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Security misread: A critical analysis of Ukraine's debate on NATO

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MISREAD SECURITY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
UKRAINE'S DEBATE ON NATO

A Thesis

Written in

Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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BY

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Seeking NATO Membership

The importance of debates on whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's membership is in the interests of Ukraine continues since the independence of Ukraine was declared and the country was pressured to become a non-nuclear state actor. Regardless of the well-established dialogue and close cooperation between NATO and Ukraine that were launched in 1991, "not a single election platform of any of Ukraine's political party or presidential candidate has ever declared NATO membership to be its or his/her goal" during the period of Ukraine's existence.¹ Even the former pro-Western president of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, did not mention Ukraine's NATO aspirations in his 2004 presidential election program.² The case for Ukraine's admission to NATO notwithstanding, Yushchenko's intention was not on the government's immediate agenda. At least initially, it appeared that the Orange leader had played his game wisely and had given much more emphasis to the goal of the European Union.

By the time of Mr. Yushchenko's inauguration, Ukraine's foreign policy was consciously directed at maintaining its neutrality and at pursuing the gradual integration into European institutions. In view of Ukraine's geostrategic position, the first two presidents of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, considered it in the interests of Ukraine to follow a multi-vector foreign policy as the country was still trying to get out from under the Russian influence. While successfully dealing with Russia and

¹ American Institute in Ukraine, "NATO and Ukraine's Politicians: Time for Political Accountability," <http://www.aminuk.org/index.php?idmenu=12&idsubmenu=81&language=en> (accessed August 17, 2009).

² *Ibid.*

being very cautious about the issue of Ukraine's membership in a Western military alliance, the Ukrainian political leadership was clear about the interest of Ukraine's prospective membership in the European Community. Further, a firm conviction was that increases in the standard of living of a nation's population could be reached through reciprocally advantageous relations with Russia, Asia, Latin American countries, and long-term cooperation with the Western World.³ To avoid aggravating relations with Russia, under the leadership of the first two presidents, Ukrainian diplomats stood firm in their demand to transform NATO from "collective defense organization into collective security organization, which would include Ukraine and Russia."⁴ Considering the fact that the EU and NATO approach to Ukraine has not functioned as a part of coordinated Western policy, the question of whether to build the extensive all-European security system was repeatedly discussed in the various political circles.

Having secured harmonious and friendly relations with Russia, during the Yeltsin's presidency in the second half of the 1990s, distinct interest groups started to see NATO membership as a stepping stone to membership in the EU. Furthermore, with Putin's ascent to power, significant part of Ukrainian political elite made public statements that Ukraine's neutrality is a temporary condition and Ukraine's incorporation into NATO is a long term-goal for a country that found itself caught between "its desire for stronger ties to the West and growing pressure"⁵ from the Russian Federation. In order

³ The concept of the "Western World" refers to the countries of Western and Central Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and now Baltic states. These countries are capitalistic, democratic and considered advanced. Very often the term "Western World" comes to be synonymous with the concept of "First World" which is also constructed term around the economic, political and cultural values of European/Western Civilization. In this context, several countries in Asia can be also considered as a part of the "Western World."

⁴ Stephen Larrabee, "Ukraine's Balancing Act," *Survival* 38, no.2 (Summer 1996):146.

⁵ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 145.

to avoid offending Russia and complicating Ukraine's security dilemma, the first two presidents of Ukraine did not take any decisive policy action for NATO membership. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian politicians repeatedly stated that in case of deterioration of Russia-Ukraine relations, Ukraine "would have no choice but to strive to join NATO."⁶ Consequently, the issue of Ukraine's incorporation into NATO permeates the entire history of Ukraine as an independent state and has always depended not only on the relations with Russia, but has been contingent on the interests of major political and economic powers.

The 2004 presidential elections were momentous for Ukraine and the domestic political conflict between two parts of the state entirely reflected a geopolitical struggle between Russia and the Western World over the new Ukrainian state. With the wide scale of Western and Russian interference in the 2004 Ukrainian elections, the fiasco of the Moscow-backed candidate, in the 2004 presidential elections has been interpreted by many in East and West as a loss for Russia and as the triumph of the United States in Russia's backyard. The reaction of Russian politicians to this failure of Russia's plans for Ukraine made clear that the Kremlin had underestimated the domestic political environment in Ukraine. There were indications that Moscow would not accept loss of its control and dominance over the post-Soviet space. The aggressive tone of the Russian leadership certified that in Russia's foreign policy as well as in the Western world, geopolitical interests are positioned much higher than essential political values.

⁶ Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine: NATO Relationship," Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine, April 14, 2000, <http://www.ualberta.ca/CIUS/stasiuk/st-articles/an-ukr-nat2.htm> (accessed June 21, 2011).

While there were no doubts about the corruption and fraud in the Ukrainian presidential elections, there was clear evidence of the U.S. government supporting regime change through support from the National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House, and private philanthropists such as George Soros to help the opposition and pro-democracy groups to overturn the government by using mass protests. Yushchenko's electoral triumph had little to do with the development of the "civil-society," but replicated analogical Western interventions in Georgia, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova or Serbia.⁷ It does not necessarily signify that people of Ukraine have chosen a Western rather than Eastern path of the political and social development. Looking back, it can be said that prior to Yushchenko's rise to power, the majority of the population of Ukraine favored close relations with the Russian Federation, even at the expense of close relations with the United States. The false choice between "authoritarian" Russia and the "democratic" West, imposed on the people of Ukraine, was designed to shift the country westward and launched a series of events aimed at bringing the post-Soviet country under the West's increasing influence and domination.⁸

The Ukraine's so-called "Orange Revolution" in 2004 was crucial factor influencing the Ukraine's foreign policy and consequently the process of Ukraine's incorporation in Euro-Atlantic security arrangement.⁹ The newly-elected government of the country of 46 million people demonstratively prioritized relations with the West over Russia. The integration into the European Union, membership in the World Trade Organization and the incorporation of Ukraine into the Western military apparatus have

⁷ Konstantin Kilibarda, "The Ukrainian elections: a dangerous fairy-tale," The Koly's Blog, entry posted December 2, 2004, <http://www.killingtrain.com/node/301> (accessed June 21, 2011).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Taras Kuzio, "Is Ukraine Part of Europe's Future," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no.3 (Summer 2006):89.

been selected and established as major foreign policy objectives. Three years after Victor Yushchenko became president, with the strongly reiterated support of the United States, Ukraine was approved for admission to the WTO. In terms of Ukraine's membership to the EU, good progress has also been made. However, despite a great number of significantly important agreements in numerous areas of cooperation, the EU has always been sufficiently clear that it has no plans to offer Ukraine "membership for now and instead would propose closer economic and political ties, including greater collaboration on energy policy and a free trade agreement."¹⁰

The implementation of the policy of aligning Ukraine with Europe and the United States has undoubtedly damaged the relationship between Ukraine and Russia. Specifically, Ukraine's strategic goal to join the European Union and NATO in combination with its border and gas disputes with Russia, interpretation of Soviet-era history, and the question of one of the Russia's biggest naval bases in Crimea has substantially contributed to the deterioration in relations between the two post-Soviet republics. Consequently, in a period of great political instability in Ukraine against the background of the mutual political intimidation and blackmail between two neighboring countries, the government of Ukraine found an opportunity to move from empty rhetoric to concrete action, and finally took a decision to apply for NATO membership.

According to the perception of Ukraine's pro-NATO forces, Ukraine's membership in Euro-Atlantic Alliance could significantly ensure the country's defense

¹⁰ Dan Bilefsky, "Ukraine to pursue EU entry," *New York Times*, September 14, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/14/world/europe/14iht-ukraine.2811837.html> (accessed September 10, 2009).

against external pressure and consequently enhance the deteriorating security of the country. In the judgments of Ukraine's analysts and intellectuals, membership in the Euro-Atlantic security arrangement, based on the conception that no country encountering a threat should be left to confront it alone, is the best guarantee to Ukraine's independence and integrity.¹¹ In January 2008, the Ukrainian government confronting the low level of public support for joining the Western military organization sent an open letter to NATO asking Ukraine to be considered for a Membership Action Plan.¹² Although the official NATO position proclaims that Ukraine will become a full-fledged member of the alliance, under the pressure from Russia and because of the internal conditions of Ukraine, this has been postponed until an undecided future date.

B. Return to “Multi-Vector” Foreign Policy?

In the wake of Russia's invasion of Georgia, Ukraine's membership in Western military alliance seemed inevitable. However, while the conflict between Russia and Georgia was the precise reason for the United States and Eastern Europe to bring Ukraine into NATO, Western European leaders felt that Russian invasion was legitimate and insisted that further extension of NATO would provoke Russia and would make Kremlin more aggressive. Therefore, major European powers' unwillingness to see Ukraine as

¹¹ Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 states that: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed June 21, 2011).

¹² Vladimir Socor, “Ukraine's Top Three Leaders Request NATO Membership Action Plan,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 10 (2008), http://www.jamestown.org/si.....x_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33304 (accessed September 12, 2009).

NATO ally derives from their reluctance to deteriorate relations with Russia on which Western Europe is massively dependent for its supplies of energy resources. The truth is that there are too many differences among the interests of NATO members and it would not have been rational for the countries of Western Europe to jeopardize their own economic and political position in order to get Ukraine into NATO. Clearly, the refusal to grant Ukraine the Membership Action Plan at the ministerial meeting in December 2008, despite intense lobbying from former U.S. President, George H. W. Bush, indicated the differences over the understanding of the nature of security and clearly demonstrated a lack of a unified perception of threat. In sum, the costs of legitimacy of Ukraine's incorporation into NATO have become too high which in its turn explains why the expectations of Ukrainian government have not been fulfilled yet.

Besides, domestic political infighting and Ukrainian public opposition against joining NATO has been a crucial obstacle for Ukraine to meet the necessary criteria for NATO membership. Ukrainian society has always been divided on the issue of NATO membership. In fact, while Western European leaders exhibit patience and are not willing to antagonize Russia which views the expansion of NATO as a hostile action, Yushchenko's push for NATO membership in the absence of public approval not only engendered fears of a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but further divided Ukrainian society. In this context, the issue of NATO membership has served to emphasize the political divisions of the post-Soviet country. Pro-NATO sentiments have been widely present in the western and central part of Ukraine, whereas the strong opposition to Ukrainian membership in NATO from the Russian-speaking east and south of the Ukrainian state has only increased the complexity of the issue. In spite of the

numerous pro-NATO information campaigns launched by the government of Ukraine, the majority of the population, being united in support of integration into the European Union, has categorically objected to Ukraine's membership in Euro-Atlantic collective defense pact. It is also important to mention that for the most part the opposition to NATO among Ukrainians is formed by the stereotypes produced by the Soviet political propaganda.

As Victor Yanukovich became a president in 2010, he dropped NATO membership bid from Ukraine's agenda, insisting that Ukraine is not ready to join the Atlantic Alliance and arguing that NATO conditions require the Ukrainian public to claim ownership over the consensus of Ukrainian membership in the Alliance. From the public rhetoric of Yanukovich after coming to power, it has become clear that the president will not do anything for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration in the nearest future and Ukraine is determined to pursue the policy of non-alignment as the central guidance point in the security sphere. Specifically, several times Yanukovich acknowledged that membership in NATO would be put to the Ukrainian electorate once the country had gone through political and economic reforms.¹³ Practically speaking, the question of the country's accession to the North-Atlantic Alliance, with Ukraine's eastern and southern parts being more committed to good relations with Russia, had gone away as quickly as it was raised after the Orange Revolution and Viktor Yushchenko's election.

Without doubt, Ukraine's adoption of non-aligned status is a great achievement. First of all, abandoning Ukraine's drive towards the membership in Western military bloc

¹³ Dan Bilefsky, "Ukraine to pursue EU entry."

entirely represents the Ukrainian people's will. Secondly, Yanukovich's public position on NATO signifies a wise move to repair the negative effect of the radical change in the ethnic identity of Ukraine after the events of the Orange Revolution. Finally, the Yanukovich's non-alignment strategy contributed not only to the stability of the country, but has done a great deal to change the European security calculus. A neutral Ukraine diminishes the risk of entrapping NATO members and Ukraine itself into military confrontation with Russia. However, the only question is how long the leadership of Ukraine will be able to coordinate policy between Russia and the West and simultaneously play hard with the population of 46 million people.

C. The Construction of Consent or Simply a Role in “Reset”?

Although the current leadership of Ukraine overturned the previous government's pro-NATO drive, the U.S. – led military alliance continues to be interested in Ukraine. While Bush's administration was trying to draw Ukraine away from Russian influence by encouraging it to join NATO at any cost, under the Obama administration, the idea of Ukrainian membership in NATO has become attached to further deepening of relations with the North-Atlantic Alliance and promotion of political, economic and military reforms and at the same time maintaining good relations with Russia. In fact, since the United States and NATO publicly welcomed Ukraine to the Alliance should the government of Ukraine change its mind, it has become apparent that the West and particularly the United States remains interested in the new government's undertaking of economic reforms and its commitments to democracy. Concerns about Russia's determination to use force to protect its geopolitical interests and Washington's ambition to “reset” relations with Moscow led to the reformulation of U.S. foreign policy in the

region and thereby to an adjustment in its Ukraine policies. Undoubtedly, by publicly suspending support for Ukrainian membership in NATO, after years of tensions, the Obama administration succeeded in establishment of broad and positive relationship with Russia.

On the other hand, conversations about Ukraine's non-aligned status are not confirmed and there are no specific moves in a direction of its acknowledgement.¹⁴ I argue that the agreement between Ukraine and Russia concerning the 25-year extension for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea is not simply a complication for Ukraine's non-aligned movement, but a clever political move to reset relations with Russia and further enhance bilateral cooperation of Ukraine and NATO. In contrast to the approach of former president of Ukraine, Victor Yushchenko, who championed a speedy NATO membership for Ukraine at the expense of Ukrainian-Russian relations, Yanukovich recognizes that the issue of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration creates a division in society, contributes to political and economic instability and therefore is one of the main cornerstones of advancement of positive image of Yanukovich.

While Yushchenko used a security approach to obtain access to NATO membership, Yanukovich appeals to Western constitutive values and norms. In fact, references to low public support for Ukraine's membership in NATO are used by Ukrainian government to justify the country's non-aligned status. Based on Frank Schimmelfennig's analysis, the proper use of "rhetorical action" strategy is the main

¹⁴ Vikno.EU, "The NATO in Foreign Policy of Ukraine," Vikno EU news Web Site, March 10, 2011, <http://vikno.eu/eng/politics/politics/the-nato-in-foreign-policy-of-ukraine.html> (accessed April 11, 2011).

factor that accounts for NATO's enlargement decisions.¹⁵ Thus, while Yanukovich aims at shaping the public attitude towards Euro-Atlantic integration, he strategically uses the rhetoric in order to represent that Ukraine is making tremendous strides toward democratization and adoption of liberal values and norms. Therefore, I argue that through a process of "rhetorical action" in regard to the issue of Ukraine's joining NATO, Yanukovich is cleverly stabilizing the country and is creating the conditions for a more consistent political and economic strategy which in the sphere of mutual relations with NATO is the de facto continuation of a Yushchenko's policy.¹⁶

In this context, it is very important to remember that Ukraine's joining Alliance was on Yanukovich's agenda when serving as Ukraine's Prime Minister in Kuchma's government before the 2004 Orange Revolution. Considering that several times Yanukovich has shifted his rhetoric in regard to the Ukraine's membership in NATO, it becomes clear that anti-NATO sentiment has always been nothing else than a key instrument of electoral propaganda in the internal struggle for political power.¹⁷ There should be no doubt that in a political struggle against former Orange forces, anti-NATO position of Yanukovich guaranteed him support from Russia and played a vital role in his electoral victory. Soon, after becoming president, Yanukovich formally fulfilled his

¹⁵ See Frank Schimmelfenning, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

¹⁶ For more on the idea that Ukraine's "rhetorical action" is the crucial factor that explains the delay to join the Membership Action Plan of NATO, see Oleksandr Svitych, "Ukraine and NATO: The Failure of Rhetorical Action" (MA Thesis, Central European University, 2008).

¹⁷ Lyudmyla Pavlyuk and Adrian Erlinger, "NATO and Ukraine: Elites' Actions, Public Perception, and Polarization," *Merydian – Centre of Informational Researches*, <http://www.merydian.info/nato.html> (accessed April 12, 2011).

campaign promise to abandon the pursuit of NATO membership.¹⁸ However, in reality the foreign policy of Ukraine remains rigidly Westernized and according to a great number of political analysts, practical cooperation between Ukraine and NATO has only increased. In fact, this policy of Yanukovich is not only consistent with a new strategic concept of NATO, which postpones any real decisions on the issues of the Alliance's enlargement in the coming years, but calls for the deepening of cooperation between NATO and its partners.

As of today, NATO and Ukraine continue to cooperate in the frame of the Annual National Program which “sets out a very active program of cooperation with defense reform, good governance and dealing with corruption.”¹⁹ Furthermore, with Ukraine's and NATO's commitment to cooperate in the implementation of wide-ranging domestic reforms, Ukraine continues to take part in joint military exercises with NATO forces. As a matter of fact, it is well-known that NATO is ready to draw Ukraine into a conversation about the deployment of missile defense system in Europe. It is remarkable that despite Ukraine's current neutral status, NATO officials publicly express their beliefs that ultimately Ukraine will join the Alliance.²⁰ Therefore, I argue that in the public sphere the present Ukrainian government removed membership in the North-Atlantic

¹⁸ “Dvulikij Janus Ukrainskoj Politiki: Ukraina i NATO – Shagi k Sotrudnichestvu ili Put' v Nikuda?” *NovoROSS.Info*, April 6, 2009, <http://novoross.info/ecskluziv/7101-dvulikiy-yanus-ukrainskoy-politiki-ukraina-i-nato-shagi-k-sotrudnichestvu-ili-put-v-nikuda.html> (accessed April 12, 2011).

¹⁹ Yuriy Onyshkiv, “NATO's Robert Simmons: ‘We Believe at Some Stage Ukraine Will be a Member of NATO’,” *Kyiv Post*, October 11, 2010, <http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/85918/> (accessed April 11, 2011).

²⁰ *Ibid.*

Alliance from the list of foreign policy goals, but in practice Ukraine's cooperation with NATO continues to be active, comprehensive, and, in fact, intensified.²¹

D. Mixed Policy Motives for NATO Enlargement

Although the analysis of alliance theory is not the focus of this work, within the context of international relations theory the motives for alliance formation are clear. It is important to remember that NATO's formation in 1949 and the first fifty years of its existence were closely associated with the period of Cold War in terms of the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West. It is generally accepted that the main purpose of the Atlantic Alliance was the containment of the Communist expansion to the Western Europe and its activity should be examined as a response to the Soviet threat. In terms of a theoretical study of alliances, it can be said that the existence of NATO until the end of the Cold War, with its essential function of consolidating NATO area countries' strength, has been grounded mainly on the realist/neorealist philosophies of international relations and has possessed a security and strategic character.²² In particular, if the U.S. security guarantees to Western Europe, brought under the provisions of the Marshall Plan, were considered extremely significant to America's economic and strategic interests, membership in NATO for the European countries reassured them that their status and sovereignty would be strengthened against prospective Soviet aggression. Thus, seeking protection from Soviet expansionism on the part of the weaker European states and the behavior of the major power's interest

²¹ NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "NATO- Ukraine Cooperation Less Politicized, But as Active," Media Centre, 2011 Press Releases, July 7, 2011, <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2523> (accessed August 22, 2011).

²² Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 445-475.

complemented each other and resulted in an integrated military organization with a clearly identified opponent. As a consequence, NATO emerged as an “alliance concluded between elites with totally different ends but sharing a similar view of means.”²³

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and disappearance of the Soviet threat, the organization’s historic objective of balancing a rising Soviet power had been achieved and the issue of the persistence of NATO in a post-Cold War world has become of critical importance. The immediate response was the plan by the United States to enlarge NATO membership into Eastern and Central Europe. Since then, the Alliance has taken steps to advance its reach not only to former Warsaw Pact countries but to three former Soviet Baltic states. Contrary to the expectations about the Alliance’s lack of relevance in a post-Cold War world, “NATO has added to the list of functions it is prepared to carry out, broadened its ties to other countries and organizations, and is working to expand its membership.”²⁴ Recently, despite Russian objections to the organization’s expansion into former Soviet republics, NATO offered to strengthen military and political cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia to achieve a goal of eventual membership.

While they expressed recognition of general security concerns, the majority of Central and East European political leaders on their road to NATO membership “avoided publicly identifying specific potential enemies” and argued that regional instability rather than a traditional military threat from specific source had been the main reason for their

²³ Ernst B. Haas and Allen Suss Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), 160.

²⁴ McCalla, “NATO's Persistence after the Cold War,” 446.

countries to join the military alliance.²⁵ According to Ted Galen Carpenter, such an argument has always been deceitful and has indicated a conflict between the elite's interpretation of state interests and the objectives they wished to attain with NATO membership.²⁶ Taking into consideration certain declarations by Central and East European politicians, security factors alone did not move their countries to join NATO, but concerns of national identity have played a significant role in the formulation of each country's foreign policy.

Furthermore, during the period of Cold War NATO was an obvious illustration of realist/neorealist philosophy in practice. As a result, the Alliance's involvement in the Balkans, the attachment of NATO membership to continued domestic reforms and the interplay between the goals and interests of member, applicant and partner states have hinted at the limitations of the realist/neorealist theory as an explanation of NATO mission. It is proper to say that the leadership of Ukraine has not considered NATO solely in military terms and has been mindful that democracy and free markets could be consolidated by Ukraine's membership in Western military alliance. Moreover, it is wise to remember that NATO has been considered by the government of Ukraine to be a stepping stone on the path to European Union membership, with all its economic advantages.²⁷

²⁵ Ted Galen Carpenter, "Strategic Evasions and the Drive for NATO Enlargement," in *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality*, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2001), 19.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ For an account of this, see Jonathan Dean, "NATO Enlargement: Coping with Act II," in *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality*, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2001), 124.

E. Importance and Objective of Study

At the time when the internal debate concerning the question of Ukraine's seeking NATO integration is alive, the geopolitical position of Ukraine as a buffer zone between traditional East and West contributes multiple levels of entanglement to the issue. As stated by Hall Gardner, the fact is that "a contemporary, unstable Ukraine is the key European pivotal state like Poland in the interwar period."²⁸ This increasing vulnerability and the restless call of the United States to extend NATO's territorial jurisdiction further east can lead to the geopolitical conflict. Consequently, Ukraine joining NATO may in fact decrease its security. Indeed, the issue of Ukrainian membership in NATO affects the course of events in the system of international relations, and thereby demonstrates the need for a critical analysis of the issue of Ukraine's integration in North-Atlantic Alliance.

While the Ukrainian government argues for the benefits of NATO membership, several perspectives in international relations show that despite the benefits that Ukraine expects to derive from NATO membership, it is unwise for Ukraine to pursue membership. While the pro-NATO forces in Ukraine do not consider the Alliance in exclusively military terms, the strengthening of Ukraine's position vis-à-vis Russia and protection against a possible Russian threat has been always seen as the main value of NATO membership for Ukraine. A heightened fear of being caught in a revived form of Russian influence and an exaggerated perception of the possibility of military conflict between Russia and Ukraine is behind the pursuit of a pro-NATO strategy. In this thesis,

²⁸ Hall Gardner, "NATO Enlargement and Geostrategic History: Alliances and the Question of War and Peace," in *NATO for a New Century: Atlanticism and European Security*, ed. Carl C. Hodge (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 39.

I show that NATO enlargement should be viewed not as a measure to maintain regional stability, but needs to be examined in a more complex geopolitical, cultural and economic context. It is only through challenging the security advantage of Ukraine's joining NATO that it is possible to understand that an endeavor to turn Ukraine into NATO member is not advanced by Ukraine's security concerns. Ultimately, it needs to be acknowledged that NATO's mission has changed beyond its military goals, and NATO's expansion should be discussed from a much broader standpoint than of strategic alignments.

This work seeks to demonstrate that through the context of discursive construction of multiple challenges for the security of Ukraine, proponents of Ukrainian adherence to NATO have been actively lobbying for Ukrainian membership into the Alliance. It was very clear during the presidency of Yushchenko, who was supported by the majority of Ukrainian-speaking population, when Russia gained a central focus in the discursive construction of Ukrainian security concerns. Since Yanukovich came to power, the Russian-Ukrainian relations have improved and the reasoning to look for the Western security guarantees and assistance against Russia was abandoned. While Yanukovich has been clear that the issue of Ukrainian incorporation in NATO may "emerge at some point,"²⁹ the movement to official bringing of Ukraine into NATO has started to be grounded not on the idea of strengthening Ukraine, but on the adherence to transform Ukraine into a democratic state with a flourishing market economy.

Second, in exploring the idea of Western proponents having few security concerns about Russia, I develop an analysis that allows seeing Ukrainian adherence to NATO as a

²⁹ RIA Novosti, "Yanukovich Opens Door to Russian Navy Keeping Base in Ukraine," RIA Novosti Web Site, February 13, 2011, <http://en.rian.ru/world/20100213/157869607.html> (accessed October 28, 2011).

way of disciplining Ukraine to neoliberal agenda of global capitalist system. I argue that membership in NATO means signing on for a wide range of political institutions and neoliberal economic policies prescribed by the Western governments. The issue of Ukraine's joining NATO will be incorporated into the idea that the economic force causes the main change in the system of international relations and with it consolidates unjust political and socio-economic system. It is very problematic to repudiate that present-day societies, including Ukrainian, are structured around global capital and production accumulation.³⁰ People all over the world remain exploited by corporate capitalist elites, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union neoliberal capitalism continues its expansion as the hegemonic force.

In Ukraine like in other developing countries a new type of the economic system, far from natural, has been organized and which operates through different separate institutions. Such an institutional arrangement is not able to function unless society is shaped and subordinated in a way as to allow structure to operate according to its own laws.³¹ Imperial domination, considered to be the highest stage in capitalist development, no longer needs the support of ideology and brutal force to keep the population cowed, but contends to control the societies through a passive consumerism and a policy of systematical depersonalization. Ukrainian society turned into the actor in the capitalist system, and membership in NATO will lock into a policy behavior with real inability to

³⁰ Douglass Kellner, "Theorizing Globalization," *Sociological Theory* 20, no. 3 (2002): 289.

³¹ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 258.

take control of its own local interests, and through which capitalist hegemon pursues its economic and geopolitical interests.³²

This thesis aims at a critical study of Ukraine's possible integration in the Euro-Atlantic security space and develops an argument against Ukraine's incorporation into NATO. My argument is that by joining NATO, Ukraine may well become predisposed to undertake a course of action that will not serve the interests of the people of Ukraine. Drawing upon the relationship between NATO expansion and the extension of Western colonialism, I claim that incorporation of Ukraine into NATO will deprive the government of Ukraine of its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy, and will make Ukrainians completely dependent on the decisions and policies of the Western world. Even now, before Ukraine's incorporation into the Western concert, we are witnessing the government ignoring the will of the majority of the population.

The main purpose of this research is to better understand the issue of Ukraine's incorporation in NATO and the complexity of the world through arguments against Ukraine's joining NATO. The thought developed in my thesis will be that NATO is an instrument of the United States, as the hegemonic power of the capitalist world-economy, to expand neoliberal hegemonic ideology and fully integrate Ukraine into global economy. To be sure, this thesis contributes to the idea that NATO should be examined as an achievement of the U.S. foreign policy and in the context of the U.S. promotion of international capitalist order. The project views the process of Ukraine's incorporation

³² For an account of this, see John Ikenberry, "State Power and the Institutional Bargain: America's Ambivalent Economic and Security Multilateralism," in *U.S. Hegemony and International Organizations*, ed. Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane & Michael Mastanduno (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49-70

into NATO as part of the neoliberal structural adjustment to reconstruct the political, economic and social order in the post-Soviet country to serve the geostrategic and economic interests of the United States. Thus, NATO expansion and incorporation of Ukraine with U.S. military presence as well as strategic and political commitments should be seen from the perspective of American political interests.

F. Project Overview

The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter one provides an overview of Ukraine-NATO relations. This introductory part of my thesis clearly demonstrates that the process of Ukraine's integration in North-Atlantic Alliance has been always shaped by the interaction of geopolitical and economic interests of international actors in the region. Furthermore, this chapter develops an idea that despite the adoption of the non-aligned neutral status by Ukraine during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich, the cooperation of Ukraine and Alliance has not stopped, but has only intensified. While Ukraine was rejected the Membership Action Plan in 2008, the process of Ukraine's incorporation into Alliance continues in the frame of the Annual National Program that is considered to be part of the first cycle of the NATO Membership Action Plan.³³ This point is extremely important in the context of motivation and interests of all actors involved in the process of NATO enlargement and bringing Ukraine into NATO. By focusing on the mixed policy motives for Ukraine's collaboration with NATO and questioning the prevailing idea that Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration continues for security and defense concerns,

³³ Denis Kiriukhin, "NATO – Ukraine: Membership not in Shape but Essence," in *EuroDialogueXXI*, <http://eurodialogue.org/NATO%20-%20Ukraine-Membership-not-in-Shape-but-Essence> (accessed September 14, 2011).

I formulate my position against Ukraine's joining NATO and intend to make a contribution to the debate over the potential membership of Ukraine in Alliance.

While the benefits and positive aspects of Ukraine's possible membership in NATO are known and widely discussed from the standpoint of looking for the ways to guarantee Ukraine's security, the negative aspects, associated with the incorporation of Ukraine into the broader capitalist and liberal-democratic space of Western Europe and North America, are largely unknown and remain to be unquestioned. Chapter two demonstrates that in my thesis I am determined to provide an analysis of the process of Ukraine's incorporation into NATO which employs a methodology based on critical approach. Despite the fact that it is not possible to define a critical approach specifically, it offers "a distinct methodological strategy and a unique research program."³⁴ It should be taken into account that the project of critical theory does not reject any other theories, opinions and approaches, but incorporates all of them into studying and explaining of our social and political reality.

Making use of the critical approach, chapter two introduces theoretical grounding for the idea that the issue of Ukraine's joining NATO should be analyzed within the context of the world-system. Immanuel Wallerstein's ideas help us to understand that the structure of the international system is based on world capitalist economy, and capitalism is a "force that had to be understood in global rather than local terms - which means that emancipation must be a global project."³⁵ Armed with the understanding that the development of U.S. hegemony led to reconstruction of global political economy, the

³⁴ Raymond A. Morrow with David D. Brown, *Critical Theory and Methodology*, Vol. 3 (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, INC., 1994), 36.

³⁵ Quoted in Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 58.

reader is directed to the neo-Gramscian idea of global social order with the hegemony of the United States which operates through various social relations, international institutions and culture. While I recognize limitations of these two distinct theories and their deficiency towards certain positions, I use them in building my argument and mainly for the purpose of rethinking the issue of Ukraine's incorporation in NATO. At the risk of suffering from a great deal of theoretical pluralism, it should be clear that research methodology that adopts critical theory which in its turn, allows an assessment of different claims and adoption of certain theoretical assumptions, is necessary.

Chapter three challenges the main argument for Ukraine joining NATO based on claim that Ukraine would be given collective defense guarantees by the members of the military Alliance and thereby would significantly improve its security environment and position vis-à-vis Russia. Moreover, incorporation of Ukraine into NATO will in fact decrease its security.³⁶ Russian reaction to Kiev's NATO aspirations means that bilateral relations would suffer to a greater extent if Ukraine joined the Western military alliance without Russia. Furthermore, the chapter seeks to demonstrate the problems and limitations of the realist/neorealist point of view, with its focus on balancing against perceived threats, and indicate that NATO enlargement into Ukraine should not be viewed as a measure to ensure Ukraine's independence and integrity. Above all, the purpose of this chapter is to understand the security and identity discourses through which Ukraine's integration into NATO takes place.

³⁶ Although there are a number of works warning that NATO's expansion and incorporation of Ukraine without Russia entails huge costs and risks, for a straightforward account of this, see books of Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality* (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2001); and Anatol Lieven, *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1999).

Chapter four examines NATO in exclusively economic and political terms. It suggests that NATO has been institutionally transformed from a military to a multilateral organization. Nevertheless, the purpose of this chapter is not to explore the issue of Ukrainian membership in NATO specifically, but to indicate that political authority structure for the global economy, social and political life is organized around various forms of consensus formation in favor of neoliberal disciplinary governance. While this chapter elaborates on the mechanisms of the global economy, it offers an understanding of how NATO, as one of the numerous tools of exercising power, plays an active role in “the rearrangement of political systems in the peripheral and semi-peripheral zones of the ‘world-system’ so as to secure the underlying objective of maintaining essentially undemocratic societies inserted into an unjust international system.”³⁷ The philosophy of Antonio Gramsci and the works of critical theorists constitute a fundamentally important development of my argument and demonstrate how the process of Ukraine’s incorporation into NATO is linked to the developments of the capitalist economy.

In chapter five I will focus on the analysis of the evolution of neoliberalism by considering the essential connections between the notions of imperialism and neo-colonialism, in order to prove that NATO is part of a mechanism whose strategic aim is to extend the particular form of social and political control of Western bloc over the rest of the world. As part of the argument that Ukrainian membership in NATO is not in the interests of Ukrainian people, the chapter points to the relationship between neoliberal globalization and particular form of governmentality. In this sense, my argument builds on the idea that the steady performance of free markets depends upon thoughtful and

³⁷ Quoted in William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6.

comprehensive regulation which lies in the provision of domestic and international stability through international interdependence and cooperation.³⁸ As well as other international organizations, NATO participates in the process of the conversion of the state into a tool for correcting socio-political and economic policies to the requirements of capitalist economy.³⁹

In concluding the thesis, chapter six reconsiders the information analyzed in the previous chapters and confirms my argument against Ukraine joining NATO. The evidence in the research clearly demonstrates that Ukraine's move toward NATO membership is not driven by the security interests of Ukrainian state. It will become clear that the issue of Ukraine's potential membership in the Alliance should be analyzed from much broad range of theoretical perspectives than solely focusing on mainstream theories.

³⁸ Ronnie D. Lipschutz, *The Constitution of Imperium*, (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2009), 29.

³⁹ Adopted from Robert W. Cox, "Global Perestroika," *Socialist Register* 28 (1992):30.

II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND, LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

A. Methodology

Central to my thesis is the idea that the current Ukrainian leadership pursues the same political goals of EU and NATO memberships as former presidents. The previous introductory chapter has shown that in terms of Euro-Atlantic integration Viktor Yanukovich prefers more cautious approach. In contrast to Yushchenko, Yanukovich, whose loyal political base is pro-Russian electorate in eastern and southern Ukraine, is not able to play to anti-Russian nationalism to get Ukraine into NATO. In order for his government to look legitimate it is necessary to be perceived as acting in the interests of the entire population. However, if Ukraine continues to modernize its armed forces and persists in adapting its legislation to international standards, the necessary measures to deal with Russian pressure and to influence public opinion will be applied as soon as political consensus in the West on Ukrainian membership in NATO is reached. The events of Ukraine's Orange Revolution at the end of 2004 have shown that through various methods of manipulation it has become possible to mobilize the masses of people towards government's desired objective in a very short period of time.

Certainly, this assertion challenges and contradicts the dominant view about the world of international relations and Ukrainian politics. However, I seek to question widespread ideas, certain rules and norms, imposed knowledge and practices. To many people it may appear that my argument is anti-American or even pro-Russian, however, in reality I seek to look at the process of Ukraine's integration into NATO from the position of national interests and from the angle that falls outside the mainstream point of

view.⁴⁰ While the debate on Ukraine's joining NATO from a realist/neorealist point of view is widespread and has increasing acceptance, there are many issues related to identity politics that cannot be explained by the mainstream international relations theory. Moreover, while this thesis does not make a claim to objectivity or universalism, it is necessary to "think critically and reflectively about how particular values, assumptions and concepts are used to describe the current social 'reality' and possible alternatives."⁴¹ Therefore, realizing that discussions on this topic are mainly based on orthodox paradigms and being convinced that knowledge and beliefs about everything in the world are tied to certain discursive contexts, I am very interested in a critical approach that allows communication between different theoretical paradigms.⁴² In my case, the answers to the questions that I ask are not to be discovered by one or two theoretical approaches, "but by ethical reasoning conducted through dialogue"⁴³ across realist/neorealist, postmodern, structural, postcolonial, constructivist, liberal/neoliberal perspectives.

Thus, I would like to emphasize my methodology of engagement across numerous theoretical approaches. For example, the study opens with an analysis of realist/neorealist approach to the issue of NATO enlargement and Ukraine's incorporation in the Alliance. Examining the realist/neorealist formulation offers us not only a better understanding of Ukraine's motivations for joining NATO, but also expands our vision of how Russia can behave in conditions that are threatening to its national interest or survival. Nevertheless,

⁴⁰ Adopted from Sergey Goncharov, "Zachem nam eta Yevropa?" Khvylya, October 28, 2011, <http://hvylya.org/analytics/geopolitics/14148-zachem-nam-eta-evropa.html#comments> (accessed November 1, 2011).

⁴¹ Quoted in Jill Steans and Lloyd Pettiford, *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes* (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2005), 243.

⁴² See Colin Wight, "Incommensurability and Cross-Paradigm Communication in International Relations Theory: 'What's the Frequency Kenneth?'" *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 25 (1996), 319.

⁴³ Adopted from Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 38.

while the literature on alliances has been traditionally realist or neorealist in orientation, the motives of policymakers of prospective or recently submitted member states as well as disagreements between the United States and other NATO members makes us turn to additional theoretical approaches in international relations.⁴⁴ Clearly, liberal and constructivist theoretical insights applied in this work help us to see the “nature of the consensus that provides the basis for stability and order in international society.”⁴⁵ The fact that much of the explanation about NATO’s continuation after the Cold War derives from non-realist schools of international relations theory reinforces the idea that none of the paradigms of international relations can fully account for NATO’s subsequent developments since the end of the Cold War.⁴⁶

Being Ukrainian, it is twice as difficult for me to give an unbiased analysis of the situation surrounding the Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Nevertheless, I am very interested in thoughtful research and strive “to stand outside prevailing structures, processes, ideologies, and orthodoxies while recognizing that all conceptualizations derive from particular political/theoretical/historical perspectives.”⁴⁷ This is important to understand as from my personal standpoint, to stand outside means to have a room for various thoughts and ideas contradicting and rejecting each other, but at the same time to have an ability to find logic, reason and see the purpose of each of them. To be considered from outside means to have an ambition to open that outside world to others, to be a force for change. Finally, being from outside should be rational, based on

⁴⁴ McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," 445-447.

⁴⁵ Quoted in Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate." *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 16, no. 2 (1987): 235.

⁴⁶ Adopted from McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," 445-475.

⁴⁷ Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 30.

experience and practice of application of knowledge in the real world, today's world, real time.⁴⁸ The structure of my thesis follows a pattern that “allows us to analyze countries such as Ukraine not as unique cases with no parallels in the world but as cases that can fruitfully be compared and contrasted with others.”⁴⁹ Ultimately, the emancipatory interest is of main concern for me. It is hoped that this analysis of the issue of Ukraine's joining NATO will contribute to transcending of the traditional boundaries of thinking about international politics and Ukraine's post-Soviet transition in particular.

This study is a product of two years of research in DePaul University and engagement in a social context that is very different from Ukraine where I started my scholarship. Having lived for the past seven years in the United States and having experienced a decentralization of identity, I have learned to observe how the various discourses which are embedded in cultural and social practices shape both our reality and identity. It is noteworthy that this thesis is a part of my ongoing analysis about governmentality and the ways power is exercised. In fact, questions of power relations have significantly influenced my view not only about Ukraine's membership in NATO, but also about the conception of modernity. While in Ukraine, the discourse of Western standards is powerful and modernization is defined only in terms of a post-communist transition, I maintain that Ukraine is still subjected to conditions that continue to place the country under Western capitalism's neo-colonial domination.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 57.

⁴⁹ Quoted in Paul J. D'Anieri, “Constructivist Theory and Ukrainian Foreign Policy,” in *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail Molchanov (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 53.

As will become apparent, in the absence of reference to any prominent postmodern theorist my challenge to such enlightenment ideas as progress and modernity is based on my reading of French philosophers, Michel Foucault and Jean Baudrillard. My thesis criticizes the view of Western modernization as progress and attempts to show that under the banner of democracy promotion, economic growth and consumerism powerful social forces impose the capitalist path of development and the Western-led model of social and cultural systems to secure their position of dominance and exploitation. In my work, I make clear that NATO should be examined in the context of the concept of governance that was formulated by Foucault, saying that global social forces are exercising their political authority at distance and whose aim is to establish and consolidate capitalist international order. Furthermore, my study of Ukraine's integration in NATO clearly suggests looking at the process of Ukraine's integration into Western institutions as a way to transform and discipline Ukrainian society according to the demands of neoliberal capitalism. Without neoliberal model of disciplined control of individuals, current kind of global capitalism is impossible.⁵⁰ In this context, the role of democratic principles and procedures in various institutional structures is crucial.

Overall, my research maintains that in the contemporary world of globalization, Ukrainian state has become subjected to the agents and structural forces of neoliberal capitalism. I seek to point out the fact that neoliberalism is a powerful ideology which weakens state sovereignty and works to further world order on the basis of norms and mechanisms of global governance. Once again, I have to emphasize that Foucault's vision of power and his ideas about discourse have been crucial for reevaluation of my

⁵⁰ Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 135.

positions and beliefs. Drawing on Foucault's concept of governmentality it has become clear that the Ukrainian state has no monopoly on sovereign power, and should be considered only as an instrument to exercise an authority and legitimize the use of force over its population. While performing services for national oligarchy, the Ukrainian state is being forced to operate in the interests of transnational corporations.⁵¹

Although the theoretical basis of this research allows for multiple theoretical perspectives and appropriates a postmodernist position to take a significant place in this analysis, it should be clear that none of the theories mentioned above carry the task of changing the international system as it is today. Obviously, postmodernism, while arguing that our reality is discursively constructed, rejects the struggle to form a new alternative. For this reason, through linking interest in overcoming economic inequalities and various forms of oppression, it is decided to adopt critical theory as the basic research methodology. Focusing on the relations of domination and considering Marx's concept of false consciousness and criticism of modernity as the initial stage of its development, critical theory in contrast to post-modernist approach anticipates in creation of new possibilities for social justice and progress.⁵²

B. Literature Review

Introducing Wallerstein

While the main framework of the research is based on critical theory, at first it is necessary to examine Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system theory. Despite the debates

⁵¹ See Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Empire of Capital* (New York: Verso, 2003), 137.

⁵² Morrow and Brown, *Critical Theory and Methodology*, 320-321.

of the origins of capitalist development⁵³ and an ongoing critique, concerned with not giving enough weight to the cultural analysis, Wallerstein's world-system approach sheds a light on the fact that the course of international system is the course of capitalist economy.⁵⁴ Wallerstein's criticism of modernization theory and his analyses of the hegemonic power lead not only to the reexamination of the role and position of Ukraine in the capitalist global world, but also the essence of historical change in general. Initially it is worth noting that according to Wallerstein, the analysis of any sovereign state such as Ukraine cannot be done separately from the world-system. Crucial to my argument is Wallerstein's idea that the accurate starting point of analysis should be the capitalist world-system, and sovereign states have to be seen as a part of organizational formation within single capitalist world-economy.⁵⁵ From this perspective, economic and socio-political changes in Ukraine along with particular events should be examined in the scheme of modern capitalist world-system.

Wallerstein's method is very useful in understanding that economic base is the driving force and global capitalism is radically unfair economic, political and cultural order. Drawing heavily from orthodox Marxist analysis, Wallerstein observes that the essence of the capitalist world economy consists of unequal exchange relations between different geographical areas of the world and the parasitic relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries. While this point is specifically analyzed in chapter four, it is important to underline that, according to Wallerstein, the capitalist world-economy operates through the order of cyclical rhythms to which scholar refers as

⁵³ Robert Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism," *New Left Review* 1, no. 104 (July – August, 1977): 25-92.

⁵⁴ Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-System Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).

⁵⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System* (New York: Academic Press, INC., 1974), 7.

to Kondratieff cycles. As Wallerstein summarizes, Kondratieff cycles consists of the phase A and the phase B which have so far been fifty or sixty years in length.⁵⁶ Assuming that capitalism is a system whose dynamic is to spread out or collapse, it should be obvious that the phase A reflects the recovery and the expansion of the economy, while the phase B signifies its exhaustion and stagnation. Because significant structural changes are implemented in the phase B in order to return to the phase A, “a Kondratieff cycle, when it ends, never returns the situation to where it was at the beginning of the cycle.”⁵⁷ Following Wallerstein, it should be clear that a series of restoration measures, which have been repeatedly applied throughout the last 500 years to solve problems of capital accumulation, resulted in the transformation of the “capitalist world-economy from a system located primarily in Europe to one that covers the entire globe.”⁵⁸

In the current historical conjuncture, according to the world-system approach, the B-phase of the Kondratieff cycle (world-wide economic stagnation), which the capitalist world-economy experiences, comes to its end and marks the collapse of capitalism. Acknowledging that there are two scenarios for the future of capitalist world-economy and one of them is the possibility of the restructuring of the capitalist system and formation of new wave of cyclic changes, Wallerstein insists that capitalism will be replaced by a new order either worse or much better, depending on the worldwide political struggle.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Wallerstein, *World-System Analysis: An Introduction*, 31.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 163.

⁵⁹ Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Depression: A Long-Term View,” *Commentary* 243, October 15, 2008, Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton, New York, <http://www.all4all.org/2009/04/3503.shtml> (accessed July 22, 2011).

Wallerstein believes that capitalism has entered a critical phase, unfavorable for maximum accumulation of capital and thereby for a new transition into the phase A. Once again, this means that under this scenario, the current global system of modernity has reached a crisis point that will eventually lead to the establishment of a new historical system. This argument, in turn, is supported by Wallerstein's assertion that the decline of U.S. hegemony in the 1970s led to global capitalist crisis. Nevertheless, while Wallerstein's approach offers a cyclical view of history and deliberates on the concept of hegemony as the necessary structural element of capitalist socio-political and economic order, it seems that the world-system theorist underestimates the current role of the capitalist hegemonic state in the system of international relations, the United States.

From Wallerstein's viewpoint, the hegemony of the United States has ended during the capitalist crisis in 1970s. In his work titled *U.S. Weakness and the Struggle for Hegemony*, Wallerstein argues that the period of unquestioned U.S. hegemony lasted during the first twenty-five years of the post World War II period.⁶⁰ According to the author, the crucial turning point was the "world revolution" of 1968 which (depending on location) was seen as anti-liberal and anti-tyranny movements of the working class, the reaction to U.S. imperialism and a civil-right struggle. Wallerstein claims that in addition to the dissatisfaction with a pace of economic recovery and weakened socio-political values, the rise of economic rivals and the U.S. Vietnam's defeat, "all taken together,

⁶⁰ Immanuel Wallerstein, "U.S. Weakness and the Struggle for Hegemony," *Monthly Review* 55, no. 3 (July-August 2003), <http://monthlyreview.org/2003/07/01/u-s-weakness-and-the-struggle-for-hegemony> (accessed July 19, 2011).

Also see Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World* (New York: New Press, 2003).

mark the beginning of the decline of the United States.”⁶¹ To add extra weight to this idea, Wallerstein notes that it was at this point that the cost of good times with its consequences started to be experienced. Institutional foundations of post-war prosperity began if not to fall apart, then to shake noticeably.⁶²

Behind the Curtains: Structural Power

Setting aside the structural economic changes in the world politics during the 1970s, Susan Strange’s examination of the notion of structural power in international relations has been a valuable theoretical contribution for this work. Strange suggests that we reject a classical realist view on the concept of power and hegemony, which emphasizes the category of the state as the central actor exercising power in the relational aspect or in terms of resources, and move on to think of power in terms of influence and ability to determine the way in which the relationship between states, political and economic institutions, and even individuals have to operate on the national and international stages.⁶³

While Strange agreed with Wallerstein that a sharp decline of the U.S. power has taken place, she disagrees that the United States has lost its hegemonic power over the system of international relations.⁶⁴ According to Strange, the idea of America’s declining power, and the notion that this decline has been a vital cause for the disorder of the

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Immanuel Wallerstein, “America and the World: Today, Yesterday, and Tomorrow,” *Theory and Society* 21, no. 1 (February 1992): 8.

⁶³ Susan Strange, “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” *International Organization* 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1987): 565.

⁶⁴ Susan Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis,” *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 483.

capitalist world-system is simply a myth.⁶⁵ Strange is clear that the reason for the impression of the weakened U.S. authority is the fact that the capital controls have been dissolved and markets along with their actors have been given much more freedom to operate in the integrated world. In other words, Strange argues that the decline of U.S. hegemony can be explained by the government's unwillingness to intervene with global free market mechanisms as opposed to the perception of military or economic failures of the U.S. in the international arena.⁶⁶

For Strange, the change in America's role and position in the world has been determined by internal economic factors rather than international and political. As Strange points out, since 1970s in the U.S. foreign policy the goal of pursuing commercial and financial interests has finally overcome its political and national interests.⁶⁷ This way of looking at things, according to Chris Brown, allows us to see the influence of America's corporate class over its foreign policy.⁶⁸ It should be clear that while the strength of the American political system to influence the international agenda has been weakening, the ability of the U.S. corporate class to exercise power over the international community has been increasing.⁶⁹

This does not mean that the United States as a superpower has been in decline, rather, it has changed its role. As Strange notes, the intensified role of U.S. multinational companies worldwide signifies that the ability of the United States to exercise influence and authority has become much greater than that of any other government in the

⁶⁵ Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," 553.

⁶⁶ Strange, "Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," 483.

⁶⁷ Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," 553.

⁶⁸ Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, 190.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

international arena.⁷⁰ Strange argues that although at the height of reorganization of the international economic system in 1970s there were weaknesses in the American power and consequently the deterioration of international regimes, the expression of U.S. hegemony should be sought in international cooperation and global economic and socio-political policy-making.⁷¹

According to Strange, there are four primary structures upon which the international system is based and through which the hegemony maintains and operates. These primary, separate and independent, but at the same time interconnected structures are: the financial structure, the political structure, the production structure and the knowledge structure.⁷² Generally for Strange, all four are significant, and the state-actor which has primary control over the structures and consequently can gain favorable outcome without being actively involved in the making of decisions is the most powerful.⁷³

Neo-Gramscianism and Understandings of International Political Economy

In contrast to the idea that the U.S. hegemony has declined dramatically, neo-Gramscian approaches in international political economy, which developed in the 1980s, elaborate on the concept of structural power and argue that the U.S. hegemony did not end in the 1970s, but has increased significantly. Drawing from Antonio Gramsci's ideas of hegemony and transnational class alliances, neo-Gramscian theorists such as Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, and Adam David Morton analyze hegemony in ideological, cultural

⁷⁰ Susan Strange, "The Future of the American Empire," *Journal of International Affairs* 42, no. 1 (Fall 1988): 7.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷² Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," 565.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

and class context and apply the structural power frame to international relations. For example, Cox, in his work titled *Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*, makes it clear that direct control and supremacy of one state over the chain of other states may be essential but not enough for the hegemony to be exercised.⁷⁴ Cox pays much closer attention to the role of ideas and institutions in maintaining a stable international order and develops an analysis of the U.S. hegemony which, according to him, is an outcome of the alliance of capitalist class and social forces from all over the world.

Clearly, although within the state, Wallerstein considers hegemony to be based on the combination of ideology, institutions and ideas which ensure the continuing supremacy of leading corporate classes, on an inter-state level, world-system approach limits itself to the state-centric conception and misses the restructuring of the global capitalism during the 1980s.⁷⁵ Gill is among those who heavily criticizes the conventional notion of hegemony, associated with the behavioral forms of power, and elaborates on the idea that both domestic and international power spreads not only behaviorally, but also structurally, in “normative” and “material” proportions.⁷⁶ As Gill argues, the power and influence of the United States continues, but nowadays it is through cultural values such as consumerism and individualism.⁷⁷ It is important to recognize that this kind of American hegemony has been built and maintained through the “combination of tactical

⁷⁴ Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (1981): 139.

See also Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

⁷⁵ Stephen Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 38-41.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 86.

alliances” which have operated through a great variety of institutions.⁷⁸ Focusing on class analysis and Gramscian theory, Gill points out that the American corporate class invested enormous power resources into the formation of transnational capitalist alliances through which its power and hegemony are exercised on a global scale.⁷⁹

If we think about the nature of international system since 1970, it should be obvious that it is structured in a way that produces positive outcomes for the American corporate class notwithstanding state’s economic or military position. The ability to set the global agenda through international organizations and transnational alliances has provided the United States a possibility to exercise its power with a minimal amount of force. As Cox underlines, the existence of formal and informal institutions allows pressure on states to be exercised without a visibility of state’s power and authority usurpation.⁸⁰ Neo-Gramscians point out that international institutions such as IMF, World Bank, WTO, NATO, and UN Security Council should be seen as instruments of U.S. hegemony.

In this connection, Stefano Guzzini underlines that the concept of structural power involves “three different meanings, namely, indirect institutional power, nonintentional power, and impersonal empowering.”⁸¹ Although the activity of global socio-political, economic and military foundations looks like a consequence of an interaction of intended and inadvertent influence of actor’s decisions and non-decisions, according to Guzzini,

⁷⁸ Ibid., 87.

⁷⁹ Stephen Gill, “American Hegemony: Its Limits and Prospects in the Reagan Era,” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 15, no. 3 (Winter 1986): 317.

⁸⁰ Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” 144.

⁸¹ Stefano Guzzini, “Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis,” *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 450.

Strange's structural lens make a compelling case for the "non-intentional power."⁸² Guzzini notes that for Strange, the international system seems to be administered by the transnational forces whose location is very difficult to identify for the reason of being not tied to a particular geographic territory, but whose current centre for decision making is in the United States.⁸³ Following Strange, Guzzini concludes that regardless of the fact that forces in the U.S. are not always able to control what gets on the international agenda and what will be the outcome of their decisions or actions, the international structure is organized "in a way that decisions in countries are systematically tied to and affect actors in the same and other countries."⁸⁴

As is apparent, forces exercising hegemony do not exist exclusively within states. Examining the issue from the perspective of critical theory, Cox argues that the "entire world can be seen as a pattern of interacting social forces in which states play an intermediate though autonomous role between the global structure of social forces and local configurations of social forces within the particular countries."⁸⁵ Therefore, it is extremely important not to take the notion of state and identity as unquestioned starting points and understand that both the nation-state and national identity have arisen under certain historical conditions. If we think about the state in terms of this discourse, the crucial point is that the behavior of actors in the system of international relations is "shaped either directly by pressures projected through the system or indirectly by the subjective awareness on the part of actors of the constraints imposed by the system."⁸⁶

⁸² Ibid., 457.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," 141.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 144.

In this context, William Robinson makes it clear that if prior to the late 1960s, state capitalist classes were in well-defined rivalry with each other, in the modern era of globalization we are witnessing the formation of a world ruling class “whose coordinates are no longer national.”⁸⁷ Thus, it is important to note that “as national circuits of capital become transnationally integrated, these new transnational circuits become the sites of class formation worldwide.”⁸⁸ Therefore, capitalist elites, in order to protect their privileged status act collectively through strengthening and extending international institutions, democracy and free-trade ideology.⁸⁹ Those who do not obey the rules of the dominant capitalist elites and act in the interests of the state, people and communities are punished with strong sanctions, international isolation or military force.

Strengthening of Ukraine's Peripheral Structure

Obviously, now we are witnessing the transformation of Ukraine into a full-fledged market economy and finalization of the process of capitalist class formation. The power in Ukraine belongs to the wealthy echelons of society which are a part of a complex system working to extend and consolidate Western neoliberal hegemony. As Ukrainian elite is focused mainly on its personal enrichment, there are doubts about long-term strategic planning in Ukrainian foreign and internal policies. Further, sovereignty of the Ukrainian state and power of the central government can no longer be considered absolutely in categories of state or national interest.⁹⁰ Ukrainian state is becoming more and more internationalized what means that sovereign power of the state is shifting to

⁸⁷ William I. Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2004), 37.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁸⁹ Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, 62.

⁹⁰ Stepan Havrysh, “Rekvyem po Suverenytetu,” *Ukrayins'ka Pravda*, May 30, 2011, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2011/05/30/6216838/> (accessed July 12, 2011).

international institutions and regimes. Therefore, the adoption of key decisions on strategic development is impossible without active involvement of supranational global institutions such as UN, IMF, NATO, WTO, G-8, EU, NATO, OSCE and so forth.⁹¹ In this context, the current stage of relations between Ukraine and NATO means a reorganization of the national forms of governance. In fact, while cooperation between the Alliance and Ukraine in economic, military and political spheres should be seen in context of reproduction of hegemonic relationships, possible future membership in NATO for Ukraine will signify the consolidation and legitimization of capitalist hegemonic ideology.

⁹¹ Ibid.

See also Vandana Shiva, "Food Rights, Free Trade, and Fascism," in *Globalizing Rights*, eds. Matthew J. Gibney (New York: The Oxford University Press, 2003), 102.

III. THE NEOREALIST ARGUMENT - UKRAINE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO

A. Argument

While military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine is simultaneously the worst case and a perfectly credible scenario, deterioration in relations between the two former Soviet republics is inevitable in the case of Ukraine joining NATO without Russia. Even at the early stage of Ukrainian movement towards NATO, initiated by former president Yushchenko, Russia's negative reaction was apparent. This section of the thesis places the issue of Ukrainian membership in NATO in the context of the concept of security from the "methodologically positivist and philosophically realist"⁹² standpoint, and argues that Ukraine's admission to the military circle of the Western states not only harms European security in general, but expands the danger of war.

As a part of my argumentation that Ukrainian membership in NATO is not in the interests of Ukraine, this chapter focuses on the main argument of the Ukrainian political establishment in favor of NATO. The chapter demonstrates that Ukraine's incorporation into the North Atlantic Alliance will decrease rather than increase Ukrainian security "by placing it in a more vulnerable position than it was before it chose to join the alliance."⁹³ Despite the rhetoric, there is a growing realization that the expansion of the military alliance into Russia's geopolitical backyard is extremely risky and may in fact reduce Ukraine's state security. Even during Yushchenko's presidency, in a moment when Ukraine was actively pursuing membership in NATO, Russia had every reason to view

⁹² Quoted in Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 28.

⁹³ Quoted in Michael Altfeld, "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test," *The Western Political Quarterly* 37, no.4 (December 1984): 525.

this as a threat especially when taking into consideration the factor of the United States in the region. The Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, in his speech before the lower house of Parliament in 2006 said that NATO's relations with Ukraine are examined from the point of view of the Russia's national interest and the acceptance of Ukraine will mean a "colossal geopolitical shift."⁹⁴ Since the Orange Revolution, while the U.S. has been pressing Ukraine toward NATO membership, Russia has been expressing its dissatisfaction with political leaders' ambitions of Ukraine by cutting energy supplies and intervening in Ukraine's domestic politics. Therefore, I argue that NATO membership for Ukraine will lead to negative consequences for relations between Ukraine and Russia which may result in an unfavorable outcome for Ukrainian society.

Although there is an impression in the West that the question of war in Europe has been solved, a nuclear-armed Russia has every reason to view NATO expansion as a direct threat to its state security which in its turn may lead to the taking of protective measures on the part of the Russian leadership. The status of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, and considerable Russian-speaking communities in Ukraine, and its economic dependence on Russian energy resources raise significant concerns about the unpredictable consequences of Ukraine's entry into NATO. The chapter analyzes how Ukraine can suffer more under NATO and ultimately questions the very credibility of NATO's security commitment to Ukraine in the case of military confrontation.

⁹⁴ "NATO Entry for Ukraine, Georgia would be Geopolitical Shift for Russia," *Pravda*, July 7, 2006, <http://english.pravda.ru/world/81693-NATO-0> (accessed September 19, 2009).

B. The Illusionary Fear of Russia

The Neorealist Logic

By claiming that NATO membership for Ukraine will maximize the security of the country, it is clear that the pro-Western government has used neorealist terminology to formulate its main argument for Ukraine to join NATO.⁹⁵ This evidence is supported by the neorealist assumption that sovereign states are the only actors in the system of international relations which are motivated by state interest and driven by power.⁹⁶ According to neorealism, the interest of each state is its security and survival. Furthermore, in Kenneth N. Waltz's words, "Preoccupation with identifying dangers and counteracting them become a way of life."⁹⁷ This means that states are obliged to "continually adjust their stance in the world in accordance with their reading of power of others and their own power."⁹⁸ Michael Altfeld argues that the security of a state can be strengthened either by building up its own military or by joining an alliance formed on the basis of mutual commitments by states to oppose dangers jointly in case of one being attacked.⁹⁹ While the enlargement of the military is financially costly and demands a considerable expenditure of human resources, membership in an alliance, according to James Morrow, increases security immediately "with the costs of commitment to the ally,

⁹⁵ Neorealist or structural realist theory of international relations develops on the idea that the world politics should be analyzed both in the unit-level and structural-level contexts. See Kenneth H. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Glen H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 20.

⁹⁶ Steans and Pettiford, *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, 49-69.

⁹⁷ Kenneth H. Waltz, "The Origin of War in Neorealist Theory," in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 43.

⁹⁸ Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, 46.

⁹⁹ Altfeld, "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test," 525.

the possibility of entrapment, and the need to align policy with the ally to render the alliance credible.”¹⁰⁰

Stephen M. Walt’s widely cited book *The Origins of Alliances* concentrates on the elaboration and testing of a number of hypotheses about alliance formation and functioning. Walt claims that the behavior of states is determined by threats, and argues that the process of forming or joining the alliances occurs in the pursuit of security or autonomy. For Walt, external threats are the primary and the most unquestionable catalyst to becoming a member of the military alliance.¹⁰¹ Being focused on external threats, the state faces a choice between joining a system of collective security or allying itself with the source of danger and domination. Walt argues that consideration of such factors as aggregate and offensive power, geographic proximity and certain conditions in regional or international politics with its ideological and intentional implications play a crucial role in the state’s adjusting of its security policy. According to Walt’s theory, the conscious choice to pursue membership in NATO and the abandonment of a non-aligned multi-vector foreign policy is a natural reaction of Ukraine to the perception of the threat from the Russian Federation and can be explained by a “balance of threat theory.”¹⁰² On the basis of a “balance of threat theory”, Walt instructs Ukraine to join NATO rather than keeping its neutral stand or bandwagoning with Russia.

The tense state of relations between Ukraine and Russia has represented the cost of Ukraine’s neutrality as extremely high. Being confronted by significant pressure from Russia, the choice of neutrality for Ukraine seemed to place the survival of the state at

¹⁰⁰ James Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” *Annual Review of Political Science* (2000): 76.

¹⁰¹ Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 26.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 264.

huge, visible risk. For Walt, the geographical propinquity of threat is a key factor in the process of alliances' grouping which for its part shapes the perception of Ukraine's political elite and determines the choice of alliance partners. Walt is clear that alignment with a threatening state is perilous as it only multiplies the resource base of the dominant actor and strengthens the relations between strong and weak states on the basis of obedience.¹⁰³ While perceiving the coalition with others to balance against the threat from the state nearby, the pro-NATO forces have been confident that the power and ambitions of Russia will be reduced and thereby NATO membership would enhance Ukraine's regional influence. In reality, Yushchenko's NATO ambitions in the face of solid popular opposition not only put emphasis on the underdeveloped sense of Ukrainian state interest but also led to the deterioration of its relations with Russia.

The Justification for NATO Membership

While tensions in bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia existed before Yushchenko became the president, during his five years' tenure Russian-Ukrainian relations worsened significantly. Yushchenko's inability to consolidate power and his failure to implement coherent domestic economic reforms resulted in an intensified foreign policy approach based on security and geopolitical considerations rather than economic benefits. Furthermore, identity politics in the form of Ukrainian nationalism which was stoked under Yushchenko and which was drawn upon to compensate the failure of the state, has become the main instrument in the hands of political leadership to "shape both the internal political landscape and the whole set of goals and instruments of

¹⁰³ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 153.

foreign policy.”¹⁰⁴ As the country was pushed deeper and deeper from serious political crisis into economic decline, the rhetoric of internal security and geopolitics, laden with identity politics, was intensified. In this context, Mikhail Molchanov, while analyzing Ukraine’s policy of European integration, points out that the main objectives and overall direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy has always been used by Ukrainian leadership “to compensate for glaring failures of domestic policy on practically every direction imaginable.”¹⁰⁵ The struggle for power during the entire Yushchenko’s presidential term and a serious economic crisis with institutionalized corruption, heavy unemployment and unprecedented fall in living standards facilitated the growth of anti- Russianism “as the best proof of democratic credentials and western orientation of newly independent state.”¹⁰⁶ Therefore, on the basis of Molchanov’s analysis, the point is that Russia has never been a threat for Ukraine and the sources of Ukraine’s problems are within Ukraine’s elected leadership.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, focusing on government alone is not enough. The problem is much deeper and involves the issues in spheres of manipulation of public consciousness.

Molchanov refers to anti-Russianism not only as a justification of Ukrainian independence that was developed by Western opinion leaders throughout the first post-Soviet decade, but argues that the perception of Russia as an enemy and the rhetorical reaffirmation of the myth of resurgence of Russian imperialism has been instrumental in

¹⁰⁴ Mikhail Molchanov, *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 12.

¹⁰⁵ Mikhail Molchanov, “Ukraine’s European Choice: Pitfalls and Prospects,” (Research project funded by the NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO: Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 2003): 6, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/molchanov.pdf>; (accessed 16 April 2010).

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 32.

the country's developing of pro-NATO drive. This is to confirm Richard Solomon's assumption made in 1999 that "Ukraine's acceptance of a Western policy of actively pulling Ukraine into NATO would surely sharpen the appearance of an anti-Russian ideology on the part of the Ukrainian government, thereby severely threatening relations not only between Russia and Ukraine, but also between Russians and Ukrainians."¹⁰⁸ The perception of Ukraine as a victim of a hostile Russian foreign policy has been constructed to alienate Ukraine from Russia as much as possible both in geopolitical and cultural contexts.¹⁰⁹ Thus, while realizing the complexity and sensitivity of the issue of eastward NATO expansion on Russia's borders, Yushchenko, with strong support of Washington, was pushing Ukraine into NATO at the expense of its relationship with Moscow.

It should be apparent that Yushchenko's approach to bringing Ukraine into NATO was based on the strategy of raising the level of hatred towards Russia and represented itself as a justification for Ukrainian membership in the military organization. Yushchenko was confident that only the perception of Russia as an enemy or a threat for Ukraine could change the view of NATO within the Ukrainian population and could bring the case for NATO membership for Ukraine without Russia. The rhetoric and activity of the former president was directed to reproduce Ukrainian hostility towards Russia through propaganda that accuses the Russian people for the crimes not just of monarchical Russia but even for all those of the Soviet leadership against Ukrainian people.¹¹⁰ In fact, the debate around ethnic differences between Russians and Ukrainians,

¹⁰⁸ Richard H. Solomon, Foreword to *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, by Anatol Lieven (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), x.

¹⁰⁹ Molchanov, "Ukraine's European Choice: Pitfalls and Prospects," 7.

¹¹⁰ Adopted from Lieven, *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, 157.

enthusiastically supported by Yushenko's government, in turn significantly contributed to the challenges related to Ukraine's state building.

Unfortunately, in spite of the people's great optimism and expectations, Yushchenko was not only unsuccessful in developing pragmatic and balanced domestic and foreign policies, but significantly contributed to putting Ukraine on the verge of a split with the western part of the country shifting towards the West and the eastern and central parts moving towards Russia. Constant speculations about Ukrainian history, issues of maritime border demarcation and the status of Russia's navy in the Crimean Peninsula, gas disputes, mutual political accusations and aggressive rhetoric by Kiev and Moscow significantly contributed to the situation which has been found as threatening and hostile for both Ukraine and Russia. While Russia was making demonstrative and more conflict-oriented actions to show Ukraine's vulnerability to ethnic and linguistic pressures, Yushchenko's push towards Ukraine's integration into NATO was grounded on the view of Russia being a rogue, egoistic and threatening state. The strategic choice between East and West which has attracted its attention during the events of Orange Revolution, and Yushenko's appeal to Ukrainian nationalism explain the escalation of the hostile perception of Russia among Ukrainians.

To be sure, under Yushchenko's leadership, the Ukrainian perception of Russia as a threat was intensified and served as a serious destabilizing factor for Ukrainian society. In this regard, George Liska confirms the idea that a possibility for conflict is the decisive factor in the alignment and realignment policies of each state.¹¹¹ As Liska claims, the primary advantage of the movement toward alignment is deterrence and confrontation of

¹¹¹ George Liska, *Nations in Alliance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 13.

rival or adversary. Through the conclusion of agreements in the realm of national security the stronger state or the partner-states commit to mutual assistance of the potential victim in the case of possible conflict with another strong power. While the goals which every state expects to achieve by means of alliance are various, according to Liska, the threat against the weaker state from the third party is a determining condition in alignment and realignment processes. Similarly, Glen Snyder stresses that “adversary relations provide the reason d’état for alliances and alignments.”¹¹² Therefore, concerns about maximizing the self-preservation of Ukraine and the necessity to align against Russia served as a specific motivation for the speediest decision to pursue membership in NATO, what in its turn was represented as a right choice to serve Ukrainian state interests.

C. Russia’s Security Dilemma

If for the Soviet leadership, the signing on 4 April 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty was interpreted as an offensive move by the Western bloc, allowing Ukraine to join NATO without Russia would signify an immediate geostrategic threat and danger for Moscow. This fact is supported by the neorealist premise which finds the reason for such a sense of insecurity in the anarchical nature of the international system.¹¹³ Historically, during the formation of NATO, there was a strong common interest to provide a defense against the Soviet bloc. At the same time, Soviet Union had to take actions to protect itself. The Soviet response to the formation of the military Alliance was to enhance its own power and security by the counter-formation of the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance as

¹¹² Glen H. Snyder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” review of *The Origins of Alliances*, by Stephen M. Walt and *The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems*, by Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, *International Organization* 45, no. 1 (1991): 125.

¹¹³ Waltz, “The Origin of War in Neorealist Theory,” 43.

For more on insecurity as a main consequence of anarchy, see Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 17.

well as the founding of the Warsaw Pact in 1955.¹¹⁴ From the position of the neorealist theory of international relations, the behavior of the Soviet Union was caused by the fear of insecurity generated by the uncertainty about the intentions of the United States.¹¹⁵ In its turn, the formation of a counter-alliance provided reasons for NATO members to consider the behavior of the Soviet Union as aggressive. Since no side could recognize that the buildup of the military power was defensively inspired, each had to presuppose that it could be planned for attack.¹¹⁶ Such an illusionary perception of security, based on the uncertainty about others' intentions, has served to be the explanation for the Cold War and the successful existence of the North-Atlantic military alliance since 1949.

The Russian Fear of Geo-Strategic Threat

The Russian perception of the Atlantic Alliance and its enlargement elicits an antagonistic reaction from Moscow and is an important factor in Ukraine's desire to join NATO. In the minds of the Russian political elite as well as the average Russian, the prospect of a new wave of NATO expansion to include Ukraine indicates a "continuation of the policy aimed at pushing Russia out of its traditional spheres of influence, and a move that signifies Russia's encirclement with international protectorates or mandate territories of a Bosnia-Kosovo type."¹¹⁷ For Russia, on the basis of the historical assumptions, the process of NATO's eastward enlargement seems to be motivated by the Western intentions to exploit Russia's weakness and should not be viewed as a peaceful process. In fact, a strong opposition to the idea of Ukrainian membership in NATO and

¹¹⁴ Gardner, "NATO Enlargement and Geostategic History: Alliances and the Question of War and Peace," 23.

¹¹⁵ Adopted from Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 17-19.

¹¹⁶ Glen H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984): 461.

¹¹⁷ Molchanov, *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations*, 274.

the Alliance's continuous expansion all the way to Russia's borders is a clear sign of NATO's dismissal of Russian interests, and therefore evokes a harsh reaction from the Russian political establishment. If the inclusion of three Baltic countries heightened Russia's sense of isolation, the Ukrainian accession to NATO, according to the average Russian, would be decisive evidence of Western attempts to isolate and subordinate Russians at the same time.¹¹⁸ The point is that while Western World perhaps views NATO as being transformed into a political organization, in Russia, the Alliance is considered in purely military terms. From the Russian perspective, plans to incorporate Ukraine into the Western military alliance along with the American proposal to deploy anti-ballistic missile (ABM) components in Eastern Europe are grounded on realist reasoning and are targeted against Russia, regardless of whether there is an authoritarian or democratic form of government. Western behavior has been interpreted as aggressive, and an extension of NATO's influence as a threat to Russia's security.

Within Russian society it is generally accepted that the process of NATO enlargement is connected to Western perceptions of Russia as being a potential enemy.¹¹⁹ Such an assumption is based on anti-Russian opinions, prevalent mostly in the United States and Eastern Europe, which are rooted in the past dating back hundreds of years, and which since the end of the Cold War have continued to be full of hostility.¹²⁰ The growth of Russia's defense spending, its attempts to preserve its traditional sphere of influence and its elimination of domestic opposition have contributed to an image of

¹¹⁸ Lieven, *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, 156.

See also Kent R. Meyer, "US Support for Baltic Membership in NATO: What Ends, What Risks?" *Parameters* 30 (Winter 2000-2001), 67-82.

¹¹⁹ Anatol Lieven, "The NATO-Russia Accord: An Illusory Solution," in *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality*, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2001), 147.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 145.

Russia as a potential threat. This view of Russia as a source of danger was recently reinforced by the depiction of war in Georgia by the Western mass-media. While rejecting Georgia's role in starting the conflict along with ignoring the importance of the U.S. material support to Saakashvili's regime, Western journalists, according to historian Herbert Bix, "Fostered Russophobic sentiment by disseminating completely one-sided war news, demonizing Russia as the evil aggressor, and championing 'democratic', peace-loving Georgia."¹²¹ While realizing that it is not possible to completely grasp the objectivity and being willing to adjust myself to the relativity of truth claims, I tend to agree with this viewpoint. Moreover, this debate clearly demonstrates how power relations contribute to the formation of certain knowledge and leads to conclude that perceptions play a critical role in the issue of Ukraine's incorporation into NATO.

As seen from Moscow, a new round of hostility towards Russia clearly confirms that the West's struggle against communism and the Soviet Union had not ideological, but exclusively geopolitical meaning. This viewpoint finds its support in different schools of thought regarding the strategic geopolitical importance of the area of the former Soviet bloc precisely to the United States. Nevertheless, to provide a clear and a strong explanation for NATO's engagement with the countries of the former Soviet Union, it is necessary to refer to the geopolitical views of one of the prominent advocates of NATO's membership for Ukraine which is motivated by the resentment toward Russia. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor in the Carter administration, has portrayed Russia's exercise of its influence on neighboring states as a extension of uncivilized and "proto-imperial approach", and has argued for the adoption of the Western policy of

¹²¹ Herbert Bix, "Lessons from the War in Georgia," Asia Times Online, October 22, 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JJ22Ag02.html (accessed June 7, 2010).

“geopolitical pluralism” that should seek as its primary objective to guarantee that Russia would not become a “mighty supranational state and a truly global power.”¹²² According to Brzezinski, the political, military and economic integration of the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe should be a basic strategy of the Western geopolitical approach.¹²³

Furthermore, in terms of Russian-Ukrainian relations, Brzezinski confirms this mode of thinking by arguing that “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.”¹²⁴ Therefore, as it can be seen from this realist analysis of the role and place of once-Soviet states in Europe, it is clear that NATO’s engagement with Ukraine is a part of a broader policy directed to oppose Russian interests in the region. Unfortunately, being great supporters of Ukraine’s NATO membership, the majority of Western thinkers and policymakers such as Brzezinski simply ignores both the real interests of ordinary Ukrainians and their everyday reality and has been consciously pushing Ukraine into a culturally driven conflict with Russia.¹²⁵

The Problem of Self-Identification

Ironically, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Ukraine and Russia have found themselves to be confronted with severe problems of self-identification and statecraft. In this context, Igor Klyamkin, Alexander Akhiezer and Igor Yakovenko have

¹²² Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (1994): 76.

¹²³ Adopted from Roland Dannreuther, “Russian Perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance,” *Final Report for the NATO Fellowship - 1995-1997*, Edinburgh University, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/dannreut.pdf> (accessed September 7, 2011):33-35.

¹²⁴ Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” 80.

¹²⁵ Lieven, *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, 154.

argued that Russia's political crisis with the West during the Ukraine's presidential elections in 2004 was a conflict based on cultural principles.¹²⁶ According to the scholars, the obvious explanation to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine is the fact that not only the Ukrainian political elite but also a considerable part of Ukrainian society have acquired the European identity and are on their way to the full integration into Western civilization.¹²⁷ It should be pointed out that for Russia, allowing Ukraine to join Western institutions without Russia means an indication of imminent danger to Russian national identity which is grounded on the common history of the East Slavic peoples. Therefore, while this chapter argues against Ukrainian membership in NATO from the realist/neorealist perspective, it is also important to recognize subjective and behavioral obstacles to this membership that are closely related to the issues of national identity.

It is a little wonder that with a Russian perception of the Atlantic Alliance and with the level of mutual interdependence between two states, Russia has been antagonized by the intentions of pro-Western leadership to alienate Ukraine from Russia culturally, as well as geopolitically. Linked to these, Klyamkin, Akhiezer and Yakovenko underline that "When Western civilization begins to expand by absorbing parts of the former Soviet empire, the logic of civilization is replaced by the logic of geopolitics."¹²⁸ The authors suggest an idea that Ukraine's membership in NATO would signify the moment of Slavic civilization's loss of its basis, and thereby would advance the Russia's identity crisis to its depth. In fact, it should be plain that Russia's identity crisis involves

¹²⁶ Alexander Akhiezer, Igor Klyamkin and Igor Yakovenko, "Time to Decide on Russia's Identity," *Russia in Global Affairs* 3, (July – September 2006), <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/16/1045.html> (accessed June 15, 2010).

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

For more on issues of Ukrainian and Russian national identities, see Lieven, *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, 135-152.

the issue of devaluation of Russia's long-standing identity as a strong Eurasian power in which the concern for Slavic-Orthodox unity dominates.

While realizing that classification scheme to which we can also address Eastern Slavs is a modern construct and which is very problematic to apply in the academic work, it is also very important to understand that “all nations tell a version of their histories that is shaped by present circumstances.”¹²⁹ Nevertheless, of all countries of the former Soviet Union Ukraine has the strongest cultural ties to Russia and is the most important partner country, but both nations are also intimately linked. Consequently, as Molchanov notes, considering the traditional Russian perception of Ukraine as a younger brother, if not actually a part of a large Russian ethnicity, the vision of inviolable border between the two states means much more than a conventional military dispute.¹³⁰

As a response to the crisis of Russia's dislocation of cultural bonds after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a discourse of reunification and preservation of East-Slavic civilization of which Ukraine is an important part, and the idea of the domination of Russia in the Eurasian world has represented an attempt to solve the national question for Russians. The fact that a great number of Russians live in neighboring states has become a crucial factor in the debate on who should belong to the Russian nation or whether Russia can sustain its image of the “unique” country, or even a separate civilization. According to a great number of Russian scholars and politicians, the development of Russian identity not only requires the unification of all Russians under

¹²⁹ Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), xiii.

¹³⁰ Molchanov, *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations*, 246.

one political structure but also demands a multi-ethnic approach which involves the unification of all Eastern Slavs into one federal unit.

Proponents of preserving the East Slavic civilization insist on the restoration of “the ties of organic solidarity between people, which are increasingly lost with the advance of Western civilization.”¹³¹ As Vera Tolz says “linguistic and cultural similarities between Eastern Slavs and alleged common history, stretching back to the medieval principality of Kievan Rus” are the key elements that form the positive attitude of the majority of Russians to the view that Belarusians and Ukrainians are a part of the Russian nation.¹³² Moreover, it is important to underline that the majority of average Russians very often see themselves as “Soviet people” and regard the former Soviet space as their homeland. Thus, the idea of “all-Russian unity” which in turn demands an alteration of post-Soviet borders and limiting the sovereignty of Russia’s independent post-Soviet neighbors “reveals a supranational, civilizational tendency” in the resolving of Russia’s crisis of national identity.¹³³

Igor Zevelev stresses the dramatic growth of the formulations of the ideological factors of the Russian foreign policy in the context of “civilizational affiliation of the country”, noting that “beginning in 2008, for the first time since the Soviet Union’s breakup, the Russian government began to speak in terms of a large supranational project.”¹³⁴ Nevertheless, while Zevelev acknowledges that identity is shaped by discursive practices and points out that supranational project in any form is a product of a

¹³¹ Molchanov, *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations*, 100.

¹³² Vera Tolz, “‘Creating’ a Russian Nation,” *Perspective* 9, no. 2 (November-December 1998), Institute for Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy, <http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol9/Tolz.html> (accessed June 21 2010).

¹³³ Igor Zevelev, “Russia’s Future: Nation or Civilization?” *Russia in Global Affairs* 4, (October – December 2009), <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/29/1317.html> (accessed 21 June 2010).

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

ruling class, he argues that current Russian domestic and foreign policy formulations in terms of civilizational affiliation resulted from “the failure of attempts to become an independent part of the Greater West” and as a consequence of tense relations with the West in particular.¹³⁵

The key point we derive from the constructivist analysis of Ukraine’s and Russia’s identity problem is the “honest assessment of the Ukrainians’ and Russians’ common past.”¹³⁶ Although a great number of contemporary Ukrainian, Russian and Western historians are involved in a struggle for an explanation of the origin of the Slavs, it is necessary to realize that Kievan Rus as a long-lasting East Slavic political entity existed before the modern Russian, Ukrainian or Belorussian nations developed. Ukraine’s and Russia’s historical and political identification are interconnected, “their languages are traceable to a common root, their ethnic features exhibit profound similarities, and their mutual perceptions on a mass level are generally not hostile.”¹³⁷ As Anatol Lieven comments, “These links have not just been forged over the centuries by Russian, then Soviet, governments but have also developed ‘organically’ through millions of human contacts over hundreds of years.”¹³⁸

If the links between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples are to be disappeared, it should be allowed to occur through a slow and natural process of erosion, “without diktats, and without the stirring up of new ethnic hatred where none has so far existed.”¹³⁹ In this context, Molchanov indicates that “because of Ukraine’s intimate connection to

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*, 19.

¹³⁷ Molchanov, *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations*, 11.

¹³⁸ Lieven, *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, 2.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 161.

Russian politics and society and Ukraine's crucial proximity to the very sense of Russian national identity," Ukraine's incorporation into NATO will represent the greatest challenge to Russia's long-term statehood and eventually may bring the country to catastrophe.¹⁴⁰ In other words, with the deprivation of its Ukrainian essence, Russia will discontinue being the Russia we knew, and it will be required to reconstruct its identity.¹⁴¹

Ultimately, the policy of NATO enlargement is perceived by the Russians as anti-Russian, and admittance of Ukraine into the alliance is considered as a course of action aimed to increase a distance between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, while the contemporary situation in Ukraine with two centers of gravity represents a danger for Russia, the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO unilaterally causes feelings of horror not only among fanatical nationalists but also among people of liberal-democratic convictions.¹⁴² Considering that the expansion of NATO is producing new dividing lines on the map of Europe as well as paying attention to anti-Russian attitude expressed in Western World and produced by those like Brzezinski, there is a complete justification for Russia of being suspicious or even afraid of the West.¹⁴³

D. From Risk to Immediate Danger

With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, NATO was deprived of a reason for its existence as a military unit, and this created a problem for the realist/neorealist explanations of NATO expansion. However, while it is true that NATO has faced no

¹⁴⁰ Molchanov, *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations*, 275.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 246.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 243.

¹⁴³ For more on Russia's legitimate concerns, see Lieven, "The NATO-Russia Accord: An Illusory Solution," 144-146.

immediate threat, neorealists argue that the existence and enlargement of Alliance is directed to meet a potential threat from a resurgent Russia. From a neorealist point of view, the very exclusion of Russia and the growth of anti-Russian opinions in Eastern Europe is clear evidence that Russia continues to be a potential threat to NATO. While Russia has taken reciprocal steps to restore its defense capabilities, in the West this has been immediately interpreted as a revival of a military threat. Furthermore, Russian worries about NATO enlargement are portrayed as “an additional reason to fear and distrust Russia.”¹⁴⁴

Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder develop a theoretical argument concerning the alignment to balance against the greatest perceived threat.¹⁴⁵ Christensen and Snyder disagree with Walt’s assertion that states should join in an alliance against the perceived threat and argue that successful pursuing of security in the multipolar world demands avoiding of alliances. This view holds that the increase of defense through forming the alliance in order to balance a threat decreases the security of the threatening state, and thereby gives a rise to the security dilemma which in turn provokes competitiveness and warfare. According to Christensen and Snyder, the multi-polar structure of the international system by itself is very dangerous and any active behavior of a state actor aimed at pursuing their interests may threaten the stability of the system and inevitably lead to nationalistic clashes with other states.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 145.

¹⁴⁵ Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” *International Organization* 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990).

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 140.

Despite the questionable status of the real motives of NATO enlargement, with the approach of powerful NATO military force to the Russian borders, the possibility of surprise attack on Russia from the West increases dramatically. In light of Russia's perception of NATO and the strategic importance of Ukraine for Russia, in the event of Ukraine's incorporation into NATO, Russia will take short countermeasures. Because Russia will never reconcile itself to the humiliation and infringement of its state interests, further expansion of NATO without Russia would not only harm Russian-Ukrainian relations, but may threaten the entire structure of European security.¹⁴⁷ The entry of Ukraine into NATO raises the possibility that in case of military confrontation between Russia and any other member of the alliance, the territory of Ukraine may become the main scene of military confrontation

I tend to agree with the viewpoint that NATO's membership for Ukraine, while excluding Russia, "increases the most important potential threat to Ukraine, which is an internal one."¹⁴⁸ It is reasonable to expect that Ukraine's admittance into NATO would lead to resource depletion what in its turn could have the greatest impact on the economic and cultural destiny of the country. Moreover, being culturally divided with the eastern and central regions bearing a stronger Russian influence and the western regions pursuing a strong Western direction, turning Ukraine into a Western military ally would rise nationalist sentiments what would further divide Ukrainian society. Even the preliminary position and reaction of Russian government on the issue of Ukraine's joining NATO has contributed to a split of culturally and ideologically divided Ukraine. Under such circumstances, an open conflict between pro-Western and pro-Eastern Ukraine is likely.

¹⁴⁷ "Lieven, "The NATO-Russia Accord: An Illusory Solution," 154-156.

¹⁴⁸ Lieven, *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, 158.

In this case, there are no doubts that Russia would stand on its interests and would not leave its Russian Diaspora without support.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, according to Lieven, such a scenario would provide an opportunity for annexation of Crimean Peninsula and Eastern Ukraine to the Russian state.

This assumption can be supported by the view of Samuel Huntington that culture will be central to any future conflict.¹⁵⁰ If the wars of the previous centuries were “primary conflicts within Western civilization,” with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the interactions between Western and non-Western civilizations will determine the evolution of conflict.¹⁵¹ For Huntington, while the division of Europe on the basis of ideology has vanished, the cultural separation between “Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other hand, has reemerged.”¹⁵² Ukraine is situated on the dividing line in Europe and is culturally divided between the Catholic and Orthodox worlds.¹⁵³ While pointing to the events in Yugoslavia, Huntington argues that cultural dividing line is a line of instability and bloody conflict. As Jennifer Moroney affirms, “being therefore unable to play that central role in the stability and security of Central Eurasia that is so often ascribed to it,” Ukraine cannot fully integrate into the West.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, according to Huntington’s analysis, it is clear that any pro-Western move by the country that is closer to the opposite culture is extremely risky for its security. In short, Huntington’s civilizational paradigm provides an intelligible

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁵⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilization?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993):22.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 23.

¹⁵² Ibid., 29-30.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 30.

¹⁵⁴ Jennifer D. P. Moroney, “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy on Europe’s Periphery: Globalization, Transnationalism, and the Frontier,” in *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail Molchanov (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 62.

framework for understanding that “harmony between Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine is the cornerstone of stability not just of Ukraine but of the entire region.”¹⁵⁵ Huntington makes a crucial point for this research by noting that while a realist approach to the situation between Ukraine and Russia “highlights the possibility of a Russian-Ukrainian war, a civilizational approach minimizes that and instead highlights the possibility of Ukraine splitting in half.”¹⁵⁶

Realizing the reality of the situation, it is hard to have confidence in the determination of NATO to intervene on Ukraine’s behalf in the case of war.¹⁵⁷ It is not obvious how defense guarantees to Ukraine can be honored in the event of a confrontation with a nuclear Russia.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, in the event of a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine which can begin over the matter of Russian Black Sea Fleet, situated in a Crimean city of Sevastopol which has a majority of ethnic Russians, any credible defense of Ukraine would demand a deployment of the ground military forces.¹⁵⁹ It is not in Germany, Italy’s or even America’s interests to defend a state that only a few years ago was considered to be on the opposite side of an ideological and geographical divide. As Christensen and Snyder notes, there is no guarantee that any of the member states can be protected until the other members of the alliance assume all the calculated risks.¹⁶⁰ Allies have and maintain various ideas of their interests and the question of how much a state behaving in its state interest will contribute to security guarantees of other

¹⁵⁵Quoted in Lieven, *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, 161.

¹⁵⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 37.

¹⁵⁷ Owen Harris, “The Errors of Expansive Realism,” in *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality*, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2001), 195.

¹⁵⁸ For NATO’s credibility problems see Carpenter, “Strategic Evasions and the Drive for NATO Enlargement,” 20.

¹⁵⁹ See Hyland, “NATO’s Incredible Shrinking Defense,” 36.

¹⁶⁰ Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity.”

states is not clear.¹⁶¹ Morrow underlines that “A decision to intervene in a crisis will be determined in part by specific interests of the state in the issues of that crisis.”¹⁶² There are too many differences among the interests of NATO members and too many nuances in the Ukraine-NATO-Russia triangle which also raises doubts in the ability of the U.S. to honor its commitment to NATO members. The negative attitude of Western Europe towards Ukraine’s initiative to become a full-pledged member of Euro-Atlantic security arrangement throws doubts on the credibility of NATO and implies a supposition that NATO’s expansion is meant to transit the cost of fighting Russia to Ukraine. Hyland suggests an idea that in “the face of current and prospective military realities, a NATO military guarantee will become a frivolous gesture.”¹⁶³ Thus, Ukraine can become a base coin in the geopolitical game of great power politics.

E. Conclusion

Similar to the process of alliance formation during the period of Cold War, in the event of NATO enlargement, the perception of security threat has served as one of the legitimizing foundations for new and potential members to be incorporated into the military alliance. In the case of Ukraine, the active drive towards NATO membership gave the rise to anti-Russian ideology, and thereby significantly threatened relations not only between Russia and Ukraine, but also led to the internal instability in Ukraine. It is important to note that prior to Yushchenko’s pushing Ukraine into NATO, relations between Ukraine and Russia had generally been stable. Despite the rhetoric of Ukrainian and Russian politicians, the level and quality of Russian-Ukrainian relations indicated

¹⁶¹ Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?”

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 69.

¹⁶³ Hyland, “NATO’s Incredible Shrinking Defense,” 37.

that Ukraine could not be threatened with Russian subjugation or conquest. Although NATO has been transformed in responsibilities and tasks since the early 1990s, Yushchenko's active pulling of Ukraine into NATO on Washington's urgings was clearly grounded on security concerns and was motivated by fear of the enemy. In arguing in neorealist terms, the question of Ukraine's joining NATO became crucial to the subject of Ukrainian independence and state sovereignty. In fact, it should be apparent that in the absence of a threat, NATO enlargement and Ukraine's incorporation in the Alliance while excluding Russia could never occur.

From the recent rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia under the leadership of Yanukovich, it is clear how the interests of the policymakers influence and shape any particular course of actions. The decisive defeat of Yushchenko in Ukraine's 2010 presidential elections and the disappearance of hostility toward Russia are one of the numerous indicators that the behavior of Yushchenko's government was not driven by the interests of the Ukrainian population. The impression seems to be that under the Orange leadership, Ukraine's state interest and its policy toward NATO membership was defined by the U.S. policy of "geopolitical pluralism" which was designed to expand U.S. influence to the borders of Russia. Not only was the Ukrainian state interest under Yushchenko subjectively driven, but the entire issue of Ukraine's security was defined through a discourse of Russia as an existential threat. In this context, it is clear that the social constructivist approach of international relations is extremely useful to examine the issue of Ukraine's incorporation into NATO.

At the same time, I do not make any claim that under the current leadership of Yanukovich, the government has a positive role in advancing the interests of Ukrainian

people. The point is that since Ukraine gained its independence there has been no consensus about the Ukrainian state interest and its foreign policy approach. Being divided on the issue of Ukraine's foreign policy orientation, Ukrainian ruling elite has always put its own private economic interests ahead of the Ukraine's state interest. Ultimately, it should be clear from this chapter that the hypocritical myth of Russian drive for imperialism and aggression was created by the West through the reinterpretation of history, and which has been successfully adopted by the pro-Western ruling elite as a conceivable reason for the full integration into the Western institutions.

More important, matters of identity, community, and culture demonstrate an important point in the analysis of Ukraine's foreign policy and indicate that the potential threat to Ukraine comes from within in the form of ethnic nationalism which gains strength from Western desire to impose on Ukraine the U.S. led international order. Admittedly, any effort to incorporate Ukraine into NATO would result in a new wave of anti-Russian nationalism which in turn "could produce exactly what the West should fear most, a reaction in Russia and the Russian diaspora."¹⁶⁴ As a result, this would fuel the growth of Russian ethnic nationalism which would obviously have an effect on Russian foreign policy, and thus make war between these two neighbors and the split of Ukraine very likely.¹⁶⁵ The most straightforward explanation for this is the conviction of a great number of Russians that Ukraine is at very heart of the Russian state-building problem. While arguing that the Russian Orthodox Church was born in Kiev and drawing on the history of Kievan Rus, Molchanov makes it clear that in some respects Ukraine is more

¹⁶⁴ Lieven, *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, 158.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 158-159.

“Russian” than Russia itself.¹⁶⁶ There are no doubts that for Russian nationalists, the case of Ukraine’s choosing the “wrong side of what many see as a global divide separating the Russia-led world of Orthodoxy and the consumerist, individualist, and exploitative West,” would signify the kiss of death.¹⁶⁷ Consequently, Russia would be forced to take defensive measures in strategic terms.

The expansion of NATO and incorporation of Ukraine into the Alliance is “an unnecessary, expensive, and provocative initiative with perilous implications.”¹⁶⁸ If for Russia, Ukraine’s induction into NATO would signify more than just crossing the “red line” of what Russia considers its sphere of influence, for Ukraine it would mean only an illusion of security. In addition, Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia contributes greatly to the idea that Ukraine cannot pursue NATO membership at the expense of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Indeed, as discussed in this chapter, Russia’s perception of Ukraine’s incorporation into NATO is a key factor which is critical to Russian-Ukrainian relations and to Europe’s stability overall.

The incorporation of a country with a large Russian population and huge cultural differences would be destabilizing and is unlikely to make the continent of Europe more stable. It is quite clear that with Ukraine’s admission into the military alliance, the potential for military confrontation with Russia increases. In its turn, the likely war between Russia and Ukraine may spill into the number of conflicts between European NATO member states and Russia, and this thereby would increase the danger of a Russian-American confrontation. Certainly, that would cause not only a European crisis,

¹⁶⁶ Molchanov, *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations*, 108.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ Carpenter, “Strategic Evasions and the Drive for NATO Enlargement,” 28.

but would lead to a disastrous outcome. However, in a hypothetical case of military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, NATO allies can refrain from participation on the side of Ukraine. According to the majority of military experts, the U.S. involvement along with the European allies in hostilities against Russia, with its powerful nuclear arsenal, looks quite doubtful. NATO members can make pledges to defend Ukraine under Article V of the NATO Treaty, but in times of crisis there is no guarantee they will keep their promises, and thus NATO membership for Ukraine may result only in a paper security guarantee.¹⁶⁹ The point is that the key benefit of Ukraine's membership in NATO, which is the collective defense guarantees, is uncertain.¹⁷⁰

This chapter has focused on the main argument of the Ukrainian political establishment in favor of Ukraine's membership in NATO and demonstrated that bringing Ukraine into NATO will decrease rather than increase Ukrainian security. Although I have tried to concentrate on realism/neorealism to analyze Ukraine's and NATO's behavior toward each other and to address the Russian factor as the most important in the issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO, I am sure that it has been clear that my main argument against Ukrainian membership in NATO remains distant from the realist/neorealist position. Considering the arguments in this chapter, it should be apparent that an attempt to turn Ukraine into NATO member is not driven by Ukraine's security concerns. The next chapter outlines that for the West, Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration means more than being a member of a collective security system.

¹⁶⁹See Hyland, "NATO's Incredible Shrinking Defense," 37.

¹⁷⁰Lieven, *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, 160-161.

IV. FROM SECURITY TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CHANGING FACE OF NATO

A. Argument

While the previous chapter focused on the issue of Ukraine's incorporation into NATO mainly in the context of Ukraine's and Russia's security interests, this chapter takes the discussion outside the security concern of NATO enlargement with regard to Western interests. The chapter builds on the idea that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left NATO without a clear threat, and this in turn led the Western military alliance to extend not only its geographical reach but also the scope of its operations. NATO's transformation has made it a different kind of organization that not only provides a defense for its members against any military challenge, but, more importantly, serves as a tool to promote the growth of capitalist neoliberal hegemonic ideology into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

While proponents of Ukraine's incorporation into NATO argue that membership in the military alliance will serve as an incentive for domestic reforms and demonstrate Ukraine's commitment to Western norms of behavior, I situate the modernization of the state associated with NATO membership in connection with the continued domination of the Western socio-political and economic models over the global community. The aim of this chapter is to establish a starting point for explaining the idea that the development and the concept of modernization with its numerous strategies serve as a mechanism to ensure the survival of the capitalist world-economy and to advance the interests of the already developed countries of the West. For the purpose of this thesis, it should be clear that thinking of modernization and development in terms of power and discourse enables

us to see that neoliberalism, as a campaign of capitalist expansionism, involves an exercise of a hegemonic system of rule which represents our social reality and thereby enforces the domination of the U.S.-led Western knowledge and conceptions about the world.

The current chapter provides the analysis of neoliberalism as philosophy and ideology and requires thinking about the issue of Ukraine's integration into NATO in terms of globalization and power relations. The analysis in this chapter is crucial for our understanding that along with other international organizations NATO participates in the process of the transformation of the state into a tool for correcting national socio-political and economic policies to the demands of global capitalist economy.¹⁷¹ In fact, to understand the argument that the concept of modernization and the politics of neoliberal development should be seen as a discourse of power and control, it is necessary to make a brief excursion into Immanuel Wallerstein's analysis of a capitalist world economy.

Of course, it should be acknowledged once more that there is no single path to investigate the ways in which power operates. However, using the world-system conceptualization to provide an explanatory framework for the analysis of the issue of Ukraine's incorporation into NATO helps us to unpack the complex processes of neoliberal legitimizing and institutionalization, involved behind the scenes. Furthermore, the chapter points to the neoliberal and complex regime of governance, which involves not only the issues of regulation and global stability but also the matters of discipline and control of individuals.

¹⁷¹ Cox, "Global Perestroika."

B. Hidden Agenda? Advancing Development

Even if one accepts the argument that NATO is extremely important in pacifying European anxieties and deterring a potential aggressor, it is increasingly evident that the expansion of NATO and the incorporation of Ukraine into the Alliance is based on Western terms and is tied to the changes in the domestic political and socio-economic order of Ukraine. While liberal pluralists argue that international and non-governmental organizations, peace, trade and democracy are reciprocally reinforcing and necessary corollaries for promotion of political stability and military security in Europe and North America, they have trouble explaining why the process of NATO enlargement excludes Russia.¹⁷² It is also unclear why the Alliance with its Wilsonian principles of constructing peace along the lines of universal legal norms, liberal democracy, economic globalization and respect for human rights has not been used to affect Russian policy by including Russia in NATO.¹⁷³

With the disappearance of the Soviet threat and Western triumph in the Cold War, NATO lost its military role that in turn led to the necessity of reconstruction of its identity.¹⁷⁴ As Steans and Pettiford summarized, “It did so by refocusing its aim to protect and spread liberal democracies, taking on board the liberal argument that democracies do not fight each other.”¹⁷⁵ For Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, a crucial factor in reinventing of NATO’s identity as a “democratic security community” was the problem of Russian post-Cold War self-identification and its choice between

¹⁷² Lars S. Skalnes, “From the Outside In, From the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International Relations Theory,” *Security Studies* 7, no. 4 (Summer 1998): 70.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity,” *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000).

¹⁷⁵ Steans and Pettiford, *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, 195.

Western and Eastern civilizations.¹⁷⁶ Williams and Neumann are clear that while in the beginning of 1990's NATO started to be increasingly represented as a Western civilizational entity, under the pressure of communist-nationalist opposition and with regard to seventy years of Soviet history, Russia was bound to give up its early liberal-internationalist position and demonstrate resistance to a Western civilization and NATO enlargement in particular. The Russian leadership was forced to choose between abandoning the agenda of the cultural argument and accept the enlargement of NATO, or remaining a counter-civilizational force and consequently entail an opposition to NATO enlargement only at the cost of being cast as an anti-Western, anti-democratic and neo-imperialist state outside of the new Euro-Atlantic security community.¹⁷⁷ Indisputably, Russia's move towards multilateral foreign policy and its Eurasian role has played into the hands of those who have perceived Russia as a threat and have stated that NATO should expand with or without Russian approval.¹⁷⁸ Therefore, it is apparent that NATO's persistence and enlargement must be understood in the context of its transformation in its own identity where security, military, and culture have become increasingly tied to the issues of democracy and market economy.¹⁷⁹

Even though post-Cold War Russia has never been a threat to either Western or Eastern Europe, the perception that Russia poses an actual threat is necessary for the promotion of domestic reforms in new NATO member states.¹⁸⁰ For Lars Skalnes, the very feelings of insecurity, which have pushed the countries of the former Soviet Bloc

¹⁷⁶ Williams and Neumann, "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity," 361.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 380.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 371.

¹⁸⁰ Skalnes, "From the Outside In, From the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International Relations Theory," 83.

toward NATO, provide an incentive for domestic reforms. The more a new member of the Alliance considers Russia as a potential threat to its security and the more NATO shows its commitments to its defense, the greater the influence of NATO membership on domestic politics and thus the foreign politics of this new member.¹⁸¹ Logically, Skalnes points out, that in order to sustain a belief that NATO offers a protection against a potential Russian aggression, and thus for NATO to maximize its impact on domestic politics of the NATO member state, Russia should be excluded from membership.¹⁸² Such remarks reveal that the interest of NATO members in Ukraine's incorporation into the Alliance is very difficult to explain in the context of European security and demonstrates that NATO is one of the most important instruments at the disposal of Western policymakers to constructively integrate Ukraine into the community of countries that share political and economic values and principles.

In the minds of leading pro-Western Ukrainian politicians, Ukraine's membership in Euro-Atlantic security space means an improvement of investment climate, opening new economic possibilities and changes resulting in the increase of the welfare of Ukrainian citizens. The claim that NATO enrolment promotes democracy, free market values and paves the way for European Union membership provides an additional public justification for Ukrainian politicians to strive to enter the Euro-Atlantic security space in the period of transition from communism. Indeed, the fact of NATO's transformation from an exclusively military alliance with a clear enemy into a mechanism of promotion and strengthening of Western-defined norms and values suggest an idea that membership

¹⁸¹ Skalnes, "From the Outside In, From the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International Relations Theory," 84.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

in the Alliance is only an interim surrogate for the real goal of economic growth and development.¹⁸³ While Western policymakers claim that the main factors hindering Ukraine's progress are domestic, the point of NATO's membership influencing domestic politics and extending the correct form of governance provides the evidence of NATO's playing an instrumentally considerable role on Ukraine's path to neoliberal development and transformation. In other words, Ukraine's ambition to join the NATO community should be viewed as a part of a broader structural policy of modernization which is equated with the neoliberal policy paradigm.

C. Neoliberalism As the Only Path to Development

*"There is no Alternative"*¹⁸⁴

Although, it is impossible to define neoliberalism in a clearly delineated set of constant features, it is not difficult to identify how neoliberal theories constitute the basis for development policies and strategies. If every country is different and the process of neoliberalization in each state can demonstrate remarkably rich details, with the most basic feature of systematic usage of state power to impose market imperatives, the overall picture is clear.¹⁸⁵ Specifically, if markets do not exist in such fields as health care, education, land, water or social security, the government is not only responsible for a gradual establishment of a necessary structure for the markets, but also creates legal structures and operations to guarantee the proper functioning of markets.¹⁸⁶ However, the

¹⁸³ Dean, "NATO Enlargement: Coping with Act II," 124.

¹⁸⁴ This is a widely known statement by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made in favor of the program of radical neoliberal reform in the 1980s.

¹⁸⁵ Alfredo Saad-Filho, and Deborah Johnston, "Introduction," in *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*, ed. Saad-Filho, Alfredo and Deborah Johnston (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 3.

¹⁸⁶ David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2.

work of David Harvey and others makes it apparent that under neoliberalism the role of the state must be kept to a bare minimum of creating and preserving an institutional framework appropriate to neoliberal economic practices.¹⁸⁷ According to this view, the main reason for developmental difficulties and slow economic growth has always been the inefficient role of the state and public sector. Therefore, in order to reach the ultimate goal of development through economic growth, it is necessary to rely on free market forces rather than on state intervention.

Neoliberal theorists recognize that “The free market will on average allocate resources much more efficiently than will the state, and this in turn will promote economic growth.”¹⁸⁸ Broadly speaking, neoliberalism places a particular emphasis on the growth of a private sector which provides a higher level of accumulation of the capital and holds that state has to be withdrawn from areas of social provision. Whether there are better social welfare programs, laws that favor workers to join labor unions, or higher taxes on the corporations, neoliberal ideology opposes almost any activity or policy that can interact with or inhibit the free operation of markets.¹⁸⁹ In this context, the role of the state is reduced to the preservation of pro-market institutional structures. As Wendy Larner points out, governments are now concerned with improving growth performance and market competition, rather than developing and promoting of policies to

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

See also Dag Einar Thorsen and Amund Lie, “What is Neoliberalism?” *University of Oslo: Department of Political Science*, working paper, <http://folk.uio.no/daget/What%20is%20Neo-Liberalism%20FINAL.pdf> (accessed December 21, 2010):1-21.

¹⁸⁸ Gerd Nonneman, “Economic Liberalization: The Debate,” in *Political and Economic Liberalization: Dynamics & Linkages in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Gerd Nonneman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1996), 4.

¹⁸⁹ Mark Hudson, “Understanding Information Media in the Age of Neoliberalism: The Contributions of Herbert Schiller,” *Progressive Librarian* 16 (Fall 1999), http://www.libr.org/pl/16_Hudson.html (accessed December 8, 2010).

guarantee a comprehensive social welfare system and full employment.¹⁹⁰ The economic policy of neoliberalism lies primarily in its rejection of protectionism, which is regarded as the main cause of an inefficient economy. Thus, proponents of the neoliberal approach emphasize the importance of free markets, free trade and private property and believe that state involvement in economic affairs should be limited as much as possible.

Is There a Difference? The Evolution of Liberalism

Speaking of neoliberalism as a set of market-liberal economic policies tended to encourage the accumulation of capital and favoring laissez-faire economics, it is evident that the use of the term neoliberalism in the context of political economy is very often associated with the orthodox liberalism dated back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There is no doubt that the basic principles of neoliberalism are built on the doctrines of famous economists of classical liberalism such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Jeremy Bentham who advocated for a minimal government intervention in economic matters and believed that it could be mutually beneficial if societies are able to trade freely with each other. It should be emphasized that liberal economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries believed that free market and open trade was the best way for any economy to develop and thereby to coordinate human activity.

Nevertheless, while Smith in his book *The Wealth of Nations* strongly supported free trade and explained how an unregulated market would naturally regulate itself via the hidden hand of individual's rational behavior, this does not mean that Smith viewed

¹⁹⁰ Wendy Larner, "Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality," *Studies in Political Economy* 63 (Autumn 2000): 7.

the market “as a unilateral or unconditional policy.”¹⁹¹ Andrew Wyatt-Walter argues that there is “a considerable danger in interpreting Adam Smith's views on international relations” and makes it clear that for Smith government was necessary to protect society against corruption and unfair competition, violence, injustice, inequality and oppression.¹⁹² Moreover, being a great opponent of mercantilism, Smith accepted that the market would not be able to provide public goods on their own, and consequently government would need to provide public works and institutions for the benefit of the general populace, not a specific group of people.¹⁹³ Similarly, Noam Chomsky emphasizes that at the heart of Smith’s argument for free markets and free trade was always a demand for government’s just regulation in the interests of all people.¹⁹⁴ Therefore, if Smith lived in our time and observed some of the typical manifestations of neoliberalism, he would in all likelihood perceive them very strange and objectionable.¹⁹⁵

The belief in the free market and market forces which has become a goal desired for its own sake is one of the reasons to differentiate between neoliberalism and classical liberalism.¹⁹⁶ If classical liberalism concentrated on the importance of formal equality among people, placed greater emphasis on social groups and showed concern over unemployment and marginalization, neoliberal strategy of development places greater emphasis on narrow self-interest rather than mutual interest, profit rather than progress,

¹⁹¹ Theodore H. Cohn, *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Pearson Education Limited, 2010), 81.

¹⁹² Andrew Wyatt-Walter, “Adam Smith and the Liberal Tradition in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 22, no. 1 (January 1996): 24.

¹⁹³ Cohn, *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice*, 81.

¹⁹⁴ Noam Chomsky, *Profit over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999), 39.

¹⁹⁵ Paul Treanor, “Neoliberalism: Origins, Theory, Definition,” 2 December 2005, <http://web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/neoliberalism.html> (accessed December 1, 2010).

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

marketing and advertizing success instead of quality of the product. As Treanor emphasizes, “A general characteristic of neoliberalism is the desire to intensify and expand the market, by increasing the number, frequency, repeatability, and formalization of transactions.”¹⁹⁷ It is a modern neoliberal theory that declares every human behavior to be grounded on maximizing material resources and public goods to be seen as individual wealth.

Indeed, within neoliberal framework the interests of human beings are placed above the interests and principles of community and society, justice and moral values. In this context, Valentina Fedotova recognizes that while neoliberalism is reinforced by the cynical references to teachings of Smith, it is so detached from his theory that it completely distorts liberalism’s leading principles.¹⁹⁸ For Fedotova, such a deeply religious man and truly virtuous representative of his time as Adam Smith could not put the individual above society.¹⁹⁹ While referring to the analysis of Smith’s doctrine by Andy Denis, Fedotova emphasizes that, according to Smith, wise and virtuous individuals, trying to satisfy their own private interests, create an order around themselves with respect to the social order of which they are a part.²⁰⁰

In Smithian economics, private incentives were always aligned with social costs and benefits, which resulted in promotion of general welfare.²⁰¹ Therefore, it should be apparent that for Smith the good of the society was unconditional primacy which has to

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Valentina Fedotova, “Zapadnye Liberaly Protiv Rossijskih Zapadnikov,” *Perspektivy*, 29 December 2007, http://www.perspektivy.info/rus/gos/zapadnyje_liberaly_protiv_rossijskih_zapadnikov_2007-12-29.htm (accessed December 3, 2010).

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Andy Denis, “Was Adam Smith an Individualist?” *History of Human Sciences* 12, no. 71 (1999).

²⁰¹ Joseph Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 190.

multiply the happiness of people. The emphasis on the idea that market economy contributes to a socially beneficial equilibrium leads Chomsky to argue that the basic ideas of orthodox liberalism are expressed not in the neo-classical or neoliberal theory but in the concepts and practices of the libertarian socialist movements.²⁰² Ultimately, it should be clear that while the proponents of neoliberalism are convinced that they are carriers of ideas of classical economic liberalism, neoliberalism violates the basic principles of classical liberalism.

Much More Than Economic Theory

A scientific claim of human nature as wholly selfish and competitive forms any basis of neoliberalism.²⁰³ The idea that human beings are essentially self-interested has completely turned from scientific disposition into normative ethics which is structurally fundamental for all political, social and economic decisions in market society.²⁰⁴ For neoliberals, every human being is an entrepreneur whose actions are motivated solely by gaining material profits and maximizing their social status.²⁰⁵ Furthermore, all forms of relations, including relations between employees of one company are treated as sub-types of market competition. Hence, all types of social relations are based on the market-driven approach that claims that the usual purpose of human life is material acquisition. As Patrick Fitzsimons writes, “individuals who choose their friends, hobbies, sports, and

²⁰² Chomsky, *Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order*, 40.

²⁰³ Ted Lechterman, “Neoliberalism 101,” *DisGuide 2008*, 7 October 2007, <http://harvarddisguide.blogspot.com/2007/10/neoliberalism-101-by-ted-lechterman.html> (accessed December 8, 2010).

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

partners, to maximize their status with future employers, are ethically neoliberal.”²⁰⁶ Thus, while individual relations with one another are not necessarily monetarised, the economic base of such relationship indicates at the “extension of the market principle into non-economic area of life.”²⁰⁷

There is no difference between the market economy and market society.²⁰⁸ Consequently, it should be immediately apparent that neoliberalism is not simply the approach to economics that subverts the bureaucratic government, stresses the importance of free trade and enhances the role of the private sector. Neoliberalism is also a modern version of social and political philosophy in which “the existence and operation of a market are valued in themselves, separately from any previous relationship with the production of goods and services.”²⁰⁹ More important, Henry Giroux suggests that neoliberalism has to be understood not only as the politico-economic movement designed to shift regulation of the economy from public to the private sector, but as a constructed ideology that spreads out its reach to incorporate all aspects of pedagogical, social, cultural and political life within the principles of a market society.²¹⁰

Clearly, neoliberalism is not simply one of the most pervasive ideologies of the twenty-first century, but something much more.²¹¹ Harvey provides a systematic

²⁰⁶ Patrick Fitzsimons, “Neoliberalism and education: the autonomous chooser,” *Radical Pedagogy*, (2002), http://radicalpedagogy.icaap.org/content/issue4_2/04_fitzsimons.html (accessed December 8, 2010).

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Treanor, “Neoliberalism: Origins, Theory, Definition.”

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Henry A. Giroux, “The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of Cultural Politics,” *College Literature* 32, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 13.

²¹¹ Henry A. Giroux, “Neoliberalism and the Demise of Democracy: Resurrecting Hope in Dark Times,” *Dissident Voice*, (August 2004), <http://dissidentvoice.org/Aug04/Giroux0807.htm> (accessed December 20, 2010).

overview over the development of neoliberalism and claims that in order to occupy a commanding position in the global community, any economic doctrine or thought should appeal to our values, aspirations, abilities and opportunities.²¹² He claims that the founders of neoliberalism have used political ideals of individual freedom and human dignity as the basis of neoliberal content. Since the concepts of freedom and dignity are attractive to people in their own right, neoliberalism, through the rhetoric about the individual liberty and freedom of markets, has become especially widespread and successful after the wave of fascist and communist dictatorships.²¹³

Neoliberals have maintained that government is the enemy of the people and have fostered the illusion that the powerful state is responsible for all economic catastrophes. According to neoliberals, the fall of communism provided us with evidence that the command economy cannot be made to work.²¹⁴ For the proponents of the neoliberal project, the state's inefficiency to allocate resources is a problem of all countries, but in the developing world where state officials are more likely to be corrupt it is a serious headache.²¹⁵ Therefore, it is agreed by neoliberals that economic development and growth, associated with free market economy and free trade brings transparency, ensures good governance and promotes democracy. With a conviction that economic growth and profit-making are the fundamental principles of democracy, neoliberalism removes government control of market forces and observes an aggressive individualism.²¹⁶ Thus, the pervasiveness of neoliberalism is evident by the claim of neoliberals that a process of

²¹² Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 5.

²¹³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴ Chris Brown, "A World Gone Wrong?" in *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Malden: Polity Press, 2002), 571.

²¹⁵ Ha-Joon Chang and Ilene Grabel, *Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic Policy Manual* (New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2004), 71.

²¹⁶ Giroux, "The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of Cultural Politics," 8.

economic liberalization is taking place alongside the concepts of human dignity, democratization and individual freedom.

Nevertheless, while liberals of all types argue that economic liberalization leads to political liberalization and eventually to democracy, neoliberalism as a theory does not explain how a political system should be organized.²¹⁷ Neoliberal philosophy remains silent on whether or not a state should work either directly or through elected representatives.²¹⁸ Furthermore, Thorsen and Lie are clear that “If the democratic process slows down neoliberal reforms, or threatens individual and commercial liberty, which it sometimes does, then democracy ought to be sidestepped and replaced by the rule of experts or legal instruments for that purpose.”²¹⁹ Referring to Harvey, Thorsen and Lie conclude that radical free market policies could be enforced under the patronage of “autocrats as well as within liberal democracies.”²²⁰ More important, the designers of neoliberalism initially distanced themselves from free market liberalism calling for some government intervention to stimulate domestic economic growth.²²¹ Ultimately, considering the plurality of views that has always existed within political and philosophical camps, various communities of intellectuals have managed to develop a plural set of ideas. In its turn, this has been constructed in quite diverse political systems

²¹⁷ Thorsen and Lie, “What is Neoliberalism?”

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 15.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen and Gisela Neunhoffer, “Introduction: Reconsidering Neoliberal Hegemony,” in *Neoliberal Hegemony: A Global Critique*, ed. Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen and Gisela Neunhoffer (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2.

which nowadays communicate the positions as both advocates and critics of neoliberalism.²²²

While arguing that diverse political and economic paradigms only pretend to be critical of neoliberalism, Plehwe, Walpen and Neunhoffer are clear that the main task of neoliberalism is not to eliminate the state, but “rather to reduce its scope and redefine its role vis-à-vis market.”²²³ Therefore, neoliberalism cannot be understood as a complete political or economic theory or even a philosophy, but a plural set of concepts of how “the relationship between the state and its external environment ought to be organized.”²²⁴ Similarly, Wandy Larner argues that neoliberalism is a more complicated occurrence which should be seen as a contemporary form of politico-economic governance grounded on spreading of market relationships.²²⁵ More important, despite the different interpretations of neoliberalism, most of the critics agree that neoliberalism is a political and economic project of the trans-national upper class which under the mask of attractive rhetoric shifts authority and wealth from the public sphere to private purse of firms and corporations.²²⁶

D. About Capitalism

A Reformulation of Wallerstein's Framework

From the perspectives of Wallerstein’s world-system approach, progress associated with modernization theory is simply an illusion, and ideological models of

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Thorsen and Amund Lie, “What is Neoliberalism?” 15.

²²⁵ Larner, “Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality,” 5.

²²⁶ Niels S. Hahn, “Neoliberal Imperialism and Pan-African Resistance,” *Journal of World-Systems Research* 13, no. 2 (2007): 143.

development are necessary instruments for managing the global capitalist order. A world-system evaluation of the progress for poor and underdeveloped countries is completely different from the idea that development and economic growth can be achieved through overcoming autochthonous traditional values and social structures.²²⁷ Even more important, the world-system approach rejects the alternate hypothesis, based on the dependency theory, claiming that the pattern of growth and development experienced by the advanced, high-consumption states would be a possibility on the account of internal change to socialism as an alternative to capitalist economic system.

In his detailed studies of capitalism, Wallerstein continues the tradition of Marxist sociology and political economy and advances a theoretical and historical account of the origins and structure of the modern world-system as a capitalist world-economy.²²⁸ According to Wallerstein, capitalism is not simply an arrangement of economic relations and legal norms, but an international system which has existed since the sixteenth century with its own hierarchy. The capitalist world-system emerged in the late Middle Ages as a result of the feudal crisis which threatened the ability of a privileged group of European elites to extract surplus value from the direct producers and thereby determine the way of socio-economic development.²²⁹ In fact, it is important to acknowledge that the capitalist system has not been the first world-economy ever, but the first world-economy to survive and to attain the phase of capitalist development where the whole world is operating within the frame of institutionally stabilized hierarchical and geographically extensive

²²⁷ Peter Evans, "Beyond Center and Periphery; A Comment on the Contribution of the World System Approach to the Study of Development," *Sociological Inquiry* 49, No. 4, (1979): 16.

²²⁸ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*.

²²⁹ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 162.

social division of labor.²³⁰ Over the past five centuries, as Wallerstein writes, “the new system consolidated itself in Europe and went on from there to take over the world, in the process eliminating all alternative modes of social organization” and establishing new institutional frameworks, new forms of production processes, and new modes of labor control which have operated via mechanisms of market.²³¹

The characteristic feature distinguishing Wallerstein’s world-system analysis from orthodox Marxism is a claim that the defining feature of capitalism is not a private ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange of commodities in markets, but constant maximization of production of surplus value, appropriated by the capitalist class which employs wage workers in production to generate profit. Wallerstein underlines that the fundamental force of the capitalist world economy is the “relationship between capital/labor and the extraction of surplus created by direct producers (labor), or by others (capitalists) either at the actual site of production or, later, when goods are exchanged in the market place.”²³² In other words, Wallerstein perceives capitalism as a system whose existence is composed in continual and endless accumulation of capital, meaning that “people and firms are accumulating capital in order to accumulate more capital.”²³³ Because capital is accumulated by taking profits in the market, the key issue for capitalists is the production of goods at the much lower price than that for which they can be sold. By the logic of production, despite the continuous technological and organizational improvements, labor costs represent a principal and increasing proportion of the actual price for which services and products are sold.

²³⁰ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 17.

²³¹ Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms*, 162.

²³² Quoted in Steans and Pettiford, *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, 92.

²³³ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 24.

When labor costs rise and eventually become too high for capitalist entrepreneurs, relocation of production to the places with historically lower salaries is an obvious response to overcome obstacles of capital accumulation. Thus, the ongoing division of labor of a capitalist global economy divides production into core-like, semi-peripheral and peripheral goods and services and thereby leads to an unequal exchange of products in such a way that there is “a constant flow of surplus-value from the producers of peripheral products to the producers of core-like products.”²³⁴ In fact, arguing that the segmentation of the world along the categorical boundaries and conceptual framework is a function of the capitalist world system, Wallerstein explores inequality and uneven development across societies through a world-wide division of labor with a structured circle of production processes interacting with each other through the market.²³⁵

Briefly About Class, State and the Core/Periphery Hierarchy

In this regard, it is appropriate to underline that the major institutions of the capitalist world-economy are markets, states, classes, households, and identities.²³⁶ As Andrew Savchenko notes, “All of these are mere readjustments of the division of labor within one giant capitalist enterprise.”²³⁷ Accordingly, this means that political and economic forms of organization which are drawn into a single global system are reciprocally connected and work to support a capitalist kind of social order.

While in the capitalist mode of production much of the surplus value takes the form of material profit extracted from labor and taken by capitalists, it should be clear

²³⁴ Ibid., 28.

²³⁵ Ibid., 24.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Andrew Savchenko, “Constructing a World Fit for Marxism: Utopia and Utopistics of Professor Wallerstein,” *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 66, no. 5 (2007): 1045.

that there are two basic social classes which have different interests.²³⁸ Robinson refers the concept of class to the “group of people who share a common relationship to the process of social production and reproduction and are constituted relationally on the basis of social power struggles.”²³⁹ In his work, Robinson especially deals with the issue of global capitalism and the process of transnational class formation while arguing that “class formation is an ongoing historical process and refers to changes over time in the class structure of society, including the rise of new class groups and the decline of old ones.”²⁴⁰ Therefore, drawing upon the orthodox Marxist thought, it makes sense to conclude that “capitalism is characterized by a ruling class (bourgeoisie), which owns/controls the means of production, and the working class (proletariat), who must sell their labor to survive.”²⁴¹ Furthermore, Robinson makes it clear that the comprehensive study of the concept of class can involve an identification of different fractional interests within each of the classes.²⁴² While class analysis is complex, I argue that the study of capitalist political economy and full understanding of capitalist society is impossible without an analysis of class structure.

Overall, my point is that the conflict between various incompatible interests is represented by the concept of class struggle and capitalism is an exploitative economic system with its own tensions and struggles. Although my study does not directly focus on the specific aspects of class structure, it does weigh heavily on the issues of transnational class formation. What should be clear is that in the current phase of global

²³⁸ Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, 34.

²³⁹ Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World*, 37.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴¹ Quoted in Steans and Pettiford, *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, 79.

²⁴² Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World*, 37.

capitalism, we are witnessing the process of transition from national to transnational class formation. “As national productive structures become transnationally integrated, world classes whose organic development took place through the nation – state are experiencing supranational integration with ‘national’ classes of other countries,” according to Robinson.²⁴³ The emphasis here is that at the present time this process of transnational class formation takes place through promotion of globalized consumerist culture, ideology and institutional framework.

Within the Marxist tradition, the role of the state in the process of mediating a conflict resulting from class struggle is extremely important. If for the realist thinkers, the state is a sovereign actor representing the interests of the whole nation, in my study I reject state-centrism and consider state as not the basic unit of the system of international relations but as a constructed political organization which initially came into view at the time of early capitalist development in Europe and was placed in a hierarchical order. As Wallerstein notes, “The sovereign states became the primary political units organizing the necessary flow of the factors of production” and enabling the extraction of surplus value from wage labor in production activity via market mechanisms.²⁴⁴ Similarly, Savchenko writes that “Nations and states are but a veil thrown by world capitalism onto its giant mechanism for the extraction of surplus.”²⁴⁵ Therefore, the state system was structured not only to ensure the transfer of surplus-value from direct producers to elite classes, but

²⁴³ Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World*, 43.

²⁴⁴ Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms*, 162.

²⁴⁵ Savchenko, “Constructing a World Fit for Marxism: Utopia and Utopistics of Professor Wallerstein,” 1045.

also to protect the interests of the dominant class and guarantee that society remains disciplined and controlled.²⁴⁶

In this way, in order to maintain conditions favorable to economic growth and secure the rule of capital, capitalist classes across nations cooperate with each other. This means, in turn, that social relationships as well as inter-state relations are determined by the structure of the capitalist economic system “which gives priority to the endless accumulation of capital” and operates according to the principles of discrimination and exploitation.²⁴⁷ In fact, the processes of oppression and manipulation are extremely necessary for the capitalist socio-political and economic order as they contribute to inequality which in its turn diminishes the number of the players in the capitalist system and thereby restricts the range of interests.²⁴⁸

Being focused on the unlimited accumulation of capital as the main driving force of the capitalist global economy, Wallerstein’s world system-theory categorizes every state in the world as capitalist. As part of the modern world system, no country has developed in isolation and has had to accumulate capital in order to survive. In arguing this way, Wallerstein flatly denies the widespread view that after the Second World War there were two types of world system, known to us as socialist and capitalist. Consequently, the assumption that Soviet Union has always been a fundamental part of the capitalist world-economy allows us to “see beyond ideological labels and into the

²⁴⁶ For more on the state as an instrument of the capitalist ruling class, see Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *State and Revolution*, Vol. 2 of *The Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 290-295.

²⁴⁷ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 24.

²⁴⁸ Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 99.

very nature of relations of production.”²⁴⁹ In this context, I agree with Andrew Linklater who points out that it has always been crucial for the state to construct a national ideology to incorporate the majority of the population and thereby to guarantee the survival of capitalism.²⁵⁰ What Linklater’s analysis brings out is the idea that the survival of capitalism depends on multiple combinations of consent and coercion in which the interests of the ruling class compromise with the demands coming from inferior social forces. In other words, the dominant class is more likely to achieve its class goals under the banner of popular interests.²⁵¹

Similarly, Gill argues that “The central goal of socialism and social democracy was not the replacement of capitalism, but civilizing the capitalist mode of production.”²⁵² Therefore, the logic of this thinking suggests that we look at the Soviet-type economies in a different light and classify the Soviet-type economies as state capitalism.²⁵³ In this regard, ideological confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States occurred in parallel with a conflict between classes within and across states in the capitalist world-system.²⁵⁴ It also reflected the struggle for monopoly power within the world-system both before and immediately after World War II. Gill is clear that after the Wall Street crash in 1929 the world economy fragmented into economic blocs and the

²⁴⁹ Savchenko, “Constructing a World Fit for Marxism: Utopia and Utopistics of Professor Wallerstein,” 1043.

²⁵⁰ Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, 152.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Stephen Gill, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 50.

²⁵³ Savchenko, “Constructing a World Fit for Marxism: Utopia and Utopistics of Professor Wallerstein,” 1043.

²⁵⁴ Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, 7.

worldwide depression of the 1930s led to intensified class struggle between social forces in favor of capital and against capital.²⁵⁵

While building on the classical Marxist idea that the relationships between capitalists and working classes are characterized by unjust and exploitative nature, Wallerstein divides the world into the most powerful states and those which are dependent on them. In his conceptualization of global capitalist economy, scholar ascribes the terminology of “core” and “periphery” to the states in terms of ownership and production processes and calls the degree of profitability of the production activities a “core-periphery relationship.”²⁵⁶ While less developed states are called periphery and they are financially and technologically dependent on other actors of international system, core states are those among major world powers with considerable military strength and a high degree of autonomy. Worth mentioning is the fact that Wallerstein assumes also the existence of states that have a relatively even mix of production of core-like and peripheral goods, and refers to them as to a “semi-periphery.” The major concern of semi-peripheral states is to “keep themselves from slipping into the periphery and to do what they can to advance themselves toward the core.”²⁵⁷

At the first glance, it might be tempting to think about the existence of semi-periphery as a model of economic success and as a result of modernization. However, following Wallerstein, it is clear that some obvious countries to be labeled semi-peripheral are necessary for the stabilization of the capitalist world-economy which is achieved though the creation of the illusion of progress and elimination of unified

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 28.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 29.

opposition to core states. Therefore, the arrangement of the capitalist world-economy consists of a tripartite division of labor which resulted in disproportionate exchange favoring strong states and undermining the resource base of the weakest. Specifically, weak states, in most cases, produce primary products like raw materials and supply industrialized capitalists with productive and cheap labor. Major sectors of the peripheral economies are organized in a way to serve the interests of the core states rather than to meet the needs of the local population. In contrast, the strong states, while emphasizing their role of guarding quasi-monopolies of the core-like production activity, “relate to weak states by pressuring them to keep their frontiers open to those capital flows which are useful and profitable to firms located in the strong states.”²⁵⁸ On this basis, the formation of transnational class coalitions is extremely essential to the continuous process of domination.²⁵⁹

The elites of the core pursue the integration of the intermediary constituents within the ruling class of peripheral and semi-peripheral states into the structures and processes of the capitalist world economy for the purpose of supporting the core’s economic domination and guarantee the rule of capital in particular.²⁶⁰ Furthermore, the promotion of a stable form of world order is the ultimate goal of the alliance between the ruling classes of the capitalist states. In this context, depending on the numerous economic, political and geographic factors, the role of each state is very different. However, once again, relations between states are structured hierarchically, and flow of capital between those who are powerful and those who are poor is asymmetrical. In brief,

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 55.

²⁵⁹ Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, 39.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 39-40.

the entire state structure of the capitalist world economy not only “maintains conditions conducive to economic growth,” but also allows an unequal exchange of goods and services in such a way that much of the surplus value obtained in the marginal areas of the world-economy is transferred to the economically developed zones.²⁶¹

While the proponents of dependency theory focus strictly on the concept of core-periphery relationship, Wallerstein’s world-system theory centers on the entire global system currently functioning within the frame of a singular division of labor and numerous cultural systems. The point is that if the dependency approach views the positions of the states within the system of international relations as differentiated, Wallerstein and other scholars who work under a world-system framework argue that the set of circumstances for each state is hierarchically ordered and the possibilities open to states for development or capital accumulation are “shaped by the cyclical and secular evolution of the world system as a whole.”²⁶² Peter Evans is clear that “Neither the concrete forms of production associated with a given structural position, nor the structural position assumed by a given nation” should be seen as fixed.²⁶³ It follows from world-system theorists that hierarchy is absolutely essential and has to be maintained for the continuation of a world capitalist economy, and “leaving one structural position means taking on a new role in the overall division of labor, not escaping from the system.”²⁶⁴

²⁶¹ Steans and Pettiford, *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, 118.

²⁶² Evans, “Beyond Center and Periphery; A Comment on the Contribution of the World System Approach to the Study of Development,” 16.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

For this reason, it should be pointed out that the relations within and between states are in a constant conflict and disharmony which are rooted in the structural relations of domination and dependence. The competition between various social forces, rivalry between leading state actors, and the endeavors of peripheral or semi-peripheral states to improve their status lead to an ongoing clash of interests, contradictions, and tensions which eventually result in repressive relationships or direct conflicts.²⁶⁵ Clearly, the hierarchical frameworks in which capitalist relations take place determine conflict as a central and structural process in the capitalist world-system. It is not the anarchy of the state system, as realists' claim, which is the major problem of international relations, but rather the conflictual and repressive nature of the capitalist socio-political and economic organization.²⁶⁶

E. Geoculture and Capitalism. Connection

What Is It All About?

On the basis of the previous section it is fair to say that an unjust social and economic capitalist order is maintained and legitimized by a range of practices, belief systems, institutions and ideologies. The combination of these elements helps to organize relationships between states and classes, social movements and oppositional groups.²⁶⁷ This idea closely relates to the realist concept of hegemonic stability which claims that the dominance of certain major states or one hegemonic state is necessary for the international economic system to be more open and stable, or in our case, to legitimize capitalist rule. As we already have seen, Wallerstein confirms this idea by claiming that

²⁶⁵ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 57.

²⁶⁶ Steans and Pettiford, *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, 75.

²⁶⁷ Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, 39.

besides states and inter-state system, the capitalist world-economy requires the appearance of repeated and in most cases relatively brief hegemonic powers.²⁶⁸ In fact, scholars generally agree that when a dominant or hegemonic state is lacking in power, economic stability is very difficult to maintain.

Nevertheless, if major approaches to international relations theory employ the concept of hegemony to describe the power of a predominant state in the system of international relations based solely on the military and economic component, building on the ideas of Antonio Gramsci and on the works of leading critical theorists, I argue that, in the modern capitalist world, hegemony in addition to military and economic status should be viewed in terms of culture and ideology. Indeed, through culture and ideology particular capitalist states and social forces define the rules of the game, exercise their power, use it to assert authority and domination, and more importantly, to achieve the endless accumulation of capital. This means that power of the ruling class and core states does not consist only of violence and coercion, but also on consent and persuasion.

Such kind of hegemony at the international level demands “more than a single balance of power or an order between states, since it also involves the complex patterns of social relations which connect social classes in a range of countries.”²⁶⁹ As Gill writes, global hegemony occurs when there is strong agreement between these social classes across all levels. The scholar makes it clear that hegemony would be entirely accomplished when the key institutions and socio-political and economic forms of organization in addition to the vital values of the superior capitalist state develop into

²⁶⁸ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 59.

²⁶⁹ Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, 47-48.

models for imitation in other peripheral and inferior states.²⁷⁰ Finally, the upshot of the argument is that the international hegemony should not be viewed solely in a state-centric terms, but needs to be seen as a system of rule premised upon ideas and cultural apparatus which has for its origins the outward expansion of the power and influence of the dominant capitalist groups in the leading capitalist states.²⁷¹

According to the Gramscian analysis, hegemony is the consequence of struggle between leading social classes. It is a situation under which sufficient levels of agreement between classes that stand oppose to each other is reached. While hegemony is perceived to be built on the active and broad measure of consent, “it functions according to basic principles that ensure the continuing supremacy of leading social classes.”²⁷² Thus, hegemony is not based simply on consent, but on actively sympathetic agreement, in which general populace wants what the ruling class requires. In a similar vein, Cohn states that “A dominant class that rules only by coercion is not hegemonic in Gramscian terms because its power does not extend throughout society and it can be overthrown simply by physical force.”²⁷³ Cohn is clear that in order to maintain their power, dominant social classes must gain consent of subaltern classes on the basis of common material interests, ideas and shared values. In fact, hegemony involves not only persuasion and legitimate forms of rule, but also should constitute a whole way of life.²⁷⁴ Thus, for the reason that hegemony seems to assume responsibility for not only a peaceful order but a more favorable future for everybody, it is widely accepted by

²⁷⁰ Ibid., 46.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 76.

²⁷² Steans and Pettiford, *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, 118.

²⁷³ Cohn, *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice*, 112.

²⁷⁴ Gill, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, 13.

ordinary people.²⁷⁵ Thus, hegemony creates the kind of stability within which the dominant ruling group legitimizes and maintains its power and thereby subordinates social classes which, being unaware that they are oppressed, view the capitalist's hegemony as perfectly legitimate.²⁷⁶

While acknowledging that societies are always to some extent undergoing forms of structural change and transition and hegemony is a dynamic and continuous process, both culture and ideology are, in themselves, powerful instruments working to support and question the existing capitalist order.²⁷⁷ Wallerstein argues that the concepts of culture and ideology should be seen as a system of values, rules and practices that consciously and unconsciously manage social relations through encouragement and penalties, and thereby create the system of illusions that persuade members of societies in the legitimacy of a particular socio-political and economic order. In this context, Gill is clear that in its negative usage, ideology represents the Marxist idea of false consciousness and refers to the false and real interests of social classes.²⁷⁸

While at the level of domestic politics the hegemony of the capitalist bourgeoisie operates through a variety of educational institutions, trade unions, political parties, and associations, at the international level it performs through the international organizations and more precisely through the outward spread of Western military, economic, political, and cultural power. All these forces gradually inspire the masses to accept certain ideas that justify the domination of the ruling class and represent their supremacy as natural

²⁷⁵ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 57.

²⁷⁶ Cohn, *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice*, 63.

²⁷⁷ Immanuel Wallerstein, "The National and the Universal: Can There Be Such a Thing as a World Culture" in *Culture, Globalization and the World-System*, eds. Anthony D. King (Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 99-100.

²⁷⁸ Gill, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, 6.

and immutable. It is more important, however, to understand that that the main force behind the spread of hegemony is an intellectual intelligentsia. Intellectuals, as Gramsci argued, should be seen as the instruments for dominant social classes to provide the consent of the general public. In the majority of instances, in the case of social conflict, closely linked to the moral, intellectuals have to choose in favor of one side or the other.²⁷⁹

Liberal Ideology as a Force to Discipline Labor

Despite the fact that a capitalist world-economy has been in existence since the sixteenth century, its geoculture, which Wallerstein defines as a framework of beliefs and values within which a capitalist world-economy operates, appeared in the wake of French Revolution.²⁸⁰ Like any culture, the geoculture has developed and changed. The way in which the shift of geoculture has occurred and will continue to do so is due to an ideological orientation. Once again, ideology is not simply a set of ideas or theories, but a systematic strategy in the social arena which anticipates “that there exist competing groups with competing long-term strategies of how to deal with change and who best should take the lead in dealing with it.”²⁸¹ If before the French Revolution the dominant group of people used the power of the state to force the subordinate group of people to alienate control of labor power, after the period of radical social and political upheavals in Europe a capitalist system of production started to be based upon the system of wage payment. While referring to the analysis of capitalism by Nicos Poulantzas, Linklater

²⁷⁹ Sergej, Kara-Murza, *Manipuljacija Soznanjem*. Moskva, 2009.

²⁸⁰ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 61.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 60-61.

emphasizes that because a capitalist system of production switched to the mode of contract between the dominant and exploited class of people, capitalism applied ideas of “freedom and equality” of all people and defended its claim to legitimacy in these liberal concepts.²⁸²

Thus, it is appropriate to remember that in the capitalist global economy, the entire system operates to keep out the majority of the population from the benefits of the capitalist economic system “by including in the work-system in a layered hierarchy all the world's potential force.”²⁸³ In Wallerstein’s words, “This system of exclusion via inclusion was infinitely strengthened by the diffusion in the nineteenth century of a dominant liberal ideology which justified this exclusion via inclusion, and managed to harness even the world's antisystemic forces to this task.”²⁸⁴ It is evident from these formulations that the concept of ideology should be understood as the reflection of the worldview of the fraction of society which in most cases implies the negative aspect of reproducing beliefs and values in other classes which serve to deprive their specific interests.²⁸⁵ Furthermore, the point should be made that liberalism, being composed of political extremes between which liberal ideology falls, has always sought to define the political scene and has been the central system of principles and beliefs of the capitalist geoculture.²⁸⁶

As Wallerstein argues, liberalism was the predominant ideology during two centuries from 1789 to the year of 1989, the same time that so called Communism and an

²⁸² Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, 151.

²⁸³ Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Collapse of Liberalism,” *The Socialist Register* 28 (1992): 108

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁵ Gill, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, 6.

²⁸⁶ Immanuel Wallerstein, *After Liberalism* (New York: The New Press, 1995), 2.

ideological force of Marxism-Leninism collapsed. Accordingly, during this period of the triumph and collapse of liberalism as the hegemonic ideology, the reality of ideological consensus stood behind the mask of ideological conflict from which one can draw certain conclusions. Worth noting that for Wallerstein, a great ideological antinomy of the twentieth century between Wilsonianism and Leninism was constructed as a mechanism for the political integration of the periphery and semi-periphery into the capitalist world-system and to shift the industrialized production of goods and services into those less developed zones.²⁸⁷ At first glance, it might be tempting to think about the rivalry of two ideological doctrines as real and intense, however, according to Wallerstein, the proponents of both doctrines had very similar beliefs and ideas regarding economic and politic arenas.²⁸⁸

In brief, the idea of proletarian insurrection against the bourgeoisie degenerated into the theory of anti-imperialism and turned into support for nationalist and liberation movements which were only an expression of classical liberal presuppositions.²⁸⁹ Thus, according to Wallerstein, Leninism, being a great adversary of liberal-socialism at the national arena, resembled the liberal socialism at the international level.²⁹⁰ Clearly, a consequence, promised by both ideologies of Wilsonianism and Leninism was “closing the gap between the rich countries and poor.”²⁹¹ As a result, the entire system of nationalist regimes was established in order to move along the path of decolonization and national development which was defined as following the advice of either the West or the

²⁸⁷ Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Concept of National Development, 1917-1989 Elegy and Requiem,” *The American Behavioral Scientist* 35, no. 4/5 (March-June 1992):518.

²⁸⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Collapse of Liberalism,” *The Socialist Register* 28 (1992): 96-110.

²⁸⁹ Wallerstein, “The Concept of National Development, 519.

²⁹⁰ Wallerstein, “The Collapse of Liberalism.”

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 102.

East, and eventually to “catch up.” It should be pointed out that while there were differences between Wilsonian and Leninist ideological canons about the road to self-determination of the peoples of the peripheral zones, decolonization was the fundamental task for them. Therefore, to explore further, Wallerstein makes it clear that “with the ideologies elaborated and constrained, with the antisystematic movements channeling the energies of discontent,” all sociopolitical strategies, decisions and knowledge are the powerful force to ensure that the power and value of geoculture lies in its theoretical apparatus.²⁹²

F. Conclusion

Although it may seem logical to argue that a balance-of-threat theory provides the most convincing explanation of why certain Ukrainian elites want to join NATO, it is quite unwise not to refer to economic and sociological approaches that contribute to our understanding of the issue of Ukraine’s joining NATO. If in the previous chapter I generally demonstrated that incorporation of Ukraine into NATO would increase the security risks of the Alliance members and at the same time would not produce net security benefits for Ukraine, in this chapter I show that neoliberal principles, values, rules and norms of socio-economic and political order are one of the most important factors in further NATO enlargement in Eastern Europe. While the balance-of-threat approach to NATO enlargement explains the motivation of Ukrainian policymakers for their interest in NATO membership because of fear of a future Russian threat, “it cannot account for NATO’s enlargement decisions.”²⁹³ True, NATO’s further Eastern

²⁹² Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 73.

²⁹³ Schimmelfenning, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*, 37.

enlargement and bringing Ukraine into Alliance are neither efficient nor necessary to increase the security of old members of the Alliance and cannot address the security problems in post Cold War Europe.

If we perceive Russia as a potential threat we focus our attention on the Russian power and its offensive capabilities, it becomes clear that Russia cannot pose a threat to either old or new members of the Alliance.²⁹⁴ The point is that the political rhetoric around the issue of Ukraine's incorporation into NATO is overblown and is used instrumentally to represent the arguments of the pro-NATO forces as "legitimate and to persuade the audience of the legitimacy of their claims in order to elicit political support and induce political cooperation."²⁹⁵ According to Schimmelfening's analysis of NATO enlargement process, the proponents of Ukraine's NATO integration use arguments, based on notions of security and stability, "to shame the opponents into compliance" and to mobilize social pressure through manipulation of public opinion.²⁹⁶

The discussion in this chapter contributes to the argument that an attempt to turn Ukraine into NATO member is not driven by Ukraine's security concerns, but by strong Western interests, especially economic. Very clearly, Ukraine is in the periphery of the global capitalist system. Ukrainians live under poor socio-economic conditions not because they are worse or less intelligent than Westerners, but because Ukraine is at the bottom of hierarchical economic pyramid, within which the distribution of the

²⁹⁴ Skalnes, "From the Outside In, From the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International Relations Theory," 64.

²⁹⁵ Schimmelfening, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*, 208.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 229.

global surplus value and capital accumulation takes place.²⁹⁷ The achievement of a greater competitive advantage for Ukraine under the conditions of globalization is possible only through increased exploitation and a further decline in living standards of Ukrainians.²⁹⁸

What I am getting at is the fact that Ukrainian society has become increasingly class divided around national circuits of accumulation, and social power struggle is a predominant locus of contemporary Ukraine. In its turn, powerful economic forces under the banner of globalization and international cooperation not only redefine and reinforce the relations between social classes and groups within Ukraine, but construct the basis for the incorporation of Ukrainian capitalist class into transnational structure. Therefore, it is crucial to understand that the issue of Ukraine's incorporation into NATO should be regarded as a part of the processes of consolidation of neoliberal capitalism and transnational class formation.

While arguments between markets versus state positions have always been central ideological themes of policy-making process in different time and various states, I argue that ideological disputes between various development doctrines, models and theories are operating within the frame of a single capitalist system.²⁹⁹ In fact, fostered by neoliberal economists, another kind of modernization theory has become dominant, according to which every country needs to introduce and advance neoliberal reforms, which boil down to complete privatization, deregulation of prices with national currencies, and promotion

²⁹⁷ Aleksandr Merezhko, "Razvitie Kapitalizma v Ukraine," *Skepsis*, 30 November 2006, http://skepsis.ru/library/id_1181.html (accessed May 24, 2011).

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁹ Wallerstein, "The Concept of National Development, 1917-1989 Elegy and Requiem," 517.

of free competition. In this light, promotion of democracy is one of the main priorities at which the project of neoliberalism aims and such organization as NATO has been transformed to defend that kind of democracy.

One should not miss the point that the basis of the neoliberal political program has become a consensus of the rulers and the ruled which consists of the need for mass participation in the political process. It is important to underline that the consolidation of so called democratic procedures for decision making and consolidation of neoliberal economic reforms are closely intertwined with each other. In essence, the process of openness and democratization advances the cause of commitment to promote a difficult economic policy reforms, contributing to economic growth over the longer run, by exposing the inefficiencies of authoritarian rule to competitive politics.³⁰⁰ Specifically, through exploitation of crisis conditions and managing opposition, new democratic governments initiate economic reform policies. But is it a democracy when two or three identical political parties with almost the same political agendas, dispensed with enormous financial resources, share the power and regularly replace each other on the governmental positions? Is there a presence of a civil society in which ethnic politics is organized, competitive and linked to party politics?³⁰¹

Elections have become rituals around the world and the development of stable politics and the free market economy in the countries of the former Soviet Union has become a strategic goal for the Western governments.³⁰² The illusion of democracy takes

³⁰⁰ Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 151.

³⁰¹ Rob Jenkins, "Mistaking 'governance' for 'politics': foreign aid, democracy, and the construction of civil society," in *Civil Society*, ed. S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001), 265.

³⁰² See Shiva, "Food Rights, Free Trade, and Fascism," 102.

away the right from the people to make even simple political or economic decisions, and namely NATO contributes to the complete liquidation of the meaning of the people as the source of power. The case of the Ukrainian government's determination to intensify cooperation with NATO, without taking notice of the people of Europe's second largest country, proves the correctness of the words stated above.

Not only neoliberal policies such as trade liberalization and privatization accompany the process of democratization, but also, in the case of failed states, the humanitarian interventions are applied.³⁰³ In this respect, it is appropriate to comment Gramsci that any radical change or action should be preceded by the consent and hegemony. For example, today political leaders are able to achieve through democratic consent what Pinochet succeeded to achieve through state violence in Chile. The ideas of individualism, freedom and democracy have become globally spread and the economic stagnations have been interpreted as a crisis of governance. Therefore, if in the 1950s and 1960s the argument was made that democracy would follow development as a result of economic growth and political modernization, in the 1990s it became clear that democratization has become one of the essentials for the promotion of free market policies and consequently economic growth.³⁰⁴

Finally, this chapter has called attention to the idea that the consensus around the democratic norms and consumerism in today's globalized world is the structural power of increasingly united global elite to enforce discipline through the market. As Robinson notes, "The shift from authoritarianism to polyarchy as the dominant form of political

³⁰³ Ray Kiely, *Empire in the Age of Globalization* (Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005), 134.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 133.

authority in much of the world represents a shift from coercive to consensual forms of social control at the transnational level.”³⁰⁵ Clearly, at a time when the debate concerning the issue of theoretical foundations of neoliberalism deepens, neoliberalism violates all the principles of liberalism, which supposedly made it a slogan. While the neoliberal ideology demonstratively refers to all kind of liberties and human rights, in reality it brings out the interests of the mega capital forces.³⁰⁶ In this context, Wallerstein is completely right in claiming that liberalism had collapsed. Nevertheless, it is wise to remember that while some are saying that the history of liberalism and capitalism has ended, neoliberalism has triumphed precisely in its most radical liberal forms both at practice and at the level of ideology. Neoliberal capitalism has become not simply a more prevalent force in contemporary human lives, but a unique and uniform global system of beliefs and values.

³⁰⁵ Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World*, 83.

³⁰⁶ Ljubiša Mitrović, “Bourdieu's Criticism of the Neoliberal Philosophy of Development, the Myth of 'Mondialization' and the New Europe,” *FACTA UNIVERSITATIS Series Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History* 4, no.1 (2005): 41, <http://www.cceol.com> (accessed March 29, 2011).

V. THE EXPANDING ROLE OF NATO - FROM DEVELOPMENT TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE?

A. Argument

In this chapter I demonstrate that the extension of NATO should be seen as an extension of multiple forms of power, and the issue of Ukraine joining Euro-Atlantic Alliance should be examined in the context of the U.S. state's interests alongside capitalist systematic interests and values. I view the process of NATO expansion as the maintaining of America's grand strategy of openness that "derives directly from U.S. principles and practices elaborated and implemented during and even before the Cold War."³⁰⁷ The argument I develop below considers NATO expansion nothing more than the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the post-Soviet space which aims at the consolidation of free market reform, and thereby moves forward commercial interests.

It should be obvious that NATO should be regarded as a multilateral organization whose evolution has been connected with the development of modern capitalism. To be precise, in the second half of the twentieth century the capitalist world, under the banner of decolonization and the guidance of the Bretton Woods system, entered the new phase of the process of accumulating power in which international institutions, working under the influence of the U.S. political establishment, have devoted themselves to the reconstruction of the bureaucracies of the Third World and transforming government policies to serve the interests of the rich states and maintain their dominance.³⁰⁸ Therefore, as the analysis in the preceding chapters has demonstrated, NATO should not

³⁰⁷ Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 3.

³⁰⁸ Adopted from Steans and Pettiford, *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, 94.

be simply regarded as a military institution, but as one of the central institutional instruments at the disposal of Western policymakers to ease the transition of post-Soviet countries into a full-fledged market economy.

B. From Colonialism to International Regulation

Steans and Pettiford correctly point out that Wallerstein's world systems approach provides us a possibility to look in an entirely different light on the concept of economic development and the process of decolonization.³⁰⁹ In fact, any logical attempt to understand the operation of the global capitalist economy must include an analysis of decolonization as one of two main geopolitical events in the post-Second World War period that has allowed massive expansion and further development of capitalism.³¹⁰ Based on Wallerstein's analysis, Steans and Pettiford suggest an idea that the end of colonialism cannot be seen as indicating the end of oppression and exploitation of the poor, agricultural states by industrialized and developed nations. Scholars recognize that the formal end of colonialism simply transforms the nature of colonialism from a direct type, based on military occupation, to an indirect form based on economic arrangements and production of knowledge.³¹¹ The fundamentals and instruments of the neo-colonial policies have become loans, different types of financial and political assistance provided through foreign and national companies.³¹²

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?" in *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Malden: Polity Press, 2002), 138.

³¹¹ Steans and Pettiford, *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, 94.

³¹² Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, *The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 6.

In this context, I argue that colonialism should not be seen simply as an uncultivated method of military and political domination of the peoples of the non-Western world by European powers, but as a necessary measure of capitalist economic system to extend the global market and to provide the access to the resources of cheap labor, land and raw materials. It was only after successfully engaging indigenous populations to the civilized world, which destroyed their traditional way of life and imposed Western values, when the promotion of state sovereignty along with capitalist expansion took place.³¹³ The declaration of independence of former colonies did not mean to guarantee complete sovereignty of young states. On the contrary, through joining the United Nations and other international institutions former colonies have been integrated into the political and bureaucratic systems of the metropolitan structure. In essence, having become tightly attached to capitalism, peoples of the former colonies did not have any choice, but to follow the development strategies of the West, directed at the restructuring of class relations. This resulted in accelerated integration of the working-class masses, exchange markets on a global basis and internationalization of production.

Post-war Keynesian Consensus

There cannot be any room for doubt that institutional transformations that have their origins in the West and the development of modern capitalism are coincidental and interconnected processes. As Harvey confirms, “the restructuring of international relations after the Second World War was designed to prevent a return to the catastrophic

³¹³ For more on post-colonial approach and impact of capitalism, see Aime Cesaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000).

conditions that had threatened the capitalist order in the period of the 1930s.”³¹⁴ In particular, with the decolonization of much of the Third World a new hegemonic world order based upon the regulation of inter-state conflict along with globally conceived civil society has started to form.

For Mann as for Wallerstein, decolonization means largely the process which “ended segmentation of the world economy into separate imperial zones,” and has been typically tied to capitalist development and industrialization.³¹⁵ While prior to the Second World War there were multiple dominant centers of capitalism operating on the global scale, after 1945 there was a shift towards a more simple, a collective center of the world capitalist system.³¹⁶ According to Samir Amin, the new collective center and expansion of capitalism has become the ensemble of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Therefore, the role of the United States as a hegemonic power should be situated in its relation with this collective center of the capitalist world system.³¹⁷ Furthermore, the political and social changes since the Second World War signify the development of a neoliberal movement inside a segregate worldwide domain of elite consensus arrangement.³¹⁸

Based on Gramscian concept of “passive revolution,” it is argued that the post-1945 world order was reformed to establish advanced methods of capitalist production

³¹⁴ Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 9.

³¹⁵ Mann, “Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?” 138.

³¹⁶ Samir Amin, “U.S. Imperialism, Europe, and the Middle East,” *Monthly Review* 56, no.6 (November 2004): 14.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*

³¹⁸ William K. Carroll and Colin Carson, “Neoliberalism, Capitalist Class Formation and the Global Network of Corporations and Policy Groups,” in *Neoliberal Hegemony: A Global Critique*, ed. Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen and Gisela Neunhoffer (New York: Routledge, 2006), 53.

worldwide and to consolidate ruling capitalist class.³¹⁹ The term “passive revolution” refers to the process of gradual transformation of socio-political and economic order in the way to legitimize the rule of the leading capitalist forces.³²⁰ Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize that while the Bretton Woods system aimed to spread the principles of free market internationally and encourage open competition, it allowed governments to intervene in the domestic economy to pursue full employment and prevent disruptive capital flows. Thus, the Bretton Woods system should be seen as an international economic order in which the general fundamentals of liberalism were “embedded.” Overall, as Cohn summarizes, “Policies to promote openness in the global economy included measures to cushion domestic economies, and policies to provide domestic stability in turn were designed to minimize interference with expansion of the global economy.”³²¹ In other words, in the absence of capitalist hegemony, comprehensive and slower transformation of the socio-political and economic order in the form of Fordist production and Keynesian macroeconomic management took place.

Awakened by the oppressiveness of politico-economic and social orders, former colonial states were encouraged by the Western countries to develop capitalist economies through engaging in free trade enterprise. This advancement of market mechanisms in the developing world was believed not only to put an end to the backwardness of the peoples, but more important, to ensure that Third World states did not fall into the hands of socialist regimes. Paul Baran is clear that while “the military performance of the Soviet Union during the war and the rapid recovery of its war-ravaged economy provided the

³¹⁹ Gill, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, 161.

³²⁰ Adam David Morton, *Unraveling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy* (London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2007).

³²¹ Cohn, *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice*, 83.

final proof of the strength and viability of a socialist society”, in the context of the Cold War, the United States and other Western capitalist countries were put in fear of “the spectacular advance and expansion of the world’s socialist camp.”³²² Therefore, the idea of economic growth and modernization as an outcome of power politics won backing from across the political and economic spectrum in the newly independent and less developed countries.

The end of the Second World War brought changes in the conceptual development doctrine.³²³ Rather than emphasizing spontaneous development from below, development and progressive social change has come to be associated with Westernization, or more accurately, Americanization. After the victory over fascism, the idea that the United States is the source of modernity has started to spread out from a Western core to the rest of the world. In fact, the Fordist form of production, the democratic form of state and the American form of civil society have become models to follow throughout the world.³²⁴ However, despite the increasing power of financial markets and determination of the neo-classical liberal views, only a few countries followed the approach of the completely unregulated market economy.³²⁵

Although the postwar international economic architecture owed much to the laissez-faire doctrine of orthodox liberals, the ideas of John Keynes on international and national economic planning had a significant impact on the post-war economic thought.

³²² Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), 10.

³²³ Eric Thorbecke, “The Evolution of the Development Doctrine, 1950-2005,” in *Advancing Development: Core Themes in Global Economics*, ed. George Mavrotas and Anthony Shorrocks (Houndmills, Basingstoke Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan in association with the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2007), 3.

³²⁴ Gill, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 53).

³²⁵ Cohn, *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice*, 83.

While neoclassical liberal architects of the post-war institutional order argued that capital controls contributed to the 1930s Great Depression and consequently to World War II, Keynesian economists believed that a self-regulating market was to be blamed for those disasters.³²⁶ Speaking in favor of increases in spending on social programs by state, followers of Keynesianism promoted the idea of government's intervention in the process of production and distribution to protect the economy from the influence of the capitalist cycle. Despite the clash of economic ideas and ideologies, post-war architects came to a compromise and designed the international economic framework on the basis of interventionist liberal policies. Taking into account the social turmoil against unrestrained market forces and the threat of continued class struggle, this kind of strategy was believed to be one of best choices to stimulate aggregate demand and stabilize capitalist society.³²⁷

If economic growth became conceived as the primary criterion of development, it had to be accompanied by the establishing of Western policies which promote privatization and deregulation, consolidate democracy and encourage trade and capital market liberalization. It became widely believed that political institutions along with economic growth were the main policy objectives that are the necessary for moving an economy of the state out of negative macroeconomic indicators into a positive.³²⁸ According to Steans and Pettiford, "International institutions were thought to be increasingly necessary as a complement to states, whose individual capabilities to deal

³²⁶ Ibid., 17.

³²⁷ Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World*, 42.

³²⁸ Thorbecke, "The Evolution of the Development Doctrine, 1950-2005," 30.

with problems generated by new technologies were decreasing.”³²⁹ While arguing that various kinds of institutions and agencies in different ways shape social, political and economic behavior, William Garside is clear that there has emerged a general consensus among modern economists that only through the complex system of international institutions, both formal and informal, the invisible hand of the market can perform well and eventually lead to economic growth.³³⁰ If, according to a liberal perspective, pre-World War II economic rules and institutions were weak and disruptive, the agreements laid down at Bretton Woods in 1944 established a new framework for international peace and cooperation which consisted of three international economic institutions – the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and later the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

For liberal thinkers, these institutions have been part of a complex structural framework and have played a crucial role in determining not only the post-war world economy, but also global peace and justice. In fact, the liberal study of international interdependence emphasized that institutionalized application of market principles would allow all human beings to enjoy the benefits of material progress equally. By rejecting an assumption that conflict between states is natural, liberals argued that these new forms of international political organization were necessary to manage both social and economic relations. For example, while one of the main functions of the Bretton Woods system was to avoid the competitive devaluation of currencies, “the IMF was created to monitor a system of pegged or fixed exchange rates, in which each currency had an official

³²⁹ Steans and Pettiford, *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, 38.

³³⁰ William R. Garside, “Introduction: Economic Growth and Development – An Institutional Perspective,” in *Institutions and Market Economics: The Political Economy of Growth and Development*, ed. William R. Garside (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 2.

exchange rate in relation to gold or the U.S. dollar.”³³¹ In contrast to the IMF’s ability to make short-term loans for the purpose of maintaining the pegged exchange rates, the IBRD or World Bank has been able to help countries (first Europe, then developing) with long-term loans needed for the various reconstruction projects. In sum, the predominant conviction of liberal thinkers after the Second World War was that the cause of the war was the economic breakdown, and thereby the main purpose of the Bretton Woods system was to promote economic growth and development by providing a secure structure for economic activity.³³²

Obviously, the idea that institutions are the rules of the game that shape the long-term performance of economies has a long history. It is commonly associated with the name of Adam Smith who believed that favorable results can be obtained from decentralized institutions rather than centralized initiatives.³³³ However, the conservative school of neoliberal economic theory interpreted the Bretton Woods agreements, which originally sided with interventionist policies, very differently.³³⁴ The years of the post-war American economic boom suspended Keynesian economic doctrine, based on the idea of a governments’ having a responsibility to provide steady economic expansion, jobs and increasing standards of living, with the shortage of effective demand.³³⁵

To be sure, the demand on the part of U.S. businesses significantly contributed to the persistence of the belief that only the unfettered market can guarantee the best

³³¹ Cohn, *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice*, 22.

³³² Steans and Pettiford, *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, 28.

³³³ P. Dorian Owen and Clayton R. Weatherson, “The Deep Determinants of Long-run Growth and Economic Development,” in *Institutions and Market Economics: The Political Economy of Growth and Development*, ed. William R. Garside (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), 142.

³³⁴ Henry R. Nau, *Perspectives on International Relations: Power, Institutions, and Ideas* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 204.

³³⁵ Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth*, 8.

distribution of income and is the most effective instrument to foster economic development and social progress. Furthermore, when the U.S. economy was the largest and most powerful economy in the world, conservative neoliberal economics otherwise known as the Chicago School became highly influential and emphasized those aspects of the Bretton Woods agreements while favoring the U.S. interests and policies.³³⁶ Not only did the United States favor rules and norms for the conduct of postwar economic relations, but the U.S. dollar served as its major trading currency. Therefore, due to economic expansion and to enormous investments of the U.S. into Europe, provided by the Marshall Plan, the U.S. managed to occupy a hegemonic position and assumed the increasing responsibility for the capitalist stability in the world.³³⁷

Towards Neoliberal Hegemony

It is essential to understand that mainly because of the United States' replacement of British hegemony over the capitalist world economy the nature of global capitalism has become quite different to that before the World War II. If there have been always hegemonic powers in the history of the modern world-system such as Spain, Portugal, United Provinces and the United Kingdom, the influence of the United States in the current capitalist order cannot be compared to that of any other mentioned above.³³⁸ The establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions and the shift to the role of the dollar as the international reserve currency has allowed the United States to obtain an economic

³³⁶ Dezalay and Garth. *The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States*.

³³⁷ Lyuk Mishel, "Ekonomicheskij Nacionalizm Protiv Mirovoj Ekonomiki," *Elementy*, no. 4, <http://my.arcto.ru/public/4econat.htm> (accessed June 9, 2011).

³³⁸ Cohn, *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice*, 61.

capability that was unparalleled.³³⁹ Furthermore, while claiming to foster liberty and prosperity, the United States evolved into the center of the world politics and culture.³⁴⁰

It was only after the Second World War, when U.S. recognized the reality of power relations in the world order and has started to intensively promote the ideal of itself as a model for the rest of the world.³⁴¹ To be sure, the U.S. support for the Wilsonian ideals of self-determination, national sovereignty and democracy has won support for the power of the United States and has inspired progressive elements in many societies to affiliate with these ideals and seek closer ties with the United States.³⁴² Consequently, being the only industrial power that after the World War II possessed the diplomatic, economic and military strength, the United States initiated the process of shaping and managing postwar international relations according to America's ideas, practices and domestic interests. Finally, when economic, political and military center of world capitalism shifted to the United States, its longtime imperial aspirations for geopolitical expansion have found a renewed strength.

The United States was committed to support the democratic development of societies. In order to secure its interests and solve the crisis of capital accumulation it launched the project of development. The case of post-World War II institutional transformation and construction of rules and regulations for the primacy of moving forward domestic interests of the United States is explained by Lipshutz, whose analysis has been associated with the notion of imperium as a heteronymous system subject to the

³³⁹ John Bellamy Foster, "The New Age of Imperialism," *Monthly Review* 55, no.3 (July-August 2003): 3.

³⁴⁰ Wallerstein, "U.S. Weakness and the Struggle for Hegemony."

³⁴¹ Kiely, *Empire in the Age of Globalization*, 129.

³⁴² Daniel S. Hamilton, "The United States: A Normative Power?" *Center for European Policy Studies*, Working Document No. 291 (May 2008), <http://www.ceps.eu> (accessed February 15, 2011).

regulations originating from the single configuration of power and authority.³⁴³ Lipshutz is among those who argue that foreign policy of the United States should be viewed as an extension of its domestic commercial orientation. According to Lipshutz, the main reason for the United States to pressure European allies to grant their colonies independence and foster the process of national awakening was economic. Therefore, the post-war world order that was supposed to be built around the legitimacy of democracy and self-determination was dictated by the commercial development and crave of the U.S. capitalist industrial system to capture markets, spheres of influences and capital investment. Clearly, the U.S. support for the right of self-determination was not based on the notions of fairness and idealism, but because of comprehensive planning and calculation that the end of European colonial rule was likely to extend its own power in a post-war world-system.³⁴⁴

In the Cold War context and in the fear of being confronted against the forces that contributed to the erosion of European colonialism, the United States through the involvement of social scientists have managed to establish a universal view of human nature and produced core concepts and problem definitions with which global community should operate. As Michael Latham emphasizes, “responding to a perceived Communist threat in the midst of a collapsing European colonial order” a broad range of American scholars developed a modernization theory explaining why some countries succeeded in their economic development while others had not.³⁴⁵ Therefore, while modernization

³⁴³ Lipschutz, *The Constitution of Imperium*, 9.

³⁴⁴ Michael Cox, “The Empire’s Back in Town: Or America’s Imperial Temptation – Again,” *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 32, (2003):18.

³⁴⁵ Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 209.

refers to radical changes in political structures, social values and economic organization, it should be viewed as an ideology aiming to transform the world in the ways in which the security of the capitalist world would not be challenged.³⁴⁶

To be sure, Latham refers to modernization as a conceptual structure that clearly states “a common collection of assumptions about the nature of American society and its ability to transform a world perceived as both materially and culturally deficient.”³⁴⁷ In fact, the emphasis should be made that the process of modernization mostly meant the adoption of Western technology, development of an independent mass media and acceptance of Western culture and products, values of efficiency and professionalism.³⁴⁸ In this context, Gill is clear that precisely the “outward expansion of the United States has also served to foster the values of consumerism and possessive individualism, so that increasing proportions of the populations of, for example, Third World states have come to identify with American culture.”³⁴⁹ Thus, vision of the entire world started to be transformed by Western techniques and institutions according to American model.

Although in the previous chapter I examined the socio-political and economic aspects of development process, the main focus of the modernization theory has been a set of individual characteristics considered as necessary to economic growth and progress.³⁵⁰ While non-Western societies through its entire history felt a prejudice against profit, commerce, speculative investment and interest, these elements were encouraged to achieve a rising of standards of living and for the reconstruction of economies. Acting in

³⁴⁶ Ibid., 4-5.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 5.

³⁴⁸ Kiely, *Empire in the Age of Globalization*, 121.

³⁴⁹ Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, 86.

³⁵⁰ Sankaran Khrishna, *Globalization & Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-first Century*, (Maryland: Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2009), 9.

a self-interested way has started to be seen as a necessary to the social progress and development.³⁵¹ From the modernization perspective, the only guarantee of progress is the cultivation of individuals with modern values, and having a state structure conducive to the development of free trade and commerce.³⁵² Thus, economic growth has started to be considered as the work of rational and enterprising individual. In other words, “In the modernization school of thought, the individual is the center of social analysis and in many ways the sole reality, with society, state, and other forms of collective being.”³⁵³ This viewing of progress via the individual behavior has been applied by knowledgeable experts and international institutions on the entire underdeveloped world.

The general point is that in the predominant and mainstream Western political culture, resistance to the American expectation and position has been always judged to arise from the backwardness of the people, while support of Washington’s policies has been regarded equivalent to democratic thinking and behavior.³⁵⁴ Of course, the improvements of the infrastructure, the accelerated spread of consumerism, technological innovation and industrialization have created feeling and belief in progress.³⁵⁵ In fact, an important aspect of modernization has always been its simultaneous benefit to the welfare of the underdeveloped state and highly industrialized capitalist economy. Nevertheless, there should be clarity about the benefit in the relationship between the kind of post-colonial state, serving the interests of capitalist marketing network, and economically developed and dominant nations, supplying with power, wealth and privilege a corrupt

³⁵¹ Ibid., 9-10.

³⁵² Ibid., 14.

³⁵³ Ibid., 10.

³⁵⁴ Lamis Andoni, “Obama does not get it,” *Al Jazeera*, March 9, 2011, <http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/03/20113911948670383.html> (accessed March 9, 2011).

³⁵⁵ Cesaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*.

national elite that forfeits the well-being and dignity of the ordinary people.³⁵⁶ The demand for mutual benefit has depended on a level of threat to the capitalist elites of the globalized world and thereby “on an assertion of central imperial control.”³⁵⁷

For the U.S. political establishment, the rhetoric of self-determination, democracy, rule of law, anticommunism and human rights has been nothing else than a convenient instrument to arrange the structure of global capitalism in a way to converge with the U.S. interests. The pro-freedom and pro-justice slogans have had to grapple more with human consciousness than the physical structure and have worked to becloud the material quality of capitalist imperialism.³⁵⁸ Therefore, it should be immediately apparent that development as a largely national process has resembled the processes of colonial civilizing in which “a puppet ruler is installed, a native mercenary army hired to fight, and western troops sent to crush rebellious tribesmen who refuse to follow the diktat of the imperial power.”³⁵⁹ In this context, various and influential accounts that identify development with civilization, progress and modernization have been instruments of exploitation and oppression in the hands of capitalist forces.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁶ Richard Falk, “The toxic residue of colonialism,” *Al Jazeera*, February 14, 2011, <http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/02/2011213201140768988.html> (accessed February 16, 2011).

³⁵⁷ Frederick Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept,” in *International Development and the Social Sciences*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 69.

³⁵⁸ Lipschutz, *The Constitution of Imperium*, 100.

³⁵⁹ Quoted in Eric Margolis, “Let’s Speak the Truth about Afghanistan,” *The Huffington Post*, July 30, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-margolis/lets-speak-the-truth-abou_b_115591.html (accessed February 21, 2009).

³⁶⁰ Krishna, *Globalization & Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-first Century*, 4.

C. The Consolidation of Neoliberal Hegemony

Once Again, Crisis as a Starting Point

Through the early 1970s, partly because of the socio-political responses to the effects of World War II, neoliberal doctrine hid under the umbrella of government policy. However, despite that modification, it is important to underline that the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, capital controls and multilateral institutions “between the end of the Second World War and the start of the 1970s” allowed the largest development of productive structures and expansion of global economy in history.³⁶¹ One of the reasons for such change is the fact that “the crisis of the post-war order accelerated the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism - from economies of scale to economies of flexibility.”³⁶² In other words, “the large integrated plant employing large numbers of semiskilled workers on mass-production of standardised goods became an obsolete model of organisation.”³⁶³ This has significantly strengthened the power of capital within the production process and caused business to become less controllable by state authority.³⁶⁴ Thus, while in the first half of the twentieth century liberal capitalism was interested in strengthening the role of the state to benefit corporations with legal privileges, tax benefits and financial investments, since the last decades of the twentieth century, the transnational corporations, through the implementation of neoliberal ideology, have been weakening the state and insisting on privatization of state enterprises.

³⁶¹ Niels S. Hahn, “Neoliberal Imperialism and Pan-African Resistance,” *Journal of World-Systems Research* 13, no. 2 (2007), 146.

³⁶² Cox, “Global Perestroika,” 28.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

The incorporation of monopolies in the production and financial sector has resulted in their taking over the state and turned for the world domination. In 1973, the switch to market-determined free exchange rates along with the oil price shock and subsequent prolonged international recession created favorable conditions for political leaders and leading economists to further push the free market ideology over Keynesian compromise. Slower rates of growth, intense social movements and high inflation across the world “laid the basis for the liberalization of finance and important changes in U.S. economic policy, which led to increased bank lending to the developing world in the 1970s.”³⁶⁵ As a result, during the 1980s, being encouraged by Western banks to borrow, developing states were confronted with enormous debts and interest payments. Therefore, the resulting defaults and control of inflation helped to push further the agenda for a revived political approach which eventually came to be recognized as neoliberalism.³⁶⁶

Ironically, the role of the IMF increased again. As Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore stressed, “It has become very active in reconfiguring domestic political and business institutions of all kinds, advising countries on appropriate configurations of everything from their social spending to their stock markets and banking sectors.”³⁶⁷ For Barnett and Finnemore, the IMF started to intervene in member’s income, labor, monetary, environmental and fiscal policies in ways generally rejected by its original architects. Barnett and Finnemore are clear that “The Fund moved from a limited focus on balance-of-payments lending to ever more sweeping structural interventions in member’s economies and societies in an attempt to control activities that might contribute

³⁶⁵ Kiely, *Empire in the Age of Globalization*, 95.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 45.

to stabilization.”³⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the IMF’s critics argue that these structural adjustment programs have not been merely a remedial package for stabilization and economic growth, but part of a scheme directed to reconstruct economies of the developing states according to the free market model.

There cannot be any doubts that through the IMF’s package of neoliberal structural adjustment policies as a condition for loans, neoliberalism, has imposed its market values and economic regime on weaker states.³⁶⁹ Neoliberal policy prescriptions imposed by the international agencies have forced developing states “to open their frontiers by lifting import and export restrictions, to remove price controls and state subsidies, to enforce rapid privatization or divestiture of all or part of state-owned enterprises, to implement user fees for basic services such as education and health and to cut social expenditures.”³⁷⁰ Thus, the widespread consensus in favor of economic liberalization was reached not only because of the failure of state interventionist policies during the period from the World War II through the 1980s, but as a result of intense campaign to spread a belief in the free market as the most effective way to foster economic growth and development by powerful international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank and known as the “Washington Consensus.”

Under the regimes of Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s undiluted neoliberal dogma rose to dominance and stimulated the spread of “transnational corporations, the expansion of foreign direct investment and the interpenetration of capital.”³⁷¹ The

³⁶⁸ Ibid., 47.

³⁶⁹ Giroux, “Neoliberalism and the Demise of Democracy: Resurrecting Hope in Dark Times.”

³⁷⁰ Niels S. Hahn, “Neoliberal Imperialism and Pan-African Resistance,” 151.

³⁷¹ Carroll and Carson, “Neoliberalism, capitalist class formation and the global network of corporations and policy groups,” 53.

principal assertions of this dogma have become the ideas that “states should leave economies to the efficiencies of market forces” and were required to adopt such policies as free trade and privatization, deregulation and foreign investment.³⁷² Hence, states became more accountable to business corporations rather than to the public. In fact, the role of state is now limited to that of a regulator of contracts between individuals and companies, and mediator of the conflict resulting from the class struggle.

Therefore, the 1970s and 1980s have been characterized by the shift away from an international world order of sovereign states towards transnational liberal economic order in which multinational corporations have started to dominate.³⁷³ The key to the above developments have been a profound “changes in communication, information and transportation technologies that now enabled production to be globally parceled out.”³⁷⁴ This in turn has allowed the relocation of the capitalist industrial production and eventually constituted the basis of a renewed cycle of capital accumulation, that is nowadays called globalization.

Project of Neoliberal Globalization

Though the relationship between the extension of neoliberalism and the process of globalization is vitally important, there is no doubt that both are tightly connected to the relationship of Western power.³⁷⁵ The concept of globalization has been used by free market theorists as liberalization and has been referred to as an accelerated integration of

³⁷² Kiely, *Empire in the Age of Globalization*, 95.

³⁷³ Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, 88.

³⁷⁴ Khrishna, *Globalization & Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-first Century*, 45.

³⁷⁵ Kiely, *Empire in the Age of Globalization*, 30.

many local economies into one global market.³⁷⁶ In this context, Kiely denies the assertion that contemporary globalization arrived from nowhere and claims that it should be seen as an outcome of the transition from a Keynesian to a neoliberal form of capitalism.³⁷⁷ Moreover, Keily is clear that in the process of transition and further extension of globalization the United States played a central role.³⁷⁸ Therefore, in spite of its new terminology, globalization is the formation and the outcome of a far longer intellectual history of promotion of markets for goods and for consolidating the global population in compliance with the forces operating in the free-market based capitalism.³⁷⁹

If globalization began in the end of nineteenth century due to the military power and eventually slowed down during the interwar period, “in the late twentieth century, economic instruments, competition and cooperation” intensified and further extended the process of globalization.³⁸⁰ Current globalization is of a new kind; it is not English, but Anglo-American.³⁸¹ To be precise, the crucial aspect of globalization is the comprehensive diffusion and supremacy of American capital and power.³⁸² Just as the products of the United States have overflowed global markets since the post-World War II, American culture is now suffusing every continent.³⁸³ People everywhere are exposed

³⁷⁶ Jan Aart Scholte, “What is ‘Global’ about Globalization,” in *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Malden: Polity Press, 2002), 84.

³⁷⁷ Kiely, *Empire in the Age of Globalization*, 95.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 361.

³⁸⁰ David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, “Rethinking Globalization,” in *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Malden: Polity Press, 2002), 72.

³⁸¹ Stuart Hall, “The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity,” in *Culture, Globalization and the World-System*, eds. Anthony D. King (Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 27.

³⁸² World Public Opinion. Org., “Globalization,” http://www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/globalization/culture.cfm (accessed September 9, 2011).

³⁸³ Ibid.

to the values of the United States as never before. U.S. brands are not simply selling products, but also a life-style.³⁸⁴ Furthermore, according to Robinson, “the global cultural icons symbolize the domination of a particular corporate capitalist culture.”³⁸⁵ We are witnessing how the U.S. political and business leaders, with the broad support of society, are imposing on the entire world the idea that American neoliberal values are universal and undeniable because they form the basis of civilization. Therefore, the consequences of a never-ending process of accumulating power and wealth, globalization should be referred to as an acceleration and triumph of the integrated capitalist system.³⁸⁶ At the same time, it should be obvious that the defining feature of the current capitalist epoch is the rise of transnational capital which aims at dominating the global market and generates pressures for cultural and political activities, with intense consequences for power relations.³⁸⁷ The spread of neoliberal knowledge structure has resulted in the further expansion of investments and markets, cutting the state sector and destruction of rights of indigenous peoples.

Although the interconnectedness of individuals, groups and countries has existed for centuries and the increasing integration through trade has been a key characteristic of the global economy since the Second World War, namely the collapse of the Soviet Union and the position of the United States as the leading beneficiary of the information revolution have led to the “spectacular growth in intensity, scope and visibility of

³⁸⁴ Kiely, *Empire in the Age of Globalization*, 123.

³⁸⁵ Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World*, 32.

³⁸⁶ Kellner, “Theorizing Globalization,” 289.

³⁸⁷ Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World*, 32.

globalization as a public issue.”³⁸⁸ The Soviet Union fell and with it a new unipolar world, dominated by one master unchecked by any rival, was born. Having “conquered” and having put under the control the entire Western hemisphere, the United States received a green light for the access to the market of the post-Soviet republics that resulted in openness of the former communist state to American influence and power. The lack of prevalent strategic and ideological threat gave the United States free hand to pursue its foreign policy based on its interest.³⁸⁹ At the same time, it should be clear that without the exercise of American power, the existing liberal capitalistic world order would eventually collapse.³⁹⁰

The transition from the ideological confrontation to the consensus over the model of global economic and political management created a perfect moment and unprecedented opportunity for the United States to take a lead and change the international environment in the America’s image. The fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 and the culmination of the confrontation between traditional East and West left the world with illusion that the victory of liberal democratic capitalism was final.³⁹¹ As a result of the “technological revolution involving the creation of a computerized network of communication,”³⁹² the process of neoliberal globalization became a reality and has given an impression that all people from all the regions of the globe have been caught up

³⁸⁸ Duncan Green and Matthew Griffith, “Globalization and Its Discontents,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of Affairs 1944-)* 78, no. 1 (2002):51.

³⁸⁹ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Shuster Paperbacks, 1994), 805.

³⁹⁰ David Held and Anthony McGrew, “The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction,” in *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Malden: Polity Press, 2002), 5.

³⁹¹ Sergei Karaganov, “A New Epoch of Confrontation.” *Russia in Global Affairs* 4 (October-December 2007), <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/21/1148.html> (accessed November 18, 2007).

³⁹² Kellner “Theorizing Globalization,” 287.

in a single movement and are all marching together towards the peace, prosperity and democracy.³⁹³

D. Neoliberal Triumph in Ukraine

The essential point is that for the majority of Ukrainian politicians the country's modernization and progress has been associated with Western neoliberal economic and political framework as the only legitimate path to restructure itself after decades of the communist rule. Since the declaration of Ukraine as an independent state, the neoliberal ideology has been central for the ruling class.³⁹⁴ In fact, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, former Communist party officials and Komsomol workers quickly equipped themselves with the knowledge of neoliberal political economy in exchange for the legitimization of their power and authority by the Western world.³⁹⁵ Furthermore, the experience of the Soviet centrally planned developmental strategy and the desire for individual liberty and equality before the law signified that Western political and socioeconomic model with an emphasis on private enterprise, consumerism, market economy and withdrawal of the state has presented an attractive picture to the populations in Eastern Europe.³⁹⁶ Therefore, with the end of the ideological battle in the context of Cold War, the idea of the development by replacing “backward” practices with Western norms and institutions has been greeted with euphoria by the countries of Eastern Europe.

³⁹³ Susan George, “Globalizing Rights?” in *Globalizing Rights*, eds. Matthew J. Gibney (New York: The Oxford University Press, 2003), 16.

³⁹⁴ Yuriy Romanenko, “Prognoz Budushhego Ukrainy: Strah i Besporyadok Nesut Real'nye Perspektivy,” *Globalist*, November 8, 2006, <http://globalist.org.ua/novosti/society-news/events/prognoz-ukraina-2010-no57006.html> (accessed November 11, 2010).

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁶ Gill, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, 54.

After the series of external shocks crested with the spectacular collapse of the Soviet Union, the fundamental institutional change in development strategy, greater openness to trade, and complete deregulation of the financial system have become the essential preconditions to successful stabilization and adjustment processes in Eastern Europe. It has been widely accepted that through economic growth and modernization in the overwhelmingly Western-centric vision or more specifically in the American image, social inequalities and the Soviet way of life would be eliminated. Furthermore, the political conditionality, tied to Western financial aid which has been imposed on the former communist countries, left little choice but to adopt the program of radical political and socioeconomic policies associated with capitalist development and democratic, as opposed to authoritarian, form of government.³⁹⁷

Consequently, it is apparent that while domestic transition dynamics of the countries of Eastern Bloc has differed in size and intensity, the vision of Western-led development model for such countries as Ukraine has resulted from domestic demands and international pressures.³⁹⁸ Importantly, while the process of modernization within Central and Eastern Europe has targeted not only communist political and socioeconomic system but also the Soviet Union,³⁹⁹ it has deepened the problem of Ukraine's national identity, and thereby has delayed a structural change in economic and sociopolitical life of Ukrainians. Nevertheless, current Ukrainian political establishment continues to view Western neoliberal model of development as the only legitimate path to progress, and

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

³⁹⁸ Reimund Seidelmann, "Western and Eastern Europe After the East-West Conflict: Reinventing Responsibility and a Grand Strategy," in *NATO for a New Century: Atlanticism and European Security*, ed. Carl C. Hodge (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 51.

³⁹⁹ Ibid., 53.

gradually transforms politics and economy of the country in a top-down manner according to the prescriptions of the Western world.

Furthermore, it is necessary to acknowledge that a part of the reason that the nature of neoliberal reforms in Ukraine was always half-hearted is the fact that none of the Ukrainian political forces possessed an absolute power.⁴⁰⁰ In point of fact, both Mr. Kuchma and Mr. Yushchenko while trying to balance between the needs of big capital and public sentiments were not able to fully implement neoliberal economic policy reforms.⁴⁰¹ For Yuriy Romanenko, the victory of Yanukovich in 2010 Ukrainian presidential election marks the radical shift towards neoliberal structural policy. Having succeeded in the allocation of maximum concentration of powers in one institution, Yanukovich's regime, under the guise of “tough measures to restore order” has made a commitment to neoliberalism as the dominant ideology and political stance.⁴⁰²

The neoliberal offensive in Ukraine which began with the advent of Yanukovich is entirely logical in the context of achieving a non-violent solution to the political crisis in Ukraine.⁴⁰³ Since Yanukovich's arrival happened at the time of global economic crisis, any government's actions could be perceived as a necessity to protect a common good.⁴⁰⁴ In this context, referring to Milton Friedman, Romanenko underlines that only crisis could lead to real change in Ukraine. Specifically, through exploitation of crisis conditions and managing opposition, Yanukovich's government has initiated economic reform policies.

⁴⁰⁰ Romanenko, “Prognoz Budushhego Ukrainy: Strah i Besporyadok Nesut Real'nye Perspektivy.”

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Ibid.

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

As a result, Yanukovych released the program of economic reforms for 2010-2014 which comprehensively defines an application of neoliberal economic agenda. In fact, the systematic reform program, which according to Ukrainian mass-media was developed by McKinsey & Company, consists of the pension and tax reforms, reform of the labor code and many other programs of economic reforms which have been written on the prescription of IMF, and more important, as a precondition for IMF financial aid. In short, this program envisages raised living standards, improved growth performance and more transparency through complete privatization and liberalization, deregulation and fiscal decentralization, complete reformation of public services.

NATO as a Dutiful Agent of Neoliberalism

While the IMF and World Bank have been the most powerful advocates of neoliberal reforms in the developing world over the last three decades, NATO, WTO and the European Central Bank joined the race to spread neoliberalism shortly after the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. If Central and Eastern Europe's integration into the Western Alliance's institutional framework was recently accomplished and consolidated, Ukraine's reorientation has attained an advanced stage in the economic and political spheres.

Rachel Epstein argues that international institutions have had a significant influence on post communist countries which have set themselves on a free market reform trajectory.⁴⁰⁵ According to Epstein, the liberal, or as I call it neoliberal, worldview that currently prevails in the minds of political and economic elites of Eastern and Central

⁴⁰⁵ Rachel A. Epstein, *In Pursuit of Liberalism: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008).

Europe is supported “by a perception of where authority is grounded.”⁴⁰⁶ For most parts of Eastern and Central Europe, the transition to political pluralism and free market enterprise “has been marked by a shift from domestic sources of authority, such as historical experience and nationalist striving to international sources of authority, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and the Bretton Woods institutions.”⁴⁰⁷ Epstein’s claim that “Domestic actors view international institutions as authoritative sources of information and, as a consequence, seek their approbation,” is very persuasive.⁴⁰⁸

International institutions not only exercise power over policymaking elites and consequently determine an international orientation of states, they also influence the “domestic balance of power among groups in society.”⁴⁰⁹ International institutions, whose main priority is to develop new policy programs, persuade and shape the actions of domestic actors and should be viewed as active agents of domestic and global change.⁴¹⁰ While I realize that a number of different theoretical approaches can be relevant for the evaluation of the role of the state in today’s internationalized world and extremely useful for our understanding of how international institutions and regimes can transform political dynamics, this section attempts only to highlight the point that international organizations have promoted consensus around the neoliberal policy manifestations in the countries undergoing transition. More important, the point is that

⁴⁰⁶ Epstein, *In Pursuit of Liberalism: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe*, 7.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., 197.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., 9.

See also Rachel Epstein, “The Social Context in Conditionality: Internationalizing Finance and Defense in Postcommunist Europe,” paper prepared for the 10 Biennial International EUSA Conference, 17-19 May, 2007, <http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/epstein-r-08b.pdf> (accessed September 9, 2011).

⁴¹⁰ Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*, 156.

multilateral institutions play a key role in regional and global processes of monitoring and implementation of free market-oriented knowledge structure while disciplining alternative knowledge, ideas, policy options, and practices.

As previously mentioned, for Ukraine, Euro-Atlantic integration means not only being a member of collective security system, but fostering of economic development through a neoliberal political and constitutional framework. If for Walt, Ukraine's participation in the transatlantic cooperative security arrangement can increase the state's strength in relation to Russia and enhance its regional influence, according to Brett Leeds and Andrew Long's hypothesis, Euro-Atlantic integration means more for Ukraine than just being an associate of military organization.⁴¹¹ Leeds and Long assert that military allies unconditionally have positive economic consequences, and members of the collective security system are expected to facilitate economic growth, development and trade.⁴¹² For scholars, the security externality and the reaction of commercial institutions are the main motives and explanations for intensive engagement in mercantilism. Leeds and Long conclude that "When firms feel secure that conflict between their state and that of their trading partners is unlikely to occur and that the states will work together to promote commerce between their respective businesses, they are more likely to invest in trade."⁴¹³

As determined by the liberalist theoretical perspective of international relations, Ukraine's membership in NATO will provide a well-balanced and secure framework for

⁴¹¹ Andrew Long and Brett Leeds, "Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements," *Journal of Peace Research* 43 (2006).

⁴¹² *Ibid.*, 434.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*, 435.

regional and international economic activity, and thereby will encourage close trading relationships and reassure the international community that economic cooperation remains safe. Namely, the liberal view with its ideas of complex interdependence and functionalism ascribes to NATO a crucial role in driving states to collaborate in a much more widespread way than they had done before. Liberal explanations for the incorporation of Ukraine into NATO derive from the idea that all states are bound to benefit from interdependency and cooperation. This argument stresses that while NATO reduces the threat for nascent democracies and thereby promotes and extends the liberal community, the Alliance also continues to play a security role. Liberal scholars see NATO as one of many multilateral mechanisms to promote security and transnational cooperation through reinforcing democracy and free market economies. In fact, my point is that the only arguments which demonstrate security advantages for Ukraine joining NATO seem to rely more on particular Wilsonian liberal internationalism or constructivist notions about the constitutive role of alliances rather than realist conventional wisdom.

According to Epstein, countries who are not even members of the Alliance yet, but have joined the path to its membership, already demonstrate their devotion to Western political and economic models. Through the Partnership for Peace, a program directed at creating trust between NATO and non-members, a process of denationalization of defense planning and foreign policy in majority of countries of Eastern and Central Europe has already taken place.⁴¹⁴ Furthermore, while the partnership commits to extend defense cooperation between a non-member state and the

⁴¹⁴ Epstein, *In Pursuit of Liberalism: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe*, 109.

Alliance, it pushes a cooperative non-member state to transform power relations from an executive-led model to a model of democratic civil-military relations.⁴¹⁵ One of the main focuses of NATO has always been the establishment of “a system of check and balances in which the executive, government, parliament, and society, through the media and nongovernmental organizations would share in oversight.”⁴¹⁶ Moreover, particular transformations in defense will not only lead to further distributional consequences, but signify a transformation of “previously contested ideas into commonly held assumptions.”⁴¹⁷ It follows, therefore that NATO uses its membership requirements not only to regulate the behavior of societies, but also to define new tasks, create new categories of actors and shape social reality in ways that favor a market-oriented approach.

Alexandra Gheciu’s book *NATO in the “New Europe” The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War* is an analytical examination of NATO’s role in building of construction of Western liberal norms and practices in former Communist states. While analyzing the practices of NATO in Eastern and Central Europe, Gheciu argues that NATO has been deeply involved in socializing “Central and Eastern European political, military, and functional elites into adopting Western-defined liberal democratic norms and building corresponding institutions in their states.”⁴¹⁸ Through NATO’s involvement in the numerous processes of domestic politics, the organization has “played an important role in post-Communist efforts in Central and

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., 29.

⁴¹⁸ Alexandra Gheciu, *NATO in the “New Europe” The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 3.

Eastern Europe to (re) draw boundaries between reasonable/unacceptable definitions of national identity and interests”⁴¹⁹ While Gheciu unifies a great number of arguments that are useful for my study, the claim that NATO has been deeply engaged in a relatively broad set of activities aimed at projection of a particular kind of liberal state identity in Central and Eastern Europe, “while simultaneously rejecting alternative norms and institutions as inherently flawed” is important.⁴²⁰

E. Conclusion

In summary, it should be clear that the process of decolonization ended the process of the extension of power through conquest and led to the major transformations in the form of capitalist imperialism. The United States, a unique country “in the degree of its reliance on military spending, and its determination to beside the world, military as well as economically,”⁴²¹ established not only the renewed cycle of capital accumulation, but a new form of social control and discipline. The chapter has sought to demonstrate that the Bretton Woods system was designed to drive states into consensus that global economic and social development should be based around market-based principles. More important, it should be apparent that the post-war order was organized to promote a regime, associated with the classical liberalism, in which the notions of complex interdependence and integration were highly suggestive in order to improve living standards and promote rapid economic growth. This chapter also briefly examined the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and marked it as a shift to economic globalization

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

⁴²¹ Quoted in John Bellamy Foster, Hannah Holleman, and Robert W. McChesney, “The U.S. Imperial Triangle and Military Spending,” *Monthly Review* 60, no. 5 (October 2008): 1.

associated with the widespread implementation of the free market doctrines, known as neoliberalism.

International institutions have become significantly necessary instruments for maintaining international economic and political order. Through the engagement particularly with the liberal pluralist perspectives, I examine international institutions as the instruments to promote the neoliberal policies of privatization, liberalization and deregulation. My main argument here is that markets are expanded and produced with the help of international organizations. It should be clear that international institutions, such as NATO, IMF, WTO, and World Bank impose the limitations on socio-economic and political life of states to promote neoliberalism as Western model of economic development and thereby deprive of any other achievable policy alternatives.

As for Ukraine's membership in NATO specifically, I argue that while it has always been a protector of capitalist liberal order, with the end of the Cold War the Alliance has become an active and important tool in the process of post communist transition. I agree with the viewpoint that through a series of "mechanisms of teaching and persuasion," NATO continues to be deeply involved in promotion of Western-style liberal political and economic norms.⁴²² As Gheciu concluded, NATO, "conventionally regarded as just a military alliance, which, by definition, would not become involved in domestic politics" should be seen as one of the leading agents in the international socialization process aiming to shape public opinion and reconstruct domestic politics.⁴²³

⁴²² Alexandra Gheciu, "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe'," *International Organization* 59, no.4 (Autumn 2005): 973-974.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*, 1009.

In short, the arguments taken up by Epstein and Gheciu, led me to conclude that engagement with NATO plays a significant role in the formulation of state interests and even definition of national identity. I argue that in close engagement with NATO, the Western states consider domestic reforms as instruments of establishing a neoliberal model of development in the transition countries. Logically, this means that membership in NATO signifies a subscription to Anglo-American neoliberal economic model, imposed by the Western World. Given this context, it is vitally necessary to think that Ukraine's membership in NATO demands a resignation of Ukrainian sovereignty in the realms of foreign and domestic policy. This discussion contributes to the argument that an attempt to turn Ukraine into NATO member is not driven by Ukraine's security concerns, but by strong Western interests, especially economic.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The significant part of Ukraine's identity problem emerged out of its historical context. Historically, eastern and southern parts of Ukraine were under the Russian empire and western Ukraine at times was a part of Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Poland. More important, Ukrainians lived not only in various political entities, but also in very different cultural systems which developed on the basis of Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches. While eastern Ukrainians speak Russian, the people of western Ukraine, on the other hand, speak Ukrainian. Only after World War II, with the end of prolonged conflict between western Ukrainians and Poles, Ukraine established its present-day borders as a republic within the Soviet Union. In 1991, when Ukraine gained its independence there were predictions that Ukraine would break up the way of Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, while being hardly a well-integrated country, Ukraine continues its existence as an independent and unexpected state that many are still adjusting to.⁴²⁴

Ukraine is not strictly speaking a national state. Rather it is a unique multinational and multicultural state in which the Russian presence has been extremely large. Previously oppressed different cultural traditions "entered the conceptual space of identity debate" and created an equilibrium which implies the absence of unilateral colonial pressure.⁴²⁵ For some it may be an exaggeration, but I am suggesting that Ukrainian state serves as a good example of the artificially constructed state consisting of

⁴²⁴ Adopted from Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*.

⁴²⁵ Liudmyla Pavlyuk, "Holding together Ukraine's East and West: Discourses of Cultural Confrontation and Reconciliation in the Ukrainian Mass Media," *Postcolonial Europe*, <http://www.postcolonial-europe.eu/index.php/uk/studies/64-holding-together-ukraines-east-and-west-discourses-of-cultural-confrontation-and-reconciliation-in-the-ukrainian-mass-madia> (accessed June 16, 2010).

different peoples whose integration into one political group emerged rather recently. Thus, the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state resulted in the underlying dispute over the question of what it means to be Ukrainian.

The search for a Ukrainian identity rests on a conflict between the eastern cultural tradition, which attaches values of the connection between Russians and Ukrainians, and western cultural tradition, which privileges Ukraine's Western identity. In the debate over cultural affiliation of Ukraine it does not matter which of these cultures are better. The problem is that Western and Eurasian political cultures are different and not compatible. Following Jeffrey Hahn, I am referring political culture to the values, beliefs, and attitudes about political life which society holds and which, through "an intergenerational transfer known as the process of political socialization," constitute an integral part of person's social identity.⁴²⁶ In fact, it is necessary to emphasize that the notion of "Eurasia" in this work is not referred to the assembly of the continents of Europe and Asia, but as Dmitri Trenin notes, it is addressed to the "traditional Russian state - the stardom of Muscovy, the empire, the Soviet Union."⁴²⁷ To explore this issue further, Molchanov makes it clear that "Eurasianism emphasizes the conservative side of Russian political culture, elevating the state over society and defending impersonal 'order' against the 'anarchic' impulses of individual freedom."⁴²⁸ Arguing for the pro-Eurasian ideology of Ukraine's foreign policy, its proponents are clear that such a political culture is

⁴²⁶ Jeffrey Hahn, "Yaroslavl' Revisited: Assessing Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture since 1990," working paper funded by National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (2005), http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2005_820_06_Hahn.pdf (accessed August 12, 2011).

⁴²⁷ Dmitri Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 2.

⁴²⁸ Molchanov, *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations*, 100.

contradictory to a kind of “liberalism” and “democracy” that Western political culture advances.

Although the debate over Ukraine’s integration in NATO covers mainly such issues as the enhancement of state security, modernization of armed forces, and improvement of military performance, NATO membership for Ukraine is a part of the process of nurturing Ukraine’s Western self-conception and demonstrates Ukraine’s commitment to the process of integration into Western institutions. According to Paul D’Anieri, “even if Ukraine is never admitted to NATO but establishes NATO membership as a goal, then something new has been said about Ukrainian national identity.”⁴²⁹ In fact, the issue of Ukraine’s integration into NATO for the majority of Ukrainian population involves not the point of a return to Europe or Western civilization, but a matter of changing dimensions of Ukrainian society along the structure of civilization. Therefore, it should be clear that NATO is playing a crucial role in influencing Ukrainian political culture and political environment.

Pro-NATO forces in Ukraine have portrayed the Alliance mostly in military terms, and argued that strengthening of Ukraine’s position vis-à-vis Russia and protection against a possible Russian threat is the main value of NATO membership for Ukraine. I have argued that an attempt to turn Ukraine into NATO member is not driven by Ukraine’s security concerns. Obviously, Ukrainian society has had a long history of Soviet rule and domination. Russian influence on Ukraine has always been evident. However, I assert that most of political, economic and cultural tensions between Ukraine and Russia are artificial and in most cases mean to mobilize certain fractions of electorate

⁴²⁹ D’Anieri, “Constructivist Theory and Ukrainian Foreign Policy,” 50.

and to discredit the political opponents. While I acknowledge that “the Ukrainian-Russian cultural war is part of a wider on-going undeclared conflict between both countries over their evolving national identities,” it must be clear that the disputes and differences over national identity have always been chronically used in Ukraine’s elections at all levels.⁴³⁰ It is also true that Russia used its energy resources to influence Ukrainian policies.⁴³¹ However, as Anton Fedyashin argues, “Since Russia has subsidized Ukraine's economy by selling it gas below market prices, it was well within its rights to expect cooperation in return.”⁴³² With regard to Ukraine’s pro-Western course, it is interesting to note that “Russia has never objected to Ukraine's participation in the EU, the OECD, or any other non-military Western institution.”⁴³³ This is probably because prospect of Ukraine actually joining these Western institutions has remained a long way off.

The question of Ukrainian membership in NATO has always been influenced by historical and ideological factors which in recent years have become the main electoral motivations of the Ukrainian highly polarized society.⁴³⁴ Unfortunately, following the election of Yushchenko, the problems only intensified and manipulation of public opinion has become a live issue as never before. Clearly, Yushchenko reduced Ukraine’s Western orientation to NATO membership and depicted his anti-Russian policy as the expression of Ukrainian patriotism.⁴³⁵ In the absence of Russian threat and due to the lack

⁴³⁰ Taras Kuzio, “The Ukrainian-Russian Cultural Conflict,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6, no.87 (May 2009), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34955 (accessed April 13, 2011).

⁴³¹ Anton Fedyashin, “Our New Russian Opportunity,” *PostGlobal*, February 12, 2009, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/needtoknow/2009/02/our_new_russian_opportunity.html (accessed April 19, 2011).

⁴³² *Ibid.*

⁴³³ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁴ Pavlyuk and Erlinger, “NATO and Ukraine: Elites’ Actions, Public Perception, and Polarization.”

⁴³⁵ Fedyashin, “Our New Russian Opportunity.”

of spectacularity of Ukrainian-Russian antagonism the security approach was determined for a failure as a conceivable reason for Ukraine's incorporation in the military Alliance. Therefore, the perception of a Russian threat served to be the central argumentative strategy of the former Ukrainian government to bring Ukraine into NATO.

Nevertheless, while in the public sphere the balance-of-threat served a largely convincing explanation for Ukraine to be incorporated into NATO, in practice the security concerns have resulted to be nothing else than a part of rhetorical action to persuade the opponents of Ukraine's incorporation in NATO. Active pulling of Ukraine into NATO, grounded on security concerns and motivated by the fear of the enemy, brought the opposite effects which seem to be neither overlooked by the former U.S. leadership nor by the former Ukrainian president. Once again, this happened because of the neorealist argumentative strategy of Yushchenko that was completely different from the rhetorical strategy of the leaders of Central and Eastern European states who along with security concerns appealed to the Western liberal principles of social and political order. Relying on Schimmelfennig's analysis it is clear that the perception of security threat is not a legitimizing foundation to be incorporated into the military alliance such as NATO.⁴³⁶

Furthermore, identification with the Western international community and the perception of liberal democratic norms as legitimate are sufficient preconditions for NATO's decision to admit new members.⁴³⁷ While Central and Eastern European states have always identified themselves positively with Western international community,

⁴³⁶ Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, 90.

perceived Western liberal norms as legitimate and eventually integrated into NATO and the European Union, for such countries as Ukraine positive identification with the Western community is not enough. The process of integration into NATO or the European Union requires the transformation of Ukrainian identity in turn which is problematic for both Ukraine and Russia. Attempts to speedily shift the construction of Ukrainian identity in the pro-Western direction during the presidency of Yushchenko have significantly contributed to the political instability and further division in Ukrainian society.

Therefore, the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO while excluding Russia would decrease rather than increase not only Ukraine's security, but also Europe's security. With Ukraine's incorporation into military alliance, the great danger is that Russia will be trapped in a security dilemma what in its turn will force Russian policymakers to adopt more hostile attitude not only towards Ukraine, but also towards organization in general. Russia would have every reason to view Ukraine's incorporation into NATO as a threat, especially given the geographical position of its Black Sea Fleet. In these circumstances, it is apparent that an effort to turn Ukraine into North-Atlantic military ally would lead to potentially negative consequences in Europe and beyond. Moreover, the Crimean question would never go away just because Ukraine joins NATO.

Consequently, the conclusion that an attempt to turn Ukraine into NATO member is not driven by Ukraine's security concerns flows logically. NATO is the organization of the Western community which pursues a strategy of transforming the values, rules and norms of the Western neoliberal capitalism into "domestic institutions and discourses that

effectively govern domestic and foreign policy-making.”⁴³⁸ Seen from Schimmelfenning’s perspective, membership in NATO signifies the affirmation of a Western political and socio-economic model against competing alternatives in both domestic and international arena.⁴³⁹

I have argued that the extension of NATO should be seen as an extension of multiple forms of power and influence, and the issue of Ukraine joining Euro-Atlantic Alliance should be examined in the context of the U.S. strategic interests. If states, according to realists, are considered to be the only entities in the system of international relations, then it is obvious that NATO should be examined as a tool for advancing of agent’s state interests. Why is it in the interests of the U.S. to contribute huge proportions of resources to group undertaking and back NATO’s membership for the weak and unstable states?⁴⁴⁰ This work contributes to the idea that NATO should be seen as multilateral organization which reinforces and promotes a global governance system, aiming at the establishment and consolidation of capitalist international order under the supervision of the United States. Taking the argument a step further, being a multilateral organization, NATO’s norms and rules have been applied to reinforce the process of transnational class formation, linked to globalized patterns of production and distribution, which in its turn are tied to the interests of U.S. corporations.

It has been argued that in the second half of the twentieth century the world capitalism entered the new phase of accumulating wealth and power in which

⁴³⁸ Quoted in Schimmelfenning, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*, 73.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁰ Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” in *Economic Theories of International Politics*, ed. Bruce Russett (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 26.

international organizations have played a significant role in support for the needs of the capitalist mode of production. Except until the Second World War, the United States has considered itself to be the heir to Western civilization with the responsibility for defending the West against the enemies.⁴⁴¹ Following the end of the Second World War, Western imperialist camp, guided by the United States, became the decisive force in the system of international relations. The highest priority of the U.S. political establishment has become to reform the manufacturing, business and commercial world along lines that would absorb U.S. manufacturing surpluses and offer opportunities for investment.⁴⁴² A new world order, constructed through such institutions as the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, was to be subordinated to the needs of the U.S. economy and subjected to U.S. political control.

In contrast to the common view that is constructed on the concepts of rhetoric, the United States' foreign policy originated directly from domestic policy and its main goal has always been to center commercial interests.⁴⁴³ The domestic market of the United States required constant economic growth, with rising profits and full employment, required investment abroad and growth of trade.⁴⁴⁴ As a result, "the finance oligarchy involved the state in national economic planning and implicated it in the process of economic and military competition with the dominant classes of other societies."⁴⁴⁵ State monopoly capitalism that replaced laissez-faire state has started to use its power to force

⁴⁴¹ Alexandr Dugin, "Global Transition and its Enemies," *The USA and the New World Order: A Debate between Alexandr Dugin and Olavo de Carvalho*, entry posted March 7, 2011, <http://debateolavodugin.blogspot.com/2011/03/alexander-dugin-introduction.html> (accessed June 7, 2011).

⁴⁴² Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), 149.

⁴⁴³ Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, 14.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴⁴⁵ Quoted in Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism*, 79.

weaker states to allow entry of its goods into their markets, and has forced states to accept unfavorable terms of trade.⁴⁴⁶ The struggle for monopoly power has become the dynamic principle in the U.S. foreign policy.⁴⁴⁷

The existence of the Soviet threat helped to unite capitalist powers into the U.S.-led military alliance, and thereby enforced U.S. hegemony.⁴⁴⁸ Security became the excuse for Europe, Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand to agree to military and economic integration with the United States.⁴⁴⁹ This point gives rise to the claim that the supremacy in the security structure is most significant to the supporting of capitalist hegemony.⁴⁵⁰ Gill is clear that while we can speak of Australia, Japan or Europe as major economic challengers, their dependence on the United States for their security signifies that those actors are subordinated.⁴⁵¹ Here I join Lipschutz, who comments that “for the United States in particular, the importance of the Soviet Bloc lay in its real or imagined threat to Western capitalism as a system.”⁴⁵² The confrontation between two superpowers has allowed the United States in a relatively short period of time to plan a global military strategy, “dividing the planet into regions and allocating the responsibility for the control of each of them to a U.S. Military command.”⁴⁵³ It follows from this that the main goal of the U.S. military agenda has been to maintain the U.S. hegemony, act as the police officer, and make sure that there would not appear a player in the system of international relations that can challenge U.S. militarily and economically.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷ Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*.

⁴⁴⁸ Foster, “The New Age of Imperialism,” 3.

⁴⁴⁹ Lipschutz, *The Constitution of Imperium*, 22.

⁴⁵⁰ Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, 77.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

⁴⁵² Lipschutz, *The Constitution of Imperium*, 22.

⁴⁵³ Amin, “U.S. Imperialism, Europe, and the Middle East,” 15.

In fact, according to Aleksandr Dugin, we are dealing with a new form of Westernization, that in different ways “passed by Roman Empire, Medieval Christianity, the Modernity (with the Enlightenment and colonization) and up to present day postmodernism and ultra-individualism.” The bad news is that the historical existence of the U.S. goes simultaneously with the course of the human history, and the gap between the devotion to the promotion of justice and the reality of the U.S. foreign policy objectives is tremendous.⁴⁵⁴ As Andrew Bacevich correctly points out, “From the earliest days of the Cold War the United States entertained a strategic vision that looked well beyond the imperative of defending the world against communist aggression.”⁴⁵⁵ My point is that the promotion of neoliberalism has initially been in the U.S. interests and has had nothing to do with global social justice and economic growth.

From Wallerstein’s analysis it is clear not only that the concept of state is constructed to perform a number of roles which are vital for a capitalist economic growth, but more important for my argument is the notion that the economic structure of capitalism for its successful functioning requires the existence of dominant ideologies or belief systems. Namely the “crisis in state-led development in the Third World and the discrediting of the Soviet-based left” led to the extraordinary degree of global consensus over the adoption of free market-oriented reforms, promoted by the global institutions and the most powerful state actors.⁴⁵⁶ However, the claims of the experts of international institutions that everyone would benefit from the model of export-oriented manufacturing

⁴⁵⁴ Dugin, “Global Transition and its Enemies.”

⁴⁵⁵ Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, 6.

⁴⁵⁶ Green and Griffith, “Globalization and Its Discontents,” 52.

are incontrovertibly false. Unfortunately, the global community with its naivety has been caught in trap.⁴⁵⁷

That very process of globalization with its pop-culture, technological innovation and consumerism which jointly have contributed to the feeling of constant development and progress distracted people from understanding the true nature of exploitation and oppression that the majority of the world's population has been experiencing. As George puts it, "Rather than encompassing everyone in a collective march towards a better life, globalization is a process that allows the world market economy to take the best and leave the rest."⁴⁵⁸ Nowadays, subordination of social groups in capitalist globalized world is based on the extraction of consent which implies the global spread of consumerist culture and power of democracy. A point that has to be kept in mind is that these are the instruments by which bourgeoisie ruling class maintains its capitalist hegemony. I am convinced that the key to understanding and appreciation of globalization is to conceptually keep the globalization as a "politico-economic project" distinct from globalization as a "techno-cultural process."⁴⁵⁹ While globalization entails both capitalist markets and flows of technology, people, ideas and culture "across national boundaries via a global networked society,"⁴⁶⁰ it represents itself as a counterpart of the U.S. foreign policy which is either economic policy or consists of instructing the world in American virtues.

⁴⁵⁷ George, "Globalizing Rights?" 16.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ Adopted from Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 361.

See also Kellner, "Theorizing Globalization," 285-286.

⁴⁶⁰ Kellner, "Theorizing Globalization," 287.

According to modernization theory, societal development and economic growth of the newly established states such as Ukraine or Slovenia should take place through the application of neoliberal economic mechanisms and democratic consolidation. While the postwar planners designed national and international economic order on the basis of the ideas of John Keynes, who argued for state interference in the economy and provision of goods and services to a national population, current political and economic establishment is pushing for a neoliberalism as a new liberal orthodoxy associated with the market-driven approach based on classical liberal policies and favoring a minimal role of the state. Thus, if during the 1960's the development doctrine was dominated by the conception of economic ideology centered on the important role of both the government and market, in the present years the political economy of modernization approach has relied heavily on the role of international institutions and free market as an engine of development and progress.⁴⁶¹ To estimate the radical change in political and economic thought, George makes it clear that if in 1945 or 1950 someone had proposed that the government should diminish its role in the economy or that society should be given much less than social protection, he or she would have been called insane.⁴⁶²

Today, markets are seen to be a better way of organizing not only an economic activity, but are tightly linked to a policy of social and political arrangement. More important, the neoliberal view of development, based on economic growth through free market economies and free trade, has supplanted all other prospects for economic

⁴⁶¹ Thorbecke, "The Evolution of the Development Doctrine , 1950-2005," 32.

⁴⁶² Susan George, "A Short History of Neo-Liberalism: Twenty Years of Elite Economics and Emerging Opportunities for Structural Change," in *Global Finance: New Thinking on Regulating Speculative Capital Markets*, ed. Walden Bello, Nicola Bullard and Kamal Malhotra (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc. , 2000), 27.

practice and continues to deprive any other regional alternatives toward development policies.⁴⁶³ As Arturo Escobar writes, “The total opening of the economy – coupled with a new round of privatization of the state - has become the order of the day.”⁴⁶⁴ In fact, any political and economic activity that might interact with liberalization of trade and finance, privatization and deregulation is automatically questionable and causes suspicion because it seems to interact with the mechanisms of the free market, which is seen as the most efficient and only rationale, fair and democratic instrument of organizing human production and exchange.⁴⁶⁵

As culture along with ideology advance from the national to the international levels, they become institutionalized in organizations such as NATO.⁴⁶⁶ If after the breakup of the Soviet Union, discussions in the 1990s often rotated around “whether NATO would, could or should survive, they now centre around the implications of its centrality, and its current and future enlargement.”⁴⁶⁷ The questions of how and why the military alliance survived after the end of the Cold War directs attention of the scholars to the redefinition of NATO’s traditional mission and purpose. The extension of the zone of NATO eastward has been viewed from the standpoint of geopolitical interests and should be regarded as an ideological measure. If it was not so why then the integration of Russia

⁴⁶³ Louis Emmerij, “Turning Points in Development Thinking and Practice,” in *Advancing Development: Core Themes in Global Economics*, ed. George Mavrotas and Anthony Shorrocks (Houndmills, Basingstoke Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan in association with the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2007), 40.

⁴⁶⁴ Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 94.

⁴⁶⁵ Robert W. McChesney, “Introduction,” in *Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order*, by Noam Chomsky (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999), 8.

⁴⁶⁶ Joseph Beaudreau and Patrick Clairzier, “Neo-Liberal Democracy: A Contradiction in Terms,” *Spectrezine*, July 15, 2009, <http://www.spectrezine.org/neo-liberal-democracy-contradiction-terms> (accessed April 4, 2011).

⁴⁶⁷ Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity,” 357.

into a Western concert had not occurred and how the NATO expansion into East-Central Europe, despite the agreement between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990 against the enlargement of NATO, can be explained.⁴⁶⁸

I have demonstrated that NATO should be viewed not as a measure to maintain regional stability, but as an instrument to promote a hegemonic neoliberal hegemony. The argument I developed above considers neoliberalism as a modernization project of the capitalist elites, based on the exercise of global power and directed by the imperatives of the international accumulation of capital.⁴⁶⁹ Therefore, NATO is one of the numerous transnational social forces working to maintain the essentials of the global system of capitalism through transforming Central and East European societies. Finally, Ukrainian membership in NATO will signify the consolidation hegemonic ideology in Ukraine.

I argue that Ukraine, being situated in the zone between West and East, should not rely on NATO to guarantee its state security, in particular at the expense of Ukraine-Russia relationship. Furthermore, I consider the idea that NATO cannot maintain its status of collective security arrangement unless the role of the European Union and Russia in the European security arrangement is equal to the role of the United States, and “unless it admits virtually all European nations – which would make it nearly congruent with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.”⁴⁷⁰ However, while examining NATO in the context of the Western extension of power, I argue that Ukraine

⁴⁶⁸ For more on Gorbachev’s agreement related to NATO see Stanley Kober, “Russia’s Search for Identity,” in *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality*, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2001), 131.

See also Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006), 13.

⁴⁶⁹ Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*.

⁴⁷⁰ Carpenter, “Strategic Evasions and the Drive for NATO Enlargement,” 17.

should be a non-aligned state, and its geographical position provides a special advantage for Ukraine to develop itself as a powerful regional player.

In this work, I underline the importance of the government of Ukraine to conduct both domestic and foreign policies in the interest of the citizens of the country. I appeal not to look for the ways to raise the standards of people's lives according to Russian or Western prescriptions, but to follow the pragmatic, open-minded and independent political course to serve the development of a self-disciplined and socially integrated individual.

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