children, young people up to 17 years, pregnant women and nursing mothers,” according to MDS’s *Bolsa Família* website. The program’s benefits and eligibility requirements are illustrated in Table 2.1. The use of the *Cadastro Único* continues and it is extremely important for contains all participant and magnetic card information. A state-owned bank, *Caixa Econômica Federal*, processes all family grants.

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206 http://www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia/beneficios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bolsa Família Benefit Received</th>
<th>Bolsa Família Eligibility Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Benefit: R$77</td>
<td>• Granted only to extremely poor families (monthly income per person under to R$77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable Benefit for 0-15 Year Olds: R$35</td>
<td>• Granted to families with children and adolescents 0-15 years of age</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Variable Benefit for Pregnant Women: R$35 | • Granted to families with pregnant women in their composition  

  • Payment is made in nine consecutive monthly installments, from the date of the beginning of the benefit payment, provided that the pregnancy has been identified until the ninth month  

  • The identification of pregnancy is carried out in the Bolsa Família Health System. Cadastro Único does not identify pregnant women. |
| Variable Benefit for Lactating Women: R$35 | • Granted to families with children aged between 0 to 6 months in its composition  

  • Payment is made in six consecutive monthly installments, from the date of the beginning of the benefit payment, provided that the child has been identified in the Cadastro Único until the sixth month of life  

* The above variables benefits are limited to five per family, but all family members must be registered in the Cadastro Único |
| Variable Benefit for Teens: R$42 | • Granted to families with teenagers between 16 and 17 years old - Limited to two benefits per family |
| Benefit for Overcoming Extreme Poverty (calculated case by case) | • Transferred to the families of the Bolsa Família Program that continue in extreme poverty (monthly per capita income of up to R$77), even after the receipt of other benefits. It is calculated to ensure that families exceed the income limit of extreme poverty |

To obtain the benefits noted above, participants must be committed to the conditionalities put forth by *Bolsa Família* program. In education, children and adolescents ages 6 to 15 years old must have an 85% attendance rate; those between the ages of 16 and 17 must attend at least 75% of the time. In health, women ages 14-44 that are pregnant or lactating must monitor their health and their infant’s. Additionally, they must keep track of their child’s vaccination card until the age of 7. If families do not have a valid reason for not maintaining their school attendance high or vaccination records organized, the sanctions for noncompliance from 2006 to 2008 were the following: warning, blocked benefit, 1st suspension, 2nd suspension, and cancellation. It would take about a year for a family’s grant to be cancelled.209 This provides families with enough time to break down barriers and be compliant. Moreover, research shows that since 2006 conditionality monitoring has become stricter. Soares argues that “If the number of conditionalities is excessive or their monitoring too draconian, the most vulnerable families will be the first to be sanctioned for noncompliance.”210 Others oppose by saying that the conditionalities are just as important as the benefit. “According to their vision, *Bolsa Família* is, first and foremost, an incentive to human capital for poor families. In the public policy arena, this group of people proposes more emphatic monitoring of conditionalities and even the establishment of new ones. Their paradigm is *Progresa/Oportunidades*, which is explicitly a human capital accumulation programme.”211

All in all, *Bolsa Familia* has been globally recognized for its innovations. First, the Brazilian government rationalized the program’s organization by unifying program under a single secretariat. There was also a standardization of program rules, even though the program’s


administration was federalized. Additionally, regulation of *Bolsa Família*’s recipients’ behavior has made it a nucleus for provision of other social services (e.g. school, health care). *Bolsa Família*’s universalization of benefits to the entire Brazilian population, rather than fragmentary, municipality-based benefits, has also made it original.

During the ten-year celebration of *Bolsa Família*, the Minister of the MDS, Tereza Campello, said the program has helped alleviate poverty and inequality. The Ministry claims the per capita monthly income of those that lived in poverty “increased from R$60 to R$120.” Those that lived in extreme poverty started to obtain a “per capita income up to R$60.” The cash assistance can make up to “10 per cent or more” of the total income for those that live in extreme poverty. The highest reduction of poverty has been among the Afro-Brazilian population. The MDS website states in Portuguese, “Today, of the 13.8 million families served by the program, 73% declared themselves black women.” In 2005, 93 per cent of the beneficiaries were females and 27 per cent were single mothers. The perspective here is that if women’s self-esteem increases, there will be long-term positive effects on the generations to come. In 2013, the World Bank also reported that “BF has been key to help Brazil more than

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halve its extreme poverty – from 9.7 to 4.3% of the population…income inequality also fell markedly, to a Gini coefficient of 0.527 an impressive 15% decrease.”

*Bolsa Familia* is to invest “in the human capital of poor children so as to increase their well-being when they are adults.” In 2010, Paul Glewwe and Ana Lucia Kassouf presented “[e]ight years of school census data (1998-2005)…to create a panel of public schools with grades 1-4 and 5-8” to examine the impact of *Bolsa Familia* on students’ progress. The study found that the program has increased school enrollment “rates by about 5.5 percentage points in grades 1-4 and by about 6.5 percentage points in grades 5-8.” Glewwe and Kassouf show dropout rates for those in the program have decrease “by about 0.5 percentage points for children grades 1-4 and by 0.4 percentage points for children in grades 5-8.” The researchers add, “*Bolsa Familia* is more effective at increasing the enrollment of blacks, mulattos and indigenous children than it is for whites.” The scholars conclude by saying “82 per cent of beneficiaries would have enrolled in school even without *Bolsa Familia*,” and that further research is needed on this particular topic. In 2013, Hanna Nilsson and Karin Sjöberg determined there was an increase in the promotion and knowledge of the *Bolsa Familia* program throughout Brazil. They used “cross-sectional data from 2011 and a regression discontinuity design” to conduct

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219 Paul Glewwe and Lúcia Kassouf, “What is the Impact of Bolsa Familia Programme on Education?” “The estimation method used compared changes in enrolment, dropout and grade advancement rates across schools that adopted the programme at different times.”

220 Glewwe and Kassouf, “What is the Impact of Bolsa Familia Programme on Education?”

221 Glewwe and Kassouf, “What is the Impact of Bolsa Familia Programme on Education?”

222 Glewwe and Kassouf, “What is the Impact of Bolsa Familia Programme on Education?”

223 Glewwe and Kassouf, “What is the Impact of Bolsa Familia Programme on Education?”
their research.224 The scholars suggest “[t]he increased consciousness about the program, with more families applying for the grant, might lead to more families becoming beneficiaries of the program, and therefore more children benefitting from the grant and increasing their assimilation of education.”225 The mothers Nilsson’s and Sjöberg interviewed note that “the grant is not enough to change either their living standard or their living situation. The grant helps them with their daily lives and helps them to get out of misery, but it will not change the situation for the families.”226 In 2015, Alan de Brauw and his colleagues, using a “longitudinal household-level dataset of more than 11,000 households…[from] 2005-2009,” concluded that “Bolsa Família appears to be affecting the gender gap in schooling…it is widening a gap that…favors girls.”227 This result may have slightly varied, depending on the age, sex, and location of their research participants, but it was the most predominant result.

*Bolsa Família’s conditionalities in the health sector are that children ages 0 to 7 years of age get vaccinated and obtain regular health checkups, while women, pregnant or lactating, get pre and post-natal checkups.228 When *Bolsa Família’s* decade of initiation was celebrated, the Minster of the MDS highlighted the following in relation to *Bolsa Família’s* health focus, “19.4% reduction in infant mortality rate, 52% decrease of chronic infant malnutrition in children up to 6 years of age, 58% reduction in death due to malnutrition, Drop from 16.8% to 14.5% in the rate of stunting in children up to 5 years of age, 50% increase in prenatal care, 46%

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227 Alan de Brauw et al., “The Impact of *Bolsa Família* on Schooling,” 313.

reduction in deaths from diarrhea, and 99.1% vaccination rate in children.\footnote{Corona-Parra, "Celebrating 10 Years of Bolsa Familia."} The Lancet, one of the leading magazines in world health, presented many of these statistics.\footnote{"Bolsa Familia: uma década de resultados para a cidadania," Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Agrário, (July 2013), accessed January 2015, http://bolsafamilia10anos.mds.gov.br/node/124.} Superior health results were found for those that participated in the program for more than four consecutive years. Note, since Bolsa Familia was launched MDS has only conducted two evaluations of the health sector of the program, one in 2005 and another in 2010.\footnote{Medici, “Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers on Heath Status.”} The 2005 evaluation results were not very revealing, however, the 2010 showed positive impacts. The survey evaluated families in 269 municipalities from 24 states and there was a control group of non-participants. In relation to immunizations, “BFP beneficiaries: 15% more probability to receive all vaccines.”\footnote{Medici, “Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers on Heath Status.”} In addition, Bolsa Familia participants were found to have a decreased risk of having prematurely born children and better nutrition options.\footnote{Medici, “Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers on Heath Status.”} From 2000 to 2010 infant mortality has fallen, while life expectancy in Brazil has risen. Data from the 2010 Census shows, however, “that while the northeast region recorded a major decrease in infant mortality, the rate remains above the national average at 18.5 deaths per 1,000, the highest infant mortality in the country.”\footnote{Carl Bob Willis, “Healthcare in Brazil: Signs of progress, but more needs to be done,” Brazilian Bubble, (July 8, 2012), accessed February 2015, http://brazilianbubble.com/healthcare-in-brazil-signs-of-progress-but-more-needs-to-be-done/.} It is the presentation of these positive impacts that have made programs like Bolsa Familia so popular globally.

The implementation of class-based programs was originally the result of a neoliberal agenda. Minorities were further economically isolated in the 1980s and something had to be done. As a result, programs like Bolsa Familia emerged. Today, this program is highly celebrated. According to the MDS, income inequality is decreasing, school enrollment is
increasing, and life expectancy is on the rise. Still, many remain skeptical and wonder if the program will create a level of sustainability as it is meant to do or make those that face financial need more dependent on government assistance. These topics will emerge in the discourse analysis of *Bolsa Família*. 
Chapter 3

Research Method and Findings

In the attempt to analyze and compare the conceptual frameworks utilized to present affirmative action, or Law of Social Quotas, and *Bolsa Familia*, *LexisNexis Academic* was used to index newspaper articles only. Within the database’s “Advanced Options” March 29, 2015, to the previous ten years, was the “Date” included to conduct the search (I). Under “Build Your Own Segment Search,” in the case of affirmative action, documents were selected based on two terms: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND BRAZIL (II). “Source” and “Index Terms” were left untouched, however, under “Content Type,” “Newspapers” was the only term selected, as noted previously (III).

**Figure 3.1 LexisNexis Academic Snapshot 1**
Once the search criteria were applied; approximately 366 documents were initially collected. The first of the results was clicked on (IV).

**Figure 3.2 LexisNexis Academic Snapshot 2**

Within the first result, *FT Interview: Celso Amrim, Brazil’s foreign minister*, with the intention to further reduce the number of the collected sources, under “Find Documents with Similar Topics” the “Brazil (V)” term was selected to ultimately “Narrow Search with Index Terms.”

**Figure 3.3 LexisNexis Academic Snapshot 3**

The application of “Narrow Search with Index Terms” condensed total of 188 stories. These were sorted by relevance and the first 25 were selected to move forward with the study.

**LAW OF SOCIAL QUOTAS** was separately searched for. The same process outlined above was used in *LexisNexis Academic*. Except there was no need to “Narrow Search with Index Terms” for only three results were produced, two of which were duplicates of the 25 previously selected for the study.
In the case of *Bolsa Família* the same procedure was followed, except the “Newspapers” selected were based on the following term: BOLSA FAMILIA as emphasized below. The total number of items indexed was 551. Again, the first 25 relevant sources were selected to move forward with the study.

**Figure 3.4 LexisNexis Academic Snapshot 4**

The procedure for discarding irrelevant or less relevant newspaper articles from the results complied was fairly simple. All 53 stories were read, 28 for affirmative action / Law of Social Quotas, 25 for *Bolsa Família*, and duplicate sources were removed. This reduced the total number of documents being used for the study to 39. The affirmative action search produced the most duplicated newspaper articles.

A word frequency analysis followed the initial evaluation of the sources. TagCrowd.com was used for this process. “TagCrowd is a web application for visualizing word frequencies in any text by creating what is popularly known as a word cloud, text cloud or tag cloud,” states the
application’s website. First, all of the affirmative action / Law of Social Quotas articles were placed in the application’s text box to be visualized as a word cloud. The word cloud only consisted of 50 words and the words’ frequencies were shown in parenthesis. As a note of reference, the newspaper articles first had to be converted into a single Microsoft Word document to be inserted into the web application. Then, the same process was followed for the stories complied for Bolsa Família, this resulted in the creation of a second word cloud. The outcomes were as shown in Figure 3.5:

Figure 3.5 TagCrowd.com Word Clouds

In moving towards the interpretation of the above data, 40 words were discarded from each word cloud to be able to conduct a more thorough discourse analysis. Words removed were those that merely reproduced the search terms, for example, “affirmative action” and “bolsa familia”. Logically, high frequency prepositions in either English or Portuguese were deleted, for instance, “a,” “the,” “de,” “da,” and so on. Lastly, words that are very generic and not particularly charged, such as “Brazil” and “Lula” were removed. The results, or word list by frequency, are shown in Table 3.1, with the overlapping terms highlighted:

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Table 3.1 Word Frequency Analysis Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WORD</th>
<th>AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FREQUENCY</th>
<th>BOLSA FAMÍLIA WORD</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Work</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racism</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Inequality</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is clearly a very limited overlap and the distinguishing terms are many. There then lies the question of semantic grouping of the distinguishing terms. Based on both the word clouds and the brief interpretation of the term data table above, the semantic grouping for *Bolsa Família* seem to be words that have to do with welfare and development, while the affirmative action terms have to do with racial inequality and quotas. The following chapters will further discuss these results.

There are clear limitations to this research method. This procedure oversamples some kinds of sources and undersamples others. For instance, *LexisNexis Academic* has excellent coverage for English-language newspapers, especially those in the U.S., but not nearly as wide a range of coverage for Portuguese-language newspapers in Brazil. Actually, none of the newspaper articles extracted were in Portuguese. This work is also not sampling academic papers, government documents, or other kinds of sources. Perhaps the discussions in those other kinds of sources are oriented differently. Nonetheless, this thesis is not intended to be definitive, rather it is an exploratory work, conducting a preliminary sample of the discourse.
Chapter 4

Analysis and Discussion

4.1 Affirmative Action Discourse

The qualitative analysis of the discourse of affirmative action in this section is entirely drawn from the newspaper articles retrieved from LexisNexis Academic, utilizing the research methods described in Chapter 3. The investigation finds that discussions of affirmative action are framed in terms of race, and even in terms of racial quotas even though Brazil has framed its most important piece of affirmative action legislation in race-neutral terms; the Law of Social Quotas (Lei de Cotas Sociais). The most astonishing aspect of this analysis was the lack of discussion about the law’s race-neutrality. Only an article by Simon Romero stated, “The Law of Social Quotas takes the previous affirmative action policies to another level, giving Brazil’s 59 federal universities just four years to ensure half of the entering class comes from public schools.” Another article selected for the investigation is called “Brazil’s Affirmative Action Law Offers a Huge Hand Up; Public Universities in Brazil Will Reserve Half Their Seats to Provide Racial, Income, and Ethnic Diversity - a Law That Goes the Furthest in the Americas in Attempting Race-Based Equality. It Will Most Greatly Affect the Large Afro-Brazilian Population,” but the discussion within the article merely turns to the controversy surrounding the implementation of the law. Again, the following paragraphs will illustrate the discussion of affirmative action. The words that were most frequent in the Analysis Results of the Findings Section in Chapter 3 are used as guidance for the summary.

With the aim of promoting affirmative action policies, many, including political figures, speak of a racial hierarchy in Brazil. In several of the newspaper articles selected for the

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framework analysis, the racial category of black, even though sometimes indefinable, is more often than not treated as an easily definable term. As explained in Chapter 1, centuries of racial intermixing in Brazil, including the Portuguese scientific theory that racial mixture would gradually *whiten* the Brazilian population, and Freyre’s once popular racial democracy thesis, have all made it hard to classify Brazilians by race. However, “Brazil’s former president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, once said…he was ‘completely in favor’ of the quotas. ‘Try finding a black doctor, a black dentist, a black bank manager, and you will encounter great difficulty…It’s important, at least for a span of time, to guarantee that the blacks in Brazilian society can make up for lost time.’”

Brazil’s Secretariat for SEPIR, Luiza Bairros, said, “officials expected the number of black students admitted to…universities to climb to 56,000 from 8,700 [after the Law of Social Quotas became effective].” Also, “Brazil’s first and only Afro-Brazilian senator, Paulo Paim, believes affirmative action is the best way to redress a history of social wrongs that began with slavery and was then masked by what some call ‘the myth of racial democracy.’”

Before his death, Abdias do Nascimento told American scholar Henry Louis Gates Jr. during an interview, “‘The black people feel in their flesh the lie which is racial democracy in this country…You just have to look at a black family. Where do they live? The black children, how are they educated? You’ll see that it’s all a lie. You must understand that I’m saying this with profound hatred, profound bitterness at the way black people are treated in Brazil.’”

With this, many of the newspaper articles directly quote individuals that hold high political positions, not

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238 Romero, “Brazil Enacts Affirmative Action Law for Universities.”

239 Romero, “Brazil Enacts Affirmative Action Law for Universities.” As of the end of 2017, there is no evidence to support this turned out to be an accurate estimate.


only do they continue to refute any lasting memory of the racial democracy theory, but provide examples of how Afro-Brazilians have been sidelined in employment, education, and housing.

Additionally, other proponents of affirmative action highlight the discrimination and racism that exist in Brazil; they show that there are in fact racial differences that need to be addressed. Sibylla Brodzinsky states, “Blacks in Latin America are more likely to be poor, less educated, have shorter lives, and have higher infant mortality rates than whites, reports the United Nations economic commission…Some [countries] have responded with race-specific policies, such as Brazil’s Law of Social Quotas.”

An article from 2009 says the following:

Data from the 2000 census-conducted before the first quota policies were adopted-showed that just 2 percent of university graduates were black and 12 percent were pardo, a Brazilian catch-all term for those of mixed European, African, and American Indian descent. Nearly one in four Afro-Brazilians were illiterate, compared with one in 10 whites. Blacks and pardos also earned on average half the salary of whites, inequalities that have remained virtually unchanged for a century.

In 2007, Timothy Garton Ash, Professor of European studies at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, “went to Brazil asking questions about poverty, social exclusion and inequality; within minutes, [his] interlocutors were talking about race.” Garton asserts, “To address this problem, [former President Cardoso’s] government initiated affirmative-action programs.” As mentioned previously, President Cardoso and President Lula acknowledged that racial differences exist in Brazil. Both Presidents took necessary steps to appoint individuals of Afro-descent in state positions says David Goldblatt. He adds, “But significant progress in these realms must be set

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244 Timothy Garton Ash, “Welcome to a Mixed-Up World; Brazil has a Serious Problem with Race and Poverty, but it also Reveals the Beauty of Miscegenation,” Globe and Mail (Canada), July 14, 2007, accessed March 29, 2015, LexisNexis Academic.

245 Ash, “Welcome to a Mixed-up World.”
against the country’s enduring racial inequalities: African-Brazilians – who make up at least half of the population – are overwhelmingly concentrated in the poorest classes and under-represented in the ranks of nearly all elite occupations.”

Simon Romero writes similarly in his article, “…the top ranks of government and the private sector remain dominated by whites.”

In an article called, *Wealth is still unevenly distributed*, the author quotes “Allyne Andrade, a young black lawyer, [who] says: ‘Brazil is mixed, yes, but to be a black person in a high position is very difficult. People are surprised if you are very smart; they treat you like an alien.’”

Additionally, in 2014 Brazil hosted the World Cup and was highly criticized for having, “high ticket prices in a country where blacks still generally earn far less than whites, a poll by the Datafolha polling company suggested that fans attending games were overwhelmingly rich and white.”

The government made public announcements that warned against “racial insults or other discriminatory behavior.” Most games exposed large screens and banners that stated, “Say No to Racism.” In sum, those in favor of the implementation of affirmative action policies in Brazil highlight the discrimination and inequality faced by the Afro-Brazilian community as a way to promote the need for such laws.

Contrastively, critics of affirmative action feel it creates a platform for citizens to be racially categorized and generates racial inequality. Other challengers of the policies simply feel citizens are discriminated against because of their social class. “Opponents of the racial quotas

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248 Stillman, “Wealth Is Still Unevenly Distributed.”

249 Romero, “Injury Showcases Failure to End World Cup Racism.”

250 Romero, “Injury Showcases Failure to End World Cup Racism.”

251 Romero, “Injury Showcases Failure to End World Cup Racism.”
argue that poverty, not race, is the main obstacle to getting a university education in Brazil,” says Marion Lloyd. In the article, *Welcome to a mixed-up world; Brazil has a serious problem with race and poverty, but it also reveals the beauty of miscegenation*, “Maria-Tereza Moreira de Jesus, a black poet and writer, has reportedly put it this way; ‘Racism exists, from how one is treated in a shop to being interviewed for a job, but basing [school] entrance on race is another form of racism.’” 252 In like manner, Lloyd quotes Flávio Bolsonaro, a state legislator from Rio de Janeiro, who once stated, “‘You’re not discriminated against because you’re black, but because you are poor.’” 253 He is the same individual who “filed a legal challenge after the State University of Rio de Janeiro adopted the country's first quota for higher education, in 2003. In June a state tribunal upheld Mr. Bolsonaro's claim that the measures violated Brazil's Constitution, which outlaws all forms of discrimination, and ordered the university to halt its affirmative-action measures.” 254 Those who wanted to appeal the court’s ruling argued that quotas were not a racist program, but provided blacks the same opportunities that were never given to them in the first place, it was “about making reparations.” 255

Many of the articles selected for the discourse analysis continue raising the question, who is black? The attempt to implement a racial quota system in Brazil is impossible and unjust the sources assert. Leonard Pitts quotes Yvonne Maggie, a Brazilian anthropologist and university professor, she says, “‘We don’t need to say that race exists…We have to say that race is not important to define people in social terms, that black and white are the same kind of people.’” 256

252 Ash, “Welcome to a Mixed-up World.”

253 Lloyd, “Slowly Enabling the Disabled.”

254 Lloyd, “Slowly Enabling the Disabled.”

255 Lloyd, “Slowly Enabling the Disabled.”

Throughout the article Maggie takes pride in the fact that, unlike the U.S., Brazil never bought into the “racial boundaries…lie.” She adds, “race does not exist and therefore should not be acknowledged in law…Brazil has a kind of ‘social racism’ supported not by law, but by custom.” This “custom” will be further expounded on in the following paragraph. Moreover, “Brazil’s confusion and denial over race are manifest in the way the lines can blur in defining who is black and who is white. Take the case of the Da Cunha brothers,” says Telma Marotto. The Da Cunha brothers had applied to enter the UnB under 20 percent quota system. As explained previously, students would submit an application with a photo of themselves. One of the brothers was determined to be white and the other black. Turns out they were twins.

This overall discussion of affirmative action perhaps comes to say something about how the Afro-descendants of Brazil perceive themselves. The sources gathered illustrate how racial indistinctiveness, due to discourses such as the racial democracy theory; in Brazil have in fact had an effect on how citizens identify themselves and relate to others. A sort of “custom” has been created, something that has become part of the common flow of knowledge and produces a ‘social racism.’ For example Goldblatt explains the following:

Precisely who is black, or African-Brazilian, remains an open question in the country’s unspoken and complex racial codes, where one's position is only partly determined by skin colour or genetics. When Ronaldo, [a famous soccer player], clearly a man of mixed African and European heritage, was asked what he thought of racism in Brazilian football, he acknowledged its existence but replied: ‘I’m white, so I am really ignorant of these matters.’

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257 Pitts, “Racism Takes Many Hues in Brazil.”
259 Pitts, “Racism Takes Many Hues in Brazil.”
260 Goldblatt, “In Focus.”
In conjunction, “Lucia Maria Xavier de Castro, coordinator of Criola, an activist group representing black women, says she has known many people who were unable to accept their own blackness. ‘The person does everything to get rid of black traces. Straightens her hair, dresses like white people - not colorful. People do everything to eliminate traces. It's as if this person had a birth defect and was trying to correct it by taking those attitudes.’”

This statement may again be a reminder of a time when the Brazilian government attempted a whiting strategy in the country, the historical line of thought continues. When Mensageiro da Verdade Bill, a rapper from a favela, was interviewed he expressed the following in relation to race selecting in Brazil:

> One of the characteristics of Brazilian racism, he says, is that the person can choose to be what she wants. Oh, I’m white, I’m not black. Here, the darker you are, the more discrimination you suffer. And that makes it difficult for the blacks, from light to dark, to understand each other. The lighter-skinned blacks avoid the darker-skinned blacks because they don’t want to suffer the same discrimination. It’s hard for them to work together because of the degree of discrimination according to your color. The cruelest racism, says MV Bill, is actually intraracial, perpetuated by light-skinned blacks against dark-skinned blacks. Fair skin, he says, represents power, even in the favela.

Some would argue, however, that in Latin America there has been a return to blackness, since countries like Brazil are now enforcing affirmative action policies. In 2010, the “census showed that a slight majority of this nation’s 196 million people defined themselves as black or mixed-race, a shift from previous decades during which most Brazilians called themselves white.”

Unlike the U.S., Brazil never had Jim Crow segregation. Once more, the question has always been “who counts as black?” In 2007, the black movement, supported by North

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261 Pitts, “Racism Takes Many Hues in Brazil.”
262 Pitts, “Racism Takes Many Hues in Brazil.”
264 Stillman, “Wealth Is Still Unevenly Distributed.”
American foundations, suggested that the whole non-white population be classified as black, so everything would be simpler. Some people quickly opposed and said,

This would be to import the worst of U.S.-style racial classification and to deny the whole Brazilian specificity of miscegenation. If there really have to be university admission quotas by colour - something courts in the U.S. have now declared to be discriminatory - let them at least be based on the traditional Brazilian method of self-identification. In the past, people have tended to opt toward the lighter end of the spectrum, especially as they became more prosperous. (“Money whitens,” a sociologist dryly observes.) If quotas were now to result in a few more people preferring to be black, so be it. After so many centuries when it was so much more advantageous to be white - slavery was only abolished in Brazil in 1888 – there’s a case for stacking the cards just a little the other way. And if that means that one day a girl most people would consider to be white applies to university as a black, well, good luck to her.265

Several of the sources selected for the analysis state that the race discussion should be moved aside and that creating a more effective education system is key to moving the nation forward.

““Education is the only way to exit poverty,”” quotes Telma Marotto.266 Yet, there are newspapers that cite individuals who argue that regardless of education, work experience, or social status they face “racist affronts”267 due to the color of their skin. Brazil abolished slavery over 120 years ago and ““the descendants of slaves haven’t yet received appropriate attention from the central government.””268 Before anything the elementary public school system needs to improve, so that children can learn the basics and then preform at least on average at the university level. Many students end up leaving higher-level academic institutions because they are unable to perform.269 Ultimately, “The democratization of higher education, which has always been a dream for most neglected students in public schools, is one way of paying this

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265 Ash, “Welcome to a Mixed-up World.”
266 Marotto, “Simmering Racism Holds Back Half Brazil’s People.”
267 Marotto, “Simmering Racism Holds Back Half Brazil’s People.”
268 Marotto, “Simmering Racism Holds Back Half Brazil’s People.”
The Brazilian government believes that enacting affirmative action policies is a step in this democratization process.

Brazil’s Law of Social Quotas was written in a universalistic manner with the intent to combine considerations of social class and race together, which may explain, in part, the prevalence of the discussion of race in the newspapers selected for this discourse analysis. The law aims to close the inequality gap between *black* and *white* Brazilians. Although the beneficiaries of the law are to be selected based on their socio-economic standing and public school attendance, advocates of the law quoted in the newspaper articles selected for this analysis, speak of race to provide real life examples of inequalities that exist in Brazil. Opponents of affirmative action say it creates a racial divide and that it is the Brazilian public elementary school system needs to improve first. Further, at the time of this framework analysis, as mentioned in Chapter 3, mention of the *Lei de Cotas Sociais* in the newspaper articles extracted from LexisNexis Academic was minimal. Some of the articles also predate the enactment of the *Lei de Cotas Sociais* and included information of affirmative action policies in general, including the quota systems that had been implemented at Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ), the State University of Northern Rio de Janeiro (UENF), and University of Brasília (UnB), mentioned in Chapter 2. One thing can be concluded from this analysis, however, both advocates and critics of affirmative action in Brazil evoke the racial democracy theory as an aspiration to one day make it a Brazilian reality.

### 4.2 Bolsa Familia Discourse

As in the previous section, the qualitative analysis of the discourse of *Bolsa Familia* in this section is demonstrated through newspaper articles extracted from LexisNexis academic. *Bolsa Familia* is a program that is race-neutral, but that benefits Afro-Brazilians more than Euro-

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270 Romero, “Brazil Enacts Affirmative Action Law for Universities.”
Brazilians. From the frequency analysis of the policy, it can be established that race drops out the discussion in its entirety, and thus the program is discursively constructed as being about poverty alleviation rather than being about race.

In the newspaper articles gathered, Brazil’s economic position is almost always mentioned. The country is part of the BRIC economies, meaning Brazil, Russia, India and China. “Brazil’s growth [has] surprisingly overshadowed its counterparts and exceeded all economic projections,” says economist Jim O’Neill.271 The “economic engine of Latin America,” in 2013 the World Bank “projected that Brazil will surpass France to become the world’s fifth largest economy by 2016.”272 President Cardoso and President Lula are often credited for implementing effective social and fiscal policies that assisted the country in recovering “from the global financial crisis.”273 In 2008, Sara Miller asserted, “Lower inflation and easier access to credit – along with higher minimum wage – have created a new class of consumers who have kept the economy going. And with the world’s largest conditional welfare program for the poor…Brazilians are feeling economic stability as they have never before.”274 “The proportion of Brazilians living [in poverty]…declined from 8.8% to 3.6% between 2002 and 2012…the government credits Bolsa Família for more than a third of the improvement,” says Jonathan Watts.275 Generally, a win-win situation is portrayed. Brazil’s poorest citizens are granted cash to spend and they are then able to participate in a “growing” economy. However, since the extraction of these newspaper articles, Brazil entered into a deep economic crisis. According to

the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), in “2015, the country’s GDP fell by 3.8 percent, making it the first time Brazil has seen two years of negative growth since 1931.”

Economic instability coupled with the Brazilian community’s discontent with the current political climate, including changes in administration, the future seems more uncertain.

While Brazil’s path towards improving their Human Development Index (HDI) has been a struggle. The newspaper articles selected for the study highlight that after the implementation of Bolsa Família the country’s HDI improved. In 2003, “Manari, in the state of Pernambuco…received the lowest human development index ranking the country by the United Nations Development Program, with an average monthly income of $13 and 57 percent of the population illiterate – on par with Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.”

According to a 2006 survey by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Brazil [had] one of the highest youth illiteracy rates in the region and its students rank close to last in math and reading proficiency.” Since the application of Bolsa Família states like Maranhão “which…long had the highest illiteracy rate in Brazil” have raised their HDI.

According to a principal adviser with the research department of the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, “More children are attending school in [Brazil]…but it’s not clear that they are learning more,” a critique that will be expanded later. The World Bank and other development NGOs claim that there is “a quiet confidence in the eyes of young children living in the slum areas that has never been there before” and “since 2003 the country has

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276 Mu Xuequan, “Brazil GDP falls by 3.6 percent in 2016,” XinhuaNet, March 8, 2017, accessed February 26, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/08/c_136110450.htm. This source is not one of the articles extracted from LexisNexis research, but it is important to note Brazil’s current economic position.
277 Llana, “Brazil Becomes Antipoverty Showcase.”
278 Llana, “Brazil Becomes Antipoverty Showcase.”
279 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”
made significant headway in reducing poverty, lowering inequality, and improving the
development opportunities of its vulnerable population." With these positive results, Brazil
has become a model in the international development arena. Lindert, a human development
economist from the World Bank, says, “Many countries are looking to Brazil as an example of
how to implement these programs…Study tours are going to Brazil all the time to learn from this
experience…The impacts are impressive. We are seeing one of the largest, most unequal
countries get more equal.” Some say programs like *Bolsa Familia* are increasing “South-South
learning,” Mozambique being an observing nation, for instance. In 2013, Campello, Minister
of the MDS, said that approximately “63 delegations from various countries” had talked to her
about copying this “model of development.”

With this, the sources selected for the examination of *Bolsa Familia* highlight the aspects
of the program that have made Brazil an international “model of development.” Take income,
for instance. “The country [that] has long been known for having one of the most unequal levels
of income distribution on the planet,” now provides cash grants to its poorest inhabitants.
David White claims that “payments range from R$22 to R$200 a month” depending on family
structure. For the first time in their lives people feel like they are obtaining a regular income.

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282 Llana, “Brazil Becomes Antipoverty Showcase.”


285 “Bolsa Familia Is a Model to Emulate, Says Brazilian Minister,” *Qatar Tribune*.

286 “Battling Extreme Poverty-Made in Brazil,” *Capital*.


288 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”
Those that have difficulty finding a sustainable employment state, “The only income…is Bolsa Família.” Due to this, local and family owned businesses are booming, citizens now have money to spend. Notably, Bolsa Família has also become a source of empowerment for women. “In many cases, it’s their only sources of income,” says Watts, “so it means they are less dependent on their husbands, more likely to share in decision-making, and have higher self-esteem.” Program participants also express how their lives have changed since the enactment of Bolsa Família. If, for example, they do not earn enough money through their everyday jobs they still have money rather than having nothing. According to the MDS, individuals have gained a “level of financial literacy” since they previously did not have a “regular income to budget with.” One newspaper article goes as far as to claim that “Between 2003 and 2009, incomes of the poorest Brazilians grew seven times those of rich citizens.” Similarly, a work written in 2010 asserts, “Income for Brazil’s poor grew seven times [as fast as] for the rich, and three times the national average.” According to the World Bank, “the chasm between rich and poor Brazilians is narrowing.”

289 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”
290 Llana, “Brazil Becomes Antipoverty Showcase.”
295 Nolen, “What Would Robin Hood Do?”
rose 2.5 percent for the poorest 20 percent of Brazilians – the lowest growth for all income groups – while it rose 6.4 percent for the top 20 percent income earners in the country.”  

Thus, “big questions remain about [Bolsa Família’s] efficiency, its impact on inequality, and whether it is in the long-term interests of Brazil.” Those that celebrated the program’s ten-year anniversary in 2013 were animated about “a cheap and efficient way to improve the lives of the most destitute. Critics…[said Bolsa Família] merely locks the poor into a holding pattern and has little impact on inequality.” Those pro Bolsa Familia claim that if it “does little to address inequality…there is an element of the programme that makes it a long-term investment in the future.” In the past, if Brazil’s economy was booming, the wealth would go directly to the rich, but in recent years, and for the first time, income inequality has declined and, in part, thanks to Bolsa Família.

A steady income is only provided to individuals that meet their educational and health care conditionalities. “Bolsa Familia is used as an enforcement method for public health and education goals. Parents who fail to have their children vaccinated or send them to school are penalized with reduced payments,” says a teacher Rosimat dos Santos Souza. “While the Bolsa Familia is unlikely to lift adults out of poverty, the hope is that it will create the health and

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298 Barnes, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia.”


300 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”

301 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”

302 Nolen, “What Would Robin Hood Do?”

303 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”
education conditions for the next generation,” says Watts.\textsuperscript{304} \textit{Bolsa Familia} is attempting to “empower” all citizens by increasing access to an education and health care.\textsuperscript{305}

Similar to other sources, in the article entitled \textit{Brazil’s Bolsa Familia: welfare model or menace?}, there is an indication that \textit{Bolsa Familia} can be an effective program, but the newspaper maintains that the low-quality education system in Brazil needs to be reformed.\textsuperscript{306} An economist, Tiago Berriel, says, “The positive Bolsa school statistics ‘don’t mean our formation for human capital is very good’…The portion of its GDP that Brazil spends on education is comparable to that of other countries, nearly 6 percent, but Brazil gets a low return on that investment. Brazilian 15-year-olds test significantly lower than the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development average.”\textsuperscript{307} Likewise, Monte Reel says, “Skeptics contend that the cash assistance programs divert focus in developing countries from making structural reforms in education and the economy.”\textsuperscript{308} On the other hand, the principal adviser with the research department of the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington says, “The main constraint is the quality of the schools. But when people say that the money would be better spent to improve education, it’s very difficult because we don’t know of simple ways to improve education.”\textsuperscript{309} Other economists go on to explain that an education does not “ensure…social mobility.”\textsuperscript{310}

Regardless of the educational criticisms, \textit{Bolsa Familia} has also become an international

\textsuperscript{304} Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”
\textsuperscript{305} Llana, “Brazil Becomes Antipoverty Showcase.”
\textsuperscript{307} Reel, “Cash Aid Program Bolsters Lula’s Reelection Prospects.”
\textsuperscript{309} Reel, “Cash Aid Program Bolsters Lula’s Reelection Prospects.”
\textsuperscript{310} Barnes, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia.”
model program because individuals have to fulfill requirements, to obtain their grant. Finding
full-time permanent employment is not a condition to receive the benefit, however.311 Bolsa
Família “encourages women to engage in other social programmes such as artisanal workshops,
where they can develop skills that make them even more self-sufficient.”312 The program is a
helpful supplemental income for those adults that are not able to find stable jobs. The money
given to people is not a lot, but it is helpful to those that have “uncertain work and [are]
surviving day-by-day.”313 The Minister of the MDS clears some popular misconceptions about
the recipients by saying,

Critics quote Confucius and say it is better to teach people how to fish than to give them
fish, but Bolsa Família recipients aren’t poor because they are lazy or don’t know how to
work, they are poor because they have no opportunities, no education and poor health.
How can they compete with those disadvantages? By giving people the money to survive,
we are empowering them, including them and giving them the rights of a citizen in a
consumer society.314

In another article the Minister of the MDS is quoted saying, “there is little evidence that the
small stipend encourages Brazilians to stop working. Campello says 75 percent of adults who
receive the payments are economically active, either looking for work or employed, though often
in informal jobs that come without pensions and sick leave.”315 In a newspaper article called
What would Robin Hood do?, the Minister asserts, “75 per cent of adult recipients work, and
most of those who don't are in areas that lack employment prospects. Ms. Campello loves this
statistic. ‘Fifty per cent of the people who get the Bolsa Família don't work. That's true. You
know why? Because they're under 14 -- we don't want them to work! Half of the extremely poor

311 White, “Bolsa Família Scheme.”
312 Watts, “Brazil’s Cash Transfer Scheme a Source of Empowerment for Women.”
313 Nolen, “What Would Robin Hood Do?”
314 Watts, “Brazil’s Cash Transfer Scheme a Source of Empowerment for Women.”
315 Barnes, “Brazil’s Bolsa Família.”
people in this country are children." Some articles point to the "logical" fact that Brazilians are better off finding a job since "the average amount received by poor families is three to four times lower than the minimum wage."

_Bolsa Família_ has been the central program of Brazil’s “social welfare strategy.” Academics that have “studied welfare polices” and detest the fact that _Bolsa Família_ has gained so much international attention “warn that _Bolsa Família_ is simply a new way of maintaining a profoundly unequal status quo.” A professor from the Federal University of Rio states, “But why is _Bolsa Família_ so applauded? The conservatives say, ‘Look we gave 70 reais per month to the poor so that’s good.’ But it’s neoliberalism…People who don’t understand Brazil think _Bolsa Família_ is the greatest thing, but _Bolsa Família_ is rubbish.” Similarly, “Lena Lavinas, professor of welfare economics at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, says the government overstates the importance of _Bolsa Família_ and has exaggerated its achievements by failing to account adequately for inflation in its statistics. If rising prices are properly factored into the calculation, she says, the extreme poverty rate ought to be 90 reais a month, which would mean _Bolsa Família_ has lifted only 7 million people above this line.” Sure the country has increased the size of its middle class, but many say that _Bolsa Família_ has accomplished what it was set out to do and that the program may be getting too big. In 2014, critics stated that Brazil might be spending too much money on “funding populist social security programmes…while avoiding

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316 Nolen, “What Would Robin Hood Do?”
318 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”
319 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme.”
320 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme.”
321 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”
though economic and labour reforms that would boost productivity and growth.”

Further, “it has sparked debates similar to ones in the United States over how to best lift the poorest out of misery without becoming a so-called welfare nation.” Terms like “welfare queen” will start to surface warn critics, since the government has not reprimanded those that may “game the system.” Opponents of the program also say, sure the poor are being recognized and there is less hunger in the country, “But inequality and old-style politics clearly remain alive.” They argue that it is a tool utilized by the Worker’s Party to remain in power. Overall, those that critique the program fear that “Brazil is encouraging a welfare mentality at a time when it needs to foster entrepreneurialism to become internationally competitive.” Individuals need to seek work rather than depending on the government.

The Brazilian government claims it is not building a welfare state. Through most of the newspaper articles of *Bolsa Família*, there is mention of the role of the Brazilian government in the organization and outcomes of the program. The program came into effect under President Lula “and he told Brazilians, ‘You do not owe anyone anything for this: this is your right [as] a citizen of this country.’” *Bolsa Família* is often described as “only one of four pillars in the government’s *Plano Brasil Sem Miséria* (Brazil Without Poverty) strategy, which also includes a minimum wage, formalizing employment, and policies to support rural families. There are also

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322 Leahy, “Brazil Considers the Cost of Welfare as Growth Slows.”
323 Barnes, “Brazil’s *Bolsa Família*.”
324 Barnes, “Brazil’s *Bolsa Família*.”
325 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme.”
326 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme.”
327 Leahy, “Brazil Considers the Cost of Welfare as Growth Slows.”
328 Langellier, “Closing the Gap on Poverty.”
329 Llana, “Brazil Becomes Antipoverty Showcase.”
330 Nolen, “What Would Robin Hood Do?”
pension schemes and housing projects that aim to tackle inequality.” Government officials often point to how cost effective the program is, “with a return of 1.78 reais to the economy for every 1 reais spent.” Also, “In 2012, the program cost the Brazilian government less than 1% of its budget.” Furthermore, families that did not have the opportunity to consume goods now do. “They lived in a pre-capitalist world, shut out from consumption. Now they have goods and services from the market,” says the head of social research at the government led Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA). In relation to human development, the government has provided statistics which show that parents that receive the grant are more likely to send their children to school and take them to the doctor. Government officials also assert that “95 percent of school-age kids from families receiving Bolsa stipends fulfill their school requirements. While the percentage of students who drop out of high school nationally is 11.3, it is only 7.4 for students whose families are Bolsa Familia recipients.” Also in defense of the grant, “contrary to the old conservative line about welfare mothers procreating to engender better benefits, the number of births per woman in the lowest income category dropped 30 percent, significantly faster than the national average. According to Brazil’s National Household Survey, the program has not discouraged work.”

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331 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief;” “Battling Extreme Poverty-Made in Brazil,” Capital.

332 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”


335 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”

336 Barnes, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia.”

earlier in their pregnancy.\textsuperscript{338} The government has had program officials reach out to some of the most marginalized individuals in remote areas of Brazil.\textsuperscript{339}

There are critics that attempt to discredit the overvalued position that has been given to \textit{Bolsa Família} by the Brazilian government. There are “Brazilians fed up not only with what they see as populist handouts, but in general with high taxes and the way the government applies that revenue. There are also accusations of fraud; the government admits the requirements for new applicants aren’t very stringent.”\textsuperscript{340} The government just wants to enroll more people, and quickly.\textsuperscript{341} Many say that here is no need to credit \textit{Bolsa Família} for so much improvement, “much of what the government attributes to the family grant likely would have happened without it. Brazil’s economy took off at the start of the last decade, posting growth rates of eight and nine per cent a year. That growth created 21 million new jobs from 2001-2012.”\textsuperscript{342}

“In Brazil, there weren’t policies and politics for addressing poverty until the Bolsa Família…” says Watts.\textsuperscript{343} The program is not perfect, however, there are many other programs geared towards the same objective, to reduce poverty.\textsuperscript{344} Without the program says Campello, “All of those people [that] are in our program. If it disappeared, they would fall back into extreme poverty.”\textsuperscript{345} Opponents argue the program “preserves misery”\textsuperscript{346} for there is a new generation of individuals obtaining the benefit and that alleviating poverty does not only entail

\textsuperscript{338} Watts, “Brazil’s Cash Transfer Scheme a Source of Empowerment for Women.”

\textsuperscript{339} Barnes, “Brazil’s \textit{Bolsa Familia};” Kurczy, “Social Workers Channel Indiana Jones to Deliver Welfare Checks to Brazil’s Amazon.”

\textsuperscript{340} Barnes, “Brazil’s \textit{Bolsa Familia};” Leahy, “Brazil Considers the Cost of Welfare as Growth Slows.”

\textsuperscript{341} Barnes, “Brazil’s \textit{Bolsa Familia}.”

\textsuperscript{342} Nolen, “What Would Robin Hood Do?”

\textsuperscript{343} Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme.”

\textsuperscript{344} Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme.”

\textsuperscript{345} Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”

\textsuperscript{346} Barnes, “Brazil’s \textit{Bolsa Familia}.”
providing citizens with additional income. Either way, the Bolsa Familia program model is one of Brazil’s greatest exports. 347 “The question of poverty is at the forefront of Latin American governments today. The poor are visible again, and Brazil is playing a lead role in this,” quotes Miller. 348

While any discussion of race is absent from the LexisNexis sources on Bolsa Família, in one article called “Trusting the Poor with Choices” by Patrice Coeur Bizot the author states,

In Brazil…inequality fell by 21 per cent…And it has had a positive impact on health and education outcomes. In Brazil the school enrolment gap between mainstream groups and marginalized races and indigenous groups has equalized. While the long-term impact of CCTs on gender equity is still to be confirmed, in Latin America there is consensus that money transferred to women has positive effects on their self-esteem and economic autonomy and that conditionalities increase women's access to social services. 349

This provides some evidence to support that Bolsa Família is accomplishing its intent of assisting Afro-Brazilians. Recipients of the grant, however, are starting to be viewed in a certain manner; recall the “welfare queen.” Overall, the newspaper articles gathered for this review show that entities part of the Brazilian government have played a large role in the program’s positive and progressive framing. The Minister of the MDS is often quoted providing statistics in favor of the anti-poverty program. Program developers highlight the improvement of human capital continuously, in education, health, and income. International observers, or governments, then duplicate the welfare program for it holds universal values. Through this analysis one finds that race almost completely drops out of the Bolsa Familia’s conceptual framework, but in Brazil and globally, the intent of programs like Bolsa Familia is to lift people of certain races out of poverty to help build a more equal and sustainable future.

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347 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”
348 Llana, “Brazil Becomes Antipoverty Showcase.”
349 Patrice Coeur Bizot, “Trusting the Poor with Choices: Why India needs to examine how cash transfers can serve as a safety net for its poor?” The Indian Express, June 27, 2011, accessed April 26, 2015, LexisNexis Academic.
4.3 Summarizing Themes

In this section systematically summarizes the emergent discursive themes that were found in the qualitative discussion of the articles obtained during the LexisNexis search. First, the overlapping terms will be examined and then the remaining words. The objective here is a broad summary, not an in-depth textual analysis of each article.

Education and Government

The word frequency analysis proved that education and government were the only overlapping terms utilized in the newspaper articles selected for the discourse analysis of affirmative action and Bolsa Família. Affirmative action in education is framed as a change needed to reform the education system in Brazil. The Law of Social Quotas is needed to include the marginalized. It will “open” doors of opportunity to the most vulnerable. The government is cited as the entity that has implemented affirmative action; however, the government continues to strive for a racial democracy. For the problem in Brazil is more often than not noted as a class issue not a race issue. This assumption plays a role in the way in which these terms, education and government, are utilized to frame Bolsa Família. The poor have the right to access a higher education, therefore, Bolsa Família, through its conditionalities, hopes to instill in future generations the importance of obtaining an education by mandating that children attend school. Government entities continuously provide study results and statistics that support Bolsa Família’s positive impacts on Brazil’s poorest population. These studies have made Bolsa Família the international model it is today. It can be concluded that some sort of education reform needs to take place in Brazil for both the affirmative action and Bolsa Família articles call for the improvement of the public school system. Overall, the government is the entity assisting those that live in poverty in obtaining an education.
Affirmative Action: Black

Who is black, or Afro-Brazilian, remains an unanswered question. In the sources selected for the study, there is clear evidence that the use of the racial label continues to be ambiguous. Black, however, tells a peoples’ history and of their, whoever the blacks are, feelings towards that history. The term is used to describe individuals that are poor, unhealthy, and illiterate. Nevertheless, the articles highlight a shift in Brazilian society, a return to blackness. This return does not only mean a new way in which individuals may label themselves, but also includes a new lens with which to view history, specifically, a history with a real racial democracy.

Affirmative Action: Discrimination

Those in favor of affirmative action have used the term discrimination to highlight how those that are labelled as black have been stripped of opportunities. Blacks in Brazil face discrimination in education, the workplace, health care services and so on. In some sources, there is mention of race discrimination within poor communities, or favelas, where there is little difference in social class. Moreover, the word discrimination is applied in attempts to defend affirmative action in Brazil and challenge a race-less course of thought.

Affirmative Action: Nation

The nation is Brazil. Once internationally viewed as a color-blind community, is today at the center of an affirmative action debate. The country’s leaders have admitted to racial inequalities, however, the nation as a whole has not come to accept the use of racial labels. The country has comes to terms with the fact that education reform is one of the key components in moving the nation forward.
Affirmative Action: Quotas

All of the resources gathered for the discourse analysis of affirmative action in Brazil focused on quotas in the country’s education system. The Law of Social Quotas was implemented to provide low-income citizens with access to an education. Academic institutions have a quota to meet, or are to reserve a percentage of their admission spots to public school educated students and those who qualify as, again, low-income. The law mostly serves Afro-Brazilians and indigenous peoples. However, many of the articles drawn from LexisNexis predate the implementation of the Lei de Cotas Sociais and included information of affirmative action policies in general, including the racial quota systems that had been implemented at several federal universities mentioned in Chapter 2.

Affirmative Action: Race, Racial, Racism

Race continues to be a highly controversial topic in Brazil. Even though there have been attempts in the country to label individuals racially, to implement policies such as affirmative action, these attempts have been unsuccessful for social class plays a role in individuals self-identification. The hope of a Brazilian racial democracy remains.

Additionally, in the newspaper articles gathered, the term racial is always coupled with another term that describes a difference, or divide. Those terms are the following: racial indistinctiveness, racial differences, racial classification, racial categories, racial hierarchies and racial inequality. The term is also associated with racial equality and racial quotas. This could lead readers of articles to understand that racial difference exists in Brazil, but that there is some sort of campaign to bridge the gaps amongst racial groups.

Similar to the term discrimination, the word racism is used in the sources gathered to build an argument in favor of affirmative action. The racism faced by Afro-Brazilian population
in different sectors of society is highlighted. The expression is also used to describe the characteristics of Brazilian racism. It is something that some claim cannot exist for race in Brazil is supposedly indefinable, or imaginary, yet it is the termed used to describe something very real in Brazilian citizen’s lives.

*Affirmative Action: White*

Who is white, or Euro-Brazilian, remains an unanswered question. As mentioned in the brief discussion of the term black, race continues to be liquid in Brazil. However, the term is often associated with those that are rich, healthy and well educated. The newspaper articles also suggest that those that once labeled themselves as white may now be self-identifying as black.

*Bolsa Família: Development*

In the sources used to analyze discussions of *Bolsa Família’s* conceptual framework, the term development was utilized to describe a positive change in Brazil since the incorporation of *Bolsa Família*. According to the government, the Human Development Index has improved, infant mortality rates have diminished, school attendance has increased, and individuals now have money to spend. *Bolsa Família* has also become the cash transfer program to mimic internationally due its *effective* development strategies.

*Bolsa Família: Economic*

Brazil’s ability to develop strategies to enrich their most vulnerable population is almost always coupled with their economic status. The country witnessed a high level of economic stability, until the beginning of an economic crisis starting in 2013. The government suggests it would like for everyone to feel the economic stability, however, skeptics wonder if welfare economics is the best route to take in relation to creating a more economically sustainable future or if it is creating a dependent population.
**Bolsa Familia: Health**

One of *Bolsa Familia’s* main objectives is to improve the health of Brazil’s future generations and low-income population. Routine health checks and obtaining vaccinations are part of the conditions set forth by the program. Access to health care is a human right, asserts the Brazilian government. Additionally, good health will give those that live in poverty an increased opportunity to attend school without interruption due to good health and compete for social mobility.

**Bolsa Familia: Income**

The Brazilian government is providing additional income to those that are economically eligible for the *Bolsa Familia* program. The government claims that for the first time in their lives people that have difficulty in finding full-time permanent employment feel like they are obtaining a regular source of income that assist them in purchasing their basic needs. As a result of implementing *Bolsa Familia*, the income of the poorest Brazilian citizens is growing as fast as it is for the rich. The government is attempting to further reduce the income gap between the rich and poor.

**Bolsa Familia: Inequality**

Noteworthy, the way inequality is talked about in the sources gathered for the discourse analysis of *Bolsa Familia* mostly relates to economic inequality. Brazil’s decline of income inequality is mostly attributed to *Bolsa Familia*. At no point is there mention of racial inequality. There are critics of the program that say *Bolsa Familia* does little to reduce inequality; however, their arguments are deafened by the statistics produced by government entities.

**Bolsa Familia: Poverty**
*Bolsa Família* is the one of the largest poverty relief programs in the world. According to some, if the program disappeared those that are currently obtaining benefits would go back to living in misery. *Bolsa Família* is not only alleviating poverty for adults, but for the generations to come. The newspaper articles surveyed, stated that presently combating poverty is at the forefront of many countries globally.

*Bolsa Família: Welfare*

*Bolsa Família* is the largest conditional cash transfer program in the world. Skeptics say that the program is a governmental error for it will create a dependent and welfare society. Those in favor of *Bolsa Familia*, on the other hand, say it has empowered women, decreased infant mortality rates, and some of the most marginalized citizens of Brazil now have access to a better future through program conditionalities.

*Bolsa Família: Work*

There is not much evidence proposing that *Bolsa Familia* discourages work even though this has been suggested. Representatives from the MDS claim that once in the system, participants of *Bolsa Familia* can easily be referred to other “benefit and target” programs, *Bolsa Familia* ultimately becomes “a platform.” Some individuals may be referred to job training programs, for instance. Many recipients of the cash grant already have jobs, per the MSD, except they may not make enough or a consistent salary, so they utilize the grant as supplemental income. Many low-income participants of the program have informal jobs. The *Bolsa Familia* discourse is shaped in ways that suggest that the program provides a level of security to those that do not have a steady income. The government also emphasizes that most recipients are children and participants are working for their money for they have conditionalities to meet.

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350 Watts, “Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Scheme Marks a Decade of Pioneering Poverty Relief.”
Chapter 5

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to conduct a discourse analysis of affirmative action and Bolsa Família in Brazil. The most important piece of Brazilian affirmative action legislation, the Law of Social Quotas, has been legally coded in non-racial terms; however, it is constantly discussed through a racial lens. The debates surrounding affirmative action often remind readers of the racial democracy theory for many remain hopeful that this may one day become a Brazilian reality. On the other hand, race drops out almost completely from Bolsa Família’s framing and yet it is a universal, or income-based, program that is designed to mostly benefit Afro-Brazilians. The program has become an international model for human development and Bolsa Família is celebrated a lot more than affirmative action. As illustrated in the Summarizing Themes section of the last chapter, there are no visible overlaps in the discursive framing of these policies except for the fact that the government is involved in the implementation of both programs and that the secondary school education system in Brazil needs to be improved. In general, the Law of Social Quotas and Bolsa Família should be recognized as universalistic policies that supplement each other to improve the quality of life for the Brazilian community.

One limitation to completing this work was that only English newspapers were sampled. This investigation was also conducted outside of Brazil and without the involvement of human subjects. The conclusions made here could have changed if these variables were different. This thesis also examines and includes the topic of race, something that is still very ambiguous in Brazil, which leaves room for inconsistencies in the research.

This paper contributes to works on Brazilian racial identity, ethnic studies, and public policy studies. To future scholars, assessing which policy works best, the Law of Social Quotas
or Bolsa Família, in relation to poverty, education, and life expectancy is an option for further research. Regardless of what future scholars choose to investigate, it will have an impact on discussions of socially and economically marginalized groups in Brazil.

Furthermore, starting 2016, Brazil has gone through some considerable changes. President Rousseff was impeached and removed from office due to a bribery scandal involving a national petroleum company and for disregarding of the federal budget. Simultaneously, the Brazilian economy was in the worst recession in over 25 years, probably the political reason for the removal of President Rousseff, with minimal economic improvement in 2017. President Rousseff’s successor center-right President Temer does not have the public’s support for he too has been involved in corruption scandals, but has been able to evade impeachment. Brazil has had an international audience since they hosted the Olympics in 2016. This is more than likely the reason why such world-renowned programs as Bolsa Família and even affirmative action have been able to survive. However, such a hostile social, political, and economic environment leaves room for much uncertainty for the future of these programs.
Bibliography


