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MEXICAN IMMIGRATION AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION: THE CASE OF CHICAGO

by John P. Koval

Photo by Claudia Morales Haro
THE IMMIGRANT CAPITAL
OF THE MIDWEST

The history of Chicago is a history of immigration. The 1850 and 1860 censuses reported that over half of Chicago's residents were foreign-born in both of those decades. The present and the future of Chicago is intimately linked to immigration as well; the 2000 census reports that nearly one in four Chicago residents (23%) are foreign-born—the current peak of an upward trend than began from a historic low of 11.1% in 1970 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1999). And that proportion is expected to grow in the short and the long term. Now, more than at any time in its history, Chicago is truly a multi-racial and multi-ethnic city. Its 911 emergency number, for example, offers a menu of 150 languages to respond to a caller's crisis (Telephone interview, 12/10/02). Correspondingly, the immigrant flow to Chicago over the past quarter of a century represents over 200 countries and places. (Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1972-1998). Chicago, the City of Neighborhoods, ethnic neighborhoods, hasn't changed; the ethnicity of those neighborhoods hasn't.

Chicago has been, historically, and is, currently, the immigrant capital of the Midwest. It is also one of the five immigrant capitals in the country: Los Angeles, New York, Miami, San Francisco, and Chicago, in that order, account for nearly 60% of all immigrants to the U.S. (Waldinger, 4ff). When we add Boston, Dallas, San Diego, Washington, D.C., and Houston to this group, nearly 75% of all foreign-born in the country are accounted for in this cluster of 10 American cities (Waldinger, 4ff). Mexicans are the nation's and the city's largest immigrant group, making up nearly one-third of all Chicago immigrants. Not surprisingly, then, immigration is transforming the social and cultural fabric of much of the country, with especially strong impact on several major cities—including Chicago. At the same time the country is also undergoing an economic transformation of major proportions. The shift from a predominantly industrial economy to a high technology information and service-based economy is nowhere more prevalent than in Chicago. This paper will examine the role of immigrants in the economic transformation of Chicago's labor force and economy and, in particular, will examine the place of immigrant Mexican workers in that transformation.

IMMIGRATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL
AND LOCAL RESIDENTIAL PATTERNS

Immigrants, unlike tourists, do not come to a country or a city because of its beauty, museums, weather, spas, entertainment, and fine dining nor to visit friends and relatives. Economic opportunity is the engine that drives the majority of immigrants to this country and to the city of Chicago. Coupling this assertion with one other—that immigrants make use of a kind of occupational compass that points them to regions and cities with the highest or best prospects for employment—leads to a simple but important point.

Willie Sutton, bank robber of a bygone era, when asked why he robbed banks gave a simple answer: “Because that’s where the money is.” The same logic applies to immigration. Willie Sutton’s nose for money pointed him to where the money is; immigrants’ nose for jobs points them to where the jobs are. Immigrant capitals are “Where the jobs are.” A large immigrant presence in a city or suburb is a crude but reliable measure of their economic vitality. In addition, the presence of many different immigrant groups, who typically have different skills, educational backgrounds, and occupations, further reflects the diversity of a city or a region’s economy. And in a large metropolitan area like Chicago, the economic vitality of its collar counties and satellite communities is also attested to by the size of their immigrant communities. For, while residential patterns of the middle class and upper middle class may be linked to life-style and status values, residential patterns for the working class are usually more closely linked to the availability of work and the presence of affordable housing.

Much ado and many words, coupled with a kind of surprise and awe, have been made about the 2000 census data that confirmed the suburbanization of immigrants. The awe is from a bias that assumes suburban residential patterns are a reflection of immigrants moving up in income and life-style.
For some this may be true but it is probably not the case for most. The more likely answer is the Willie Sutton Syndrome—that’s where the jobs are.

**Graph 1**
**Mexican Immigrants: Intended Residence upon Arrival 1983-1998**

While Mexican immigrants have been slower to find suburbia than some other immigrant groups, an upward trend began in the late ‘80s, as Graph 1 shows, and by 1998 a slight majority of documented Chicago-bound immigrants reported to the Immigration Service that their first residence in Chicago was going to be suburban. Suburban Cook County accounts for about half of all suburban immigrants and the remaining five collar counties account for the other half.

Immigrant suburbanization probably reflects three interrelated dynamics. First, the population density of traditional in-city ports of entry for Mexicans, like Pilsen and Little Village, has become so great that there is simply less available housing for newcomers. The resultant westward flow of native-born and foreign-born has been to contiguous but suburban communities such as Cicero and Berwyn (and beyond). Second, networking with co-ethnics typically accounts for where newcomers first live and work. So, as native-born and more settled Mexicans become suburban, their networking with in-coming immigrants further increases a suburban Mexican presence. Third, the economic compass spoken about earlier also points Mexicans to the suburbs.

**Graph 2**
**Where Workers Work: Chicago Metropolitan Area 1955-2000**

Over the last quarter of a century nearly one million (942,382) legal immigrants came to the Chicago metropolitan area from over two hundred countries and places (Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1972-1998). The majority of immigrants are concentrated among a few sending countries, however. A simple computation based on the data displayed in Graph 3, for example, shows that immigrants from five countries—Mexico, Poland, India, the Philippines, and South Korea—constitute over half of all newcomers to Illinois. Mexicans lead the immigrant in-flow, account for 41 percent of the region’s foreign-born population, and outnumber the second largest Chicago immigrant group, Poles, by a margin of nearly 2 to 1 (Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1972-1998). A longer listing of ethnic immigrants than is presented...
here would provide conclusive evidence for what this graph hints at. All continents and regions of the world are represented in Chicago's immigrant community, and, at the regional level, in relatively large numbers: Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South America, Asia, and, to a lesser extent, Africa.

THE WORLD OF IMMIGRANT WORK

Historically, immigrant groups have clustered in occupations and industries as well as in neighborhoods and communities. Long before social scientists developed techniques for measuring and analyzing these clusters, experience was our teacher. In Chicago at the turn of the century the label "Irish Trinity," for example, referred to the trio of occupations characterized by a preponderance of Irishmen—police, politicians, and priests—not to any esoteric Irish religious practice or belief (Holli and Jones, 75). Viewed through the rational and less colorful lens of contemporary social sciences, the Trinity has been replaced with occupational niches; that is, instances in which a larger number of a given race or ethnic group are found in specific occupations or industries than their proportions in the total labor force would lead us to expect. The quantification of such over-representation has resulted in an index, the Index of Representation (RI), and it is now a convention to label any occupation or industry as a racial or ethnic niche when that index registers 1.50 or higher—50% more than their proportion of the labor force would lead you to expect.

Table 1
Occupation for Foreign Born Mexican Males

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
<th>Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooks</td>
<td>7,875</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>4.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine operators, not specified</td>
<td>5,712</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>5.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janitors and cleaners</td>
<td>5,334</td>
<td>16.17</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except construction</td>
<td>5,274</td>
<td>20.67</td>
<td>4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundskeepers and gardeners, except farm</td>
<td>4,902</td>
<td>24.86</td>
<td>10.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assemblers</td>
<td>4,695</td>
<td>28.87</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous machine operators</td>
<td>4,689</td>
<td>32.88</td>
<td>6.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiters or waitresses assistants</td>
<td>3,792</td>
<td>36.12</td>
<td>7.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction laborers</td>
<td>3,582</td>
<td>39.18</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous food preparation occupations</td>
<td>3,339</td>
<td>42.03</td>
<td>5.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welders and cutters</td>
<td>2,997</td>
<td>44.60</td>
<td>8.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck drivers</td>
<td>2,952</td>
<td>47.12</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors, production occupations</td>
<td>2,268</td>
<td>49.06</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic, shipping, and receiving clerks</td>
<td>1,914</td>
<td>50.69</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenters</td>
<td>1,704</td>
<td>52.15</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand packers and packagers</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>53.49</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butchers and meat cutters</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>54.69</td>
<td>5.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painters, construction and maintenance</td>
<td>1,374</td>
<td>55.87</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and administrators, n.e.c.</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>57.02</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial truck and tractor equipment operators</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>58.16</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PUMS 1990, U.S. Bureau of the Census

Male and female Mexican immigrants are both tightly packed in an exceptionally small number of occupations. There are over 900 occupations listed in the Census Bureau's 3-digit occupational code. Yet, as Table 1 shows, nearly 60 percent (58.2%) of all male Mexican immigrants are found in only 20 occupations. In all but one occupation (manager/administrator)—19 of 20—Mexican immigrants are over-represented, ranking from a low index of 1.78 (carpenters) to a high of 10.45 (groundskeepers and gardeners); that is, there are nearly double the number of Mexican carpenters and nearly 10.5 times the number of Mexican groundskeepers and gardeners than their proportion of the labor force would lead one to expect. The only occupation with a higher RI for Mexican men is "drywall installation," with an index of 14.7. This latter measure is consistent with the occupational culture of construction work where the explanation "dry walling is Mexican work" is typically prefaced by Anglo construction workers with "I don't do that..." The majority of these Mexican niche occupations are found in four industrial sectors: manufacturing, construction, restaurant and food service, and groundskeepers and maintenance work.

Table 2
Occupation for Foreign Born Mexican Females

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
<th>Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assemblers</td>
<td>5,622</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td>7.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine operators, not specified</td>
<td>3,333</td>
<td>14.94</td>
<td>5.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand packers and packagers</td>
<td>3,312</td>
<td>20.46</td>
<td>11.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous machine operators</td>
<td>2,631</td>
<td>24.85</td>
<td>6.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except construction</td>
<td>2,583</td>
<td>29.16</td>
<td>3.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashiers</td>
<td>2,532</td>
<td>33.38</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packing and filling machine operators</td>
<td>2,154</td>
<td>36.97</td>
<td>9.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maids and housemen</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>40.27</td>
<td>6.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretaries</td>
<td>1,824</td>
<td>43.31</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile sewing machine operators</td>
<td>1,764</td>
<td>46.25</td>
<td>12.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janitors and clerks</td>
<td>1,719</td>
<td>49.12</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks</td>
<td>1,473</td>
<td>51.58</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production inspectors, checkers, and examiners</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>53.88</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PUMS 1990, U.S. Bureau of the Census

Female Mexican immigrants are packed into an even smaller number of occupations than their male counterparts. Ten occupations account for nearly half (46.2%) of all Mexican women in the labor force and twenty occupations account for nearly two-thirds (63.0%). While only 14 of the 20 most populated female occupations have an over-representation index higher than 1.50, those that do are very highly over-represented. Highest are textile sewing machine operators (12.5), followed by hand packers and packagers (11.5) and packaging and filling machine operators (9.9). Mexican women's jobs are also clustered in a very small number of industries: manufacturing, the food business, and secretarial and clerical jobs.

Diversification is one of the ABC's of financial investment. The same can be said of the world of work. The less diversification in the financial market, the greater the risk. Similarly, the less the diversification in the labor market, the more vulnerable the workers. Since such large number of Mexican immigrants, whether male or female, cluster in so few occupations their economic future could be seriously compromised.

Yet, you can only work with what you've got. Most Mexican immigrants have the social capital of a network of family, friends, and relatives who help them locate in a specific city and, most likely, help them find a job. Once on the job they typically have a strong work ethic and quickly gain respect and appreciation from fellow workers and employers. What they don't have is the human capital of education (typically
less than high school), the ability to speak or write in English (for many), or the occupational skills and training to place them in jobs other than manual laborers, on-the-job trained machine operators, and other semiskilled occupations. This has been the American immigrant story for nearly 150 years, but the story is changing; the long-term decline in industrial jobs—de-industrialization—is continuing, corporate and industrial investment in high technology rather than workers is resulting in further job erosion, and the enormous growth in part-time and temporary labor may soon produce a separate reporting of the “contingent labor force” by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. An incongruent theme emerges from these adaptive processes; they are good for business and bad for workers, especially Mexican workers.

ETHNIC OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION

Ethnic immigrants are never a random sample of the residents of their country of origin, nor do they mirror the occupational or economic structure of that country. In some cases specific occupations are recruited by the receiver country to complement or meet shortages in some skills levels—like the recruitment of Filipino nurses and Indian information technology specialists to this country. In other cases the phenomenon of self-selection, coupled with networking among co-ethnics with similar occupational backgrounds or experiencing similar economic stress, results in a high degree of occupational homogeneity for immigrants with similar national origins—like Korean small businessmen and Mexican agricultural workers. The net result is not simply occupational stratification, but ethnic occupational stratification.

See Graph 4 below

When we examine U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service data for immigrants coming to the Chicago metropolitan area from 1972 to 1998 in the graph below, two distinctive features are prevalent. When we disaggregate the male labor force into occupational categories and cluster immigrants by country of birth for each of those categories, ethnic concentration for some in the category “managerial and professional specialties” emerges. The majority or near majority of Indians (± 60%) and Koreans (±50%) have managerial or professional occupations while a very small proportion of Poles (± 10%) and Mexicans (± 5%) do. There has been rather remarkable consistency and stability in the size and rank order of this ethnic concentration for more than a quarter of a century.

See Graph 5 on next page

When we examine the opposite end of that continuum and look at operators, fabricators, and laborers (unskilled and semiskilled blue collar occupations) we see the same rank order—but inverted. In this instance a large majority (about two-thirds) of all male Mexican immigrants are found in this occupational category, as are a healthy but declining proportion of Poles (a high of 40% before the collapse of the Soviet Union and leveling off at 20% for the last six years), while Koreans (± 10% for the past 20 years) and Indians (hovering around 2—3% for the last ten years) do not. Here, again, there is a striking consistency over time in the distribution of ethnic groups in the occupational hierarchy.
Graph 5
Immigrants to Chicago Metro Area
Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers
Males 1972-1998

Graph 6
Immigrants to Chicago Metro Area
Managerial and Professional Specialty
Females 1972-1998
The ethnic occupational hierarchy for immigrant women is quite similar to that of the men. As seen above, the majority of Indian and Korean immigrant women in the labor force, like their male counterparts, are found in the “managerial and professional specialty” category (60-80%). Polish and Mexican women, especially Mexican women, have a very low representation (5%).

See Graph 6 on opposite page

When we examine the opposite end of that continuum, we find that the majority of Mexican women work in the unskilled and semi-skilled occupations of “operators, fabricators, and laborers” (±60%)—blue collar work. The vast majority of Korean and Indian women in the labor force do not (±5%). More recent cohorts of Polish women no longer work in these occupations either (±5%).

THE SKILL MISMATCH HYPOTHESIS: THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE WRONG TIME?

For the first half of this century, the nation’s large urban areas worked as staging grounds for the integration of unskilled newcomers. Not only did cities have large concentrations of low-skilled jobs, but they also had an industrial structure that allowed for upward movement based on the gradual acquisition of skills on the job (Kasarda, 1993; Wilson, 1987). This rising economic tide did tend to lift all boats and structural mobility was the result. As one analyst put it:

A man got on the [occupational] escalator simply by taking and holding a job, and then simply watched his income rise steadily as the nation’s entire occupational wage structure shifted upward (Massey and Hirt, 1998).

The postindustrial transformation of late 20th century America depleted urban areas of their absorptive capacity in the industrial sector of the economy. Proponents of this position claim that changes in technology and communications decimated the “traditional goods-processing industries that once constituted the backbone of cities and provided entry level employment for lesser skilled African Americans” and, by implication, other minorities (Kasarda, 1993).

Herein lies a double-bind for Mexican immigrants. Their social capital is of optimum value in acquiring unskilled and semiskilled jobs. Yet, while Chicago still has the largest manufacturing labor force in the country, it pales in relation to the industrial giant it once was. At the height of its industrial might in the 1950s and 1960s Chicago had nearly one million industrial jobs (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1952-2002). Today that number hovers around 600,00 and some experts believe a 150,000 reduction (a 25% job loss) is possible within the next five years, most of them unskilled or semiskilled jobs (Chicago Tribune, 12/27/02; Sec. 3, 4). Thus, on the demand side, “the very jobs that in the past attracted and socially upgraded waves of disadvantaged persons continue to disappear; on the supply side the number of minority residents who lack the education for employment in the new information processing industries is increasing” (Kasarda, 83) The fact that in the face of global competition “Technology has played a major role in helping U.S.
manufacturers become more productive and able to survive downturns" (Chicago Tribune, 12/27/02, Sec. 3,4) is of small solace. While companies survive, large numbers of workers' jobs do not. By 2003 Chicago's industrial labor force had shrunk markedly and is expected to shrink a good deal more. As unskilled and low-skilled Mexican immigrants continue to come to Chicago they compete with co-ethnics for fewer full-time jobs in the industrial pool while also being prime candidates for Chicago's contingent labor force.

The skill mismatch hypothesis, when applied to the industrial sector of the economy, is simple and blunt. Capital-intensive modes of production, computers and other forms of high technology, are replacing labor intensive production as American industry continues to refine its industrial niche in a global economy. As a result, large numbers of unskilled workers become redundant while a small number of skilled and well-trained workers become a mainstay. Unskilled, untrained Mexican immigrants constitute a mismatch with the present and future skill requirements in a restructuring industrial economy.

While one component of economic restructuring results in the decline and, in some cases, the elimination of industrial jobs and a shrinking of the middle, another component is producing a job increase in the service and information technology sectors. This element of restructuring only exacerbates the mismatch hypothesis, however, and produces increased employment instability with a strong economic sting. Roger Waldinger, in Ethnic Los Angeles, makes the point:

The postindustrial transformation of American cities yields service industries with a bifurcated job structure, offering both high wages and stable employment for highly educated workers and low wages and unstable employment for less skilled workers displaced from manufacturing. The result is an increasingly high level of inequality. (My emphasis)
(\textit{Waldinger and Bozorgmehr, 1996, 24})

\section*{EXACERBATING THE ISSUE: THE HOURGLASS ECONOMY}

An hourglass economy is a metaphor intended to illustrate the shape or structure of the distribution of wage and salaries in the economy. Our preference would probably be a diamond-shaped wage structure in which one tip of the diamond represents a small number of high wage earners and the opposite tip a small number of low wage earners, with everyone in between—the largest bulk of wage-earners—receiving high enough incomes to lead a middle class lifestyle. Unfortunately, the increased level of economic inequality that Waldinger speaks of looks more real than not.

Evidence for this conclusion is found in recent projections of expected job growth in the labor force from 2000 to 2010 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. A number of insights can be gleaned from these data since the BLS (a) identified 30 occupations with the largest expected job growth in this decade, (b) reported growth by absolute numbers and percentage growth for each occupation, (c) placed each occupation's median hourly earning in a quartile ranking, and (d) identified the level of education and training required for each occupation. Placing each job into its relevant income quartile and tallying the number of new jobs in each of those four quartiles results in Graph 8, above. The news is not good.

First, a bottom-heavy hourglass wage structure for those 10.1 million new jobs is clearly evident. The middle income occupations constitute less than 10 percent (8.3\%) of the new jobs. The two lowest quartiles constitute nearly two-thirds of all new jobs (62.9\%). Second, the majority of the new jobs are in the service and information technology sectors—computer support specialists, customer service representatives (sales clerks and kindred), and waiters and waitresses. Third, the education and training level requirements for most jobs are at two extremes: a bachelor's degree or short-term on-the-job-training (unskilled). Hence the hourglass wage structure. The commentary from the BLS on these projections has three components:

The hourglass economy will continue to be fed and shaped: the fastest and largest occupational growth is predicted to occur among (a) professional and related occupations and (b) service occupations—each at opposite ends of the educational attainment and earnings spectrum. These two groups combined are expected to provide more than half the total job growth from 2000 to 2010 (\textit{Hecker, 2001, 58}).

Occupations requiring a postsecondary vocational award or an academic degree, which accounted for 29 percent of all jobs in 2000, will account for 42 percent of total job growth from 2000 to 2010 (\textit{Hecker, 2001, 57}).

Most new jobs, however, will arise in occupations that require only work-related training (on-the-job training or work experience in a related occupation). . . . This reflects the fact that these occupations accounted for about 7 out of 10 jobs in 2000 (\textit{Hecker, 2001, 57}).

In return for the eroding factory sector, then, cities have gained a new economy dominated by knowledge-intensive white collar service industries and jobs that typically require education beyond high school, increasingly baccalaureate or professional degrees, and therefore preclude poorly educated minorities from obtaining employment. The importance of a college or professional degree for high level occupational placement and mobility is not new. Its paramount position as the near exclusive passport for high occupational placement is
new. In the past higher education was but one of a trilogy of
mobility paths. Mobility based on skill acquisition, informal
apprenticeship, experience and personal growth—a Horatio
Alger story of mobility through the ranks through individual
merit—is now a part of our historical mythology rather than
temporary reality. Likewise, the story of an entrepreneurial
modern day Henry Ford expanding a storefront business into
a multinational corporation, while not science fiction, is
probably too unrealistic to make it even as a movie script.

The implication of both these trends for the Mexican work
force is sizable. Unskilled and semiskilled manufacturing jobs,
a major source of work for Mexican immigrants, are declining.
And, while there is a shortage of educated, skilled and
technically well-versed workers for the jobs that remain, these
characteristics are not part of the Mexican immigrants’
traditional human capital. On the other hand, a growing
service and high tech economic sector is so bifurcated by
education and income that unskilled and semiskilled jobs in
that sector, typically “Mexican jobs,” guarantee sizable
economic inequality with little or no hope of the kind of
upward mobility that was so typical of the industrializing
America of the past. Waldinger’s research on Mexican workers
in Los Angeles led him to conclude that Mexican immigrants
are a trapped underclass since “Mexican and Central
Americans seem to have been herded into niches that
constitute mobility traps” (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr, 1996,
453) Others are even more specific and pointed in their
projections. Sakia Sassen, for example, takes the position that
economic inequality is a structural characteristic built into a
high tech information age society (Sassen, forthcoming). Since
a college degree is the most powerful predictor of
occupational placement—to the top half or to the lower half
of the hour glass—most mobility will take place within each
half of the hour glass economy rather than between them.
This results in a distinctive type of mobility stagnation or
rigidity. Such an occupational structure is usually referred to as
a caste system.

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Professor of Sociology at DePaul University. Presently, he is an
editor and contributor to a forthcoming book The New Chicago.

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United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization
Service "Immigrants Admitted to the United States: 1972-1998"
Washington, D.C.

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