Dance Education for the Lifetime Learner: From Margaret H'Doubler to the 21st Century

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Dance Education for the Lifetime Learner:
From Margaret H’Doubler to the 21st Century

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

*Master of Arts in the Social and Cultural Foundations in Education*

DePaul University - College of Education

Krista Zozulia
Abstract

This paper will explore the development of dance education starting from the original conception of Margaret H’Doubler. The literature surrounding this topic will be focused primarily on the work of philosophers Émile Durkheim, Karl Marx, John Dewey, Frédéric Lordon, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Rancière, and Ivan Illich to critically examine H’Doubler’s inauguration of the first dance major in higher education in 1926. Further, this paper will explore movement as a mode of learning, as a practice that embodies epistemology and questions the political nature of the corporeal body; dance as way to assemble life, to become a lifetime learner through the pursuits of one’s heartfelt desires. Finally, the study will attest to the continuation of funding for curriculum research for dance studies programs within and as well as outside of higher education.

Keywords: Dance Education, Totality, Effervescence, Ritual, Politics
Acknowledgements

I dedicate this work to my beloved grandmother, Beverly Willhoft who passed away from cancer this past winter unexpectedly on a Tuesday night. She had been diagnosed with stage four lung cancer just three weeks prior to her passing. The cancer had spread to her entire body. I was there for the final diagnosis, my mother softly smiling at her mother commenting that her x-rays looked like Christmas lights. Grandma laughed deeply at that one, the familiar laugh followed by a series of short breathless coughs.

Grandma Bev was lifelong learner and educator. For half of her life, she was a kindergarten teacher in California who dedicated herself to her students, community, and family. She had lifelong friends and everyone knew her as the mother and friend who strove to create joy everywhere she went. I’ll never forget the lectures where she emphasized the importance of the changes we were facing as a society. She always talked about how she witnessed teachers losing their drive and passion. In the pursuit of a career, for a long time, I ignored the warnings.

Grandma was also beautiful painter. She loved flowers. She crocheted blankets to last through the storms. I’ve had one already for 15 years. Grandma loved to play as many games as you can think of and loved to host parties. She loved to sing. She cooked and baked what seemed like thousands of dishes. She read countless books, traveled all over the world, and up until her passing worked at a local consignment shop. Grandma never stopped devoting her time to her friends, old and new. She preached the importance of love to others and to never letting things get the better of you. She simply never stopped moving and caring for the life around her.

Grandma Bev has been the inspiration for where I am today. She is the blood in my veins, the warm blanket of memories that will continue to nourish my heart. And it is with this thesis, that I honor her own commitment to a life of joy, of making others feel unique and
particular, of making each friendship special and like new. I feel honored to continue her work in this world. I am to have completed this thesis as a stepping stone for the rest of the research I will do to continue her legacy, to continue to build a world of permanent joy.

My work here, with Dr. Stephen Haymes, Jim Duignan, and other fellow professors, has given me the tools for me to continue her legacy, to continue on the individual path she encouraged me to follow. It is with this that I extend a gracious “thank you” for the long talks, conversations with my books, and observation of new sites, that I now have a revived energy to continue my thinking as a unique and particular individual in this world, just as my grandmother was.
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Introduction

A Personal Note about this Project

In starting out this study, I first write to my readers about my background for this research project. I think it is important to hear a more real voice in this project first, as well as the inspiration for how I got here to writing about this topic. I hope in reading this, you get a sense of who I am, and where I hope to go as a maker of history, that this study serves as one tool for the assemblage of a narrative that widens my conatus for more possibilities, for a joyful life made through dancing to the music of memories.

Before attending DePaul, I was training at a dance studio in Chicago. I had just graduated with an undergraduate degree in Contemporary Dance, and overwhelmed with uncertainty, I decided a city would be the most optimal place to get started. I grew up in the suburbs of Chicago, so going somewhere familiar with family and friends around sounded like a good idea, but mostly, my intention was to utilize resources in the most optimal ways. While tensions were ripe between my (nuclear) family, I decided to focus elsewhere: to become the best dancer I could possibility be, to live in the vanity of a life on the stage. So to be considered a professional dancer, I decided that meant a more serious ballet training.

Flash backward–after four years at Indiana University, I walked away with a degree and a feeling that I had not learned how to dance. Thrown into the competitive space of auditions, with a disconcerted introduction to what seemed to be a committed community of dancers, I sacrificed all my time and focus on training to make my way inside the walls. I grew an attention to detail to the ballet line, to the quick recall of dance steps and rhythmic patterns of contemporary songs. I thought following passion came at the expense of happiness and joy, so I forced myself to assemble a life around a competitively willing attitude supported by an ever thickening
personality. I later found out, after being told “to work on my personality” that this home I believed to be a place for comfort, for a life of constant passion, was a great fallacy.

During my new Chicago dancer-life, I worked myself towards a daily exhaustion, the classic too-many-jobs artist lifestyle. I became isolated and lonely as I failed to make time for support from family and friends, and I continued to blame myself. I enslaved myself to ballet, to a life that meant proving my optimal self, proving myself worthy of love and praise by my family, friends, and even more—proving myself worthy of the views and fans on social media, and holding onto the fantasy of future praise for life on the stage.

All of this came alongside the beginning of my career as a dance teacher. I returned to the studio from my hometown and began to teach six to twelve year olds ballet. I didn’t quite understand how my world had gotten so saturated with ballet, because during my undergraduate career, I had spent most my time working through what were deemed egalitarian practices, modern movements of flow and release, of using the “natural” states of the body and finding the truest expression of the self. So, when I found myself back at that studio, the birthplace for the beautiful ballet dancer I was supposed to be, I realized I had been schooled to believe myself as solely that ballet dancer. And I had continued to fail to prove myself worthy of all the time spent in those studios. What was it all for?

I was working through an injury at the time. Breaking the fifth metatarsal of my right foot after failing to land a high jump while doing a ballet grand allegro across the floor is quite a traumatic experience for any dancer, but for me I think it meant more. I had broken it just months before graduation. I felt great peace though because I finally had both the mind and a body that could “restart” and become something new. Ballet was this tool to rebuild my life, one groped by fear and insecurity, yet pride and determination. I told myself this peace was only temporary, like
a vacation from the real world, that my body could be trained again and properly restored and
good than before. What I failed to learn at that moment was that this mentality was exactly what
I needed to learn: that my body had become a means without an end in sight; in other words, I
had become capital for the limitless performance economy. Shortly after experiencing an
assumption, a great freedom to choose my life again, I wouldn’t stop until I could prove that I
could be the dancer everyone had hoped for, that I had believed in. But I now had a cause, an
oppression to overcome.

Yet, in teaching those little ballet dancers at my old studio, I was alienated. I had returned
to a space that was supposed to feel familiar, however, in my return, in feeling the floor that was
once my springboard, holding bars that were once my support, I approached this space as if it
were a dusty box in the back of a closet, the one with old letters or photos or whatever one keeps
back there. I spent time, sifting through those memories, remembering what it was that brought
me to dance, allowing my body to remember what it had felt during those adolescent years of
decision making for what was supposed to be the rest of my life. I was approached by my old
teachers, the ones I had told myself I would do better than, with the same looks as if I had never
left. And they still told me how beautiful I was back then. I felt indebted to them, to their praise
that I would someday make it. I thought: maybe I was wrong, maybe I didn’t know the reality
when I was a stupid teenager, how ungrateful I was to appreciate dancing, the privilege to
afford such an activity. I wanted to become part of the dance studio family again, but somehow I
still felt like a stranger on the outside.

Then I remembered the one teacher who had changed everything for me: my ballet
teacher. It was her style and approach for teaching us, which grew my love for dance. I was not
just a dancer, but a person who could talk to my teacher as a friend. She was not on the studio
staff at the time I had returned to teach there, but it seemed as if I was hired for those teachers in order to fill that void, to represent her. But in the end, in chasing the profit of a growing studio, the now constant winning of competitions and ability to afford expensive costumes and master teachers, I was ignored by those teachers for the very foundation which that teacher had fought for: for the love of dance, for the love of each other. She always hated competitions. She hated the excess and the demand for more trophies. I realized ballet for her was more than a tool, but a language assembled by love.

I felt uncomfortable teaching. I felt that I could not approach students with care the way that teacher had done with me. I didn’t have a context for teaching the methods I had learned. What use would I be to them without providing a transmission of a history for movement that served something more than the vanity of the stage? As a teen, my life outside the studio was a mess, my family was torn apart through the demands of suburban living. Dance then, became this “outlet” or space of joy, a space where my twin sister and I would only sometimes fight with the language of dance that we only we understood as kinesthetic learners, as twins. I felt the pressure to be a hero for my students knowing how important the studio place was for me. How could I use those single hour class times to reach my students? To reach myself?

When I discovered *The Dance and Its Place in Education* by Margaret H’Doubler, I began to understand the gaps in my education. As I began reading, I could not help but feel angry that this philosophy had not been in the core curriculum in my undergraduate degree. When I left school, overwhelmed with uncertainty and a broken foot, I realized that I had totally given my sense of authority to every teacher who stood in front of me for 23 years. When asked to choose a life after finishing and being “set free” from college, I realized I didn’t have a single tool I thought I needed, and I had no direction. H’Doubler became this for me at the time I felt
strangled by ballet teachers, by myself, as I searched for some kind of new foundation for the greater body I was supposed to have. H’Doubler reminded me that dance was to be loved by the whole person, a sense of being I had totally given away and lost all spirit to try to find again.

In rethinking pedagogy, I struggled to create a life H’Doubler had asked for to truly begin *dancing*. I was not surrounded by supportive teachers, nor had I nourished my relationships, my friends and family, in ways where I could love the life around me. From this point, I began to realize once more, that my body had become a tool for the apparatus of the studio, and the space that had once released me, was now my prison. In contrast to my adolescent years, I realized that building a life around me was living in a home built by choice, by effort, by love, and that the studio was not just an escape, but one important part in the assemblages of that life. I began to realize that teachers weren’t simply support beams, like the ballet bars I’d always have in my grasp every morning, they were people with families and a love of dance like me. I began to realize that they were as unsure of how to talk to me as I was to them, that our language of dance had been filled with a static, our frequencies directed elsewhere, by forces outside the studio. I felt so unequipped to approach any of them being shy and embarrassed from what I believed were all mistakes and unprofessional ways of being, that I didn’t know where to start.

It is with this process, that I came to DePaul to answer the questions I knew to be true: that each of us feels alienated from the things that we love, despite being saturated in them. I asked myself how to teach, how to help those students learn, as I had known my own struggle, and in turn, I found that the answer asking myself that same question: how to help myself learn, how to teach myself, and how to learn to let go of those teachers, the ones who had caused damaged, as the authorities over my life, realizing that their practices were the result of greater forces deeply held by the culture of our society. H’Doubler had begun to show teaching as a
careful and important act for humanity, for nurturing the spirit, for loving the soul. That teacher who taught me to love ballet, taught me to love, and in turn, ballet became one part of that process towards connecting with my life and the world around me as *an assemblage of love*.

This is the spirit of my topic, woven through the theoretical and historical works that provide conversation towards creating a philosophy of dance personal to my experience. I chose H’Doubler because I felt that I needed to start at the university setting as it was in this space and later her words that I became emancipated. This made me realize how my dance education had failed to incorporate the things H’Doubler found important to guarding dance from a world of instrumentalization. As H’Doubler was the first educator for dance in higher education, it is from her perspective I begin to understand the challenges of creating a philosophy of dance, as well as the need to find ease in what always seems to be pressing implications for the change we *must* make *tomorrow*. Too often, challenges feel like restraints, when it is the radical quality of the compression of time and space which fosters the burst of ideas, a renewal. With this in mind, this study serves as this space for compression, an effervescence, a politics that questions my part in the narrative of dance education. As a dancer, the expression goes that we move better than we speak or write, and so, to challenge this myth, I write a study in which I must reflect on my body as more than a tool for language, but one mode in the multiplicity of thought.

**Rationale for Thinking about Higher Education**

Stepping outside of my personal narrative, there are a few concepts to consider when thinking about dance education and its place in higher education today. As certification and online programs focused on remote skill acquisition are increasingly at the forefront of higher education, the growing concern is that higher education will continue to be hollowed out for the sake of efficiency and profit. The fact of the matter is–students don’t want to face a lifetime of
debt for following interests that will not provide an income, a job that will sustain them which makes these programs look all the more appealing. Because our lives are governed and controlled by the market, a human capital model where skills acquisition and professional development are in the interest of capital gain and productivity, one would believe, in theory, that this growth model would entail higher wages and standards of living for the American Dream for all to experience (Suleman, 2016). In the interest of capital gain, students are directed to learn the demands of job competition to chase the Dream. Seems pretty compelling. The fact is that I too had to chase the job to be part of the community of career artists if I were to survive as a dancer and pay my bills.

High student debt rates encourage students to rethink their interests, to imagine the freedom one could have without the debt of school. In a world where students cannot choose to follow their interests, they cannot envision a new world, which is great for large corporations who need consumers and unfulfilled laborers. Some argue large corporations need be taxed at a higher rate to get rid of student debt (Balsera, Klees & Archer, 2017). With higher taxes, students would be free to think about their education without fearing the implications of a lack of job, a lack of integration into the social life that allows them to find purpose.

So as dance education in higher education has shifted from the department of physical education to fine arts, curriculum has reflected this change which alters the landscape for the dance professions (Gilbert, 2005). With high student demand for performance opportunities as well as professional exposure, dance departments’ studios are increasingly becoming the training sites for the professional dancer and choreographer skilled in Western forms of dance technique, composition, and education because this is where the most profit is located (Park, 2018). With limited funding, dance programs are using their resources for skill-based courses, such as
improvisation and choreography, without sufficient time spent on courses in philosophy, history, culture, and aesthetics situated in a historical context (Schupp & McCarthy-Brown, 2018; Gilbert, 2005). Without a focus on content, however, “their actions or products lack meaning or substance” (p.34), and students become bodies for the market. Students of dance education fear that following their interests will amount to nothing but debt, so they find, as I did, that following the dominant narrative becomes the safest option for keeping one’s passion alive.

Furthermore, since the election of President Donald Trump in 2016, there has been significant rethinking for the role of arts in education, and this marks an important moment to encourage people to pay attention and realize their autonomy in their cultural practices. This study provides a look at creative industries in postsecondary education, specifically through the lens of dance education, in order to remember that educating the unique and particular person sustains us in an ecological way, one that resists the efficient, debt-laden laborer whose spirit is captured in the corporate state.

**Purpose and Direction of Chapters**

In this study, a brief history of dance in college will help educators to rethink its purpose in the 21st century, to look deeper at the philosophical foundations, the beliefs, attitudes, and rituals, that shaped its conception. Further, the study is founded on the question: how does dance education serve as an important site for the investigation into the political ontologies that underlie pedagogical methods in higher education? Understanding the attitudes that shaped the moral conscience of the early 20th century allows us to see the ideas that shaped dance education and the changes undergone since. One goal of this study is to assist dance educators in fostering a philosophy for dance in the 21st century.
The development of this study will explore dance education focusing on the original conception of Margaret H’Doubler at the University of Wisconsin who was influenced by the work of 20th century progressive education theorist, John Dewey. The terms, dance education and dance, will be used broadly to leave, purposefully, dance as an ambiguous and abstract idea as what seemed to be the case during the development dance education in the 20th century; in other words, dance is not situated in a specific context other than the setting of higher education, which gives the study rationale to think about how this ambiguity came to be, to understand the impact of modernization on culture and the loss of its niche, specificity. The literature surrounding this topic will be focused primarily on the work of philosophers starting with Émile Durkheim and Karl Marx in Chapter One, used to situate and think critically about John Dewey’s thoughts on education and labor in the 20th century. In Chapter Two, the study will explore Dewey’s thoughts on experience as education which in the latter half of the chapter, will be looked at critically through the Marx and Durkheim. In Chapter Three, the study will then hold Dewey and H’Doubler parallel to think about the mechanisms in which dance education became situated as a study in higher education. In the final chapter, the study combine thoughts from Hannah Arendt, Jacques Rancière, and Ivan Illich to question the schooling of dance education; rather, it questions the purpose of dance education and where it belongs. With this in mind, I begin the study thinking about the ambiguity of the place for dance education:

Indeed, dance is a medium through which cultural understanding is represented and in which change can be envisioned and sampled (Ross, 2000, p.59).
Chapter One.

Social Ontologies of Labor and Work during the 20th Century

1.0 Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to think about the social ontology of labor starting from the 20th century industrial period. Margaret H’Doubler is situated in the middle of the 20th century where higher education becomes a site transformed by the advent of the factory. She looks at dance education as a site to explore the body as more than a tool, a topic explained more in Chapter 3. For the purposes of this chapter, labor will be the focus to understand economic change in the late 19th and early 20th century as an impetus for the shaping of the corporate institution. The first part of this chapter looks at Émile Durkheim while the second part looks at Karl Marx. This chapter will begin to explore the ambiguity of the place for dance by looking through Durkheim’s solidarity.

1.1 Labor in the Durkheimian framework

After the defeat of Napoleon III in 1873, Paris saw the destruction and elimination of the feudal identity, making room for the construction of a national identity. At this time, smaller ethnic identities were absorbed, and the market economy dismantled the peasantry; cultural modernization began driving the development of the state where the growth of industrial labor became a sign of advancement in the 20th century. In 1893, Durkheim wrote the *Division of Labour in Society* to make sense of the change occurring, to find a science that would ground this change into functional guidelines for the state to follow. As an empiricist, a philosopher of structuralism, he developed a science of the collective to explain the forces constructing and holding together a society through change, in other words, solidarity. In this study, Durkheim’s
theory of solidarity will be used as a framework to understand the development of ritual practices. Through Durkheim, the profane and the sacred elements of ritual can help to better understand the development and placement of dance education in higher education during the industrial era.

1.2 Rituals and Collective Consciousness

In order for the collective to bind in solidarity, Durkheim saw law as social force where the expression of the legal system would be able to correspond to the ways in which people interacted (McLaren, 1999, p.4). He described two forms of solidarity. The first, mechanical solidarity, was described as the pre-modern or “non-modern” society, exhibiting a lack of independence and a sameness of people (Alexander, 1999, p.110). In the second, organic solidarity, Durkheim described this as the greater division of labor where such interdependence would allow for each part to contribute to the whole with “regulated moral cooperation” (p.142). Further, each previous stage of a society would then become incorporated into the whole totality, especially during effervescence, a time of hyper-excitement and transformation (Durkheim, 1995, p.220-221). Ultimately, Durkheim understood that society, the collective, was a precondition to individuals where the individual could only arise in a society and not before it. The study will continue to explore the rituals of the collective to understand the role of dance in forming solidarity.

With this in mind, Durkheim wrote The Elementary forms of Religious Life in 1915, seeing the state as the collective conscious. He began to model the modern state, one developed through organic solidarity, on the mechanical forms he witnessed in tribal peoples to understand the growth of the collective consciousness (Quantz, 2011, p.10). Durkheim understood that organic solidarity meant fostering the rituals from indigenous and religious practices within the
secular state. This meant that the state would be governed through the division of labor as a way to encourage each person to have a part in the solidarity of the collective.

Durkheim found that rituals governed by animism, the religion of spirits, and naturism, the deification of nature, were instable as they were based on dreams and symbolic language which meant they did not require a pre-established society in order to form (Durkheim, 1995, p.47). Without a strong collective, Durkheim believed that solidarity would struggle to grow. Durkheim believed that religion had to be practiced within reality “as if every community had a group mind” (Quantz, 2011, p.10). This would allow for a strong state, to ensure that great change, such as the collapse of feudalism, would not leave people isolated and withdrawn. The next section discusses the integration of rituals into society for the occurrence of solidarity. The study continues to keep in mind the following: when addressing religion, did Durkheim consider movement practices such as dance as part of the rituals of solidarity? Or were they to be considered backward and mechanical?

1.2.1 Rituals

For Durkheim, the group mind was to be practiced through rituals or large participatory, ceremonial, practices to encourage a bond between peoples (Alexandar, 1988, p.111). Rituals would help remind the collective society about the purpose of its individuals through a periodic activation of stimulus (p.xlii). Durkheim (1995) defines,

It is a system of rites, feasts, and various ceremonies all having the characteristic that the recur periodically. They meet the need that the faithful feel periodically to tighten and strengthen the bond between them and the sacred beings on which they depend (p.60).

Durkheim believed that building solidarity and consciousness would evolve from the reenactment of the sacred (Alexander, 1988, p.2). Through ritual, Durkheim found that this sacred could be in the form of objects imbued with the emotional power of the group. These
objects would reinforce “moral energy,” reinforcing the loyalty of the group through memory passed down from past generations (Durkheim, 1995, p.447). It was through the participant’s experience with the group ritual, that Durkheim believed that the individual conscience would develop through observing the group (p.111). Rituals based on the sacred could reinforce the moral laws and thus characterize the group to foster solidarity through a common objective.

The industrial era had begun to force a rational economic-centered governing on private and public life in the early 20th century. Durkheim (1995) witnessed a fragmentation and weak sense of solidarity as people became concerned solely with their jobs. He recognized that the French Revolution had left people without a greater role for their lives:

We have already seen how the [French] Revolution instituted a whole cycle of celebrations in order to keep the principles that inspired it eternally young. If that institution quickly perished, it is because the revolutionary faith lasted only briefly, and because disappointments and discouragements quickly replaced the first moment of enthusiasm. But although the work miscarried, it helps us to imagine what might have come to be under other conditions; and everything leads us to believe that the work will sooner or later be taken up again (p.430).

Durkheim saw the institution as a rational place to govern ritual, to maintain and encourage the enthusiasm experienced after the French Revolution. When he mentions, “what might have come to be under other conditions” it is to strengthen ritual practices, to construct the conditions to maintain the sacred. He believed that to regulate orientation towards the collective, solidarity could be maintained to help the individual understand his part in the collective. The institution of the modern state would be this moral center to maintain order.

In Durkheim’s framework, institutions were the site to shape a “well-functioning” society (p.8). Rituals for Durkheim were functional and would operate to strengthen the collective mind. What did Durkheim mean by institution? While the idea of the institution is vague, this will be a
question for the ongoing study; it will be a term used to think about the purposes of institution, of situating dance into the institution of higher education.

1.2.2 Collective Consciousness through Classification

Collective consciousness can be defined as the shared beliefs and values that exist prior to the particular society: it is a pre-condition for the society that must exist across generations. The collective, however, is not simply the sum of individual consciousness. The collective consciousness can only be realized in individuals through its effects, meaning that the collective is pre-determined by the sacred:

Collective thought is possible only through the coming together of individuals; hence it presupposes the individuals, and they in turn presuppose it, because they cannot sustain themselves except by coming together. The realm of impersonal aims and truths cannot be realized except through the collaboration of individual wills and sensibilities… (Durkheim, 1995, p.447)

This idea of collaboration can be understood through the idea of totality, the abstract form of society; in other words, totality is the total conception of the universe, and it provides the “total genus outside which nothing exists.” Collaboration of individuals is then categorized starting from the genus of an abstract totality, made rational through the rituals governed by the institution. For Durkheim, totality is a natural hierarchy made possible through participation in institutions of social life:

The purpose of classification is the establish relations of subordination and coordination, and man would not even have thought of ordering his knowledge in that way if he had not already known what a hierarchy is. Neither panorama of physical nature nor the mechanisms of mental association could possibly give us the idea of it. Hierarchy is exclusively a social thing…Society furnished the canvas on which logical thought has worked (p.149)
Durkheim understood society to be governed through classification invoked by the genus. The genus is subject to change through collective renewal, effervescence that reveals the growth of organic solidarity. The individual participates in the ritual process, but his conscience is established outside of him (p.443):

The classificatory system of collective symbols can sometimes be drastically changed through these experiences; the relation of social actors to these dominant classifications is always shifted and transformed (Alexander 1999, p.192).

Institutional reforms reestablish culture through entities in civil society (p.133). Because the social body is subject to the hierarchy and the lineage of the genus, social actors change as a result of the change of rituals, or institutional reforms, relying less on “cognitive reification” in a “highly differentiated” modern nation-state and more on the collective mind directed by the state (p.112). Hierarchies are natural according to the nature of the state. The organization of the public and its participants reflect back the logic of nature, the growth of organic solidarity.

As dance becomes part of higher education, it becomes part of the collective mind, a spirit for expressing the modern state. Dance is made useful by positing itself in the order of the social body. The spirit of dance in the institution will be a topic discussed more in chapter three and four to better understand the implications of integrating a dance major into higher education during the 20th century. In the next section, alienation will be discussed to better understand Durkheim’s goals with ritual practices that reinforce the sacred and the collective consciousness of the state.

1.3 Durkheim’s Division of Labor, Anomie and Liminality

In The Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim sees the distribution of work and the occupational identity as the center point of society (Alexander, 1999, p.49). As mentioned earlier, the institution becomes the genus, or the sacred which can be renewed and transformed
through rituals. The growth in organic solidarity occurs via the division of labor as specialization increases in its structure, individuals depend on the state and cooperate with one another (Marks, 1974, p. 330). This reification of the sacred state also reinforces the profane. As such, crime becomes a normative and functional ritual in the advancing society as the duality of the sacred/profane relationship strengthens and reaffirms the sacred. Crime, defined through state and moral law, then requires institutional reform to act against the profane, to hold up the sacred (Durkheim, 1995, p.367). This section will discuss Durkheim’s conception of “anomie,” a normlessness or statelessness, where those without a part in the division of labor are shaped as either the profane or sacred figure to have a function in strengthening the collective consciousness and solidarity of the state. Defining the criminal, the profane, is an important theme throughout this study to think about the role of the dancer and the place for dance education in the social order.

1.3.1 Anomie

With the modernization and economic ordering of public and private life, Durkheim focused on secular ritual practices as he witnessed a growth of anomie in individuals (Quantz, 2011, p.6). Anomie, abnormal and disconnected behavior, was the result of the growth of occupationalism, a lack of ritual practices that would hold society together and would strengthen solidarity (Marks, 1974, p.330). Marks describes how Durkheim understood the collective conscious as a regulatory process that could absorb this abnormality:

Durkheim is certain that the changes that complex society needs in order to rid itself of its anomie cannot arise from the obscure, diffused societal consciousness: "When collective ideas or sentiments are obscure or unconscious, when they are scattered piecemeal throughout the society, they resist any change. They elude any action because they elude consciousness" (1958, p. 87). And this was tantamount to saying that no structural foundation of this "obscure" societal
consciousness could conceivably be located. Thus, the central government had the crucial role to play in generating civic morality (p.340).

Because the creation of the nation-state absorbed smaller groups into a nationalist collective national identity, it left many aimless, without a place, causing individuals to occupy themselves solely with their labor; this created anomie where, according to Durkheim, the state could correct it through “generating civic morality” (above). Those who resisted the new modern morality were ultimately seen as profane figures, and even as profane figures, their place would still contribute to the function of the whole. Punishment would still be able to reify the sacred.

And as the individual did not have his own consciousness without the collective, Durkheim believed that the sacred had to be constantly renewed through ritual practices for all to contribute and foster a well-functioning society. Punishment became necessary for the collective renewal of the sacred:

A religious prohibition...arises from the respect evoked by the sacred object, and its purpose is to prevent any disrespect...[one] system that separates different species of sacred things...[and] one that separates all that is sacred from all that is profane” (Durkheim, 1995, pp.305-306)

If those caught in anomie should reject the consensus, they will be symbols of the profane, but if they should collaborate in harmony with the collective, they will be a species of the sacred, an appendage of the institution; it became a matter of shaping the individual’s action, his duty, to follow the social bonds for the collective life. Moral law, then, provides this authority to guide those lost in anomie.

In addition, symbols of the profane, or criminals, became subjects not because they were morally wrong, but because those who named them criminals defined them as the morally wrong, defining the profane as social fact: “it is thus this opposition which, far from deriving
from the crime, constitutes the crime” (Durkheim 1974, p.40). The opposition of the sacred, the profane, thus symbolizes the need to renew in the sacred. Both are part of the system of morals which govern and help innovate modernity. For this study, the movement of bodies through dance exists in this space either acting as a sacred enactment of spirit or as a crime against the total image of the social body. The institution of higher education becomes the site that organizes this image through moral law guided by pedagogy.

1.3.2 The School as a Moral Center

Durkheim defines the division of labor as a “general biological phenomenon” that occurs as a necessary condition in the natural course of development (Durkheim, 1964, p.3). He witnesses the specialization that occurs as a result of the transition of economy; but this specialization occurs not only within the economic functions, but in what he calls the judicial, political, and administrative as well as the arts and sciences (p.2). This is what he meant by “law” and the governing of “social fact.” For Durkheim, philosophy had been fragmented into disciplines each with a purpose and method of its own. These fragmented parts needed direction. Thus, moral law could decipher their use and function: “...it is often the case that custom is out of step with the law” (p.25). As the school place because a moral center for the growing state built on efficiency with notions of use and function in mind, dance and its institutions which allow it to be shaped through curriculum can be better understood.

Relationships were to be guided by the customs of the governing law (p.26). It is precisely for this reason, the school became the integrative site for national identity and the shaping of this moral law (Alexander, 1999, p.94). The parts needed to be directed. The school become the place where students could be introduced to the practices of the nation-state, to discover their autonomy through the pedagogical practices, a microcosm of the collective social
life; it became the space necessary for the contribution of subordinate labor: the children of the state as the future of collective life.

In *Moral Education: A study in the theory and application of the sociology of education* (1973), Durkheim acknowledged the school as a place for applying the science of solidarity. For example, Durkheim notes the benefits of repetitive, rote memorization training, yet understood that the child could only apply this learning with a moral understanding (p.177); further, he articulates that the student must learn through curiosity to that which he witnesses in his life, learning from his mistakes along the way. This is where the child begins to reinforce the sacred by deciding upon the profane, the criminal. Thus, through his faults, he must grow beyond ideas of blame of himself and of the other as each has an essential role to play (p.187). Teachers would provide this learning of such social fact, and help students to realize that punishment must be respected (p.202). Furthermore, through repetition the child would be able to understand his acts—and then develop a moral authority similar to his teacher. This idea of moral authority through pedagogy will be discussed more in the latter half of Chapter two to understand how dance became a mode for moral guidance in higher education.

1.3.3 Thinking through Liminality

The concept of liminality will be discussed in this next section to consider life outside the collective ordering of the social body. The term “liminal” is derived from Victor Turner’s notion of structure and anti-structure, where liminal groups exist at the margins of society, a place betwixt and between (Alexander, 1999, p.72). As juridical law makes meaning through the division of labor, where wages make workers or non-workers, liminal groups do not allow the law to define their ritual practices (p.73). Liminal groups struggle to maintain this space as social forces seek to absorb them and capture the moral center of their rituals. This phenomenon reveals
the challenge for unions, artists, and other groups who seek to counteract the isolation of anomie, but who also seek to find a place outside the dominant social order. How is a group to protect their practices without being undermined and captured by state institutions?

This undermining of practices is revealed through the artist identity as it exists in a state of liminality. The artist is constantly exposed to the social forces that wish to control and utilize its role. It is from Turner’s notion of liminality, a Durkheimian framework can be decolonized and realized as a framework to challenge the status quo by fostering solidarity through practices that strengthen the collective mind of the liminal space (Quantz, 2011, p.7). From this point on, this study will look at dance in higher education as a liminal space and question its politics. In looking at it this way, the notion of liminal space not only shows the political nature of the role of dance in the division of labor, but reveals the complicated nature of the educational model for dance in higher education. Dance in higher education can be best depicted as a liminal space where its place in higher education has benefits as well as consequences. It can be considered as a liminal space, however, only when considering its historical context in the 20th century.

Further, liminal groups interpret the meaning of symbols in the way that serves their distinct group, and through claiming space, bring about change in society rather than oppression and conformity. Earlier I explained that once the rituals of a group are removed, solidarity comes into question and in seeking a place, consensus to the mainstream is resisted or complied with. When the group becomes liminal, betwixt and between the governing laws of society, there is a threat to the social order as the state actors look to define their rituals as either sacred or profane (Carlson, 1996, p.24). Because the liminal group thinks about how to maintain their practices despite the rationalization of the totality, the social construction of the genus does not oppress
them. Through cultural transmission, the liminal group remains intact through its members, its kinship (Rancière, 2014).

In *Performance: a critical introduction* (1996), Marvin Carlson addresses Durkheim’s rituals as a performance site with the potential for subversive activity in liminal spaces. Carlson, however, understands Turner’s model as a form of structuralism, an extension of Durkheim’s functionalist approach and questions the role of rituals if they must still exist in a structure that brings about a particular reification. Rather, if the liminal is functional, then liminality must still revolve around a genus defined a pre-conditioned state. Who defines the genus of the liminal group? And how is the sacred to be maintained? Is organic solidarity only to be related to the growth of a modern state?

Quantz (2011) explores Bakhtin’s idea of carnival as a ritual critique to circumvent the institutionalization of rituals, to reclaim nonrational spaces (p.19). Medieval carnival is, unwillingness to accept anything as sacred...nonlegitimated voices can compete with the status quo...[through] transformation and renewal (p.53).

Through the mockery of rituals and the tabling of profane/sacred duality, ritual critique transforms the expression of social life. In the sense of liminality, critique of the structure becomes actionable and transformative. Ritual critique becomes a way of thinking about liminality less so as a group of oppressed who desire to revolutionize the structure, and more so as a critical cultural transmission.

Anomie can define people as isolated if they do not have the solidarity of a group to affirm their existence. It could be said, however, that anomie generalizes those isolated. Thinking about cultural memory can allow for those isolated to reconsider their place in society and find ways to practice, to share rituals that allows for a creolization of cultures. Liminal groups look to reclaim space in the overarching structure of society but this does not necessitate a utopian
revolution. In addition, thinking about the cultural amnesia that occurs during large structural changes as a result of modernization is how we can understand the ambiguity behind dance in higher education and its loss of connection to specific communities. Ritual critique can unpack this ambiguity and seek to define dance practices by each specific genus, place, and peoples who understand its history, its power. The next section will discuss Karl Marx’s critiques of power in production to continue to think about ritual critique.

1.4 Labor in the Marxist framework

From the collapse of feudalism, to the growth of the nation-state, Marx witnesses the growth in the management of the protestant bourgeois, a classless society governed by those with money. In this way, we can relate back to Durkheim from section 1.2 to his concept, effervescence, a hyperexcitment that mobilizes transformation. Through great changes, such as the collapse of feudalism, Durkheim understood that ritual practices must form to strengthen the collective consciousness of the group. The collective conscious today is now governed by the corporate state, where ritual is performed through the maintenance of jobs. Durkheim’s idea of effervescence, the idea of hyperexcitment, is seen today in the form Sheldon Wolin (2008) called opportunism, where changes continuously supersede changes in order to continuously find new markets and profit off of new rituals, or commodity. This effervescence makes it possible for the individual to become a passive, vulnerable body through the ritual of the job. Dance practices become kitsch and trendy: dancer as a professional looking for the next gig.

As the corporate state turns its management inward towards controlling every aspect of private lives, the job becomes the place to maintain solidarity. This is a concern today as opportunism consumes the entirety of one’s life. This is what Marx was concerned about in the late 19th century. He saw man becomes a means for the production of capital. He understood that
man was no longer a maker of his own history as the classless society created the mass man. If
man could not produce something that he could reflect upon, he could not enact a cultural
transmission where skills could be taught to others. Man would become useless without his
fellow men to come into existence with.

In conjunction with Durkheim, Marx will be used as a framework to understand the
development of labor in the 20th century industrial period to further our discussion on the
collective consciousness and ritual practices. I provide this section in this chapter as an important
transition into thinking further about my previous discussion on liminality and ritual critique. As
corporate capitalism continues to control every aspect of our public and private lives, does
liminality exist? How can dance practices operate as ritual critiques to spaces and bodies
controlled by capitalism? Marx, in this sense, questions man’s production by looking at the
sources of power which foster the unquestioned performance of capital.

1.5 Marx’s commodity through a Hegelian framework

This section discusses the development of Marx, who from studying Hegel, began to
think about the power of money and commodity. Thinking about commodity in the context of
Hegel allows us to see how Marx challenges the genus of the collective, how he rethinks ritual in
the social order. He questions self-awareness and the oppressive nature of labor. This section will
begin with a short summary of Hegel’s idea of reason and logic.

Hegel looked at the development of the individual in the structure of social life. He
understood the political community as the place for contemplation through social interaction, for
those faced with alienation to be directed toward self-awareness: “for Hegel the individual
considered outside a social context is an abstraction” (Browning, 1999, p.16-17). Therefore, the
subject who is dependent, such as a slave, cannot achieve self-awareness through social life.
Hegel’s focus for his study in political philosophy was on the types of social interactions that grew from fragmentation. As Hegel understood it, one could look at the historical foundation of certain political practices to understand the development of reason, internal to the process of change (p.18)—and he believed out from the development of reason would come the absolute logic through understanding the patterns that create change.

The community relied on the individual’s abilities as a rational agent in order to build relations through social practices. This would happen through reflection on history and man’s participation in the political organization of the state (p.5). In this sense, this is where Marx begins his critique: Hegel’s idea of freedom becomes “concrete forms of the social relation in the capitalist mode of exchange” (Moseley, 2014, p. 69). Because of Hegel’s reliance on social reproduction through the state, as part of the logic of an advancing society, Marx sees the problems with power as it impinges on the self-consciousness necessary for production which makes the worker of value:

Marx’s analysis finds a question, namely, the question about the necessity of the subordination of the state, of politics, to private interest...The question is now about the organization of the process in which human beings satisfy their natural needs, whose point of departure is the organisation of the process of social reproduction (p.72).

Marx thus uses the commodity as the germ in Hegel’s dialectic, diverging from Hegel in his notion on transcendence: “in direct contrast to German philosophy...here we ascend from earth heaven.” Marx’s historical materialism acknowledged the material existence of commodity and the social relationships that made it appear as a source of power; he understood the apparatus of labor and man’s alienated relationship to his production (Fromm, 2017, p.8). Through understanding his alienation, the proletariat could overthrow the bourgeois. Marx discovered “that the labour represented as the value of commodities embodies a material quality...and social
quality” (Browning, 1999, p.74). The next section continues to discuss the materiality of alienation.

1.6 Thoughts on Alienated labor

This section offers a few thoughts on Marx’s concept of alienated labor and how it relates to anomie. Thinking about the idea of alienation, as a part of the European existential tradition, can remind us of the similarities between anomie and alienation, where both look for a ritual practice that allows for a transcendence involving institutions, but can also reveal some of the differences that allows us to think about a ritual critique through Marx. In chapter four, the study returns to this discussion to rethink alienation altogether. For now, this section provides a brief overview that will help us understand John Dewey’s philosophy for education in the next chapter.

Marx understood that private property had become the apparatus for landowners to govern the laws, constructing a civilization to allow for growth and profit. This began an accumulation of wealth in the form of objects, “a world of things,” to gain power. As commodification increased in society, Marx saw the value of human interaction decrease, thus alienating man from his production (p.82-83). Capitalism was to blossom through labor, labor then becoming the sole essence of private property, commodifying the worker himself (p.45; p.131).

Labor as transactional exchange was Marx’s concern: that man’s essence in production would become the means for his life (p.45). As the worker produces tools he cannot use, he becomes a consumer enslaved to his job: “capital increases value (is valorised) only by approaching the unpaid labour of wage-workers” (Moseley, 2014, p.10). Marx said,

What constitutes the alienation of labor? First, that work is external to the worker, that is is not part of his nature; and that, consequently, he does not fulfill himself in his work but denies
himself, has a feeling of misery rather than well-being, does not develop freely his mental and physical energies but is physically exhausted and mentally debased (Fromm, 2017, p. 85).

He also explains,

An enforced *increase in wages*... would be nothing more than a *better remuneration of slaves*, and would not restore, either to the worker or to the work, their human significance and worth. (p.91).

When man can no longer reflect on the object of himself, as an object of nature, and he cannot produce work he finds value. As he is “mentally debased” through alienation, it is not so much about the raise in wage for their work that will provide a better life, but that work has become external to man. It is through the elimination of capital that society can be governed to allow human particularities to flourish; and elimination of capital means rethinking the ritual practices that uphold the commodity as sacred (Quantz, 2011, p.8).

Further, when man cannot connect with others because he cannot produce, he gives away his power to the oppressor who rules his production (p.90). He becomes isolated, and so Marx exposes this truth: the development of private property is veiled as a natural truth through Hegel’s political economy (p.91). Production as wage-work is servitude to capital. One cannot become emancipated if he is enslaved to his tool and so for Marx, it becomes the workers obligation to overthrow the bourgeois to open the commons. Man can overcome alienation when man reclaims his work and shares his skills with other workers to build a life *internal* to the interdependency of those relationships.

Finally, alienated labor for Marx, differs from anomie for Durkheim. As articulated above, alienation controls the worker’s subjectivity by the force to conform to the rational order of capital. In other words, he is forced to participate in the division of labor because his life depends on it, and Marx seeks to rethink this order to emancipate the worker. Anomie, on the other hand, deals the lack of ritual, or practices, that make the individual part of the collective
consciousness of the rational order (Forsythe, 1978, p.80). Anomie is alienation in the sense that the individual does not have a place during times of change, so institutions look to absorb them into the system of labor. In this way, alienation could be looked at as a stage that takes place within a spectrum of anomie. In other words, when work becomes a job, man is tied to the external demands of the corporate state and he is alienated but not necessarily within anomie.

Without a job, he is within anomie, but with a job he is alienated from himself. Perhaps if the job becomes work and man is fulfilled through his production, he is neither. There is the question of joy and when one’s work truly amounts to this state of production, a concept this study will explore in chapter four through Frédéric Lordon’s (2014) “happy servitude” in chapter four. For now, recognizing the relationship between anomie and alienation can help recognize the difference between the ritual of dance practices serving as education and dance education as the ritual of the collective conscious when we think about the role of the school in society. This difference is key to thinking about ecological ways of living and dance as a practice of ritual critique.

1.7 Chapter Conclusion

Durkheim developed a functional approach to understanding the consciousness of society to determine how to strengthen the bonds of individuals during times of change. As a proponent of growth through organic solidarity, he was not the only theorist of the 20th century to think about rituals and the collective. John Dewey, who will be discussed in the next chapter, also strove to find methods to help the individual bond with society, placing education at the center for strengthening the collective. Further, Durkheim’s framework is relevant for this study as institutions continue to govern society through a rational social model, where alternative spaces
for education such as dance, are at a constant threat to being defined according to labor defined by the totality.

In summary, this study looks at dance education in this light—during the late 19th and early 20th century, Durkheim and Marx witnessed the specialization and commoditization of work, respectively. As such, dance in higher education struggles to articulate its “practical” existence as a labor; and thus, it becomes shaped as a sacred art in order to hold value for the institution. Marx means to overturn the structure and de-rationalize the economy so that man can produce value in life (Quantz, 2011, p.7). Dance education serves as this potential site but figures like Margaret H’Doubler, struggle to articulate its values to secure its place in higher education as the institution has the power to control its purpose or discard it as waste. This is relevant as there is never a time where liminal groups are not under threat; and dance educators should carefully examine dance practices through looking at the historical structures that shape their existence to protect and encourage unique epistemologies, or ways of understanding the world.
Chapter Two.

Dewey’s Philosophy: Experience as Solidarity

2.0 Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to describe John Dewey’s development as a public intellectual during the 20th century. The beginning of the chapter will discuss his point of view as a progressive theorist on education, while the latter half will analyze his work through both Durkheimian and Marxist frameworks to think critically about the implications of his work in society at the time. Later in chapter three, this becomes important when talking through H’Doubler’s understanding of dance as she creates the first dance program in higher education after attending Dewey’s lectures on “Theories of Experience” at Columbia University during the 1916-17 academic year (Ross, 2000, p.123)—as this was a time in which Dewey had started to become what West (1989) refers to as both “a giant” and a “world-historical figure” (p.85). After attending these lectures, H’Doubler began to develop a pedagogical model for dance—one in which she had no prior experience teaching. The historical development of Dewey and his role in shaping American pragmatism, for this reason, is important to better articulate H’Doubler’s educational model, to trace both Marx and Durkheim through Dewey and thus through H’Doubler. These historical structures will help the dance educator to begin to articulate a dance philosophy in the 21st century.

2.1 John Dewey: the social democrat

Dewey became a public leader for progressive education during the early 20th century as he saw oppressive working conditions during the growth of an industrial society. Witnessing this growth, he saw a drastic change in the household (Dill, 2007), a growth in household economy,
where each family member was required to contribute (Winkelman, 2016). So as family life became fragmented, the educational role that the family once served no longer provided the social and moral foundations for the young. With most time and culture shaped towards the industries outside the home (Winkelman, 2016), and without this role of integrating the child into the social world, a role the family had once served, the school for Dewey became a site for this socialization.

Dewey criticized many reformers at the time, who saw education as a site for social control; as such, his main concern was helping the young understand their role, not simply as subordinates, but as active community workers (p.311). Shor (1992) writes, “Dewey was an uncompromising egalitarian critic of official vocational schemes. He drew attention to the class bias built into the educational system” (p.48-49). Dewey’s approach to education was intended to liberate workers, and he believed they could overcome oppressive work conditions by understanding the importance of their role in society, in other words, a common people working to towards the frontier of the American dream.

2.2 Dewey’s Philosophy

Many know Dewey as a pragmatist, whose philosophic tradition emerged out of a combination of religious upbringing, philosophy in the Hegelian and Emersonian tradition, and the growth in science as a mode for relevant research (West, 1989). So as American pragmatism was developed, its relevance came from societal frustration towards dominant religious and philosophical discourses on consciousness, a separation of the mind and body, largely embedded with what pragmatists had begun to call mystic ideas about morality (p.42) as many witness harsh working conditions and drastic change in family life and culture.
Pragmatism thus developed with the growth of industry, focusing on the empirically centered scientific method that used experiences and realities of the social world as data for the learner to critically reflect upon. Pragmatism in the 20th century became defined through its “cultural criticism with a moral purpose” attitude, a concept where consciousness was to be founded on the scientific method (p.43). Charles Sanders Peirce is known as the start of this tradition as he rejects Cartesian philosophy of consciousness:

First, Cartesians hold that philosophy must begin with universal doubt. Peirce views such doubt as but a fiction inapplicable to itself... Second, Cartesians argue that the ultimate test for certainty is to be found in individual consciousness. Peirce rejects this discarding of past authorities and testimonies, especially certain forms of human collective experience. For Peirce, the Cartesian primacy of self-consciousness leads toward a full-fledged subjectivism, an imprisonment in the veil of ideas with no reliable bridge between ideas and things, consciousness and reality, subject and object. Third, Cartesians leave inexplicable those facts that people most want to know. By using God as a deus ex machina to account for the self and world, Cartesianism supplies little knowledge about either. Fourth, the Cartesian philosophical method of inference overlooks the relatedness of ideas to other ideas, propositions to other propositions (p.44).

It is from Peirce that Dewey is critical of many reformers’ notions of social control because he believed that the learner and worker could experience their surroundings with joy if taught about the structures and the importance of their roles. Thus, Dewey rejects the Cartesian mind and body duality as he witnesses the repression on the body and weakening of the mind through labor (Winkelman, 2016, p.309). Such “full-fledged subjectivism” (mentioned above) enslaved the worker to the industrial apparatus, and left him within the strict confines of regimented labor without a bridge into a social-historical world.
In order to combat subjectivism, Dewey found that activity, and the conscious reflection on projects, could be directed by the development of aims, or methods which direct one to learn from their experiences. This directed thinking, then, would help the worker to find purpose through production, towards the critical reflection necessary to build a bridge for the subject-object relationship. Dewey (2012) emphasized learning through consequences:

If a person cannot foresee the consequences of his act, and is not capable of understanding what he is told about its outcome by those with more experience, it is impossible for him to guide his act intelligently. In such a state, every act is alike to him, Whatever moves him does move him, and that is all there is to it... (p.32).

And further,

Habits reduce themselves to routine ways of acting, or degenerate into ways of action to which we are enslaved just in the degree in which intelligence is disconnected from them. Routine habits are unthinking habits...habits that posses us instead of us possessing them...habits which put an end to plasticity...motor skill without accompanying thought, marks a deliberate closing in of surroundings upon growth (p.55)

As a pragmatist, Dewey saw experience as empirical where the surrounding world of the student could be measured through relationship and interactions (West, 1989, p.74). Through relationships, the student would be able to actively connect to the world rather than become a passive tool for the means of monopoly corporations. These relationships would be his guide to discovering his purpose and dignity—he would develop social modes, or habits, through integrating himself as a worker in the community.

Further, Dewey saw critical reflection as empirical investigation and method, rejecting what he claimed to be anti-empirical notions of reason. He believed critical intelligence as a path to individuality when grounded in the realities of modern struggle (West, 1989, p.74; p.110):
In fact, the dominant theme of his metaphilosophy is that philosophy is neither a form of knowledge nor a means to acquire knowledge. Rather philosophy is a mode of cultural critical action that focuses on the ways and means by which human beings have, do, and can overcome obstacles, dispose of predicaments, and settle problematic situations (p.86).

In the effort towards practical application, Dewey sees the school as the site to begin to build responsible citizens and workers to grow beyond the industrial society and into a modern, intelligent world, to shape their practices for the common good of society. In his chapter on “Natural Development and Social Efficiency as Aims,” Dewey (2012) remarks on the democratic duty of the worker. His responsibility is to contribute in an economically useful way:

Persons cannot live without means of subsistence, the ways in which these means are employed and consumed have a profound influence upon all the relationships of persons to one another. If an individual is not able to earn his own living...he is a drag or a parasite upon the activities of others. He misses for himself one of the most educative experiences of his life. If he is not trained in the right use of the products of industry, there is grave danger that he may deprave himself and injure others in his possession of wealth. No scheme of education can afford to neglect such basic considerations....With the change from an oligarchal to a democratic society, it is natural that the significance of an education which should have a result ability to make one’s way economically in the world, and to manage economic resources usefully instead of for mere display and luxury...

(p.128)

With the growth of the nation state, for Dewey, the growth-economic model was a natural course for society to modernize, and to improve social efficiency would achieve this growth and optimal harmony, where a balance of social, vocational roles would achieve the optimal functioning of society. As a result, he believed that if students understood the importance of their role in building a modern world, they would cultivate “democratic habits” through critical reflection
upon their vocations (Winkelman, 2016, p.311). In turn, through good habits, such as civic duty and responsibility, they would develop fulfilling lives to participate in the service of society.

In order to achieve the optimal efficiency, socialization for Dewey became the center for his philosophy. Building a culture meant fostering vocational knowledge to help the individual flourish in his service capacity for the greater humanity. While Dewey strove to make available a philosophy embedded directly in the experiences of the working class, many are critical about his discussions as he does not address a bias towards whiteness (Margonis, 2009). The study will continue to explore the gaps in Dewey’s democratic ideals in the next section.

2.3 Dewey through Durkheim and Marx

Throughout this section, the study seeks to synthesize the material discussed thus far. So far, I have provided the historical circumstances and perspectives of three important theorists relevant at the time of the advent of dance education as conceptually understood by Margaret H’Doubler. This section takes it a step further by providing a more critical perspective to understanding both the connections between each theorist as well as the implications. Ultimately, this will become important as the study will later discuss the benefits and consequences of Margaret H’Doubler’s philosophy—a discussion that will help shape a philosophy relevant for the 21st century.

2.3.1 Thoughts on Durkheim

Dewey and Durkheim shared similar perspectives in thinking through practical, secular methods that could sustain society through great change (Dill, 2007, p.222), as well as help it thrive. The school then, became a space for developing moral cohesion through socialization, or in other words, they understood moral education as the focus of the school in order to integrate the individual into society, to build solidarity for the future.
In this way, Dewey and Durkheim share similar thoughts as they were concerned about the fragmentation they witnessed due to the growth of the industrialized society. Dewey writes in *Art as Experience* (2005):

Life is so compartmentalized and the institutionalized compartments are classified as high and as low; their values as profane and spiritual, as material and ideal. Interests are related to one another externally and mechanically, through a system of checks and balances...Compartmentalization of occupations and interests brings about separation of that mode of activity commonly called “practice” from insight, of imagination from executive doing, of significant purpose from work, of emotion from thought and doing (p.21).

Dewey alludes to his concern with individualized “practices” that compartmentalize not only the subject-matter from the actions that organize it, but individuals from one another (Dewey, 2012, p.315). Art in this instance, is moral action, and making the distinction between morals and disciplined moralities, Dewey marks the latter as “consecrations of the status quo, reinforcements of the established order,” as it does not involve the social practice and actions that build society. But rather, he understood that action needed to be guided by morals, or learning from experiences that would become disciplined through courses on moralities in religions or philosophies fragmented from the action of learning.

In a similar regard, in *Moral Education* (1973), Durkheim explained a rational, secular approach to morality, where “the bond between religion and morality needed to be demolished” (Dill, 2007, p.225). Durkheim says,

Morality is not, then, simply a system of customary conduct. It is a system of commandments...at the root of the moral life there is, besides the preference for regularity, the notion of moral authority...these two concepts of morality are closely linked...This is the concept of discipline.
Discipline in effect regularizes conduct. It implies repetitive behavior under determinate conditions. But discipline does not emerge without authority (p.31)

At first glance, Dewey is in opposition to Durkheim through the notion of discipline. Later, however, Durkheim says, “discipline and rules often appear constraining” (p.32), and like Dewey, Durkheim is concerned with developing of the “appropriate response to every stimulus from the environing situation” (p.37) when he talks about regularizing conduct. With a focus on the learning environment that engages—or we could say from Durkheim—disciplines complex stimuli (2012, p.68-70), Dewey thinks similarly to Durkheim on his notion of authority as a force to foster solidarity. For both Durkheim and Dewey, focusing on the stimulus, the central nervous system, could motivate the worker in a physical way—to become disciplined through moral action in understanding his role in the school.

They differ on one important end, however, in this notion of discipline. Each theorist has a different take on the individual’s role in society:

The individual was subject to the authority of the society for Durkheim; the state was this representative authority and education was its primary tool. He and Dewey differed on their views of the individual and society. For Dewey, the moral self started with an individual ‘experiencing’ through the scientific method in the context of society. Durkheim’s approach differed in that the society stood over and above the individual, moulding her to its ideal. Society shaped the individual to conform to a moral ideal; for Dewey, in contrast, the individual shaped morality in a social context. This does not discount the social nature of the moral force embodied in society for Durkheim; indeed, it was flexible, not static...But nonetheless, once established, the authority of Durkheim’s sui generis society was further removed from the individual than Dewey’s and thus carried a more authoritative disciplinary force (Dill, 2007, p.30).
The individual for Dewey, experiences and learns about his world and changes it through social interactions, starting in the school place. Durkheim, on the other hand, sees the state as the collective authority which changes society through the discipline of education. So while both theorists emphasized the ritual practices and the sacred symbols that held society together in order to transcend it in a secular form in the boom of the industrial era, they differ in how they see the individual and the role of the state in achieving solidarity.

Durkheim, as mentioned in the first chapter, alludes to a collective that grows organically only through the nature of the nation-state. Dewey, on the other hand, looks at the individual learner, which is why, some are critical: he emphasizes a model that works for a more privileged middle class, reinforcing vocational learning and service for lower classes (Margonis, 2009). In the next section, the study looks further at Dewey and the absence of the power structures built by the capital economy, that place Dewey in the light as an “uncompromising egalitarian.”

2.3.2 Thoughts on Marx

Dewey and Marx shared similar perspectives on Hegel’s logic: they both felt that society could be shaped through critical attention to the structures, through practical, measurable means. In Dewey’s work, he brings attention to the natural evolution of the modern society, emphasizing the nature of the “problem” as a method to narrow down the possibilities “in order to do away with some evil” (Rytina et al., 1970, p.315). In Marx’s work, the dialectic serves as a model which society can be interpreted through, where those oppressed would be able to overthrow those in power (p.316). What Marx and Dewey both achieve is practice and action interwoven through theory, but consequently, this approach creates gaps: “when theory and practice are one, theory cannot act as an external check on practice” (p.317). Both share a similar frustration on the approach of theory, and depart from Hegel as they seek to provide society with approachable
means for change, offering little in their models about the distinction on the multiplicity of communities and epistemologies.

Yet, they differ on one important end—Dewey, “Americanizes history” (West, 1989, p.71), assuming a general consensus in the American society, and as the study showed in the last section: the school and the authoritative role of the teacher are to steer the student towards democratic habits (Rytina et al., 1970, p.315). But what is democracy for Dewey? Dewey understands that the community will evolve towards a democratic state, and thus can be shaped through the experiences in education at the individual level. Marx, would be critical of this perspective, as Dewey sees the intellectual group, the bourgeois, as those who shape the pedagogy that governs the morality of society through the youth. While Dewey understands that changing the individual’s habits will bring order to society, the intellectual must organize the institution to allow for and discipline this change. Marx would be critical because “humanity in man, says Marx, must not even become a means for his individual existence; how much less could it be considered a means for the state, the class, or the nation” (Fromm, 2014, p.45). For Dewey, the individual, not the intellectual, becomes a means for the growth of the state.

Further, Dewey’s focus and particular audience for his work was influenced by the university culture. As such, he does not acknowledge those with power, failing to be critical of his own position as a public intellectual. Dewey discusses experience as a way to learn, but there is a difference between the intellectual, those with access to schools which foster the appropriate methods of inquiry for experiential learning, and the vocational worker, those with prescribed duties and limited choices for schooling due to financial restraints. One constructs the experience while the other is the subject for the experience. With a growth mentality, Dewey believed in the evolution of civilization, often calling indigenous or black peoples backwards and primitive:
He may have believed that European Americans and African Americans were at different stages of evolutionary development and thus in need of differing types of education. ‘‘primitive’’ is used to describe heterogeneous groups of people who are at an earlier stage of development and thus rely on personal loyalties to family and clan, as opposed to the more objective dictates of reason and law. Primitive peoples’ moral decision making is directed by the rules of their group, not by a process of individual reasoning and the scientific pursuit of truth, and their decisions about the natural world are pervaded by traditional and mystical understandings. (p.22)

And because Dewey strove to maintain his position within higher education, he avoided criticizing white intellectuals and the aspects of socioeconomic privilege:

Dewey enacted a basic strategy of white people by withdrawing from discussions that called upon him to understand and name his own complicity in a system of racial privilege...His reliance upon abstract terms, such as democracy, the student, and the community, allowed him to gloss over the ways in which his educational philosophy reflected practices and norms that had been developed among relatively privileged European Americans...[and] the luxuries of creativity experienced by the white students were possible because the society was simultaneously preparing domestic workers (p.29)

Marx in this sense, would argue that vocational workers could lead a revolution through understanding their power by taking authority over their conditions and cease to become the means for capital growth. Dewey sees this socialization, the growth and interaction of roles, as a positive. For this reason, Marx understands a socialism, rather than socialization within a growth economy, as the only true means to democratically govern society—life without the frontier, without the fallacy of the American dream.

2.4 Chapter Conclusion
Dewey celebrates the growth of the professional class, establishing theory that allows for the better practice of consensus, for a well-organized society. In this light, Dewey’s Durkheimian “sacred” is growth and the future modern state, technology and measurable practice. Marx is critical, for growth means the destruction of lives and a modern future means servitude of the masses for those with power. Even though Marx remains tied to the dialectical model, his look at structures of power helps the educator to realize the implications of Dewey as a public intellectual and his role in shaping the landscape of education. When one cannot see the contradictions of the role he serves, he serves himself and allows others to become his social capital, means for his enterprise. This is important for building a philosophy of dance education, especially in the neoliberal age of the 21st century where corporations seek to control both private and public aspects of life to be shaped toward the collective totality, the limitless control of capital.
Chapter Three.

H’Doubler’s Philosophy: Dance as Education

3.0 Overview

H’Doubler’s goal for dance in higher education was to make it teachable, to foster the practice of art through the body and learn about the sensory impulses of the body, a philosophy she drew from Dewey (Ross, 2000). Drawn towards Dewey’s ideas on experience as education, H’Doubler was critical in developing the purpose for the dance education program at the University of Wisconsin as she witnessed both a growth in technical training and performance of modern dance and lingering aristocratic ballet practices. While she was aware of the dance movements taking place outside the academic setting, H’Doubler never trained as a dancer herself, but instead as a physical education teacher and a basketball coach, her goals were to find ways to motivate the learner beyond the exercise of sport— to encourage approachable learning for movement that would increase awareness and function of the body (Ross, 2000; Gray, 1978).

The purpose of this chapter is to look at the connections between H’Doubler and Dewey, and then use Durkheim and Marx to be able to rethink the philosophy of dance education. According to Ross (2000), “The model H'Doubler created for dance in American higher education, shaped by Dewey's theories, dominated the field for nearly forty years” shaping dance curriculum until the 1990s (p.143). Shifts in curriculum can change the landscape in radical ways, which is why it is crucial to unpack the historical nature of the philosophies for reformers like H’Doubler.

3.1 The Development of Dance Education
During the turn of the twentieth century, the body became a site for the “ideological and social relationships to be radically redefined” as educators searched for the true expression of life (Vertinsky, 2009, p.2034). In contrast to the formal nature of movement during the Victorian era, movement became a way, especially for middle to upper-class women confined to the household, to learn to move their bodies in an appropriate form (Ross, 2000). In this regard, François Delsarte is well-known for his movement system which allowed for a scientific approach towards the expression of the body (Vertinsky, 2009, p.2034). His system was brought to the United States in the late 19th century by Steele Mackaye, who continued his work through expressive gymnastics with Genevieve Stebbins, who focused on poses from Greek statues and sacred dances (p.2035), a prominent theme for dance during this time. Several well-known dancers, such as Isadora Duncan, Loie Fuller, and Ruth St. Denis, studied these movement practices (p.2034) and elements of Greek folklore can be found in their performances.

While H’Doubler was not immersed Mackaye and Stebbins teachings, “What was important was that the dissemination of American Delsartism through widely popular manuals ...useful in helping to support middle- and upper-class women in socially acceptable forms of expressive physical movement, clothing reform and their entrance into public life” (p.2035). During this era, as women entered the public sphere, Blanche Trilling, the founder and director of the Department of Physical Education for Women at the University of Wisconsin from 1914-1946, “oversaw all of H’Doubler’s work,” giving her an “assignment” to bring dance “worthy of a college woman’s time” (Ross, 2000, p.73-74; p.102). So while H’Doubler was not directly exposed to Delsarte or modern dance innovators like Duncan, Fuller, and St. Denis, the change in physical culture prompted new demands for dance education. Further, it was the context of the opening-of-the-doors for women in higher education and the search for appropriate movement
forms for women in the public sphere, that H’Doubler, alongside her mentor, Trilling, was able to integrate dance as an important approach for women’s education. Trilling, who had constructed a philosophy based on educating the whole person, what she called “the emotional and intellectual individual within the exercising body,” (p.79) allowed H’Doubler to continue her project and explore pedagogical methods relevant for women during the progressive era, to think about the practice of movement for women outside of the private realm of the household.

Further, despite the new freedom for women in the public sphere, the body became a site, an apparatus for new methods of control. At this time, proper hygiene and eugenics, or rather the idea that fitness could be passed down through genetics, began to become linked by some progressives as integral factors for growth and modernization (p.51; p.68). The political nature of movement education and the colonization within systems will be discussed later, in the final chapters as the study moves on to discuss politics through Jacques Rancière and Hannah Arendt, to better understand the implications of developing a philosophy within higher education. For now, H’Doubler’s methods for constructing dance education will be analyzed to better understand the implications of incorporating popular theories from public intellectuals like Dewey who preach democracy as a social consensus.

3.2 H’Doubler and Dewey

From the last chapter, the study looked at Dewey’s philosophy based on the empirical nature of experience, the fusion of the mind and the body in contrast to previously held Cartesian notions of duality. In this light, H’Doubler found Dewey’s understanding of learning through the sensing of stimuli, mind and body as one experience, a perfect match for thinking through a pragmatic philosophy of dance education. Dance, for H’Doubler, was to be made educational
rather than artistic practice. For the purposes of this section, Dewey’s notion of experience will be the starting point in thinking through the connections between H’Doubler and Dewey.

Dewey believed in creating a space which would foster experiences for students to learn from. As such, for Dewey, activity could be directed through both the role of the educator as well as the objective setting of the space. Because Dewey believed in what some call “a social constructivist dimension” (Jayanandhan, 2009, p.107), with experience in mind, H’Doubler constructed a space at the University of Wisconsin in both her role as educator as well as in building the aesthetics of the studio. As an educator, H’Doubler wrote,

The teacher’s first task will be to arouse the interest of this heterogeneous group. It is helpful to make clear at the first meeting of the class the purpose and the values of the work. There may be students in the class who have been accustomed to learn dancing by paying other people to think for them in their dancing. Unless they can change their point of view, they will be disappointed in their work. The whole class should be made to feel at the start that the important thing in this class is what they can do for themselves, that their progress will depend upon what they put into their work...And if the teacher herself will set them the example by bringing in the new ideas and suggestions which she picks up in her reading, or in the lectures she attends, or in any of her daily contacts, the students will enjoy bringing in suggestions from their outside experience and applying to the problems of the dance the resources they have acquired from their other studies (H’Doubler, 1925, p.41)

As an educator, H’Doubler was largely concerned with the training mindset often prescribed by movement techniques. She decided that the educator could instead serve as a moral guide for the individual learner to experiment through problem posing, a Deweyian tool for situating the learning experience. In setting the classroom, the teacher could become the moral center for the students, to guide them with caution through practices that foster “man’s fundamental
needs...through grasp of the science of dancing” (p.42). This moral center also meant constructing the aesthetics of the studio: from requiring the students to wear handmade garments and tunics with Roman-style sandals (Gray, 1978, p.44) to the building of a proper studio where its walls were lined with large gray curtains, Victorian lampshades, and other Grecian decor (Ross, 2000, p.170). H’Doubler (1925) wrote,

As a rule, especially in public schools, there should be a feeling against unnecessarily expensive costumes for classroom work. At the same time, however, time and effort should be given in having the costumes artistic and becoming no matter how inexpensive the material or how simple the line (p.39)

Like Dewey, organizing the space meant setting up the experience to work intelligently through the experiment of the body’s stimulations, which meant first thinking about proper garments that were socially and morally appropriate for women at the time. Thinking through these objective conditions would then allow students to be focused on their expression and their reactions in the research of the body:

In large measure she was leading students into discovering how they could use their own bodies as stimuli and modulate their physical responses to the essential limitations nature exercises on bodies in motion. (Ross, 2000, p.127)

To build a space fit for the educational experience of dance movement, H’Doubler let her curriculum emerge from the classroom rather than “imposing a strict sequence of information to be transferred to students” (p.146). H’Doubler was sensitive in this way, asking the teacher to practice caution when giving feedback and corrections to students as to not disrupt their sensations and flow of learning (H’Doubler, 1925, p.48).

The construction of the space founded a platform for critical attention to the body and expression. H’Doubler was skeptical of public performance that took away from this exploration.
As an educator, H'Doubler sought dance for the expression of the spirit and not for “entertainment of the community” (p.208). She was concerned largely that the child would be “tempted...to find excessive gratification in self-display instead of seeking values in art and society which will raise him above himself” (p.209). H’Doubler advised against working towards performance as the means for daily class, as a “final aim” for the class:

Dancing should always be an end in itself, and the student should devote himself to the joy of his work without any ultimate consideration of whether or not it ever worked into a public performance (p. 211)

While on the one hand, she felt that through creating dance for performance, the educator was to be careful not to dictate the student’s abilities and creation process. But, H’Doubler also recognized the ability of the educator to offer a critical perception and experience into the process, to help the student express their emotions through movement:

For not only must there be emotion back of a movement if it is to have meaning, but there must also be a compelling need of expressing that emotion. A person may feel joy, but if he does not also feel deeply the need to express that joy, any joyous movements which he may make for some other reason will be meaningless and ineffective. There is little danger in the class work that the student will make movements that do not spring out of emotion, that are not expressive, even if poorly so. In a program, however, he may realize that his art needs more action and try to give it action, while he is still vague as to what the action is expressing...If the instructor spends the greater part of her time and energy in helping the students really to feel the beauty of the dance and to experience sincerely the emotional content, they will not tend to make movements merely for the sake of the movement, but will use those movements which express that which they are experiencing. The result will then be worthy of the name of art (p.218)

In aiding the emotional expression, the educator was to bring out the individuality in each student, to help discipline his powers through intellect (H’Doubler, 1957, p.63). Dance becomes
a mode for the personality to grow throughout one’s life by maintaining a “creative impulse” through adulthood; further, it becomes a site where the practice of creativity can transfer into daily actions, ones centered on the expression and the cultivation of morality, a spirit for life (p.65). The study discusses more on this idea of personality and expression in the next chapter.

Ultimately, H’Doubler was concerned with the identity of the professional dancer, that dance would be “doomed” (p.66) if it became a means of entertainment which she believed “needs more action” (above). It is from this point of view, that H’Doubler is similar to Dewey in her understanding of the professional dancer. Dewey, as a professional educator and public intellectual, strove to improve the experience of the student because he felt that occupations had become compartmentalized. Drawing from Dewey, H’Doubler was concerned that dance would lose its spirit for imagination, so it became a moral imperative for the creative impulses to be directed by the authority of the learning environment as well as the authority of the teacher.

H’Doubler’s careful construction of the classroom and the role of the instructor in educating students has become all the more relevant today, as dance education in higher education sits on a rocky ground, constantly striving for funding to provide space and time for those interested in its practice for example. Dance inside the institution of higher education rests on the model of the career-driven student to produce professional dancers who will succeed in the visible, performance realm of commercial arts. When one thinks of dance, it is common to think of popular television shows, movies, or the plight of the dancer-entrepreneur who strives to make it in the audition-world. This identity is one that is difficult to resist and forces out those communities where dance provides one mode of transmission for a culture outside entertainment, a mode of cultural transmission outside of the desire to follow one’s passion at all cost. Many even qualify the professional dancer through a particular materiality: the professional with the
headshot, the video reel of performance clips ready-made for the next audition; however, these are modes of access to a world where there is little room for what H’Doubler knew to be “life’s essence,” warning us that “art cannot be divorced from life” (p.xxi). What did life mean for H’Doubler? Is this professional dancer model divorced from life if it serves and reifies the modern society?

This begs the question: if H’Doubler warned dance educators about the professionalization of dance, then why is this identity still held so strongly today? How can we rethink the structures of higher education, the role of the educator and the student, to think critically about the forces of capitalism and their relationship to what we qualify as the arts? The next two sections will look critically at H’Doubler through both Durkheim and Marx, to think through a philosophy of dance education that is long-lasting and transformative.

3.3 H’Doubler through Durkheim

This section reflects on H’Doubler through a Durkheimian framework to find underlying themes and commonalities between our study’s 20th century thinkers. For example, dance through a Durkheimian lens can be defined as a sacred act as it forwards the collective consciousness through its ritual practice, such as daily technique classes and performances on the stage, the renewal of solidarity through participation in these spaces. Durkheim would have studied this through looking at aboriginal practices, as dance was largely incorporated in ceremonial rituals, and thus, it can be implied that dance became a largely studied phenomenon in the early 20th century due to the alienation that resulted from the industrial era, but also from the change in structures of labor, the collapse of the public sphere and women entering the workforce. Attempting to overcome alienation and great change, dance for European and white middle-class Americans, became this source for fostering and celebrating the culture of the
frontier. Backwards, traditional ways of movement practices could then be taken from and called advanced for the growing society.

In the early 20th century, the body became a site to discipline the moral attitude of society, to refine the division of labor through shaping efficient bodies. Dance developed into a mode for the consciousness, which we see through H’Doubler, for the individual to be directed towards intellectual ways of being. With the idea of morality in mind, there are many similarities and differences between Durkheim and Dewey that we saw in chapter two, which by extension, Durkheim and H’Doubler. It can be implied that H’Doubler carried a similar attitude about the collective consciousness and morality, as she uses Dewey’s texts as her model for developing her practice. From chapter two, the study notes the differences between Dewey and Durkheim, that while Durkheim sees the collective consciousness stimulated by the practices and actions of the group and the overarching institution, Dewey looks at the individual’s experience to affect the total society. Thus, H’Doubler looks at the experience of the individual, his ability to learn by experience, to be able to understand the spirit of himself through movement, and further, the spirit of the culture of his growing nation.

Unlike Dewey, however, H’Doubler’s position is a political one as she exists in Turner’s liminal space of the social order. Still like Dewey, through offering a space for expression for what must be founded as an empirical study in higher education during this industrial period, she seeks to make change in higher education through the absorption of that liminal space. She seeks to define the professional artist as profane, a social fact she deems by calling it a profession, compartmentalized as labor. Rather than understand artists during this time, and clarify which dance she was speaking about, she claims dance as egalitarian and open for expression. Dancers during this time were not only training in movement styles in mechanical ways for theatrical
entertainment, but inventing new ways of moving the body to understand the culture of the modern era (Guadagnino, 2019, March 20). H’Doubler allowed dance to be absorbed because she did not and probably could not clarify which dance she was talking about. But we can imply that she did not need to clarify, because with secular rituals in mind, the more regulated, the more refined, the more growth in organic solidarity. Because of H’Doubler’s lack of experience as a dancer herself, she had the power to take the “spirit” of dance and make it educational, to remove the culture that fostered its spirit to begin with. Though her position is a political one inside the university, challenging the role of women, outside of this space, it seems that she appropriated the lived experiences of artists outside the system, and as such, shapes dance through social fact: a spirit to be define through the sacred space of the institution. Dance made educational in this context leaves many questions for the philosophy of dance when tied to the institution which this study will continue to explore.

Further, dance educators for a long time have wanted dance to exist as a “real” study, to “verify” it as an intellectual study starting in higher education. This goes back to anomie, that because dance practices may exist in liminal spaces, they face a lack of resources, a lack of social contract that recognizes them; and especially, given that dance requires the body, lack of care would require a search for a space that would provide the opportunity for a balanced life where the dancer could care for herself. This space becomes the university, the site for the growth of the frontier, where dance, alongside the fine arts, can be considered as part of this growth, and perhaps even captured by the state. It becomes a question then, to let dance remain in its act as a resistant space as and for the lived experience the artist outside the system, or to become part of higher education to be able to bond in solidarity through the division of labor.
Through the politics that is this qualifying-of-the-arts as education, that dance is to be “considered too” becomes manifold:

The arts in American education were and still are marginalized, and dance as for some time has been among the least regarded of the arts (Ross, 2000, p.7).

H’Doubler wanted dance to be part of higher education, to be incorporated into education as a practice of expression, for the learner to embody himself, which is important for the white middle-class student caught in rigid systems of desk and book learning. Still, H’Doubler did not offer a critique of the structures of higher education, but rather, believed dance to be an art, a critical study for movement, for the purpose of education and not for dancing in and of itself. As she understood the politics of women becoming part of higher education, cautious about her position, it could be said that thinking about any sort of ritual critique outside western enlightenment philosophy, the education of the “whole person” (Ross, 2000, p.7) was not an option, especially with the desire for a new program developed by a woman. The only ritual critique that H’Doubler could offer was in her resistance to the duality of mind and body, one large step for thinking about a relevant philosophy, one tied to a major public intellectual, Dewey, also a reformer cautious of his place in the university at the time.

3.4 H’Doubler through Marx

In chapter one, the section discussing Marx served as an important segway into thinking further about liminality, because liminal groups, or creative practices in and outside of institutions are face the risk for elimination. Marx understood the rationalization of economic ordering fostered by structures of power that could be challenged through the revolt of the oppressed class. Liminal groups, in this way, are like Marx’s proletariat, challenging the structure to maintain a space for their culture; yet, they are different as liminal groups exist in the gaps of the system, not necessarily seeking an active overthrow of the oppressors, but a
maintenance of their solidarity. In this study, through Marx, H'Doubler serves as an actor absorbing the liminal space, acting less in the spirit of revolution than in the attitude of a progressive reformer seeking to use dance practices for the vision of a Eurocentric education centered on American pragmatism.

Marx commented on the collapse of feudalism and its effects on the worker, witnessing a growing alienation. As Marx relates to Durkheim in his idea of effervescence, a hyperexcitement that mobilizes transformation, H'Doubler was able to use her position in higher education to critique this effervescence of growing professionalization through the study of movement beyond mechanics and mimicry, but in the pursuit of individual expression. Due to the transformation of the industrial era, H’Doubler was concerned that movement would become mechanical, isolated from the spirit of learning. While this relates to Dewey’s desire for experience as a mode of learning, for H’Doubler, the relationship between higher education and women was her concern, and in this way, she differs from Dewey; further, H’Doubler’s actions could actually be viewed in a Marxist perspective as she advocates for an oppressed class of woman seeking education and public exposure. H’Doubler is political as she seeks to bring women into the public, leveraging her position to do so. As a woman, she must challenge politics that is her identity as a woman, as well as the dominant knowledge industry of higher education. She makes dance education the practice and space to be able to do so:

America in the 1920s was in the midst of significant cultural change, much of it spurred, as were H’Doubler’s innovations in dance education, by what historian Stanley Coben as labeled a widespread “rebellion against victorianism.” H’Doubler was in distinguished intellectual company during this decade of reaction and reform...H’Doubler, however, tended to frame her change as reform more than rebellion. This is a wise posture for a revisionist, for it implies that all that H’Doubler is doing is dusting off a forgotten treasure for humanity and reestablishing it
where it belongs, and the heart of cultural transmission, in education...It is this anchoring of the
dance as historically indispensable, and yet retooled for the new America, that H’Doubler would
use to win its acceptance (p.10-11).

Still, while H’Doubler’s place is political, she does not consider other ways of dance beyond
European styles. Ross mentions later how H’Doubler equated jazz dance by black Americans
and other forms of dance from the global south as unartistic and unintellectual forms of
movement (p.13). Later many black dancers become integrated into the university as well as
other forms of black movement and epistemologies; however, today, we see that most of these
forms are colonized by the culture of higher education often hiring “diversity” faculty to serve as
the “other” to the dominant culture (Schupp & McCarthy-Brown, 2018). There are implications
to such ambiguity despite the political nature of one’s role. The next chapter will explore politics
and alienation further to understand H’Doubler’s role in shaping dance education.

3.5 Chapter Conclusion

Given that she changed the landscape of dance education, and that studying the biology
of the body through dance practices was a feat that challenged the Cartesian duality of mind and
body, H’Doubler was able to reform higher education for white middle-class women to think
about their bodies with health in mind during the post-Victorian era. As women become
integrated into the public, dance in higher education meant verifying the existence of the white
women’s body as more than a private, reproductive role. Yet, this also meant that dance could be
professionalized through the labor of performance in the public realm, what H’Doubler resisted
in cultivating the spirit of the individual. While she resisted this professionalization, this study
offers a moment to rethink and reconsider her philosophy with Capitalism in mind, where
professionalization is the reality and the mode for the knowledge industry in higher education.
H’Doubler was a pioneer of her time in much the same way that Dewey was, and we can offer
similar critiques to H’Doubler as the study offered for Dewey. The study will continue to consider: was the moment that dance became defined educational, a moment and a symptom where dance, and many art practices, could no longer operate without the dependency of the state to verify it? How can we reconsider the role of public realm? This will be the subject for the next chapter as the study looks at the nature of language through Jacques Rancière, Hannah Arendt, and Frédéric Lordon to rethink a philosophy for dance education.
Chapter Four.

The Ethics of Dance Education

4.0 Overview

The following chapter will describe the implications for creating a philosophy of dance education, one in which H’Doubler attempts to develop through Dewey’s pragmatic lens starting during the progressive era. When H’Doubler attempts to make dance educational through the institution of higher education, she is caught in a double bind: first, the institution captures and claims the spirit of dance practice by making it pedagogical, becoming a sacred space for the student to express spirit according to the ritual practices provided by the school, and second, the teacher and student depend on one another to properly express the spirit to produce “educable responses” (H’Doubler, 1957, p.65) to enhance one’s capacity and personality which both depend on the moral center of the school. The chapter will look at this pragmatic approach to dance education through Plato’s instrumental reason to better understand H’Doubler’s desire for dance to be of use for education, for the enlightened student of dance to reflect what H’Doubler called “man’s mental evolution” (p.43). This final chapter will begin to rethink spirit as more than the expression of the growth of modernity.

4.1 Plato’s Capture of Spirit

According to Arendt (2007), philosophy for Socrates was not to be done or to be made practical for each member of the polis to access, but rather, it was to be a site for understanding one’s doxa, or opinion on the world through his experiences in life (p.7). Socrates’ death becomes a moment where his student, Plato, in fear of losing philosophy to the more practical matters of life, establishes an order of the philosopher-king who rules the city to secure the place
of the philosopher. In this order, the hierarchy of the philosopher-king captures the soul of the individual for the logos of the order, to give each person a part so that the philosopher too, can have a part. The establishment of this order meant claiming the spirit as a language to be expressed through the oligarchy, those rightfully born in a place of power—for spirit was not for the uneducated polis, whose voices were mere sounds of pain or pleasure. Spirit for the polis meant expressing their jobs to maintain harmony, it meant that their voice were the sound of the stimulation they’d find through their work but could not be considered as real language for relationships to be built upon. Spirit for the polis was not about knowledge or fostering languages to create opinions about the world around them; but, that is until the artisan who writes poetry becomes an unforeseen phenomenon in Plato’s order (Rancière, 2004, p.44).

Socrates’ decision not to flee during his trial reveals his commitment to the truth of reason, and despite Plato’s fears, his death is not a moment where hope is lost, where reason can be stamped out through the establishment of order. Socrates knew that reason grew through conversations with oneself, and would always remain as long as one has himself and his fellow men to come into existence with (Arendt, 2007, p.20). The concern for Arendt (1998) becomes that man cannot discover this language without his fellow men, without the public realm (p.220-221). So while Plato frames Socrates’ death as a point of no return, concerning himself with the practical use of philosophy as an answer to avoiding death to philosophy, we find today, that a Socratic philosophy is not about the governance through a vertical hierarchy as Plato would have it survive—it is about fostering a life worth living: a life built with one another as unique humans. This is Plato’s major flaw, a flaw in which shapes modernity through the rationality of proper schooling.

4.1.1 H’Doubler’s Capture of Spirit
Many academics, like H’Doubler, follow Plato when they fail to recognize the paradox of their situation, their role in contributing to the hierarchy of a social order, through explicating to the student about the ideal life that can be had through growth, or change that will happen in the future. Even though she maintains a precarious position as an unmarried woman in higher education of the early 20th century and questions the very politics of the institution, despite her position, H’Doubler still contributes to the capture of dance as a pedagogy. At this moment, dance education becomes elevated to the standards of the institution where the demands of the dance teacher become equated with the responsibility of the philosopher-king who is to enlighten the student about the world. The teacher alone, like the philosopher-king, is allowed to set the agenda, to shape the parameters of the curriculum:

If we go to one of the first masters of educational theory, Plato, we are told that “the purpose of education is to give to the body and soul all the beauty and all the perfection of which they are capable.” This definition of purpose still holds, but today we would qualify Plato’s statement in some such manner as that suggested by Spencer in his definition of life as “the conscious adjustment of internal relations to external.” Both views, it is clear, focus upon the development and growth of the individual, and both imply self-activity, which we may take the keynote of current educational speculation. The higher aim of education today is the development to the fullest extent of the growth of the individual, based upon a scientific understanding of all his needs and capacities. In doing so we try to attune our own thinking to harmonize with the student’s particular interests because we realize that in his interests lie the key to his needs and capacities (H’Doubler, 1957, p.61)

While dance for H’Doubler becomes a way in which women can learn about their bodies, to become emancipated from the Victorian image of the woman as lazy and idle, she creates a hierarchical authority for the teacher in two ways: when she alone decides what counts for dance
curriculum and what does not, and when she understands that the individual can be guided through their capacities, and thus she controls her students’ bodies when she becomes the one enlightened to help students discover themselves. In addition, she reaffirmed that women, desiring to become part of public life, required proper indoctrination to be able to understand their bodies, to give birth to the ideas of humanity as a sacred voice of the nation-state.

Furthermore, through H’Doubler’s dance-for-education model, the student of dance is to become a teacher of dance, but not a dancer, because the teacher’s pedagogy offers a place for dance to exert the spirit of a social order that expresses efficiency and growth of organic solidarity. We can see how this goes back to Plato’s parts where the artisan who writes poetry is not supposed to occur because they participate in more than a single role in their labor towards creating a language that should not come to the public light—the artisan should only be heard as utterance of voice as part of the polis. For H’Doubler, the dancer should be a teacher, but not a dancer, because then they can express the harmony of the social order: they can strengthen the collective conscious by acting as a moral center through the pedagogical expression and capture of creativity.

Further, H’Doubler grabs movement styles and motifs from the dance-artist of the early 20th century, only to be made legitimate and sacred by the university. Ross (2000) reminds us, “H’Doubler defined dance education in opposition to dance as an art form” (p.166), and this is in order for dance to become an experience rather than be experienced in the context of where it is born. The chapter will continue to look at dance as more than a practice of reason, as more than the work one will do inside the studio for the development of a life of harmony outside of it; rather, it will look at dance as action to move oneself, to move others, to relate to one another
through a lasting assemblage of languages that allows communities to embody memory as a reclaiming and as a resistance to future colonization.

4.2 Alienation and Capture for Marx, Marcuse, and Lordon

This section discusses the idea of spirit and expression of emotion in order to further articulate what it means to define the totality through the stimulation of a collective consciousness. Thinking about expression is relevant to understanding the reasons dancers move, what draws people to dance, and how emotions are influenced by the dominant collective conscious. For example, H’Doubler had emphasized the expression of spirit and her ideas of dance as emotional expression are still prevalent today. The notion of emotional expression, however, carries with it the assumption that all emotions are ready and able to be expressed through the practice of an art form, where dance for H’Doubler becomes the ultimate expression as it incorporates the body. But emotions are not that simple—they are embedded with affects and tied to ecology. Affects, the objects, memories, and associations direct desire through their materiality and thus are subject to be shaped by the built environment of the social order. While emotional states are often assumed to be natural and universal, this does not allow for one’s truth, one’s doxa to come into existence. In the social order, the dancer bears the responsibility of the performative sacred act, but this is a mere veil for the instrumentality of emotions in an efficient economic order.

H’Doubler explains,

In art, as in reality, the drives are of the emotional nature; when subjected to the restrain and directions of the intellect and executed by the physical, they result in a fusion of all our energies with the focal point centered in the personality (H’Doubler, 1957, p.63)

In this instance, she reveals the discussion in the previous section above, that the polis who experience pleasure and pain, experience a reality of an emotional and unintellectual nature—in
other words, the polis need to be educated to control their passions. Emotions cannot be wasted and must be tied to the job. Dance as a pedagogy becomes one site to control waste.

H’Doubler calls this control personality which must be shaped for each worker to have a part not only in physical labor but in the psyche of the economic structure. Fabrication of materiality in a controlled and commoditized society, however, creates weakness in people as the memories associated with objects and relationships, the ecology, are shattered through a definitive order that rids the unique and particular. H’Doubler’s idea of personality differs from the idea of the unique and particular, from doxa: in order to qualify as a person or a character one must be part of the dominant narrative which is the result of what she calls “a fusion,” and efficient use of energies. In this narrative, efficiency rids permanence embodied through memory of generations past who made the world to be built upon, and personality becomes an individual choice or personal development, a performance of the structure rather than a way one comes into existence with one another.

Thus, the polis then become subjugated to these emotions, removed from thought and memory, to become slaves to their labor and nothing more. So as the result of the social order, the dance teacher enlightens the student through introducing methods for expression, reinforcing an instrumental use of emotions for the performance of personality. Empathy to understand another’s doxa becomes a transactional mode rather than a way of relationality towards assemblages of joy. In the following sections, capture and alienation will be discussed through the lens of Herbert Marcuse, Baruch Spinoza, Lardon, and Marx in order to understand dance as a language to connect and have a conversation through ecological life as opposed to dance as a mode of performance for society, a tool for education.

4.2.1 Alienation
This section discusses the concept of alienation more broadly in order to situate it into the context of labor of the 20th century to articulate H’Doubler’s preoccupation with the spirit as a place for developing personality. Because the arts often become a subject matter, an activity, where one can think creatively outside of a repressive world to overcome alienation, in this way, H’Doubler wanted dance to qualify as an art, for the body to become this place for overcoming oppression. This idea of arts, however, reaffirms that alienation will always have to be dealt with, that we will always have to cope with a failed reality, but as long as there are arts accessible, we can then remain hopeful. Through Marx, Marcuse, Spinoza, and Lordon, this section will describe some of the issues with an existential philosophy tied to a Eurocentric vision of culture.

As a reminder from chapter two, Marx describes political economy as the site where economic exchange value molds the worker into a commodity to be dispensed with after use (Fromm, 2014, p.81). Life becomes about the accumulation of wealth in the form of objects, “a world of things,” and as commodification of life increases, human relationality decreases, alienating man from his work (p.82-83). Capitalism blossoms through alienated labor, the essence of private property (Fromm, 2014, p.131). And when alienated from his labor, man does not know himself because his essence, or identity, is defined through alienated labor. Universal emotions, then, become defined through this essence:

From an essentialist point of view, an essence is the mechanism that guarantees the identity of the natural kind and serves as the principal defining element for instances of that kind, regardless of what those instances actually look like…(Barrett, 2006, p.29)

As skills encapsulate his essence, man loses his sense of being as his identity becomes prescribed in a ready-formed society (Fromm, 2014, .132). He cannot create his history (p.24) as he cannot
abstract the object of himself to form his subjectivity, and instead, he is used by another as an object in their motive: for the creative power of money (p.137).

In *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse wants to understand how to overcome this state of alienation. For Marcuse, alienation from labor is different in comparison to alienation from nature, or what we could call self-alienation (Parkinson, 1977, p.453). In this case, the latter is a choice and an imagined reality, a new world of culture, a revolution of alienated labor:

This notion of productivity has its historical limits: they are those of the performance principle. Beyond its domain, productivity has another content and another relation to the pleasure principle: they are anticipated in the process of imagination which preserves freedom from the performance principle while maintaining the claim of a new reality principle...If the achievements of the performance principle surpass its institutions, they also militate against the direction of its productivity—against the subjugation of man to his labor...It is the sphere outside labor which defines freedom and fulfillment, and it is the definition of the human existence in terms of this sphere which constitutes the negation of the performance principle (p.156).

Marcuse imagined that a new reality could be constructed through aesthetics to offer permanent pleasure, a reality beyond repression. Alienation from nature would allow the alienated object, the worker, to develop his subjectivity through imagination in Eros (p.143). Life would become play because man would have the leisure time to develop his subjectivity, to realize his dreams as reality in the “recapture of time” (p.233) where he could transcend his passions. This idea of subjectivity, of overcoming, can only be realized, however, when libido-object desires are relinquished from the state apparatus (p.242), which is difficult to achieve when man is subjugated to his labor. With Marcuse’s idea of play, repression remains inevitable.

Emotions then, in essence, are social—they are the guarantee that dance has a place in the social order to perform a duality of freedom and repression. In turn, emotions bind dancers to
their bodies, and in seeking a way to express alienation, movement is produced and they perform on the stage or teach in the studio, to express the spirit of the social order. Emotions as means of capital become an economy for the profession of dance (Lordon, 2014, p.1; Dempster, 2016). So, going back to Marx, this complicates the subject and object relationship when emotions become social capital (Shilling, 1991). If dancers cannot transcend the object of self, and remain oppressed, the creative power of money captures emotions in order not to waste human capital. In this context, dancers are trapped within their bodies as emotions define one’s self-concept, one’s social role defined by the state body. Performance for dancers is then a mode that is a constant need-to-overcome life, a culturally codified artistic expression of rational enlightenment: emotion is to be expressed and exerted as capital through performance.

Lordon (2014), however, understands life as self-preservation through directing the conatus, the energy of desire to preserve one’s being (p.1). He uses Spinoza’s anti-humanist framework that rejects the claims of subjectivity, seeing immanence within the material world (Gatens, 2000, p.60). Subjectivity for Marx and Marcuse is to be developed through transcendence of passions. Spinoza, on the other hand, adopts an anti-subjectivity framework where one finds a multiplicity of being through fostering assemblages: man is part and composite of nature as opposed to separate and transient that occurs in transcendental thought (p.61).

Lordon says,

...young Marx, keen on reviving his concept of alienation...almost inevitably return to schemas of loss and separation...imagining emancipation in the form of a reunion. Thus, individuals are alienated when they are ‘cut off from their power of acting,’ and the ultimate meaning of disalienation to find one’s way ‘back,’ so as to coincide with it again...For Spinoza there is no power that is not immediately and fully actual...there is no reserve...the conatus is always exhausting what it can do (p.143)
Lordon portrays how corporate bodies reorient the conatus to align workers with the master-desire to use their energy efficiently for capital (p.45). As powerful affects force workers to fixate on their labor through removing assemblages of joy, they capture their will and desire to move on their own path. Lordon (2014) describes this capture as “happy servitude,” as it transubstantiates one’s feelings towards the master-desire, weakening their power by removing their ability to assemble joyful affects according to their own desire (p.91). This reshaping can cause the subject to experience what feels authentic when a codified social structure inhibits the ability to rethink possibilities and manifest possible becomings, forcing one to submit their power to the conatus of the master-desire (p.83):

Forms of sociability built on capture rely on the habituated world passing as the only possible world. The contagiousness of the affects predispose us to accept this habituated expressed world as the world. Sociability is built out of our tendency to mistake that which the other expresses for the thing expressed: in this way the ‘other’ (especially the powerful other) may structure and organize my perceptions of the world...Sociability captures mobile, molecular becoming in molar forms of being (Gatens 2000, p.67)

Sociability is the source of the authentic feeling exo-determined by affections; in other words, the perpetuation of the social order is directed by the contagiousness of affect. Considering these forces, capture is more than an illusion to be mastered through intellect, as Marcuse would build through aesthetics, as H’Doubler would understand exploration through body to develop one’s personality, but rather affective capture halts and inhibits mobility (Parkinson, 1977, p.456). So it is not so much that personality must be developed, as H’Doubler believed, as it is the loss of personhood that the social order enforces, a personhood that must be recaptured to come into presence through doxa, to direct one’s conatus through reassembling the material world: a materiality that includes emotions.
For Spinoza, affects can weaken or give power to the body through the structure of social life, which means man is not subjugated to his emotions if he can reorient his conatus by fostering memories through building and remembering a lost culture. The ability to move through one’s alienation and direct one’s conatus towards strong affects (Lordon, 2014, p.162) as opposed to transcending the feelings that alienate the individual, will be discussed in the following sections. This study will further explore emotion and its utility in the division of labor, especially in creative industries such as dance.

4.2.2 Reorientation

As discussed earlier, Hegel’s dialectic relies on the plane of transcendence through the pursuit to the absolute spirit. This view assumes that in order to transcend the plane of immanence, or nature, towards civilization, sociability must organize it (Gatens, 2000, p.60), seeking to regulate life processes and fixate affections on the capital apparatus. The plane of immanence, however, according to Deleuze and Guattari, “is a plane of experimentation...in a ceaseless process of becoming something else” (p.61).

Prescribed ways of being are fostered in the division of labor, constantly seeking relations which give greater power to the market. Spinoza’s ethology surpasses the logic of molar forms:

If we understand a rule-based morality as one which addresses itself to molar subjects, then ethology may be understood as offering an ethics of the molecular, a micropolitics concerned with the ‘in between’ of subjects, with that which passes between them and which manifests the range of their possible becomings (Gatens, 2000, p.62).

When thinking about modification, what we will later call disturbance, as an action that occurs from the interaction in between subjects, the oppressed, those subjugated to their labor, do not need to emancipate themselves through recognition by their oppressors—they do not need to “overcome contradictions in which they are caught” (Freire, 2017, p.49). Modification, or the
“effect of a prior affection,” means that as momentum moves subjects through interactions and within relationships, their affections are subject to change or change others. This recognition can mobilize. In other words, affects modify one’s conatus, but do not encapsulate subjectivity in full. If one can be modified into sadness, they can also modify their life towards joy through recognition of their power.

In addition, as each person has a conatus shaped by these prior affections, one’s recognition of particular relationships can help foster joyful affections. Affect can be looked at as a modified state, a variegated piece of their conatus where “something…happens to it and modifies it” (p.15):

Since we are doomed to exo-determination, there is no possibility of being outside alienation. But it does not follow that all forms of alienation are equal. Some present individuals with wider latitudes for desiring and enjoying, releasing them from the fixed ideas of the master-desires that other forms compel them to live under. The common life is not a choice that people are free to reject. The endogenous forces of their passionate lives lead them to it necessarily, beginning with the requisites for reproducing their material lives (Lordon, 2014, p.162).

Lordon ends Willing Slaves of Capital with the excerpt above, and it is in this conclusion that he emphasizes Spinoza’s substance as permanent alienation, a state where we are constantly exposed to forces we cannot control but can learn to understand our power through organizing a life against those forces which weaken us. Lordon attests that one can widen their latitude and direct their energy away from the master-desire through fostering positive material assemblages and recognizing the forces that alter their conatus.

Widening one’s latitude means understanding those forces which cause weakness of spirit; it means understanding the materiality of hatred (the profane). Spinoza’s notion of hatred understands the importance of self-representation in the social structure: “people tend to
experience...pride and shame, only when they become aware that they have lived up to, or failed to live up to, some actual self-representation” (Tracy & Robins, 2009, p.105). Approval of one’s social role affirms a place and survival within the social structure (p.106). Looking onto others for the confirmation of this representation drives affects as one associates their memories with how others respond to them. Identities become contagious as one desires a positive existence and a confirmation of their existence. And so when identities are regulated and constructed as Lordon notes, this can alter one’s self-image, the image of whether or not one’s existence is painful to others, whether or not they are Durkheim’s profane figure. While this can subjugate one to their emotions, it can also allow one to understand that sadness is not simply a given, but a part of the objects, memories, and associations which surround them but do not define identity. It is important to understand that it is the directive of the collective consciousness to make sure emotions are properly defined, that those criminal are made to experience hatred by others to direct it back towards themselves.

The worker looks for joy through his servitude towards a master-desire because he does not recognize his power outside of this labor-performance: his aim, or telos, is thought to be of intrinsic motivation driven through his own desire, when in truth, it is controlled and exo-determined by affect. This becomes problematic for understanding one’s emotions as capture is hidden within the disconnected forms of material assemblages directed subtly towards the order of human capital. Enclosed in private property, emotions are shaped through the universality of essence where enclosure allows for the perfecting of reason. Perfection can then be developed through the division of labor, giving birth to an empty commoditized world where the dancer’s body becomes a symbol of this capture.
4.3 Disruption and Deschooling

Earlier in chapter one, the study looked at Durkheim’s idea of effervescence, a hyperexcitement that mobilizes transformation to understand how in times of change, society seeks to find solidarity through a collective conscious; this collective conscious comes to being through ritual practices through the renewal of the sacred. When thinking about this renewal and how we think about rituals today, it can be difficult to think about a society without the ritual of schooling. Today neoliberalism has caused the corporate state to invade all aspects of our private and public lives. For this reason, Arendt, through Socrates’ doxa, explains that the social, the collapse and conflation of private and public worlds, has become a collective housekeeping done by the policing of the state and now, corporations. While Durkheim’s idea of collective conscious was in the interest of solidarity in times of change, it missed a main aspect, one which allows for ecological relationality: care.

Though academics and scholars like Durkheim, Marx, and Dewey saw that people began to become alienated from one another, they found that only again, through a modern system, could society continue to “improve” itself. Care, it would seem, would just happen alone, without the need for thinking about the epistemologies lost before their time. From the industrial era, to today, the solution for this care, seems to be a continued-waiting for the masses to come together to finally fix this problem. It is not, however, a mass effort to change the world we live in. In order to disrupt, through Rancière and Illich, the study will explore what it means to deschool ourselves through living out a politics that questions the nature of the social order. The study concludes with thoughts on language as a site for bring bodies, of nature and of peoples, together to share and open a commons. Maybe this is a long-lasting effervescence we can look forward to.
4.3.1 Politics through Rancière

In the neoliberal era of the 21st century, emancipation often becomes categorized as a solution for gaining autonomy through revolution. As shown above in the discussion on universal emotions, those oppressed can seem to be passive bodies that require explicating to in order to find salvation from oppression (Rancière, 1991, p.16)—that one must be told what their emotions are in order to express them, that expression means experiencing an emotional state to be exerted properly through an aesthetic. But, when we look at Rancière (1999), like Spinoza, he brings attention to the space between the improvisation of individuals and the policing order, or “when there is a place and a way for two heterogeneous processes to meet” (p.30). This meeting place of two processes, becomes the potentia, or the power to maintain a public realm for the appearance of doxa (Arendt, 1998, p.200).

This appearance requires the mobility of peoples, where those with “no part” in the collective order can come into the public, to participate. When the policing of social life becomes a conversation about the identities of the social order, between those communities without a part in it, politics occurs and opens up possibilities for rethinking the social order. Exposure of “the wrong” for Rancière means when worlds meet that are not supposed to meet, a shared language allows a bridge for the development of one’s doxa; further, the public becomes more than representation but about connection.

So going back to H’Doubler, this means, first, that H’Doubler had exposed the wrong initially when participating in the public life as a woman in higher education, in the very act of becoming the philosopher-king. Here, she is positioned as a part without a part because at this time she is not supposed to have a say in the scholarship and must be careful about the program she creates. She is cautious about performance in the sense that she wants to dance to become
part of academic labor, whereas performance at this time meant challenging the profession and social role of the entertainer, a space and role outside of the sacred institution of higher education. At the time, H’Doubler is not the public intellectual that Dewey is, so with that in mind, she must position herself carefully within the leading progressive theories; through her participation in progressive thinking, as a woman post-Victorian era, H’Doubler bridges two worlds that should not meet. While she has to control the curriculum for the sake of the risky space of the institution, it is the very act of her participating that is politics:

Domestic space is thus at once that private space, separated from the space of citizenship, and a space included in the complementarity of laws and morals that defines the accomplishment of citizenship. The unseemly appearance of women on the electoral stage transforms into a mode of exposure of a wrong, in the logical sense, this republican topos of laws and morals that binds police logic up in the definition of politics. By constructing the singular, polemical universally of demonstration, it brings out the universal of the republic of a particularized universal, distorted in its very definition by the police logic of roles and parts...thus politicized, attributes to women who are mothers, educators, carers, and civilizers to the class of lawmaker citizens (Rancière, 1999, p.41-42).

Even though H’Doubler is not a lawmaker per say, as a woman in the 20th century, she appears in the public space as she makes a change in the laws of education, in what constitutes movement education. Through Dewey’s idea of experience, she qualifies that women’s experience of movement is in fact experience to be considered educational. While still problematic as a subject of education, dance still exists as part of higher education because H’Doubler was able to qualify dance as academic study. This allows us to question: what does it mean to have a part? Who or what captured dance? Like in Spinoza’s affects, politics entails understanding what makes up the structures of the social order beyond representation and control of the state apparatus:
The notion of the state apparatus is in fact bound up with the presupposition of an opposition between State and society in which the state is portrayed as a machine, a “cold monster” imposing its rigid order on the life of society. This representation already presupposes a certain “political philosophy,” that is, a certain confusion of politics and the police. The distribution of places and roles that defines a police regime stems as much from the spontaneity of social relations as from the rigidity of state functions (p.29).

Through Rancière, we can begin to see how alienation, for Marx, Marcuse, Lordon, means that without a part in the social order, the individual is estranged from their production, that they become a means to an end without relationships that commit to the responsibility of a life of joy. And thus, through Rancière we can see that this alienation can be overcome through the forming communities of relationality that contest their very part as alienated beings in society. Contesting this part of no part becomes, not so much a victimization of one’s oppression then, but a resistance to being told that one is merely without substance when they don’t fit the visible, representational order: of being told of one’s alienation.

While spirit for H’Doubler implied a particular rationality, it also implied that spirit for women was part of the dominant, masculine order. During her time, she contested the notion that women were idle and lazy in the private realm, but rather that they too, could participate in the making of the spirit of the dominant culture. This study recognizes that though there is a question of where politics starts and ends, when spirit is captured as capital, it is in the act of rethinking this space for woman that politics occurs, that the dance community of higher education forms. Spirit must be captured in H’Doubler’s dance education for the very sake of being considered part of the dominant spirit, for women to be considered producers of more than the privacy of the household. In looking at H’Doubler’s action as a politics, this allows us to further question: where does dance belong? It allows us to ask again: what does it mean to have a part? The next
section will describe the ritual of schooling to think through the part of the hero in society, to question the artist and the place for dance.

4.3.2 Illich and Deschooling

Ivan Illich studied under Paulo Freire, who developed *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* in order to help those suffering under the destruction and domination of the industrial society. As Freire studied Marxism, his work follows the understanding that oppression is to be overcome through the development of consciousness; it becomes that revolution must be through the form of protest or mass schooling of the masses, risking despotism and hatred because of the necessity of leaders to enlighten the oppressed. Illich reveals, however, that this idea of the heroic teacher comes from the idea of the promethean figure where man can become responsible through his foresight and save the oppressed (Kahn, 2009). As a promethean figure, the teacher then becomes responsible to sacrifice themselves for the common good of humanity. Similar to Freire, even Marcuse attempted to reconfigure the culture hero’s “unbridled social prometheanism” (p.41), but as shown in the section on alienation, Marcuse still remains tied to the social order. Illich helps us rethink the social order in his notion of deschooling society.

With Illich, the manipulative hierarchy of the social order can be deconstructed. Illich (1970) looked at the hidden rituals that govern society (p.51). He used the promethean hero to reveal the hidden assumptions about dreams of a better future (Kahn, 2009, p.48). For example, Prometheus’ brother Epimetheus in many stories is portrayed to be “dull-witted” and his marriage to Pandora is described as “a root of human travails;” but, Illich inverts this common notion of the savior-hero:

Illich emphasizes that Pandora was the keeper of hope…[and Epimetheus was] rather the ancient cultural archetype of those who freely give and recognize gifts, care for and treasure life
(especially during times of catastrophe), and attend to the conservation of seeds of hope in the world for future others (p.41).

This is where Illich derives his notion of convivial relationships, of friendships, where a collaboration of unique skills and interests can provide care for a world (p.46). Illich’s notion of care requires what Socrates knew as doxa, opinions developed in the context of others. Care is not necessarily preoccupied with a better future, rather, looks at taking interest in the present, in the gifts that contribute to a joyful living.

Further, Illich provides the notion of deschooling to unveil the social addiction to the job (Illich, 1970, p.55). He reveals that a schooled society will never satisfy the needs of people. Gift-giving can be seen through convivial tools and relationships to rethink the purpose of institutions and the heroic nature of the pedagogue:

I choose the term “conviviality” to designate the opposite of industrial productivity. I intend it to mean autonomous and creative intercourse among persons, and the intercourse of person with their environment; and this in contrast with the conditioned response of persons to the demands made upon them by others, and by man-made environment. I consider conviviality to be individual freedom realized in personal interdependence and, as such, an intrinsic ethical value. I believe that, in any society, as conviviality is reduced below a certain level, no amount of industrial productivity can effectively satisfy the needs it creates among society’s members (Illich, 1973, p.11)

Illich elaborates that convivial tools are a means which foster productivity and allow energy to be used proportionally for the community. With the notion of gift giving in mind, tools in this sense can foster care for nurturing a lively ecology. Having “a part” means that what we define as “nature” or the “outdoors” has a part to be contested, for thinking about what constitutes “the environment,” for what constitutes “the experience.” In other words, ecology becomes politics
through deschooling society. Convivial relationships are not human centered and contesting the part of nature as an acting citizen is a strange but crucial argument. Illich describes memory as part of the soil:

   We were torn from the bonds to soil - the connections that limited action, making practical virtue possible - when modernization insulated us from plain dirt, from toil, flesh, soil and grave. The economy into which we have been absorbed - some, willy-nilly, some at great cost - transforms people into interchangeable morsels of population, ruled by laws of scarcity...To speak of friendship, religion and joint suffering as a style of conviviality - after soil has been poisoned and cemented over - appears like academic dreaming to people randomly scattered in vehicles, offices, prisons, and hotels. Therefore, we issue a call for philosophy of soil: a clear, disciplined analysis of that experience and memory of soil without which neither virtue nor some new kind of subsistence can be (Illich, 1990).

Thinking about soil, care becomes more about “the kind of dignity in our pain that asks not for more, but less” (Kahn, 2009, p.48). That to have less means not so much a lesser life, but a life with a widened latitude to experience joy, to create a permanent place through memory of each unique and particular thing/body/object. Deschooling society is not about a revolution of the oppressed but about coming to one another’s aid in care for a better life, give back to the soil what we borrow to continue to exchange the gift of memory.

   In this way, dance can be looked at as a convivial tool, a language that articulates one’s episteme, a way of knowing the world through movement. Dance, however, can be more than what we know it as in its westernized form; with this idea of conviviality in mind, dance as a movement form is only one tool that expresses a mobility of people. Dance practices must be informed through the culture of a people grounded in the memories of their soil, through their relationships with one another. This means building dance practices inside and outside higher
education; it means seeing the institution of higher education as one place for epistemologies, for convivial knowledge building:

Tools foster conviviality to the extent to which they can be easily used, by anybody, as often or as seldom as desired, for the accomplishment of a purpose chosen by the user. The use of such tools by one person does not restrain another from using them equally. They do not require previous certification of the user. Their existence does not impose any obligation to use them. They allow the user to express his meaning in action. Some institutions are structurally convivial tools...Any institution that moves toward its second watershed tends to become highly manipulative. For instance, it costs more to make teaching possible than to teach...Increasingly, components intended for the accomplishment of institutional purposes are redesigned so that they cannot be used independently (p.22).

Dance in higher education can thrive when spirit does not remain tied to the social order. Dance can be realized as a language, as a mode of thinking about the possibilities of language to express ecology rather than a dominant culture; it can question both dominant ideas on speech and embodiment. Embodiment can be more than a physical practice only to be realized through dance movement. Instead, dance practices that nurture ecology can be realized as embodiment when we think about what “body” we are speaking about. The study will conclude in the next section with a language of ecology in mind.
Conclusion

Thinking about Democracy

As discussed in chapter three, H’Doubler desires reforms to create institutional change instead of rebellion or a revolution. Her logic operates under Rancière’s notion of the Platonic will “to reduce man and citizen to the couple of illusion and reality” (2014, p.58). In H’Doubler’s case, as an act of law, reforms can build organic solidarity through a science of parts, a movement of a population towards a common totality where punishment for those who act outside of the law can reinforce the social, republican order (p.64). Anarchy, however, differs from revolution, and H’Doubler fails to acknowledge anarchy as a democratic act through its politics. Rather, politics is anarchic as it embodies a duality of the human being and the citizen. Rancière says,

The democratic process is the process of perpetual bringing into play, of invention of forms of subjectivation, and of cases of verification that counteract the perpetual privatization of public life (p.62).

He implies this form as language, where the polis insert their right in the form of a supplement, this supplement being “the law [that] refuses them,” which occurs through claiming rights they do not have (p.61). Acting politically, the polis can draw conflict to the law by revealing its paradox: that doxa is located within both public and private realms.

For example, in reference to H’Doubler’s act to claim dance as an experience, through Dewey’s public figure, she claims herself an equal in a public life where she has no claim. Through claiming dance as an experience for education, a supplement is inserted in the form of her claim as a public figure. This act becomes the political subversion of dance that qualifies dance as scholarship; it forces dance, and its students as a population of women, into the
dominant society of men in the public realm. So the question remains, does it remain liminal? Perhaps it is H’Doubler’s lack of clarification about the dance she is discussing that she allows the ambiguity to absorb the liminal state of dance practices. Perhaps it is the moral demands of the public institution that causes her to misunderstand the political nature of her role and action in qualifying dance as education. Or, maybe this ambiguity begins when the realm of appearances remains strictly for the public realm—when the public realm assumes precedence over the private. It is important not to forget that politics becomes a forgotten act through the veil and display of an identitarian political game, “the face that each of them want to see” (p.69) and the privatization of the public.

It is in this lack of distinction that dance becomes captured as emotional energy to be expressed towards the totality; it becomes the excess to be directed by the reforms of the institution in which it is caught:

The idea of the republic is one of a system of institutions, laws, and moral values that eliminate democratic excess by making State and society homogenous. The School, by means of which the State distributes the elements to educate simultaneously both men and citizens, quite naturally suggests itself as the best institution for realizing that idea...The distribution of knowledges is only socially efficacious to the extent that it is also a (re)distribution of positions...one must therefore have an additional science. Ever since Plato this royal science has had a name. That name is political science (p.68).

The direction of these reforms can be shaped by curriculum with precedent on letting students express their personalities: that personality becomes a site for research and rationale for their artwork. Captured emotion directed towards a limitlessness allows for an emotional, self-righteous artist bent on either a heroic revolution or self-interested display. It calls for little responsibility, removing the critical, political act that the artist-citizen can enact. Understanding
the political act is crucial for the student-artist, who through the institution must gather the tools for scholarship, for critically thinking about their part to play, for engaging relationships which remove the fear of alienation of a liminal status to be absorbed by the illusion of the state apparatus; this illusion decoupled from reality becomes the fallacy of the artist without claim to citizenship.

The artist with a part serves the elite intelligentsia who gets to decide the rituals which govern solidarity of society. The artist with a part creates or structures whatever suits the fancy of the mind, the personality, within the limits of the paintbrush or the dance-step—these limits serve not as a microcosm of the greater society, but as a model of what it might look like to have created something creatively within limits, as an opposition, as a profane to the sacred limitless corporate state, the expanding false democracy. It captures creativity by making it the spirit of the creative, nothing more than an artistic voice:

But there is no science of the just measure between equality and inequality. And there is less of it than ever when conflict erupts between the limitlessness of capitalist wealth and the limitlessness of democratic politics (p.69).

This excess is then blamed for too much spirit for democracy, to call the “limitless of wealth” the blame of “the voracious appetites of democratic individuals” (p.70). Too much voice, with very little reason, means reform by the oligarchic elites who have access to language of solidarity of the social realm. Schooling thus inscribes a history outside its politics and labels the creative act rather than a political one.

**Dance as Ecology**

In *The Mushroom at the End of the World*, Tsing (2015) writes about the stories that mushrooms in Japan tell through as forgers look through the varying soils, a land altered by industrialization. In the Interlude titled “Dancing” she writes,
Forgers have their own ways of knowing the matsutake forest: they look for the lines of mushroom lives. Being in the forest this way might be considered a dance: lines of life are pursued through senses, movements, and orientations. The dance is a form of forest knowledge—but not that codified in reports. And, although every forager dances in this sense, not all dances are alike. Each dance is shaped by communal histories, with their disparate aesthetics and orientations (p.241).

Tsing goes into the forest with the forgers to understand their dances. She then writes,

Life lines are entangled: candy cane [flowers] and matsutake; matsutake and its host trees; host trees and herbs, mosses, insects, soil bacteria, and forest animals; heaving bumps and mushroom pickers. Matsutake pickers are alert to life lines in the forest; searching with all senses creates this alertness. It is a form of forest knowledge and appreciation without the completeness of classification. Instead searching brings us to the liveliness of beings experienced as subjects rather than objects (p.243).

Tsing’s use of dancing as a metaphor for uncovering the story of the mushroom and the story of the forger in the forest is relevant to thinking about dance as a journey, as a storytelling not only of the human narrative but of the immanence of humans, a story that is part of nature. Dance is not just a studio practice or stage performance: it is a way of telling stories. These stories must be told to bring one’s doxa to the ambiguity of dance.

This relates back to H’Doubler, who was preoccupied that students of dance would be caught up in perfection, and strove for dance to be used to develop personalities. H’Doubler warned about how dance would be utilized by the individual for personal gain and vanity. Today, dance has been caught in the schooled society, however, that may not have been H’Doubler’s goal. Her goal was to make dance part of the educational landscape, and thus, to qualify it as a language of expression. It was in qualifying dance as this language that she did not recognize the
greater world of nature and peoples to also be part of not only one, but a multiplicity of languages. We can look at H’Doubler through Rancière, as a model of politics, of what is required to make change in the institution, and then perhaps with Illich, we can rethink the school altogether, and how schooling impacts the learning of dance today in a neoliberal era where the labour-capital now consumes the entirety of one’s being. When we think about this invasion of our lives, we can push back by calling it a disturbance to be directed towards a renewal:

Disturbance can renew ecologies as well as destroy them...Disturbance opens the terrain for transformative encounters, making new landscapes possible...Disturbances follow other disturbances. Thus all landscapes are disturbed; disturbance is ordinary. But this does not limit the term. Raising the question of disturbance does not cut off discussion but opens it, allowing us to explore landscape dynamics. Whether a disturbance is bearable or unbearable is a question worked out through what follows it: the reformation of assemblages (Tsing, 2015, p. 160).

Dance is a place for research, to understand the nature of capture, and to mobilize oneself outside of the passivity directed by a policed governance. It is not so much a pedagogy as it is a language of dancing within and through disturbance: “the power to learn all languages” (Rancière, 1991, p.94).
References


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