US Foreign Policy During the Nixon and Ford Administrations

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US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CHILE
DURING THE
NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATIONS

A Thesis
Presented in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

March 2012

BY
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College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences
DePaul University

Chicago, IL
DEDICATION

To my family, whose encouragement and support were essential to the completion of this project.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A very hearty thanks to my thesis advisor, Dr. Rose Spalding, Professor of Political Science at DePaul University. Her patience, guidance, encouragement, insight as she mentored me through the thesis process were indispensible. Great thanks also to Dr. Patrick Callahan, Professor of Political Science at DePaul. He provided vital insight and guidance in developing Chapter Two of this thesis and offered excellent input on later drafts of both Chapters One and Two. I would also like to thank Fr. Thomas Croak, Associate Professor Emeritus in the Department of History at DePaul. Drs. Spalding, Callahan, and Croak all served on my thesis committee. Their suggestions at my proposal defenses were invaluable in shaping the project as I began my research, and their suggestions at my final defense were invaluable in shaping the final document. Many, many thanks to you all!

Thanks must also be given to the libraries at DePaul University, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and the University of North Carolina at Charlotte from whom I borrowed more books than I can count.

Thank you, as well, to MEPCO Insurance Premium Financing, AXA Assistance, USA, the Cheatham Lab at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Nutrition Research Institute, and the School of Architecture at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte for employing me throughout my career as a graduate student.

Finally, thank you to my parents, Douglas and Ann Murdock, for scouring the pages of this document for typing errors. I deeply appreciate your assistance!
I first became interested in the topic of CIA involvement in Chile as an undergraduate in a core humanities course on ethics at Queens University of Charlotte. I had to write a paper and the topic intrigued me. Like many who have written on the subject, what I first wanted to know was whether the US could be held responsible for the 1973 coup. What I discovered was that in a strictly technical sense, though the CIA manipulated the political situation in Chile, the Agency was not directly involved in the kidnapping attempt on General Schneider or the successful coup three years later, and so I concluded in my paper.

As I began to think about my graduate thesis project, I discovered that my initial question was neither very interesting nor very useful.

First, it’s an unresolvable question. The CIA was not directly involved in the major events of 1970 and 1973 in Chile, but the US Government certainly did what policy makers perceived was necessary to encourage both actions. It is impossible to determine, however, what would have happened had the US refrained from using its covert powers of influence.

Second, there can be little practical application derived from determining whether the US can be held responsible for the events of 1970 and 1973 in Chile. What could be gained by simply passing judgment? Not much. There is a more interesting question, a question with more possibilities for future practical application: how did the United States find itself acting in a matter fundamentally discordant with core American political values? That is the subject of this thesis.
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# COMMONLY USED ACRONYMS

This list is not meant to be exhaustive but should be a helpful guide to acronyms commonly cited in this thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODE</td>
<td>Confederación Democrática, the Democratic Confederation - the Unidad Popular's main opposition front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONDORTEL</td>
<td>Operation Condor's main communication system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>CIA Chief of Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DINA</td>
<td>Directorate of National Intelligence, Pinochet's secret police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXIM</td>
<td>Export-Import Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOIA</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act (United States Congress)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOC</td>
<td>Government of Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Intelligence Community (United States Government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAPU</td>
<td>Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario, Chile's Movement for Unified Popular Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>Movimiento de Izquierdo Revolucionario, Chile's Revolutionary Movement of the Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARA</td>
<td>National Archive and Record Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCCH</td>
<td>Partido Comunista de Chile, Chile's Communist Party of Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>Partido Democrata Cristiano, Chile's Christian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>Partido Nacional, Chile's National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Partido Socialista, Chile's Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Unidad Popular, the coalition of the left in the 1970 election and during Allende's presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VOP Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo, Chile's Organized Vanguard of the People
WH Western Hemisphere Division (of CIA)
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY, AND SOURCES

“I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country
go communist due to the irresponsibility of its people.”
~ Henry Kissinger, June 27, 1970

I. INTRODUCTION

For decades, the Cold War brought the threat of nuclear conflict. The two
dominant world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were ideologically
opposed and saw each other’s nuclear capabilities as a threat to their respective national
security. Though the United States and Soviet Union never met in open war, their
conflict spilled over into the third world. As several leftist political movements
developed in Latin America, US policy makers feared the domino effect, in which one
country after another would fall to socialism or communism and thus fall under potential
Soviet influence. Policy makers perceived a socialist/communist Latin America as a
threat and devised various strategies to reverse the Latin American leftward trend and
“contain” the spread of socialism/communism – ideas which became blended in the
collective American consciousness - to as few countries as possible.

Chile was one of the countries where the political Left was best established in
Latin America. For decades it demonstrated a substantial following. A coalition of the

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1 Henry Kissinger, quoted in Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy
Toward Latin America, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 349. Kissinger’s comment was made
during a 40 Committee meeting on June 27, 1970: “The Chairman’s comment was, I don’t see why we
need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.” NARA,
“Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee 27 June 170 [sic],” June 29, 1970, U.S. Department of State,
The meeting minutes appear to be more of a memorandum of conversation than a transcript. “I don’t see
why...” seems to be a direct quote from Kissinger, whereas “The Chairman’s comment was,” acting as the
meeting minutes author’s own introduction to Kissinger’s comment, based on the author’s similar treatment
of other statements made by meeting attendees. The existence of these meeting notes gives this quote by
Kissinger more validity than another quote attributed to him - “Chile is a dagger pointed at the heart of
Antarctica” - as I discuss later in this chapter.
Communist and Socialist Parties and others had come close to winning the presidency in the past. The Chilean Left began to develop in the early 1910s. The Worker’s Socialist Party (POS), founded in 1912 and led by Luis Emilio Recabarren, “quickly developed a small but vibrant national organization”\(^2\) that stretched the length of the country. In 1922, the POS became the Communist Party which maintained a presence in government for several decades, excepting a period when the party was officially outlawed from 1948 to 1958. The Socialist party was founded in 1933 after the demise of Chile’s twelve-day “Socialist Republic.” Left minded groups put off by the Communist Party’s “ideological orthodoxy, organizational rigidity, and international loyalties,”\(^3\) found a home in the Socialist Party. The Socialist, Communist, and Radical Parties banded together in 1938 to form the Popular Front coalition, advancing the representation of the Socialist and Communist Parties in the Chilean Congress and in the Cabinet. The Socialist Party, though weakened during the 1940s and early 1950s by “a series of divisions,”\(^4\) maintained a presence in the government even during the decade of the Communist Party’s “clandestinity.”\(^5\)

In the 1950s, the Socialist party split into two factions, one in support of the dictator Carlos Ibáñez, the other, led by Salvador Allende, seeking to “rebuild an alliance” with the illegal Communist Party.\(^6\) The Socialist party came together again in 1957 and, with the re-legalization of the Communist party in 1958, very nearly won the Presidential election in 1958, with Allende as the coalition’s candidate. As the peasantry

\(^3\) Ibid, 87.
\(^4\) Ibid, 88.
\(^5\) Ibid, 86-89.
\(^6\) Allende was then a senator. See Roberts, *Deepening Democracy*, 89.
became politically active and the urban poor population increased in the 1960s, the base of support for the Left grew, strengthening the chance of success in the next presidential race. Allende received a slightly smaller percentage of the vote in 1970 than he did in 1964, but, with a three-way division among competing coalitions, the race was close enough to send the decision for the presidency to the Chilean Congress, per a provision in the Chilean constitution. Allende won, but more because of Congressional disenchanted with the Right than a love for the Left, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis.

Covert action in opposition to Salvador Allende’s campaign was the Nixon Administration’s response to the threat of socialist government in Chile. The prospect of the election of Allende caused a frenzy among the chief architects of US foreign policy. Government documents from several agencies (CIA, DOS, and DOD, among others) demonstrate that the CIA, at the behest of policy makers in Washington, led a campaign to keep Salvador Allende out of the executive office. Once Allende was elected, policy makers pursued a policy of economic warfare in an attempt to destabilize Allende’s government while the CIA kept tabs on the Chilean military, discreetly encouraging a coup without committing US assistance or active participation in such a move.

In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger argues that Salvador Allende was bent on undermining Chilean democracy by establishing a socialist state which, by its nature, would be hostile to US interests in the hemisphere. He justifies the US Government’s involvement in Chilean politics by insisting that our national security was at stake. Policy makers’ real motives were more complicated, as I discuss further below. But the oppressive regime that came to power as a result of the coup in 1973 presented a threat of

\[\text{Ibid}, 88-94.\]
a different sort. Not only did the coup itself undermine Chile’s democratic tradition, it also used disappearance, torture, and murder to root out those deemed subversives by the regime, creating a culture of fear in which basic human and democratic rights were oppressed. Declassified US Government documents indicate that policy makers in Washington were well aware of the activities of that regime. Our continued support of military dictator Augusto Pinochet Ugarte was at variance with the foundational principles of American society and damaged both the domestic and international reputation of the United States Government.

According to Samuel Huntington’s theory of a peculiarly American struggle to maintain “Creedal” purity in policy and government, the American polity cycles through periods of complacency and passionate attachment to American political values. The US Government must, at times, set principles aside in favor of addressing the realities of difficult policy situations; the American public will allow divergence from the Creed in such cases. The gap between policy and principle continues to widen until there is such a state of divergence from principle that it is no longer possible for the public to dismiss or ignore the discrepancy. American society then enters a period of “Creedal Passion,” forcing the Government to return, at least in part, to foundational principles.

In Huntington’s estimation, then, domestic politics would eventually recover from the excesses of the Nixon Government and there would be at least some measure of restoration of political values to American government. In the case of the Nixon Administration, the Creedal phase was already in progress, initiated by the Vietnam War and added to by the Watergate scandal. Revelations of CIA misdeeds, including action in Chile, kicked Creedal Passion into high gear, resulting in the Congressional and
executive ordered investigations of the Intelligence Community. The legislation of greater checks on Intelligence Community activity at least in part renewed faith in the US Government’s adherence to fundamental principles.

Recognition of such a cycle, however, does not diminish the short-term domestic impact a deviation from principle will have on the legitimacy of the Government and, thus, the effectiveness of an administration. Furthermore, US actions abroad seem to linger on the world stage, continuing to affect how the international community perceives the United States. How we conduct ourselves on the international stage matters, and our international stature will not always protect us from the consequences of mistakes. It is therefore helpful to understand how and why the Nixon Administration found itself undermining Chilean democracy and why both the Nixon and Ford Administrations found themselves supporting a dictator. Such is the purpose of this thesis.

II. THE WHY AND THE HOW

Most studies of US involvement in Chile in the early 1970s center around the debate over the degree of responsibility of the Nixon Administration compared to internal pressures that instigated the 1973 military coup that ousted Salvador Allende. The goal of this study, as stated above, is less to assess the degree of US responsibility and more to examine the characteristics of the foreign policy of the Nixon and Ford Administrations that first led the US Government to involve itself in Chile and then to continue its involvement once Pinochet had solidified his position as dictator. My research revealed two questions central to the debate among policy makers about the situation in Chile: what to do – to intervene or not to intervene – and how to do it. The below table outlines the core points of my argument.
Table 1.1 Strategic Calculations Affecting Policy toward Chile, 1970 to September 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Two Questions:</th>
<th>Strategic Calculations</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>What to do in Chile</strong></td>
<td>1. Need to maintain the world balance of power</td>
<td>The perceived need to intervene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Traditional ethnocentric attitude toward Latin America</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Fear of the perception of US weakness by countries on the international stage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How to do it</strong></td>
<td>1. Domestic public resistance to the costs of overt military conflict</td>
<td>Use of covert means (i.e., the CIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Weakening US economy (slow growth, rising unemployment, etc)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. The desire to avoid political costs of departure from principles of “self-determination and free election”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Nixon and Kissinger’s centralized, covert policy style</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussions about what to do in Chile were framed largely in terms of the perceived need to maintain the world balance of power. Traditional US ethnocentrism was re-articulated as a belief in the necessary subordination of the domestic politics of third world nations to the need for a power balance among the principal nations of the world. Third, there was a sense among policy makers at the highest levels that US willingness to act was being tested. If we failed to act, the international community would regard us as weak and might have taken advantage of that weakness to challenge our leadership. As for the means, lack of public support for overt military intervention, reduced resources, and the desire to avoid the political costs of appearing hypocritical – the Nixon Administration was already “strongly on record in support of self-determination and respect for free election”\(^8\) - made the use of covert means attractive.

The centralization of the policy making process made it possible for Nixon and Kissinger

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to bypass the 40 Committee’s indecisiveness and take a more targeted approach to policy toward Chile. I elaborate on those points and discuss competing hypotheses in Chapter Two.

A third question I asked was why the Ford Administration continued to support Augusto Pinochet when it became clear that the policies of his government were fundamentally discordant with our core values. It may be better to ask why the Ford Administration did not seek to influence the Pinochet regime in spite of both domestic and international pressure to do so. A similar table of strategic calculations is helpful here as well.

Table 1.2 Strategic Calculations Affecting US Policy toward the Pinochet Regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Two Questions</th>
<th>Strategic Calculations</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| What to do about Chile? | 1. World balance of power not threatened  
2. Pinochet government friendly to US and open to US influence  
3. Pinochet government presented no challenge to US authority in the region | Continue to support Pinochet |
| What were the consequences for policy? | 1. Domestic pressure to censure the regime could be managed  
2. International pressure to censure the regime could be managed  
3. Kissinger’s continued control over policy and his covert policy style | Deepened discrepancy between public rhetoric and actual policy |

I elaborate on these points as well in Chapter Two, but very briefly, I found that policy makers continued to support Pinochet because his government did not pose the same threat the Nixon Administration had felt with the prospect of an Allende presidency. Additionally, Pinochet’s regime was friendly to the United States and open
to US influence. Furthermore, the new Chilean Government presented no challenge to US authority in the region. Kissinger in particular was loath to criticize a government friendly to US interests; putting up with human rights violations was an acceptable price to pay. The Ford Administration could not, however, simply ignore the issue of human rights. Domestic and international pressure to address Chile’s human rights record forced Kissinger to manage the tension by adjusting public rhetoric regarding policy toward Chile. His continued control over the foreign policy process, furthermore, allowed him to continue the Administration’s policy of support for Pinochet, deepening the discrepancy between public rhetoric and policy, as was characteristic of the Nixon Administration.

III. Methodology

The nature of the subject and sources available indicated that the use of qualitative-historical methods of analysis would be most appropriate, using a variation on Theory-Guided Process-Tracing. I use theory to inform the tracing of a process through a narrative of events, in this thesis, using my theory of the why and the how to inform a study of the process that led to deepened involvement in Chile in the early 1970s and support of the Pinochet regime after the 1973 coup through a narrative of related events.9

The sample consists of one case study, using both primary and secondary sources to reconstruct, interpret, and evaluate events. Primary documents consist of memoirs of key US policy makers, official government reports (the Church Report and the Hinchey Report), speeches, television interviews, and other archival materials, including

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memoranda, “telecons,”[10] briefings, etc. I collected archival material chiefly from the Department of State’s own collection, available online, and from the National Security Archive, based out of The George Washington University. The Department of State’s collection is quite extensive. Seven agencies contributed to the collection: The Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Archives and Records Administration. There were three separate releases of information (Tranche I, Tranche II, and Tranche III) covering this time period. Not all agencies have released three sets of documents, though most have done so. The National Security Archive at The George Washington University, in addition to the documents available on its website,[11] has established The Digital National Security Archive,[12] a catalogued, searchable online database of all the documents in the National Security Archive’s collection from which I collected Kissinger “telecons” related to US involvement in Chile.

In a few instances, I utilized speeches and television interviews available through The American Presidency Project,[13] a searchable online database of messages, public papers, and other documents of US presidents based out of the University of California at Santa Barbara. Nixontapes.org, established by Luke A. Nichter, Richard A. Moss, and Anand Toprani, constitutes “the most complete digital tape collection in existence”[14] of the thousands of hours of tape recorded meetings during Nixon’s presidency. The editors

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have separated out those meetings in which policy toward Chile was discussed and have transcribed many of the conversations in that sub-collection.

In order to make the project manageable, I limited the time span under study from 1970 through 1976, with a brief review of CIA involvement in the late 1950s and 1960s. The bulk of the documents available refers to the period up to the coup and the few days following. The documentary record is much thinner for the time period covering the Ford Administration (1974-1976). What evidence there is suggests that the direction of foreign policy toward Chile once Ford took office did not alter significantly, except as it was affected by the Church Committee proceedings and subsequent reports. My analysis of the period between 1974 and 1976 thus focuses chiefly on the political fall-out in Washington after the CIA’s involvement in Chile became public knowledge and the effect that the Church Committee’s review of the CIA’s activities had on US interactions with the Pinochet regime.

IV. DATA ANALYSIS

My thesis draws on five types of data: government documents (primary sources); the memoirs and diaries of key individuals (also primary sources); secondary sources that discuss the history of US involvement in Latin America; secondary sources that discuss US Cold War foreign policy; and secondary sources that discuss developments in Chile during the Allende government.

The first category of primary sources, the documentary record that includes official cables, communiqués, telecons, memorandums, etc, allows us to reconstruct the chronology of events to demonstrate what events influenced decisions and, in turn, who was responsible for decisions that influenced later events. It also reveals the debates and
dissent within the different departments and agencies involved in activities in Chile. Such a detailed chronological overview grounds in hard evidence arguments about the direction of influence and responsibility. The documentary record, however, does not produce a complete narrative of events. In those cases, I relied on secondary sources to fill the gaps. Those secondary sources provide background information on events that occurred in Chile that are not adequately described by official US government documents, such as the effects of Allende’s economic program on the Chilean economy, the resulting political upheaval, etc.

Second, I worked with memoirs and other apologetic primary sources. Memoirs by policy architects in particular can be considered a form of “perpetrator testimony.” The terms “perpetrator testimony” and “survivor testimony” traditionally belong to the field of Holocaust history, but are useful in other lines of historical inquiry as well. Memoirs and other apologetic sources provide information, in the actors’ own words, about the unfolding of historical events. The nature of perpetrator testimony is inherently problematic. Though it may seem on the surface that the testimony of individuals directly involved in a particular act or set of actions is authoritative, many historians dismiss perpetrator testimony as a useful source of information, arguing that perpetrator testimony is so tainted by the desire of the perpetrator to minimize his role in the criminal or questionable acts committed that the evidence given by the perpetrator is virtually useless. But Christopher Browning, in Collected Memories: Holocaust History and Postwar Testimony argues that, though much of perpetrator testimony is less than accurate, it is still highly useful when evaluated critically.
Browning establishes four criteria or “tests” for determining the validity of perpetrator testimonies (both within the context of a trial and without): “The self-interest test;” “the vividness test;” “the possibility test;” and “the probability test.”

Corresponding to the first test, a perpetrator will sometimes offer incriminating evidence against himself or herself when it was in his or her own self-interest to do so. In other words, when a perpetrator can offer something beyond flat out denial of participation in the activities under review, he or she is likely telling the truth. A perpetrator may offer self-incriminating testimony, at least a partial truth, to establish that he or she was not involved in more sinister activities.

Browning’s second test operates on the observation that accounts of events given that are the most detailed and vivid are likely those which contain the most factual truth. Put more simply, the less detailed a perpetrator’s lies are, the less a court, jury, or review panel will be able to disprove them. Thus, the more detailed the testimony, the less likely it is that a perpetrator is lying, at least about the factual information given.

Browning’s third test is built on the argument that there is no reason to entirely discard the testimony a perpetrator gives when there is little or no contradictory documentation. If a perpetrator gives evidence indicating he was in one location, for example, and there is no documentation to prove otherwise, it must be determined that it is possible the perpetrator is telling the truth. In the fourth test, Browning assumes that when a perpetrator’s testimony is corroborated by other evidence (documentation, etc) his or her testimony “can be viewed not only as possible but also as probable.”

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16 Ibid, 11.
17 Ibid, 12.
The basic thrust of Browning’s argument about using perpetrator testimony is that, in the absence of “smoking gun” documentation, the historian must devise ways to critically examine and use the evidence available, even if that evidence is highly problematic, as with perpetrator testimony. A few other tips Browning offers are first, to look for the consistencies within different accounts of the same event, and second, to look for alternative explanations when the key details of different accounts don’t match, such as the time or place of a particular event. I kept those observations and cautions in mind as I worked with the memoirs of Kissinger and Nixon, both of whom may be considered “perpetrators” of the Allende overthrow and demise of Chilean democracy.

My thesis draws on three sets of secondary sources as well. The first consists of works by experts in the history of US involvement in Latin America who have invested many years studying and analyzing the events in Chile. Because of their zeal for the truth and their desire for justice, the authors of this set of sources often become dogmatically attached to one extreme view or another, which causes them, at times, to argue beyond the evidence they cite. The challenge is to extract the information they present and to determine what is useful and insightful in their arguments. The second set of secondary sources were those that I utilized to fill in the gaps in the documentary record, as I discussed above.

The last set of secondary sources are works by experts in US foreign policy who have spent years studying the formation and effects of US foreign policy during the Cold War. These sources provide historical insight into the workings of the policy making process to inform a discussion of policy trends during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, including both new and inherited trends. They are valuable sources in
that they allow us to situate policy toward Chile within the larger scheme of US foreign policy but are often limited in their insight into the Chilean case in particular and also inflected with bias.

V. Literature Review

1. Official history and critique

There are two official histories of CIA activities in Chile, the first written by the Church Committee in 1975 and the second by official CIA historians in 2000. These two histories do not give two different accounts of events; rather, they complement each other. “Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, Staff Report,” more commonly referred as The Church Report, was meant to serve as a foundation for the Senate Committee’s public hearings,¹⁸ whose purpose was to review the activities of the US intelligence community at home and abroad. The report became an appendix in the Church Committee’s larger report on the hearings. The writers of the report document, fairly dispassionately, the actions taken by the CIA between 1963 and 1973. It reveals that the path to 1973 was increasingly marked by US interference in Chile, through economic support to opposition groups, covert CIA activities ranging from the creation of propaganda to the fomenting of a coup, and economic sanctions against the Allende government after Allende achieved the presidency. The writers of the report draw conclusions about the level of CIA involvement in Chilean politics leading up to and during the Allende presidency, and pose some questions that set the stage for the Committee’s hearings.

¹⁸ Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Volume 7: Covert Action, Appendix A: Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, Staff Report, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 146.
Between June, 1999 and November, 2000, thousands of CIA and US Government documents regarding activities in Chile were declassified. The CIA itself produced a report on their actions entitled, “CIA Activities in Chile,” more commonly known as the Hinchey Report. The report was written in response to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (the Hinchey Amendment), and was meant to fill in the gaps in the record of the US Government’s involvement in Chile during the Pinochet era. But the Hinchey Report is nowhere near as thorough as the Church Report, perhaps by design. Both reports are discussed in detail in Chapter Five of this thesis.


Both Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss US actions in Chile in their memoirs. Nixon’s discussion of Chile in RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon is rather short. Kissinger’s arguments echo Nixon’s, but are better articulated and more nuanced. He goes into great detail in the three volumes of his memoirs, White House Years, Years of Upheaval, and Years of Renewal, recounting the events that led to our involvement, including a discussion of inter-agency politics, how the US interacted with the Allende government, and how the intelligence investigations affected policy making and the intelligence community.

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A third memoir of use to this study is *The Haldeman Diaries*, by Nixon’s Chief of Staff, Richard “Bob” Haldeman. Haldeman’s published diary does not touch on Chile, though he does briefly mention the ITT scandal.\footnote{The ITT scandal arose out of revelations that the International Telephone and Telegraph company (ITT) had attempted to funnel money to Allende’s opposition through the CIA. See Chapter Three of this thesis.} What his diary does provide is some support for the observation, discussed previously, that Kissinger was a chief architect of foreign policy during the Nixon presidency.

3. Academic and Journalistic Interpretations: Critiques of US Actions in Chile

Peter Kornbluh, John Dinges, and J. Patrice McSherry all offer criticism of US policy toward Chile in the 1970s. Dinges and McSherry focus specifically on Operation Condor; Kornbluh discusses Condor but also comments on CIA actions between 1970 and 1973, as well as the activities of DINA (Chile’s secret police) before the formation of the Condor organization. McSherry’s critique is by far the most condemnatory; she sees US actions in Chile as part of historical conspiracy to keep Latin America subjugated to the power of the United States. Both Kornbluh and Dinges are willing to acknowledge some internal debate about US actions within the larger US policy making body, especially after Chile’s human rights violations became a concern. Kristian Gustafson differs from all three both in the aim of his analysis and in his conclusions about US responsibility for the coup.

Kornbluh’s *Pinochet File* is a veritable tome of USG communiqués, memos, and CIA reports on CIA activities surrounding the rise and fall of Salvador Allende and the US Government’s continued relationship with first the Chilean Junta, and finally Pinochet himself. Contrary to the claim Henry Kissinger makes in his memoirs that he
called off the effort to oust Allende in mid-October 1970, Kornbluh presents evidence that, though Kissinger may have advised the CIA to discourage one group of coup plotters, separating one group of plotters from another was a false distinction; both or several groups plotted together. Whatever the direct US participation in the actual coup attempt was or was not, the fact is that we actively encouraged coup plotting which may not have developed without CIA prodding. Also, the fact that the policy makers tried to cover the CIA’s role in the 1970 coup plotting for fear that the CIA and US Government would be implicated in the death of General Schneider suggests that policy makers knew the actions that led to Schneider’s death were wrong.

Dinges focuses on the Pinochet regime’s participation in and leadership of Operation Condor. The book is an excellent source of information about the formation and operation of Operation Condor, an integrated intelligence community formed by South American military regimes, discussed further in Chapter Five. Dinges’ book is especially useful in that it includes material from Dinges’ interviews with various leaders in the US and in Latin America that were connected with Condor and US policy making bodies in the 1970s; these are materials I would not otherwise have access to. One drawback of Dinges’ text is that it is a highly journalistic account, and, though thoroughly researched, Dinges’ sources are not always carefully documented, making it difficult to corroborate Dinges’ evidence.

Dinges discusses only briefly US involvement in Chile before the formation of Operation Condor. The information he provides on the course of events from 1970 on is much less detailed than Kornbluh’s, but Dinges does comment that US policy makers

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23 Ibid, 29-35.
“sent an unequivocal sign to the most extreme rightist forces that democracy could be sacrificed in the cause of ideological warfare.”24 His chief aim is to determine the extent to which the United States was aware of and involved in Operation Condor. He documents at length the amount of information the US Government had about the organization’s assassination plots. Dinges concludes that US policy makers were happy to assist in the creation of an integrated intelligence community in Latin America, and that those policy makers were willing to accept some human rights abuses. When it became apparent that the organization was planning operations outside of Latin America – in Europe and the United States - however, US policy makers changed their tune. The messages the US Government sent to Chile and other Condor countries were, therefore, inconsistent. The effect of all the “red light/green light” messages US officials sent to Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Brazil was understandable confusion about what the US position actually was on the organization’s purpose and actions.25

McSherry, in *Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America*, does not discuss the 1973 Chilean coup. Like Dinges, her concern is the US Government’s role in the creation and development of Operation Condor. She argues that the United States supported the organization from its inception, in a deliberate and sinister attempt to deepen the subjugation of the general populace in the various Latin American countries in order to maintain US hegemony in the region through the USG’s relationships with Latin American dictatorial regimes. The rise of counter-insurgency methods of warfare “transformed the nature of state and society just as conventional,

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‘industrial’ warfare had done in the early twentieth century.”

The creation of a “parastatal” network, or a “shadow state apparatus” enabled Latin American dictatorships to conduct clandestine, virtually untraceable operations against the very civilians those states were mandated to protect, thereby creating an atmosphere of terror and instilling a paralyzing fear among the general populace. McSherry also argues that the United States played a much more integral role in the growth and expansion of Operation Condor than other sources commonly acknowledge.

McSherry notes, as does Kornbluh, that Condortel, the organization’s main communications system, was located in the Panama Canal Zone on the US military base, but McSherry seems to infer more from that fact than does Kornbluh. Perhaps Kornbluh was holding back, only mentioning Condortel in passing, but McSherry views that particular connection between the US military and Operation Condor as irrefutable evidence that the United States knew exactly what Condor was up to, and, by allowing Condor to use the Panama Canal base for Condortel’s center of command, was explicitly encouraging Condor’s various acts and objectives.

What seems to be missing from McSherry’s argument and explanation of events is an acknowledgement of the US Government’s opposition to the expansion of Condor’s activities beyond the borders of Latin America. Common to the arguments of all three authors is a sense of dissatisfaction with US support of Chile and Operation Condor, given the obvious human rights abuses being committed on Latin American soil. None of them absolve the United States of responsibility for the coup or for Condor.

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In *Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974*, Kristian Gustafson takes a slightly different approach in his analysis of US action in Chile than Kornbluh, Dinges, and McSherry. Gustafson, a former officer of the Canadian Army that now lectures on intelligence and security at Brunel University,29 neither vilifies nor excuses US policy makers for their actions in Chile, maintaining that “the truth is somewhere in between” the arguments that the US Government was “criminal[ly] imperialist” and that “the United States did nothing wrong.”30 But Gustafson’s primary objective is not to assign blame for the coup or to gauge the amount of US responsibility for the events of 1970. His goal is to draw some lessons about the effectiveness of covert operations and the utility of the CIA as a policy tool that might inform future use of covert action via the CIA by the US Government. He does this by first establishing a coherent narrative of US actions in Chile. Whereas my thesis primarily addresses the Nixon and Ford Administrations’ involvement, Gustafson’s analysis stretches from CIA involvement in the lead up to the 1964 Chilean presidential election through the coup in 1973 and into 1974.31

One important claim Gustafson makes is that “U.S. actions in Chile [were] essentially a single campaign from 1963 to 1973.”32 He is, to my knowledge, the only published source making that claim. He also contends that the CIA is not “an all-powerful ‘dark force,’” but that it is necessarily restrained by “the demands and

31 Ibid, 4-5.
32 Ibid, 16.
constraints of operating covertly, and the consequences of being caught.”33 For similar reasons, covert action has a limited ability to change the internal political landscape of a foreign state, contrary to the beliefs of some American executives (notably, Nixon).34 He further asserts that “harmonious interdepartmental relations” are the best guarantee of the success of any covert action plan. Finally, he argues that the American executive should not have “unfettered presidential authority to order covert action.”35 A “formalized approval process” for covert action is a necessary restraint that “impos[es] needed checks on the extent, proportionality, and morality of operations.”36

4. Explanations of Foreign Policy Making in the 1970s

Saul Landau, John Lewis Gaddis, and James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver present in depth analyses of the Nixon Administration, its characteristics, and its policy making processes. John Mearsheimer and Michael Lind offer general theories of US interaction with other nations, particularly addressing the pursuit of hegemony. Lars Schoultz discusses US policy toward Latin America since the early years of the American republic. Finally, Michael Hunt analyzes the effect that racism and ethnocentrism have had on US foreign policy toward the third world.

In The Dangerous Doctrine: National Security and U.S. Foreign Policy, Landau argues that the Nixon Doctrine was characterized by an obsession with US national security, a concern for the appearance of strength to mask the declining real power of the United States, and rigid anticommunist public rhetoric in spite of the relaxation of ideological tensions between the US and the two major communist powers. When

33 Ibid, 16.
34 Ibid, 16.
36 Ibid, 17.
discussing the Ford Administration, Landau argues that it did not break significantly with the foreign policy doctrine Nixon and Kissinger had formed: “President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger continued to pursue détente in practice and anticommunism in ideology as basic US national security policy. At the same time that Ford and Kissinger parleyed with the Soviets and Chinese, they continued to foster dictatorship throughout the Third World.”

Under Ford, the US “exported” the idea of the national security as the paramount policy concern to third world nations; Landau uses as an example the formation of Operation Condor by the Southern Cone countries with the blessing and assistance of the US.

Gaddis argues in Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War that Nixon and Kissinger centralized policy decision making in the White House, pursuing a “philosophical deepening” in policy making, movement from “superiority” to “sufficiency” in defense policy, and pursuit of a balance of power, multipolarity, and trilateralism rather than hegemony. Nixon and Kissinger, Gaddis argues, also redefined what constituted a threat, defining threats in terms of an enemy’s actions and redefining the relationship between threats and interests. Whereas previous administrations had defined US interests in terms of the threats they perceived on the international stage, Kissinger believed it necessary to first define what was in the US interest and then define as threat that which would endanger those interests.

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38 Ibid, 118-120.
40 Ibid, 278-279.
41 I discuss the redefinition of the relationship between threats and interests in Chapter Two.
Gaddis also notes the inconsistency between the Nixon administration’s policy toward the developed powers and its policy toward the third world. He explains this inconsistency as the fear that the communist movements in each of those countries would have altered the “status quo” and may have “appeared to shift the balance of power,” echoing Landau’s observations on the importance of the appearance of strength to the Nixon administration. Regarding the Ford administration, Gaddis notes that Kissinger remained in charge of foreign policy, which helped to keep the “fundamental elements” of Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy in tact; Gaddis does not discuss the Ford administration at length.

In *United States Foreign Policy and World Order*, Nathan and Oliver argue that upon his assumption of the presidency, Richard Nixon was presented with two problems: waning public support of the war in Vietnam, and a desire to preserve the United States’ “special place in the world,” despite power shifts on the international stage. To meet these challenges, Nixon and Kissinger sought to construct a system of “shared responsibilities,” negotiating directly with the Soviets to balance strategic power, opening relations with China to ease military demands in Asia, and détente with the Soviet Union. Nathan and Oliver also argue that Kissinger was the driving force behind the development of the Nixon administration’s foreign policy. Stability was his chief policy concern. For Kissinger, absolute peace was impossible to achieve. Policy makers could only hope to avoid war by achieving stability through a global balance of

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43 Ibid, 273.
46 Ibid, 367.
48 Ibid, 383.
power. Nathan and Oliver also note a difference between the public rhetoric and policy decisions of the Nixon administration and observe that the Nixon administration was “almost paranoid” about its public appearance. Nathan and Oliver make little mention of the Ford administration and what they do mention is discussed only in connection with Henry Kissinger.

Moving from the specifics of the Nixon and Ford Administrations to the greater picture of US foreign policy making through history, John Mearsheimer and Michael Lind address the topic of hegemony as it relates to US foreign policy strategy. Mearsheimer lays out his theory of Offensive Realism in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. In postulating his theory he attempts to answer two questions: “what causes states to compete for power” and “how much power do states want.” His answer to the first question is that the structure of the international system of states forces those states into competition with one another for power for three reasons: first, there is no central power policing the great powers; second, states invariably maintain “some offensive military capability;” and third, states fundamentally distrust one another. His answer to the second is that states want as much power as they can gather to themselves, “with hegemony as their ultimate goal…and the best guarantee of [a state’s] survival,” which, in turn, is “the primary goal of great powers.”

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49 Ibid, 383.
50 Ibid, 354; 359.
51 Ibid, 360.
53 Ibid, 3; 30-31.
54 Ibid, 22; 3.
Mearsheimer argues that global hegemony, the grand prize in the competition, is nearly impossible to obtain and maintain, due chiefly to “the stopping power of water…the difficulty of projecting power across the world’s oceans onto the territory of a rival great power.” The next best thing, he states, is to obtain regional hegemony and thwart attempts by other great powers to do the same. A regional hegemon feels most secure when it is the only regional hegemon in the world and when other great powers in close proximity to each other compete with and balance each other - taking the pressure off the interaction of the regional hegemon with either state – and checking the hegemonic aspirations of any other great power, reducing the need for the regional hegemon to intervene. The United States, Mearsheimer contends, is the only state in modern history to attain the lofty position of regional hegemon.

In *The American Way of Strategy*, Lind argues that the goal of US foreign policy has always been to protect American political autonomy and self-determination both from external and internal influences, “by means of the American way of strategy.” The American way of strategy, Lind argues, fuses realism and liberal internationalism which, when reduced to their fundamental principles, are not antithetical political traditions.

In a world guided by both liberal internationalism and realism, Lind argues, the principle of self-determination illegitimatizes empire and decreases “the threat of international anarchy” thereby reducing the costs of maintaining national security which

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56 Ibid, 40.
57 Ibid, 41.
58 Ibid, 41; 140-141.
59 Ibid, 42; 141. This is exactly the scenario Henry Kissinger sought to cultivate in opening up relations with China, at the time a potential great power in close proximity to the Soviet Union, as I will discuss in Chapter Two.
60 Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 143.
in turn “preserves the American way of life.” But the particular brand of American republican liberalism is best and most easily developed in a peaceful world and, Lind contends, “[p]eace itself must be created and maintained by power.”

As both the ideas of empire and of a single-state world offend liberal internationalist sensibilities, it remains that three realist “patterns of power” are the best means of creating and maintaining peace: hegemony, both world and regional; concert of power; and balance of power. Lind contends that the best of those tools is a concert of power system, in which each world region is responsible for addressing its own issues through its own economic, military, and political organizations. Regional consensus, he argues, is much easier to obtain and maintain than world consensus. Lind does make room in his concert of power for what amounts to regional hegemons – greater powers in each region of influence that lead within their region and protect their region’s interest on the global stage in concert with other greater powers. Lind’s regional leaders are virtually indistinguishable from Mearsheimer’s regional hegemons, though Lind casts them in a more idealistic, if not more positive, light.

Lars Schoultz, who writes chiefly of US interaction with Latin America, also addresses the subject of hegemony as an underlying element of US policy toward the region. In *Beneath the United States*, Schoultz argues that four factors color US foreign policy decisions toward Latin America, as outlined briefly earlier in this chapter: national

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63 Ibid, 35-37.
64 Ibid, 182-183.
65 Ibid, 187.
security, domestic politics, economics, and an underlying ethnocentrism.\textsuperscript{66} He also argues that regional hegemony became, for US policy makers, a measure of US prestige and, eventually, of US strength, on the international stage.\textsuperscript{67} In another text, \textit{National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America}, written before the end of the Cold War, Schoultz argues that the US’s chief concern “[s]ince the end of World War II” has been “strategic denial…how to keep the Soviet Union out of Latin America.”\textsuperscript{68} Strategic denial of the USSR, Schoultz argues, could be seen as part of a larger pattern of strategic denial rooted in the Monroe Doctrine, going so far as to call that strategic denial “the Cold War corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.”\textsuperscript{69} Schoultz does briefly discuss US involvement in Chile in the 1970s in \textit{Beneath the United States},\textsuperscript{70} but since the State Department released documents under FOIA’s Chile Declassification Project on US involvement in Chile after \textit{Beneath the United States} was published, his knowledge of the case is imperfect.

Michael Hunt also makes reference to North American Anglo ethnocentrism as a foundational factor in US policy toward Latin American countries and beyond in \textit{Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy}. Three distinct pictures of Latin Americans emerged in the North American Anglo imagination in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries, as depicted in political cartoons: a dark, uncouth man, “fated to give way before his betters;”\textsuperscript{71} a “white maiden” in need of “salvation or seduction;”\textsuperscript{72} and an ill-tempered and ungrateful

\textsuperscript{66} Schoultz, \textit{Beneath the United States}, xv.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid, 368-369.
\textsuperscript{69} Schoultz, \textit{National Security}, 225.
\textsuperscript{70} Schoultz, \textit{Beneath the United States}, 360-361.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, 61.
black child in need of correction. The depictions in the political cartoons were reflected in statements made by North American statesmen who used one or another of these images to suit their purposes: expansion (the dark male), annexation (the white beauty), or “the drive for hemispheric preeminence” (the black child). At the heart of it all was a racism based on the simple concept that skin color was a measure of worth – mental, physical, and social - rooted in Elizabethan attitudes toward black Africans which in turn was “an extension of a variegated pattern of beliefs and practices extending back millennia and across cultures around the globe.”

5. Analysis of Chilean Politics During the Allende Regime

Jonathan Haslam, in The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile, and Nathaniel Davis, in The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, provide excellent information on what was happening on the ground in Chile during Allende’s presidency. Haslam, in particular, provides an insightful analysis of the Allende government’s economic policy and its effect on the Chilean economy. Davis, US Ambassador to Chile during Allende’s time in office, also provides great insight and interesting observations. In addition to his own memories, he occasionally provides excerpts from his family’s journals to illustrate the atmosphere around specific events, such as the March of the Pots and the coup in 1973. His account of the events on the day of the coup is particularly gripping. In his discussion of Chile’s internal political and social struggle during Allende’s time in office, Davis relies heavily on secondary sources, many of which I was

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74 Ibid, 60-61.
76 Ibid, 90. Though Chileans and Argentines are more of European descent, they were nevertheless subject to the same racist attitudes as the peoples of other Latin American countries.
able to access. Where possible, I have provided citation of those sources in addition to citing Davis.

6. Observations on American Politics

In *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*, Samuel Huntington argues that Americans are a peculiar people, unique in their devotion to the “American Creed” - a value-set established at the founding of the nation. American government, the Creed states, “should be egalitarian, participatory, open, non-coercive, and responsive to the demands of individuals and groups.”77 The perceived legitimacy of the US Government is tied to the degree to which the USG adheres to those principles. Government must be perceived as legitimate in order to function, but American Government can never achieve the perfection demanded by the American Creed and is, thus, forever open to charges of illegitimacy.78

“‘Credibility gaps,’” Huntington writes, “develop in American politics in part because the American people believe that government ought not to do things it must do in order to be a government and that it ought to do things it cannot do without undermining itself as a government.”79 The American polity copes with the gap between American ideals and the limits of American institutions (the *IvI* gap, as Huntington calls it) in one of four ways. When both the “[i]ntensity of belief in ideals,” and “[p]erception of the gap” are high,80 Americans adopt a moralistic attitude and seek to “eliminate” the gap. When intensity of belief is low, but perception of the gap is high, Americans “resort to a

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78 Ibid, 39.
79 Ibid, 41.
80 Ibid, 64.
cynical willingness to *tolerate* the gap.\textsuperscript{81} When both intensity of belief and perception of the gap are low, Americans display a marked complacency, ignoring the gap. When intensity of belief is high but perception of the gap is low, Americans tend to “deny” the gap “through an immense effort at ‘patriotic’ hypocrisy.”\textsuperscript{82}

The pattern of periods of intensity of belief in the Creed and awareness of the gap is cyclical, Huntington argues. Periods of Creedal complacency, then, are necessary in order for government to function, especially “in response to the need to destroy a traditional society or to fight against foreign enemies.”\textsuperscript{83} But those periods of complacency require a level of cognitive dissonance in the American polity that is not sustainable. An awareness of that dissonance will inevitably increase until there is a widespread feeling that the dissonance cannot continue, giving rise to a period of Creedal Passion when American ideals are highlighted and demands are again placed on government and society to realign with the Creed.\textsuperscript{84}

**VI. LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS**

The study is limited chiefly by the availability of primary documents/sources. I reconstructed events as well as possible from what has been declassified and made available to the public with the assistance of the Congressional and CIA reports and secondary sources. There may, however, be documents in existence that have remained classified; the information in those documents is out of reach. Also, documentation of clandestine activity may be purposefully vague to maintain a certain level of deniability. Many words or lines, at times whole pages, have been redacted to maintain secrecy and

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, 64. \\
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid, 64. \\
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid, 40. \\
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, 63-70.
protect individuals mentioned that might be harmed by a revelation of their involvement.

The occasional vagueness, redactions, and some ambiguity in the interpretation of “perpetrator testimony,” as discussed above, limited at times my reconstruction of the course of events.

Additionally, I encountered at times what may be called folk wisdom surrounding the issue of US policy toward Chile; namely, that Henry Kissinger called Chile “a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica.” Many secondary sources use that quote to build

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My own Google Books search for the phrase “a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica” returned one rather interesting result. In a page from the March 25, 1946 edition of *LIFE Magazine*, I found the following phrase: “Argentina is a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica.” See John K. Jessup, “Spruille Braden: Our battling Assistant Secretary of State has lost round one to Argentina’s Perón, but he and his cause have staying power,” *LIFE Magazine*, March 25, 1946, 58. Clearly, “a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica” was not a quote by Henry Kissinger at all, at least not originally. Neither was the phrase originally meant to describe Chile. According the *LIFE* article, the quote belonged to Richard Edes Harrison, an important cartographer. The phrase “Argentina: a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica” is the title of one of his maps, reprinted in *Look at the World: the Fortune Atlas for World Strategy*. See Arthur J. Klinghoffer, *The Power of Projections: How Maps Reflect Global Politics and History*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 170; Richard Edes Harrison, *Look at the World: the Fortune Atlas for World Strategy*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944).

*Look at the World* is a collection of several maps Harrison drew for *Fortune Magazine*. His maps made him famous. He did most of his work for *Fortune* during the Second World War:

“More Americans came into contact with maps during the Second World War than in any previous period in American history, creating a unique opportunity for cartographic experimentation. Harrison was the person most responsible for sensitizing the public to geography in the 1940s….A public hungry for information about the war tore his maps out of magazines and snatched them off shelves and, in the process, endowed Harrison himself with the status of a minor celebrity.” See Susan Schulten, “Richard Edes Harrison and the Challenge to American Cartography,” *Imago Mundi* 50 (1998): 174-188.


What are we to make, then, of the folk wisdom surrounding the quote and its attribution to Kissinger? I don’t think it is unlikely that he could have made such a statement at some point. He could
their own arguments and I hoped to use it in mine. I could not however, trace the quote to its original source. What I did find was much too interesting to leave unaddressed. I have, thus, incorporated a discussion of that quote and its origin – or lack thereof - in an appendix to this thesis.

VII. CHAPTER OUTLINE

My thesis is composed of six chapters. First, this introduction includes the thesis statement, methods and review of major sources. Chapter Two discusses theories of US Intervention, Nixon-Kissinger and Ford-Kissinger foreign policy, the various characteristics of the Nixon and Ford administrations that help to explain the policy decisions made about intervention in Chile and continued relations with Pinochet despite the obvious human rights abuses being perpetrated by the new Chilean regime.

Chapter Three briefly examines US involvement in the 1958 and 1964 Chilean elections and takes an in-depth look at the CIA’s instigation of a coup attempt in 1970. Also included are a review of Henry Kissinger’s version of the events of 1970, as told in his memoirs as well as similar claims made by Richard Nixon in *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*.

Chapter Four continues the narrative with an in-depth look at CIA involvement in the course of events between October 1970 and 11 September 1973. It discusses Nixon’s and Kissinger’s claims about the extent of US policy makers’ knowledge of and responsibility for those events.

very well have been familiar with Harrison’s maps and was perhaps adapting a familiar phrase to a new situation. Whatever the case, it is an interesting example of an apocryphal quotation entering the accepted body of knowledge on a given subject.
Chapter Five is a review of events in Washington, mostly following the coup, that affected US interaction with Chile. It also includes a discussion of the US Government’s knowledge of Operation Condor and its activities as well as a critique of the Ford administration’s lack of action in the face of the obvious crimes the organization was committing. Chapter Five also includes a review of Kissinger’s version of events, as stated in the third volume of his memoirs, *Years of Renewal*, as well as a brief review of President Ford’s discussion of Chile-related events in his own memoirs, *A Time to Heal*. I utilized Browning’s perpetrator testimony tests where appropriate in evaluating the testimony of Kissinger, Nixon, and Ford in Chapters Three through Five.

I reflect in Chapter Six on how best to evaluate US actions in Chile – in terms of the success or failure to achieve policy goals, the impact on the US Government’s domestic and international image, or the adherence to the fundamental principles on which our nation was built, what Huntington calls the “American Creed.” I then consider the application and implications of Huntington’s argument about the cyclical nature of American domestic politics to the actions of the US Government in Chile in the early 1970s. I end with some speculations about what the outcome of US policy toward Chile could have been had policy makers acted differently.
CHAPTER TWO
FOREIGN POLICY MAKING DURING
THE NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATIONS:
THEORIES OF US INTERVENTION

“Our main concern...[is that] the picture projected to the
world will be his [Allende’s] success.”
~Richard Nixon, November, 1970

I. INTRODUCTION

In order to better understand how the Nixon Administration arrived at the decision
to deepen US involvement in Chile in the 1970s, it is necessary to first explore the
Administration’s policy making process. James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, John
Lewis Gaddis, and Saul Landau generally agree that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger
were the chief architects of US foreign policy during the Nixon Administration.
Kissinger especially attempted to redefine the US approach, pushing for a “philosophical
deepening,” a shift from the pursuit of hegemony to the desire to maintain a balance of
power; the redefinition of “threats,” “interests,” and the relationship between the two; and
the shift from the pursuit of superiority to a pursuit of sufficiency.

Some elements of US foreign policy were carried over from previous
administrations, for example, a re-articulation of the belief of previous US statesmen in
the fundamental inferiority of third world peoples. Those elements were accompanied by
several characteristics unique to the Nixon Administration. Though there is some
disagreement about particulars, William Bundy, Robert Dallek, Gaddis, Landau, and Tim
Wiener agree on four points: that Nixon and Kissinger centralized the policy making

86 Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 79.
process;\textsuperscript{87} that they had an immense concern for the international reputation of the United States;\textsuperscript{88} that there was marked inconsistency between the Nixon Administration’s policy toward the developed powers and policy toward the third world;\textsuperscript{89} and that the policy making process changed very little when Ford took office, chiefly due to Henry Kissinger’s continued control of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{90} The above noted philosophical changes, the belief in the inferiority of third world peoples, and characteristics of the Nixon and Ford Administrations all contributed to US policy toward Chile in the early to mid 1970s.

I begin this chapter with a discussion of the characteristics of the Nixon and Ford Administrations that bear on the development of policy toward Chile. A discussion of alternative interpretations to my own follows, and I conclude with a rearticulation of my own analysis, based on the themes developed previously in the chapter.

\textbf{II. “A PHILOSOPHICAL DEEPENING”}

In \textit{US Foreign Policy and World Order}, Nathan and Oliver note, as Gaddis suggests in \textit{Strategies of Containment}, that Kissinger drove the intellectual development of the Nixon Administration’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{91} Gaddis argues that Kissinger believed that the United States needed a “philosophical deepening” in its policy making. There

\begin{footnotesize}


\textsuperscript{91} Nathan and Oliver, \textit{United States Foreign Policy}, 382.
\end{footnotesize}
were three “prerequisites” necessary for this “deepening.” The first was a recognition that power has a “multidimensional nature.”

92 The three chief dimensions of power were military, economic, and political. 93 A military loss could be compensated for by an economic or political gain. 94 Provided that the global balance of power remained unchanged, this broadening of the definition of power allowed for movement away from “a fixed to a flexible perception of interests” in foreign policy. 95

A second prerequisite was a recognition that “conflict and disharmony” were inevitable and inescapable facets of the international order. 96 Pursuing peace would weaken US resolve to address threats to US stability. Furthermore, a quest for peace would necessarily lead to a weakening of defenses, and there would always be at least one state willing to take advantage of those vulnerabilities. The final prerequisite was a recognition of US limitations. Gaddis quotes Kissinger’s statement that, “No country can act wisely simultaneously in every part of the globe at every moment of time.” 97 It was neither possible nor desirable to try to solve all the world’s problems. Restraint must govern American involvement abroad. 98

Nathan and Oliver argue, as does Gaddis, that international stability and maintaining the balance of power were paramount policy concerns. 99 Nathan and Oliver cite a revealing statement by Kissinger:

“Whenever peace – conceived as the avoidance of war - has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the

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92 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 275.
93 Ibid, 280.
94 Ibid, 275.
95 Ibid, 275.
96 Ibid, 276.
97 Ibid, 277.
98 Ibid, 277.
99 Nathan and Oliver, United States Foreign Policy, 382-383; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 274-286; 336.
mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community. Whenever
the international order has acknowledged that certain principles could not be
compromised even for the sake of peace, stability based on an equilibrium of
forces was at least conceivable.”

For Kissinger, international conflict was an unavoidable aspect of the international order.
Policy makers should work to reduce the possibility of war by striving to establish and
maintain stability, which Kissinger defined as “an equilibrium of forces.” Stability
was the “hallmark of successful diplomacy,” and the best means of maintaining stability
was to distribute power among several regional authorities.

Gaddis also discusses Nixon’s and Kissinger’s redefinition of what constituted a
threat. Previous administrations defined threats in terms of an enemy’s ideology –
ideology predicted behavior. The Nixon Administration began to define threats in terms
of an enemy’s actions – future actions could be predicted by analyzing previous behavior.
Gaddis cites Kissinger’s statement in 1969: “‘[W]e have no permanent enemies…we will
judge other countries, including Communist countries…on the basis of their actions and
not on the basis of their domestic ideology.’” It was not, then, the Soviet Union’s
ideology but its “combination of hostility and capability that existed in [its] foreign
policy” that constituted the threat the Soviet Union posed to the United States.

Gaddis argues as well that Nixon and Kissinger redefined the relationship of
threats and interests. Previous administrations allowed perceived threats to define policy

\[\text{\small \cite{gaddis1982strategies}, 282. Gaddis quotes from Kissinger’s first volume of\m}
\text{\small memoirs, White House Years. Kissinger’s statement was made during a White House press briefing on\m}
\text{\small December 18, 1969. The full quote is as follows: ‘‘We have always made it clear that we have no\m}
\text{\small permanent enemies and that we will judge other countries, including Communist countries, and specifically\m}
\text{\small countries like Communist China, on the basis of their actions and not on the basis of their domestic ideology.’’}\m}
\text{\small Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979), 192.}\m}
\text{\small \cite{gaddis1982strategies}, 283. As I discuss in the next section, the same rule did not apply to all nations.}\m]
interests, specifically the threat of communism. As Gaddis observes, "‘Containing communism’ had become an interest in and of itself, without regard to the precise way in which communism as a unified force might endanger American security."\(^{105}\) Nixon and Kissinger, however, focused on defining what they believed to be the national interest and then defined as threats that which would jeopardize that interest. This re-conceptualization allowed the United States much more freedom in terms of diplomatic relations with communist countries. “[T]he United States could feasibly work with states of differing, even antipathetic, social systems as long as they shared the American interest in maintaining global stability.”\(^{106}\)

The Nixon Administration also shifted policy from the unilateral action of previous administrations and the perpetuation of the existing bi-polar power structure to a pursuit of tri-lateralism with US allies and a pentagonal, multi-polar balance of power.\(^{107}\) Kissinger also sought to move away from a need for “superiority” to “sufficiency” in defense policy. To meet these challenges, Nixon and Kissinger pursued a system of “shared responsibilities.”\(^{108}\) They believed it was necessary to build a new policy framework, the major element of which included direct negotiations with the Soviets to balance strategic power.

The Administration thus pursued détente with the Soviet Union and an opening of relations with China - China’s growing influence was expected to offset the power of the Soviet Union\(^{109}\) - and allowed both Western Europe and Japan to strengthen their power regionally. The combined power of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan (tri-

\(^{105}\) Ibid, 283.
\(^{106}\) Ibid, 283.
\(^{107}\) Ibid, 278-279.
\(^{108}\) Nathan and Oliver, *United States Foreign Policy*, 367.
lateralism), was to balance the Soviet Union and China, in a pentagonal balance of power, shown in Figure 2.1, below.\textsuperscript{110}

*Figure 2.1 Kissinger’s Pentagonal Balance of Power*

The tri-lateral power relationship may be better understood as triangular in nature, as depicted in Figure 2.2, shown below.

*Figure 2.2 Kissinger’s Tri-lateral Power Relationship*

It is important to note that though the US recognized that both Western Europe and Japan could be power centers in their own right, becoming partners with the US in the balancing of relations with the Soviet Union and China, the power that Western

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid, 279-280.
Europe and Japan wielded was economic, not military power. Kissinger himself said that “It is wrong to speak of only one balance of power, for there are several which have to be related to each other…In the military sphere, there are two superpowers [the US and the Soviet Union]. In economic terms, there are at least five major groupings. Politically, many more centers of influence have emerged.” Gaddis observes that Nixon described those five major groupings as the countries comprising the pentagonal power relationship he and Kissinger were pursuing.

III. TWO DIFFERENT FOREIGN POLICY CONSTRUCTS

Although the parameters of US foreign policy during this era seem clear, they were not applied uniformly. The Administration appears to have had two different foreign policy constructs: one set of policies for the developed powers and another for the third world. The communist ideology the Nixon Administration tolerated in the Soviet Union and China was not tolerated in the third world. Gaddis notes the Administration’s policies toward Vietnam, Chile, and Angola as examples.

There are several possible explanations for the policy inconsistency. One approach suggests that there may have been a “perceptual lag.” Gaddis summarizes the theory of other scholars that “Nixon and Kissinger responded to [indigenous socialist/communist movements in the third world] with the outdated reflexes of the Cold War, not realizing the extent to which their own policies had made that view of the world

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111 Ibid, 278.
112 Kissinger, quoted in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 280.
113 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 278.
115 Gaddis, 285.
obsolete.” Another possibility was that the third world had become a “testing ground,” for the willingness of policy makers to act. In *The Dangerous Doctrine*, Saul Landau quotes a statement by Richard Nixon in 1970 before the invasion of Cambodia: “It is not our power, but our will and character, which are being tested tonight.” In *A Tangled Web: the Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency*, William Bundy alludes to the idea that Kissinger felt that the US was being tested, particularly in September, 1970. The hijack by “a radical Palestinian group” of two American and one Swiss commercial planes that were then taken to Jordan, “a possible Soviet submarine base in Cuba,” and the election of Salvador Allende in Chile “appeared to be simultaneous tests contrived by the Soviet Union.” The Vietnam War and the *Mayaguez* incident (also in Cambodia) were other tests that policy makers felt they had to “pass.”

I am inclined to agree with the “testing ground” argument to an extent, but I would argue that on a fundamental level, Nixon and Kissinger believed that all nations were not created equal and, thus, were not entitled to equal consideration in the forming of US foreign policy. Landau notes the revealing quote by Henry Kissinger that Seymour Hersh provides in *The Price of Power*: “[T]he axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo. What happens in the South [the third world] is of no importance.” For Nixon and Kissinger, the nations of the

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116 Ibid, 285. Gaddis is here summarizing the arguments of scholars that he ultimately disagrees with; he does not provide citations for those arguments.
117 Landau, 99.
118 Ibid, 182.
119 Ibid, 179.
120 Ibid, 179.
121 For a discussion of Vietnam, see Landau, 80. Also see discussions of the 1975 *Mayaguez* incident in Paterson, 608-609 and in Nathan and Oliver, 378.
122 Landau, 105. The Kissinger quote Hersh cites was reported to him by Gabriel Valdés, a Chilean politician. The full quote is “History has never been produced in the South. The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo.”
world fit into one of three categories: great powers that possessed superior military strength (the United States and the Soviet Union); lesser powers that exercised influence through economic or political strength (countries of Western Europe and Japan, among others); and a final group of nations (the third world) that mattered little in the grand scheme of things.¹²³

Among this final group there might arise the occasional regional power that the US could use as a surrogate to exercise influence, as Nathan and Oliver observe. Third world countries were “objects in a larger game, episodically important, but only insofar as they impinged upon the traditional focus of the Nixon Doctrine.”¹²⁴ On the whole, however, Nixon and Kissinger seemed to see the third world largely as the rabble in need of control, as evidenced by Kissinger’s statement about the irresponsibility of the Chilean people in allowing a socialist leader to be elected.¹²⁵

What Nixon and Kissinger would not tolerate in the third world was the emergence of a socialist/communist regime that might have altered the “status quo” and upset the world balance of power that they had worked so hard to promote and maintain.¹²⁶ As Gaddis observes: “[E]ach of these [socialist/communist] movements, if allowed to proceed unopposed, would have produced changes in the status quo that might have appeared to shift the balance of power.”¹²⁷ William Bundy makes a similar

¹²³ See Gaddis, 279-280 for a discussion of tri-lateralism and the pentagonal power relationship between the U.S., Japan, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. See Landau, 105 for U.S. attitudes toward the third world.
¹²⁴ Nathan and Oliver, 391-392.
¹²⁶ Gaddis, 286.
¹²⁷ Ibid, 286. Author’s original emphasis.
observation: “[Nixon and Kissinger] were open-minded about China and trumpeted their ability to discern that Nationalist factors outweighed Communist ideology in Sino-Soviet relations. But in Chile, several Middle Eastern countries, South Asia, and Africa, any Communist interest meant to them an early Soviet grab for power, at the expense of the United States.” Any movement toward socialism/communism was interpreted as a threat to US interests, and the administration used covert action, not diplomatic strategy, to neutralize the socialist/communist threat in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and other minor world regions.

IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL INFERIORITY OF LATIN AMERICANS

Part of the reason for this policy distinction between developed countries and the third world was the re-articulation of a belief in the fundamental inferiority of third world peoples. Lars Schoultz has written extensively on the superiority US statesmen have traditionally felt toward Latin Americans. In Beneath the United States, Schoultz concerns himself with the larger historical narrative of US foreign policy toward Latin America. He argues that national security, domestic politics, and economics have always guided US Latin America policy, but that the foundation of all three factors is the belief that Latin Americans are essentially an inferior people. That fundamental belief, present in some form since the early years of nationhood, continued to be the lynch-pin of US foreign policy toward Latin America.

128 Bundy, 515.
129 With the exception of Vietnam, a conflict the Nixon administration inherited.
131 Schoultz, Beneath the United States, xv; 367; 374.
Schoultz cites many examples of this belief by key shapers of US foreign policy in the inferiority of Latin Americans, from Alexander Scott’s observations in 1812 that “[Venezuelans are] timid, indolent, ignorant, superstitious, and incapable of enterprise or exertion. From the present moral and intellectual habits of all classes, I fear they have not arrived at that point of human dignity which fits man for the enjoyment of free and rational government,”\textsuperscript{133} to George Keenan’s statement in 1950 that “It seems unlikely that there could be any other region of the earth in which nature and human behavior could have combined to produce a more unhappy and hopeless background for the conduct of human life than in Latin America.”\textsuperscript{134}

What are the sources of this disdain for Latin America and Latin Americans? Schoultz makes a convincing argument. He compares US sentiments toward Western Europe to those toward Latin America. “[N]orthwestern Europe,” he argues, is perceived as culturally sophisticated, economically developed, militarily powerful, and politically sound (i.e. democratic). Latin America, by contrast, is perceived as culturally unrefined, economically underdeveloped, militarily weak, and not uniformly democratic.\textsuperscript{135} In short, “northwestern Europe [is] the cradle of the dominant North American culture.”\textsuperscript{136} Latin American culture, perceived as fundamentally different from that of North Americans, is therefore believed to be fundamentally inferior.

That fundamental inferiority was compounded by the US officials’ hostility toward Catholics and Catholicism. Schoultz quotes US minister to Peru, Isaac

Christiancy:

\textsuperscript{133} Alexander Scott, quoted in Schoultz, \textit{Beneath the United States}, 7. According to Schoultz, Scott was “the first U.S. foreign aid official.” See Schoultz, \textit{Beneath the United States}, 7.

\textsuperscript{134} George Kennan, quoted in Schoultz, \textit{Beneath the United States}, 316.

\textsuperscript{135} Schoultz, \textit{Beneath the United States}, xvi-xvii.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid, xvi-xvii.
“If there is any one thing for which you and I and the great mass of the American people ought to be more thankful for than any other, it is that we were not born and raised under the dominion of the catholic church, which, wherever it prevails, makes all permanent or settled popular government impossible.”

Disgust over miscegenation was another facet of the US attitude toward Latin Americans, as was a dehumanization, contempt, and mistrust of Africans, indigenous people, and Spaniards. Schoultz notes us proconsul to Latin America Joel Roberts Poinsett’s comment that miscegenation “contributed to render the Mexicans a more ignorant and debauched people than their ancestors had been.” Schoultz also cites Assistant Secretary Francis Mairs Huntington Wilson’s comment after his first visit to Latin America: “What can you expect from the formula for this mixture: the crude brutality of the African; the stolidity, shiftlessness and craftiness of the Indian; the cruelty and greed of the Spaniard…” The fundamental otherness of Latin Americans, horror of miscegenation, negative attitudes toward the peoples that populated Latin American nations - Africans, indigenous people, and the Spanish – all contributed to the disdain of US officials and the general public toward Latin America.

Michael Hunt makes a similar argument to Schoultz in *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*. He differs from Schoultz in that he digs deeper to find the root of Anglo North American attitudes toward Latin American peoples that influenced US policy toward that region. Hunt finds that the Elizabethan attitude toward black Africans as a people wholly inferior to white Europeans was easily transferred by Anglo Americans to Native North Americans. That Elizabethan attitude was itself an “extension” of attitudes toward race and racial hierarchy that stretched “back millennia and across cultures around the

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137 Ibid, 95.
138 Ibid, 19.
139 Ibid, 207-208.
globe,” as noted in Chapter One.\textsuperscript{141} The image of the Native American as a savage provided justification for American expansion into and conquest of Native American territory. That justification was again transferred to American policy toward “other peoples,” Latin Americans included.\textsuperscript{142}

In addition to that basic racism, North American attitudes toward the Spanish, “baggage the English colonists brought to the New World,”\textsuperscript{143} were applied to Native South Americans. According to the “black legend,” the Spanish were cruel, Catholic (an object of harsh criticism in Protestant eyes), and poor governors.\textsuperscript{144} If the skin color of Native South Americans wasn’t condemnation enough, colonization by the Spanish debased them further. “From this [Spanish] legacy derived those qualities that Americans most often associated with Latinos – servility, misrule, lethargy, and bigotry.”\textsuperscript{145} US Statesmen believed that those qualities kept “Latin governments” from operating as successful republics. Hunt quotes John Randolph, John Quincy Adams, and Thomas Jefferson:

“You cannot make liberty out of Spanish matter.”\textsuperscript{146}

“[Latin Americans] have not the first elements of good or free government. Arbitrary power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their education, upon their habits, and upon all their institutions”\textsuperscript{147}

“A priest-ridden people…[incapable of] maintaining a free civil government.”\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid, 90.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid, 52-58.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid, 58.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid, 58; 101.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid, 58-59.
\textsuperscript{146} John Randolph in Hunt, \textit{Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy} 59. John Randolph was a congressman from Virginia in the early 1800s. See Hunt, \textit{Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy}, 59.
\textsuperscript{147} John Quincy Adams in Hunt, \textit{Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy}, 59.
The “black legend” informed both American foreign policy toward Latin America and public opinion about Latin Americans. According to Hunt, three distinct stereotypes emerged as the US began to encounter Latin Americans, noted in Chapter One:

- The Latino as a dark-skinned brute “fated to give way before his betters,” much like the Anglo American view of Native North Americans.\(^{149}\)

- The Latina as a white-skinned “maiden” in need of protection, “salvation or seduction”.\(^{150}\)

- The Latino as a black child,\(^ {151}\) “a prodigal and dangerous delinquent”\(^ {152}\) in need of “Uncle Sam’s tutelage and stern discipline”.\(^ {153}\)

These images, as depicted in political cartoons and mirrored in the statements of US Statesmen, were invoked as justification for policy decisions. The image of the dark-skinned brute was useful during the period of American expansion westward into California and Mexico. The image of the “fair-skinned and comely señorita”\(^ {154}\) was employed “when the times called for saving Latins from themselves or from some outside threat.”\(^ {155}\) The image of the obstinate black child in need of correction was utilized when US “supposedly benevolent actions” met with “resentment and sullen defiance.”\(^ {156}\)

Hunt links those attitudes and images to the development of the Monroe Doctrine.\(^ {157}\) In the context of US relations with Europe, however, James Monroe’s

\(^{150}\) Ibid, 61.
\(^{151}\) Ibid, 61–62.
\(^{152}\) Ibid, 67–68.
\(^{153}\) Ibid, 62.
\(^{154}\) Ibid, 59.
\(^{155}\) Ibid, 60.
\(^{156}\) Ibid, 61.
\(^{157}\) Ibid, 62.
message to the US Congress on December 2, 1823 was more clearly connected to the desire to protect the US from foreign incursion and to protect the budding economic relationship between the US and its newly independent neighbors to the South.\footnote{George C. Herring, \textit{From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776}, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 154.} With the restoration of the Spanish monarchy, Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, feared that Spain, backed by the Holy Alliance, would attempt to regain control over their former colonies. In his speech, Monroe stated unequivocally that the US would brook no trespasses in the Americas:

> “[A]s a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved…the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power…”\footnote{James Monroe, “Seventh Annual Message,” December 2, 1823, The American Presidency Project, eds. John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, \url{http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29465&st=&st1=#axzz1h1zFCKOM}.}

A similar statement later in Monroe’s speech does seem to indicate a nascent possessiveness over Latin America, and it is perhaps from this statement that Michael Hunt derives his argument that “the ripening claim of the United States to the role of natural leader and policeman of an American system of states…was embodied in the Monroe Doctrine.”\footnote{Hunt, \textit{Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy}, 62.} Monroe states:

> “With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere, but with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”\footnote{James Monroe, “Seventh Annual Message,” December 2, 1823, \textit{The American Presidency Project: V. Presidents of the United States: 1817-1825}, Eds. John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, \url{http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29465&st=&st1=#axzz1h1zFCKOM}.}
That possessiveness grew throughout the next eighty years, developed into a paternalistic attitude toward Latin America, and ultimately led to the Roosevelt Administration’s idea that the US must necessarily be the policing power in the Americas.¹⁶²

Concerned once again about European involvement in Latin America, this time over Britain’s and Germany’s intervention in Venezuela in order to recover debts owed, Secretary of State and former Secretary of War, Elihu Root, declared that the US “[could not] ignore [its] duty” and policeman of the hemisphere.¹⁶³ Venezuela had refused to play by the rules that governed the interplay between sovereign states. Such conduct could not, and would not be borne, and none but the US would shoulder the burden of enforcing those rules, as was its duty.

Roosevelt’s Fourth Annual Message to Congress on December 6, 1904 formally stated what is known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Portions of the statement very nearly quote Elihu Root verbatim:

“It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare…Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power…It is a mere truisim to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the

¹⁶³ Elihu Root in Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 369-371.
right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it.”

Roosevelt reiterated those sentiments in his Fifth Annual Message to Congress:

“...In some state unable to keep order among its own people, unable to secure justice from outsiders, and unwilling to do justice to those outsiders who treat it well, may result in our having to take action to protect our rights ....We must ourselves in good faith try to help upward toward peace and order those of our sister republics which need such help. Just as there has been a gradual growth of the ethical element in the relations of one individual to another, so we are, even though slowly, more and more coming to recognize the duty of bearing one another’s burdens, not only as among individuals, but also as among nations.”

We can see in Roosevelt’s speeches the possessiveness of the Monroe Doctrine developing into paternalism. The United States was to be the enlightened teacher and policeman of the hemisphere, benevolently bestowing favor and assistance to those Latin American nations that behaved “civilly,” and chastening those that did not. Freedom required responsibility and those Latin American nations who behaved irresponsibly must submit to the tutelage and policing of the United States. A similar attitude was also expressed in the Nixon Administration, as in Kissinger’s observations about the “irresponsibility” of the Chilean people. If the Chileans wouldn’t take care of their own political problems, the US Government would show them how to do it.

V. CONCERN FOR PUBLIC IMAGE

Another characteristic of the Nixon Administration was a concern for the public image of the US. The delicate balance of power depended greatly on the international community’s perception of US strength, or so both Nixon and Kissinger felt. They were

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166 See Footnote 1, Chapter One.
thus deeply concerned with the US Government’s international reputation as a great power. Landau argues that the Nixon Administration sought to maintain the appearance of great strength to cloak the declining real power of the United States. Gaddis contends that though the Nixon Administration generally rose above ideological differences with communist nations in favor of preserving the balance of power, “the administration was not prepared to tolerate further victories for communism…The dangers of humiliation, of conveying the appearance of weakness to real adversaries, were too great to permit acquiescence in the triumph even of hypothetical adversaries.” He also cites a revealing statement by Henry Kissinger, given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1974: “[while] a decisive advantage is hard to calculate, the appearance of inferiority – whatever its actual significance – can have serious political consequences.” Nixon and Kissinger were also concerned with the Administration’s domestic public image. Nathan and Oliver observe that the Nixon Administration was “almost paranoid” about its public appearance, noting the Administration’s fear of a right-wing backlash of opinion if the war in Vietnam were lost.

Lars Schoultz presents a convincing argument about the historical concern for the reputation of the United States in regard to its relations with Latin America. Schoultz argues that Latin American countries do not themselves present a threat to national security. Rather, concerns about national security are based on the fear that strong nations outside the region may, if allowed to gain control over a portion of the region, use

167 Landau, Dangerous Doctrine, 102.
168 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 286.
169 Henry Kissinger, in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 286.
170 Nathan and Oliver, United States Foreign Policy, 360.
Latin America as a base from which to attack or threaten the United States.\(^{171}\) These concerns have inspired the United States to pursue a policy of “strategic denial” in regard to Latin America, ensuring that no enemy can gain a foothold in the region. Schoultz is not the first scholar to make the “strategic denial” argument,\(^{172}\) but he adds the element of a quest for regional hegemony. Schoultz observes that, once attained, regional hegemony in Latin America became symbolic as gauge of US status among the international community. Initially, the concern over maintaining hegemony was linked simply to the prestige of the United States on the international stage. During the Cold War, this concern about prestige shifted to a concern over credibility and the appearance of strength. As Schoultz observes, the “‘loss’ [of regional hegemony] would be interpreted around the world as a sign of U.S. weakness.”\(^{173}\)

John Mearsheimer in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* and Michael Lind in *The American Way of Strategy* make similar arguments. Mearsheimer argues that, though world hegemony is “virtually impossible for any state to achieve,”\(^{174}\) great powers strive to achieve, and then maintain, regional hegemony for the better security of their states.\(^{175}\) Similarly, Lind argues that “reasonable fear” – the fear that “other great powers” would pursue tactics that directly or indirectly threaten the security of the United States inspires the drive to achieve and maintain hegemony.\(^{176}\) Lind also echoes Mearsheimer in his assertion that global hegemony, were it even attainable, is unsustainable economically and “sacrifices too much of the liberty of American citizens.”

\(^{171}\) Schoultz, *Beneath the United States*, 368.
\(^{175}\) Ibid, 41; 345.
as noted in Chapter One. Common to both is the principle that the desire for power encourages a state to seek a preponderance of regional power when hegemony on a global scale is unachievable. That principle can certainly be seen in US relations with Latin America, particularly in light of Schoultz’s analysis. Having achieved regional hegemony, the maintenance of power was of paramount concern.

Schoultz’s, Mearsheimer’s, and Lind’s arguments lead to the conclusion that US national security would be jeopardized by the weakening of regional hegemony, diminishing the perception of US strength and influence. But why would a democratically elected socialist in Chile constitute such an erosion of hegemony in the region? It certainly cannot have been due to the way in which Allende came to power. The USG had committed itself publically to supporting democracy in the Americas and one cannot dispute that Allende was elected by the people. The USG had also, however, committed itself to keeping socialism/communism in the Americas from spreading beyond Cuba, counting the rise of any new socialist/communist government in Latin America as a gain for the Soviet Union. Having made that commitment, there was little room for the US to back down from what was necessarily perceived as a challenge.

VI. Centralization of the Policy Making Process


Kissinger established his offices in the West Wing’s basement, “from which he could have easy access to the

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177 Ibid, 176.
president.”

Decision making was to be centralized. In Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, Tim Weiner cites Richard Helms in a 1988 interview between Helms and Dr. Stanley I. Kutler: “Richard Nixon never trusted anybody.” Helms went on to complain that Nixon had no confidence in the competency of the various departments and agencies at his disposal, including the Air Force, the State Department, and the CIA. Weiner also cites Thomas Hughes’s comment that “Both [Nixon and Kissinger] were incurably covert.” Bundy notes Nixon’s “unshakeable bent to deceive,” and that “[Nixon’s] taste for acting secretly was obsessive.”

Gaddis offers an explanation that goes beyond personality - that centralization was necessary in order to achieve the Administration’s foreign policy objectives: “To a remarkable extent, they succeeded [in achieving their goals], but only by concentrating power in the White House to a degree unprecedented since the wartime administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.” Saul Landau maintains that in order to limit opposition to his policy decisions, Nixon created a “private national security apparatus” that bypassed the established bureaucracy which continued to view the Cold War in rigid ideological terms. “Nixon created a special finance committee with its own funds, the Finance Committee to Reelect the President, headed by commerce secretary Maurice Stans, a White House-controlled political grouping independent of the Republican party…and, finally, a secret foreign policy apparatus headed by Kissinger and designed to circumvent the clumsy and stagnant national security bureaucracy.” Weiner himself argues that, “[Nixon and

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179 Ibid, 100.
181 Wiener, 292.
182 Bundy, 519.
183 Gaddis, 273.
184 Landau, 103.
Kissinger had reached an understanding: they alone would conceive, command, and control clandestine operations.\textsuperscript{185} Centralization allowed Nixon and Kissinger to realize their policy goals by streamlining decision making and limiting dissent.

Kissinger acknowledges Nixon’s desire to work around the bureaucracy in his memoirs,\textsuperscript{186} a notion he himself found not only attractive but necessary. In “Bureaucracy and Policy Making: The Effect of Insiders and Outsiders on the Policy Process,” an essay presented at UCLA in 1968, Kissinger argues that the bureaucratic process leads to fragmented policy, isolation of executives from the information they need to make decisions, as well as reliance on “experts” that may manipulate the information on which a decision is made and on “administrative consensus” in decision making rather than an executive’s own reasoning and conviction.

He also argues that it is virtually impossible for policy makers to “plan ahead” and address future policy decisions because they spend the majority of their time addressing existing problems. The bureaucratic policy making process becomes so arduous that once a decision is made and policy is put into action, it is very difficult to revisit the issue. Furthermore, the difficulties of working within the bureaucracy cause some executives to limit decision making to a very small group, not open to the scrutiny of the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy, in those cases, continues to operate in ignorance, “sending out cables” inconsistent with actual policy because they know no better.\textsuperscript{187} That is exactly the scenario that developed as Nixon and Kissinger centralized the policy making process, particularly in regard to Chile policy. Nixon and Kissinger were firmly

\textsuperscript{185} Wiener, 293.
\textsuperscript{186} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, 671.
in the driver’s seat of the policy making process while the Department of State, Edward Korry, and his staff at the US Embassy continued in ignorance, “sending out cables” inconsistent with the Administration’s objective.

VII. **DOMESTIC FACTORS AFFECTING US POLICY TOWARD CHILE**

Both Landau and Schoultz note that the various military entanglements in which the US had been involved during the Cold War had reduced public support for overt military action. Support for the Korean War fluctuated between 50 and 80 percent throughout the early 1950s. Support for the Vietnam War also fluctuated slightly, but generally decreased between the mid 1960s and early 1970s, reaching an all time low of 40 percent in January 1973. It is important to note that dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War slightly decreased between 1969 and 1970, but began to increase again in the second half of 1970, a critical period in US efforts in Chile. With public support for large scale conflict increasingly strained by the Vietnam War, it was unlikely there would be much support for additional overt military action elsewhere.

Economic resources were also strained. The world economy in the 1970s was in recession and the United States was not unaffected. Important to note are the decrease in GDP growth and increase in inflation during some key years of US action in Chile. The 3.1 annual percent change in GDP between 1968 and 1969 drooped to 0.2% between

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188 Landau, 62; Schoultz, 361.
191 Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, 592-599.
1969 and 1970; the inflation rate increased to 5.7%. GDP experienced negative growth between 1973 and 1974; inflation jumped to 11% in the same period, the highest rate in the decade between 1965 and 1975 (see Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3 US Economic Indicators, 1965-1976

Additionally, the unemployment rate, which had remained fairly stable between 1967 and mid 1969, climbed to 6.1% in December 1970, a seventy-four percent increase from December of the previous year. Unemployment remained close to 6.0% throughout 1971.\textsuperscript{192}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & GDP Percent Change from Preceeding Period & Inflation Rate \\
\hline
1965 & 6.4 & 1.6 \\
1966 & 6.5 & 2.9 \\
1967 & 2.5 & 3.1 \\
1968 & 4.8 & 4.2 \\
1969 & 3.1 & 5.5 \\
1970 & 0.2 & 5.7 \\
1971 & 3.4 & 4.4 \\
1972 & 5.3 & 3.2 \\
1973 & 5.8 & 6.2 \\
1974 & -0.6 & 11 \\
1975 & -0.2 & 9.1 \\
1976 & 5.4 & 5.8 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textit{Source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau for Economic Analysis and US}

Covert action thus became increasingly attractive as a tool for implementing policy: it was cheap, compared to large scale military action; it was efficient (maximizing results with reduced means); and it was, by nature, secret – the public didn’t have a chance to dissent. This movement toward the use of covert action was an existing policy trend, noted by some scholars as beginning as a result of the Korean War in the 1950s. Others note that low-level violence became ever more appealing after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Whenever the trend began, it was only exacerbated by the war in Vietnam.

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194 Landau, 62.
195 Nathan and Oliver, 302.
The CIA is exempt from disclosing budget information under the Freedom of Information Act, so it is impossible to compare total CIA spending to total military spending during the Cold War. We can, however, compare spending on CIA activities in Chile to spending on two major military conflicts during the Cold War: the Korean War and the Vietnam War. To achieve its goal in Korea, the US government spent $30 billion, deployed 326,683 men in 1951 and did not decrease that number until 1954, when troop deployment dropped to 225,590. The Korean War resulted in 36,574 US in-theater deaths. In Vietnam, the US government spent $111 billion, deployed 537,000 troops in 1968, the greatest number of troops deployed to Vietnam between 1950 and 1974, and lost 58,220 soldiers in-theater.

By comparison, to achieve its goal in Chile, the US Government spent just over $6 million, decreased troop deployment to Chile to 29 troops in 1971, and lost no soldiers in combat. There is no way to tell how many CIA operatives were involved in the Santiago Station’s activities, though it is certain that the number is far below that of troop deployment during the Korean and Vietnam Wars; perhaps in the hundreds, perhaps less.

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198 Information available in the documents released through FOIA’s Chile Documentation Project and from the Church Report.
Clearly, using the CIA to achieve a policy goal was significantly cheaper, and more efficient, using fewer US human resources than larger-scale military conflict.

In addition to the lower costs, there were also fewer political risks associated with this strategy. Since, as we shall see in Chapter Three, knowledge of the CIA’s more sensitive activities in Chile was limited to very few individuals outside the Agency, there was little chance for the larger policy making community, let alone the public, to dissent.

There were, after all, several precedents for successful CIA intervention in another nation’s politics. In 1953, the CIA successfully manipulated the political situation in Iran that eventually resulted in the coup that removed Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq from power.\(^{204}\) Immediately following the coup in Iran, the CIA turned their attention on the Jacobo Arbenz government in Guatemala. After weeks of psychological warfare and violence, Arbenz stepped down on June 27, 1954.\(^{205}\)

The Kennedy Administration authorized the disastrous attempted invasion on Cuba in 1961 at the Bay of Pigs, organized by the CIA,\(^ {206}\) and urged the Agency in 1962 to build an intelligence network in Cuba through which they could affect the demise of the Castro regime.\(^ {207}\) Though the Bay of Pigs debacle cannot be counted as a successful intervention, it nevertheless set important precedent. The CIA was also involved with the 1963 coup in South Vietnam that toppled the Diem regime.\(^ {208}\) Moreover, the CIA had lately been successful in its covert action program in influence the 1964 presidential election in Chile. Covert action was an excellent means of quietly addressing situations potentially embarrassing to the reputation of the US, such as the rise of a second


\(^{205}\) Ibid, 106-119. Known as “Operation Success.”

\(^{206}\) Ibid, 204.

\(^{207}\) Ibid, 212-217. Known as “Operation Mongoose.”

\(^{208}\) Ibid, 247-255.
communist state in Latin America, a region over which the US had traditionally enjoyed a comfortable political and military dominance.

VIII. FOREIGN POLICY MAKING DURING THE FORD ADMINISTRATION

Gaddis and Landau agree that the Ford Administration did not break significantly with the foreign policy doctrine Nixon and Kissinger had formed. Though he does not discuss the Ford Administration at length, Gaddis does note that Kissinger remained in charge of foreign policy, which helped to keep the “fundamental elements” of Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy intact. In The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, Jussi Hanhimäki observes that, “Ford was convinced that Kissinger was a genius. As a result, the running of foreign policy tilted even further into Kissinger’s hands after August 9, 1974.”

Landau argues that President Ford and Kissinger, who remained Secretary of State, continued to pursue détente in practice while using anticommunist rhetoric publically as a basic US national security policy. Under Ford, US policy makers “exported” the idea of national security as the paramount policy concern to third world nations; Landau uses as an example the formation of Operation Condor by the Southern Cone countries with the blessing and assistance of the United States.

Under the Ford Administration, chief foreign policy makers, along with the CIA and other intelligence gathering institutions, underwent great scrutiny by three different investigative committees: the Rockefeller Commission, Church Committee, and Pike Committee. But the investigations of all three committees, especially the Church

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209 Gaddis, 273.
211 Landau, 118-120. Operation Condor is discussed further in Chapter Five of this thesis.
Committee, had a greater effect on the Administration’s public rhetoric about foreign policy than its actual policy. The curious discrepancy between public rhetoric and policy practice had been present while Nixon was in power, but it was deepened as a result of the investigations and the subsequent increase in Congressional oversight of US covert action.\textsuperscript{212} As noted in Chapter One, Landau observes that “[a]t the same time that Ford and Kissinger parleyed with the Soviets and Chinese, they continued to foster dictatorship throughout the Third World.”\textsuperscript{213} Henry Kissinger’s speech to the OAS in June, 1976,\textsuperscript{214} and his private conversation with General Augusto Pinochet prior to the speech is an excellent example. Kissinger jealously guarded his control over the policy making process and, though forced to pay public lip service to human rights in his speech, he affirmed US support of the Pinochet’s government in private.\textsuperscript{215}

IX. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS

How does the above discussion help us understand why Nixon and Kissinger pursued a deepened involvement in Chilean politics in the early 1970s? What was the motivation for US action in Chile? There are several competing hypotheses: that it was merely traditional US anti-communist ideology that served as the impetus for action; that the CIA was a rogue institution, acting of its own accord; that the US was promoting democracy in Chile by supporting opposition political parties; that US economic interests were jeopardized by Allende’s rise to power. Other arguments highlight the potential that US domestic politics, ethnocentrism, and a quest for hegemony played a role. US national security interests are also cited, as socialist/communist governments in Latin

\textsuperscript{212} Nathan and Oliver, 354, 359; Landau, 103. Kissinger himself acknowledges this incongruity in his memoirs; see Kissinger, \textit{Years of Upheaval}, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1982), 385.
\textsuperscript{213} Landau, 117-118.
\textsuperscript{214} Kissinger, \textit{Years of Upheaval}, 413.
\textsuperscript{215} Discussed further in Chapter Five of this thesis.
America posed a threat to national security. Finally, one scholar argues that US action in Chile in the 1970s was the natural outgrowth of CIA intervention in the 1960s. I discuss my own interpretation in detail in the concluding section of this chapter.

It is tempting to explain away US involvement in Chile in the 1970s by attributing the impetus for action to anti-communist ideology. On the surface, this seems to be a logical argument; it fits in nicely with generalizations about US foreign policy during the course of the Cold War. We have already discussed the “philosophical deepening” of foreign policy that developed during the Nixon Administration, part of which was the movement away from ideological motivations as the source of any policy decision. Salvador Allende’s offense was not simply that he was a socialist.

The language we find, however, in the documentary record is peppered with references to socialism and communism. We cannot, therefore, fully dismiss the idea that ideology played some role in the decision to intervene in Chile. Indeed, it may be evidence of the US ethnocentric attitude toward Latin America that precluded US policy makers from extending the same considerations they gave to the governments and peoples of great powers to the governments and peoples of Latin America.

Another possible interpretation of US intervention in Chile is that the CIA was a rogue institution acting without the approval of a higher authority. After the CIA’s activities in Chile, among other matters, were exposed by Seymour Hersh in a series of articles in the New York Times, both Representative Otis Pike and Senator Frank Church suspected that the CIA was acting without a government mandate. Each went on to chair a committee (the Pike Committee and the Church Committee) to investigate that charge and other concerns about the way in which the US Intelligence Community (IC) went
about its business.\textsuperscript{216} The documents made available through the Chile Documentation Project, however, show, as the Church Committee ultimately concluded, that though the 40 Committee may not have been in control of CIA operations in Chile, the executive branch \textit{was} directing the CIA’s activities.\textsuperscript{217} Henry Kissinger claims in his memoirs that at one point the CIA did act without the authority of the executive branch, but the documents available do not support his claim, as I discuss in Chapter Three.\textsuperscript{218}

Kissinger also claims that US policy makers desired only to promote democracy. He argues that it was our responsibility to intervene to support the “democratic counterweight” to Allende.\textsuperscript{219} This seems to me an empty claim. The US, via the CIA, did funnel support to \textit{El Mercurio}, a newspaper the CIA had used extensively as an outlet for their anti-Allende propaganda campaign, and to the PDC (Partido Demócrata Cristiano), an opposition political party to Allende, as it had done in Europe after World War II in efforts to keep communist candidates from winning elections.\textsuperscript{220} But, as I discuss later in this thesis, US policy makers’ motives for action in Chile were neither so noble, nor so simple as supporting democracy.\textsuperscript{221}

Furthermore, Allende was himself a democratically elected president. His government generally operated within constitutional parameters giving him quite limited authority. Furthermore, Allende did not have a firmly established popular mandate. A document dated January 3, 1970 observes that “Chileans have a pathologic fear of a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{217} “Church Report,” 52. Chapters Three, Four, and Five of this thesis discuss the documents mentioned.
\item \textsuperscript{218} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, 675-676.
\item \textsuperscript{219} Ibid, 659.
\item \textsuperscript{220} Weiner, \textit{Legacy of Ashes}, 29-33.
\item \textsuperscript{221} See Chapter Four.
\end{itemize}
‘Communist Government’ but are easily lulled by a benign concept such as Popular Unity...222 As Allende had won only a plurality in the 1970 election and his coalition represented only a minority in Congress, he was bound to be plagued by opposition forces that would more than likely have kept his plans for a communist revolution in Chile in check. How then could he have represented a threat to democracy at home or a threat to regional stability in Latin America? US policy makers had little need to intervene to buttress the “democratic counterweight” to the Allende regime.

Lubna Qureshi argues in Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende that the impetus for action in Chile was protection of US business interests,223 “threatened by...President Salvador Allende’s expropriation policies in Chile.”224 Lars Schoultz would agree that economic interests at least played a partial role in the actions of the US government, as they have in other US policy decisions regarding Latin America.225 Certainly the scandal over the alleged use of funds from the International Telephone and Telegraph Company to finance CIA operations in Chile demonstrates that US businesses operating in Chile were concerned about the direction in which Allende would take the country.226 In the case of ITT, however, US policy makers were unwilling to strongly associate with the corporation. Policy makers allowed the CIA Station in Santiago to assist the corporation

222 The UP (Unidad Popular, or Popular Unity) was the coalition of parties backing Allende as their candidate for office. The UP consisted of the “democratic” parties of the left, the PR, API, and PSD; the “Marxist” parties, the PCCH and the PS, and the MAPU, “somewhere in between.” CIA, “Political Parties Chilean Left Have Reached Impasse,” January 3, 1970, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/000093AF.pdf.


224 Schoultz, Beneath the United States, xv; 367; 373.

225 According to Kissinger, the funds were offered to the CIA, but Washington refused to accept them. See footnote in Kissinger, White House Years, 667. What he fails to note is that CIA officials and Santiago did assist ITT is funneling the funds to Allende’s opponents as an alternative to acting, themselves, as the go-between. See Chapter Three for further discussion of the ITT scandal.
in making the connections that would help ITT funnel money to the candidate it was supporting, but policy makers would not allow the CIA to be the funnel, as ITT had requested.\footnote{See Chapter Three for further discussion of ITT situation.} US corporate concerns, at least, did not appear to be a strong enough impetus for involvement. Kissinger himself denies that economic interests influenced policy. The greatest policy concern, he claims, was US security interests.\footnote{Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, 656.} But though business interests were not the reason policy makers decided to intervene, economics certainly figured into the decision to use covert means instead of overt military intervention. The budget deficit resulting from the billions wasted in the unsuccessful Vietnam War reduced the monetary resources the Nixon Administration had at its disposal. As discussed above, covert action was cheaper and more efficient than large scale military intervention.

Kissinger himself cites security interests as a major reason for intervention in Chile. A third world communist state was open to Soviet influence and a potential base from which to launch an attack on the US or its allies. The existence of a second communist/socialist government in Latin America was a frightening prospect. “Allende,” Kissinger writes in his memoirs, wanted to establish an “irreversible dictatorship and a permanent challenge to our position in the Western Hemisphere.”\footnote{Ibid, 656.} He argues that the chance of Allende and Chile igniting a communist revolution in Latin America was greater than that of Cuba because Chile was part of the mainland of the continent.\footnote{Ibid, 657.} He also argues that there is evidence to suggest that Allende wanted to create a training
ground for revolutionaries in Chile.\textsuperscript{231} Chile, therefore, presented a viable threat to US national security. Kissinger’s claims in \textit{White House Years} lead ultimately to the argument that he was afraid of the domino effect.\textsuperscript{232} But Kissinger had earlier stated that Chile was of very little strategic importance in the grand scheme of world politics.\textsuperscript{233} In fact, until it seemed a strong possibility that Allende might be elected president of Chile, neither Nixon nor Kissinger appeared, from the documentary record, to be overly concerned about events in Chile.

Finally, Kristian Gustafson argues that US involvement in Chile was one long campaign from 1958 to 1976; US policy under the Nixon Administration was simply part of the perpetual motion of the covert action machine in Chile. There are merits to that argument – he accomplishes his purpose of providing an analysis of covert action policy from which he derives practical suggestions for the future use of covert action. But that analysis does not explain the violence of Nixon’s response to news that Salvador Allende might very well win the election. Whether the US Government via the CIA had been involved previously in Chile or not, I contend that the Nixon Administration would still have intervened. Existing CIA operations in Chile were simply a convenient mechanism for enacting policy.

\textbf{X. Conclusion}

What, then, explains the Nixon Administration’s involvement in Chile? It is helpful here to return to themes outlines in the first Strategic Calculations table from Chapter One.\textsuperscript{234} Nearly every scholar of foreign policy during the Nixon Administration

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid, 680. Kissinger does not provide a citation for that evidence.
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid, 673.
\textsuperscript{233} See page 7 of this Chapter.
\textsuperscript{234} See Table 1.1.
\end{footnotes}
notes that there was marked inconsistency between policies of détente and more open relations with the established and emerging communist powers, on the one hand, and policies toward the third world, which appeared to be characterized by rigid Cold War anti-communism, on the other. Why did Chile become one of those “episodically important” nations of which James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver write? I would argue that a re-articulation of traditional US ethnocentrism toward Latin America, which defined Latin America as incapable of managing its own affairs and in need of US direction, gave policy makers a sense that they had the right, perhaps even the duty, to intervene.

For all Nixon’s and Kissinger’s willingness to pursue détente with the Soviet Union and open relations with China, they had little respect for the Chilean people’s right to govern themselves. With little respect for Chileans’ right to elect leaders of their choice, the situation in Chile could be interpreted as simply another test of US resolve. Would policy makers rise to the challenge and prevent another communist state from emerging in Latin America? Chile did not, itself, pose a security threat.

Because the US had publicly defined the Chilean left as an enemy, however, the election of Allende would send a signal to US allies and enemies alike that the US was losing its influence over Latin America, a blow to the prestige of the United States and a possible invitation to enemy states to set up shop very close to home; too close for comfort. Chile became one of those “episodically important” nations because political developments in Chile threatened to destabilize the world balance of power, the maintenance of which was Nixon’s and Kissinger’s chief goal. That blow to US prestige was a concern in itself, considering the Nixon Administration’s obsession with its public
image on the international stage. As real power was reduced for lack of resources, the appearance of strength was of the utmost importance in deterring aggression and maintaining the world balance of power. Together these themes gave rise to the notion that we *should* be involved in Chile.

Domestic politics played a role in determining the means employed to achieve the Nixon Administration’s goal. As Schoultz argues, the attitudes and pressures of the voting public and of the US Congress affect the way policy decisions toward Latin America are made. In the case of Chile, public attitudes toward the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and later the Congressional intelligence investigations all affected US policy toward Chile. Additionally, the Administration was afraid of the political ramifications of acting in violation of principles they supported in public statements – “self-determination and respect for free election.” Those factors, coupled with reduced resources, as discussed in section VII of this chapter, made covert action via the CIA an attractive option for implementation of policy.

Furthermore, the centralization of the policy making process limited dissent and made possible a more proactive approach than the 40 Committee had been willing to take. One might argue that welcoming dissenting voices in the policy process would not necessarily have produced different results, but, as detailed further in Chapter Three, had the 40 Committee remained in control of policy, the death of Schneider could potentially have been avoided and the choice of the Chilean Congress may have been different. We cannot know whether the Chilean Congress would have chosen Allende had there been no attempted coup, but the death of General Schneider, which Chilean Congressmen

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blamed on radical right-wing groups, hardened their resolve not to be influenced and to choose the left-wing candidate to spite the radical right-wing actors.

Beyond the Allende problem, why did the Ford Administration, and Kissinger specifically, persist in supporting the Pinochet regime despite numerous reports of the Chilean Government’s human rights abuses? As I suggested in Chapter One, it may be better to ask why the Ford Administration did not intervene when both domestic and international pressure groups thought it not only appropriate but necessary for the US to do so. The history of US involvement in Chile in the 1960s and early 1970s shows that policy makers were clearly not averse to intervening in Chile’s internal politics. What, then, could be the reason?

The strategic calculations that influenced the perceived need to intervene in the early 1970s were mirrored in the factors contributing to US continued support of the Pinochet regime. It is helpful here, as well, to return to the themes of the second Strategic Calculations table from Chapter One.\(^{236}\) Kissinger’s primary concern throughout his career as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State was that the delicate balance of power he worked so diligently to establish not be compromised. The Pinochet government was conservative and therefore, in contrast to the Allende regime, was not a threat to that balance. Furthermore, Pinochet’s government was friendly to the US Government and thereby open to US influence, leaving traditional US ethnocentric, paternalistic feathers unruffled. Finally, as the Government of Chile was once again underneath the protective wing of the United States, the Pinochet regime presented no challenge to the perception of US strength on the international stage. In Kissinger’s eyes,

\(^{236}\) See Table 1.2.
there was little incentive to censure Pinochet when all of Kissinger’s and Nixon’s fears about the Allende government had been assuaged with the September 11 coup.

But pressure from the US Congress and the international community to address the issue of human rights with Pinochet’s regime required a response. Kissinger, who remained in control of foreign policy during Ford’s presidency reverted to the practice, characteristic of the Nixon Administration, of publically stating one policy while pursuing exactly the opposite behind closed doors. Kissinger thus paid public lip service to the human rights cause, most notably in his speech to the OAS in June 1976. In private, however, he told Pinochet that nothing really had changed. The documentary record, discussed at length in the following chapters, provides a narrative in which the above themes can be seen in action.
CHAPTER THREE
BUILD-UP TO A COUP

“The problem is how to bring about his downfall.”
~ Undersecretary of State John N. Irwin, II, November 6, 1970

I. INTRODUCTION

Though Allende had been defeated in three previous presidential elections - 1952, 1958 and 1964 - he was chosen to represent the Unidad Popular in 1970. Jorge Alessandri represented the conservative National Party. Radomiro Tomic represented the Christian Democrats. Not long into the race, the CIA considered Alessandri the only viable opposition to Allende; Tomic simply did not have enough support. On election day in September, Allende received the plurality, 36.3% of the vote. The Chilean Constitution required that the decision for the presidency be sent to congress when no candidate received a clear majority of the vote; their decision, then, was between the top two candidates, Allende and Alessandri. Traditionally, Congress chose the candidate the received the greatest percentage of the popular vote. The CIA pulled out all the stops, on Nixon’s orders, to keep that from happening.

In the months preceding the election, CIA operations in Chile eventually developed into two “Tracks,” discussed in detail in this chapter. Very briefly, Track I involved money spent to influence the election politically – an anti-Allende propaganda campaign and the attempted bribing of Chilean Congressmen to vote against Allende if the decision went to Congress. Track II, at Nixon’s request, involved goading the military into action against Allende. Track I was reviewed and sanctioned by the 40 Committee in the Department of State, with the knowledge of Edward Korry, then US

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Ambassador to Chile, and others in the larger policy making body. Knowledge of Track II was much more limited. Only Nixon, Kissinger, a few close advisors, and the CIA were aware of Track II.

Pulling the essential information out of literally thousands of documents to create a coherent narrative of the evolution of US policy toward Chile and the progression of CIA operations in the lead up to the election is no easy task. But, as I reviewed the documentation of US actions in Chile covering the period between January and October of 1970, several patterns or themes emerged. The first point of interest was that though I knew Henry Kissinger to be a member of first the 303 Committee and later the 40 Committee, he did not seem to be the driving force behind policy toward Chile until midsummer 1970 when it became apparent that the election of Salvador Allende was a distinct possibility. Likewise, there is very little documentation about President Nixon’s hand in US foreign policy toward Chile until September 1970.

The decline of Ambassador Edward Korry’s influence is another trend I noted. In early 1970, the 40 Committee and the CIA greatly valued Korry’s opinion. Thomas Powers notes that Korry had assisted the CIA with a delicate problem early on in his time as Ambassador to Chile, and enjoyed a cordial working relationship with the CIA Station in Santiago.\textsuperscript{238} But as 1970 progressed, Korry failed to deliver on his promise to bring Chilean President Eduardo Frei into line with US plans, and as Korry’s reporting became increasingly long-winded and erratic, confidence in the Ambassador’s assessment of developments in Chilean politics and his estimation of US ability to influence the elections waned.

Another theme I observed was that policy makers from the various agencies, many of which fed into the 40 Committee, had widely disparate views of what the US position should be toward Chile. As a result, policy was significantly more cautious at the beginning of 1970 than it became after Nixon’s September 15 meeting, which resulted in the establishment of Track II of covert action in Chile. The caution of the 303 Committee, and later the 40 Committee, may have undermined the success of US plans for keeping Allende out of power, as Kissinger himself argues in his memoirs.

It was Nixon’s consternation over what he felt was insufficient coordination and resolve on the part all the agencies involved in US efforts in Chile that led to the centralization of decision making about Chile, reflective of the general trend of the Nixon Administration’s foreign policy process. When Nixon and Kissinger centralized decision making on action in Chile, policy making became stronger, more decisive, and more cohesive. The dissenting voices that had limited action in Chile were cut out of the process. It was by then, however, too late for Track II to succeed in keeping Allende out of power. But CIA Headquarters remained positive. After Allende’s inauguration, CIA headquarters cabled to the CIA Station in Santiago encouraging the Station that though the goal of keeping Allende out of power had not been realized, they were nearer to goading the military into action than they had been just a few short months before.

II. THE UNITED STATES IN CHILE, 1958 TO 1970

I expected to find evidence that the CIA had been involved in the Chilean elections in 1958, in which Salvador Allende lost to Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez. 239

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239 Though Mark Zepezauer claims in The CIA’s Greatest Hits that the Agency “intervened massively” in both the 1958 and 1964 elections, he provides no documentation for his claim. Mark Zepezauer, The CIA’s Greatest Hits, (Tucson: Odonian Press, 1994), 38. I did find an article written in 1969 that noted a significant increase in US aid to Chile in 1958. Miles D. Wopin, “Some Problems of the
What I found was little mention and no evidence of such involvement. According to Peter Kornbluh, the CIA did not become involved in Chilean politics until after the 1958 election. Kornbluh argues that Allende’s near win in 1958 prompted the Kennedy Administration to intervene in Chile. Kristian Gustafson echoes Kornbluh in *Hostile Intent*.

“The shock of Allende’s strong campaign in 1958…was doubly sharp because it was unexpected…During the 1958 election campaign, the United States, for the first time since the 1879-84 War of the Pacific, had to pay close attention to Chile because from seemingly out of nowhere the Communist-Socialist popular front under Senator Allende had become poised – perhaps – for a win. What was going on?”

What was going on, Gustafson argues, was that “Chile had changed.” While wealth grew, so did the gap between the rich and the poor. Roughly one third of the Chilean population held the majority of the wealth. “[S]ocial stratification and inequitable wealth distribution contributed to the rise of a number of Marxist parties such as the Socialists and Communists.”

The US responded by supporting Chile’s political center. Gustafson notes that Walter Howe, US Ambassador to Chile in 1958 suggested that “the political pendulum has swung as far to the right in Chile as it is likely to go, and that the return swing is likely to be evidenced in…the presidential election of 1964.” The country’s strong democratic tradition made Chile the perfect poster child for the Kennedy Administration’s Alliance for Progress, a massive campaign to encourage democracy in


244 Ibid, 21.
Latin America through “social and economic support.” With the strength of the political left’s campaign for the 1958 election, the upcoming 1964 presidential election became symbolically important as a gauge of the strength of Chile’s democracy and the success of the Alliance for Progress’s program.

In April, 1962, the Administration began funneling money to Christian Democrats in order to accomplish three goals: “(1) To Deprive the Chilean Communist Party of Votes…(2) To Achieve a Measure of Influence Over Christian Democratic Party Policy…[and] (3) To Foster a Non-Communist Coalition.” Further support was approved in August 1963. A political action program was finalized in December 1963 by the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA. Christian Democratic Candidate Eduardo Frei Montalva’s campaign members requested in March 1964 that the US donate $1 million to the campaign in order to meet the campaign budget. The Special Group – precursor to the 303 Committee – approved the amount on April 2 with a provision that the funding source “would be inferred” without revealing US involvement. The Special Group increased funding in May and again in July, 1964. All told, “[t]he CIA

246 Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 25.
248 “Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division (King) to Director of Central Intelligence McConne,” January 3, 1964, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, 545-548, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d245.
249 Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 34.
spended a total of $2.6 million directly underwriting the campaign...[and] an additional $3 million was spent on anti-Allende propaganda activities.”

In addition to monetary support of the opposition, the CIA conducted a “massive” propaganda campaign both within Chile and abroad. Two committees were set up, one in Washington, DC and one in Santiago, to manage action in Chile. The Washington group included “Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann; the Western Hemisphere Division Chief of the CIA, Desmond Fitzgerald; Ralph Dungan and McGeorge Bundy from the White House; and the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four, the branch that has jurisdiction over Chile.”

The Santiago group included “the Deputy Chief of Mission, the CIA Chief of Station, and the heads of the Political and Economic Sections, as well as the Ambassador.” US efforts were rewarded when Frei won the election in 1964 with a “clear majority.”

Though the CIA had itself doubted the effect its covert action program was having on the presidential race, its confidence was boosted by Frei’s win. Gustafson argues that US involvement in the 1964 election set an important precedent for the US Government: “The U.S. Government...showed in general an acceptance of the idea that the damage done to Chile by its intervention was less than the potential damage of an

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253 Ibid; S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., Staff Report on Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, at 9; 14 (Comm. Print 1975). The S. Select Comm. Staff Report on Covert Action in Chile is commonly referred to, and hereafter cited, as the “Church Report.”
254 “Church Report,” 16.
255 Ibid, 16.
256 Ibid, 17.
elected Marxist government." It also established the USG’s relationship with the PDC which continued into the early 1970s.

Gustafson notes that Edward Korry brought the idea of involvement in the 1969 Chilean congressional election to the CIA in “late 1967 or early 1968.” The CIA “formally suggested” involvement in May 1968. The CIA believed that involvement in the 1969 congressional election was an important element in setting the stage for the 1970 presidential election. But, Gustafson argues, the action plan for influencing the congressional election was “haphazard and progressed without clear executive direction.” The DOS, US Embassy in Santiago, and the CIA all had different ideas about how best to approach influencing the election. Furthermore, departments involved in developing an action plan displayed a basic lack of understanding of Chilean politics. Rather than support congressional candidates from more conservative parties, both the CIA and Korry championed support of the PDC, despite evidence that the PDC was leaning steadily leftward. Gustafson argues that support of the PDC actually undermined the goal of US policy toward Chile by drawing votes away from more conservative congressional candidates whose politics were more closely aligned with the US goal of “keep[ing] the Marxists from power.”

As the CIA and policy makers planned their approach to the next election in 1970, they proceeded with a fair amount of caution. US involvement in the campaigning process was limited to anti-Allende propaganda; the CIA was not authorized to endorse or give support, financially or otherwise, to any particular candidate. On January 30,

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258 Ibid, 48.
259 Ibid, 48.
260 Ibid, 55.
261 Ibid, 54.
262 Ibid, 53-75.
1970, several individuals from various Department of State offices devoted to North and South American affairs, US Ambassador to Chile Edward M. Korry, William V. Broe, CIA Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, and two or three more individuals whose names have been redacted from the document held a meeting to discuss what suggestions for CIA action in Chile should be presented to the 303 Committee. Several months earlier, the 303 Committee had decided to hold off on any decision about Chile until the Chilean parties had decided on their candidates. There was some talk of prominent literary figure Pablo Neruda as a possible candidate in the Chilean election, but Ambassador Korry thought that Neruda’s nomination was unlikely. The other three candidates discussed at the meeting were eventually nominated by Chileans to represent their parties in the 1970 election: Alessandri (PN), Tomic (PDC), and Allende (UP).

There was also some discussion about whether or not the US should throw its support behind either Alessandri or Tomic. At that time Ambassador Korry discouraged such action. Ironically, Korry’s reason for cautioning against supporting Alessandri was that he felt Alessandri would “[bring] on a military government,” which, Korry argued,

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263 The Special Group, or 5412 Committee, was established in 1955 under NSC 5412/2. The Special Group was a subcommittee within the National Security Council responsible for the oversight of U.S. covert operations. The Special Group was renamed the 303 Committee under National Security Action Memorandum No. 303 in 1964. The 303 Committee was later succeeded by the 40 Committee. For further discussion of the Special Group and the 303 Committee, see “Note On U.S. Covert Actions,” Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume V, Vietnam 1967, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v05/actionssatement. For further discussion of the 40 Committee, see “Church Report.”


265 In addition to his literary career, Neruda was politically active and served the Government of Chile several times in an official capacity, as honorary consul to Burma, Chilean consul to Argentina and Mexico, as an elected representative to the Chilean Senate, and as Chilean Ambassador to France. “Pablo Neruda,” Poets.Org: From the Academy of American Poets, (accessed December 28, 2011), http://www.poets.org/poet.php/prmPID/279.
was “not in the ideal interest of the United States.” Korry gave three reasons the US should not support Tomic, the second of which has been redacted:

“[F]irst, the PDC does not want [help from the United States], and that helping them would hurt us [the US], for he feels that [redacted] and thirdly, a good case could not be made for helping the PDC... a Tomic government would do a number of things repugnant to the U.S., at which point the U.S. Government would ask, why did we help Tomic?”

Over the next few months, the CIA was unable to determine with certainty the candidate most likely to receive a majority of the votes in the Chilean general election. In March of 1970 the CIA reported that Alessandri was confident that he would carry more than 50 percent of the popular vote; Frei, however, was concerned that Allende and Alessandri would receive approximately the same number of votes. Interestingly, though Alessandri was initially expected to be the front runner, a preliminary CIA report dated January 1, 1970, predicted fairly accurately – though at that point, merely one of several possibilities - the Chilean Congress’s election of Allende: A few months later, the CIA predicted that Allende’s support would only grow.

As the year progressed, plans for action in Chile developed into Project FUBELT, a two-track plan to keep Allende out of power, outlined briefly in the introduction to this chapter. According to Peter Kornbluh, director of the Chile Declassification Project at The George Washington University’s National Security Archives, “FU was the CIA’s designated cryptonym for Chile; BELT appeared to infer the political and economic strangulation operations the CIA intended to conduct to assure Allende never reached

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267 Ibid.
Chile’s presidential office. “Track I, the chiefly political solution to the problem in Chile, overseen by the 40 Committee, was divided into two “Phases,” as recommended by Ambassador Korry. Phase 1 was a plan to increase money spent on anti-Allende propaganda. Phase 2, as both the writers of the Church Report and Peter Kornbluh show, was a plan to bribe Chilean Congressmen to vote against Allende, if the popular election did not decide the presidency; Kornbluh specifies that the Congressmen to be bribed were members of the PDC. Track II was the military solution to the problem in Chile. Track II developed in response to President Nixon’s mandate to the CIA to “prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him” by any means necessary. The Departments of State and Defense and Ambassador Korry and his staff were specifically kept out of the loop on Track II activities.

Ambassador Korry suggested his two-phase plan for action in Chile in June. The plan was reviewed during a 40 Committee meeting on June 18. The minutes for this meeting are not available though I have reviewed documents that discuss the June 18 meeting and Korry’s proposal. The Church Report indicates that the money set aside

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270 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 517.
272 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 12.
274 Track I was not then known as Track I and the name “Project FUBELT” was not applied until Track II developed in September 1970.
275 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 12.
276 According to a Memorandum for the Record covering several 40 Committee meetings, no “detailed minutes” were taken “due to the illness of the Executive Secretary…” CIA, “40 Committee Decisions,” September 14, 1970, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/00009451.pdf.
for bribery was $500,000.\footnote{279} Kornbluh indicates that it was $250,000; he calls it a “contingency slush fund.” One document that is available notes that “a group of U.S. and Chilean businessmen are contributing some $250,000 to fight the UP.”\footnote{280} Lack of reporting and redaction of key information keeps us from knowing with any certainty how much money was set aside for Phase 2.

The 40 Committee approved Phase 1 in July, but held off on approving Phase 2 until a date that was either not specified or was redacted.\footnote{281} Kornbluh notes that Phase 2 was approved but that “distribution was tabled until after the election.”\footnote{282} I cannot find any specific mention of Korry’s “Phase 2” in the 40 Committee meeting minutes I have reviewed.\footnote{283} Many of those documents are, however, highly redacted, obscuring the issue. One document does state that “You [Ambassador Korry] have at your discretion the contingency fund [redacted] previously requested [redacted] More can be made available [redacted] (This fund may be dispersed as agreed between you and [redacted]).”\footnote{284} Another communication to Korry indicates that the “contingency fund”

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\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{279} Church Report,” 12-13.
\item \footnote{280} DOS, “Proposal for Political Action in Chile,” June 22, 1970, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, State Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/StateChile3/searchable_00009508.pdf. All but the first page of the document have been redacted. No further information regarding the transaction is available in this document.
\item \footnote{282} Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 12.
\item \footnote{283} DOS, “40 Committee Proposal,” July 2, 1970, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, State Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/StateChile3/00009C05.pdf. This document does indicate that the 40 Committee approved Phase 1.
\end{itemize}
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was available to assist in the “Frei-Reelection Gambit.” The “contingency funds” referred to in the documents may or may not be Korry’s Phase 2 plans; there is no way to know with certainty. Later documents indicate that some policy makers tried to revive the bribery plan but, at the time, the 40 Committee continued to resist arguments in favor of Phase 2, discussed further below.

Korry was upset at having his Phase 2 plans rejected, especially after a cable from Assistant Secretary Charles A. Meyer advising that he and others had recommended against approving both Phases of Korry’s proposal. Korry was so upset that he refused to implement Phase 1 because he equated lack of Phase 2 support with a lack of unity of purpose between policy makers in Washington and the Embassy in Chile:

“Because of the wide gap between your views and those expounded by me, I have instructed without further explanation [redacted] to hold in abeyance the implementation [sic] of the 40 Committee decision pending further consultation with you…Having assumed that [sic] our president and all his advisors would wish to oppose an electoral triumph of a communist candidate…we had, I sincerely believe, no choice than to ‘have done something’…It is because I now discover that the assumption was wrong insofar as it concerned you and that this discovery comes after the 40 Committee has taken its decision that I am so troubled….What is at issue now is whether we can effectively carry out the 40 Committee decision in view of your and the department’s strong opposition to the program. I fear we cannot and would like to have your further comments on the problem before making any new recommendations.”

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288 Ibid.
It was only after Meyer cabled back, apologizing for being too blunt and assuring Korry that they could discuss the thought process behind the decision to recommend against the proposal via a better “medium of exchange”.\textsuperscript{289} that Korry advised the CIA Station in Santiago to proceed with Phase 1.\textsuperscript{290}

As Allende’s support increased toward the middle of the summer of 1970, the US Government strengthened its anti-Allende propaganda campaign\textsuperscript{291} but refused to throw its support behind either Tomic or Alessandri.\textsuperscript{292} When the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) requested that the CIA channel ITT funds to the Alessandri campaign, US policy makers refused. They did, however, allow the CIA to advise ITT of other ways to channel funds to Alessandri. “The writer [William Broe, Chief of CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division] advised that we could not absorb the funds offered [by ITT] and serve as a funding channel [to the Alessandri campaign]….The writer volunteered to explore all possibilities for the infusion of funds into Chile, including a discussion with Chief of Station, Santiago, so that he could advise Geneen [President of


ITT] on the best possible method he could use if he desired to channel funds to Alessandri.”

In August, a CIA contact or operative whose name has been redacted cautioned that the prospect of an Allende presidency was not being taken seriously. “Allende very strong and being underestimated. Has large solid block of voters and two strong candidates to right [Tomic and Alessandri] likely to divide vote that mostly went to Frei in ’64 [election].” Korry reiterated again the importance of influencing the Congressional vote. Later that month, President Frei told a CIA contact that he believed that the Chilean Congress would elect Allende if he came in first in the popular vote. “Frei said flatly that if Salvador Allende…came out ahead of independent candidate Jorge Alessandri in the popular vote [sic], [Chilean] Congress would name Allende president.” But Frei also believed that Alessandri “would be a sure winner if he beat Allende by 100,000 votes on 4 September.” In mid-August, Kissinger and Viron P. Vaky also attempted to revive Korry’s Phase 2 plan, even going so far as to begin to arrange the staffing necessary to carry out the plan.

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293 Ibid.
III. **ELECTION DAY AND ITS AFTERMATH**

On September 4, 1970, what the CIA had predicted was realized. Allende won 36.3% of the popular vote. The remainder was split between Tomic and Alessandri, as noted in the introduction to this chapter.²⁹⁸ The decision for the presidency would go to the Chilean Congress. There is surprisingly little documentation dated September 4. The CIA reported the next day that Santiago was fairly calm and quiet.²⁹⁹ US policy makers, however, were swift to increase funds for existing anti-Allende programs and to authorize, and insist upon, additional covert action. Contact with members of the Chilean military increased, a CIA task force within the Western Hemisphere Division was formed specifically to address the situation in Chile, Track II was quickly developed and implemented, and communication between US actors in Chile and policy makers in Washington was tightened.

The day after the election, a telegram was sent from CIA headquarters in the US to the station in Santiago asking for an assessment of possible means of keeping Allende from taking office.³⁰⁰ Three days later, a CIA memorandum (unsigned) on the possibilities of denying Allende the presidency noted a marked change in the attitude of the Chilean military toward the prospect of a coup. The memorandum also outlined three possible courses of action: congressional political action, military action, and

propaganda. The writer or writers of the memo did note that “Any political action taken
to deny Allende the presidency must be tied to or complement Chilean initiatives.” 301
There was a sense, echoed in later documents, 302 that CIA efforts would not succeed if
the Chileans themselves weren’t convinced of the need to keep Allende from power or to
remove him. By September 9, the CIA had decided that the only real chance of
preventing an Allende presidency was by a military coup, “either before or immediately
after Allende’s assumption of power.” 303 Two days later, a fresh anti-Allende
propaganda campaign was initiated. 304

The 40 Committee, at this point, also expressed interest in a coup and requested,
by Kissinger’s orders, a “cold-blooded assessment” of the “pros and cons” both of
assisting with a coup and of “organizing an effective future Chilean opposition.” 305
Three days later, Korry advised that the military was not likely to move and suggested a
“Frei Reelection Gambit.” 306 A later CIA report on covert activities in Chile between
September 15 and November 3, 1970 describes the plan for Frei’s reelection:

“The basic [’Frei-reelection gambit] consisted of marshaling enough
Congressional votes to elect [Jorge] Alessandri over Allende with the

301 CIA, “Chile/Prospects for Political Action to Deny Salvador Allende the Presidency,”
September 8, 1970, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection,
302 CIA, “Frei Must Manage Coup Actively,” September 28, 1970, U.S. Department of State,
Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/
searchable_00009495.pdf.
303 CIA, “Exploring Avenues to Prevent an Allende Government from Exercising Power,”
September 9, 1970, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection,
Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/
searchable_0000944E.pdf.
305 CIA, “Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 8 September 1970,” September 9, 1970,
U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, State Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/
documents/StateChile3/searchable_00009516.pdf.
306 DOS, “Ambassador’s Response to Request for Analysis of Military Option in Present Chilian
Situation,” September 12, 1970, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, State Chile
understanding Alessandri would resign immediately after inauguration and pave the way for a special election in which Frei could legally become a candidate…The political action program had only one purpose: to induce President Frei to prevent Allende’s election by the Congress on 24 October and, failing that, to support - - by benevolent neutrality at the least and conspiratorial benediction at the most - - a military coup which would prevent Allende from taking office on 3 November.”

On September 14, the 40 Committee approved the “Frei Re-election Gambit” and authorized Korry’s use of a “contingency fund.” It is possible that this contingency fund was an authorization for Phase 2.

The Hinchey Report indicates that on September 15, 1970 President Nixon authorized the CIA to “prevent Allende from coming to power or unseat him.” To quote the report, “The CIA was instructed to put the U.S. Government in a position to take future advantage of either a political or military solution to the Chilean dilemma, depending on how developments unfolded.” A Memorandum for the Record, dated September 16, 1970, states that

“On this date the Director called a meeting in connection with the Chilean situation…the Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime was not acceptable to the United States. The President asked the Agency [CIA] to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him. The President authorized ten million dollars for this purpose, if needed. Further, the Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense.”

Richard Helms’ handwritten note on the meeting is revealing:

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“1 in 10 chance, perhaps, but save Chile worth spending not concerned risks involved no involvement of embassy $10,000,000 available, more if necessary full-time job - - best men we have game plan make the economy scream 48 hours for plan of action”

The September 16 memo also states that Thomas Karamessines, DDP (Deputy Director for Plans) was to lead the project from the United States, “assisted by a special task force set up for this purpose in the Western Hemisphere Division [of the CIA].” David Atlee Phillips was appointed to lead the WH Division task force. If their orders weren’t already clear enough, a communication from Western Hemisphere Division headquarters in the US to the Santiago Station on September 21 defines precisely the Task Force’s goal as the pursuit of a “military solution” to the Allende problem. It is important to note here the deliberate isolation of the Departments of State and Defense, including Korry and his embassy staff from the policy making process, an indication of the Nixon administration’s characteristic centralization of decision making. As things progressed in Chile, Nixon and Kissinger’s grip on policy making only tightened.

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It was at this time that another version of the Frei-Reelection Gambit, involving the military, appeared. A communication from CIA headquarters in the United States to its Station in Santiago describes the maneuver the CIA pursued.315

“From your [Santiago Station’s] previous communications it is our understanding that Frei should:
A. Seek resignation of Cabinet;316
B. Form new Cabinet comprised entirely of Military;
C. Frei appoints acting president
D. Frei departs from Chile
E. Chile has Military Junta which supervises new elections
F. Frei runs in new election”317

There are a few documents worthy of note regarding the second Frei Reelection Gambit. The first is a cable ostensibly from the CIA Station in Santiago to CIA Headquarters advising of a conversation between Ambassador Korry and two of Frei’s Cabinet Ministers, Carlos Figueroa and Sergio Ossa. There is no clear indication from the memorandum where the Gambit originated.318 Another CIA document indicates that the idea began within the Chilean military.319 This document also indicates that the Santiago Station and CIA Headquarters believed the second version of the Gambit to be

315 The Frei-Reelection Gambit was part of “Track I,” the part of FUBELT to which the Ambassador, 40 Committee, DOS and DOD had access.
316 Once two members of Frei’s existing Cabinet had resigned, (Carlos Figueroa and Andrés Zaldívar, Ministers of Economy and Finance respectively), the “Collegiate Principle” would apply, by which the remaining Cabinet members would be forced to resign as well. CIA, “Ambassador Korry Exchanged Views About the Chilean Situation,” September 21, 1970, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/searchable_000093FD.pdf.
under 40 Committee auspices. The response cable from Headquarters to Station clarifies to the Santiago Station that Korry was not to be included on any Track II activities.\textsuperscript{320}

Citing this second Frei Reelection Gambit, Peter Kornbluh argues that the goal of both Tracks I and II of Project FUBELT was a coup. “The historical distinction between Track I and Track II – that the first favored a constitutional approach and the second focused on a military coup to block Allende – is inaccurate… The main difference between the two approaches was that Track I required Frei’s participation and involved Ambassador Korry’s efforts to pressure the Chilean president to give a green light to the Chilean military.”\textsuperscript{321} If Kornbluh is correct, the “coup” pursued in Track I plans was the second Frei Reelection Gambit, not quite the bloody hostile takeover generally evoked by the word “coup.” As CIA Headquarters stated, the second Gambit worked within the Chilean Constitutional parameters as much as possible, not out of a sense of duty to uphold the Constitutional tradition in Chile, but because they felt it would be more palatable to the Chilean people and, thus, more successful.\textsuperscript{322} I believe, however, that Headquarters’ response to the Santiago Station’s cable that lumps under the Track I mandate this second plan to reelect Frei indicates that Headquarters felt the second Gambit was more in line with Track II. Whatever the case, CIA Headquarters was anxious not to involve Korry in anything to do with the military. The problem with both Gambits was that they depended on Frei to get the ball rolling and, for all his talk, Frei


\textsuperscript{321} Kornbluh, Peter, \textit{Pinochet File}, 14.

would never fully commit. When it became clear that President Frei was not going to pursue political action with any real purpose, the plan was given up and Track I was, from that point on, not much more than a worldwide propaganda campaign. The 40 Committee ultimately gave up on both reelection plans.

On September 17, a CIA memorandum, entitled, “Operational Planning and Progress of Project [redacted],” details initial actions taken in connection with the agency’s plans in Chile. Though the name of the “Project” has been removed from the record, we can assume that the writer is referring to Project FUBELT. It is interesting to note that this memo and another from September 17 discuss for the first time, albeit briefly, the possibility that plans for a military coup were actually in the works.

The object of “Track II” of Project FUBELT was, from the beginning, to instigate a military coup. After the WH Division’s Chile Task Force was formed at CIA Headquarters in the US, headed by Thomas Karamessines and David Atlee Phillips,

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they immediately sent a cable to the Santiago Station. The document seems to cover objectives of both Tracks I and II, though neither track is mentioned by name. After discussing the “Frei-Reelection Gambit,” the Task Force issued the following instructions: “Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Parliamentary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective.” Two weeks later, further clarification was given: “[Redacted] instructs you to contact the military and let them know USG wants a military solution, and that we will support them now and later…Your efforts to prepare for future while necessary should be considered second priority…In sum, we want you to sponsor a military move which can take place, to the extent possible, in a climate of economic and political uncertainty. Work to that end with references as to your charter.” The document gives instructions to contact the military and use the “rumor mill” to develop a “coup climate;” it also gives further instructions which have been redacted.

If the chief obstacle to achieving initial Track I objectives was President Frei’s reticence to use his influence to goad the military into action, the chief obstacle to Track II was that many prominent members of the Chilean military had a deep respect for Chile’s democratic tradition and were loath to undermine the Chilean Constitution by

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328 CIA, “USG Wants a Military Solution,” October 7, 1970, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/searchable_0000919C.pdf. The cable is directed “Immediate Santiago [redacted].” The cable comes from CIA headquarters and discusses information and instructions known only to the CIA. It is, then, safe to assume that “you” refers the CIA Station in Santiago.
moving forward with a military coup. To overcome that obstacle, the CIA decided it was necessary to create a “coup climate,” as noted in the above paragraph. A cable from CIA Headquarters, “Blueprint for Fomenting a Coup Climate,” states that, “…it is our task to create such a climate climaxing with a solid pretext that will force the military and [Frei] to take some action in the desired direction.” The cable also lists three specific areas of focus: Economic Warfare, Political Warfare, and Psychological Warfare. A number of military leaders were scrutinized as possible coup leader candidates, but retired General Roberto Viaux was fixed on as “the only military leader of national stature [who] appears committed to denying Allende the Presidency by force.” The difficulty in working with Viaux was that, as a retired general, he was not officially in command over any troops. Because Viaux did not control a significant military force, policy makers decided to advise the General to refrain from taking any immediate action.

As I read through the documents that concerned Track I, I came across talking points for and minutes from meetings of the 40 Committee. One meeting in particular, on October 16, 1970, was attended by Ambassador Korry. Knowing, from earlier documents, that the 40 Committee, Ambassador Korry, and the Departments of State and

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330 CIA, “Cable From Headquarters [Blueprint for Fomenting a Coup Climate],” in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 50.
332 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 16.
Defense were purposefully kept out of the loop on FUBELT’s Track II activities, I was quite surprised to find that the Committee was briefed on the possibility of a coup; General Robert Viaux’s name was mentioned specifically.\textsuperscript{335} Documents that predate the general election in Chile, and certainly predate the beginning of FUBELT mention Viaux’s name in connection with possible coup plans. Korry and the 40 Committee would very likely have had access to that information.\textsuperscript{336}

The conclusion of the Committee at the October 16, 1970 meeting indicates that, though Committee members were aware of Viaux and the possibility of a coup, they were clearly not aware of the CIA’s Track II activities. “The Chairman observed that there presently appeared to be little the U.S. can do to influence the Chilean situation one way or another. Those present concurred.”\textsuperscript{337} While the 40 Committee and the Ambassador were fretting over their inability to influence the course of events in Chile, the CIA Station in Santiago was busy talking to anyone and everyone in the Chilean military that they determined would be interested in participating in a coup.


\textsuperscript{336} Information was not restricted prior to the genesis of Project FUBELT, thus, it is likely that both the Ambassador and the 40 Committee knew about Viaux prior to the Chilean general election.

While the CIA was working on the military covertly, Alexis Johnson and Henry Kissinger instructed Ambassador Korry to make it absolutely clear to the military that US support would be withdrawn if the military did nothing to prevent Allende’s ascension to the presidency, but that previous cuts to US military aid would be reconsidered if the Chilean military were successful in keeping Allende out of office.\textsuperscript{338} Though it seems strange that Korry, who was to be kept out of all Track II plans, was asked to contact the military about a coup, his mandate was limited to advising the Chilean military what the US would do to support the military after an action against Allende, and what the US would \textit{not} do should no action be taken by military leaders. Korry replied that he felt he had already made that point clear and advised Johnson and Kissinger that the USG should begin to negotiate with Allende.\textsuperscript{339} In another document from the same day, Korry argued specifically against encouraging a coup.\textsuperscript{340}

Without Korry’s knowledge, coup plotting continued. All parties involved agreed that the head of the military, General Schneider, presented an obstacle to unifying the military against overthrowing Chilean democracy. Schneider was a staunch supporter of the Chilean Constitution and firmly believed that the military was obligated to allow the elected presidential candidate to take office, even if it meant allowing a socialist to attain the presidency. CIA operatives had been keeping tabs on General Roberto Viuax’s plans


to kidnap General Schneider, but by mid-October, the CIA and policy makers aware of Track II activities concluded that Viaux’s plan was not strong enough to succeed and that an abortive coup would be worse than no coup at all. Kissinger instructed the CIA to advise Viaux to hold off until chances for a successful coup were better. The CIA was also instructed to “continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight – now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders [were] given.” The next day, CIA Headquarters cabled to the Station in Santiago advising of the decision to request that Viaux halt his plans, but reiterating that pursuing a coup was a “firm and continuing policy” of the administration.

After that cable, events on the ground in Chile seemed to be moving faster than policy makers in Washington were able to respond. On the same day that a CIA document indicates that weapons were on their way to Chile in preparation for an imminent coup attempt, Kissinger, perhaps planning for the worst, cabled to Nixon

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with recommendations in preparation for an Allende presidency. A National Archive and Records Administration (NARA) document indicates that an unknown Chilean officer was requesting supplies (guns, ammunition etc). Headquarters cabled to the Station in Santiago requesting that the Station explain why they were suddenly more optimistic about a coup, and advising that high-level clearance may be needed to proceed.

Several things happened on October 19. The Santiago Station was advised that they should appear surprised if the coup attempt did succeed. Headquarters requested that the Station get their information ready for possible presentation to superiors regarding coup leaders, if the coup succeeded. In another cable, the Station communicated General Camilo Valenzuela’s plans to kidnap General Schneider. Yet another cable indicates that there were firm plans for kidnapping Schneider. Another cable from October 19 advised that the previous plan for a coup was not likely to succeed; the leading General’s name has been redacted, so it is not clear to which plan

this document refers. What is clear is that the situation on the ground in Santiago was shifting very quickly.\textsuperscript{353}

On October 20, CIA Headquarters advised the Santiago Station that the CIA had done enough, that the Station should no longer seek a coup, but that Station operatives should remain open to receiving any information or requests for help from the Chilean military.\textsuperscript{354} On October 21, one cable indicates that the CIA was preparing for the inauguration of Allende,\textsuperscript{355} and another indicates that machine guns were being delivered to coup plotters.\textsuperscript{356} Three different groups of coup plotters in Chile attempted to kidnap General Schneider.\textsuperscript{357} The first and second kidnapping attempts were unsuccessful. On October 22,\textsuperscript{358} Schneider was fatally wounded in the third kidnapping attempt; he died of three gunshot wounds on October 25.\textsuperscript{359} Though all three coup attempts were unsuccessful, CIA Headquarters sent an encouraging cable to the Station in Santiago, advising that “Station has done excellent job of guiding Chileans to point today where a military solution is at least an option for them.”\textsuperscript{360}

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\textsuperscript{357} CIA, “Hinchey Report.”


\textsuperscript{359} Kornbluh, \textit{Pinochet File}, 28.

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Though there was no guarantee before Schneider’s death that Chilean Congressmen would *not* support Allende, his election was by no means certain. The Chilean Congress traditionally voted in the candidate who received the greatest number of popular votes, but they were not obligated to side with the popular vote. The death of Schneider, however, produced a reaction, undesired and unforeseen by the coup plotters, the CIA, and the US Government. The members of the Chilean Congress elected Allende, 153 to 42, not because they were clearly for him, but because they were clearly against the disruption of Chilean democracy. It is impossible to determine whether or not Allende’s election could have been avoided had there been no coup attempt in 1970, but the episode does seem to indicate that the CIA, and US policy makers, underestimated the force of Chilean democracy and the Chilean Constitution. As Peter Kornbluh observes, “On October 24, 1970, the Chilean Congress overwhelmingly ratified Salvador Allende as president…[T]he Schneider shooting [had] produced an overwhelming public and political repudiation of violence and a clear reaffirmation of Chile’s civil, constitutional tradition.”

IV. **Perpetrator Testimony**

What account do Nixon and Kissinger give of the events leading up to the Congressional election in 1970? Certainly, the men who made the decisions about US involvement in Chile have direct insight into the motives behind US actions. Their testimony is therefore quite valuable, though it behooves us as readers to be discerning in our evaluation of that testimony since, in the case of Chile, there are grounds for considering it to be “perpetrator testimony,” as described in Chapter One. My goal in

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applying Browning’s perpetrator testimony tests to Nixon’s and Kissinger’s account of
the Nixon Administration’s decisions about and actions in Chile is to determine the
validity of their testimony when they offer information that fills a gap in the documentary
record. Similarly, in comparing Nixon’s and Kissinger’s arguments about US motives to
the documentary record, my goal is to determine whether or not their arguments are
borne out by the evidence.

Browning’s “tests” for evaluating perpetrator testimony are difficult to apply
directly to the arguments Nixon and Kissinger make about their role in the decisions
regarding US action in Chile in 1970. The tests are meant to evaluate “factual” evidence
(actions, events, etc) neither corroborated nor disproved by documentation, and do not
lend themselves to evaluating statements or arguments about the motives or
circumstances that led to those actions or events. But the tests and the principles behind
them do help us pull out the relevant and potentially truthful information from the
testimony and discard that which seems disingenuous and perhaps meant to distract the
reader from the heart of the issue.

I discussed Nixon’s arguments from his memoirs in Chapter Two; there is no
need to repeat them here, except occasionally as they relate to Kissinger’s memoirs. I
discuss first, below, Nixon’s and Kissinger’s arguments about their movies as an
introduction to the evidence both men give to back up their claims and thereafter proceed
with analyzing relevant pieces of Kissinger’s and Nixon’s presentation of the facts.
There is not much indication that Nixon himself was deeply involved in policy making
toward Chile until September, 1970, as I noted in the introduction to this chapter. He
devotes only a small portion of his memoirs – barely two of the book’s 1,094 pages - to
Chile and Allende.\textsuperscript{363} The only event he refers to that occurred during the time period covered in this chapter is the famous October 15 “turning off” of CIA efforts, discussed further below.\textsuperscript{364}

Kissinger writes much more extensively about US involvement in Chile in all three of his memoirs. He covers late 1969 to October 1970 chiefly in the first volume, \textit{White House Years}. There are three main things we can draw from \textit{White House Years}: his arguments about why the US became involved in manipulating Chilean politics in 1970 (discussed in Chapter 2), the conclusions he draws and arguments he makes about the course of events from January to October 1970 and the level of his involvement in decision making, and the timeline he creates of those events.

Kissinger’s first argument is that policy makers at the highest level (the White House) did not pay enough attention to the Chilean situation early on in 1970.\textsuperscript{365} He gives three reasons. First, he and President Nixon, with other White House-level policy makers, were preoccupied with other concerns (the crisis in the Middle East, Cuba, etc).\textsuperscript{366} In addition, policy makers in the White House were not made aware of “the gravity of the situation,”\textsuperscript{367} because “the line agencies” (Department of State, CIA, etc) could not agree about the importance and meaning of events happening on the ground.\textsuperscript{368} To compound it all, Kissinger admits that he did not know enough about Chile to

\textsuperscript{363} Richard Nixon first published his memoirs in 1978, initially printed in two volumes. Those volumes were later combined to form one text.
\textsuperscript{365} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, 661-663.
\textsuperscript{366} Ibid, 663.
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid, 663.
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid, 663.
“challenge the experts,” leading him to depend too heavily on advice from experts; advice he later concluded was flawed. Overall, he gives the impression that he gave little thought to Chile until very close to the September 4 elections and states that he “should have been more vigilant.” When Nixon and Kissinger were finally made aware of the danger, he argues, it was too late to take any very effectual action and, because the timeline was short, “action was frantic.”

The assessment and options paper Kissinger requested from the Senior Review Group (discussed further below) gave Kissinger great cause for concern over Chile, though the writers of the report seemed to dismiss the points in their assessment that caused Kissinger to tremble:

> “An entrenched Allende Government would create considerable political and psychological losses to the U.S.:
> (a) hemispheric cohesion would be threatened;
> (b) a source of anti-U.S. policy would be consolidated in the hemisphere;
> (c) U.S. prestige and influence would be set back with a corresponding boost for the USSR and Marxism.”

These were some of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s greatest fears, as I discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis. Because Nixon was not positioned to make a decision about Chile prior to the September 4 election, Kissinger argues, “the virulence of his reaction” to the popular election is understandable.

Beyond his claim that the “line agencies” kept information from White House policy makers, Kissinger criticizes the policies those agencies did follow prior to the

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369 Ibid, 663.
370 Ibid, 666.
371 Ibid, 671.
372 Ibid, 668. Kissinger seems to be quoting a summary of the inter-agency report, composed by his staff.
373 Ibid, 671. Kissinger is very likely referring to the September 15 meeting in which Nixon made his famous “make the economy scream” quote.
September 4 election as “minimal and ineffectual” and inherently problematic. He observes that the Department of State had little enthusiasm for an anti-Allende campaign and that lower level policy makers across the board had no “clear cut plan” to address the Allende problem. The Department of State, the 303 and (later) the 40 Committees, the Ambassador, and the CIA drug their feet for many months, proposals for action were delayed, and funding amounts authorized for those programs were far too small to be effective. Valuable time was thus lost, he argues, both for the planning and implementation of action against, at that time, whatever Socialist/Communist candidate would run in the election. Later, one proposed action plan (discussed further below) co-sponsored by both the CIA and US Embassy in Chile, though first reviewed in December 1969, was not finalized for submission to the 40 Committee until March 25, 1970. In accordance with Kissinger’s claim that high level policy makers weren’t made aware of any planning or need for planning, he states that he and Nixon did not know that an action plan was in the works.

Kissinger also thought that the policy that lower level policy makers pursued was fundamentally flawed in that they refused to authorize support to any one of Allende’s opponents, specifically Alessandri, and that they had begun to withdraw covert support to Chilean democratic parties in the late 1960s. As Kissinger observes, you cannot expect to keep one candidate out of office without throwing your support behind an opposing candidate. Members of the Latin American Bureau in the Department of State,

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374 Ibid, 669.
375 Ibid, 667.
377 Ibid, 666.
however, did not like Alessandri enough to favor him over Allende; the Bureau favored candidates who, like Eduardo Frei, were progressive without being socialist or communist. Frei was comfortable, familiar, and a popular leader in Chile, but he couldn’t legally run for a 2nd consecutive term and US policy makers did not want to face the reality of having to choose the lesser of two evils, Allende’s two opponents, Tomic and Alessandri. Instead of out-right support to either opposition candidate, covert action from early to mid-1970 was limited to anti-Allende “spoiling” activity. When the CIA/Embassy action proposal was finally approved after presentation at the March 25th 40 Committee meeting, the approval was curtailed by caveat: the US would not directly support Alessandri. Far from helping to achieve the goal of keeping Allende out of office, Kissinger concluded, the “anti-Alessandri bias of our bureaucracy ensured an Allende victory.”

In addition, Kissinger argues, policy in the 1960s toward Chile was idealist and disconnected from reality, weakening our measure of influence over Chile in 1970. The Latin American Bureau, Kissinger observes, chose late 1960s to withdraw “covert support for foreign democratic parties…demoralize[ing] the very forces we wished to encourage.” Because of that shift, those the US Government wished to influence in Chile were predisposed to distrust the USG. Previous policy decisions and existing prejudices in the agencies made it difficult to enact successful policies in 1970 which would have accomplished the goal of keeping Allende out of office.

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378 Ibid, 662.
379 Ibid, 663.
381 Kissinger, White House Years, 667.
382 Ibid, 664.
383 Ibid, 664-665.
Finally, Kissinger contends that the US should have spent more money sooner in order to achieve its goal in 1970.\textsuperscript{384} The money the 40 Committee approved for “spoiling activities” in 1970 was considerably less than what the US Government spent in 1964.\textsuperscript{385} Kissinger calls the additional funds approved for action in Chile later in 1970 “too little,” and “too late.”\textsuperscript{386} Kissinger argues that, had he been aware of the true situation in Chile, he would have recommended to President Nixon that the Administration “consider a covert program of 1964 proportions.”\textsuperscript{387}

The task of reviewing Kissinger’s testimony was made difficult by Kissinger’s refusal to provide citations for the events to which he refers, arguing that the declassification and release of classified of government documents is “distasteful.”\textsuperscript{388} In looking for corroborating documentation to Kissinger’s timeline, I found that all but three of the events he refers to are supported by documentation or secondary sources. Two of those events, to which I apply Browning’s tests, are Kissinger’s claim that he requested an interagency situation report and options paper in July 1970 that did not involve the CIA, and that he requested a similar paper from Ambassador Korry in September of that year, after which he followed Korry’s recommendations.\textsuperscript{389} Though the other events he discusses can be corroborated by documentation, there are times when Kissinger leaves out information important to the narrative. By withholding that information, he manipulates his readers’ perception of his involvement in the decision making on Chile. The episodes that follow include the above mentioned events to which I apply

\textsuperscript{384} Ibid, 665-667.
\textsuperscript{385} Ibid. 667.
\textsuperscript{386} Ibid, 667.
\textsuperscript{387} Ibid, 669.
\textsuperscript{388} Ibid, 658.
\textsuperscript{389} I do not address the third event here as it is not particularly significant or relevant to this chapter.
Browning’s tests, and others in which Kissinger appears to have excised or forgotten information that might cast the CIA or himself in a negative light. Though these episodes may appear to be relatively minor events in the narrative, they do seem to indicate that Kissinger is quite deliberately attempting to distance himself from the CIA, align himself with non-CIA actors within the USG, cast doubt on well supported arguments, and distract his readers with partial information.

He first states that the 303 Committee put off a decision on what to do about Allende at a meeting in “late” 1969.\textsuperscript{390} 303 Committee meeting minutes confirm that such a decision was made on April 15, 1969, despite a recommendation for early action by then-DCI Richard Helms. Whether or not the Committee reiterated that decision in late 1969, as Kissinger states, cannot be verified with available documentation.\textsuperscript{391} He then notes the changeover of the 303 Committee to the 40 Committee in February of 1970.\textsuperscript{392} In March 1970, Kissinger notes that the 40 Committee approved another small amount of money – too little to be of much use - to support anti-Allende propaganda efforts in Chile.\textsuperscript{393} In June, this sum was increased.\textsuperscript{394} Documentation indicates the sum of $390,000 was approved at the June 27 1970 meeting of the 40 Committee. Kissinger also notes that Ambassador Korry’s two-phase plan was proposed in June.\textsuperscript{395} He then notes the 40 Committee’s request for a “cold-blooded assessment” of what it might mean, were Allende to come to power.\textsuperscript{396} The next day, he observes, Alessandri announced he

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\item \textsuperscript{390} Ibid, 665.
\item \textsuperscript{392} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, 660.
\item \textsuperscript{393} Ibid, 665.
\item \textsuperscript{394} Ibid, 665.
\item \textsuperscript{395} Ibid, 666.
\item \textsuperscript{396} Ibid, 671.
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would comply with the Frei Reelection Gambit in which he would resign from office, should he win, so that President Frei could legally run against Allende.\textsuperscript{397}

In July, Kissinger writes that he asked for a situation report and options paper advising on the possibility of an Allende government. An interagency group, he claims, responded to his request. The CIA was not a part of the interagency group, Kissinger notes, because his request had little to do with covert activity.\textsuperscript{398} This claim is unsubstantiated, offering us a chance to apply Browning’s perpetrator testimony tests. The self-interest test seems inapplicable here. Kissinger is not admitting to an act that would be frowned upon to prove that he was not involved in doing something worse. The vividness test can be applied. Kissinger’s description of his request and the response of the interagency committee is quite vivid. In fact, Kissinger appears to quote portions both of his request for a report and from his staff’s summary of the report, though he does not cite any documentation. The possibility test also applies. It is quite possible that Kissinger did request such a report and that he received a response; the request was within the scope of his authority and a response would have been expected. But is Kissinger’s testimony here probable? On one hand, Kissinger himself states that he knew little about Chile and relied, at times too heavily, on the analysis and advice of others; that would seem to indicate that the probability that Kissinger requested and received a report, with which the CIA was not involved, was high. However, the portions of his memoir that appear to be quotations from the responding report are quite similar, though not identical to, a portion of a CIA intelligence memorandum from September 7, 1970,

\textsuperscript{397} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, 671.
\textsuperscript{398} Ibid, 667-668.
perhaps a month after the report. In Kissinger’s memoir we read (also quoted above, but reproduced again here, for comparison):

“...the interagency group came up with a conclusion which as summarized by my staff made it difficult to understand how our national interest was not affected:

(a) Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened;
(b) A source of anti-U.S. policy would be consolidated in the hemisphere;
(c) U.S. prestige and influence would be set back with a corresponding boost for the USSR and Marxism.”

From the CIA intelligence estimate we read:

“Regarding threats to U.S. interests, we conclude that:

3. An Allende victory would, however, create considerable political and psychological costs:

a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by the challenge that an Allende government would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions that it would create in other countries. We do not see, however, any likely threat to the peace of the region.

b. An Allende victory would represent a definite psychological set-back to the U.S. and a definite psychological advance for the Marxist idea.”

It is not unusual for many documents to state the same or very similar information, so it does not wholly discredit Kissinger’s testimony to find such a similarity between what Kissinger states was a report in August and an intelligence estimate in early September. I think it is more significant that Kissinger specifically states that the CIA did not contribute to the report he requested, yet the same information, almost the same phrasing, appears in the CIA intelligence estimate. At the very least, Kissinger may have his timeline confused. It does seem improbable, however, that, at that stage in policy making about Chile, the CIA would not have been a member of that interagency group, which

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399 Kissinger states that he requested the report in late July 1970 and received the report in August 1970. He does not include specific dates. Kissinger, White House Years, 667-668.
400 Kissinger, White House Years, 668.
may indicate that Kissinger is either providing disinformation or intentionally obscuring the issue in order to distance himself from the CIA.

Kissinger goes on to note General Schneider’s vow on September 10 that he would not involve the army in the election in Congress but that he would demand certain guarantees from Allende. A few days later, the 40 Committee authorized Korry to explore the possibility of the Frei Reelection Gambit in which Alessandri would resign, and set aside $250,000 for “projects in support of it.” Korry was advised of the decision the next day and was directed to “intensify contact with the military.” That same day, September 15, Kissinger met with President Nixon, Richard Helms, and US Attorney General John Mitchell. This was the meeting which, as Kissinger describes, “…is now treated as the inception of what was later called Track II…”

It is important to note that his phrasing here is clearly intended to cast doubt on the established fact that the September 15 meeting was the inception of Track II. Before the meeting Track II did not exist. Immediately following the meeting, the special group within the CIA was established to develop Track II. Kissinger is deliberately trying to undermine the well supported argument that the CIA coordinated their Track II efforts at the request of the executive branch.

Also on September 15, Kissinger contends, he asked Ambassador Korry for an options paper and that “Korry responded hopefully.” As a result, Kissinger states that he gave an address to journalists in Chicago regarding US policy toward the Allende government. This claim is unsubstantiated by declassified documents, so we must apply

402 Kissinger, *White House Years*, 672.
403 Ibid, 672.
404 Ibid, 672.
405 Ibid, 673-674.
Browning’s tests. Once again, the self interest test does not apply because Kissinger is not admitting to committing an illegal act or making an unpopular decision to defend himself against more serious allegations. Kissinger’s description of his request to Korry is rather vague. His description of Korry’s response is more detailed, but Kissinger states that he is summarizing Korry’s response. He could be intentionally obscuring the issue, or he could be summarizing because all of Korry’s cables, without exception, are exasperatingly long-winded; had I been in Kissinger’s position, I would have summarized, too.

In terms of possibility, it is indeed within the realm of possibility that there was an exchange between Kissinger and Korry, and we know that Kissinger gave the backgrounder to journalists.\textsuperscript{406} I would argue, however, that the probability, at least that Kissinger responded to a request or suggestion from Korry, is not particularly high. Kissinger was not immune to frustration. The day before Kissinger supposedly requested the options paper from Korry, he stated in a cable that, “I simply don’t know what to believe from Korry’s messages.”\textsuperscript{407} A few days later, Kissinger expressed even less confidence in Korry’s assessments and promises in a conversation with British Ambassador to the United States, John Freeman: “Frankly this is just from our Ambassador, who seems to have lose [sic] his sanity.”\textsuperscript{408} The day after he gave the

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backgrounder to the journalists in Chicago, Kissinger expressed his concerns about Korry to Nixon:

“-- - Ambassador Korry is imaginative, but he is an “unguided missile. He is acting now as his own project chief and is trying to construct an operation all by himself…
- - Only Korry is doing any real reporting, and while it is voluminous, it is inconsistent and contradictory. We cannot be sure of what the situation really is and how much Korry is justifying or camouflaging [sic].
- - CIA…does not feel it can impose discipline on Korry.”

The CIA Station in Santiago was also frustrated with Korry. Thomas Powers describes an encounter between Henry Hecksher, CIA Station Chief, and Korry, with Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Santiago, Harry Shlaudeman, present. “One day Hecksher – ‘this normally courteous man,’ in Korry’s words – suddenly blew up in anger at Korry’s low-key intervention with Frei… ‘Why the hell don’t you twist Frei’s arm?’ Hecksher shouted. ‘You’re telling Washington you’re doing it and you’re not!’”

Clearly no one had much confidence in the Ambassador. Kissinger may have asked Korry for an options paper, and Korry may have responded hopefully, but the idea that Kissinger gave the backgrounder to the Chicago journalists as a result of Korry’s advice seems rather improbable. In this episode, Kissinger seems to be attempting to give his actions greater legitimacy by aligning himself with Korry, a non-CIA actor involved in policy toward Chile.

On September 21, Kissinger notes that there was talk of the 2nd Frei Reelection Gambit, which involved the military controlling the Cabinet and organizing new elections. Kissinger then notes that Korry was authorized, sometime between September 21 and September 26 to advise “selected military leaders” that US military aid would not

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be negatively affected by the Chilean Military’s participation in any scheme that would keep Allende from power.\textsuperscript{411} For several days at the end of September and beginning of October, Kissinger was with President Nixon in Europe. \textsuperscript{412} While he was away, the 40 Committee “concluded [that the military would only move] if they feared an economic crisis.”\textsuperscript{413} The Committee then gave orders to precipitate such a crisis.

The “Rube Goldberg” gambit (as Kissinger referred to either or both of the Frei Reelection Gambits) died in October, as the PDC voted conditionally to support Allende in the Congressional vote. “The sole remaining possibility for forestalling the accession of Allende was a military takeover as a prelude to new elections.”\textsuperscript{414} On October 6, it was reported at a 40 Committee meeting that Frei still had not moved\textsuperscript{415} toward “any scheme that would result in his own reelection.”\textsuperscript{416} Nine days later, on October 15, Kissinger reports that he “turned off” Track II. Nixon notes the same event in his memoirs, claiming that “[i]n mid-October I was informed that our efforts were probably not going to be successful; therefore I instructed the CIA to abandon the operation.”\textsuperscript{417} On the same day, Kissinger observes, the 40 Committee also decided to give up on its attempt to foment a coup.\textsuperscript{418} A telecom notating a conversation between Nixon and Kissinger is interesting:

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\textsuperscript{411} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, 675.
\textsuperscript{412} Ibid, 675.
\textsuperscript{413} Ibid, 675.
\textsuperscript{414} Ibid, 675.
\textsuperscript{415} Ibid, 675.
\textsuperscript{416} Ibid, 675.
\textsuperscript{417} Ibid, 674.
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“P: How about Ambassador Korry. Is there anything now?
P: Just tell him to do nothing…”  

It is perhaps telling here, what Kissinger leaves out of his testimony. His purpose here appears, again, to be to support his own argument that the Administration did not pursue a coup in Chile by offering evidence that the Administration abandoned one coup scenario. What he does not write is that Administration pursued other coup options.

According to the cable from CIA Headquarters to the Santiago Station after the meeting with Karamassines, noted earlier in this chapter, it is clear that the CIA was under the impression that they were to continue to pursue a coup, despite “turning off” the Viaux kidnapping plan. Whatever the complications of the failed coup attempt of 1970, Nixon ordered continued covert involvement in the country after Allende’s election. National Security Decision Memorandum 93 from the National Security Council (NSC), “Policy Towards Chile,” on November 9, 1970 clearly demonstrates that Nixon directed the CIA to continue to influence the Chilean economy and politics via covert means:

“The President has decided that (1) the public posture of the United States will be correct but cool…but that (2) the United States will seek to maximize pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests.”

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420 Ibid.
Nixon cannot claim that our involvement in Chile ended in October, 1970. Even if he did abandon direct coup plotting after Schneider’s death, he certainly didn’t abandon efforts to destabilize the Allende government, as we shall see in the next chapter.

With Kissinger’s stubborn refusal to cite his sources, I expected to find more instances in which his testimony was unsubstantiated by documentation. The few instances when his claims are not substantiated seem, when you view the whole story, to be relatively minor episodes. But, though we don’t catch him in an outright lie, he does appear to manipulate his audience by withholding information at times, specifically in his assertion, as in Nixon’s, that he halted CIA efforts to affect a coup in October. He indeed instructed the CIA to advise Viaux against a coup, but neither he nor Nixon “turned off” all CIA efforts to influence Chilean politics, which, whether explicitly stated in their testimony or not, is what both men imply.

Kissinger’s readers would also be wise to be wary of his sympathy ploys, for example, his assertion that his too-heavy reliance on experts jeopardized success in Chile. Kissinger’s problem was not that he relied on the experts. He was, in some ways, the victim of bureaucracy whose fate he bemoaned in “Bureaucracy and Policy Making,” (discussed briefly in Chapter Two), doomed to reliance on experts because it was simply not humanly possible to know everything.422 The problem was that he relied on the wrong experts. As stated earlier, the CIA had warned the 303 Committee— which Kissinger attended - in April 1969 that success in Chile depended on early involvement. The 303 Committee, of which Kissinger was a part, dismissed the idea. In The Man Who Kept the Secrets, Thomas Powers described DCI Richard Helms’s feelings:

“…in Helms’s view, the failure [to keep Allende from achieving the presidency] belonged at least equally to the [Nixon] administration, for paying no attention when he warned the 40 Committee at least a year ahead of the election that now was the time for the CIA to get involved, and to Ed Korry, for resisting a pro-Alessandri campaign down to the bitter end.”

Kissinger’s failure, and Nixon’s, was not that they leaned too heavily on the opinion of expert advisors, but that they failed to discern whose counsel to follow.

In spite of US plans and plotting, Allende was confirmed and inaugurated. The question now was how the Nixon Administration would deal with the new Chilean government.

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423 Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA*, (New York: Alfred a. Knopf, 1979), 238. Powers notes that Helms made his recommendation to the 40 Committee in 1970. The example I found was from a meeting of the 303 Committee in 1969. It is entirely possible that Helms reiterated his recommendation in 1970 and that it was again dismissed.
CHAPTER FOUR
DEALING WITH THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT

“All’s fair on Chile. Kick ’em in the ass. Ok?
Kissinger: Right.”

~ October 5, 1971

I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter covers the time period between Allende’s inauguration and the coup in 1973. It is fitting here to address the questions that first come to mind when discussing CIA involvement in Chile, certainly the first questions that came to my mind as an undergraduate: Why did the coup happen? Who was responsible? Was it brought about by external factors, i.e., was the US responsible? Or was it due to internal factors, i.e., did Allende bring about his own downfall? Those last two questions frame the arguments about responsibility for the coup at either end of the spectrum. In my review of CIA, DOS, and other agency documents, several points became plain. First, the US, though not directly involved in coup plotting, lent its tacit support to the coup plotters in the Chilean military establishment. Secondly, it was Nixon and Kissinger’s goal to oust Allende from the time he took office, and great effort was made to destabilize the Allende government through “economic strangulation…diplomatic isolation…[and] CIA clandestine intervention.” Clandestine intervention included efforts to diminish Allende’s political support, increase the CIA’s contact with members of the Chilean military, to support non-military anti-Allende groups, and to disseminate propaganda through media outlets. Despite those efforts, the CIA did not actively participate in the events of September 11, 1973.

425 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 87.
The above observations lead me to the question of the motive behind reduced involvement, especially considering the extent of anti-Allende efforts before Allende’s inauguration. The evidence suggests that there were three reasons to maintain a low profile. First, the apparent indecisiveness of the Chilean military did not inspire confidence in the Nixon Administration and policy makers continued to distance the US from the activities of the Chilean military. Secondly, high-level officials in both the State Department and CIA felt that the coup would be successful without CIA assistance; the documents also suggest that the State Department and CIA may have been considering a contingency plan to assist the coup plotters if the coup appeared to be in danger of failure. As it happened, that contingency plan was unnecessary. Allende was overthrown, just as US policy makers had wished, with the least amount of US involvement.

The evident tension between a distrust that the military would move and the trust in the military’s ability to pull off a coup if they purposed to do so can be explained by the third element: fear of exposure. US policy makers were loath the over-commit to fostering a coup – the more effort put into laying the foundation for a coup, the greater the risk of exposure of US involvement. However, if the military did decide to move, US officials were confident that the Chileans could pull off a coup without US assistance; the risks of exposure if the US became heavily involved in coup planning and execution were great, far outweighing any benefits of direct involvement. So, the US Government bided its time, keeping tabs on developments in Chile. Their patience was rewarded. Allende was overthrown, just as US policy makers had wished, with the least amount of US involvement.
A review of the two secondary sources, Jonathan Haslam’s *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile*, and Ambassador Nathaniel Davis’s the *Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*, reveal the internal economic and political struggles that plagued the Allende regime. Whether or not US economic action aimed at destabilizing the Allende government had much effect, Allende’s own economic policies significantly weakened the Chilean economy, despite initial short-term growth. Leftist extremist activities compounded the economic crisis. The failing economy and deteriorating political situation inspired further destabilizing political action – strikes, demonstrations, and the like. The Chilean military, increasingly frustrated by the building crisis in Chile, and encouraged by US tacit support for a coup, finally resolved to move.

The above mentioned questions frame the first portion of this chapter. After discussing US response to the Allende regime, Chile’s internal struggles under the Allende government, and the motive behind reduced US involvement, I proceed with an account of events on the day of the coup and end, as in Chapter Three, with a discussion of perpetrator testimony.

II. **US Response to Allende’s Election**

On November 3, 1970, Salvador Allende was sworn into office as president of Chile. Members of the foreign policy making community in the United States were already writing briefs and options papers for action against the regime. On November 5, Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, wrote a briefing paper for President Nixon in preparation for the National Security Council meeting planned for November

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6. Kissinger also wrote a brief for Nixon. Kissinger’s brief and the memorandum of conversation from the November 6 meeting reveal the true reasons for US action in Chile, whatever policy makers might have said later.

Kissinger’s statements in his brief to Nixon demonstrate that policy makers did not believe that Chile posed a direct national security threat to the United States. Nevertheless, he argued, “…[W]hat happens in Chile over the next six to twelve months will have ramifications that will go far beyond just US-Chilean relations. They will have an effect on what happens in the rest of Latin America and the developing world; on what our future position will be in the hemisphere; and on the larger world picture, including our relations with the USSR. They will even affect our own conception of what our role in the world is.”

We can see in Kissinger’s memo a hallmark of the Nixon’s Administration’s foreign policy. The chief concern was that the rise of a second socialist/communist leader in Latin America would adversely affect the reputation of the United States, which would in turn affect its international prestige and its ability to deter aggression based on the appearance of US strength. Chile would become, “a source of disruption in the hemisphere…It would become part of the Soviet/Socialist world, not only philosophically but in terms of power dynamics…the imitative spread of similar phenomena elsewhere would in turn significantly affect the world balance and our own

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429 Ibid, 121.
position in it.”

But Kissinger cautioned against public action against the Allende regime.

“We are strongly on record in support of self-determination and respect for free election... It would therefore be very costly for us to act in ways that appear to violate those principles, and Latin Americans and others in the world will view our policy as a test of the credibility of our rhetoric... On the other hand, our failure to react to this situation risks being perceived in Latin America and in Europe as indifference or impotence in the face of clearly adverse developments in a region long considered our sphere of influence... I recommend, therefore that you make a decision that we will oppose Allende as strongly as we can and do all we can to keep him from consolidating power, taking care to package those efforts in a style that gives us the appearance of reacting to his moves.”

Kissinger was clearly aware of the costs of overtly deviating from the Administration’s stated principles.

It was also at the November 6 NSC meeting that policy makers discussed the prudence of a “cool but correct [public] posture” toward Allende’s government.

“Secretary Rogers: ... We have severe limitations on what we can do. A strong public posture will only strengthen his hand. We must make each decision in the future carefully in a way that harms him most but without too much of a public posture which would only be counterproductive. Secretary Laird: ...[W]e must retain an outward posture that is correct. We must take hard actions but not publicize them.”

By November 9, the “cool but correct posture” was official policy. “[T]he President has decided that (1) the public posture of the United States will be correct but cool, to avoid

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430 Ibid, 121-122.
431 Ibid, 122; 127.
432 The White House, “Memorandum of Conversation, ‘NSC Meeting – Chile (NSSM 97),’” November 6, 1970, in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 117. William Rogers was Secretary of State at the time of the November 6 meeting; Melvin Laird was Secretary of Defense.
giving the Allende government a basis on which to rally domestic and international support for consolidation of the regime…”

The Nixon Administration decided that, of all the options open to them, the best way to put pressure on Allende and hopefully remove him from power was to oppose him as strongly as possible through diplomatic, economic, and clandestine means. To quote the Hinchey Report, "[t]he CIA was instructed to put the US Government in a position to take future advantage of either a political or military solution to the Chilean dilemma, depending on how developments unfolded.”

**Covert Action: Approach With Caution**

The clandestine program included the usual covert political action, support of opposition groups, and propaganda campaigns.

“The [covert action] program has five principal elements: 1. Political action to divide and weaken the Allende coalition; 2. Maintaining and enlarging contacts in the Chilean military; 3. Providing support to non-Marxist opposition political groups and parties; 4. Assisting certain periodicals and using other media outlets in Chile which can speak out against the Allende Government; and 5. Using selected media outlets [redacted] to play up Allende’s subversion of the democratic process and involvement by Cuba and the Soviet Union in Chile.”

Financial support was provided to the PDC, the PN, and the PDR, “the only serious sources of opposition,” at the time. Later, the CIA channeled resources to other political opposition groups as well, such as the PIR.

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435 “Hinchey Report.”


All detail regarding how the funds were allocated to those groups has been redacted from the documents. There is one document that suggests that the CIA used its private sector contacts in Chile to channel money to the opposition parties in Chile, but no specifics are given. All monies distributed to opposition parties were given with the approval of the 40 Committee with the goal of weakening the Unidad Popular, Allende’s Popular Unity government.

One propaganda outlet on which US policy makers focused their attention was *El Mercurio*, “the largest independent newspaper in Chile.” *El Mercurio* had been an outlet for the CIA’s anti-Allende propaganda throughout Allende’s presidential campaign and beyond. Now that outlet was threatened with financial ruin, brought on by pressures from the Allende government, and both the CIA Station Chief in Santiago and Ambassador Korry advocated US financial support for the newspaper. US policy makers feared that “Allende’s intense efforts to destroy *El Mercurio* indicate[d] that he probably regard[ed] it as a significant barrier to his internal political strategy.” There was some concern that Allende had the power to shut the paper down regardless of whether the

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United States provided the funds *El Mercurio* needed to remain solvent and functioning. But two and a half weeks after the 40 Committee meeting in which financial support to *El Mercurio* was discussed, Nixon approved the recommended spending $700,000 and advised that more funds would be available to keep the paper going, if necessary, upwards of $1,000,000.\(^{443}\)

From late 1970 to November 1971, Santiago Station reports to Headquarters were comprised chiefly of updates on opposition party activity in Chile. On November 9, 1971 the CIA wrote an Intelligence Information Special Report indicating that elements in the Chilean Army, Navy, and the Carabineros (Chilean police) were planning a coup for the spring of 1972.\(^{444}\) A document from November 12, 1971 reveals that CIA operatives in the Santiago Station still believed that their mission was to actively pursue a coup.

“Taking into consideration all the caveats and limitations noted above, we conceive our [redacted] mission as one in which we work consciously and deliberately in the direction of a coup.”\(^{445}\) CIA Headquarters disagreed.

“Any discussion regarding possible [redacted] support of an attempted coup is obviously highly sensitive. Since we do not have [redacted] approval to become involved in any coup planning, we cannot accept your conclusion in reference A that the [redacted] mission is to ‘work consciously and deliberately in the direction of a coup’, nor can we authorize you to ‘talk frankly about the mechanics of a coup’ with key commanders, because the implications of that amount to the same.”\(^{446}\)


Station operatives in Santiago were directed to limit their activities to information gathering. Without clear evidence that the military was united against Allende, Headquarters was not willing even to broach the subject of a coup with policy makers in Washington.

In January of 1972 the CIA had reported that Allende was losing support and that the military was “increasingly restive,” but still not ready for a coup.\(^{447}\) Eight months later, General Augusto Pinochet himself denied in September of that year that there were any plans for a coup in the works. He did, however, reveal that “all believe overthrow attempt can develop soon…Allende must be forced to step down or be eliminated.”\(^{448}\) The document which notes Pinochet’s comments also indicates that Pinochet was told by junior US army officers that the US would support a coup in Chile.\(^{449}\) Despite Pinochet’s belief of a coming coup, the CIA and policy makers in Washington were still not convinced that it was time to take a more active role. On April 4, 1972, a CIA memorandum stated that a confrontation was coming, but estimated that it was a year away.\(^{450}\) At a US Department of State meeting about Chile in October, policy makers were clearly not yet convinced that the Chilean military was ready for a coup: “…coup probabilities seemed quite low at this juncture…”\(^{451}\) Furthermore, there wasn’t much the United States could do to bring things to a head in Chile.


\(^{448}\) CIA, “Cable [General Pinochet’s Views on Allende],” September 27, 1972, in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 144-145.

\(^{449}\) CIA, “Cable [General Pinochet’s Views on Allende],” September 27, 1972, in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 144.


\(^{451}\) CIA, “Meeting Minutes, ‘Meeting on Current Chilean Situation at Department of State, 1630-1830, 17 October 1972,’” in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 147. See also "Hinchey Report."
“[T]he conclusion was that no course of action which could be taken would help in a decisive manner to achieve the objective of removing Allende from power. The Chilean military were the key to any coup that might develop now or in the future.” 452

But, policy makers believed that, even if the military did decide to act, it would likely be unnecessary to actively support the coup effort; the Chilean military was perfectly capable of accomplishing their objective. It would, moreover, be unlikely that the US would be asked to help. There was, then, no need for US involvement beyond ensuring that the military knew the USG would look favorably on a coup. “[G]iven the Chilean military capabilities of an unaided coup, any U.S. intervention or assistance in the coup per se should be avoided.” 453

US policy makers were more cautious, but policy toward Chile had not really changed. The Nixon Administration still desired that the maximum outcome be achieved – Allende’s overthrow – with as little effort on the part of the US as possible. But, firmly believing that a coup would not be successful unless it were a “fundamentally Chilean” affair, US policy makers were unwilling to expend US resources unless the Chilean military was resolutely in support of a coup. Such was not the case until late in 1973.

The military had hesitated and vacillated for two years on the subject of a coup. The CIA received constantly conflicting opinions from their contacts about the possibility of an overthrow. The commanding officers of all branches of the military were more tolerant of the Allende government than their junior officers, particularly in the Army. The major factor keeping the Army from committing to a coup was that the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Prats, much like General Schneider, was loyal to the Chilean Constitution and refused to give support to a coup that would undermine Chile’s

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452 Ibid.
453 Ibid.
long tradition of democracy. But 1973 saw the military’s gradual saturation of frustration with the Allende regime, a frustration that eventually led to the military take-over of the government in September.

1973 was marked by uncertainty in Chile, the political landscape changing dramatically month by month. In January, Ambassador Korry still thought a coup was unlikely. By March, the CIA believed an attempted coup probable but did not, at that point, expect an overthrow attempt to succeed. The CIA recommended in March that the US should “avoid encouraging the private sector to initiate action likely to produce either an abortive coup or a bloody civil war,” and cautioned that, “We should make it clear that we will not support a coup attempt unless it becomes clear that a coup would have the support of most of the Armed forces as well as the CODE parties, including the PDC.”

In April, the CIA had the impression that given the right conditions (i.e. an outright economic and political crisis), such a coup could develop.

By May 2, commanding officers of the military planned to express their discontent to the Allende government, chiefly in order to keep junior officers from acting on their own. The Station in Santiago pushed again for a change of policy in support

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of pursuing a coup, but Headquarters was still hesitant to present the coup as an option to policy makers; The Nixon government, caught up in the Watergate investigations, was not in a position to take on new foreign policy actions that would incite opposition at home. On May 6, however, Chilean military officers were openly discussing a coup at a dinner party. The pressure was building in Chile. Later in May a communiqué from the Santiago Station to CIA Headquarters indicated that one of their military contacts would welcome a coup. In fact, the contact estimated that plans for a coup might be finalized by June 15, but specified that June 15 was not the date intended for action; coup-planning was, as yet, not unified.

On June 14, a US National Intelligence Estimate for Chile noted that Chilean Navy and Air Force commanders were in favor of “strong measures against Allende;” the Army, however, was still on the fence. The Intelligence Estimate also advised that the US “lack[ed] powerful and reliable levers” for manipulating the political situation in Chile. The commanding officers of the Army were loath to seriously pursue a coup until all civil means to effect change were exhausted. But junior level officers in the Army had reached such a level of discontent with the happenings in Chile, brought on, as they felt, by the Allende regime, that they hosted their own rebellion and attacked La

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Moneda, the presidential palace in Santiago, on June 29.\textsuperscript{463} It is difficult to determine why junior level officers were willing to act against Allende when higher level officers were not. Perhaps it was the zealousness of youth, or a difference in attitudes between the generations; younger officers may have felt less devoted to Chile’s democratic tradition. Perhaps it was more material. Junior level officers, just starting their careers, may not have had the means built up to ride out the economic challenges of Allende’s presidency. Whatever the reason for the difference, it was the commanding officers of the Army, led by General Prats, who put down the rebellion, termed “El Tancazo” (The Tank Rebellion).\textsuperscript{464}

The CIA interpreted the event as evidence that the Army was less likely than ever to join the movement for a coup, and without the Army, the coup would be almost certainly a failure. Despite their earlier drive to pursue a military coup, the Station in Santiago then recommended that financial support to all opposition groups be discontinued because it was unlikely to be effective. The PDC was unlikely to use US funds for the purpose for which they were intended, and, after the June 29 Tancazo, the military opposition to the Allende regime was clearly not united.\textsuperscript{465} There was no use in wasting monetary resources.


As it turned out, the CIA’s interpretation of military sentiment after the Tancazo was wrong. Though it was the commanding officers of the Army who had put down the June 29 uprising it was that event which pushed those officers into serious discussion of a coup. An update on the opposition forces in Chile on July 23 revealed that the UP was planning for an “inevitable confrontation.” The party, fighting for survival, was on the warpath in the economic sector and some party segments were arming their paramilitary cadres. In the opposition, the Chilean trade guilds were threatening to strike, an act “designed to provoke massive military intervention in the government of a coup.” Other groups were threatening guerilla warfare against the government. Chilean truckers also began another strike. Chile was truly in crisis. As the CIA had originally predicted months earlier, despite their later expectations that a military move would not develop, this was a crisis deep enough to trigger a coup.

By July 25, plans for a coup “lack[ed] only the identification of priority targets and a listing of measures requiring inter-service coordination.” But General Prats was still in the way. Instead of opting for a kidnapping attempt, as had occurred with General Schneider, the other commanding Army generals simply forced Prats to resign, after “several hundred army wives, including the wives of some generals,” demonstrated against him with members of opposition political parties on the pavement in front of his

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house. Prats stepped down the next day, August 22. General Augusto Pinochet took his place as Commander in Chief of the Army.\footnote{Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, 196-197.}

CIA Headquarters was finally willing to suggest financial support of the private sector in Chile in order that the strikes may continue, keeping the pressure up on both the Allende government and the Chilean military.\footnote{Considering the level of CIA Station involvement in Chilean politics in the several years previous, one could make the argument that the CIA was likely funneling support to the strikers long before CIA Headquarters’ suggestion in August 1973. Since there is no corroborating documentation, however, we can only speculate.} Headquarters promised the Station in Santiago that, if necessary, they would secure the US Ambassador’s backing for support of opposition forces in the private sector in Chile.\footnote{CIA, "Analysis of Situation in Chile," August 22, 1973, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/00009C6E.pdf.} The recommendation was passed on to Henry Kissinger and Jack Kubisch on August 29. On August 29, a memorandum was sent out detailing the 40 Committee’s approval of financial support of the opposition in Chile, including the private sector in the amount of $1,000,000.\footnote{CIA, "Chile 40 Committee Paper," August 29, 1973, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/00009C74.pdf.} Less than two weeks later, the coup on September 11 rendered such support unnecessary.

**Economic Warfare**

Much has been made of economic action taken by the US against the Allende regime, but can that action be considered economic warfare? Two days after Allende’s inauguration, the Nixon Administration developed a plan to make economic success as difficult as possible for the Allende regime. I believe that considering the evidence, economic warfare was indeed the Nixon Administration’s policy. The diplomatic and economic action plan toward Chile was outline in NSDM 93, “Policy Toward Chile,” dated November 9, 1970. The US would adopt a “cool and correct posture” which would...
consist of efforts to ensure that other Latin American governments knew how strongly the US opposed the Allende government and to “encourage them to adopt a similar posture;” to “coordinate efforts” with those other Latin American governments to oppose action by the Allende government; to “exclude,” “terminate,” “reduce,” and “limit” economic aid to Chile in all forms (credit, “financial assistance,” etc) both from the US and international sources; and to advise US firms with interests in Chile that the US would bring pressure on the Allende regime.474

It cannot be said that the Nixon Administration’s economic policy toward Chile merely responded to Allende’s policies as any other capitalist nation would do. NSDM 93 laid out a fairly aggressive plan of action. Nixon had demanded that the US dump a portion of its copper holdings, “to quickly undermine the world price of copper, Chile’s main export;”475 The Nixon Administration also maneuvered a “sufficiently malleable” chairman into power at the Inter-American Development Bank to ensure compliance with the Administration’s policy toward Chile.476 The White House refused to give instructions to the US representative in the IDB regarding the US vote for loans to Chile, indefinitely stalling the loan process. Kornbluh cites the “Status Report on U.S. Stance on IDB Lending to Chile:

“The U.S. Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank understands that he will remain uninstructed until further notice on pending loans to Chile. As...an affirmative vote by the U.S. is required for loan approval, this will effectively bar approval of the loans.”477

475 Ibid, 83.
476 Ibid, 84. Kornbluh cites an October 22, 1970 memo from Alexander Haig to Tom Houston.
477 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 84.
At the World Bank, US representatives manipulated Bank members sent to Chile to evaluate Chile’s qualifications for receiving a loan. The US Agency for International Development and the US Export-Import Bank were not permitted to extend new assistance to Chile. The Eximbank continued to give Chile a credit rating of “D,” which reduced Chile’s chance of receiving loans from private US sources. The Church Report offers statistics on the decrease in economic aid to Chile, depicted in Figure 4.1, below.

**Figure 4.1 US. Economic Aid to Chile**

![Graph showing economic aid to Chile](image)

The Nixon Administration also advised private US businesses and labor unions (which had ties, via “international affiliates” with Chilean labor unions) that the USG did not look favorably on the new Chilean government. At the Paris Club debt

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478 Ibid, 84.
479 Ibid, 85.
480 Kornbluh notes that Kissinger had ordered a reduction in credit rating for Chile as part of Track II. Kornbluh, *Pinochet File*, 85.
482 “Church Report,” 33-34. The spike in total aid in 1967 was due chiefly to the increase in the U.S. Export-Import Bank aid. The amount of Ex-Im Bank aid in 1967 is noted but not explained in the Church Report. See “Church Report,” 33. From Kristian Gustafson’s work, the spike in aid in 1967 doesn’t seem to be clearly connected to any U.S. covert action, which was directed chiefly at the 1964 Presidential and the 1969 Congressional elections in Chile. See Gustafson, *Hostile Intent*, 19-78.
484 Ibid, 85.
negotiations in 1972 and 1973 US representatives, at the direction of President Nixon, sought “to get broad creditor support to isolate Chile.”\textsuperscript{485} When US representatives could not succeed in convincing the Paris Club creditors to refuse to renegotiate Chile’s debt, “the Nixon administration,” as Kornbluh notes, “broke ranks and refused to reschedule Chilean payments on more than $1 billion owed to U.S. government and private sector creditors.”\textsuperscript{486} The Administration also sought to isolate Chile from its Latin American neighbors, chiefly Argentina and Brazil, and “considered trying to expel Chile…from the OAS.”\textsuperscript{487} Peter Kornbluh contends that the Nixon Administration’s policy of economic strangulation destroyed the Chilean economy, destabilizing the country politically as well. Kissinger contends that Allende’s own economic policies brought about his downfall.\textsuperscript{488} The truth, I believe, is somewhere in between.

\section*{III. \textbf{INTERNAL FACTORS: FAILURE OF ALLENDE’S ECONOMIC PLAN AND POLITICAL UPEAVAL}}

\textbf{Allende’s Economic Plan}

While the USG was devising ways to injure Allende’s government economically, the Allende government’ was struggling to maintain their internal economic restructuring program while avoiding an economic meltdown. They were not successful beyond the

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotetext[486]{Kornbluh, \textit{Pinochet File}, 86.}
\footnotetext[487]{Ibid, 87.}
\footnotetext[488]{Kissinger, \textit{Years of Upheaval}, 391-393. See also Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, 682-683.}
\end{footnotesize}
first year. As Jonathan Haslam comments in *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide*, Allende was not an economist and was “content to leave [the country’s economic planning] to others.”\(^{489}\) He was not known among his colleagues to be very forward thinking and, indeed, had not prepared an economic plan before winning the election in 1970. Professor Pedro Vuskovic Bravo, Allende’s Minister of Economy,\(^{490}\) was in charge of developing the economic plan ultimately approved in November 1970 by Allende’s cabinet as the “Basic Orientation of the Economic Programme for the Short-term.”\(^{491}\) Haslam describes that plan as “little but generalizations divorced from economic and political realities”\(^{492}\) with “four major objectives: increasing growth, absorbing unemployment, changing the distribution of profit, and containing inflation.”\(^{493}\) The greatest flaw of the plan, according to Haslam, was that politics were more important than sound economics: “where necessary, economic need would give way to political need.”\(^{494}\) As Haslam observes:

“No thought was given to the likelihood that land reform would disrupt production, thereby also raising inflation; that nationalized industries were bound to press for subsidies from government to keep them afloat; that increased demand was unlikely to increase investment in the private sector, which was more likely to expedite profits abroad for safety; and that price controls would distort the allocation of resources.”\(^{495}\)

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\(^{490}\) Davis, *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*, 80.

\(^{491}\) Haslam, *Death of Allende’s Chile*, 101-102.

\(^{492}\) Ibid, 102.

\(^{493}\) Ibid, 103.

\(^{494}\) Ibid, 103.

\(^{495}\) Ibid, 104.
It was politically necessary to pursue the UP’s “Basic Plan” for economic reconstruction, but neither the adverse consequences of such a policy nor a plan for addressing those consequences was ever considered by the Allende regime.\textsuperscript{496}

In \textit{The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende}, Nathaniel Davis, US Ambassador to Chile after Edward Korry’s departure, describes those consequences.\textsuperscript{497} According to Davis, Vuskovic sought to “prime the pump” of the Chilean economy by instituting mandatory wage increases, nationalizing firms, (financed by the Central Bank), hiring new employees at the expense of the government, and restricting imports.

To counteract the resulting inflation, the Allende government printed more money and granted credit via the Central Bank.\textsuperscript{498} Vuskovic’s radical plan forced private companies into nationalization by either direct government takeover or by manipulating private enterprise through price and credit control and government mandated wage increases effected through the Ministry of Economy’s Directorate of Industry and Commerce (DIRINCO). Many private companies simply could not stay in business due to the high cost of raw materials and components, the lack of credit, and the forced increase of wages to their employees.\textsuperscript{499} Consequently, government expenditure increased while tax income decreased.\textsuperscript{500} Additionally, the majority of firms nationalized began to lose money shortly after nationalization.\textsuperscript{501} Davis notes that, “[b]y November

\textsuperscript{496} Ibid, 103.
\textsuperscript{497} As noted in Chapter One, Davis relied heavily on secondary sources in constructing his narrative of the political situation in Chile. Where possible, I have located and provided citation for those sources as well.
\textsuperscript{498} Davis, \textit{Last Two Years}, 81-82. See also Robert J. Alexander, \textit{The Tragedy of Chile}, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 187.
\textsuperscript{499} Davis, \textit{Last Two Years}, 80.
\textsuperscript{500} Davis explains: “…private enterprises were nationalized or went out of business and…wealthy taxpayers went abroad.” Thus, there was little money flowing in and much money flowing out of the government’s pockets. Davis, \textit{Last Two Years}, 82.
\textsuperscript{501} Alexander, \textit{Tragedy of Chile}, 187.
1971 the Chilean government had spent the bulk of its foreign exchange reserves, and it declared a moratorium on the payment of interest and principal on most of the country’s foreign debt."502

Chile also experienced significant food shortages in 1971, leading women to march in protest in Santiago in the “March of the Empty Pots”503 on December 1. Davis writes that, though the working class was represented in the march, the majority of the participants were “women of the more prosperous suburbs.” The march, he argues, was more of a political protest than a protest against hunger since the majority of the marchers did not suffer the day to day effect of the food shortages.504

The Chilean economy continued to decline and in mid-1972, Vuskovic, blamed for the crisis, resigned from his post. Allende promptly announced a new economic plan. He declared that the plan would “rely on loans, mostly from Eastern Europe” in an attempt to stimulate investment. Other elements of the plan included tax increases “for the wealthy and upper middle classes” and price increases on “basic items.” The rise in inflation due to the new policy – a two-fold increase in the month of August alone505 - was to be off-set by mandatory bonuses on Chilean Independence Day, September 18. To fund the bonuses, the government again printed more money.506 Far from experiencing growth as a result of the new economic plan, production decreased throughout the last months of 1972.507

502 Davis, Last Two Years, 19.
503 Also known as the “march of the pots and pans.” Haslam, Death of Allende’s Chile, 115. See also Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, 162.
504 Davis, Last Two Years, 47-48.
505 Davis does not specify the figures.
506 Ibid, 84. Davis does not specify inflation figures, but notes that they “doubled” in August and increased again by 50 percent in September.
507 Davis, Last Two Years, 83.
Political Unrest

The deepening economic crisis was compounded by domestic political troubles. Leftist extremist activity and political unrest continued throughout Allende’s presidency. The Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo (VOP) held violent demonstrations, seized farms, and assassinated Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, “former vice-president and former interior minister.” The Manuel Rodríguez Revolutionary Movement (MR-2) committed acts of terrorism. The Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR) provoked indigenous groups and factory workers to protest and held hostile demonstrations.

Other extremist groups included the Movement for Unified Popular Action (MAPU, an offshoot of the PDC), the Christian Left, and the July 16th Command of the National Liberation Army.

Adding to the unrest was the emergence of three different politically charged organizations in 1972, the focos, the campamentos, and the cordones. As Davis describes:

“The focos resembled the Viet Cong – controlled areas in the Vietnam countryside in the 1960s; in a few places the MIR rather than the government held effective control…The campamentos were shantytowns, filled with families living in little prefabricated or jerry-built wooden houses. They were mostly in the suburbs of Santiago and other large towns, and the MIRistas and other left extremists organized them into militarized hamlets.”

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508 Ibid, 85. See also Alexander, Tragedy of Chile, 159; Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 99, 148.
509 Haslam, Death of Allende’s Chile, 95-96.
510 Davis, Last Two Years, 86.
511 Ibid, 86.
512 Ibid, 86-87; Alexander, Tragedy of Chile, 63, 283; Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 78-79.
513 Davis, Last Two Years, 87; Alexander, Tragedy of Chile, 283; Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 150-151.
514 The July 16th Command plotted to attack Allende’s Tomás Mora Avenue residence. Davis, Last Two Years, 88.
515 The cordones have also been referred to as the cordones industriales. Haslam, Death of Allende’s Chile, 148-149.
The *cordones* were “worker-controlled industrial belts,” controlled in some cases by the MIRistas and leftist Socialists, and in which the workers formed “communal commands” (*commandos comunales*) the “nuclei” from which grassroots “mobilization of the workers” developed separate from the efforts of the UP government.\(^{516}\) According to Davis, whether Allende was for or against “[a]ll three ganglia of revolutionary organization,” and whether the members of the *focus, campamentos*, or *cordones* were for or against Allende and his regime is unclear. What *is* clear is that they “complicated [the political] situation” in Chile.\(^{517}\)

Cuban activity, chiefly in Santiago, was another source of political unrest. “The [Cuban E]mbassy,” Haslam observes, “comprised forty-eight people – the Chileans had a mere handful uncomfortably housed in Havana,” and “the Cubans in Santiago acquired something close to *carte blanche*.\(^{518}\)” One of the Cuban Embassy officials was Allende’s own son-in-law.\(^{519}\) By their own admission, Cuban intelligence officials of the Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI) “were enormously active”\(^{520}\) in Chile. Davis notes that there were reports of arms deliveries.\(^{521}\) Haslam cites “a DGI defector,” who, “[a]t the end of 1971…said that Santiago had replaced Paris as the centre for co-ordinating liberation movements in South America,” though Haslam qualifies the statement as “yet to be confirmed.”\(^{522}\) There may then be credence to Kissinger’s and Nixon’s claims that they feared that a socialist/communist Chile would be a launching ground for revolutionary activity in the southern cone. One could also argue that Nixon’s and

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\(^{516}\) Davis, *Last Two Years*, 88-90. See also Haslam, *Death of Allende’s Chile*, 148-149; Alexander, *Tragedy of Chile*, 275, 315; Sigmund, *Overthrow of Allende*, 215.

\(^{517}\) Ibid., 88.

\(^{518}\) Haslam, *Death of Allende’s Chile*, 76.

\(^{519}\) Davis, *Last Two Years*, 91.

\(^{520}\) Luis Fernandez, quoted in Haslam, *Death of Allende’s Chile*, 76.

\(^{521}\) Davis, *Last Two Years*, 90-91.

\(^{522}\) Haslam, *Death of Allende’s Chile*, 76.
Kissinger’s fears were self-fulfilling. Allende was already vocally opposed to American “imperialism.” It is quite possible that the actions US policy makers took only radicalized Allende further.

The decline of the economy and the deterioration of the political situation in Chile eventually led to devastating workers’ strikes. A rash of strikes broke out in August and September 1972, chiefly as a consequence of Chile’s economic deterioration. The first strike lasted one day, August 21 1972, precipitated by the heart attack and death of a shopkeeper who had been forced by authorities to open his store which he had closed in protest to the government’s latest price increases. The strike and ensuing violence resulted in the government’s call for a state of emergency in Santiago province. As Davis notes, “[s]everal weeks of intermittent street violence and flash strikes followed.” Strikes occurred again in October, beginning with the truckers’ strike in Coyhaique and eventually encompassing the “Taxi Drivers’ Unions, the Confederation of Production, and the Sole National Confederation of small Industry and Artisanry,” as well as various other groups of professionals. Allende’s Cabinet did not survive the October strikes and the Chilean economy, already in poor condition, was “severely damaged.” After Allende’s Cabinet resigned, the Chilean president negotiated with military officers to fill the open posts. General Carlos Prats Gonzalez became Minister

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523 Davis, Last Two Years, 108; Alexander, Tragedy of Chile, 207-208.
524 Strikes occurred on August 30 in Concepción; in “demonstrations and clashes” inspired by the approaching anniversary of Allende’s popular election; on September 11 in a conflict “between high-school students of opposing loyalties;” three days later by “the opposition” in response to the UP strike on September 4; and in the strike of the airline mechanics of LAN-Chile. Davis, Last Two Years, 108. See also Alexander, Tragedy of Chile, 207-208.
525 Davis, Last Two Years, 109.
526 The Cabinet resigned “on the last day of [October]…to give [Allende] a free hand,” and Allende pleaded with military officers to fill the posts. Davis, Last Two Years, 111.
527 Davis, Last Two Years, 112.
528 Ibid, 114-118.
of Interior, Brigadier General Claudio Sepúlveda Donoso became Minister of Mines, and Rear Admiral Ismael Huerta Díaz became Minister of Public Works and Transportation.\textsuperscript{529}

The Allende government had managed the economy badly for two years. Allende’s popular support had greatly declined. The revolutionary left was fractioned. The workers were unhappy. The people were unhappy. Though the entrance of these military leaders into the political arena had a somewhat stabilizing effect on Chilean politics, Davis argues that it was “[t]his vitiation of the military commitment to noninvolvement in politics [that] ultimately weakened the barriers to a coup.”\textsuperscript{530}

IV. \textbf{S}EPTEMBER 11, 1973

On August 25, a CIA document indicates that Allende believed a coup was imminent, but does not show that the US Government had any knowledge that coup plans were in the works.\textsuperscript{531} Three days later, the CIA heard that a secret paramilitary group was planning a coup, but there is no indication that Chilean military was involved.\textsuperscript{532} Ten days later, on September 8 - the same day that US Ambassador Davis and Kissinger met in Washington, DC - the CIA had news of a Navy-led coup in the works for September 10. The Carabineros were on board. General Pinochet advised the Navy that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{529} Ibid, 115.
  \item \textsuperscript{530} Davis, \textit{Last Two Years}, 118. There had been some military participation previously. As Davis observes, “Brigadier General Palacios, minister of mining between April and June 6 1972, had left the cabinet at military insistence.” Davis, \textit{Last Two Years}, 116; Alexander, \textit{Tragedy of Chile}, 294, 311.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the Army would not oppose the action but he could not guarantee that the Army generals
would want to participate.533

By September 10, the CIA had news that the coup had been moved to September
11, and that all three branches of the military as well as the Carabineros were planning to
take part.534 It is unclear to whom the reports were directed; they may have been internal
within the Agency or they may have been passed along to higher ranking policy makers.
There is no clear indication of whether or not the information was passed along to Nixon
and Kissinger, but it is unlikely that such information would not make its way to the
White House.

Donald Winters, a CIA operative, is quoted by Peter Kornbluh, stating, “We were
not in on planning…but our contacts with the military let them know where we stood –
that was we [sic] were not terribly happy with [the Allende] government.”535 The night
before the coup, a top Chilean coup plotter met with a member of the CIA Santiago
Station team, requesting direct involvement of the CIA in coup events; this request was
refused. “In response to [redacted] query, the [redacted] officer said that he could not
comment on the matter, that the planned action against President Allende was a Chilean
operation, and he could only promise that [redacted] question would promptly be made
known to Washington.”536 Policy makers would not commit to directly supporting the

533 CIA, “Claim that Navy to Initiate Move to Overthrow Government that Air Force Will
Support,” U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection,
http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia/ searchable_9c9b.pdf. The Meeting between Davis and Kissinger is
discussed at length later in this chapter.
534 Ibid; See also, Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 112. Kornbluh is here quoting a cable from Jack
Devine, but gives no specific citation or reference.
535 Donald Winters in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 114. Winters was a CIA operative.
Request for U.S. Government Aid from Key Officer of Chilean Military Group Planning to Overthrow
coup, and it was carried out on September 11, 1973 without the direct involvement of the United States.

Nathaniel Davis gives an excellent and detailed account of the events of September 11 that fills in some gaps in the CIA’s documentation of the event. He indicates that there were reports of suspicious activity as early 12:00am. US Government documentation describes events occurring after 8:00am. The CIA first reported that the military had taken over a radio station. Allende, on a different station, stated that “he was in the Moneda and was prepared to defend the government. He added that he was waiting for the Army to do its duty and defend the country.”

The next CIA communications indicated that the Carabineros, excepting a small group, had left La Moneda at 9:30am. The small group was attempting to convince Allende to resign. Just before 10:00am, “several vehicles containing Carabinero officials” arrived at La Moneda. By early afternoon, Allende’s Tomás Moro residence had been bombed “because of resistance by some elements of the Carabineros…and the Presidential Bodyguards.” The CIA reported again that the Carabineros had left La Moneda before noon. “As of 1230 hours Allende ha[s] not surrendered. The Presidential Palace is in flames.” Allende’s last words, transmitted via Radio Magallanes are poignant: “Long live Chile! Long live the people! Long live the workers! These are my

537 Davis, Last Two Years, 232. Davis builds his account of September 11 from secondary sources and from the writings and memories of his own family members living with him in Chile at the time.
541 Ibid.
last words. I am sure that my sacrifice will not be in vain; I am sure that it will at least be a moral lesson which will punish felony, cowardice, and treason.”

Davis writes that Allende’s death occurred between 1:50pm and 2:20pm.

At 2:30pm, a DOS cable sent to Kissinger indicated that the “Armed Forces radio network announced at 1430 whole country under control, only snipers remain in central Santiago. States ‘high officials’ of Marxist govt [sic] under arrest, and states Moneda has surrendered.” Another cable before 3:00pm advised that the military had issued an edict via radio demanding that a long list of individuals “surrender themselves” before 6:30pm that evening. At some point on September 11, Kissinger received a report advising that there would be a military uprising that day and requesting assurance of US assistance, should it be necessary. If Kissinger or any other US official responded, the documentation has not been released. As it happened, the Chilean military did not require US assistance. In the span of fourteen hours, the Allende government, its leader dead, came crashing down. It was the best of both worlds for US policy makers. Allende

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543 Davis, Last Two Years, 270. There is no documentation available from the FOIA Chile Documentation Project on September 11 that discusses the death of Allende. This could simply be because the report of his death had not yet reached the CIA. The generally accepted conclusion is that Allende did indeed commit suicide. “Hinchey Report;” “Church Report,” 208. There has been some debate about whether he committed suicide during the attack to avoid being arrested, or whether he was killed by the military. After September 11, Chilean coup forces declared their innocence in Allende’s death, but Peter Kornbluh cites some evidence to the contrary. Allende was offered a plane that would take him to a safe place of exile in Argentina, on condition that he surrender. But Pinochet allegedly declared, “…that plane will never land…Kill the bitch you eliminate the litter.” Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 113. Kornbluh does note that Allende’s family agreed in 1990, after Pinochet had been deposed, to “[allow] a forensic examination of [Allende’s] remains.” That examination ruled that “[Allende] had indeed committed suicide as Chilean military forces surrounded his office.” Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 524-525.
was gone, the Chilean military in control of the government was friendly to US interests, and all had been accomplished with as little direct involvement as possible on the part of the US.

V. **Perpetrator Testimony**

It is not difficult to guess where Nixon’s and Kissinger’s arguments about US efforts to destabilize the Allende government lie along the spectrum of interpretations ranging from the argument that the US was directly responsible for the fall of Allende’s government to the argument that the US did nothing to purposefully undermine Allende. The latter is Kissinger’s overarching claim. Nixon’s testimony about US policy during Allende’s time in power ends with his assertion that the US did not engage in economic warfare against the Allende regime. Kissinger’s continues, making note of specific events to further bolster his arguments and build his defense. He cites both the major events of Allende’s presidency and developments in US policy toward Chile during Allende’s time in power. Kissinger describes in detail the specific events he believes prompted the military to rebel, relying heavily on the 1977 work of Paul Sigmund in *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976.* Those events have been reviewed earlier in this chapter. Since Kissinger’s outline of event in Chile is based on Sigmund’s work, and because there is little reason for Kissinger to misrepresent the actions of the Allende regime, there is no need to review those events here.

I expected to find inconsistencies between Kissinger’s account of events and the documentary record. What I found, noted in Chapter Three as well, was that he did not generally lie outright in his memoirs and was, in some cases, very forthcoming. What

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547 Paul Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende.*
Kissinger did do was manipulate or spin the information to paint himself in a less negative light. For the purposes of this chapter, rather than go through his memoirs point by point, I have chosen four sub-arguments he presents in his testimony as supporting points for his overall claim that the US Government did not seek to destabilize the Allende government; first, that it was US policy to respond to Allende’s actions, not to act against the Chilean Government without cause; second, that the US merely sought to support the “democratic counterweight” to the Allende regime; third, that the US did not engage in economic warfare against Allende’s government; last, that in the weeks approaching September 11, 1970, “no senior [US] official considered a coup likely,” implying that the US could therefore not be held responsible for actions of which they had no knowledge. Below I examine evidence Kissinger offers to support those sub-arguments and apply Browning’s perpetrator testimony tests where appropriate. The self-interest test, as in Chapter Three, is of less use in evaluating Kissinger’s testimony and has therefore been excluded, excepting where noted.

**US policy to respond to Allende’s actions**

The first of Kissinger’s arguments to address is his claim that it was US policy to respond to Allende’s actions, not to act against Allende without cause. To support his argument that US policy was to respond to Allende’s actions, Kissinger notes that the DOS released a statement in November 1970 that “left the future of US-Chile relations up to the conduct of Allende’s government.” A NARA document titled “Public Position on Chile,” dated November 20, 1970 supports his claim. The document indicates that the NSC Senior Review Group prepared a statement “for use by senior US Government officials in answering questions about Chile,” which states:
“The new President has taken office in accordance with Chilean constitutional procedures. We have no wish to prejudge the future of our relations with Chile but naturally they will depend on the actions which the Chilean Government take toward the United States and inter-American system. We will be watching the situation carefully and be in close consultation with other members of the OAS.”

Kissinger later cites a television interview with Nixon in early January 1971 announcing that he “[hadn’t] given up on Chile or the Chilean People,” despite Allende’s anti-American policies. The transcript of the interview is available through The American Presidency Project.

“…we were very careful to point out that [the election of Allende] was the decision of the people of Chile, and that therefore we accepted that decision… we can only say that for the United States to have intervened-intervened in a free election and to have turned it around, I think, would have had repercussions all over Latin America that would have been far worse than what has happened in Chile.”

Kissinger also cites Nixon’s annual Foreign Policy Report in which he stated that the US posture toward Chile would be guided by Chile’s actions toward the US and other nations. The report is available, again, from The American Presidency Project: “[O]ur relations [with Chile] will hinge not on their ideology but on their conduct toward the outside world.” Kissinger’s evidence would be much more convincing if we did not know that policy makers were formulating their “cool and correct posture” policy-making plans to enact their plan for economic strangulation just after Allende’s inauguration. We see in Nixon’s January interview the discrepancy between the Administration’s rhetoric

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549 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 380.
551 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 388.
and actual policy. We see something similar in his annual foreign policy report. Though the Administration shied away from ideology as an impetus for action in developed or strategically important countries, it is hard to entirely divorce ideology from the impetus for action Chile.

“Democratic Counterweight”

The second argument to address is Kissinger’s claim that the US sought to maintain the “democratic counterweight” to Allende by authorizing monetary support to “opposition groups.” Kissinger writes that, overall, the 40 Committee approved $3.88 million to support opposition groups in 1971 and $2.54 million to support opposition groups in 1972, though, he notes, “actual expenditures were somewhat less.” Kissinger also notes that the 40 Committee approved $1,427,666 in October, 1972 for financial support “to the democratic parties for the march 1973 Congressional elections.”

Almost all the amounts approved are redacted from documents that contain information about the funding approved by the 40 Committee in support of opposition groups in Chile. One DOS document dated April 21, 1971, indicates that $1.24 million had been approved on January 8. One amount was left un-redacted in a NSC document from April 10, 1972; it indicates that $25,000 was a portion of funds allotted to

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553 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 382-383.
554 Ibid, 382.
555 Ibid, 395.
Chilean political parties. The proposal for support for the March 1973 elections is available, but the amounts are, again, redacted. As there is no “smoking gun” which would prove or disprove Kissinger’s claims, we can apply Browning’s tests.

The self-interest test is not particularly useful, here, but the vividness, possibility, and probability tests are. Indeed, Kissinger’s description is not particularly vivid, which, in Browning’s estimation, calls into question the validity of this piece of testimony. Kissinger gives amounts approved for each year without providing dates of specific funding approvals or for which actions the funds were approved. As usual, he cites no documentation. The Church Report gives the total amount approved by the 40 Committee throughout Allende’s presidency as “approximately $7 million,” confirming the possibility and probability that Kissinger is not misrepresenting the funding amounts approved by the 40 Committee in support of Allende’s opposition.

Despite monetary support of political parties, Kissinger argues that the US had no involvement with the strikers in Chile in August of 1972 and that the US provided no assistance to the strikers, including financial support. He also notes that on August 25, William Colby “sought to bypass the Ambassador by requesting authority for the White House to channel some of the funds to the strikers.” The August 25 memorandum from Colby to Kissinger and Jack Kubisch appears to be the document to which Kissinger is referring. The document certainly does indicate that Ambassador Davis had

560 “Church Report,” 27.
561 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 393.
562 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 403.
decided against funding the strikers, and that Colby was seeking authorization from Kissinger for private sector support.\footnote{CIA, “Memorandum from William Colby, “Proposed Covert Financial Support of Chilean Private Sector,” August 25, 1973, in Pinochet File, 152-153.}

On August 29, Kissinger writes, the White House refused Colby’s request once again at the recommendation of Bill Jorden, on the grounds that the risk of exposure was high and that providing the strikers with funds might precipitate a coup.\footnote{NSC, “Covert Support for Chilean Private Sector,” August 29, 1973, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act, NSC Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/NSSCChile3/searchable_00009C11.pdf.} But later Jorden expressed distaste at the idea of a coup, a sentiment Kissinger himself did not hold in 1970.\footnote{NSC, “U.S. Covert Action Programs in Chile,” September 16, 1973, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act, NSC Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/NSSCChile3/searchable_00009C13.pdf.} Kissinger admits that the Church Committee did “[discover] exactly one diversion of $2,800 to striking truckers,”\footnote{Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 395.} saving us the trouble of contradicting his blanket statement that no funding was given to the strikers. That discovery is indeed noted in the Church Report.\footnote{“Church Report,” 31.} There is also documentation indicating that the 40 Committee approved distribution of funds to Chile’s private sector on August 29.\footnote{CIA, "Chile 40 Committee Paper," August 29, 1973, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/00009C74.pdf.} Kissinger is once again either curiously absent minded or revising history.

In addition to distancing the USG from the strikers in Chile, Kissinger notes that policy makers had little interaction with the Chilean military and refrained from involvement with a coup plot in May 1973. He records that he received intelligence that the Chilean military “were plotting” on May 24, 1973. At the recommendation of William (Bill) Jorden, the US did nothing.\footnote{Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 398-399.} A CIA document dated May 26, 1973 confirms that “plotters [were] still working on their action plan...,” but that “…Admirals
and Generals were under considerable pressure from subordinates to act…“570 The date may be slightly off, but Kissinger definitely knew in May that a coup was potentially in the works.

Kissinger also writes that “the only overture to the Chilean military during this period,” was the sale of F-5E aircraft “to major Latin American countries, including Chile” on May 15.571 Ostensibly quoting from his memo to Nixon on May 15, he argues:

“If we foreclose the possibility of Chile obtaining U.S. aircraft we could not only alienate the Chilean military but also give them no alternative but to yield to Allende’s pressure to purchase Soviet equipment with a concomitant increase in Soviet influence.”572

His description of the event appears vivid, though, as I discovered, Kissinger’s readers cannot entirely trust the quotes and excerpts he provides. That may be due to sloppiness or a deliberate attempt to obscure the issue. Given the discrepancy between another of Kissinger’s “quotations” and Ambassador to Chile Nathaniel Davis’s account of the same meeting, I am inclined to believe the latter.573 The sale of F5Es to Chile was certainly possible; the National Museum of the US Air Force notes that Northrop F-5 series aircraft were “procured by the USAF for use by allied nations.”574 His reasoning behind the sale lends the air of probability. There is no declassified record of that sale available, but a Department of Defense (DOD) document dated May 18, 1973, indicates that the Chilean military wished to purchase US air force equipment, not Soviet

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571 Ibid, 399.
572 Ibid, 399.
573 See discussion of exchange with Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, later in this chapter.
Furthermore, Kissinger mentions the sale in a conversation with Pinochet in 1976, indicating that the sale would proceed unless Congress passed a bill prohibiting assistance to Chile. Kissinger and Nixon would certainly have taken the opportunity to maintain the upper hand with the Chilean military by selling them aircraft before the Soviet Union could. It is very likely, then, that the sale did take place.

Despite the relatively small amount of money provided to the strikers, and despite the lack of interaction with the Chilean military during this period, can Kissinger rightly claim that maintaining the democratic counterweight to Allende’s regime was all the US Government sought to do? His argument implies that intervention in support of democracy is acceptable. But one could also argue that, as a rule, intervention of any sort impinges on a state's sovereignty. Many would agree that humanitarian intervention is an acceptable violation of that rule, but there are still the questions of determining what constitutes humanitarian intervention, and who gets to decide when such intervention is legitimate. Kissinger would have a difficult time proving that US action in Chile – both before and after Allende's election - was legitimate on the humanitarian grounds of supporting democracy in Chile. The goal of the Nixon Administration was neither so noble, nor so simplistic. At the very least, US motives were mixed and I would argue that policy makers, specifically Nixon and Kissinger, gave up any right to claim support of democracy when they gave orders to seek a coup in 1970. They perceived the rise of a second socialist-communist government in Latin America as a challenge to US resolve and a potential threat to US interests, and a blow to the perception of US power and

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authority on the world stage. Furthermore, they knew what implications their decisions for action would have for democracy in Chile, and they deliberately violated the democratic principles they publicly supported.  

"What we did," Kissinger argues, "was fund free newspapers and political parties that sought our help against a heavy-handed, calculated campaign to suppress them before the next election." The US did indeed support opposition political parties in Chile, as noted above, but the goal was to keep up the political pressure on the Allende regime within Chile, while the US did what it could to isolate Chile economically. The US also supported El Mercurio, a newspaper that took a decidedly anti-Allende stance. But, noted earlier as well, El Mercurio was a propaganda outlet for the CIA, hardly a bastion of free speech. US support of opposition political parties and media outlets did more to further erode Chile's democratic tradition than to prop up the democratic counterweight to Allende’s government.

**Economic Warfare?**

Kissinger also argues that the US Government did not engage in economic warfare against the Allende government. He notes that humanitarian programs and “the pipeline of existing aid commitments” continued in case Allende decided to “moderate his course;” his assertion is in accordance with NSDM 93, noted earlier in this chapter. Additionally, he writes that the US Government “supported” two Inter-American Development Bank loans for $11.5 million to Chilean universities. An article by Paul Sigmund supports his claim.  

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577 See discussion of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s contempt for Latin America in Chapter Six.  
578 Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 405.  
general US policy; NSDM 93 called for no new economic aid to Chile. Later in 1971, a memorandum for Kissinger confirms that the US continued to withhold credit and disbursement of loans. The memorandum also suggests using all the available red tape to delay the processing and disbursing loans from institutions not directly under US control:

“…we should seek to obstruct and delay Chilean loan applications before the IBRD and IDB using technical and procedural reasons to the maximum feasible extent. Our objective would be to avoid as long as we could an unnecessary confrontation, the likely adverse repercussions stemming from Chilean charges of U.S. economic retaliation…The course of action which best corresponds to the guidelines established by NSDM 93 is to allow the dynamics of Chile’s economic failures to achieve their full effect while contributing to their momentum in ways which do not permit the onus to fall upon us.”

The discussion earlier in this chapter shows that the Allende government was indeed weakened by increasingly poor economic conditions in the country, due in large part to the government’s “inefficient administration.” But whether or not US policies had much effect on Chilean economics and politics, the intent of those policies was certainly to destabilize the Allende regime, confirmed by Nixon’s own words at a meeting of the NSC on November 6, 1970.

The topic of debate at the meeting was NSSM 97, an options paper on policy toward Chile that later became NSDM 93. It was at that meeting, Kissinger writes,

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that US policy toward the Allende regime was decided.\textsuperscript{582} A memorandum of conversation from the meeting quotes Nixon: “[o]n the economic side we want [to] give [Allende] cold turkey. Make sure that EXIM [US Export-Import Bank] and the international organizations toughen up. If Allende can make it with Russian and Chinese help, so be it – but we do not want it to be with our help, either real or apparent.”\textsuperscript{583} Two additional documents demonstrate that the United States carried out Nixon’s directive on actions taken to destabilize the Chilean economy. NSDM 93 states that “the President has directed that within the context of a publicly cool and correct posture toward Chile:…no new bilateral economic aid commitments be undertaken with the Government of Chile…existing [economic] commitments will be fulfilled but ways in which, if the U.S. desires to do so, they could be reduced, delayed or terminated should be examined.”\textsuperscript{584} In another document, “Memorandum for the President,” dated January 15, 1972, John Connally of the Treasury Department advised that:

> “[Chile has] recently stopped repaying their debts to the U.S. Government and reportedly most other creditors…we have good reason to believe that far from keeping the pressure on Chile, they have now been led to believe we have already agreed to a renegotiation of their debts…As I understand it, this is not our intention and our principal purpose is to get broad creditor support to isolate Chile.”\textsuperscript{585}

Nixon’s own notes are visible on this document and they indicate that “This [economic isolation of Chile] is our policy.”

Kissinger demurs a bit in his memoirs, suggesting that he disagreed with Connally’s initial approach to the Paris club talks. He contends that, once in the midst of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{582} Kissinger, White House Years, 680.
\textsuperscript{583} The White House, “Memorandum of Conversation, ‘NSC Meeting – Chile (NSSM 97),’ November 6, 1970,” in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 119.
\textsuperscript{585} Treasury Department, “John Connally to President Nixon, SECRET ‘Memorandum for the President,’ January 15, 1972 (initialed and annotated by Richard Nixon),” in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 132.
\end{footnotesize}
the Paris Club negotiations, the US Treasury representatives, guided by Connally, backed down from "tough talk" and supported debt rescheduling for Chile in concert with other Paris Club nations. Kissinger maintains that he supported Connally’s later position more than Nixon’s hard-line attitude, and argues that he believed the US should have sought to avoid giving Allende more ammunition for his anti-American rhetoric by adopting a rigid refusal to reschedule Chile’s debt if no other Paris Club member would agree to maintain the same policy.586

In a conversation, however, between Kissinger and Nixon on October 5, 1971, just after Nixon had discussed Allende’s move to charge expropriated American copper firms with back taxes on “excess” profits that nullified the amount of money the Allende government offered as a compensation for the expropriated firms, Kissinger stated: “I would go to a confrontation with him [Allende], the quicker the better.”587 Kissinger also advised Nixon that he would work with Connally on Connally’s suggestion that the US take a hard line approach to Chile. Though policy makers felt it was too risky to be openly hostile toward the Allende regime, they did what they could behind the scenes to make life as difficult as possible to Allende and his government; “economic warfare” seems a relatively fair judgment.

“No senior [US] official considered a coup likely”

To further bolster his argument that the USG did nothing to destabilize Chile, Kissinger claims that “no senior [US] official considered a coup likely,”588 as quoted

586 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 391. The Paris Club negotiations were held in April 1972, Davis, Last Two Years, 76-77.
588 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 403.
above. His statement implies that far from encouraging a coup, the USG was completely out of touch with the Chilean military’s intentions. He notes a 40 Committee decision in August 1973 to approve another $1 million in funding of opposition groups for the following year.\textsuperscript{589} How could the US be accused of support a coup if they were clearly making plans based on the assumption that Allende would still be in office the following year?

Kissinger supports his claim that by noting that he received intelligence on July 10, after the June 29 “Tancazo,” that the military was unlikely to move, despite indications in May that a coup was being planned.\textsuperscript{590} Again, at Bill Jorden’s recommendation, policy makers refrained from action.\textsuperscript{591} The only document I was able to locate from July 10 discussing coup possibilities is from the Department of Defense. The document indicates that, though a coup was not imminent, the military was still making plans:

> “Recent events have apparently strengthened the conviction of some senior air force and navy officers that President Allende must be removed. They do not, however, have the necessary army support for a successful take-over. The military high command opposes any coup plot, but planning continues.”\textsuperscript{592}

If the DOD report is the document to which Kissinger refers, it seems like a stretch to have inferred that the military was not likely to move when “planning continue[d].”\textsuperscript{Ibid, 403.}

\textsuperscript{589} Kissinger records that he received intelligence that the Chilean military “were plotting” on May 24, 1973. At the recommendation of William (Bill) Jorden, the US did nothing. Kissinger, \textit{Years of Upheaval}, 398-399. A CIA document dated May 26, 1973 confirms that “plotters [were] still working on their action plan…” but that “…Admirals and Generals were under considerable pressure from subordinates to act…” CIA, “Coup Ambience,” May 26, 1973, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/00009C64.pdf. The date may be slightly off, but Kissinger definitely knew in May that a coup was in the works.

cannot find a document that indicates that Bill Jorden was involved in decision making in May or June 1973, but his recommendation in August is available and is consistent with Kissinger’s description of his recommendations in May and June.

Kissinger’s claim about the likelihood with which Nixon Administration officials considered a coup is challenged by the testimony of Ambassador Davis in *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*. Both men write about their meeting on September 8, 1973, having each come under fire after the meeting, which, so close to the coup on September 11, invited accusations of US plotting and participation in the coup. The two accounts of the meeting offer an excellent opportunity for comparison and raise questions about the validity of some of the “evidence” Kissinger offers in his memoirs in support of his claims. There are similarities in the testimonies. Both men maintain that the purpose of the meeting was not to “plan the deed,” as Davis quips, and they both admit that they discussed Chile. But Davis disagrees with Kissinger’s argument, described earlier in this chapter, that US policy makers had no knowledge of a coup in the works.

“Given the state of our knowledge on the afternoon of the eight, it is simply unbelievable that I [Davis] told Kissinger I could not give him ‘any time frame’ for a coup. I had just finished appealing for the interview to be held on the day scheduled so I could be back in Santiago as soon as possible.”

CIA documents support Davis’s claim. Policy makers had indeed received reports that different groups were either planning or discussing a coup that would happen in the near future. Kissinger was not ignorant of the state of affairs in Chile, Davis

595 Davis, *Last Two Years*, 354.
596 Ibid 358.
argues. In fact, Davis states, Kissinger’s conversation opener was, “[s]o there’s going to be a coup in Chile!” 

Davis himself notes that, “as memory fades,” he may not remember Kissinger’s precise words about an upcoming coup in Chile, “but [he is] certain that they convey the meaning of Kissinger’s sardonic remark.”

Davis also observes that the “transcript” of the conversation that Kissinger provides in his memoirs is not a transcript at all, but a “write-up” of Lawrence S. Eagleburger’s notes on the meeting, drawing into question the validity of any excerpts of documents or transcripts Kissinger gives without citing a source. Clearly we, as Kissinger’s readers, cannot simply take him at his word, highlighting the importance and usefulness of Browning’s tests in evaluating Kissinger’s testimony when no corroborating documentation can be located. Davis’s testimony, supported by the documentary record, refutes not only Kissinger’s claim that Davis could give him no “time frame for a coup,” but also his claim that “no senior official considered a coup likely,” as noted above.

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598 Kissinger, quoted in Davis, Last Two Years, 358.
599 Davis, Last Two Years, 357. Davis notes that he was surprised when he read Kissinger’s “transcript” of the meeting in Years of Upheaval. Eagleburger later advised Davis that the “transcript” was not a transcript at all. Lawrence S. Eagleburger was Henry Kissinger’s Executive Assistant during the Nixon Administration. “The Honorable Lawrence S. Eagleburger, 62nd United States Secretary of State,” Institute for Education, (accessed April 4, 2011), http://www.instituteforeducation.org/eagleburger_max_bios.pdf.

598 Kissinger, quoted in Davis, Last Two Years, 358.
599 Davis, Last Two Years, 357. Davis notes that he was surprised when he read Kissinger’s “transcript” of the meeting in Years of Upheaval. Eagleburger later advised Davis that the “transcript” was not a transcript at all. Lawrence S. Eagleburger was Henry Kissinger’s Executive Assistant during the Nixon Administration. “The Honorable Lawrence S. Eagleburger, 62nd United States Secretary of State,” Institute for Education, (accessed April 4, 2011), http://www.instituteforeducation.org/eagleburger_max_bios.pdf.
VI. Conclusion

The documentary record for the period covering Allende’s time in office shows that the Nixon Administration put more effort into economic action against Chile than into pursuit of a coup after Allende’s inauguration. US policy makers did not abandon the thought of a coup altogether, but they did scale back CIA efforts to foment military action. One explanation to the pullback of US efforts in Chile was that policy makers in Washington were preoccupied with the distractions of the moment. Kissinger himself makes this claim in his memoirs. He first argues that he was more concerned with becoming Secretary of State than with the situation in Chile.\(^{601}\) He also argues that the Nixon Administration was preoccupied with the “Year of Europe,” the build-up of tensions in the Middle East, and the Soviet Summit in June.\(^{602}\)

Another explanation is that the Administration was simply being more cautious. One might well ask why, after so deliberate an attempt to foment a coup in 1970, US policy makers resorted to caution after Allende took office. First, as expressed in Chapter Two, I contend that one of the reason policy makers decided to use covert means to achieve their goals in Chile was to avoid the appearance of direct involvement; public support in the US for large scale, overt intervention, and for the Nixon administration in general, was waning. In a conversation with John Connally and Bob Haldeman, Nixon himself acknowledged that, “We can’t send men now, anymore. I mean, as we well know, I hate fighting these damned wars and things, and so…the major thing we can do

\(^{601}\) Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 375.

\(^{602}\) Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 403. For a discussion of the “Year of Europe,” see Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 151-152. For a discussion of the build-up of tensions in the Middle East, see Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 195; 207-227. For a discussion of the Soviet Summit in Washington, DC in June 1973, see Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 286-301.
is squeeze them economically. And, believe me, that can have one hell of an effect. One hell of an effect.”

Second, almost immediately after Allende took office, his government began to investigate the role the CIA played in the abortive coup in 1970 and the death of General René Schneider. Though it could be argued that Allende’s investigation into Schneider’s death was reason enough to intensify efforts against him, the ineffectiveness of Track II may have inspired a greater amount of caution on the part of US officials. US policy makers already feared exposure which might further erode domestic support for the Nixon Administration. The ineffectiveness of Track II and the risk of exposure were two reasons for caution.

Another explanation is that both the CIA and DOD believed that a coup in Chile would not be successful without the full commitment of the Chilean military. The CIA believed that the military lacked the internal unity of purpose for a coup to be successful. Between November 1970 and August 1973 there were conflicting reports regarding the readiness of the military to stage a coup. It boiled down to the fact that the military in Chile had not yet collectively reached the saturation point of frustration with the Allende regime and that there was not yet enough broad public support for a military move against the Chilean government. In 1971, the CIA Station in Santiago received reports of coup plotting. In 1972, CIA informants indicated that the military was very unlikely to pursue a coup and that plans for a coup were not in the works. In early 1973, CIA informants indicated that plans for a coup were again in the works. A short while later the Station in Santiago was informed that there were no plans for a coup. In June,

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however, the “Tancazo” carried out by lower level officers dissatisfied with the Allende government and the lack of action of their superiors, gave the CIA pause. Not only did the commanding generals not participate in the attempted coup, they were the leading elements in the squashing of the rebellion. The CIA could not say with any degree of certainty that the military was committed to a coup. Furthermore, the US had clearly been in support of a coup since Allende’s election by popular vote in 1970 and had told the Chilean military as much, yet the generals continued to vacillate on the subject until August 1973. It was only after all three branches of the military were unified in their commitment to a coup that a military move was, indeed, successful.\footnote{CIA, “Meeting Minutes, ‘Meeting on Current Chilean Situation at Department of State, 1630-1830, 17 October 1972,’” October 18, 1972, in Kornbluh, \textit{Pinochet File}, 147.}

Finally, the DOD believed that, when the military finally decided to act, they would succeed without the direct assistance of the USG and would likely not even ask for assistance. There was talk among the DOS that if the military commanders decided to act in pursuit of a coup that they would be able to do so on their own strength without US assistance.\footnote{CIA, “Meeting Minutes, ‘Meeting on Current Chilean Situation at Department of State, 1630-1830, 17 October 1972,’” October 18, 1972, in Kornbluh, \textit{Pinochet File}, 148.} So, when the evening before the coup in September 1973, a Chilean military man came asking for active US support “if the [coup] situation became difficult,” he was told that the US would make no promises of support, “that the planned action against President Allende was a Chilean matter,” but that the Chileans’ request would be made known to policy makers in Washington.\footnote{CIA, “Possible Request for US Government Aid from Key Officer of Chilean Military Group Planning to Overthrow President Allende,” September 11, 1973, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/searchable_00009136.pdf.} From other documents that discuss the attitude of US policy makers at the time, it is clear that it was sufficient for the purpose of
policy makers to express verbal support for an overthrow. As more was not necessary, more was not done.

The Nixon Administration got its wish when Allende was overthrown on September 11. Indeed, the Chilean military proved perfectly capable of affecting a takeover without US assistance. But the public exposure of US involvement in Chilean politics the Administration feared was not long in coming and, as was expected, Congress and the American public were not particularly pleased.
CHAPTER FIVE
FALL-OUT IN WASHINGTON AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CHILE

“…I am not on the same wave length with you guys on this business. I just am not eager to overthrow these guys [the Pinochet regime].”
~ Kissinger, to Bill Rogers, June 3, 1976

I. INTRODUCTION

The time period covered in this chapter stretches from the days after the coup in 1973 through the end of the Ford Administration in 1976. Several features of that time period stood out to me as I conducted my research. First, covert activity in Chile decreased dramatically after the coup; with Allende removed from power, there was no reason to continue the same program of action. Second, as the American public and Congress became aware of CIA activities in Chile through a series of articles by Seymour Hersh, policy makers were forced to focus on the fall-out from exposure in Washington. Third, human rights abuses, already a hot button issue in international politics, became increasingly important to the US Congress. The Pinochet regime’s appalling human rights record earned the censure of the international community. As Congress put pressure on the Ford Administration to address the issue, Kissinger was forced to adjust his public rhetoric on policy toward Chile, though the substance of policy did not change. After a short history of events closely following the coup, this chapter proceeds more thematically than chronologically in order to highlight the features listed above.

II. **BRIEF POST-COUP NARRATIVE**

The CIA and DOS both documented thoroughly the first few days and months following the coup, the CIA covering events on the ground in Chile, the DOS covering the development of an official policy regarding the recognition of the new regime. A few months after the coup, CIA documentation drops off sharply. DOS documentation decreases as well. The subject matter also changes. The primary focus of the documents shifts from the situation in Chile to the situation in Washington.

CIA documents from 1975 are composed of general briefs of CIA activity and communications between the CIA and White House about the Church Committee’s request that documents regarding Chile be made available to their committee. Some briefs include cover letters indicating that they were written to be used as talking points for officials who were being questioned by the Church Committee; others were prepared as background information for the Committee’s review. Still others have no cover letters, but my operating assumption was that they were written for a similar purpose. The DOS collection is dominated by documents regarding communications about the deaths of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi, two American citizens arrested by the Chilean military or Carabineros and later found dead, presumably executed.

Two days after the coup, a DOS cable indicates that though the desire of US policy makers was to strengthen the relationship with the new Chilean government, the United States needed to avoid the appearance of endorsing the regime. Public perception of the US Government’s relationship with Chile was a strong consideration for

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608 Tranche III of the CIA’s release of documents under the Chile Documentation Project lists thirty-three documents between September 13, 1973 and October 13, 1973 but lists only five documents for the entire month of December. Tranche III of the DOS collection drops from 174 documents total for 1973, to eighty-seven for 1974, and drops further to forty total for 1975.  

the Nixon Administration, causing policy makers to delay public declaration of their support for the new Chilean government, though at the time they were willing to support the GOC in other ways (monetary support, etc). A memorandum in October 1973 by William Colby, then Director of Central Intelligence, reveals clearly the Administration’s priorities when considering actions to be taken by the CIA in Chile: first, the security and risk of each operation; second, coordination between US government entities and representatives in Chile (CIA and the US Ambassador, etc) in planning and carrying out operations; and third, cost.611

Two months after the coup the Administration was still trying to decide how to approach the new Chilean regime and formulate an official policy. CIA Headquarters had instructed the Santiago Station in September to recommend to the 40 Committee a restructured Chile program, in tandem with Ambassador Davis, since the coup had dramatically changed the political situation in the country.612 The CIA did request, however, that they be allowed to give previously promised financial support to the PDC.613

A DOS memo from November 1973, records a discussion about continuing PDC support.614 Department of State officials were glad to be rid of Allende, but were not quite satisfied with the character of the junta (Pinochet had not yet assumed the role of

610 Department of State, “Cable, ‘Continuation of Relations with GOC and Request for Flares and Helmets,’ September 28, 1973,” in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 243.
sole dictator). There was a debate over how involved the USG should continue to be, specifically how much monetary support should be given to the PDC in order to maintain a political balance in the Chilean government. The PDC did not support Allende, but neither did its members fully support the junta after the coup. The CIA believed that a strong PDC could stabilize the political situation in Chile disrupted by the coup as well as bring legitimacy to, and maintain the governing effectiveness of, the junta.  

The Allende government, US policy makers believed, had presented a significant enough threat to warrant using the CIA to try to remove Allende from power, but they debated the necessity of “fine tuning” the political situation in Chile. They did not wish to anger the junta by supporting a party that might oppose the junta’s actions and decisions. Neither did they wish to risk public censure for using covert action. As Jack Kubisch, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, stated at the DOS meeting, “[W]e [have] to be extremely careful about using [the CIA]…The damage to the US and to the USG were it to become known that we were engaged in covert operations could be very great, and across the board, in today’s world. We have been hurt by publicity about covert programs.” Kubich’s comment reflects the importance policy makers placed on the reputation of the United States, characteristic of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s foreign policy and rightly so, given that their fears were shortly realized.

It is difficult to determine the exact point at which US policy makers began to consider Pinochet’s government a permanent fixture, not just a transitional regime. Some

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of the first acts of the junta were to declare a state of siege\textsuperscript{617} and to dissolve Congress\textsuperscript{618}. But on September 20, Pinochet stressed that democratic government would be restored once the political situation in Chile stabilized\textsuperscript{619}. A week before, Pinochet indicated that the junta, acting in the “moderator role” as characterized by Alfred Stepan in \textit{The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil}\textsuperscript{620}, had plans to stay in power for a year\textsuperscript{621}. In November, however, though Pinochet advised that the “state of siege” would last at least another eight months, he stressed that the “state of war,” would last much longer\textsuperscript{622}, an indication that the junta saw itself as moving from the role of “moderator” to the role of “director” of the political system, its goal “shift[ing] from that of system-maintenance to that of system-change.”\textsuperscript{623}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{620} Alfred Stepan, \textit{The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil}, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 63-64. Stepan describes the role of “moderator” as one in which the military is expected to move against a regime that violates the constitution and return government to civilian rule once a suitable executive can be elected. As Stepan notes, “After the presidential election in Chile in 1970, the anti-Allende parliamentary majority predictable adopted the “moderator model” when they implicitly gave the military the role of maintaining the constitutional status quo, thus checking the executive [Allende].” See Stepan, \textit{the Military in Politics}, 79. In an earlier work, Stepan notes five “‘ideal-types’ of military role beliefs,” identified by J. Samuel Fitch in a paper prepared for the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, DC, 1987: “From the least to the most interventionist, the ideal-types were (1) classic professionalism, (2) democratic professionalism, (3) constitutional guardians, (4) guardians of national interest, (5) guardians of national security.” Fitch’s paper remains unpublished but Stepan’s later description in \textit{The Military in Politics} seems to indicate that the Chilean military could be characterized as holding the “constitutional guardian” role during Allende’s time in power. See Stepan, \textit{Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone}, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 133.
\bibitem{623} Stepan, \textit{The Military in Politics}, 134.
\end{thebibliography}
The Hinchey Report marks March 1974 as a turning point: “In March 1974, on the six-month anniversary of the Junta’s establishment, Pinochet verbally attacked the Christian Democratic Party and stated that there was no set timetable for the return to civilian rule. On 18 December 1974 Pinochet was declared Supreme Leader of the nation.” 624 Pinochet’s attitude persisted into 1975. Talking points for a meeting between Ambassador Ryan and Frederick Sherman on October 6, 1975 note that the “Military will leave power when its [sic] convinced that ‘Marxist cancer’ has been completely eradicated from the Chilean body politic.” 625 In January 1976, an article in the Ottawa Citizen noted that “Pinochet has made it clear that the armed forces will stay in power in Chile ‘maybe for a generation,’ and that if Chile ever does go to some other form of government it will be an as yet undefined ‘new democracy.’” 626

Ultimately, I would argue, US policy makers were glad to be rid of Allende and, despite the Pinochet regime’s human rights record, they were not particularly keen for the Chilean political scene to return to business as usual. Kissinger was angered by Ambassador David H. Popper’s discussion of human rights at a meeting with Chilean government officials in 1974 regarding US military aid: “Tell Popper to cut out the political science lectures.” 627 A conversation between Henry Kissinger and Bill Rogers on June 3, 1976 further illustrates my point:

“Kissinger: “…I am not on the same wave length with you guys on this business. I just am not eager to overthrow these guys [the Pinochet government].

624 “Hinchey Report.”
Rogers: The issues are absolutely separate. Who governs Chile and what they do about human rights…

Kissinger: I know but I think we are systematically undermining them."  

Pinochet’s rise to power, though perhaps unfortunate for the Chilean people, was apparently perfectly fortunate for the United States, from Kissinger’s perspective.  

III. **Official Investigations: The Church Committee and the Hinchey Report**

Nixon departed office on August 9, 1974, resigning in the face of impeachment proceedings, and Gerald Ford stepped into office the same day. Kissinger stayed on as Ford’s Secretary of State. Just a few months later, the public became aware of CIA activities in Chile as well as illegal domestic activities through a series of articles by Seymour Hersh of the *New York Times*. The American public was outraged by the revelations. So was the US Congress. In *A Season of Inquiry*, Loch Johnson lists three factors that contributed to the “extraordinary outburst on Capitol Hill” after Hersh’s articles exposing the activities of the CIA hit newsstands: the timing of the articles, the “pervasive attitude of suspicion” created by the Watergate scandal, and the change in

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public attitude and opinion about Communism with the introduction of détente in US-Soviet relations.630

The political atmosphere in the US was already charged. In an article titled, “Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies: The Experience and Legacy of the Church Committee,” published in Public Administration Review, Loch Johnson observes that in the early 1970s, the general public began to lose faith in government institutions.631 The seed of mistrust was only compounded by the breaking open of the Watergate scandal in 1972. In Realignment in American Politics, Bruce A. Campbell and Richard J. Trilling argue that Watergate challenged the legitimacy of Executive office.632 John Prados echoes Campbell’s and Trilling’s observation in Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA, remarking that by 1972 officials in the Nixon Administration had gained a reputation as “manipulators of information.”633

As discussed in Chapter Two, US involvement in the Vietnam War put an additional strain on the American public’s faith in its leaders. In Not Without Honor, Richard Gid Powers argues that Vietnam was a death knell for anti-communism, quoting Norman Podhoretz, editor of Commentary magazine: “The revulsion against the Vietnam war…had led ‘to the idea that the entire policy of trying to check the spread of
Communism was and always had been morally wrong..."\(^634\) Though the Nixon Administration’s motivation for deepening involvement in Chile in 1970 was more complicated than simply pursuing a policy of anticommunism,\(^635\) the public was bound to draw the seemingly obvious parallel between US involvement in Vietnam and Chile. Powers later adds that “the post-Vietnam public was ready to believe the worst of the government that had led the country to disaster.”\(^636\) Campbell and Trilling offer another possible factor, noting that, “The year 1973…brought the beginning of a severe economic downturn, which could only contribute to the already high levels of political conflict.”\(^637\)

Suddenly, Kissinger and other key policy makers were forced to defend the actions they had sanctioned. One particularly important document is a memorandum of conversation from a Cabinet meeting on September 17, 1974. The conversation transcribed lays out clearly Nixon’s and Kissinger’s defense of US actions.\(^638\)

“Covert operations are those which can’t be done in any other way. If they are leaked, we cannot conduct this policy. Not much is being done, but what is, is being done because they are important and can’t be done in any other way…The effort of the 40 Committee was not to overthrow Allende but to preserve the democratic system for the 1976 [presidential] elections.”\(^639\)

Kissinger goes on to argue that Allende was going to establish a Communist dictatorship, that the US was therefore defending democracy, that policy makers reduced aid to Chile but did not engage in economic warfare, and that Allende effected his own downfall by


\(^635\) See Chapter Two of this thesis.

\(^636\) Powers, Not without Honor, 346.


\(^638\) White House, “Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Cabinet Meeting, September 17, 1974-11:00a.m.,’” in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 256-257. Other than noting Nixon’s and Kissinger’s presence at the meeting, the document does not indicate the number or names of others present.

\(^639\) Ibid.
mismanaging the Chilean economy, claims both Nixon and Kissinger echo in their memoirs.

Kissinger’s mention of the 40 Committee is somewhat deceptive. The argument that policy makers were merely supporting the “democratic counterweight” to the Allende regime, discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, is unsupportable. The Nixon Administration was clearly interested in Allende’s downfall, though policy makers were rather more cautious in their approach to relations with Allende’s government than they had been before his inauguration. Furthermore, though the 40 Committee was officially in charge of making decisions about how the CIA would conduct its campaign against Salvador Allende, Nixon and Kissinger were the driving force behind policy making. Nixon himself attended the 40 Committee meeting on November 6, 1970, something he rarely did, during which Committee members discussed NSSM 97 and decided official policy on Chile.

A few months after Hersh’s articles were published in The New York Times, no less than three separate committees were created in response to the reaction in Washington to investigate the activities of the US Intelligence Community at home and abroad: The Rockefeller Commission, created by President Ford, the Church Committee in the Senate, and the Pike Committee in the House of Representatives. Hersh continued to publish articles after the three committees had been formed, further cementing in the collective mind of the public the issue of the Intelligence Community’s seemingly unrestricted activity.

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640 Ibid.
642 Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, 472-472; Prados Safe for Democracy, 430-432.
The President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, known informally as The Rockefeller Commission, was established by President Ford as an attempt to stem the tide of discontent in Washington over the revelations of intelligence activities. Ford appointed Vice President Nelson Rockefeller as head of the investigation. In *Fighting the Odds: The Life of Senator Frank Church*, Leroy Ashby and Rod Gramer observe that the Rockefeller Commission dodged the assassination topic. Frank Church, in particular, disapproved of the way the Rockefeller report, “relegated specifics about assassinations to a secret, eighty-six page supplement for the president.” Church’s frustration over this aspect of the Rockefeller report was the chief reason the Church Committee tackled the topic.

The Pike Committee’s report was lacking as well. It was too incendiary, likely as a reaction to the obstacles the Committee faced in their investigation. The Pike Committee met with a great deal more frustration than the Church Committee in trying to obtain classified documents for review. Otis Pike set himself and his committee up for problems by refusing to compromise when asking for documents from the White House and CIA. In an article on the Pike Committee and the CIA, Gerald Haines explains the difficulty:

“[Pike]…refused to allow CIA or the executive branch to stipulate the terms under which the committee would receive or review classified information. Pike insisted, moreover, that the committee had the authority to declassify intelligence documents unilaterally. He appeared bent on asserting what he saw as the
Constitutional prerogatives of the legislative branch over the executive branch, and CIA was caught in the middle.”

The Committee also often made demands for large numbers of documents and insisted the documents be delivered by the next day. Another cause of tension, Haines observes, was the different backgrounds the members of each group came from. “An underlying problem was the large cultural gap between officers trained in the early years of the Cold War and the young staffers of the anti-Vietnam and civil rights movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s.” As Johnson notes, even Frank Church was aware of the explosive nature of the relationship between the Pike Committee and the White House and CIA, citing the Senator’s comment that the Church Committee should “avoid the needless pyrotechnics of the House [Pike] committee.” The reports of both the Rockefeller Commission and the Pike Committee were greatly criticized: the Rockefeller report because it was lukewarm; the Pike report because it was unnecessarily inflammatory.

Of the three committees, the Church Committee had the greatest effect on government policy with respect to the Intelligence Community. As Johnson observes, “the Church Committee…[brought] about a major power shift,” by strengthening senatorial review of the activities of the Intelligence Community. He also remarks that, “[t]he scope of the Church Committee investigation was staggering,” reviewing not only the activities of the CIA, in multiple domestic and foreign locations, but those of the

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647 Haines, “Looking for a Rogue Elephant.”


650 Ibid, 5.
FBI and NSC as well. The Committee had eight months to “probe a multitude of alleged intelligence abuses that had taken place over the past quarter-century.” It took eight months more for the Committee members to finish their investigation. To complete its mission the Committee, “conducted numerous interviews, held sixty days of hearings, and accumulated more than eight thousand pages of sworn testimony.”

As noted in Chapter One of this thesis, what is commonly known as the Church Report is a staff report on the preliminary findings of the Church Committee prior to the Committee’s hearings. The report details when discussing the specific covert action techniques used by CIA in Chile to keep Allende out of power, the programs implemented to destabilize the GOC after Allende was elected president in 1970, and the decline of CIA activities after the successful coup in 1973.

Perhaps the harshest criticism is found in the in-depth analysis of Congressional oversight of CIA activities. First, the arguments that have been given by the CIA and government officials to justify CIA activities are examined and criticized, namely, that the Allende government was a threat because it would 1. likely form relations with communist and socialist countries (particularly with Cuba), 2. the Soviet Union could conceivably exert strong influence over the Allende regime, and 3. Chile could become “a base for Latin American subversion.” The report’s authors then argues that, ultimately, four problems contributed to insufficient Congressional oversight by the 40 Committee: the lack of timely reporting of activities by CIA officials, insufficiently

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653 Ibid, 5.
654 Ibid, 438.
656 Ibid, 46-47.
detailed reporting, lack of reporting regarding funds spent, and the lack of communication of certain important activities, such as the instigation of a coup in 1970.

The writers of the report conclude that policy makers believed that the rise of a socialist/communist government in Chile posed enough of a security threat to warrant US involvement in Chilean politics. The writers also determined that the CIA did not act on its own as a “rogue elephant,” but was closely controlled by the executive branch. There were, however, “genuine shortcomings” in the established accountability process. The CIA decided which proposals for action were made to the 40 Committee, based on “the Agency’s determination of the political sensitivity of a project.” There was no uniform process for obtaining approval of projects by the Ambassador; “[The process] depended…on how interested Ambassadors are and how forthcoming their Station chiefs are.” The 40 Committee did not generally reexamine projects it had approved unless a major change was made to the project or the project was up for renewal; projects that became ineffective or addressed a situation inefficiently or inappropriately were rarely rooted out. Additionally, the “clandestine projects not labeled ‘covert action’” were never reviewed by the 40 Committee.

The writers of the report also concluded that the exclusion of the State Department and the US Embassy in Chile from any knowledge of or involvement in Track II created two problems: first, Nixon, Kissinger, and others closely involved in

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657 Ibid, 41-49. The directive to foment a coup came straight from President Nixon. The 40 Committee, Department of State, and the U.S. Ambassador to Chile were not told about the CIA’s plans, by direction of the President. See “Church Report,” 23-26.
659 Ibid, 52.
660 Ibid, 52.
661 Ibid, 52.
662 “Church Report,” 56.
Track II were “deprived” of the expertise of members of the larger foreign policy making body on Chile; second, the US Ambassador in Chile had to “deal with” the backlash of Track II without having knowledge that would have better prepared him to address the fall out. Finally, the impression that Nixon and Kissinger gave to the CIA in establishing Track II was that the CIA had *carte blanche* and operatives at the Station in Santiago felt they were “under extreme pressure” to keep Allende from achieving the Presidency.

Additionally, no clear direction was given to the CIA regarding what proposals for action required White House clearance,\(^\text{663}\) Congressional oversight was lacking,\(^\text{664}\) and there was no clear connection between the assessment of political analysts and proposals for action.\(^\text{665}\)

The writers also argued that unforeseen costs of covert action may have outweighed the goal achieved. US legitimacy abroad may have been diminished by reports of US manipulation of Chilean politics. The parties the US Government most wanted to support, such as the PDC, may actually have been hurt by US involvement. Instead of building its own strong political support base, the PDC relied on US support. When US support was reduced, as it was between 1964 and 1970, the PDC suffered. Furthermore, general revelations of US support of the PDC may itself have undermined the PDC’s credibility within Chile. Such revelations may also have discredited overt methods of involvement in Chilean politics and economics. Moreover, the availability of covert means might in future “postpone the day when outmoded policies are abandoned and new ones adopted.”\(^\text{666}\)

\(^{663}\) Ibid, 52-53.  
\(^{664}\) Ibid, 53.  
\(^{665}\) Ibid, 54.  
\(^{666}\) Ibid, 54-55.
The writers of the Report then asked some questions for reflection which set the stage for the Committee’s hearings: Did the threat posed by the Allende regime as an established socialist government justify the instigation of a coup? Could the US be held accountable for the rise of an oppressive dictatorship, with Pinochet at its head? Whether or not the CIA’s activities were harmful or unconstitutional, the writers of The Church Report also aimed to make recommendations that the Committee could make that would bring CIA back under the mantle of Congressional oversight. This conscious deferral of judgment shows us why the Church Committee’s reports were so influential by demonstrating that the committee members were more interested in making viable recommendations for change than in crucifying the Intelligence Community.

The dispassionate presentation of critiques in the Church Report, as well as the manner in which the Committee conducted its investigation contributed greatly to the realization of the major goals of the Committee, chiefly the strengthening of Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community. But the Church Committee did more than establish a superior mechanism for the review of intelligence activities. The Committee’s proceedings indirectly influenced the public as well. Johnson notes two important side effects of the Committee proceedings: the raising of citizen awareness regarding intelligence abuses and, through the creation of the Senate Intelligence Review Board, the restoration of public confidence in intelligence activities. Those side effects may have been of greater significance than the Church Committee’s stated aims.

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667 Ibid, 56.
668 Ibid, 56.
669 Ibid, 10.
670 Ibid, 11.
671 Ibid, 12.
The Hinchey Report

As noted in Chapter One, the Hinchey Report was the CIA’s response to the Hinchey Amendment, enacted in 2000. Though the Hinchey Report, coming much later, could have had no effect on what was happening in Washington in 1974 and 1975, it is fitting to discuss the report in conjunction with the Church Report, as the Hinchey Report can be considered an official follow-up to the Church Report, and because it discusses topics addressed later in this chapter. The writers of the Hinchey Report state that what they produced should not be taken as a “definitive history” of CIA involvement in Chile, but rather as the “good-faith effort to respond in an unclassified format” to the request of the Congress. Section 311 of the 2000 Intelligence Authorization Act asked the CIA to describe in detail the involvement of the intelligence community in three specific events:

(2) The accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency of the Republic of Chile.
(3) Violations of human rights committed by officers or agents of former President Pinochet.”

Given the mandate of the writers of the Hinchey Report, we could have expected a detailed discussion of US knowledge of DINA and Operation Condor, both of which perpetrated terrible human rights abuses, especially considering that the topic was not covered in the Church Report. The Hinchey Report, however, is nowhere near as thorough as the Church Report. DINA is never mentioned by name, though the writers do discuss the CIA’s relationship with Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, the head of DINA,

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673 Operation Condor was a joint intelligence sharing and assassination operation organization between several countries in the Southern Cone, including Chile. The topic was not addressed by the Church Committee because the story of the Pinochet regime’s human rights abuses was, as yet, unfolding. DINA was the Pinochet Regime’s secret police, the Directorate of National Intelligence. Condor and its significance are discussed later in this chapter.
seen by the CIA as “the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy within the Junta.”

The only mention of Operation Condor is a short section in the summary of the report, a few sentences in the discussion of the CIA’s relationship with Contreras, and a short paragraph on the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffit, one of Condor’s more famous operations.

The writers of the report do respond, at least in part, to the questions of Congress, concluding that the CIA was not involved in Allende’s death (the report also notes the generally accepted conclusion that Allende committed suicide), that the CIA supported the Junta after the 1973 coup but was not involved in Pinochet’s accession to the presidency, and that though some of the Chilean officers involved in human rights abuses were indeed CIA contacts or agents, the Intelligence Community guidelines regarding the reporting of human rights abuses by Agency contacts were more lax than “[t]oday’s much stricter reporting standards,” maintaining that “many [Chilean] agents [guilty of abuses] would have been dropped.”

Though the section of the report on Contreras is revealing, the writers of the report leave much unwritten, such as a thorough review of the CIA’s knowledge of the human rights abuses perpetrated by DINA officials, more information about the genesis of Operation Condor and its evolution from an intelligence sharing organization to an assassination operation, and a discussion of other famous Condor abuses, for example the assassination of Carlos Prats in Argentina in 1974.

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674 CIA, “Relationship with Contreras,” in “Hinchey Report.”
675 Ibid.
677 CIA, “Relationship with Contreras” in “Hinchey Report.”
IV. **THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE HORMAN AND TERUGGI CASES**

While the White House and CIA were dealing with the Church Committee, the Department of State was under fire from another quarter – the public. Two American citizens (“AMCITS,” in certain documents), Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi, were arrested by the Chilean military shortly after the coup. Both men were taken to the soccer stadium in Santiago with hundreds, if not more than a thousand Chileans, and were never seen alive again outside the stadium. The families of both men actively investigated their deaths and eventually sought answers from the CIA and the DOS.

Cables from the US Embassy in Santiago to Henry Kissinger indicate that the Embassy had knowledge of the detention of several American citizens, among them Horman and Teruggi. The cables list the status of each detainee, as reported to and/or confirmed by the Embassy. The Embassy reported regularly on detained or missing Americans and actively pursued their release.\(^{678}\) As one report indicates: “The Embassy continues attempt locate [sic] missing persons and to visit detained persons and secure their release.”\(^ {679}\) Another document indicates that Embassy officials checked several locations for possible American detainees, including hospitals and morgues.\(^ {680}\) Several detained Americans were released on September 26,\(^{681}\) and were assisted by the US

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Consulate in making arrangements to leave Chile as soon as possible. 682  Horman and Teruggi were not so lucky. There is some evidence to indicate that the junta was frustrating Embassy efforts. Handwritten notes suggest that the junta was withholding information, specifically about Horman’s death. 683

Horman was reported missing by a neighbor, Heliette Saint-John, to the US Embassy, on September 18, 1973. 684  The Embassy recorded that Horman had been detained, “[w]hereabouts unknown.” 685  The report was made to M.T. Perez de Arce, an official at the US Embassy in Santiago. Perez de Arce advised Heliette Saint-John that Joyce Horman, Charles Horman’s wife, should register at the Embassy immediately, if she and her husband had not already done so. 686  The testimony of one of Horman’s neighbors, Mario Carvajal Araya and his wife, Isabella Rastello de Carvajal, indicates that they received a phone call from the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM) advising that Horman was in custody. The SIM agent asked Mrs. Carvajal whether she knew Horman to be a radical leftist; to which she replied that she was unaware of Horman’s political affiliations. Mrs. Carvajal was informed that the conversation was being recorded and that her life would be in danger if it was discovered that she was not telling the truth. 687  The Embassy did make a concerted effort to locate Horman. 688  On October

18, the Government of Chile advised US officials that Horman’s body had been located on October 4th or earlier; Horman had apparently died on September 18. He had been buried, was ordered exhumed, and identified via fingerprint.

Handwritten notes on the US Embassy’s report indicate that Embassy officials made a concerted effort to locate Teruggi as well. He was reportedly detained by the Carabineros on September 20; the Carabineros planned to take Teruggi to the National Stadium, as noted above. The National Stadium was the holding place for many disappeared victims immediately following the coup; most of those detained in the National Stadium were never seen again. The initial report that Teruggi was found dead in a morgue on September 25, killed by a bullet wound, turned out to be false. He was indeed dead, but a later cable indicates that his body was not located until early October at the Instituto Medical Legal, prepared for transport back to the United States. The official report of his death states that he was reportedly released from the National

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688 DOS, “Charles Horman Case,” September 19, 1973, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, State Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pinochet/8d40.pdf. The Embassy official that investigated Horman’s disappearance documented his or her daily efforts from the end of September into October. The notes are handwritten, not typed, and the writing is at times illegible, but it is clear the Embassy was indeed pursuing Horman’s whereabouts.


Stadium alive, but was never seen by his friends or family after his release.\textsuperscript{693} One document reveals that Teruggi was released from the National Stadium two hours after the imposed curfew, implying that he had been shot to death for not complying with the curfew.\textsuperscript{694} Frank Teruggi’s father wrote several letters in 1975 requesting the release of information from the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act and was denied each time.\textsuperscript{695} In 1976, at the request of the Church Committee, sanitized copies of documents were released to the Committee. There is no indication that those documents were released to Horman’s or Teruggi’s families.\textsuperscript{696}

Charles Horman’s father eventually brought suit against the State Department and Henry Kissinger, charging that Kissinger and the DOS were involved in Horman’s detention and subsequent death.\textsuperscript{697} The Center for Constitutional Rights, the organization that assisted Horman’s father in filing the suit against Kissinger and the State Department, gives a description of the case on the organization’s website, citing a DOS memo dated August 25, 1976 as evidence of the US Government’s complicity in Horman’s death.\textsuperscript{698} The writers of the DOS memo do admit that there is circumstantial evidence that the accusations may be accurate. “U.S. intelligence may have played an


\textsuperscript{698} Ibid.
unfortunate part in Horman’s death. At best, it was limited to providing or confirming information that helped motivate his murder by the GOC. At worst, U.S. intelligence was aware the GOC saw Horman in a rather serious light and U.S. officials did nothing to discourage the logical outcome of GOC paranoia. The Center for Constitutional Rights notes that the case was “voluntarily dismissed” by the Horman family “due to the inability to depose key witnesses and to obtain evidence classified as ‘secret,’” though the Hormans may decide to “reinstate” the lawsuit if more information is declassified in future.

Whether the CIA provided incriminating information about Horman and Teruggi to the Government of Chile or simply refrained from stepping in to save either man from execution, the US Embassy, at least, seemed to be acting in the interests of both men and their families. It is clear from one cable that the Embassy made every effort to locate and identify both Charles Horman and the body of Frank Teruggi. Hormans may have simply been in the wrong place at the wrong time. Whatever the case, the Horman and Teruggi issue compounded the difficulties the USG experienced in the mid 1970s.

V. THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS AN ISSUE ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE

Jack Donnelly, the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations in the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver, has written a primer, International Human Rights, on the history, theories, debates, and case studies of the issue of human rights on the global stage. He writes that the Holocaust was “the

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699 Ibid.
700 Ibid.
catalyst that made human rights an issue in world politics.”\textsuperscript{702} States were not held responsible to the international community for crimes against their own citizens until the Nuremberg Trials introduced the concept of crimes against humanity. The United Nations did much to move toward codification of human rights throughout the 1940s, with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948.\textsuperscript{703}

Though great progress had been made, Donnelly argues that the Cold War was a severe set-back to the development of the global human rights agenda: “human rights became just another arena of superpower struggle.”\textsuperscript{704} In the 1950s, The Soviet Union violated human rights by violently suppressing opposition forces in the states within its sphere of influence. The United States, meanwhile, deemed human rights violations acceptable by anticomunist states. Donnelly also notes that “a draft covenant to give human rights binding force in international law” was nearly completed in the early 1950s, taking a step further toward codifying human rights standards. The draft, however, was “tabled for more than a decade, hostage to East-West ideological rivalry.”\textsuperscript{705}

The decolonization of Africa in the late 1950s brought new members to the UN that “had a special interest in human rights,”\textsuperscript{706} highlighting the issue of racial discrimination. As a result, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination became “opened for signature and ratification” in 1965 and the International Human Rights Conventions (the International Covenant on Civil and

\textsuperscript{703} Ibid, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{704} Ibid, 6.
\textsuperscript{705} Ibid, 6.
\textsuperscript{706} Ibid, 6.
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights) were finished a year later.\textsuperscript{707}

Though the UN cannot dictate law to sovereign states, Donnelly writes that there was an important shift in the 1960s and into the 1970s “from merely setting standards [of international human rights] to examining how those standards were implemented by states,” with several “international monitoring initiatives.”\textsuperscript{708} Specifically in regard to Chile, Donnelly notes that the UN established the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile in 1973 to monitor the reported abuses of the military junta. Three years later, the UN Human Rights Committee was established as the International Human Rights Conventions came into effect.\textsuperscript{709}

The 1970s also saw the “introduc[tion] [of human rights] into the bilateral foreign policies of individual countries…beginning in the United States.”\textsuperscript{710} The US Congress established the policy that the human rights record of recipient countries must be factored into the calculation of US foreign aid. “Such legislation,” Connelly writes, “was both nationally and internationally unprecedented.”\textsuperscript{711} Outside of government action, Donnelly notes that the number of nongovernmental organizations devoted to human rights increased greatly. The increasing importance of human rights both on the international and domestic stages had a great effect on US foreign policy during the Ford Administration.

\textsuperscript{707} Ibid, 6-7.
\textsuperscript{708} Ibid, 8.
\textsuperscript{709} Ibid, 9.
\textsuperscript{710} Ibid, 9.
\textsuperscript{711} Ibid, 9. Donnelly also notes that Jimmy Carter carried the issue of human rights into US foreign policy during his presidency.
VI. THE PINOCHET REGIME’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD AND US RESPONSE

The Pinochet regime quickly became notorious for its abysmal human rights record. In *The Vicaría de la Solidaridad: An America’s Watch Report*, Cynthia Brown notes the extent of the abuses:

“[C]oncentration camps [were] filled with prisoners, torture of political detainees frequently resulted in death, supporters of the previous government were killed by firing squad, disappeared, left by roadsides, taken from their workplaces and homes, threatened, expelled from jobs and places of study, in a wave of reprisals of such proportion that it could not be fully documented…

Between September 1973 and the end of 1977, an unknown number of Chileans disappeared following their arrest by agents of the security police, DINA. Some 660 cases are currently before the courts, filed by the Vicaria. These are only the most fully-documented cases, however; estimates on total disappearances range up to 2,500.”

The international community put pressure on the regime itself to end the abuses and pressured the United States to use its influence over the new Chilean government. The importance of human rights in US policy can be seen in the communications among US government agencies regarding US relations with Chile in May 1975 and beyond. The discussion of human rights revolved around domestic public opinion and pressures from the international community. As the writers of a DOS strategy paper for policy toward Chile argued, “in Chile at this time [the human rights question] is and should be the dominant factor. There are no other U.S. interests in Chile, individually or collectively, which outweigh it. Further, the cost to the U.S. of continued identification as the principal supporter of the present GOC [Government of Chile] significantly outweighs the benefits received.”

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712 Cynthia Brown, *The Vicaría de la Solidaridad in Chile*, (USA, 1987), 5, 7. Brown was writing in 1987. Actual numbers of missing persons and cases may have increased after the date of publication.

officials were putting pressure on Chile to resolve its human rights issues. In a conversation with Chilean Colonel Manuel Contreras, CIA officials indicated to the Colonel that the CIA could not appear to assist the Chilean government with any questionable activity. CIA officials also stressed the importance of adhering to international standards for treatment of prisoners:

“Agency [CIA] cannot provide training or support for any activities which might be construed as ‘internal political repression’…Agency was very pleased by the 17 January 1974 [Chilean] Ministry of National Defense circular giving instructions for the handling of prisoners which conforms to the norms of the 1949 Geneva Convention. We hope your government will continue to adhere to these norms.”

I discussed in Chapter Two the reasoning behind the Ford Administration’s continued support of Pinochet, but it is well here to review the strategic calculations that factored into that policy. Again, it may be beneficial to the reader to reference Table 1.2. There was no need to intervene in order to maintain or re-establish the world balance of power, Pinochet’s government was friendly to the United States and open to US influence, and the Chilean regime presented no challenge to US authority and leadership in the region. But, as I argued in that chapter, pressure from the US Congress and the international community to address the issue of human rights with Pinochet’s regime demanded a response. One conversation, in particular, demonstrates the dichotomy between rhetoric and policy:

[Kissinger to Pinochet] “I am going to speak about human rights this afternoon in the General Assembly [of the OAS]. I delayed my statement until I could talk to you. I wanted you to understand my position…I will say that the human rights issue has impaired relations between the U.S. and Chile…I can do no less,

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721 See Table 1.1.
without producing a reaction in the U.S. which would lead to legislative restrictions. The speech is not aimed at Chile....My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world...But we have a practical problem we have to take into account, without bringing about pressures incompatible with your dignity, and at the same time which does not lead to U.S. laws which will undermine our relationship.”

In the same meeting, Pinochet assured Kissinger that the human rights issue was being addressed: “We [Chile] have freed most detained prisoners...we have only 400 people who are now detained.” Later in the conversation, Kissinger recommended that Pinochet release larger numbers of prisoners together: “If you could group the releases [of prisoners], instead of 20 a week, have a bigger program of releases, that would be better for the psychological impact of the releases. What I mean is that you should not delay...” Kissinger seemed curiously uninterested in Pinochet’s offer of information and his later comment about grouping releases together was quickly followed by a return to other subjects in their conversation, as if his suggestion were merely a side note. Perhaps he suspected that Pinochet would not have been eager to discuss the reports of abuse and wished to avoid an uncomfortable conversation.

It is clear that Kissinger’s June 8 speech does not reflect the Ford Administration’s actual policy on human rights; neither does it reflect Kissinger’s own beliefs, as described in the DOS memo, discussed above. Some excerpts from the speech seem appropriate:

“Clearly, some forms of human suffering are intolerable no matter what pressures nations may face or feel...As we address this challenge in practice, we must

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723 DOS, “Memorandum of Conversation between Henry Kissinger and Augusto Pinochet, ‘U.S-Chilean Relations,” June 8, 1976, in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, Pinochet File, 266. This memo was produced by the Department of State. There is no indication on the document whether and to whom the document would have been distributed.
recognize that our efforts must engage the serious commitment of our societies. As a source of dynamism, strength, and inspiration, verbal posturing and self-righteous rhetoric are not enough…a government that tramples on the rights of its citizens denies the purpose of its existence…

[T]here are standards below which no government can fall without offending fundamental values, such as genocide, officially tolerated torture, mass imprisonment or murder, or the comprehensive denial of basic rights to racial, religious, political, or ethnic groups.”

Kissinger discusses both Chile and Cuba specifically. He dwells little on the abuses in Chile, affirming that Chile was a friend of the United States and that the US Government hoped Chile would continue to make strides toward clearing its human rights record so that good relations between the two countries could continue. Cuba, however, he condemns for being uncooperative with the OAS Human Rights Commission in its investigation of abuses in Cuba. It is curious then that, in his own speech, Kissinger censures “those who hypocritically manipulate concerns with human rights to further their political preferences… [and] who single out for human rights condemnation only those countries with whose political views they disagree.” It also seems ironic that he rails against “verbal posturing and self-righteous rhetoric,” having already told Pinochet that the purpose of the speech was to placate the US Congress, not to criticize the Chilean government.

VII. OPERATION CONDOR

The Chilean regime’s human rights abuses were not confined to its own borders. In 1976 five countries in the Southern Cone, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Brazil came together to form Operation Condor, a joint intelligence and covert action group created for the purpose of eliminating the political opponents of its

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727 Ibid, 4.
member countries at home and abroad. For example, if one of Chile’s political dissidents was living in exile in another Condor country, the host country would provide information on the dissident’s whereabouts and would allow Chile to then assassinate the dissident while he remained in the host country. Assassinations were not restricted to member countries.

Perhaps the most famous Condor related assassinations were the killing of General Carlos Prats in Argentina and Orlando Letelier in Washington, DC. Both were Chilean citizens. Prats had been head of the Army before stepping down prior to the coup. Letelier was Allende’s Foreign Minister. The assassination of Prats predates the formation of the organization but later Condor assassinations followed the same pattern of intelligence sharing and host country cooperation. A “CIA Information Report” indicates that the Chilean government was keeping tabs on Prats in Argentina as early as late November 1973. A later report notes that Prats was leading a fairly quiet life in Argentina, making no trouble for the Pinochet government. But when reports that Prats was planning to write about the Allende government in his memoirs reached Pinochet, Prats was immediately marked for assassination by the regime.

Michael Townley, a US citizen working as DINA’s cross-border hit man, received the “assignment” to assassinate Prats in August 1974. John Dinges notes

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729 See discussion in Chapter Three.
731 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 332-335.
732 Note no. 1, Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 539.
733 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 334; also see Note no. 2, Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 539.
734 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 334.
735 Ibid, 334.
Townley’s testimony before a federal court in Alexandria, VA.736 “DINA operations chief Pedro Espinoza gave him the assignment, but he didn’t want to call it an ‘order’…‘I [Townley] would use a term more like inveigled…hoodwinked, tricked….I eventually said, well, I’ll try.’” 737 Townley monitored Prats throughout September 1974, “waiting for the opportunity to kill him.”738 The opportunity came late that month. Townley detonated the car bomb by remote on September 29. He and his wife sat in their own car near the entrance to Prats’s garage, waiting for an appropriate time. Prats and his wife returned home just before 1:00am on September 30. Townley detonated the bomb as Prats left the car.739 Prats was thrown “thirteen feet into the air,” landing on a sidewalk, “killed instantly.” 740 His wife, Sofia, was “carbonized” as the car burned.741 Though the Chilean press immediately fingered DINA as the organization behind the Prats assassination, Ambassador Popper at the US Embassy in Santiago dismissed the idea that the Pinochet regime could be involved, and the US chose not to investigate the assassination any further.742

The lead up to the assassination of Orlando Letelier demonstrates the depth of knowledge US policy makers had regarding Condor operations. US policy makers were aware of Chilean cross-border attempts to eliminate leftist exiles in Europe in 1974.743 Political dissidents were still disappearing or turning up dead in 1975.744 The first

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736 Dinges, Condor Years, 73.
737 Ibid, 75.
738 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 334.
739 Ibid, 334.
740 Ibid, 335.
741 Ibid, 335.
742 Ibid, 335.
official Condor convention was held in November of that year, organized by Contreras. The “Minutes of the Conclusions of the First Interamerican Meeting on National Intelligence” laid out Condor’s “three phases of implementation”: Phase One, the coordination of the intelligence services of the member government; Phase Two, increase in information exchange; Phase Three, “Approving the Feasibility Project of the [Condor] System” and establishing funding. The document was signed by representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay.

Condor’s next meeting was held in June, 1976 in Santiago, simultaneously or immediately preceding the 6th meeting of the General Assembly of the OAS, also held in Santiago, from June 4-18. Kornbluh describes Condor’s second meeting:

“This meeting, monitored by U.S. intelligence, produced several decisions: Condor nations would receive numerical designations, with Chile holding the distinction of being “Condor One”; Brazil would officially join, becoming the sixth full-fledged member of the Condor organization; DINA would house a computerized databank on known and suspected subversives; and Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay would undertake covert operations against members of the JCR living in Western Europe…Those covert operations, the CIA quickly learned, would include assassination missions against militants and civilians living in France and Portugal.”

A few days before his speech to the OAS on June 8, Kissinger cabled the US Ambassadors to Condor’s member countries asking the Ambassadors’ thoughts regarding the “violent deaths” of political exiles in their host countries and whether the

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745 Kornbluh, 344.
747 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 345.
749 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 345. The JCR was the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta, a formed “by militant [leftist] groups in the Southern Cone.” Kornbluh quotes a DOS report from June 1976: “JCR representatives in Western Europe provide assistance to cohorts temporarily residing there and publish propaganda against Southern Cone governments.” See Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 342.
Ambassadors believed the governments of the host countries to be linked to the deaths.\footnote{DOS, “Action Cable, ‘Possible International Implications of Violent Deaths of Political Figures Abroad,’” June 4, 1976, in Kornbluh, \textit{Pinochet File}, 389.}

By August 1976, the State Department had detailed knowledge of Condor’s capabilities and intent. The “ARA Monthly Report (July)” is a brief addressed to Henry Kissinger about the Condor situation and the ARA’s recommendations. It outlines Condor’s ongoing activities to the Secretary:

“The security forces of the southern cone
- now coordinate intelligence activities closely;
- operate in the territory of one another’s countries in pursuit of ‘subversives’;

On August 23, a cable went out to the US Ambassadors of Condor’s member countries with direct orders from Kissinger.

“You are aware of a series of [redacted] reports on ‘Operation Condor.’ The coordination of security and intelligence information is probably understandable. However, government planned and directed assassinations within and outside the territory of Condor members has most serious implications which we must face squarely and rapidly.”\footnote{Department of State, “Roger Channel Cable, ‘Operation Condor,’ August 23, 1976,” in Kornbluh, \textit{Pinochet File}, 393.}

For the Ambassadors in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, the instructions were to communicate, “preferably [to] the Chief of State,” that the US supported their efforts to share intelligence information but that we would not support assassination plots: “plans for the assassination of subversives…would create a most serious moral and political problem.”\footnote{Ibid, 393-395.}
The Ambassador to Argentina was authorized to offer exchanges of intelligence between the US Government and Government of Argentina. The Ambassador to Uruguay was authorized to approach General Vadora with a similar offer of information exchange, as “either the Acting President or President Designate...know nothing about Operation Condor.” The Ambassador to Chile was asked to “discuss [redacted] the possibility of a parallel approach by him.” Kornbluh and John Dinges shed light on the extra instruction for the Ambassador to Chile. The Ambassador was being asked to talk with the CIA Station Chief in Santiago, Stuart Burton, about approaching Manuel Contreras as well as Pinochet. The Ambassador to Bolivia was only authorized to discuss an increase in information exchange between the Government of Bolivia and the US Government. Though in the case of Argentina, Uruguay, and Bolivia, the US Government was willing to share information, it was not willing to be party to assassination plots. “Even in those countries where we propose to expand our exchange of information, it is essential that we in no way finger individuals who might be candidates for assassination attempts.”

John Dinges notes that the Ambassador to Bolivia, William P. Stedman, cabled back to Washington on August 26 that he had met with Bolivian officials and communicated Kissinger’s offer of information exchange, which the Bolivian Government was happy to accept. The Ambassador to Paraguay, George Landau, met with the Paraguayan dictator, Alfredo Stroessner Matiauda, personally. “[Stroessner]
heard Landau out, said nothing in reply, then changed the subject.” Ambassador David Popper in Chile, however, cabled back to Kissinger on August 24 with the recommendation that he not approach Pinochet personally. The Ambassador expressed some doubt that Pinochet was even aware that Condor had been established and believed that the warning would deeply offend the Chilean President; the Ambassador’s influence with Pinochet would suffer greatly. He did recommend, however, that Burton approach Contreras. Popper ended the cable with question about the urgency of the situation. “I note that the instruction is cast in urgent terms. Has Department received any word that would indicate that assassination activities are imminent.” Popper was clearly “unaware,” Kornbluh writes, “that Contreras had already set the Letelier operation in motion.”

The irony, as both Kornbluh and Dinges observe, is that the US Government had knowledge that could have potentially prevented Orlando Letelier’s death, but the connection was never made between that information and what they knew about Condor; if it was, the connection was never documented. Kornbluh notes that on August 5, Ambassador Landau in Paraguay cabled to the State Department that two Chileans had obtained false Paraguayan passports and had applied for and been granted visas for travel to the US. Dinges identifies the two men as Michael Townley and Lieutenant Armando Fernández Larios, both of whom had already been to the US to surveil Letelier. According to State Department documents, the names under which Townley

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759 Ibid, 187-188.
761 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 359.
762 Ibid, 358.
763 Dinges, Condor Years, 189-190.
and Fernández obtained Paraguayan passports were Juan Williams and Alejandro Romeraln. State Department officials were immediately suspicious and, having discovered that the two were Chilean nationals (which, in Townley’s case, was not entirely correct), forwarded copies of the passport pictures to the INS and advised that INS officials may wish to question the travelers when they entered the country. The visas were eventually revoked and Townley and Fernández traveled to the US with official Chilean passports “identifying them,” Dinges writes, “as government employees.”

In response to Ambassador Popper’s cable, Department of State and the CIA officials discussed his recommendations at their weekly meeting on August 27. Harry Shlaudeman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs decided in favor of Popper’s recommendation not to approach Pinochet. It is not clear that any decision was made at that meeting regarding the approach to Manuel Contreras, but a cable dated August 30 from Shlaudeman indicates that he had “authority from above” to give the go ahead to contact Contreras. But new instructions were never issued to the US Embassy.

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768 Dinges, Condor Years, 190.
769 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 359.
in Santiago. Kornbluh notes that “over the next four weeks, no additional instructions are recorded.” Dinges notes that “DCM Boyatt says he remembers distinctly that no message endorsing Popper’s alternative approach was received at the Santiago embassy.”

Two reports, dated September 10 and September 16, indicate that the State Department was keeping tabs on Letelier, but there is nothing in the reports that indicates why the Department was collecting Letelier’s biographical information. On September 11, the Department received news that Letelier had been stripped of his Chilean citizenship. Deputy Assistant for Latin American Affairs, William H. Luers, cabled Shlaudeman on September 19, in preparation for a meeting that US Ambassador to Argentina, Charles Hill, had scheduled with the Argentine junta leader, General Jorge Videla, presumably to deliver Kissinger’s message. Kornbluh notes that the cable “has not been recovered” but that Luers indicated in an interview that “he must have asked ‘how should we proceed?’” The next day, Schlaudeman sent a reply:

“Unless there is some complication I am unaware of, there would seem to be no reason to wait my return. You can simply instruct the Ambassadors to take no further action, noting that there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme.”

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772 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 359.
773 Dinges, Condor Years, 189.
776 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 360.
777 Department of State, “Cable from Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman, ‘Operation Condor,’” September 20, 1976, in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 398.
On September 21, Letelier and Michael and Ronnie Moffit were killed when another of Michael Townley’s car bombs detonated as Letelier drove down Embassy Row. Letelier died almost instantly. Ronni Moffit’s carotid artery and windpipe were severed by shrapnel. “She drowned in her own blood,” Dinges describes. Michael Moffit received minor injuries in the back seat. 778 Had the matter been pursued further, US officials may have made the connection between the two suspicious Chilean officials traveling to the US and the information the USG had regarding Condor assassination plans.

An FBI report several days after the assassination indicates a good deal of knowledge of Condor’s structure and assassination intentions, describing Condor and its three “phases” in detail. But the connection between the Letelier/Moffit assassination and Condor was then only a suggestion. 779 A CIA cable from October 6 implicates Pinochet in the assassination. “[Redacted] believes that the Chilean Government is directly involved in Letelier’s death and feels that investigations into the incident will so indicate…[redacted] has pointed to comments made by Chilean President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte to the effect that Letelier’s criticism of the Chilean Government was ‘unacceptable.’” 780 On October 4, Shlaudeman had finally replied to Ambassador Popper with a cover letter:

“I have authority from above for this…We agree that our purpose can best be served through [redacted] approach to Contreras and that the issue should not repeat not be raised with Pinochet. [Redacted] is receiving instructions to consult with you on manner and timing of approach.” 781

The instructions came too late to save the lives of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffit.

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778 Dinges, *Condor Years*, 191.
Dinges argues that the US sent a confusing volley of green lights and red lights to the Condor countries. J. Patrice McSherry notes in *Predatory States* that officers from within the Condor system have indicated that the CIA assisted in the establishment of Condor’s communications system, Condortel, and that Condortel’s “parent station” was “in a U.S. facility in the Panama Canal Zone.” The State Department clearly indicated their support of Condor’s intelligence sharing activities and offered to increase US intelligence sharing with Condor’s member countries (green light). But when US policy makers learned that Condor was planning assassinations outside of its member countries, “the U.S. attitude changed from support to opposition,” (red light). Kornbluh argues that the US Government could have prevented the Letelier/Moffit assassination, but did too little too late because of a general attitude of support toward Pinochet, an unwillingness to acknowledge the true depth of the abuses perpetrated by the Chilean government, the desire to maintain good relations with the Southern Cone countries, and “bureaucratic aversion to proactive diplomatic postures.”

It may seem strange to the reader that US policy makers were suddenly opposed to violence, when the US spent so much energy encouraging a coup. It is perhaps less strange when one remembers that the larger policy making community shied away from the prospect of a coup. The coup scenario they did consider - the Frei Reelection Gambit - would have necessitated little violence. Conversely, the individuals aware of and involved in Track II clearly had no qualms about encouraging violence. There may, however, have been some distinction in their minds between the violence inherent in

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783 Dinges, *Condor Years*, 156-174; 250.

military action and the targeted assassination of political dissidents. As Saul Landau notes:

“[p]roblems [in relations with some third world military governments arose] because the military rulers of nations such as Chile, Taiwan, and the Philippines did not understand the rules governing appropriate national security behavior outside their own countries. Pinochet, for example, did not understand that one ought not carry violence to U.S. or Western European territory.”

Additionally, Kissinger appears to have been concerned about the fallout from the exposure of such activities. He clearly feared the “serious implications” of “government planned and directed assassinations,” as noted earlier in this chapter in his cable to US Ambassadors to several countries in the southern cone. I tend to agree with Kornbluh. The desire to treat the situation with diplomatic delicacy kept policy makers from expressing US aversion to political assassination strongly enough and soon enough.

In review, though the documentary record thins a bit for the years between the coup and the end of the Ford Administration, the interactions between Congress, the White House, and the Pinochet government make several points clear. First, there were no major policy shifts with the transition from the Nixon to the Ford Administration since Kissinger remained in control of foreign policy as Secretary of State. Second, though there was a slight shift in policy in support of human rights beginning in 1974 and certainly a change in public rhetoric, the substance of US policy remained the same. As result of both public censure of policy and tightened Congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence activities, and the rise of human rights as an important issue both

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787 Kissinger does not describe the “serious implications” in the cable to the Ambassadors. The bulk of the cable is devoted to instructions to the Ambassadors for addressing the issue of Condor assassinations with their host governments.
domestically and internationally, Kissinger altered his strategy, paying public lip service
to human rights but assuring Pinochet behind closed doors that the substance of US
policy had not changed and the Ford Administration still supported Pinochet’s regime. 789
A real change in policy toward Chile did not occur until 1977, when Jimmy Carter took
office and Henry Kissinger was replaced by Cyrus Vance. 790

VIII. PERPETRATOR TESTIMONY

There is little comparison of testimony with documents possible in the third volume
of Kissinger’s memoirs, Years of Renewal. Kissinger concerns himself chiefly with
arguments about the propriety and effectiveness of the intelligence investigations and the
motives that shaped US policy toward the Pinochet regime. He is surprisingly candid
about his disagreement with the attitude of the US Congress toward the GOC and his own
preference for US strategic interests over human rights. The specific events he does cite
are not subject to dispute, such as the dates the intelligence investigation committees
were established, etc. Thus, Browning’s tests are not particularly useful in evaluating the
testimony discussed here.

Overall, Kissinger paints a nightmarish picture of the intelligence investigations;
the Ford Administration could not seem to catch a break. Kissinger first argues that
Senators and Congressmen equated the CIA with "America's Cold War role, which they
were determined to end,” 791 and the Church Committee, in particular, was out to change
the bent of American Foreign Policy. “Assaulting the CIA,” Kissinger contends, “turned

789 DOS, “Memorandum of Conversation between Henry Kissinger and Augusto Pinochet, 'U.S.-
790 Vance, Cyrus, “Options Paper for President Carter from Cyrus Vance, ‘Letelier/Moffitt Case,’
October 19, 1979,” in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 446-449.
791 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 317.
into a surrogate for reducing the country's international role.” 792 He concedes that the Church Committee “redeemed itself” by offering constructive criticism and workable suggestions about the operations of the Intelligence Community as a whole. 793

Kissinger then argues that too many documents were declassified, maintaining that William Colby went beyond his mandate as Director of Central Intelligence and released everything the committees asked for without consulting the White House. 794 Colby also “formally absolved his subordinates of the secrecy oaths they had sworn upon entering the [CIA].” 795 The intelligence committees recklessly and unnecessarily exposed national security secrets in their eagerness. 796 The Pike Committee, keen to get their hands on anything Colby would give up, were sloppy and indiscreet, releasing extremely sensitive documents for public review against the protestations of both Colby and the White House. 797 Were Kissinger writing today, he might draw parallels to WikiLeaks.

Third, it was impractical for the White House to insist on reviewing all documents before release, chiefly because the Administration did not have the manpower to review thousands of documents. The White House could not, then, establish control over which and how many documents were released without either taking the issue of "the classification of documents" to the courts or by replacing Colby. Ford was loath to do either, 798 though he did eventually replace Colby. Congress itself reigned in the Pike

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792 Ibid, 316.
793 Ibid, 330.
794 Ibid, 324-326.
795 Ibid, 322.
796 Ibid, 322.
797 Ibid, 331.
798 Ibid, 324-326.
Committee, but, Kissinger laments, not before a year and half of damage was done to the IC. 799

Finally, Kissinger argues, the changes brought about by the intelligence investigations weren't worth the damage they caused the IC. In the aftermath of the investigations, the Agency was caught between the Executive Branch and the Congress. CIA officers lacked confidence in their orders and their actions for fear that they would be personally scrutinized and were demoralized by "[f]requent internal organizational changes and drastic personnel reductions." 800 The CIA’s covert operations, he writes, no longer remain secret, "defeating the very reason for their being covert." 801 Ultimately, Kissinger argues, "[T]he American intelligence community was torn apart in our nation's historic quest for moral purity…In a democracy, [intelligence] service must, of course, be accountable. But there are ways to achieve this without institutionalizing paralysis and self-flagellation." 802

In a later chapter, Kissinger discusses Chile’s human rights abuses and US attitudes toward the Pinochet regime. But before launching into that discussion, he argues that several major conflicts added to the complexity of the situation, namely, "…the Cold War...Watergate, a presidential transition, the Middle East War, and the Cuban challenge." 803 In the South, Latin America was experiencing a wave of leftist movements, but, "[o]f all the leaders of the region, we considered Allende the most inimical to our interests" because, as he argues, “[Allende’s] internal policies were a

799 Ibid, 336. The House never released an official version of Pike's report, perhaps because it was so inflammatory. Several versions were eventually leaked, most notably the version given to Daniel Schorr, which he then turned over The Village Voice.
800 Ibid, 342-343.
801 Ibid, 342.
802 Ibid, 343.
803 Ibid, 753.
threat to Chilean democratic liberties and human rights.\textsuperscript{804} The takeover by the Chilean military was a welcome relief to the Nixon Administration. "[W]e thought [the military coup] saved Chile from totalitarianism and the Southern Cone from collapse into radicalism.\textsuperscript{805} To complicate the matter further, the executive branch and Congress were not working in tandem on policy toward Chile. "Human rights advocates in Congress accused the administration of moving on human rights only in response to pressure. We, in turn, believed that Congress was reflecting single-issue ideological and political agendas, pushed to a point that the administration considered inimical to broader United States strategic or geopolitical interests, or oblivious to them.\textsuperscript{806}

Kissinger later discusses his response to pressures within the US government and abroad to address Chile’s human rights record. Kissinger acknowledges that the Pinochet regime's abuses "exceeded acceptable moral norms."\textsuperscript{807} He argues, however, that "the brutalities in Chile were those of a continuing civil war."\textsuperscript{808} He quotes part of a speech by Frei after the coup in which Frei indicated that the junta had found "hideouts and arsenals" and accused the Allende regime of planning a civil war.\textsuperscript{809} Furthermore, the Pinochet regime’s repression had to be considered in the context of the “radical upheaval” occurring throughout the continent. Policy makers thus "sought to moderate and democratize [Pinochet's] conduct"\textsuperscript{810} rather than overthrow him.

\textsuperscript{804} Ibid, 753.  
\textsuperscript{805} Ibid, 753.  
\textsuperscript{806} Ibid, 754-755.  
\textsuperscript{807} Kissinger, \textit{Years of Renewal}, 752.  
\textsuperscript{808} Ibid, 752.  
\textsuperscript{809} Ibid, 752.  
\textsuperscript{810} Ibid, 754.  

There are no readily available sources that would confirm the validity of Frei’s claim. The junta may have found hideouts and arsenals, given the secretive Cuban activity in Santiago, and the development of \textit{focos}, \textit{campamentos}, and \textit{cordones} (see Chapter Four), but there is no indication that Allende was preparing for a civil war.
Ultimately, Kissinger admits that the Ford Administration felt the strategic interests of the US lay in support of the Chilean government, and that those strategic interests trumped the issue of human rights.\textsuperscript{811} The “radical upheaval” in Latin America was more important to US policy makers than Chile's human rights record. "We were prepared to press the junta to maintain Chile's democratic institution and to improve its human rights performance, but we did so from the position of recognizing that the forces of radical upheaval in South America posed a greater threat."\textsuperscript{812} The Cold War atmosphere on the world stage rendered it politically expedient to maintain a "constructive relationship" with the new Chilean government in order to "advance the cause of democratic institutions…without damaging fundamental United States interests or unleashing the radical violent left."\textsuperscript{813} "We did so,” Kissinger writes, “through engagement with regimes compatible with or supportive of our national security interests, rather than through confrontation, as we were being urged."\textsuperscript{814}

It was with this attitude that Kissinger approached his speech to the OAS General Assembly in June. The US Congress was about to cut off aid to Chile in the lead up to the meeting.\textsuperscript{815} Unable to simply ignore the pressure from Congress,\textsuperscript{816} Kissinger had to find a way to balance the issue of human rights and "broader United States strategic [and] geopolitical interests."\textsuperscript{817} Prior to the meeting, policy makers, including Kissinger, encouraged Chile to improve its human rights record. "The Chilean government

\textsuperscript{811} Ibid, 756-757.
\textsuperscript{812} Ibid, 754.
\textsuperscript{813} Ibid, 754.
\textsuperscript{814} Ibid, 754.
\textsuperscript{815} Ibid, 753.
\textsuperscript{816} Ibid, 749.
\textsuperscript{817} Ibid, 755.
responded by announcing that three hundred political prisoners would be freed.\textsuperscript{818}

Seeking that balance, Kissinger claims, explains his conversation with Pinochet before the OAS speech, in which Kissinger warned Pinochet that he was going to come down hard on the issue of human rights to satisfy the US Congress so that US aid could continue to flow to Chile. He assured Pinochet, however, that the Ford Administration was in support of the Chilean government,\textsuperscript{819} and that his speech was merely a formality so that the US Congress would be satisfied.

Gerald Ford’s testimony is quite different from Kissinger’s, and much shorter. Ford devotes barely four pages to the intelligence investigations, and never mentions Chile or Pinochet. He notes that he first learned that Seymour Hersh was writing a story exposing CIA activities in Chile from William Colby, who assured the President that the CIA was no longer in the business of illegal activities. On January 3, 1975, Ford writes, Colby advised him of the CIA’s famous “family jewels,”\textsuperscript{820} a collection of CIA reports “detailing 25 years of Agency misdeeds.”\textsuperscript{821} The Rockefeller Commission was created, he argues, in order to prevent accusations of a "cover up" while avoiding any "unnecessary disclosures" that could jeopardize the Agency. Rockefeller was a man he felt he could trust with the job.\textsuperscript{822}

\textsuperscript{818} Ibid, 755.
\textsuperscript{822} Ford, \textit{Time to Heal}, 230.
In contrast to Kissinger's testimony, Ford makes little comment about the Pike Committee and argues that the Church Committee was "sensational and irresponsible." The Congressional investigative committees, he writes, were out to "dismantle the CIA."

"They were trying to eliminate covert operations altogether, and if they didn't succeed in that, they wanted to restrict those operations to such an extent that they would be meaningless." Ford also argues that the committee staffs were the driving force behind "the push to continue these probes [into US intelligence activities]."

There is not much to argue with in either Kissinger’s or Ford’s memoirs. Their memoirs reflect the shift in focus from monitoring political developments in Chile to addressing the fallout of US action in Chile between 1970 and 1973. Kissinger’s memoir does, however, confirm arguments about Kissinger’s philosophy of foreign policy. Security was paramount. Human rights abuses were acceptable so long as they helped stem the tide of “radical upheaval.” Given that philosophy, his acknowledgement of the GOC’s human rights abuses “exceed[ing] moral norms,” seems rather empty.

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823 Ibid, 265.
824 Ibid, 266.
825 Ibid, 266.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS

I.  INTRODUCTION

As described in Chapter One, I set out to answer three questions in this thesis:

How did the US Government arrive at the decision to deepen US involvement in Chile in the 1970s? Why use the CIA as a means to achieve the Nixon Administration’s goal? Why did the Ford Administration continue to support the Pinochet regime when the Administration was well aware of the regime’s human rights abuses? In sum, what can we conclude about the motivations and methods behind US involvement in Chile during the Nixon and Ford Administrations? How did we get to a place where our actions were fundamentally discordant with what would appear to be core values? This chapter first pulls out the elements of the narrative of US involvement in Chile that illustrate the characteristics of the Nixon Administration and the Administration’s policy making process, reviewed in Chapters Three through Five. I then review the theories of US intervention in Chile, as discussed in Chapter Two, using examples from the narrative to explain which theories I reject and which I endorse. I finish with some reflections on the impact of the Nixon and, later, Ford Administrations’ policy.

II.  THE NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATION’S POLICY MAKING PROCESS IN ACTION

Several hallmarks of the Nixon Administration’s, and later the Ford Administration’s, foreign policy are evident in US actions in Chile between 1970 and 1976. The present study has identified five themes that run through US behavior: ethnocentrism; the idea that the US was being “tested;” the inconsistency between policy and public rhetoric;
centralization of the policy making process; and a desire to maintain the world balance of power and the international reputation of the United States as a great power. We can see the more traditional hallmarks of US ethnocentrism manifest in Kissinger’s comment during a 40 Committee meeting on June 27, 1970, noted earlier but re-quoted here, “The Chairman [Kissinger]’s comment was, I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”826 A rearticulation of that ethnocentrism can be seen in Kissinger’s comment to Gabriel Valdés that “history is never produced in the South…[w]hat happens in the South is of no importance.”827 In a conversation on March 5, 1971, Nixon himself stated that “Latin countries” could not handle democracy.

“…most Latin countries [you kind of need]—not dictators; that’s a horrible word, and a reprehensible word to most Americans—but, that strong leadership is essential…If even France, with all of its sophistication, couldn’t handle a democracy, you can’t. The Italians? That’s their problem. They can’t afford the luxury of democracy. Neither can Spain, and no country in Latin America can that I know of.”828

Another Nixon quote from 1971 is also revealing:

“If, on the other hand, you show me some cesspool like, well, like some of these Latin American countries like Colombia, and the rest, that are trying to make it the other way, they can be very bad risks [for lending nations].”829

Clearly both men had a great deal of contempt for Latin America. That contempt was worked out in policy toward Chile. Kissinger acknowledged that the USG was “strongly

on record in support of self-determination and respect for free election…”830 Yet he and Nixon chose deliberately to “violate those principles.”831 The “cesspools” to the South were not worthy enough for the US to respect those rights.

The idea that the third world was a “testing ground” is evident in the Nixon Administration’s reaction to events in Chile; US resolve was being tested. As noted in Chapter Four, Kissinger warned Nixon in the November 5, 1970 memo that, “our failure to react to this situation risks being perceived in Latin American and in Europe as indifference or impotence in the face of clearly adverse developments in a region long considered our sphere of influence.”832 Nixon’s comments at the November 6 meeting also indicate a sense that the willingness to act of US policy makers was being tested, arguing that failure to respond to the situation in Chile would set an undesirable precedent:

“If we let the potential leaders in South America think they can move like Chile and have it both ways, we will be in trouble…We’ll be very cool and very correct, but doing those things which will be a real message to Allende and others…No impression should be permitted in Latin America that they can get away with this, that it’s safe to go this way…There must be times when we should and must react, not because we want to hurt [foreign nations] but to show that we can’t be kicked around.”833

Several quotes from conversations between Nixon, Kissinger, Bob Haldeman, and John Connally also demonstrate the idea that Chile was another test of US resolve:

830 The White House, “Memorandum of Conversation, ‘NSC Meeting – Chile (NSSM 97),’” November 6, 1970, in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 117. William Rogers was Secretary of State at the time of the November 6 meeting; Melvin Laird was Secretary of Defense.
831 Ibid.
“Nixon:…everything we do with the Chilean Government will be watched by other governments and revolutionary groups in Latin America as a signal as to what they can do and get away with.”

“Kissinger: I think, unless we become too dangerous to tackle, there’s going to be a constant erosion of our international position.”

“Kissinger: — and that there’s no doubt whether the Chileans—I’ve always felt—we need to take a stand on. And if we take it from that, if they wind up being as well-off as their neighbors, what incentives do their neighbors have not to yield to the—to their domestic Left?”

The inconsistency between the Nixon Administration’s policy and public rhetoric about policy is demonstrated in several instances noted in previous chapters; in the case of Chile, that inconsistency was deliberate. In the November 6 NSC meeting, even Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird argued that it was necessary to maintain a publically “correct” posture toward the Allende regime, though the Administration should “take hard actions.”

The November 20, 1970 NSC public position statement noted in Chapter Four states that US policy would be formulated in reaction to the Allende regime’s actions, though the Administration’s position had already been firmly decided at the November 6 meeting, prior to action by the Allende government. Nixon carried that idea into the November 6 meeting. “A publicly correct approach is right. Privately

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we must get the message to Allende and others that we oppose him.” 839 That rhetoric is echoed in Nixon’s 1972 Foreign Policy Report to the Congress. 840 Nixon expresses distaste for the idea of intervention in the Chilean election in an interview in January, 1971, also noted in Chapter Four, despite his knowledge of the CIA’s continued involvement. 841 The inconsistency between rhetoric and policy carried into the Ford Administration, as demonstrated in Chapter Five in the deliberate discrepancy between stated policy in Kissinger’s 1976 speech to the OAS and his profession of actual policy to Pinochet before the speech. 842

The tendency to centralize the policy making process can be seen in the elimination of input from the State Department, Department of Defense, and the US Embassy in Chile when Track II was initiated, as noted in Chapter Three. Later, when Allende was in office, Nixon deepened centralization. In June, 1971, he instructed John Connally and Kissinger to dialogue directly, bypassing the Peterson Committee 843 on important political and economic matters regarding the Allende government:

“Nixon: Here’s what we want to do, John. What I—what I really want to do is this: Basically, this kind of a thing, normally, would be handled through the Peterson Committee… I want to set up a procedure whereby—if you would, I want you to—and just do it on a basis of where you send your guy in, of course, with your recommendations, John. Well, where this—where these economic and

843 I was unable to find information on the Peterson Committee to which Nixon refers here. It is possible that it was connected with Peter G. Peterson, mentioned elsewhere in the Nixon Tapes, but I was unable to confirm the connection.
political problems are involved at the highest level and you [unclear] pick up the phone and ask Henry. And, Henry, I want you, in your turn, to ask him. You understand?”

Finally, the importance to the Nixon Administration of maintaining a world balance of power and the international reputation of the United States can be seen in Henry Kissinger’s November 5, 1970 memo to Nixon. What happened in Chile, he argued, would have far-reaching ramifications. Chile would “become part of the Soviet/Socialist world, not only philosophically but in terms of power dynamics.” The CIA had warned that an Allende government would have a definite and negative psychological impact for the US and positive psychological impact “for the Marxist idea.” The US would need to intervene, but do so stealthily. The Administration’s value for the international reputation of the US can also be seen in Kissinger’s November 5, 1970 memo to Nixon, urging the need for secrecy: “- - we do not want to risk turning nationalism against us and damaging our image, credibility and position in the world.”

The Administration ultimately chose a policy that put the maximum amount of pressure possible on the Allende government without damaging the reputation of the United States, or so it was assumed.

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847 The White House, “Memorandum for the President, ‘NSC Meeting, November 6-Chile,’” November 5, 1970, in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 124. It is not entirely clear what Kissinger means by “turning nationalism against us,” but I believe it safe to assume that he is referring to Chilean nationalist sentiment that, if turned against the United States, would damage the US image abroad. Later statements by Kissinger in this briefing indicate that he was concerned that once Allende had consolidated power, he would denounce the US on the international stage as the “Yankee imperialist.”
848 The White House, “Memorandum of Conversation, ‘NSC Meeting – Chile (NSSM 97),’ November 6, 1970,” in Pinochet File, 119. See also NSDM 93, “Policy Toward Chile,” November 9,
III. THEORIES OF INTERVENTION

To recap briefly Chapters One and Two of this thesis, there are several theories that have been put forth to explain US involvement in Chile in the 1970s. One theory is that traditional US anti-communist ideology was the impetus for action. Another is that the CIA was a “rogue elephant,” acting of its own accord with its own agenda. A third is that the US was promoting democracy in Chile by supporting opposition political parties and media outlets independent of government influence. A fourth is that a socialist government in Latin America posed a threat to national security. Another is that policy makers were protecting US economic interests jeopardized by Allende’s rise to power. Lastly, a sixth is that domestic politics and ethnocentrism combined economic and security interests as factors in US policy decisions toward Latin America, as well as a quest to maintain regional hegemony. The below graph will help the reader organize these competing theories and my own position, revisited in the following section.

**Table 6.1 Theories of Intervention**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theories of Intervention</th>
<th>Agree</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Competing Theories of Intervention in Chile:</strong></td>
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<td>Socialist/Communist threat</td>
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<td>Rogue CIA</td>
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<td>Promotion of democracy</td>
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<td>Perceived (indirect) threat to national security</td>
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<td>Protection of corporate interests</td>
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<td>Combination of domestic politics, ethnocentrism, economic interests, and security interests</td>
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<td><strong>Additional Factors:</strong></td>
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<td>High economic and political costs of military action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Predominant concern over maintaining the world balance of power</td>
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**IV. INTERPRETING THE CHILEAN CASE**

To the casual observer it might appear that US action in Chile boiled down to no more than traditional hard line anti-communism; indeed, that was my reaction when I began to study US involvement in Chilean politics as an undergraduate. But although that threat did play a role, policy was in actuality much more complicated. As detailed in Chapter Two, Kissinger’s “philosophical deepening” required a shift from a focus on a foreign country’s current ideology to an emphasis on the actions of that nation as the basis for policy decisions. As noted in Chapter Two, Kissinger declared that “‘We have no permanent enemies…we will judge other countries, including Communist countries…on the basis of their actions and not on the basis of their domestic...
ideology.”849 Though Nixon and Kissinger broke with that policy in their relations with the Allende government, formulating a plan of “economic strangulation” before Allende had been in office for a month, they were more concerned with the potential upset in the balance of power and the international reputation of the United States than with the Allende government’s ideology.

One cannot, however, fully dismiss the argument that ideology was the impetus for action; so much of the language in the documentary record suggests a preoccupation with the socialist/communist threat. Though I disagree with an oversimplified understanding of this theory, it does have merit when paired with other factors, notably the “perceived (indirect) threat to national security.” One might also see it as further evidence of the traditional ethnocentric attitude toward Latin America: the considerations the Administration gave to the great powers in tolerating their socialist/communist ideology were not extended to nations that were less strategically important.

The US Congress suspected that the CIA was a rogue institution, acting without a mandate from a higher authority in government. That suspicion led, in part, to the intelligence investigations in the mid 1970s. The Church Committee’s own report on covert action in Chile concludes that the CIA was not a “rogue elephant” at all, but was tightly controlled by the executive branch. As I read through CIA and DOS documents, I found the same, especially after Track II was established. When it seemed as if the Station in Santiago was proceeding beyond its mandate, CIA Head Quarters in

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849 Gaddis, 282. Gaddis quotes from Kissinger’s first volume of memoirs, *White House Years*. Kissinger’s statement was made during a White House press briefing on December 18, 1969. The full quote is as follows: “‘We have always made it clear that we have no permanent enemies and that we will judge other countries, including Communist countries, and specifically countries like Communist China, on the basis of their actions and not on the basis of their domestic ideology,’” Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, 192.
Washington sent instructions to clarify the limits of the Station’s role, per instructions from a higher authority, with which the Station complied.\footnote{See Chapter Four, “Problems for the Allende Regime”.}

Henry Kissinger claims more than once in his memoirs that policy makers merely sought to support the “democratic counterweight” to the Allende government by supporting the PDC and \textit{El Mercurio}, a well established Chilean newspaper. But Nixon’s orders were to “prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him,” as noted in Chapter Three.\footnote{William V. Broe, “Genesis of Project FUBELT,” CIA, Tranche III, 15 September, 1970, available from http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/00009455.pdf. For a print copy of the memorandum, see CIA, Memorandum, “Genesis of Project FUBELT, September 16, 1970,” in Kornbluh, \textit{Pinochet File}, 37.} The CIA was given orders to foment a coup in 1970, hardly an action in support of democracy. Furthermore, \textit{El Mercurio} had long-standing, strong ties to the CIA and was one of the Agency’s chief propaganda channels. Though the paper was not under the influence of the government, it can hardly have been called a “free” news source devoted to the principles of free speech, devoid of outside influence.

Lubna Qureshi argues that US economic interests were jeopardized by the Allende regime and Lars Schoultz argues that foreign policy decisions toward Latin America are sometimes influenced, at least in part, by economic interests. But though policy makers, specifically Nixon, Kissinger, and John Connally, were concerned about Allende’s expropriation of US firms, their concern had more to do with political interests. Allende was testing the boundaries of US patience. When Nixon, Kissinger, and Connally discussed the expropriation issue on June 11, 1971, Connally suggested that the White House issue “a statement of policy” advising that the USG would neither “vote for, nor favor” loans to countries that did not prove that “satisfactory payment” had been made to expropriated US firms. Kissinger replied that he would issue a directive to halt
the loan process to any country expropriating US firms until the issue could be reviewed by the NSC, to which Nixon and Connally both agreed. Nixon wanted to make sure that Peter G. Peterson, whom he had named Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, was informed of the decision, but only as a formality. His statement implies that disputes over multi-national corporation expropriation were not central to the decision.

“Nixon: Basically, [the decision] goes beyond [Peterson’s] provenance, though, because this does involve our attitude toward these damn countries politically—

Connally: Oh, I think, basically, it’s a political decision you’re making—

Nixon: Yeah.

[Unclear exchange]

Connally: The economic part of it—

Nixon: Yeah?

Connally: —is purely incidental.

Nixon: That’s right.”

Moreover, had the fate of US business interests been the driving force behind policy, the issue would have come up more in 40 Committee meetings. Discussions, however, centered on the political cost to the US of a socialist government in Chile, evident in Kissinger’s memo to Nixon November 5, 1970. Kissinger lists seven “Dimensions of the Problem,” only one of which had anything to do with economics:

“Everyone agrees that Allende will purposefully seek:

-- To establish a socialist, Marxist state in Chile;
-- to eliminate US influence from Chile and the hemisphere;
-- to establish close relations and linkage with the USSR, Cuba, and other Socialist countries…
-- US investments…may be lost, at least in part; Chile may default on debts…owed the US Government and private US banks.

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-- Chile would probably become a leader of opposition to us in the inter-American system, a source of disruption in the hemisphere, and a focal point of support for subversion in the rest of Latin America.
-- It would become part of the Soviet/Socialist world, not only philosophically but in terms of power dynamics…
-- …the imitative spread of similar phenomena elsewhere would in turn significantly affect the world balance and our own position in it.”

Though I reject the above stated theories, I generally agree with Schoultz and would add some theories of my own, based on my analysis of the Nixon Administration’s foreign policy. Schoultz argues that security interests are often a factor in US foreign policy decisions toward Latin America. I contend that, though Chile did not pose a security threat in the traditional sense (there was no fear that the Chile would start a war with the US), it posed an indirect threat. As laid out in Kissinger’s November 5, 1970 memo to Nixon, noted above. A Socialist government in Chile would have meant a potential Soviet satellite, a threat to the world balance of power, and a loss of US prestige and the international perception of US power and influence. Such a loss of perception of influence might encourage enemies to take advantage of apparent US weakness.

Schoultz cites a traditional attitude of ethnocentrism as another factor in US foreign policy toward Latin America. I would argue that the traditional paternalistic attitude of US statesmen toward Latin American countries was echoed in statements made by both Nixon and Kissinger, as noted earlier in this chapter, and rearticulated in their estimation of the strategic importance, not only of Latin America, but of the “third world” in general. As I demonstrated in Chapter Two, third world nations were merely “episodically important” to the Nixon Administration’s foreign policy grand strategy,

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“insofar as they impinged upon the traditional focus of the Nixon Doctrine.”\textsuperscript{855} Chile was one of those “episodically important” nations, impinging on the Nixon Administration’s quest to achieve and maintain a balance of power which, as noted above, was essential to the Administration’s foreign policy strategy. We can see this concern for the balance of power again in Kissinger’s November 5 memo, the November 6 NSC meeting and the final policy decision in National Security Decision Memorandum 93, also noted above. The paternalistic and disparaging attitude toward Chile and its people removed the moral element from US policy makers’ decisions. Nixon and Kissinger never seemed to question whether or not the US Government had a right to intervene in and destabilize Chile, though they did acknowledge that public knowledge of such action might produce undesirable political backlash. The assumption that the United States did have that right facilitated decision making based on balance of power politics.

Domestic politics, another of Schoultz’s four factors, also played a role, particularly in determining the mechanism the Administration used to achieve its ends in Chile - covert action via the CIA. As I argued in Chapter Two, public support for large scale military conflict was waning. Since covert action is by nature secret, the public and Congress didn’t have a chance to dissent, protecting the Administration from a public backlash. After Ford took office, domestic politics again played a role in policy making toward Chile. Though the substance of policy remained the same, public outcry and pressure from Congress over revelations of US involvement in Chile in the early 1970s forced Kissinger to alter his rhetoric, as evidenced in his speech to the OAS in 1976.

\textsuperscript{855} Nathan and Oliver, \textit{United States Foreign Policy}, 391-392.
Schoultz also argues that US policy makers sought to maintain regional hegemony as a marker of US prestige and, during the Cold War, of US credibility and appearance of strength on the international stage. Landau argues that the Nixon Administration in particular was concerned about the appearance of strength to mask the diminished real power of the United States. Nathan and Oliver note that the Administration was deeply concerned about the international reputation of the US.

As noted above, that concern for reputation can be seen in Kissinger’s November 5 memo to Nixon and the decision to protect the reputation of the United States by a “cool and correct” policy toward the Allende government.

To those theories, I would add that in addition to domestic politics, the Administration chose to use the CIA to achieve its goal in Chile for several reasons. First, the same lack of resources that caused Kissinger to move away from a foreign policy of superiority to a policy of sufficiency made the CIA an attractive tool for action in Chile. CIA programs, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, were cheap compared large scale military action. Furthermore, the CIA was efficient, requiring less money and man power than a US military intervention.

Additionally, the CIA had already established a presence in Chile; contacts and mechanisms for action were already in place. Furthermore, the CIA had been successful in influencing the 1964 Presidential election in their favor; if they did it once, they could conceivably do it again. I would also add that Nixon and Kissinger believed that Chile was a “testing ground,” and the prospect of Allende’s election, and later his presidency, were a test of the Administration’s willingness to act. Those sentiments can be found in the quotes from Nixon and Kissinger noted earlier in this chapter. They felt that a lack of

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856 See discussion in Chapter Two, “Concern for the international reputation of the US”. 

will to respond to a challenge would jeopardize the perception of US strength and resolve which would in turn encourage enemies to further challenge the US.

V. Conclusion

There are three planes along which we can evaluate US actions in Chile: the success or failure to achieve policy goals, the impact on the US Government’s domestic and international image and the resulting consequences, or adherence to fundamental principles. In terms of the success or failure to achieve policy goals, Kristian Gustafson argues that covert action in 1968 and 1969, connected to the 1970 presidential election, had little impact.857 Kissinger himself argues that 40 Committee efforts to influence the election in 1970 were “too little” to have any real impact and that a strong plan of action came “too late.”858 By his standards, I agree with him. Before September 1970, the 40 Committee’s indecisiveness, especially the decision not to support either of Allende’s opponents, greatly limited the effectiveness of CIA action. By the time Track II developed, it was too late for those plans to have much effect. The goal of keeping Allende from power was not met.

Evaluating the success or failure of covert action after Allende’s inauguration is more difficult. The outcome US policy makers desired – Allende’s removal from power - did materialize, but whether that outcome can be attributed to US intervention, in whole or in part, is hard to determine. After Allende’s inauguration, the CIA’s covert action program diminished. Active efforts to foment a coup were considered dangerous because of the risk of exposure. CIA activity, therefore, was limited to observing and reporting.

857 Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 5.
858 Kissinger, White House Years, 667.
When it came down to it, the US Government refused to commit to active support of the coup, though it conveyed its political support through various liaisons.

The Nixon Administration did, however, expend a good deal of energy trying to destabilize Allende’s government through economic warfare. As I discussed in Chapter Four, the decline of the Chilean economy was, in my view, due chiefly to the Allende government’s own economic policies. Had the United States continued to extend the same level of aid to Chile it had extended in the past, that aid may have slowed Chile’s economic decline but it would not have saved the economy. Ultimately, we can never know what would have happened had the United States stayed out of Chilean politics. Whether or not it had anything to do with US efforts to destabilize Allende’s government, Allende was indeed removed from power with little inconvenience to the US Government in comparison to other international entanglements.

What of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s fear that inaction would be perceived as weakness, an invitation to challenge further the power of the United States? Both before Allende’s inauguration and after, the Administration pursued policies designed to meet what they deemed a challenge. Indeed, US leadership in the Americas does not appear to have been questioned at the time. Even when the Ford Administration suffered criticism for its reaction to the issue of human rights abuses by the Pinochet government, the international community looked to the US to provide authoritative censure to the Chilean government, as evidenced by Zhou Enlai’s request that Kissinger reign in the Pinochet regime’s abuses, noted in Chapter Five.\(^{859}\) In that respect, the Nixon Administration’s policy toward Chile was successful.

\(^{859}\) See Chapter Five, “Human Rights and the Pinochet Regime”.
We may not yet have experienced the potential long term consequences to the impact of US action in Chile on the international reputation of the US Government, as I discuss further below. The impact of US intervention in Chile on the domestic image of the USG was certainly negative. The Administration suffered greatly from revelations of US action in Chile, affecting public perception of the Administration’s legitimacy. Though Nixon was no longer in office at the time of the revelations, the uproar over US involvement in Chile and the resultant investigations by the Rockefeller, Pike, and Church Committees were a headache for the Ford Administration, ultimately forcing the Administration into a deeper dissonance between policy and rhetoric.

The domestic public outcry after the exposure of US actions and the public perception of legitimacy is tied to the issue of adherence to fundamental principles – what Samuel Huntington calls the “American Creed,” as discussed in Chapter One of this thesis. Americans believe that government “should be egalitarian, participatory, open, non-coercive, and responsive to the demands of individuals and groups.”860 Those principles make us who we are and should therefore be considered as a core element in the national identity. At the very least the perception of a government’s legitimacy – a foundational factor in an effectively functioning government - is inextricably linked to the extent to which its policies adhere to the foundational political principles of its nation. Though Kissinger and Nixon may have perceived the balance of power arrangement they sought to be a long-term goal that would ensure a measure of stability, they were willing to deliberately “violate” the principles of “self-determination and

860 Huntington, Promise of Disharmony, 41.
respect for free election” to achieve their goal. US action in Chile further damaged the legitimacy of the Nixon Administration, already affected by the Watergate scandal, and tainted public perception of the Ford Administration’s legitimacy as well.

Huntington argues that the American body politic cycles through periods of “Creedal Passion” - times of passionate attachment to fundamental principles leading to or springing from public outcry over violations of principle by the US Government or public institutions - and Creedal complacency - times of less passionate attachment to principles in which some departure from principle is tolerated. It can be expected, then, that the United States will eventually recover from the deviation from principle displayed by both the Nixon and Ford Administrations, if it has not done so already.

One may question the extent to which we can know what the American Creed actually is. Huntington clearly connects the Creed with values espoused by the Founding Fathers in our government’s founding documents. Schoultz and Hunt paint a somewhat different picture. US officials throughout our history have held attitudes and pursued policies at variance with Huntington’s idea of the American Creed. If our actions are consistently discordant with our stated values, perhaps our stated values are not truly our values. But if Huntington’s definition of the Creed and his argument about the cyclical nature of domestic politics hold true, perhaps the domestic fallout over revelations of US action in Chile was a blessing in disguise, giving the American public, primed for change, a final push toward a period of Creedal Passion that brought about a return, at least in part, to accountability and to principle.

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I do have one strong reservation about Huntington’s arguments in *American Politics*. In contending that government can never achieve the perfection demanded by the American Creed, Huntington implies that the American Creed cannot effectively address the realities of the international system of states – American Government must deviate from the Creed in order for the nation to survive. Huntington may deem me a moralist but I cannot agree with that assumption. Government cannot be a fair-weather friend to principle. If we agree that our principles must needs be violated at times, we cannot call them principles. Furthermore, the idea that strength of government necessarily requires deviation from principle is questionable. I would argue that it takes more fortitude to adhere to principle when it is inconvenient than it does to violate principle when it is politically expedient.

I do not disagree with the observation of an official of the Obama Administration that “[a]ll policies encounter reality,”862 but surely some, if not many, unpleasant realities are of our own making and could have been avoided had US policy makers been more circumspect. Our uncomfortable alliance with the Pinochet regime, for example, was at least in part of our own making. Policy makers in the early 1970s did not have the benefit of hindsight, but had the US been less invested in Allende’s downfall, US officials would perhaps have felt less need to support the Pinochet regime in spite of its human rights record.

Furthermore, there are long term costs to the US Government’s reputation on the world stage that I believe outweigh the benefits of a government made stronger by deviation from principle. It is not only the American public that holds the US

Government to a high standard; the international community does as well. Having tooted its idealistic horn and attempted to assert global leadership based in part on the virtue of its commitment to democratic principles, the US Government is expected to adhere to the standards it promotes. Even if Kissinger was able to satisfy at the time the concerns of the international community over US support of the Pinochet regime by modifying his rhetoric, as in his speech to the OAS in 1976, later revelations of the depth of US involvement in Chile and of the Nixon and Ford Administration’s policy behind closed doors have lifted the veil of deception. If we have not already felt the consequences, what might we expect to face in future?

In *Blowback, The Costs of and Consequences of American Empire*, Chalmers Johnson argues that the US has created an informal empire that is in danger of imperial overstretch, both militarily and economically; the increasing costs of maintaining that empire are unsustainable. In addition to the dangers of overstretch, US military and economic activity abroad has created situations that add to a growing international resentment toward the United States. He argues that two distinct but related types of blowback will result. The first is blowback in the traditional sense, terrorist action against innocent American citizens in an attempt to draw attention to and in retaliation for unpopular US actions abroad. The second is what Johnson calls “the tangible costs of empire,” which include “the hollowing out of American industry,” “the growth of militarism in a once democratic society,” and ultimately the breakdown of the international system, citing David Calleo’s reflection that “the international system

864 Ibid, 216-223.
865 Ibid, 223.
866 Ibid, 223.
breaks down not only because unbalanced and aggressive new powers seek to dominate their neighbors, but also because declining powers, rather than adjusting and accommodating, try to cement their slipping preeminence into an exploitative hegemony.\(^{867}\)

Johnson’s argument does not directly relate to the Chilean case. Kissinger himself perceived the dangers of overstretch and it was his recognition that the US could not maintain, let alone increase, military involvement abroad due to lack of public support, manpower, and economic resources that led him to seek alternative methods of maintaining the US position on the international stage. Those methods included partnering with Western Europe and Japan, opening relations with China, and pursuing détente with the USSR to establish a trilateral power relationship, as well as choosing non-military methods of intervention in other situations the Administration deemed important, as in US action in Chile.

Johnson’s more traditional description of blowback, however, may be indirectly applicable to the Chilean case. No scholar has argued that US involvement in Chile resulted in terrorist action against the United States, but US intervention in other sovereign nations on the level of CIA action in Chile has contributed to some instances of the more violent types of blowback.\(^{868}\) That alone is reason enough to understand why and how the USG deepened involvement in Chile in the 1970s so that we may avoid making similar policy mistakes, preventing the potential for blowback in future.

\(^{867}\) Ibid, 224.
\(^{868}\) Johnson notes as an example Osama bin Laden, a important partner in efforts to “[drive] the Soviet Union from Afghanistan,” that later “turned against the United States.” See Johnson, \textit{Blowback}, 10-11.
The most direct blowback of action in Chile, however, might have been a consequence that Johnson doesn’t consider: the diminished soft power of the United States, as defined by Joseph Nye in *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Nye describes soft power as the ability to convince others that they want what you want, “affecting behavior without commanding it.” Nye contends that soft power is the often overlooked “second face of power” that can and should be used as a means to meet challenges unsuited to coercion or inducement. “In international politics,” Nye argues, “the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others.” In light of that statement, US involvement in Chile in the 1970s takes on new significance.

Public knowledge of US action in Chile and support of the Pinochet regime in the face of human rights abuses certainly tarnished the USG’s reputation abroad, contributing to the international community’s perception of US hypocrisy and damaging our ability to take a leadership role among the international community on the basis of moral authority. Kissinger himself was aware of that danger, as evidenced by his warning to Nixon about violating the principles of free election and self-determination when deciding policy toward Chile. Yet, as noted above, Kissinger and Nixon moved forward with plans for CIA intervention, a clear indication that they valued hard power above soft power. That should not, perhaps, come as a surprise given the Administration’s, particularly

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871 Ibid, 5.
872 Ibid, 8.
Kissinger’s, realist bent. What is not so much surprising as it is ironic is that Kissinger’s inclination toward hard power led policy makers to undermine the basis for US soft power, the strategies of which had the potential to be extremely useful tools in meeting the challenge of protecting US interests despite diminishing resources. In that sense, the Administration’s strategy in Chile – intervention in the name of maintaining the world balance of power in order to reduce the costs of protecting the national interest - might be considered self-defeating.

Overall, I would argue, the Nixon Administration would have done better not to intervene in Chile, in keeping with its articulated principles of respecting democratic elections. The CIA’s program for action in Chile prior to Allende’s inauguration was unsuccessful, the effectiveness of the CIA’s program after Allende’s inauguration is questionable, and the domestic and international impact of deviation from stated US principles did more damage than good. The legitimacy of the US Government suffered which, if not sufficient reason to act in accordance with the American Creed as a matter of principle, has been made a matter of practicality by the potential for blowback. It is my hope that the lessons to be learned from the study of US action in Chile in the 1970s and other similar cases would inspire US policy makers to seek solutions that uphold rather than violate the American Creed as a matter both of principle and practicality.
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