The historical construction of the Native American other and U.S. self: a conceptually schizophrenic perspective

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The Historical Construction of the Native American Other and U.S. Self: a Conceptually
Schizophrenic Perspective

A Thesis
Presented in
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ABSTRACT

This Thesis traces and analyzes the historical antecedents that have led to a conceptually schizophrenic image of the Native American Other, as constructed within dominant U.S. discourses. The Thesis argues that this conceptual schizophrenia, a term borrowed from J. Marshall Beier, has been highly productive in justifying and maintaining U.S. hegemony over North American Indigenous peoples, communities, and nations. The Thesis develops a fluid historical materialist framework in order to analyze the role that capital development plays in continually shaping and developing this schizophrenic perspective. The schizophrenic perspective is not static, but fluid, and it is this fluidity that allows for consistent reimaginings of the Native American Other. This consistent reimagining of the Native American Other has continually served to justify U.S. dominance over Indigenous populations, and should not be seen as a result of an altruistic enlightenment of thought. This is to say, that the development of the dominant image of the Native American Other has not been an evolution or progression of a more authentic form of recognition, but is rather, simply a re-contextualization that serves to maintain entrenched power structures. Secondly, the Thesis examines how this schizophrenic framework has been productive in masking the incongruity between iniquitous U.S. action towards Indigenous peoples, land, and resources and the benign narrative tropes that have been instrumental in shaping the image of the U.S. national self. In the conclusion, the Thesis coalesces these ideas in order to analyze the contemporary failings of a politics of recognition.

Keywords: self/Other, conceptual schizophrenia, capital development, Postcolonial, Indigeneity
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Chapter One

Introduction

It appears to many Indians that someday soon the modern world will be ready to understand itself and, perhaps, the Indian people.

~ Vine Deloria Jr., Custer Died for your Sins (1969)

Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all.

~ Karl Marx, The German Ideology (1846)

1.1 – Theses and Objectives

This project aims to unravel the historical mechanisms and antecedents that have contributed to the formation of a conceptual schizophrenia, which permeates contemporary images of the Native American Other within U.S. discourses. This schizophrenic conception of the Native American Other, a notion identified by J. Marshall Beier, can be recognized as the simultaneous reverence and abhorrence conveyed by dominate U.S. society, for Native American cultures, practices, and peoples. Within dominant U.S. representations, the disparate communities of North American Indigenous peoples are most often held together under the uniform signifier of “Indian.” This collective designation presupposes a certain level of standard

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1 The term Conceptual Schizophrenia will carry through the heart of the Thesis and is a term that I attribute to J. Marshall Beier, International Relations in Uncommon Places (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 131.

2 A brief digression on language: here I resort to the standard postcolonial nomenclature when dissecting the relationship between colonizer and colonized, of self/Other. This project investigates a discourse that has been historically constructed by a colonial, U.S. ‘self’. I am interested in how the U.S. has related itself to the Indigenous populations of North America. This leads to an investigatory question of how has the subject of the United States constructed the Native American population as a particular (and evolving) Other? The use of the term “Native American Other” or “Indigenous Other” should be taken to denote that ontologically constitutive relationship. This project is not one of restitution or identity correction, but is an historical discursive analysis that focuses on identity formation. Occasionally I will invoke the term “Indian Other”, which should not be taken as an endorsement of a particular pejorative viewpoint, but is meant to be reflective of the term used in a particular historical discourse. For example, Chief Justice John Marshall resorts to designating the Indigenous populations of North America as “Indian Others” or “Indian Savages.” A reiteration of those terms by myself is simply meant to relay the tone and pejorative designation proffered by Marshall in his writings and logic.

3 Indeed, condemnation and disgust for Native Americans is quite literally embedded into the fabric of U.S. national identity. The Declaration of Independence condemns King George III for exciting the “domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare, is undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.”

commonality; dominant perceptions assume that while differences surely exist, there is still an unchanging and readily knowable Indian essence. It is this essence that is often appealed to in political discourse, Supreme Court decisions, and discussions of economic development, in order to justify U.S. hegemony over Indigenous populations. Furthermore, the project analyzes the political work that this conceptual schizophrenia permits. This political work yields the historical subjugation of North America’s Indigenous populations, and this project analysis how this conceptual framework has allowed the U.S. to continually re-imagine itself and its political motivations.

This Thesis argues that the mercurial needs of capital development have been a primary driver in developing and reshaping this conceptual schizophrenia. Moreover, this consistent reimagining of the Native American Other has continually served to justify U.S. dominance over Indigenous populations, and should not be seen as a result of an altruistic enlightenment of thought. This is to say, that the development of the dominant image of the Native American Other has not been an evolution or progression of a more authentic form of recognition, but is rather, simply a re-contextualization that serves to maintain entrenched power structures. Secondly, this schizophrenic framework has been productive in masking the incongruity between iniquitous U.S. action towards Indigenous peoples, land, and resources and the benign narrative tropes that have been instrumental in shaping the image of the U.S. national self.

The overall focus of the project provides an analysis of the discursive history between the U.S. (self) and the Indigenous populations of North America (Other). The primary intent of this project is not one of image correction; although, the acknowledgement of a racist, incomplete, and manufactured image of the Native American Other is implicit in the analysis. The project seeks to examine the mechanisms involved in developing the conceptual schizophrenic image of the Native American Other, and how the continual re-working of a schizophrenic
image has benefited U.S. political and economic interests. At its core the project is centered on how the United States has come to understand itself, and what type of political work takes place through and within this particular imagining. The pertinent questions focus on what has been driving these changes, and what new political frameworks and possibilities are constructed through these reimaginings? This project examines only one piece of a larger puzzle concerning U.S. self identity, but one that hopefully will open up new avenues of investigation.

There remains a large gap between the historical mechanisms that went into building and constructing U.S. economic, political, and social structures and the dominant narrative that imbues the U.S. self-conscious. There is a profound incongruence between historical motive and what the national self-conscious holds as historical (and contemporary) motivations (this idea will be further expounded upon in Chapter 3). In a similar light, the historian Edward E. Baptist has dissected the ways in which an analogous incongruence has plagued the dominant understanding of slavery in the U.S. Baptist is also concerned with the effect that this gap in national narrative and historical record has had on the national self-conscious. Baptist writes against the common notion that U.S. slavery was somehow in contradiction, and outside, of the development of U.S. democracy and the burgeoning capitalist economy. In a challenge to this accepted narrative, Baptist asserts, “[e]nslaved African Americans built the modern United States, and indeed the entire modern world, in ways both obvious and hidden.”

A straightforward, yet profound, statement that suggests a substantial, national dissimulation regarding the role that slaves played in constructing and building the U.S. as a world power, as well as the world economy. Baptist’s analysis also suggests that this misunderstanding of the historical narrative, regarding the import of slavery on building the modern U.S. economy, has been especially productive in permitting a particular view of the U.S. national self—both historically and in the contemporary present.

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Baptist buttresses this claim by quoting the American novelist Ralph Ellison, “‘[o]n the moral level I propose we view the whole of American life as a drama enacted on the body of a Negro giant who, lying trussed up like Gulliver, forms the stage and scene upon which and within which the action unfolds.’” If the foundational role of African American slave labor represents one forgotten half of U.S. history, then surely their remains another half equally forgotten. This work attempts to engage that other neglected half.

If the modern (capitalist) U.S. economy was built through the brutalization and torture of African bodies, as Baptist argues, then it is worthwhile to consider how the U.S. acquired the land that allowed for this construction of a modern U.S. state. I argue that U.S. land was acquired, and built upon, through a repeated process of what I classify as settlement, expansion, and entrenchment. This acquisition of land and soil also required a repeated reimagining of the Indigenous populations that occupied the land, and thus a symbiotic reimagining of a U.S. national self. These three periods are mainly described as distinct temporal periods, but they also serve to describe the process of how a discourse becomes naturalized and perpetuated. These periods speak to both the historical treatment of North American Indigenous populations, as well as the pejorative discursive treatment that operates on shorter and recurrent cycles. This thesis will trace the historical drives and pressures, with a particular emphasis on the needs of capital development, which influenced these changes. It will also analyze the productive political work (i.e. the continual acquisition of land, the suppression of Indigenous sovereignty, and the perpetuation of an imagined benign and benevolent U.S. self) that has occurred through these reimaginings.

The rest of this chapter will focus on unpacking the idea of the conceptual schizophrenia surrounding the Native American Other, as well as laying out the theoretical framework of

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analysis. Chapter 2 will test this theoretical framework in two specific case studies, as well as trace the historical construction of the binary form of U.S. self and Native American Other. The first case study (section 2.2) will address how a particular conception of ‘nature’ evolved under capitalist development. This analysis will establish a parallel with the image of the Native American Other (both share a similar external/universal conception) that underpins the rest of the Thesis. The other major case study in Chapter 2 will investigate how this theoretical framework can be applied to U.S. encounters with the Hopi, in the American Southwest. This section (2.4) relies heavily on a previous investigation undertaken by Lomayumtewa C. Ishii, but will push Ishii’s analysis in a direction not fully explored in his initial analysis. Chapter 3 brings these theoretical pieces together in order to trace the development of the conceptual schizophrenic imagining of the Native American Other, through three distinct periods of U.S. history and capital development. Chapter 4, the concluding chapter, examines the contemporary relevance of this history. The conclusion brings together the theoretical arguments advanced in the first three chapters in order to problematize the contemporary discourse of recognition politics. In the conclusion, I argue that a politics of recognition has been and will continue to be ineffective in altering U.S. hegemony over Indigenous populations, as it fails to address the conceptual frameworks and power structures that privilege U.S. supremacy.

1.2 Examining the Conceptual Schizophrenic view of the Native American Other

The schizophrenic conception of the Native American Other reveals itself in a myriad of forms, and it is the most pervasive conceptual framework that the U.S. government and its citizens utilize when confronting Native North Americans. Underpinning this schizophrenia is a fundamental dualism that has been expressed in a variety of ways, but has its ontological roots in the idea of the noble savage. The first iteration of the noble savage is most often attributed to John Dryden, who wrote in the play, Conquest of Granada (1672); “I am as free as Nature first made
man/Ere the base laws of servitude began/When wild in woods the noble savage ran.”

In this first iteration, and in subsequent variances of the noble savage trope, there remains an external/universal juxtaposition. The noble savage represents the ontological roots of humanity, and in this way remains a point of paradoxical aspiration, representing a fundamental purity and innocence. Yet, there is a simultaneous negative exclusion, where the noble savage is seen as barbaric and strictly irreconcilable with Western civilization. In this sense, the noble savage represents a stage of human development that Western civilization has long since past. This Thesis will trace how this basic notion of the noble savage has been expanded and developed, often through the pressures and needs of capital development, and how this development has been utilized to justify and argue particular U.S. policy towards Indigenous populations. This malleable and juxtaposed notion of an external and universal Native American Other has allowed for a positioning of Indigenous populations (against a particular idea of the U.S. self), regarding land, resources, sovereignty, and civil rights, that has been extremely productive in justifying U.S. hegemony.

Contemporary media coverage reveals this dichotomous portrayal quite openly. A search of “Native American News”, via the New York Times’ online collection, exposes several consistent types of stories that dominate contemporary news coverage. Perhaps the most prevalent pieces are ‘pop’ cultural-anthropological articles. The focus of these articles are usually positive and admiring in tone and have titles like “Navajo Rez Metal” and “Who Speaks Wukchumni?” This narrative format often draws attention to questions of identity and Native American cultural posterity. It positions a particular Native American community as straddling the ontological lines between tradition and modernity. This type of cultural reporting is complimented by two other dominant article formats. The first being pieces that focus on

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political resistance, often to infrastructure projects, which have lately been centered on Sioux resistance to the proposed construction of the Keystone pipeline. The last dominant narrative is economic, and focuses on the costs and benefits of 21st century wealth (primarily brought through Casinos) being brought to Reservation communities.\(^8\)

Collectively, this type of coverage serves to reinforce the external and universal juxtaposition that was first held in the notion of the *noble savage*. Native American individuals and communities are continually made to occupy one of two positions. The first being one of externalization, which often begets cultural signifiers of traditionalism, anti-capitalism, backwardness, nature-spirituality, primitiveness, pre-modern, and distinctly Other. The second position is one of universalism, which often promotes a vision of Native assimilation. It escapes the purview of this paper to provide a detailed analysis of contemporary media coverage. Rather, the focus of this paper is to dissect how this juxtaposed image has developed through U.S. history and the political work that it permits. It seems that Native Americans, in the case of political recognition, are trapped in a type of double location that has been highly productive in justifying U.S. interests. The following analysis in Ch. 2 and Ch. 3 will explore the myriad ways in which this double location is perpetually reimagined and re-worked in order to maintain the status quo of power relations between the U.S. and Native American populations and nations.

In order to undertake this discursive analysis, the constructive mechanisms I have identified for investigation are binary representation, the *passion* and inner logic of racist ideology, and the influence of capital. I am using these mechanisms to investigate how they have worked together to create a double location of the Native American Other. It is a dual position that represents the Native American Other as possessing the most fundamental aspects of humanity, and yet also maintains a severe limitation of rights and recognition within political and

social structures. In his work, *Homo Sacer*, Giorgio Agamben concentrates his investigation on the:

juridical procedures and deployments of power by which human beings could be so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives that no act committed against them could appear any longer as a crime. (At this point [the Jewish Holocaust], in fact, everything had truly become possible).  

Agamben grounds his analysis in the titular image of *Homo Sacer*, that who can be killed but not sacrificed. Agamben wants to uncover the juridical developments that allowed for this type of conception to be applied onto the European Jewish population.

This Thesis is concerned with a similar instance of double location, although in the case of the Native American Other it has taken on a slightly different bent. It seems that the initial conception of the Native American Other encouraged this type of *Homo Sacer* status, where Indigenous North Americans were killed, dominated, and suppressed without fear of legal or social recourse. However, this does not seem to be the conception that has persisted. It has almost been a complete reversal. Today it appears that Native North Americans are the inverse *Homo Sacer*, those who can be sacrificed but not killed. Here, I mean this in the sense that the image of Indian is revered as sacred, holy, and distinctly representative of the fundamentals of human essence. But this form of paternalistic recognition has failed to lead to any substantial recognition of Indigenous political rights or voice that does not depend on U.S. mediation and translation. There is no political or social form of representation that allows for the killing of Native North Americans, or the suppression of Indigenous rights and culture, to be visible.

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within dominant discourse. Infrastructure projects (that serve interests of capital) are debated, cultural posterity is appealed to, talk of development reigns supreme, and the completed projects materialize at the end of it all. All forms of resistance are consumed by dominant discourse. In this pattern of failed recognition, the American Indian is either assumed to be already dead, or committed some sort of self-sacrifice by clinging onto the past and tradition. This double location, caught between tradition and modernity, has been a consistent narrative of the U.S. government to justify a politics of both domination and assimilation. To help expand upon this thread of investigation, the next section analyzes the theoretical tools and insights that will guide the rest of the analysis.

1.3 Racism as Passion: The Internal Logic of Colonial Racism

A tradition in postcolonial scholarship examines the relationship between ‘colonizer’ and ‘colonized’ through the explication of restrictive and powerful binaries. These investigations, while certainly differentiating themselves through the historical subjects of investigation, maintain several fundamental themes that are relevant to this investigation. These central themes include the co-constitution of binary relationship between self and Other, and the internal logic of racist ideologies. I will examine foundational scholarship in these areas, and then briefly connect them to an understanding of the U.S., white, colonial self and the Native American Other. The questions directing this investigation are; how are racist ideologies held within a culture? What sort of mechanisms would that entail? What processes are at work, which help to naturalize this type of internal logic?

This analysis argues that the self cannot exist without the Other (each develops in an ontological symbiosis); a constitution and making of the self occurs in imagining and constructing a particular vision of the Other. Jean-Paul Sartre explored this idea in his essay, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, and proffers the idea that racist ideologies do not simply live in individuals
but permeate a society. Sartre elucidates this theme in suggesting that anti-Semitism is not simply a misguided idea. Sartre writes that too often, “we look upon persons and characters as mosaics in which each stone coexists with the others without that coexistence affecting the nature of the whole.”¹¹ This view holds that anti-Semitism can simply be one poisoned stone, held in isolation, living amongst many others within the individual. This mode of thought asserts that anti-Semitism does not affect the overall constitution of a person, but is simply an anomaly of thought, an idea that can simply be corrected with more honest information and representations. Sartre argues against this position and instead asserts that anti-Semitism is not simply an idea, but a passion. It is a passion in the sense that it does not derive from specific experience or aversion for particular traits that have been identified within the Jew, but is an all-consuming expression of feeling. In essence, anti-Semitism affects the entire constitution and behavior of the anti-Semite. Anti-Semitism is alive within the culture; it is then internalized within the individual and then expressed outwards back into the culture.¹²

The pertinent takeaway is that racist ideologies are not simply restricted to a particular viewpoint held within an individual, but racist ideologies infect how an individual (and a society) conceives the Other, nature, economic and political systems, and the basic structures of social relations. Similar to Sartre, Frantz Fanon moves the discussion of colonial racism past the idea that such racism is an isolated anomaly that rests in only a few; that it is not simply one stone in the mosaic, but a passion. In Black Skins, White Masks, Fanon argues that colonial racism is not an action or collective of thoughts held by an isolated minority, but similarly to what Sartre argued in Anti-Semite and Jew, it is something that pervades a society. Without equivocation Fanon writes, “European civilization and its agents of the highest caliber are responsible for colonial

¹² Ibid., 10-35.
To push this point further, Fanon quotes from Aimé Césaire’s *Discourse of Colonialism* on Europeans’ surprise at the rise of Nazism:

That they [Europeans] tolerated that Nazism before it was inflicted on them, that they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimized it, because, until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples; that they have cultivated that Nazism, that they are responsible for it, and that before engulfing the whole edifice of Western, Christian, civilization in its reddened waters, it oozes, seeps and trickles from every crack. 14

Césaire argues that ideologies of racism, in all its multiplicities, are not simply held together and contained within individual consciousness, but permeate and develop within the values, beliefs, conscience, and logic of a culture. In this sense, Nazism was not an aberration but an extension of previous practices of colonial racism onto European bodies. 15 Likewise, the dominant view in U.S. discourse of the Native American Other also shapes notions of the U.S. self, nature, and the structures that make up its society. This is also not one directional. Views of nature, and the embedded socio-political and economic structures also help to shape perceptions of the Native American Other.

Scholars of Indigeneity have also drawn on this idea of racist ideology as being dynamically alive, and none perhaps more adroitly than Robert A. Williams Jr. In *Like a Loaded Weapon*, Williams Jr. traces the common trope of the Savage Indian Other through the history of the American Colonies and the U.S. Supreme Court. He begins with the Founding Fathers and their reliance on the idea of “the Savage as the Wolf.” 16 There is an obvious connection to nature, where the violence and savagery of the American Wilderness and Native people were

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14 Ibid., 71.
used to justify the domination and subjugation of both. Williams Jr. succeeds in demonstrating how the Court’s repeated call upon the idea of the Savage Indian helped to codify a “legalized racial dictatorship” that functions to suppress Native rights, sovereignty, and cultural practices. What Williams Jr. points to is that the dominant U.S. perception and action towards the Native American Other was driven by a racism of passion. This racism did not simply justify U.S. hegemony, but its logic permeated into other mechanisms and systems of U.S. society. This particular type of racist passion influenced the logic of court decisions, economic structures, modes of literature, social relations, and aims of new technologies.

This notion of Savage, or Indian Other, while historically productive and consistent in application, is never static in form. It is fluid and evolving. Williams Jr.’s work *Savage Anxieties* traces the historical discourse surrounding the idea of Savage, beyond colonial North America and contemporary U.S. culture, through the history of Western Civilization. The book examines Greek mythology, the Renaissance and Enlightenment, Western philosophical thought, and modern pop culture. This extensive scope works to show how this long-standing binary has infiltrated varying logics of Western culture, or in Fanon’s psychoanalytic nomenclature, *the collective unconscious*. For Williams Jr. this binary of Savage/Civilized is not simply a misguided idea, but it is something much more pervasive and pernicious. It represents the internal logic of how a culture comes to see itself and naturalize its behavior and actions towards the Other. The subsequent analysis focuses on this *internal logic*.

The idea of racist ideology weaving into a culture and then obfuscating its origins is a theme that Fanon examines more fully in *The Wretched of The Earth*. Speaking to the naturalization of ideology, within a culture, Fanon writes with force and clarity, “the Western bourgeoisie generally manages to mask this racism by multiplying nuances, thereby enabling it to maintain

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17 Williams Jr., *Like a Loaded Weapon* 23.
intact its discourse of human dignity in all its magnanimity.” Here we can see a connection to the conceptual schizophrenia that surrounds the image of Indian Other. As the culture (and capital) develops, the images of the Other become more nuanced, more malleable, and are able to be appropriated for a wide range of ever-increasing purposes. This adaptability is highly productive. As popular views change, and certain tones or opinions become ill suited for modern discourse, new forms of representation are required to justify and maintain the same hierarchal structures of power. The inner logic of a culture is fluid; it moves and evolves in order to meet new ends.

It is important to note that these co-constitutive relationships, between self and Other, can operate on a national (or even larger geographic) level. Edward Said undertakes this type of analysis in, Orientalism, an in-depth investigation into the historical discourse between Western Europe and a falsely demarcated Orient. Said’s work employs the same strategy of binary deconstruction that was utilized by Sartre, Fanon, and Williams Jr., but his work provides a much richer textual and historical analysis. Orientalism is a cultural and discursive analysis, a dissection of the countless ways that Western Europe has related itself to the idea of Orient and Oriental. Similar to Fanon, Said recognized the ways that racist and colonial ideologies imbed and conceal themselves within a culture, becoming diffuse and inextricable to the culture itself; they are not merely isolated stones. Said sets out to unveil the historical processes in which these naturalizing tendencies occur (i.e. through literature, travel writing, art, politics, and wide set of cultural practices), the mechanisms that promote such processes, and the socio-political ends that are achieved through their proliferation and implementation. For Said, the discourse of Orientalism is not simply the historical study and political engagement by the West, with an area designated as Orient. This would represent Orientalism simply as an idea, but for Said (to call back to Sartre’s language) Orientalism seems to be a passion. Orientalism is not then a subset of

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ideas held within a culture, but a passion held, produced, and maintained in and through the development of the culture itself:

[Orientalism] is rather a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of “interests” which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand…

It is this focus on the inextricability of power, discourse, and culture that has been instrumental in shaping the development of postcolonial thought and a theme of investigation adopted for the present investigation of the image of the Native American Other. Said helps to move the focus away from arguments over representational authenticity and directs them towards the productive forces and motivators of representation, “[t]he things to look at are style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances, not the correctness of the representation nor its fidelity to some great original.” Said presents a fundamental technique for discourse analysis. What becomes important is not the veracity of representation, but the motivations, mode, and tone of the representation. These get at the questions that can help to unveil the inner logic or collective unconscious that is at work.

The influence of capital development has been lacking in previous analyses of the image of the Indian Other. In this instance postcolonial studies and Indigeneity are linked again, as both disciplines have previously displayed skepticism of privileging the role of capital in

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21 Ibid., 18.
Indigenous and Native experiences. Indeed, some scholars of Indigeneity like Elizabeth Cook-Lynn have resisted postcolonial attempts to comment or analyze the myriad experiences of Indigenous North Americans. For Cook-Lynn and many others, there remains nothing postcolonial in regards to the Indigenous experience in North America. It is in fact an actively Colonial experience, where contestations of sovereignty and rights are still being waged between a Native population and a hegemonic colonial power. The gaze of postcolonial scholarship, often couched in Western academia, can carry with it new iterations of the same problems of Eurocentrism, historicism, and remakings of the Other. Often the insertion of the importance of capital development, and its Marxian undertones, can carry with it notes of similar skepticism.22

I am sympathetic to these suspicions. However, I do not feel the inclusion of the import of capital development in this discourse analysis is meant to privilege it as the defining characteristic in the colonial or postcolonial experience. Nor is it meant to mitigate difference. It is a piece, albeit an important one, that has directed the inner logic that has produced the contemporary conceptual schizophrenic view of the Native American Other. With these criticisms in mind, J. Marshall Beier provides an apposite framing of the postcolonial subject:

‘the postcolonial subject’ is a shorthand that is in no way intended to suggest a uniform experience of colonialism giving rise to an essential postcolonial consciousness or identity. And to say that colonialism is the defining feature of postcoloniality is not to claim that it is also the defining feature of postcolonial subjectivities. Of course, its importance is not to be understated either.23

I argue that the same needs to be noted for the influence of capital development, in regards to its power in forming the dominant image of the Native American Other. The influence of

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capital development is in no way intended to define the consciousness or experience of the subject. Rather, it has defined the way in which the Other is and can be viewed within dominant discourse. Capital development affects the style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, and the historical and social circumstances under which modes of representation are developed. For my project, the role of capital is not meant to define the experience of the postcolonial subject, but rather it is directed towards the inner cultural logic that motivates representations of the Indian Other. Of course this then has a symbiotic influence on the Indigenous experience in North America, but it is part of a myriad of disparate and individual experiences and consciousnesses. It is not my intent to resuscitate or remake those experiences. My intent is to dissect the logic and conceptual mechanisms that have stifled and falsely unified those experiences and differences to begin with.

1.4 The Influence of Capital Development on Shaping Passions of Racism

This section establishes a theoretical foundation and mode of analysis utilized in the subsequent explication of the image of the Native American Other. I will first establish a Marxian theoretical framework for understanding the development of human consciousness and concepts. The primary assumption underpinning the overall analysis rests on Marx’s assertion that “[l]ife is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.” It is this assertion that buttresses Marx’s historical materialist framework, and also serves to set the foundation for my own analysis. For my purposes, I use Marx’s claim not to cement any ideas or theses on teleological grounds, but rather to open up a notion of a human consciousness that is absolutely

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24 Said, Orientalism, 18.
26 Sartre’s thinking also reflects the spirit of this notion, in his aphorism, “Existence precedes essence”, albeit for a far less historical materialist aim. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber (London: Yale University Press, 2007), 22.
fluid and driven by continual change in the material and social environment. Critical and Marxist geographers have utilized the framework offered by Marx to analyze how the material conditions (economic, political, and social structures) of a society influence cognitive conceptions and understanding of that society and the world. This section explores this understanding of human consciousness, elucidated by Marx in *Capital Vol. 1* and the *German Ideology*, in order to set a theoretical framework of analysis that focuses on the influence of material and social conditions on human consciousness and conceptions.

In a footnote in volume one of *Capital*, Marx succinctly sketches what he sees as six essential components that symbiotically work to produce human relations and history. In the last half of the footnote Marx writes:

> Technology reveals the active relation of man to nature, the direct process of the production of his life, and thereby it also lays bare the process of the production of the social relations of his life, and of the mental conceptions that flow from those relations.\textsuperscript{27}

Here, Marx asserts a deep connection and shared inner logic between these six components; they are intimately and inextricably bound together. David Harvey, in his companion to *Capital Vol. 1*, notes that this passage (and the six elements that it links together) is often used to critique Marx as a technological determinist, i.e. that technological advancements are the primary driver of change.\textsuperscript{28} In contrast to this standardized critique, Harvey suggests that Marx should be read not as a rigid technological determinist (which seems to go against his open dialectical mode of analysis), but instead should be recognized for outlining an open and fluid mode of analysis. Harvey notes that Marx is indistinct about how exactly these six elements operate together, but what remains evident is that one element is not the sole determinant for the others.


\textsuperscript{28} David Harvey, *A Companion to Marx’s Capital* (London: Verso, 2010), 192.
Rather, these elements are in constant flux, and a change in one often produces a development in the others, “these elements are plainly not static but in motion, linked through ‘processes of production’ that guide human evolution.” These six elements represent the different threads of human development and are held in a web of co-evolution, yet are still capable of moments “for autonomous development.”

New technologies help us think about the world in a different way (the ubiquity of computers, for instance, has fundamentally changed human mental conceptions and imaginings of the world). However, these technological advancements are driven by individual human spontaneity and creativity that are embedded in the context of the material conditions of a particular society.

This understanding of Marx’s method opens up a unique and fruitful mode of analysis. Marx has little concern for a traditional understanding of cause, but is interested in relations and appearances. If Marx does not make one element a determinant, nor wish to speak of cause, then what does his mode of analysis offer? Here, I take from Harvey’s encapsulation of how these different elements operate and can be understood:

What Marx is saying…is that technologies and organizational forms internalize a certain relation to nature as well as to mental conceptions and social relations, daily life and labor processes. By virtue of this internalization, the study of technologies and organizational forms is bound to “reveal” or “disclose” a great deal about all the other elements.

If one wants to understand how cognitive conceptions evolved during a certain cultural epoch, then it would be revealing to investigate the evolution and appearance of new technologies, social organizations, and modes of production. If one wishes to understand the historical

30 Ibid., 196.
31 Ibid., 193.
development of the image of Native American Other, (as framed in dominant colonial discourses) it is beneficial to analyze the historical development of new technologies and modes of production.

The important theoretical insight is that an understanding of conceptual movements is possible because of the internalization of a particular logic or relation that works through and is co-developed in mental conceptions, new technologies, modes of production, social relations and reproduction, and humanity’s relationship to nature. Changes in one element will often reveal changes in another. Thus, intensely explicating one particular element will allow for a richer understanding of the other elements. This represents a similar mode of analysis that the geographer Neil Smith utilizes in his investigation into how capitalist modes of production and development influenced dominant Western understandings of nature (explored in Chapter 2). It is this mode of analysis, reinforced with the previously discussed postcolonial framing, which is utilized going forward.

1.5 Conclusion

This introductory chapter functioned to set the multi-layered subject of investigation, as well as provide the theoretical framing of analysis. The remainder of the Thesis will explore the identified central topic, which is the development of the conceptually schizophrenic image of the Native American Other. This exploration focuses on the power of entrenched binary relationships, the internal logic of racist ideologies, and the role of capital development on influencing dominant conceptions and racist ideologies. Chapter 2 weaves these varying modes of investigation together into a cohesive method of theoretical analysis. This will be accomplished through three specific case studies. The first will be an investigation into the dominant Western conception of nature, and how the explication of the conception of nature reveals a cultural logic. This analysis informs a following investigation into the European
settlement of eastern North America that analyzes the foundational tropes and logic used to construct the image of the Indian Other. This investigation will then inform the final case study, which relies on an article by Lomayumtewa C. Ishii, of the 19th and 20th century U.S. discourse surrounding the Hopi of the American Southwest. Chapter 3 utilizes this theoretical model to identify the ways that the needs of capital development have historically shaped, moved, and re-defined the boundaries of this schizophrenia. Furthermore, the following chapters will examine how the malleable nature of this schizophrenia, and the double location of the Native American Other that it permits, has been politically productive in justifying U.S. hegemony over North American Indigenous peoples. Finally, the concomitant subject of investigation is the U.S. self. The investigation will focus on how the U.S. has come to understand itself, both in its ontological foundation, and in its motivations for political action. The analysis seeks to examine the boundary between motive and belief, or the space between the historical drivers and motivations of political actions and what the U.S. has and continues to proffer as its motivation.
Chapter Two
Capital Development, Nature, and the Native American Other

Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes... There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image.


One-dimensional thought is systematically promoted by the makers of politics... Their universe of discourse is populated by self-validating hypotheses which, incessantly and monopolistically repeated, become hypnotic definitions of dictations.

~ Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (1964)

2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the development and naturalization of dominant conceptions within U.S. society. The investigation, ultimately, serves two main purposes. The first purpose is to reveal that dominant mental conceptions (held by a society) are rarely, if ever, derived through a priori, or objective, reasoning. They are not arrived at independently of the internal logic of a society; rather, they often help to express and develop that logic. This chapter examines the influence of capital development and racism as passion (discussed in Chapter 1) that operate to sustain the internal logic of the U.S. settler colonial state. The second purpose is to show that dominant mental conceptions are naturalized and their political consequence becomes concealed, meaning that the mechanisms and modes of thought put into those conceptions become obscured. This loss of origins becomes important as the expression of dominant mental conceptions often serve to fill the needs of one particular segment of society.

The following section will examine how this process has occurred in regards to the conception of nature. The analysis is supported by the work of Neil Smith and his seminal work, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space. The section examines how the needs
of capital development helped to shape dominant understandings of nature, which shares a similar external/universal dualism with the image of the Native American Other, and how this conception became naturalized. The section will also examine the political import of this dualistic conception of nature; what is at stake and who benefits from this dualistic conception of nature? The subsequent two sections examine a similar development in the case of the Native American Other. Beyond this similar conceptual development, sections 2.3 and 2.4, will analyze how the development of a particular view of the U.S. self developed alongside the conception of the Native American Other.

2.2 An “Ideology of Nature”: Capitals’ Influence on Conceptual Development

It might seem a strange notion that advanced, capitalist society could misunderstand nature.\(^{32}\) Nature sits there waiting to be observed and understood, and it seems self-evident that modern society holds the conceptual and mental tools to carry out such an analysis. Often Western countries approach the Native American Other, with a similar sense of self-assurance; ‘surely we can understand them’. But, perhaps, the idea of understanding or misunderstanding is the wrong way to set about this topic. While it is important to identify the dominant conception of nature in the industrial West, it is perhaps of more significance to seek what the pervading conception can reveal about the structure and aims of Western, capitalist society (and ultimately the U.S.). How did the current conception of nature come about and who benefits from such a vision? The rest of this section will be spent exploring these ideas, which will serve to model how the subsequent investigation of the image of the Native American Other will proceed.

This section focuses on tracing the historical development of the mental conception of nature that occurred in the industrializing West. Akin to the conception of the Native American Other, this approach recognizes the pervasive influence of capital development on the shaping of dominant understandings of nature. The next sections will delve deeper into the political implications of this dualistic conception, examining who benefits and what is at stake. By analyzing the conceptual development of the Native American Other, we gain insight into the broader political economy of nature in the industrial West.
Other, the conception of nature is marked by an external/universal dualism. To elucidate this history, the section gives a close reading of Neil Smith’s seminal work, *Uneven Development*. In his investigation Smith adheres to the mode of analysis that Marx offered, and was discussed in Chapter one. The analysis focuses on changes in technology/scientific advancement, and modes of production. A strict focus on these elements unveils the internalization of modes of thought and logic that became present in the dominant conception of nature; each feeds into the other and a richer understanding is possible when focus is given to this internalization process. This chapter serves two primary objectives. The first is to model the theoretical framework that is utilized in the investigation of the *conceptual schizophrenia* surrounding the image of the Native American Other. The second reason is that the conceptions of nature and the Colonial Other appear to share a common ontological beginning that is marked with an initial externalization and subsequent universalisation. Attuning to these similarities sets the course for the analysis of the Native American Other that follows.

It is important to note that the Western conception of nature did not arise independently of its own internal logic; the concept of nature was not deduced *a priori* and then incorporated into the *episteme* of Western thought. Rather, to call back to the mode of thought that Marx expressed, (analyzed in section 1.4) the conception of nature developed alongside social relations, modes of production, technological advancements, and already existing cognitive perceptions. With this idea in mind, this section analyzes the influence of capital development on shaping the dominant Western conception of nature. In clarifying the concept of nature, Smith is forceful in his declaration of this influence, “MORE THAN ANY OTHER identifiable experience, the emergence of industrial capitalism is responsible for setting contemporary views
and visions of nature.” For Smith, as it was for Marx, it is important to realize that the concept of nature is always changing and always going through endless transformations. Man is always reworking and reimagining nature, and in doing so is also constantly reimagining himself. Thus, in a Marxian sense, man helps to make nature and nature makes man (this symbiotic relationship tends to go unnoticed or, in the very least, is severely undervalued within the capitalist ideology that Smith investigates, but it is active nonetheless). There is not one, singular conception of nature that pervades societies and time, but evolving conceptions of nature that are underpinned with an ideological base that has been informed by capitalism. This foundation consists of an essential dualism between a universal and external human relation to the natural world. It is this dualism that informs the current conception of nature.

The external conception of nature can be understood by examining the ways that science and labor processes interact with and perceive the natural world, from the beginnings of and through industrialization. The objectives of science and industry are internally linked, although this link has been obfuscated over time. For example, within the production process, all natural objects are viewed as potential commodities. Trees, oil, animals, metals, and other raw materials all hold potential value that can be extracted, commodified and sold; “human beings treat natural materials as external objects of labor to be worked up as commodities.” Science has a symbiotic relationship to industry in this process. Industry relies on science to develop “mechanical arts”, or ways of making the labor and extraction processes more efficient. Since science is, in part, responsible “for developing these ‘mechanical arts’ then it too must treat

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34 Smith notes that this relationship between productive activity and science is not as closely tied as they once were, at the start of the industrial revolution: “If, through mass industrial laboratories, science has been harnessed to industrial capitalism as never before, still, through pure research centers it has won some independence from direct productive needs” Ibid., 15.
35 Ibid.
nature as an external object.”\(^{36}\) Nature appears to exist in order to be consumed, to be managed and built upon, “it is the raw material from which society is built, the frontier which industrial capitalism continually pushes back.”\(^{37}\) Smith’s analysis demonstrates the intimate connection between human mental conceptions, modes of production, and technological advancement that Marx outlines in volume one of *Capital*.

A clear conception of nature as universal, where human beings are conceived as being every bit as natural as the objects that surround them, is juxtaposed against the external view of nature. In this universal conception, nature appears as something internal to human being. Again, Smith adheres to the development of Western scientific thought to support his argument. Earlier scientists, like Bacon and Newton, built their scientific theories on religious precepts. Bacon remained focused on the *essence* of objects, declaring, “‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ objects possessed the same kind of form and essence.”\(^{38}\) In the matter of *essence*, which is shared by all things, nature is universal. For Newton, the same universal concept appears in his idea of absolute space. Newton declared that it was time and space that was the “basic elements of human nature” and he identified this “absolute space” as the realm of god.\(^{39}\) Even if objects adhered to his physical laws, they were still subordinated to the universal realm in which they moved. Smith recognizes that the materiality of modern science also holds to this universal nature, where “the stuff of nature is matter; in its ‘nature,’ nature is material.”\(^{40}\)

In a subsection titled “Poetic Nature—American Landscape”, Smith provides an illuminating description of how these two conceptions of nature interact, support, and oppose one another. It is the depictions of external and universal nature, within this context, to which I

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\(^{36}\) Smith, *Uneven Development*, 15.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 11.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 16.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 17.
would like to pay special attention. The indelible image of the frontier is fundamental within the
grand narrative of U.S. expansion. In this image, the frontier forever expands westward as its
eastern borders continually shrink; the frontier is stable, but in constant readjustment. American
frontiersmen spread westward where they subdued nature and transplanted civilization in its
place. This image of the American frontier presents nature, and its natural inhabitants, as violent,
dangerous and savage. In fact, “The wilderness [appears as] the antithesis of civilization; it is
barren, terrible; even sinister, not just the home of the savage but his natural home.” In this
description nature is not only something external, but it is something that needs to be worked
on, controlled, and suppressed, in order to be reconciled with civilization. The inclusion of ‘the
savage’ as being analogous to the violent and terrible nature of the land, implicates that the
savage lacks just what the land lacks—civilization. It is the inability to extract wealth and
development from the land that contributes to the savage’s brutal and uncivilized state of being.
Also apparent is the dialectical relationship of co-constitution to which Smith and Marx point.
The Savage man is savage because he is the antithesis of civilization and the civilized man’s
notion of himself is clarified as his vision of himself is juxtaposed against the savage.

As the frontier was conquered nature came to be something that was no longer violent,
aggressive and dangerous but instead came to represent something beautiful and sacred. Leo
Marx adeptly recounts this transition, and the romantic image of the American pastoral, in his
work The Machine in the Garden. Marx’s analysis demonstrated how the idea of nature (as Other),
and the U.S.’s relation to it, shaped the dominant vision of the U.S. self. Nature categorized as a

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41 Smith, Uneven Development, 20.
42 A great deal of work, most famously done by Fanon, Cesaire, Sartre, and Edward Said has been done to explicate
this dialectical process of co-constitution and it has been integral to postcolonial theory. “In effect, we have just
seen that, contrary to widespread opinion, it is not the Jewish character that provokes anti-Semitism but, rather, that
it is the Anti-Semite who creates the Jew” (Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, 103).
43 Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964). In the work, Marx analyses the
juxtaposition between the image of North America as a Garden of Eden, and the growing industrialized
development that came to define its emergence as a nation. Marx navigates how the tension between dominant
romantic pastoral images (Henry David Thoreau, Walden), and the inextricable growth of industry.
type of Other, helped to define a particular notion of self. This view of the self then justified the treatment and attitude towards the Other.

Now that nature was tamed it could become romanticized. It is helpful to narrate this progression as a linear process but it is constantly and presently carried out in a circular juxtaposition, always moving, always being reinforced. Smith is careful to note, that universal and external nature while distinct still came to share the same plane of existence. In one aspect, this romantic ideal holds the idea of nature as external to human civilization. It was something that one left, and still leaves, the home and the city to go view, “Vacations into the wilderness became fashionable…backwoods sporting became popular, and summer camps took urban schoolchildren into the supposedly virtuous environment of raw nature.” This idealistic ‘back to nature’ movement also displays the universal view of nature, where people revisited and continue to visit nature to rediscover part of themselves—to become whole again. Nature became a spiritual place, the true domain of god, where the universality of nature and humanity could be discovered. As Smith notes, while some differences abound, a great deal of resonance connects this spiritually touristic view of nature and the god infused Newtonian science. This development in the idea of nature is critical, as it underscores how the two seemingly contradictory notions of external and universal nature continually run into one another. The two conceptions are not held in independent isolation. Rather, they blend together to create a disjointed totality. Within this totality nature exists apart from society as a realm of being fundamentally at odds with human civilization. Yet, nature also remains integral to human spiritual development and connects human beings to their ontological roots.

Ultimately, Smith comes to the same conclusion as Marx, which is: our understanding of nature is a social product. Meaning, the popular conception of nature is the result of historical
struggles, evolving social relationships, spontaneous creations of new technologies, and aims of power. The danger is that large segments of a society are often unaware of the social aspect inherent in concept formation and over time these concepts become naturalized and unquestioned. The Western human conception of nature is then the result not simply of an ‘objective’ reality brought into focus with a priori reasoning and objective, scientific reflection. The conception of nature is in great part also the result of changing technologies, modes of production, social relations, and how society lives out its day-to-day life. This historical and political influence dissipates from the social consciousness and the pieces of that social consciousness become embedded in dominant conceptions. Indeed, this is Nietzsche’s classic critique of Kantian reasoning, “he [humanity] posited ‘things’ as possessing being according to his own image… No wonder he later always discovered in things that which he had put into them.”

Smith draws attention to the social and political significance that is attached to this process of naturalization. The external conception of nature was used as an initial justification to conquer and subdue nature, while the universal conception has worked to naturalize not only the common understanding of nature, but also its internalization of the other aspects of social and political society:

The overriding function of the universal conception today is to invest certain social behaviors with the status of natural events by which is meant that these behaviors and characteristics are normal, God-given, unchangeable. Competition, profit, war, private property, sexism, heterosexism, racism, the existence of have and have-nots or of “chiefs and Indians” —the list is endless—all are deemed natural. Nature, not human history, is made responsible.

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Here, Smith offers his most powerful insight; nature is made responsible for the treatment that humanity inflicts upon it. There is a sense of inevitability, or the idea that things must be this way. It is inescapable. A certain logic becomes internalized and defines future treatment and Western civilization’s relation to nature. During this diffuse internalization the internal logic deepens its roots and obfuscates its origins. This relation is not devoid of power; it is not idle. This “ideology of nature” grounded in a convoluted and dichotomous conception of nature, works to serve and benefit a particular segment of society. Thus, this conception benefits a particular societal organization and reflects the values and logic of that structure.

This analysis culminates in the notion that even a society’s most basic, and seemingly innocent conceptions, are infused with values that serve a certain end. There is always an ideological weight attached. Shifting the analysis back to the image of the Native American Other, this realization carries even more weight. The history of how the U.S. conceived of the Native American Other should not be seen simply as how dominant perception evolved along some imaginary line of linear progress. It should be asked for what purpose and for whose benefit did changes in perception take place? The following sections explore how changing imaginings of the Native American Other often served new ends that came about as the U.S. developed as a nation. As well as how the U.S.’s self image developed.

2.3 U.S. Settlement and the Construction of the Native American Other

This section draws the analysis back to the issue of land acquisition by the U.S, and the image of the Native American Other that was used to justify this acquisition. The issue will be taken up again in Chapter 3, but here the analysis centers on how this initial period of settlement occurred. Initial European settlement of North America saw the cementation of the binary relationship of White, colonial self, and Indian Other that persists to this day. The formation of

48 Smith, Uneven Development, 29.
basic binary relations helped to establish a hierarchical power structure that posited white, colonial interests as superior to Indigenous sovereignty and land claims. It is important to note, that while the form of the binary has changed throughout U.S. history the relation of power that it protects has not. This is the power of the conceptual schizophrenia, it allows for a tremendous amount of adaptability (similar to the conception of nature) that can be realigned to fit new modes and standards of discourse. This historical change in form will be analyzed in chapter 3, but this section focuses on its ontological roots.

17th and 18th century U.S. settlement occurred along the eastern coast of North America, with large-scale westward expansion occurring at the end of the 18th and throughout the 19th century. The initial colonial period saw the establishment of informal towns and the initial development of the notion of private property. The small-scale idiosyncratic establishments of private property that came to dot the eastern coast of the colonial U.S. were buttressed by the large-scale land theft that occurred, often violently with early settlement and westward expansion. This process of land acquisition was justified by the U.S. government’s initial reliance on the Doctrine of Discovery, as well as the early decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. As Vine Deloria Jr. notes, since the founding of the U.S. “the federal government stole some two billion acres of land and continues to take what it can without arising the ire of the ignorant public.”

One of the first government policies of the United States was the doctrine of “the Savage as the Wolf”, which was proffered by George Washington. The doctrine characterized the Indigenous peoples of North America as irrevocably savage, and as fundamentally opposed to Western civilization. Robert A. Williams Jr. argues that Washington viewed Native Americans as “bestial, war-loving savages, and should be dealt with as a matter of U.S. policy.”

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50 Williams Jr., Like a Loaded Weapon, 40.
the Forest which will return as soon as the pursuit is at an end and fall perhaps on those that are left there.”

Therefore, Washington sought a plan of treaty negotiation, which would allow for the needed appropriation of land, while also hopefully leading to the total disappearance of the Native population. The doctrine of “the Savage as the Wolf” was the first official Indian policy of a nascent United States.

As the image of an American nation was beginning to take shape, these first encounters with the Indigenous peoples of North America helped to constitute the original idea of the U.S. as white Anglo-Saxon bastion of liberty. The point that I would like to stress is that in these early national conceptions the U.S. assumed a position of nationhood very much in opposition to a colonized Other. Part of what constituted U.S. sovereignty and rule was its stark juxtaposition, and superiority, to the native population. Indeed this is the mode of thinking that Chief Justice John Marshall utilized to justify U.S. land rights in “the most important Indian rights opinion ever issued by any court of law in the United States”, Johnson v. McIntosh (1823). In justification of U.S. land appropriation Chief Justice Marshall cited the doctrine of discovery, which relied on the concept of empty land (meaning if land was being used ‘productively’ then it was free for the taking), or terra nullius. In the opinion Marshall writes:

The United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that great broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country. They hold, and assert themselves, the title by which it was acquired. They maintain, as all others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest.

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51 Williams Jr., Like a Loaded Weapon, 42.
52 Ibid., 45.
53 Ibid., 51.
54 Johnson v McIntosh, 21 U.S. 573 (1823).
Through this ruling Marshall justifies and codifies U.S. land rights, but he also subtly erects a vision of the U.S. self and what the U.S. holds itself to be as a nation. Cook-Lynn, in arguing against the legal reasoning of the case, suggests that Marshall’s logic represents nothing more than the court trying to justify behavior retroactively. The motivation for early colonial settlement and theft of land from Indigenous populations, as seen in the small settlements of that established property rights in New England and the capital instincts for primitive accumulation (to be addressed in chapter 3), were largely driven by avarice and power. Here we see Marshall performing what Nietzsche prescribed as the conflation between motive and belief. With Nietzsche’s critique in mind, I come to a similar conclusion as Cook-Lynn; that Marshall’s decision should not be taken as a move to justify U.S. settlement (the need to make open land productive), but rather as a retroactive establishment of a certain belief in the validity of U.S. nationhood. This early binary relation between a sovereign U.S. and landless American Indians helped to constitute the early conceptual framework through which both nation and the colonial Other came to be viewed. This thread of U.S. settlement is picked up again in Chapter 3.

2.4 An Ideology of the Other and the Making of the U.S. imaginary

"The Colonizing mind has not gone away"

Certain parallels become readily apparent when the model set forth by Marx, and appropriated by Smith, is used to examine the evolution of the image of the Colonial Other, specifically in regards to U.S. discourses dealing with the image of the Native American Other. First, the same external/universal dualism that has marked Western conceptions of nature is also

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57 Williams Jr., Savage Anxieties (2012) provides a tight analysis on how the idea of Savage has been used by Western societies since Greek Antiquity in order to justify treatments of Indigenous peoples throughout the world. In regards to its use in U.S. historical discourses Williams’ demonstrates how the exclusion of the Savage Indian Other was used to help erect a particular image of U.S. democracy, civility, and exceptionalism.
visible in the predominant images of the Native American Other. The second point of congruency, and perhaps less apparent, is the influence of technology, new social relations, and capital development on shaping new forms of the Other. Lastly, this section demonstrates how examining this discourse in detail can reveal the internal cultural logic that has become naturalized in concepts and modes of representation.

Within the scholarly tradition of Indigeneity, there is a debate regarding the extent to which Western theoretical frameworks can be used to understand Indigenous conceptual frameworks and traditions. In an essay titled, “Hopi Culture and a Matter of Representation,” Lomayumtewa C. Ishii addressed this issue and attempts to utilize the framework offered by Edward Said in, *Orientalism*, to understand the nature of the discourse between the Hopi and 19th and 20th century U.S. settlers. To best stay true to Ishii’s intentions, a deeper exploration of Said’s arguments is necessary. Once this understanding is established, the focus will return to how Ishii’s utilized Said’s model to understand the U.S. discourse surrounding the Hopi. The analysis will appropriate the importance that Ishii puts on Said’s notion of the *cultural archive*, and also push Ishii’s work past its original intent, and focus on the role of capital development. This focus will provide a precise model of investigation to be utilized in chapter 3.

This section analyzes how nations come to conceive themselves, or create a dominant national self-conscious, through a process of orientation towards other cultures, states, and nations. In *Orientalism*, Said examined the historical discourse of how the West (specifically Britain, France, and the 20th century U.S.) perceived the Near and Middle East. For Said, Orientalism developed as a discourse of power that allowed the West to perpetually designate and create the Oriental as Other. A fundamental argument in Said’s work is that the Orient was a creation of the West that served to not only exercise varying modes (physical, political, psychological) of control over the disparate cultures and people occupying the territory
designated as the Orient, but that it also served to construct a particular image of the West. Secondly, for the Westerner the image of the Oriental represented something fundamentally external and juxtaposed to European sentimentality, but yet possessed pieces of human universality. For the Orientalist, the Orient represented a mysterious and often-backward space, yet it held sources of great wisdom and knowledge; knowledge that was developed in great ancient civilizations and since lost to time. It was then up to the European to recover this knowledge for the benefit of not only the Oriental but for all of humanity. Thus, the Orient became a “geographical space to be cultivated, harvested, and guarded.”

Ishii draws on these themes of Said in order to argue that a similar imperialist discourse developed towards the Hopi. It is important to note that nations construct an understanding of themselves, and the Other, through a historical succession of discursive practices. Ishii argues that through anthropological, academic, and popular representations of the Hopi, the U.S. developed and cultivated, “a cultural archive…[that became] the banner for metropolitan expansion and nineteenth-century political, economic, and intellectual ideology and authority in the American Southwest.”

Ishii’s argument is reminiscent of the type of psychological colonization that Ngugi Wa Thiong’o analyzed in his work Decolonizing the Mind (1986). For Thiong’o, and Ishii, mental colonization works to first devalue the myriad facets of the colonized culture, while then elevating the cultural practices of the colonizers. Ishii presents a powerful and cogent argument that highlights an Orientalist type discourse surrounding the Hopi that has been prevalent in the U.S. However, beyond the overall merits of the piece, I wish to focus on the idea of a cultural archive and how it is perpetuated. This focus will reveal the type of layering of an internal logic, which Marx spoke about, and Neil Smith adopted to analyze the Western conception of nature.

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59 Ishii, In Native Historians Write Back, 52-53.
This analysis will show how a particular logic is symbiotically cultivated (through the web of interactions that Marx focused on) and internalized not only in a society’s mental conceptions, but also through its social, scientific, political, and economic structures. Just as a particular view of nature justifies (and often necessitates) the treatment of it, so too is a constructed view of the Native American Other produced in order to justify a similar treatment.

Central to Said’s notion of Orientalism is that it is not simply carried out, or maintained, through simple acts of representation, whether it is political or cultural. It is not an ideology that is simply alive in literature or political discourses. In Sartre’s nomenclature, Orientalism is alive within and throughout a society. Said is explicit in this point:

> Yet none of the Orient is merely imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles. 61

In essence, Orientalism does not simply rest in human mental conceptions, but it lives and breathes new life within and through social institutions and structures. Orientalism is produced, reproduced, and naturalized within the diverse set of social structures and institutions of Western European (and later, American) society. Individuals in that society, whether it is through art and literature or political activity, express the logic of the discourse without awareness. It is the same type of normalization that Smith spoke to in regards to Western conceptions of nature.

This process of normalization creates a pattern of thought, behavior, and social relations that escape public scrutiny and become routinized. Ishii is also concerned with this process of

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61 Said, Orientalism, 2.
normalization. Ishii states that the U.S. discourse that centered on Hopi culture, portrayed the Hopi as “culturally, socially, and intellectually inferior” and that these “stereotypes have assumed documented authenticity in the consciousness of the general public.”62 This is a similar argument to Said’s. Like Said, such a bold statement puts the onus on Ishii to demonstrate how the public consciousness becomes to be dominated in such a way. The basic question is then ‘how does such a process take place that leads to such a ubiquitous and deep normalization?’ Ishii’s answer to this question is that it must take place in a variety of discursive modes and structures. It is the collective resources and activity produced in and through these structures that creates the cultural archive.

Ishii first turns to late 19th and early 20th century literature and travel writings in order to elucidate the most fundamental expressions of the cultural archive used to encapsulate the Hopi. Collectively, these popularized forms of representation worked to create a “separation or otherness that [was] both inviting and repulsive.”63 This archive worked to exoticize and denigrate Hopi culture for readers of the literature. For textual support, Ishii turns to the John G. Bourke’s 1884 travelogue (one of the first non-academic accounts of the Hopi), The Snake Dance of the Moquis of Arizona, which reads like an adventure novel full of danger, suspense, discovery, and the insatiable quest for a piece of humanity stuck in time. Bourke defines his motivation as such: “their religion, system of government, apparel, manufactures… appeal to the curiosity or sympathy of almost every class of travelers, archeologists, divines, men of letters, or ordinary sight-seers.”64 Bourke sets the notion that the Moquis (original Spanish designation) were not only a people to be pitied, but that they were also somehow a different section of humanity that necessitated study from a variety of angles. Bourke sets two important aspects of

62 Ishii, In Native Historians Write Back, 53.
63 Ibid., 58.
64 Ibid., 55.
the cultural archive in motion. The first is the notion that communication and understanding moves in one direction. The Moquis could not understand or communicate their own culture and traditions and therefore it must be left to a Western (enlightened) translator. The second aspect is that the reader could leave civilization and enter a cultural state of savagery and otherness. The exotic Other was strictly opposed to U.S. civilization, and yet it could be visited upon and understood without leaving one’s home. The Moquis were made to be instantly accessible and knowable and this knowledge (and the logic used to create it) became ingrained, supported, and developed through the movement of U.S. social and political structures.

Bourke’s work, and his focus on the exotic ritual of the Hopi snake dance, reflects a type of understanding that had long been present in U.S. discourses of the Native American Other. Bourke wrote of the same savagery and danger embodied within the Hopi that George Washington and U.S. court systems espoused. Portraying the eminent perils of his journey into Hopi territory, Bourke wrote:

> Our note-books were gripped tightly in one hand, and our sharpened pencils in the other, the theory of our advance being that, with boldness and celerity, we might gain an entrance and jot down a few memoranda of value before the preoccupied savages could discover and expel us.  

Bourke’s words reflect a common attitude in the feeling of leaving civilization for the dangerous but perhaps rewarding unknown of savage land. Ishii argues the cultural archive that had developed surrounding the Native American Other was internalized and reflexively used by Bourke. In doing so he helped to begin a cultural archive of the Hopi Other: “the cultural

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65 Quoted in Ishii, 55.
archive had become so entrenched in the American mind that it was almost natural for a man like Bourke to represent the other in the manner in which he did.\textsuperscript{66}

The following chapter will investigate the larger cultural archive and how it historically developed, but here I will pay attention to other facets of development that helped to drive and manufacture the cultural archive surrounding the Hopi. Bourke helped to create a \textit{Hopiland} that was a destination and culture of intrigue, and could be visited from a distance. Said argued that the \textit{Orient} was a creation of the West, and so to did \textit{Hopiland} become an “invention of the Anglophones.”\textsuperscript{67} The needs of expansion and development helped to move interest of the Hopi past casual or academic study and into the realm of tourism. Bourke’s work and others who followed in his footsteps helped to spur interest in people like Earle R. Forrest, who said, “[a]fret reading this [the academic section of the cultural archive] I became so enthused that I made up my mind I would someday witness this strange Indian Dance.”\textsuperscript{68} Arizona, and the Hopi people, became the interest of U.S. citizens seeking the last romantic frontier.

Interest in Hopi culture moved beyond the aesthetic appeal of literature and travel writings and into the physical movement of bodies into Hopi territory. As the age of U.S. expansion was culminating in the settling of the West coast, the U.S. needed to initiate a movement of accessibility and desire. The issue of accessibility to the arid deserts of the Southwest necessitated railroads, developments, and access to water, “[i]nitally trails, road systems, and waterways and then railroads enabled people to reach once distant land in relatively short time and in relative comfort. Hopiland was not out of reach for personal investigation of these ‘strange’ people.”\textsuperscript{69} The needs of territorial expansion, capitalist development, and imperial control all converged around the same logic of the external/universal Other. Here the U.S.

\textsuperscript{66} Ishii, \textit{In Native Historians Write Back}, 55. My own emphasis.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{68} Quoted in Ishii, 57.
\textsuperscript{69} Ishii, \textit{In Native Historians Write Back}, 57.
conceptions of nature and the Native American Other share a very similar discursive space. First, there was a created territory of exclusion that justified violent domination and suppression that was often motivated by representing each as violent, capricious, and opposed to civilization. Second, the universal conception permitted a level of romanticism that allowed for areas of protection and human (white settlers) connection. In the early 20th century, and now, white tourists visit national parks and Native American reservations to visit and recover a piece of spiritual sustenance.

What Ishii’s examination reveals is the multilayered entrenchment of a particular way of thinking about the Other, which becomes manifest not only in mental conceptions but also in the ways that U.S. society organizes production, social structures, and economic drives. This is not to suggest that the movement is one directional, that racist and stereotypical representations of the Other arise spontaneously and then become reflected in social relations, structures, and institutions. It is to say that economic development, new technologies, and mental conceptions feed off one another and reverberate a certain logic that becomes internalized. Here, Smith’s point concerning normalization is quite profound and applicable, “The overriding function of the universal conception today is to invest certain social behaviors with the status of natural events by which is meant that these behaviors and characteristics are normal, God-given, unchangeable.”

Ishii is less concerned with explicating this type of multifaceted relationship between discursive elements, but it remains latent in his analysis, “The United States could foster a ‘national treasure’ as well as enable the railroads to capitalize on this opportunity.” The natural logic underpinning mental conceptions, economic structures, usages of technology, and social relations all become one-dimensional.

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70 Neil Smith, Uneven Development, 29.
71 Ishii, In Native Historians Write Back, 57.
2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has functioned to demonstrate how the theoretical model offered by Marx, and adapted by Smith, can be utilized to examine the discourse of the Native American Other. Smith’s analysis served as a jumping off point to engage the dominant U.S. discourse of the Native American Other. This point of comparison was chosen for two main reasons. The first reason is the existence of a parallel conceptual relationship, (Western self and nature/the U.S. self and the Indian Other) which is represented by a similar external and universal dichotomy. Second, Smith showed how this type of conceptual apparatus is driven by outside forces, often, capital development. The logic concerning our mental conceptions, and other social and economic elements, become naturalized. The end of the chapter looked at Lomayumtewa C. Ishii’s analysis of the U.S. discourse that developed around Hopi culture. Ishii borrows Said’s notion of a cultural archive to demonstrate how a discourse is naturalized and embedded in a variety of forces and structures.

The next chapter is informed by this theoretical base and examines the larger discursive history of the Native American Other within the U.S. Similar to Smith, it will rely on the examination on the relationship between capital development and the construction of mental conceptions. Chapter 3 will trace the movement of the image of the Native American Other through U.S. history. It will examine three periods of settlement (also examined in 2.3), expansion, and entrenchment. While these periods are represented as temporally distinct, they can often be represented as the form of how a discourse becomes cemented in a cultural self-conscious. The chapter also looks at how the U.S. built its self-image through the construction of the Native American Other. Lastly, the chapter examines how the conceptualization of the Native American Other has evolved and developed into the contemporary schizophrenic form.
Chapter Three

Explicating the *Conceptual Schizophrenia* Marking the Native American Other and the Imagining of the U.S. Self

The relationship between Indigenous Peoples and the State has remained colonial to its foundations.
~ **Glen Sean Coulthard**, *Red Skin, White Masks* (2014)

We must instead ask why Western politics first constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life. What is the relation between politics and life, if life presents itself as what is included by means of an exclusion?

3.1 Introduction

The United States appears as a nation existing, and founded, in paradox. In concurrence, Elizabeth Cook-Lynn suggests the United States functions as “an imperialist nation invading weaker countries for their resources using the cover that it is democracy it is seeking.”\(^{72}\) This current dichotomous position of the U.S. can be traced back to its ontological roots. The U.S. simultaneously liberated itself from England and worked to expunge North America’s Indigenous population from their ancestral homelands, in order to acquire land for settlement and capital development. Resting at the center of this foundational, yet active, juxtaposition is the tension between what Nietzsche identified as the historical motives of action and the “belief people had in this or that motive, i.e. what humanity has imagined and told itself to be the real lever of its conduct so far.”\(^{73}\) This belief in a self-identified motive becomes represented in what Hayden White called “master tropes,” where recurrent and powerful themes are then utilized to

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\(^{72}\) Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, *A Separate Country*, 56.

construct a plot that presents a progressive and narrative national history. This national history becomes embedded in the collective unconscious of the nation. A national self-conscious develops that embodies values, events, and desires that can be juxtaposed against an external Other.

Within dominant U.S. political discourse a similar paradoxical positioning has collectively plagued the Indigenous populations of North America. The disparate Indigenous peoples of what is now U.S. territory have been collectively plagued by what J. Marshall Beier classifies as “an odd sort of conceptual schizophrenia that takes on a unitary form in the idea of the ‘noble savage.’” It is a simultaneous pejorative and reverential view of the colonial Other that has been operationalized and continually developed, given ever greater nuance, since early colonial settlement. It justifies a variety of ends from land and resource appropriation to contemporary romanticized cultural commoditization.

This chapter engages a brief historical analysis of the development of capital from U.S. colonial settlement through the 20th century. It examines how the dominant conceptual framing of the Native American Other evolved into the contemporary conceptual schizophrenic iteration, through the evolving needs of capital. Beyond this it focuses on how the justification for land appropriation, from early settlement to 20th century infrastructure projects, also changed alongside the views of the nation and the Native American Other. The chapter attends to what I identify as three distinct periods of evolution in this discursive history of the U.S.: early settlement, westward expansion, and third, the present period of entrenchment. To focus the analysis, the chapter briefly examines the early settlement period through the legal history of justification of land acquisition and Karl Marx’s idea of primitive accumulation. The chapter then moves to the issue of water rights, and the widespread implementation of private property rights that began to emerge in the mid 19th century (as part of westward expansion). Finally, this chapter analyzes the

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stage of *entrenchment*. The idea of *entrenchment* aims to understand how the U.S. has established its sovereignty, as well as claims to land and resources, through internal development projects, such as infrastructure projects. It speaks to how the U.S. has consolidated itself internally, while also working to engrain and obfuscate the tentacles of power that exist within U.S. Empire. Here I focus my analysis on an understanding of Empire that is put forth by Hardt and Negri in their work *Empire*.\textsuperscript{76} This analysis ultimately serves to demonstrate how the *schizophrenic* view of North American Indigenous peoples serves the perpetually changing needs of U.S. capital development.

### 3.2 Primitive Accumulation and Foundational Images

As previously discussed in section 2.3, initial colonial settlement of the east coast of North America necessitated the acquisition of large tracts of land and the expulsion of Indigenous populations. In this section, I utilize Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation in order to analyze how this process occurred and the pertinent political effects. David Harvey concisely defines primitive accumulation as the, “taking [of] land, say enclosing it, and expelling a resident population to create a landless proletariat, and then releasing the land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation.”\textsuperscript{77} From this definition two aspects appear necessary for the process of primitive accumulation to occur and for future capital accumulation; the first is the expulsion of people from previously held land, and the second is the establishment of private property. The establishment of private property is crucial for the ability of large-scale, capitalist agricultural and industrial projects to develop, for private property severs the laborer from his or her land and allows for the appropriation of labor by the capitalist class, “[p]rivate property, as the antithesis to social, collective property, exists only where the means of labor and the external


conditions of labor belong to private individuals."\(^{78}\) It is also important to note that this process of land dispossession, which is vitally necessary for primitive accumulation, is often achieved through violence and brutality, "it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part [in primitive accumulation]."\(^{79}\) While Marx occasionally overstated the reliance of violence in the general history of capital accumulation, it has certainly been optimized throughout U.S. history. Lastly, this idea of 'force' should also be understood as the utilization of political force and coercion, which a brief foray into the early decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court will help to further elucidate.

The recent literature on Indigeneity has focused a great deal of attention on the issue of land, both in regards to the colonial legacy of land appropriation, but also in reference to ongoing issues of U.S. federal incursions on Indigenous sovereignty, attempts to regain lost land and to protect current land and resource rights. Elizabeth Cook-Lynn cogently articulates what has been and is currently at stake in regards to Indigenous peoples relationship to land, "[h]undreds of thousands of acres of land and uncounted resources are squandered and stolen by state interests and mainstream looters, while thousands of tribal citizens live in dire poverty. The tribes’...future lies in the land."\(^{80}\) Here Cook-Lynn underscores the crux of the issue; the Euro-American and Indigenous relationship is and always has been about access to land. Vine Deloria Jr. echoes this analysis, "in every case the goal was identical: land."\(^{81}\) The following section will analyze this issue of land appropriation through the lens and motive of primitive accumulation. This initial analysis will then be used to situate the arguments and logic used by

\(^{78}\) Karl Marx, *Capital Vol. 1*, 927.
\(^{79}\) Ibid., 874.
\(^{81}\) Deloria Jr., *Custer Died for Your Sins*, 51. This focus on land should not be taken as an attempt to override the importance of struggles over civil rights or more localized struggles that focus on activities such as whaling and hunting. Nor is it meant to exoticise an "Indigenous" relationship or conception of land. Rather, it is to point to the plane in which all these subsequent struggles emerged. The primacy of land, and the attempts of the U.S. government and agencies to acquire tribal land, underpins historical and contemporary struggles.
Chief Justice John Marshall in his rulings against Native American land rights, which heavily relied on framing the notion of the doctrine of discovery within a racist language of Native American savagery, as well as cultural, racial, and epistemological inferiority.

The idea of primitive accumulation requires the creation of both large tracts of land held by a few and the creation of a wage-labor class. Early colonial settlement in North America often accomplished these two facets of primitive accumulation on divergent paths. The settler colonial project functions a bit differently than an industrializing project, where the latter works to destabilize a national population. In U.S. history, a large temporal gap exists between the constitution of private property and the large-scale production of a wage-labor class. There are several reasons for this temporal gap, which cannot be fully elucidated here, beyond the fact that the frontier, and the continual development of new land and property allowed for a great deal of sustained individual independence. This type of landed independence would eventually come to a relative end with the establishment of industrial cities and the settling of the frontier.

Land dispossession was an integral step in the process of colonial settlement of the Northeastern coasts of North America. The production of large tracts of privatized land was fundamental to the early colonial project, “Colonial powers have always deprived indigenous peoples of their riches and their very lives because Natives often inhabit a world too plentiful and desirable to be resisted by aggressive, needy dominators.”

William Cronon’s work Changes in the Land provides an apt lens through which to view the acquisition and privatization of Indigenous lands in early Colonial New England. Cronon explains that the Indigenous populations of New England lived on recurring life cycles where the people moved with the seasons and efforts were made to never overwork the land. This type of life-process was incompatible both with settler ideas of society, and also the needs of privatization and primitive

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capital development. The European settlers were able to establish ideas of land rights and acquisition through permanent settlements, “once a village was established, its improvements—cleared fields, pastures, buildings, fences, and so on, were regarded as more or less fixed features of the landscape.” Cronon’s emphasis on the idea of fixity is vital in understanding how the colonists acquired land, and also how that land was incorporated into capitalist projects. This fixation and permanence of place was one of the first steps taken that allowed for primitive accumulation.

However, it is crucial to note that the dispossession of land is a perpetual project for capitalism. Capitalism must continuously find new avenues for exploitation, often through geographical and technological changes. Capital cannot abide a limit and as a result land is continually appropriated throughout capitalist history. Frantz Fanon realized this pattern, writing:

Colonialism almost never exploits the entire country [at least initially]. It is content with extracting natural resources and exporting them to the metropolitan industries thereby enabling a specific sector to grow relatively wealthy, while the rest of the colony continues, or rather sinks, into underdevelopment and poverty.

Here Fanon speaks to the continuous cycle of primitive accumulation. Marx viewed primitive accumulation as a distinct early temporal period of capitalism, but Fanon was attuned to the perpetuity of the process. Capitalism must incessantly seek new territories for expansion.

Systems put in place during African colonization, which Fanon had in mind, and U.S.

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84 Of course this is only part of the story of primitive accumulation in North America. The dispossession of Native Land coincided with the boom of the southern cotton industry, which saw huge stockpiles of wealth accumulated through the exploitation of slave labor. For a thorough analysis on that subject see Baptist, *The Half Has Never Been Told* (2014).

85 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 106.
colonization in North America often functioned very differently. However, the larger pattern of one area of concentrated exploitation leading to massive gains of wealth by a small elite, while much of the Indigenous population toils in poverty remained similar. New areas of wealth are continually sought, and former areas of the country once thought un-useful are suddenly found rich for development and exploitation; the cycle exists in unremitting regeneration (this process, while historical, remains an ongoing one). This drive for new sources of capital accumulation manifested itself in the development of water rights and sovereignty struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries.

3.3 Expansion: Water Rights and Reimagining the Native American Other

The need for water rights, or codes, was driven by miners and farmers who moved into the arid western regions of the expanding U.S. and were in competition with the varying tribes in the region, especially the Navajo, over access to water. The same theoretical framework that was developed by Marshall (Indian Savagery and terra nullius) was utilized to dictate who would have control over water. However, two noteworthy distinctions should be addressed. The first, and the most obvious, is that the battle for access to land had shifted from fights over vast tracts of land (although this was still obviously occurring) to battles over resources. The second distinction is that this need for water was driven, at least partially, by a new need for larger tracts of private property. The types of private property that existed in early New England represented early stages of private property, where the worker was not yet divorced from his or her labor and product. Westward expansion saw the need for dams, large-scale agriculture and mining and thus a later stage of private property was required. Marx describes this later stage as the “transformation of the individualized and scattered means of production into socially concentrated means of production, therefore, of the dwarf-like property of the many into the
The debate had moved past notions of accessibility and security (holding back the *Indian Savages*) and into areas of production and development.

The development of influential capital is clearly noted in the language used to justify the initial settler claims of water rights to miners, farmers, and other U.S. expansionists. David Getches noted the new distinction as such:

Rights, then, belong to anyone who puts water to a “beneficial use” anywhere with superiority over anyone who later begins using water. Unlike riparian law, it depends on usage and not on land ownership. Once a person puts water to a beneficial use and complies with any statutory requirements, a water right is perfected and remains valid so long as it continues to be used.\(^{87}\)

Here a type of *terra nullius* justification is apparent. It is only when the water is put to use, when it is being consumed productively, that one can lay claim to it. Beyond this, there are obvious problems with who gets to set the boundaries of what defines productive or beneficial. It is a discourse that privileges the capitalist/expansionist development that was occurring and excluded the Indigenous populations who did not share the ideas of capital and resource development. Beyond the individual wants and desires of the individual farmers and miners, their expansionist efforts helped to legitimize and propel the mass appropriation of land and resources that occurred in the West and Southwest from the mid 1800’s onward. These individual efforts precipitated much larger systematic and structural changes, such as the damming and diversion of river flows (for irrigation purposes) that were brought by capitalist expansion.

The early securing of water rights in the West, specifically over the Colorado River, were diffuse and uncoordinated battles between private companies, individuals, and new States that

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\(^{86}\) Marx, *Capital Vol. 1*, 928.

were drawing claims to the river based on the idea of ‘beneficial use’. From the 1840’s and into the 20th century there developed an entangled and intricate set of laws and codes that required mediation from the federal government. Part of this mediation (at least in regards to the water rights of Native Americans) was argued over in Winter’s v United States (1908). In the West, water rights had largely been subject to the type of beneficial use appropriation that Getches noted. This meant that just because one lived on the land, it did not give them legal rights to the water. This became a point of issue for Indigenous people, especially those moved onto reservations where the water rights had often already been determined (often settlers would move close to Native American settlements and reservations, where they would build dams and divert water. They would cite appropriation rights due to the fact that the tribes had not put the water to beneficial use). The Winter’s decision was meant to clarify that ambiguity.88

Ultimately the Winter’s decision granted water rights to the reservation; the decision specifically focused on the Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana. The basic argument given in the decision was that Native Americans needed to develop and progress into civilization. This of course required access to water. This is one of many decisions that is counted as a ‘win’ for Indian rights in the U.S. but the resulting arguments and actions drawn from its reasoning have pernicious consequences. The most apparent is that the decision was often simply ignored by settlers and the ruling was difficult to enforce. The decision is also representative of a larger movement that relocated Native American rights into a more ambiguous space that framed these rights within an inside/outside dichotomy. The dominant discourse understood the tribes as having the potential for development. The tribes needed the benevolent hand of U.S. resource allocation to help them along and bring them into modernity. Progress was something diagnosed and conferred by the U.S. onto Indigenous societies and bodies. A secondary problem is that the

88 Getches, Water in a Nutshell, 308-315.
act never specified how much water to which the tribes were entitled, a problem that was
amplified by the placement of the U.S. government as the sole mediating force.

The water history of the western U.S. is a long and complicated history. This snippet of
that history shows the shifting of the discourse regarding U.S. law and Indian rights. It moved
from an exclusionary and suppressive doctrine and morphed into a semi-inclusive discourse that
began to feign concern for Native American development that maintained an effect of exclusion
and otherness. As the conceptual image of the Native American Other began to take on more
nuance, so too did the image of the United States. The Native American Other was conceived as
not only pejoratively Other, but also as simplistic and childlike. Within this line of thinking,
Native Americans lacked the education and values that would allow them to develop and
become ingratiated into Western civilization. This development can be seen as influencing the
overly sympathetic and paternalistic conception that seems to influence the common
contemporary schizophrenic view. The idea of nation also began to change, where the raison d'être
of the nation was not orientated to dominate and suppress, but rather to educate and protect. In
these instances, U.S. courts and discourse helped to classify the settlers not as colonists, but as
dispatchers of development and economic possibility. U.S. political discourse represented a drive
to continually settle and develop the continent, and aimed to bring the possibility of prosperity to
the Indigenous populations. Here Cook-Lynn’s description of a paradoxical U.S. is evident,
where the U.S. despite massive incursions into and appropriations of Native land still saw itself
as a beacon of democracy and freedom.

The Dawes Act (1887), which regulated land ownership along individual citizenship
rather than tribal affiliations, was concomitantly imposed alongside the establishment of
privatized water rights. The aim of the Dawes act was similar to the effect of water rights: land
dispossession through the establishment of private property. In 1887 Native American tribes still
‘owned’ 135 million acres of land; the Dawes act aimed to bring Native Americans into the cycle of private property where the land could be worked and sold. As Vine Deloria Jr. describes, “the basic idea of the Allotment (Dawes) Act was to make the Indian conform to the social and economic structure of rural America by vesting him with private property.” The act stated that the collective land held by the tribes should be divided among their members, where each would receive 160 acres, and the surplus would be open for sale to white settlers (another condition was that Native Americans could sell their individual plots of land after 25 years). The end result was the loss of almost 90 million acres of tribal land by 1934.

This represents the continuous cycle of primitive accumulation that begins in the phase of settlement and reoccurs in the various phases of expansion. Marx judges this initial act as carrying the same weight “as original sin does in theology.” However, a major difference seems to be that in Christianity original sin is not so easily evaded in the historical narrative. U.S. historians are incredibly reticent to engage with this component of Colonial history and grapple with the consequences. The national narrative of the U.S. as a colonial enforcer does not seem to be part of the master tropes of U.S. history. If it is addressed at all, it is made to seem that the U.S. has moved passed its colonial roots. It has been the goal of Indigenous scholarship to reassert the importance of this narrative, both for the self-representation of the U.S. as nation, but also for better understanding the past and ongoing colonization of Native Americans within the borders of the U.S. Indeed, the U.S. colonial project has never ceased, “Americans have never relinquished their colonial posture toward the tribal nations, but instead continue to manipulate them and extract their resources.” It seems that the U.S. is able to distance itself from its

89 Deloria Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins, 46.  
90 Ibid.  
91 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 873.  
92 Susan A. Miller and James Riding In, Native Historians Write Back (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2011), 33.
paradoxical positioning by shifting the discourse away from motive, legal arguments, and politics and towards (as Vine Deloria Jr. suggested) a master trope inspired narrative of the \textit{nation} and a liberal notion of ethics.

This in turn has a profound consequence on the position of Indigenous peoples within U.S. juridical and political discourses. As the U.S. has distanced itself from any identity as a settler colonial state, it simultaneously distanced itself from an honest engagement and dialogue with the disparate Indigenous societies and peoples who still seek sovereignty and land rights. This double paradoxical position of the U.S. acts as an obfuscating device, both in the historical narrative and in contemporary political discourse.

3.4 \textit{Entrenchment: The 20th Century and the Productive Power of the Conceptual Schizophrenia}

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate this cycle of expansion, limitation, and transcendence, and how it has affected the conceptual image of the Native American Other. The cycle of U.S. expansion was initially territorial, via the frontier, and then morphed into the growth of cities and global imperial and economic networks. This cycle has followed the trends of capital development that began with primitive accumulation, implementation of private property and the foundations of wage-labor. The image of the Native American Other has been held in a symbiotic relation to this cycle. Where initial expansion drove an image of racialized and cultural externalization. Later stages of capital development, beginning in the latter half of the 19th century, saw this image complicated with the need to create liberalized and atomized political subjects that could be incorporated into systems of private property and capitalist labor practices. The infrastructure projects of the 1950's represent another stage of this cycle that required a new form of territorial and economic expansion and thus an evolved and more malleable (and thus a more schizophrenic) conception of the Native American Other.
The highlighted exclusionary attitudes of European colonists, early political leaders, Supreme Court Justices, and U.S. settlers collectively acted to erect a particular image of the U.S. nation that was juxtaposed against the disorganized and primitive societies that existed prior to European settlement and continue to live and fight for political and individual rights. The 20th century would see a fundamental change to the nature of this discourse. The end of the 19th century saw the closing of the frontier and the industrial boom that swept through U.S. cities. The modern U.S. state was being connected through the building of railways and highways, while also being erected through the construction of the modern skyscraper. Simultaneously, Native societies were being enclosed in isolated reservations in order to not interrupt the flow of inexorable capitalist progress. Border expansion had more or less ceased (in the most fundamental sense as the U.S. now spanned ocean to ocean), and the U.S. could be seen as beginning to grow from within. The U.S. needed to entrench its sovereignty and power within its national borders, so it could then extend that power abroad in the 20th century.

The previously discussed period of U.S. history can be incompletely characterized as a period of rapacious expansion, privatization, and physical subjugation of the Indigenous population. This expansionist behavior was justified through a racist and exclusionary juridical and political discourse. It was a discourse that justified the superiority of the self through the exclusion of the Other. As Hardt and Negri rightly classify, these attitudes are often shared, fortified, and reflected through the anthropological sciences, “modern anthropology’s various discourses on primitive societies function as the outside that defines the boundary of the civil world.”93 Chief Justice Marshall’s justification for U.S. land rights reflects these vary attitudes. However, as the U.S. ended its expansionary period (at least domestically) and began its period of entrenchment this discourse would begin to change form. No longer can these boundaries of

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external/internal be rigidly fixed, but the borders and boundaries of the external (whether it be nature or the Other) are sublimated into a schizophrenic unity, “the process of modernization… is the internalization of the outside, that is, the civilization of nature.”\(^94\) The last section of this chapter will examine how this internalization of the outside has resulted in the contemporary conceptual schizophrenia that dominates contemporary discursive representations of the Indian Other.

The end of the 19\(^{th}\) century consisted not only of the closing of the frontier, but also of the final stages of the removal and reterritorialization of Indigenous peoples and communities. The modern reservation system that is still present today was established during the 19\(^{th}\) century and aimed to push Native societies to the territorial fringes in order to make way for white settlement and expansion. By the end of the century, Native societies were considered Domestic Dependent Nations that were confined to reservation territory, but also encouraged to civilize at their own pace and ultimately “become absorbed into the American polity at some eventuality through an inevitable process of cultural evolution.”\(^95\) The policy of removal culminated in a narrative of externalization, both territorially and culturally, but with a long-term aim of assimilation through cultural advancement. This aim of future assimilation would come to enter dominant political discourses during the middle of the 20\(^{th}\) century.

By the dawn of the 20\(^{th}\) century a cultural push (partly spurred by anti-slavery, and early feminist discourses) to end U.S. internal colonization changed the discourse of U.S./Indigenous relations from one of conquest and reterritorialization to one of moral responsibility. E.N. Olund’s article, “From Savage Space to Governable Space”, quotes Interior Secretary Carl

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\(^94\) Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 187.

Schultz (1881) summarization of the issue of U.S. political responsibility to Indigenous populations:

The circumstances surrounding them place before the Indians this stern alternative: extermination or civilization. The thought of exterminating a race, once the only occupant of the soil upon which so many millions of our own people have grown prosperous and happy, must be revolting to every American who is not devoid of all sentiments of justice and humanity. To civilize them, which was once only a benevolent fancy, has now become an absolute necessity, if we mean to save them.\footnote{Olund, 132-133.}

Schultz demonstrates a classical paternalist view of the Native American Other, which relies on the notion that Native Americans needed help, and also that they were unable to help themselves. The paternalistic attitude expressed by Schultz represents a dramatic shift in political and social attitudes from one of sheer externalization to one of incorporation and internalization. The passage of the Dawes Act in 1887, and its stress on the establishment of private property, emphasized a new policy that focused on “governance and individuation”, or rather the attempt to establish Native peoples as individualized liberal subjects.\footnote{Ibid.} Turning to the 1950’s battle over infrastructure development between the Iroquois Nations and the New York State government will reveal how more sophisticated needs of capital development entrenched a dichotomous cultural conception of the Indigenous Other. This conception relies on the individualized liberal subjectivity that was called for at the end of the 19th century, but also maintains, and requires, a pejorative externalization and Othering. This case will show how this seemingly incongruent conception is actually quite malleable to fit shifting needs of capital expansion and reterritorialization.
In the beginning of the 1950’s the Eisenhower administration, with its eye fixed on the early development of the Cold War, recognized the importance of an intricate U.S. infrastructure for maintaining a stable and flowing global market. If the U.S. was going to maintain its newly established global economic and political hegemony, Eisenhower recognized that upgrading and expanding U.S. infrastructure was of utmost importance. Under this new directive, U.S. officials began “to increase the quantity, technological level or capacity, and integration of infrastructure systems within the U.S.” In essence, Eisenhower pushed for domestic projects with an eye towards its effect on the global. Domestic development was required to further a global U.S. project of economic expansion and hegemony.

The Eisenhower administration’s goal of enhanced global reach through domestic development is reflective of the historical focus, within the U.S., on the issue of productivity. The issue of frontier water rights was decided as the question of who could be productive in establishing economic and societal development. Hardt and Negri emphasize that this has always been a dominant component of U.S. power. The two theorists characterize the nature of U.S. sovereignty against the traditional notion of regulative sovereignty that was predominant in the formation of the European nation states, which was a type of sovereignty grounded on the State’s ability to restrict and control the populace. In contradistinction, what underlies the concept of U.S. sovereignty is the continual necessity to remake and expand productive power, “the multitude that constitutes society is productive. U.S. sovereignty does not consist, then, in the regulation of the multitude but arises, rather, as the result of the productive synergies of the multitude.” For Hardt and Negri, this notion of productive power opens up an “expansive

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project operating on an unbounded terrain.”100 Hardt and Negri frame this construction of sovereignty as a dialectical one, where expansion (say the initial territorial expansion) incurs a limit and then must find a new expansionary mode that can transcend that imposed limit. It is a process that cycles between expansion, and imposed limits or controls.

Eisenhower realized, that with Europe still in a post-war recovery, the U.S. would need to absorb (i.e. purchase and consume) many of the surplus goods produced in Europe. The U.S. market was needed to get European economies up and running again. In order to transport and deliver this influx of goods, the U.S. needed to upgrade its national infrastructure so imports could be moved smoothly and efficiently. In New York State the proposed project, to meet this need, was The Thruway, which was designed to be one of the first U.S. super highways. The Thruway (built from 1950-1956) would come to span over 500 miles:

it would tie together in an uninterrupted cord every existing transportation artery and every major city in the state, from New York City on the Atlantic northward along the Hudson to its capital, Albany, and westward across its industrial belt along the Mohawk River and much of the old Erie Canal, including Syracuse, Rochester, and finally Buffalo resting on the shores of the Great Lakes. 101

The New York State Thruway represented the most essential virtues of the U.S. national spirit: engineering ingenuity, openness, freedom, movement, and economic prosperity.

The International St. Lawrence Seaway, built along the New York State and Canadian border from 1954-1959, was the second major infrastructure project developed by the State and with the support of the federal government. The Seaway was planned as a series of canals, dams, and locks that connect the Atlantic Ocean to the Great Lakes. Again, the objective for the

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100 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 165.
project was the swift transportation of goods to and from Europe. An issue that confronted both of these projects (especially the Seaway, built along the St. Lawrence River where many Iroquois tribes had for millennia relied on accessible fishing grounds) was how to gain access to necessary Iroquois land. The means and logic used by the State government to go about building on land ostensibly controlled by the varying reservations reveals how the dominant conceptual framing of Indigenous peoples was re-shaped to fit new needs of capital expansion.

In Kwinn H. Doran’s dissertation discussing the historical record of the construction of New York’s great infrastructure projects, he notes the seeming ambiguity over land and sovereignty laws between the U.S. government and the Iroquois Nation. The relationship between the Iroquois Nation and U.S. government was littered with state, local, and federal treaties that became altered and often ignored, with U.S. rejections and obfuscations that were used to continually shrink tribal land and grow U.S. territory. No one governmental agency or section of government oversaw these historical actions, which had left “New York State Indian affairs [as] a confused mess.” However, Doran notes that no such ambiguity existed within the tribal governments’ view of their own sovereignty. The history of U.S. law regarding Native American sovereignty, such as the Dawes Act, had left Native American Reservation communities in a state of semi-autonomy with a level of U.S. dependence (this interpretation reflecting the position of the U.S. government). The question posed by the federal U.S. government, as well as New York State, came down to essentially ‘where does the jurisdiction lie?’ Doran records that The Iroquois Nation answered emphatically that all such matters of jurisdiction were very clear. The land and any decision of what to construct, build, or develop on Reservation land rested with the Iroquois. Doran quotes a Mr. Joe Johnson, from a 1920

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meeting between the Onondaga and U.S. officials there to investigate the disputes over jurisdiction:

You can call me a Bolshevist or whatever you want; but I am an American. I live in the same land that my father and forefathers were born in and possessed thousands of years ago… as long as we have treaties with the State and the United States government, we are a separate government surrounded by the United States. The Indians made their own laws right on this reservation. There was a time when no state or county authorities dared to cross that line… I say, we are a separate country from the United States as long as we have treaties.104

The leaders of the Iroquois Nations echoed Mr. Johnson’s sentiment during and after the 1920’s conference and maintained that neither New York State, nor, the U.S. federal government had any jurisdiction over Iroquois land (The Iroquois estimated this to be near 6 millions acres of land).

The pertinent question is by what means and logic was the New York State and federal government able to appropriate Iroquois land and complete the massive infrastructure projects. The answer is found in the policy of Indian Termination that began in the early 1940’s and ran through the 1960’s. The policy of Termination was a federally directed program that was carried out on a state-by-state basis. The policy was aimed at terminating the independent sovereignty rights of the Native American tribes and pushed for the type of cultural and economic assimilation that was initially put forth under the Dawes Act. The state governments attempted to coerce termination by preying on the weak economic status of the disparate Reservations that were acutely suffering from the effects of the Great Depression and austere War years. Federal or state funds were promised (often in the form of a state trusteeship that would continually hold

the money until the tribal government was able to manage the funds) if the tribes were either willing to relinquish some of their Reservation land, or allow U.S. jurisdiction within their borders. Vine Deloria Jr. argued that development projects, designed by the U.S. government to help develop tribal resources, were often conceived with the condition of termination, “whenever a tribe needed special legislation to develop its resources, termination was often the price asked for.”

The practice of Indian Termination represented the final stage, as Hardt and Negri explain, of the modern imperial practice of minimizing the “distinction between inside and outside.”

This process of dialectical consumption was reflected in a speech delivered by Ben Nighthorse Campbell. In the speech Campbell summarized the intentions and effects of the policy of termination, “[i]f you can’t change them, absorb them until they simply disappear into the mainstream culture…It was a time of forced immersion of Indian children into white society.”

The history of termination in the U.S. is disparate and one of victories and losses. Many tribes, such as the Iroquois (consisting of the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Tuscarora, and Seneca), Chippewa, Sioux, and Seminole, were able to avoid termination through long legal battles that were often not without their share of land losses and some entitlements of U.S. jurisdiction. However, many other tribes were terminated by the U.S. government and underwent a long and arduous process of land restoration that began to see positive results for the tribes in the 1970’s. However much of the damage done by the policy of termination lingers, and many tribes are still fighting to restore lands and obtain owed money and land out of U.S. government trusteeship.

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105 Vine Deloria Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins, 63.
106 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 187.
The process of termination was undertaken in NY State and largely motivated by the States’ need to appropriate land for the infrastructure projects. The Thruway was pushed through often while debates over its legitimacy were ongoing. Doran recounts that while U.S. Government officials were holding meetings with the various Iroquois tribes there was often construction equipment stationed down the road waiting to operate.\(^{109}\) In essence, the movement of development was inescapable. Any discussion that was to be had was often a façade. Compounding the urgency of the debates was the far greater threat of the Seaway, which would disrupt local fishing practices. Tribal attention that was heavily directed towards the protestation of the Seaway often rendered the tribes overmatched and ill-equipped to handle the threat posed by the Thruway.

It was through the threat of dissolution that New York State subdued the Iroquois communities and was able to build both the State Thruway and Seaway. The process of termination was never fully completed in New York State, but it was its omnipresent threat that forced the Iroquois to relinquish much of its land and previously stable ways of life. Through this process, New York State and the U.S. was able to reimagine itself yet again, while simultaneously repositioning the status of Native American nations and communities in their relation to the U.S. This is a cyclical process that is surely political and economic, but as Michael J. Shapiro notes is also ontological at its core.\(^{110}\) The global economic drives of the 20\(^{th}\) century necessitated a reimagining of the U.S. and its relations to Native American nations. This economic drive, complimented by the previous cycles of settlement and expansion and the racist binary logic of the U.S. court system, allowed for this reimagining to occur. The economic uncertainty of a post-war Europe was the impetus for this new imagining and required an


ontological reposition of U.S., and Native American identity, “the erasure of indigenous peoples, in fact and in representation, has been part of the self-recognition by which state societies have territorialized and stabilized their identities.” 111

These three sections (settlement, expansion, and entrenchment) are each cycles of their own, where the spaces of inside and outside are initially defined and then reimagined. However, they are also part of a larger continual cycle that has largely been driven by capital development. It is the new and mercurial needs of capital development (primitive accumulation, private property, resource ownership, infrastructure projects, globalization) that move the cycle forward and into a new gear.

3.5 Conclusion

The defining characteristic, beyond the basic external and universal dichotomy, of the conceptual schizophrenia that marks the conception of the Native American Other is its adaptability. The popular representations and understanding of Indigenous peoples, by dominant U.S. society, is much different than was represented by George Washington or Chief Justice John Marshall. Rarely are there identifications of savagery and primitiveness in the tone that the founding fathers used to mark the Indian Other, although they occasionally still persist. This change in tone, and movement to a more accurate representation (one that often privileges the universal conception and calls for assimilation) is seen as the strength of U.S. democracy and liberal morality. As this analysis has shown, this framing simply reproduces the power dynamics of a settler-colonial state. The conception has changed, as it has repeatedly done, but the dominant conception has merely adapted to fit new needs (often of capital) and to reinforce the same power dynamics of U.S. colonizer and Native colonized.

111 Shapiro, Violent Cartographies, 31.
Ironically enough, it is Justice Clarence Thomas who has perhaps most accurately depicted the actual state of Native North Americans in relation to U.S. power. Thomas, in the 2004 case *United States v Lara*, wrote that U.S. policy towards Indigenous rights and sovereignty “is at odds with itself”,…[the federal government] simultaneously claims power to regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes through ordinary domestic legislation, yet at the same time, it also maintains that the tribes possess ‘sovereignty’. Federal Indian Policy is, to say the least, *schizophrenic*.”¹¹² It is the productive power of this schizophrenia that makes that type of federal regulation, and belief in the altruistic motivations of the U.S., simultaneously possible.

Chapter Four

Conclusion

A Civilization that proves incapable of solving the problems it creates is a decadent civilization.
A civilization that chooses to close its eyes to its most crucial problems is a sick civilization.
A civilization that plays fast and loose with its principles is a dying civilization.

~ AIME CESaire, *A Discourse on Colonialism* (1955)

Have we fallen into a mesmerized state that makes us accept as inevitable that which is inferior or detrimental, as though having lost the will or the vision to demand that which is good.

~ RACHEL CARSON, *Silent Spring* (1962)

4.1 The Inefficacy of a Politics of Recognition

This Thesis investigated what J. Marshall Beier labeled as the *conceptual schizophrenic* image of the Native American Other that predominates dominant U.S. discourses. The main argument of this Thesis asserted that this schizophrenic image has been largely shaped by the changing needs of capital development. In support of this argument, I emphasized the notion that while the content of the schizophrenic image morphed throughout U.S. history (as shown in chapter 3), the formal structure remained the same. It is this structure, reinforced by binary classifications and a cultural logic informed by a racism of *passion*, that has been utilized to justify U.S. hegemony over Indigenous populations. The second main argument of the Thesis contends that this image has been utilized to justify particular treatment of Native North American peoples, and has also been employed in construction of a benign and righteous U.S. self-conscious. The productive power of this schizophrenic image allowed, and continues to permit, the U.S. to distance itself from a settler colonial identity, while asserting political, cultural, and economic authority over North American Indigenous populations.
With the trajectory of this Thesis in mind, it seems pertinent to engage the contemporary issue of a politics of recognition. 20th and 21st century political struggles have been consistently motivated by demands for recognition, or a need for more authentic recognition. This form of political resistance has been the legacy of Hegel and the power of his Master/Slave dialectic, where social relations are the constitutive force in human subjectivity.\(^{113}\) The motivation for recognition reflects the basic notion that ‘if you could only see me properly, then you would not deny me what is just.’ This view suggests that a change in recognition will lead to a change in political and social relations. This is a rather simplified depiction, but from the position of colonizer it can be comforting and reassuring to think that this form of politics is effective.

Indeed, much of 21st century liberal politics centers on issues of recognition. Within this framework, Western states are able to admit that their previous colonial regimes were motivated by racist ideologies, but through sincere engagement they have come to see the Other in a more authentic and sincere way. This view suggests that such a growth in understanding led to the dissipation of colonial regimes and power structures; liberal enlightenment ideals triumphed. The heart of this Thesis attempted to show that this has not been the case in regards to the political struggles between the U.S. and Native North Americans. Relations between the U.S. and North American Indigenous peoples are still navigated along a settler colonial power structure. The idea that I would like to explore, in this conclusion, is why a politics of recognition has proved to be insufficient in addressing the extant colonial power structures and where new possibilities of resistance might be found.

First it is important to understand the historical impetus for a politics of recognition. At the core of the U.S. policy of Indian Termination, was the idea that if tribes could be made to no longer representatively exist then no rights or claims of sovereignty could be justified. It was a

movement to completely eliminate Native American identities as being visible in political discourse. In this historical instance, claims for recognition by Native Americans were countered by a U.S. discursive realignment that erased the framework in which tribes could negotiate. This, in part, explains why the issue of recognition became so fundamental to politics of resistance in the late 20th and 21st century. In these instances, recognition really did mean survival.

One easy answer to dispel demands for recognition is to not change the material conditions that motivate the debate, but to erase the legitimacy of those who aim to speak out. While the policy of Termination, was eventually rescinded, it was deeply consequential. The U.S. (as seen in the case of New York State) was able to meet new needs of capital and construct huge infrastructure projects. All the while, notions of U.S. development, progress, democracy, and ingenuity are subsumed into the U.S. national self-conscious. For this discussion, the pertinent question is not the legitimacy of these types of claims for recognition, for the historical records shows that Indigenous peoples have been continually misrepresented and subjugated under U.S. political hegemony. Instead, the question to consider is: is a politics of recognition adequate to change the foundations on which politics and negotiations of power take place?114

Here I suggest that recognition, without a sustained engagement in attempt to change praxis, has and will continue to be unsuccessful in producing effectual change in the extant settler colonial framework that predominates political relations between the U.S. and Native American populations. Glen Sean Coulthard analyzes the construction of this politics from the perspective of Indigenous scholarship and movements of resistance. In his book, Red Skin, White Masks, Coulthard argues that a politics of recognition has predominantly served the interests of the colonizers, while working to maintain and legitimize the status quo. Chapter 3 of this Thesis

114 This has been a central concern of political theory since the early 2000's. The nature of the debate is adroitly handled in Patchen Markell, Bound by Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
argued for a similar conclusion. Coulthard argues that Indigenous communities now require an alternative form of political resistance,

less orientated around attaining a definitive form of affirmative recognition from the settler state and society, and more about critically reevaluating, reconstructing, and redeploying Indigenous cultural forms in ways that seek to prefigure, alongside those with similar ethical commitments, radical alternatives to the structural and psycho-affective faces of colonial domination.¹¹⁵

I contend that if liberal U.S. politics is concerned with moving away from settler colonial political paradigms, then a reimagining of U.S. politics must also be undertaken. This must be a reimagining that finds alliance in other communities and peoples that advocate for ‘similar ethical commitments.’ This is surely a profoundly difficult task, and while no answer will be easy, I would like to take this space to suggest a path of re-orientation.

In attempting to overcome colonial legacies, it seems that the onus of change and action to recalibrate political movements and structures, has been almost exclusively laid at the feet of the colonized. This onus of action has been expressed in myriad forms and historical contexts. In a call to recalibrate Kenyan liberation, Ngugi Wa Thiong’o calls for an inward examination with an eye towards the lasting structures and political relations constituted by imperialism:

if we are to do anything about our individual and collective being today, then we have to coldly and consciously look at what imperialism has been doing to us and to our view of ourselves in the universe. Certainly the quest for relevance and for a correct perspective can only be understood and be meaningfully resolved within the context of the general struggle against imperialism.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skins, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 49.
¹¹⁶ Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, Decolonizing the Mind, 88.
Thiong’o calls for a politics of resistance that requires a profound inner reflection of the self that is orientated towards an engagement with the Other. It seems vitally necessary that Western communities undertake a similar introspection regarding the legacy of imperialism and liberal Enlightenment ideals. This honest and cold reevaluating of Western political ideals, practices and structures must be focused towards a “search for a liberating perspective within which to see ourselves clearly in a relationship to ourselves and to other selves in the universe.” It is in this process of reimagining and reevaluating that bonds of ‘similar ethical commitments’ can be found, which can point towards reconstructions of political structures.

I do not mean to suggest that U.S. policies and advocacy groups drive changes, to the exclusion of Indigenous voices, ideas, and movements, in the settler colonial structure of U.S. and Indigenous politics. Rather, I mean to suggest a move towards a reorientation of politics that promotes cultural contact and exchange over relations of domination and suppression. It must be an action of reciprocity and humility. As Aimé Césaire suggested, this type of contact provides new breath and new energy, “it is an excellent thing to blend different worlds; that whatever its own particular genius may be, a civilization that withdraws into itself atrophies; that for civilizations, exchange is oxygen.” This does not seem possible in the current political paradigm. The U.S., structured as a settler colonial state, is consistently driven by the needs of capital development. The incessant expansionary needs of capital, and the land and resources that is so often required to feed those needs, only serves to entrench the settler colonial paradigm. A politics of recognition is ill suited and insufficient in altering this political structure.

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117 Thiong’o, Decolonizing the Mind, 87.
118 Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, 33.
Lastly, I would like to suggest that this process of reimagining and reevaluation extend into a political praxis that is orientated around Hannah Arendt’s conception of action.\textsuperscript{119} Arendt diagnosed modern society as one that is wrought with “thoughtlessness—the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of ‘truths’ which have become trivial and empty.”\textsuperscript{120} This is a description that runs parallel to the notions of one-dimensional thought and naturalization of conceptual frameworks that was discussed earlier in the Thesis. Arendt attempts to disrupt the entrenchment of thoughtlessness through her conception of action, which possesses a vital function of interruption. It is the productive power of interruption that has the capacity to break through and disrupt patterns of thoughtlessness and one-dimensional paradigms; “The life span of man running toward death would inevitably carry everything human to ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and beginning something new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-present reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but in order to begin.”\textsuperscript{121} Possibilities for new forms of politics of resistance are held in the symbiotic relationship between reflective thought and interruptive action.

If we are to demand ‘that which is good’, then that entails a more honest engagement with the visions that the U.S. has of itself; it means not turning away from the other halves of U.S. history that do not reconcile with its self image. However, as Coulthard suggests, the U.S. must look beyond simply falling into the standard practice of recognition, for this does not address the hidden colonial structures that the U.S. still subsists on. The U.S. must move past the pattern of reimagining the same schizophrenic vision of the Other. Instead, it entails engaging the technologies, economic drives, social relations, and mental conceptions that support and are


\textsuperscript{120} Arendt, \textit{The Human Condition}, 5.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 246.
supported by that schizophrenia. If the U.S. continues to leave those elements unaddressed, then it is bound to perpetuate a colonial state and one that is starkly opposed to its self image.
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