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Moral Principles and Political Ideology: Exploring the Mediating Role of Abstract Value Endorsements

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MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY:
EXPLORING THE MEDIATING ROLE OF ABSTRACT VALUE
ENDORSEMENTS

A Thesis
Presented in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science

BY
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August, 2013

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On April 28, 2009, the late former Pennsylvania senator, Arlen Specter, stated, "As the Republican Party has moved farther and farther to the right, I have found myself increasingly at odds with the Republican philosophy and more in line with the philosophy of the Democratic Party." At the same time, he informed the electorate that he was switching party affiliation and would run as a Democrat in the 2010 election (Hulse, 2009). Senator Specter's decision to switch political affiliation was met with much controversy and discussion. He lost a lot of support from his Republican comrades and also failed to win over enough Democratic support to win the 2010 Pennsylvania senate race. Perhaps the most substantial reason Mr. Specter's decision was met with such contention was due to how we think about and identify with our political affiliations and orientations. People often identify strongly with their political orientations and consider them an important part of their personal identity (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). This devotion to political ideology, especially in the United States, can often result in individuals equating political opinions with moral truth and righteousness, which can lead to such consequences as intolerance for different political viewpoints, distrust in legitimate authorities (e.g. Supreme Court) to make the right decision, and reduced cooperation with attitudinally dissimilar others (Morgan, Skitka, & Wisneski, 2010; Skitka, 2010; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Mullen, 2002).

The two main political parties in the United States, Republicans (typically considered conservatives) and Democrats (typically considered liberals) have become increasingly at odds with one another philosophically over the past decade (Van Boven, Judd, & Sherman, 2012), which causes one to wonder how liberals and conservatives can be that different in so many aspects of their values, beliefs, and views on public policy issues. More importantly, is there a way that we can coherently make sense of the ideological differences between liberals and conservatives and come to a greater understanding of how and why individuals might differ in regards to their ideologies, morals, and values? Moral Foundations Theory (MFT, Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) offers a psychological lens through which to examine the political divide in America. Distinguishing political conservatives and liberals based on their moral concerns, Haidt and Graham (2007) were able to show, through correlation analyses, that different groupings of these moral concerns are associated with different ends of the political spectrum. While much research has been generated through the lens of Moral Foundations Theory, the fact that no explicit experimental test of the theory has been conducted places limitations on the amount one can extrapolate from the theory. This paper will explore research regarding morality, specifically Moral Foundations Theory, political ideology, abstract values, how they are all related, and how the proposed research will help to fill in the missing pieces by providing an experimental test of the link between Moral Foundations Theory and political ideology.

Morality

Research on morality within the domain of psychology garnered a lot of attention primarily due to the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (1969). He proposed a cognitive-developmental approach to study moral development in children and essentially equated moral development to a form of cognitive development. By presenting children, at different developmental levels, with different moral dilemmas to solve, Kohlberg was able to trace a developmental and incremental growth in moral reasoning. He identified six stages of moral development incorporated into three distinct levels (two stages per level) ranging from preconventional to conventional to postconventional or autonomous. In the preconventional stage, children base their moral decisions (decisions about right and wrong) on anticipated punishment or reward and are mostly concerned about direct consequences of actions. Inherent within this level is a more selfish component to reasoning and behavior. In the conventional stage, individuals shift their basis for determining right and wrong for their actions from direct consequences to how well those actions fit with the rules and guidelines of the society, which includes the family, other important groups, or even macro-level groups like the nation in which one lives. The postconventional stage goes even further beyond immediate consequences or group expectations and rules to define moral values in terms of universal and objective principles of justice. Most adolescents were not expected to reach the postconventional stage of moral development (Haidt, 2008, Kohlberg, 1969, Kohlberg, 1975).

The cognitive-developmental approach put forth by Kohlberg (1969) was not met without criticism. Carol Gilligan (1982, 1995) proposed an alternative to

the culmination of moral maturity being an ethic of justice. By examining differences between boys and girls in their moral development, she discovered that girls tended to develop an ethic of care, emphasizing responsibility toward others, as opposed to an ethic of justice, emphasizing respecting basic rights of others, as the culmination of moral responsibility. She still proposed a stage-like development going from selfishness/conventionality to selflessness/postconventionality resulting with a principled morality that is mainly concerned with care for close others and maintaining an interdependent and egalitarian relationship with close others as well. If either person within this relationship is affronted, then the relationship is inherently harmed, so the ethic of care serves to keep relationships and concerns for others and self in balance (Gilligan, 1982; 1995).

In response to the developmental trajectory approach to moral development, Turiel (1983) developed a domain theory of social knowledge, which divides this knowledge into three distinct domains: personal, conventional, and moral. His research showed that children as young as 5 years old could make distinctions between these different domains and that a sense of morality does not necessarily develop after preconventional and conventional stages, but that all three domains develop in their own ways and usually at the same time. The personal domain consists of concerns about one's own welfare. The conventional domain consists of fluid and context dependent knowledge about social norms and group interests. Since this knowledge is not specifically tied to human welfare, these norms and interests can be adjusted to fit specific environments or

situations as need be. The moral social domain, however, consists of universal and objective principles that all people should abide by. These rules exist to protect people from harm and are associated with the ethics of justice and care as put forth by Kohlberg (1969) and Gilligan (1982) (Haidt, 2008; Nucci, Turiel, & Encarnacion-Gawrych, 1983; Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012; Turiel, 1983).

The social domain approach to morality created a break from the typical cognitive-developmental strategy for moral development and understanding, thus creating an avenue for further exploration and criticism. One criticism about the theories of morality and moral development put forth by Kohlberg (1969) and Turiel (1983) was that the individual was the locus of concern inherent in their theories. Moral concerns were concerns tied to protecting individuals, from either harm (ethic of care) or unfairness (ethic of justice) (Haidt, 2008; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997; Sverdlik et al., 2012). Cross-cultural research conducted with Hindu Indians revealed that moral concerns could be expanded to domains beyond the cares and concerns of the individual. The ethic of autonomy, ethic of community, and ethic of divinity were developed in order to broaden the moral domain to include common concerns imbued with a sense of right and wrong that appear in collectivistic and non-Western cultures (Shweder et al., 1997).

The ethic of autonomy encapsulates the typical individual concerns like individual rights, fairness, justice, and personal freedom, which are all morally good things that help to establish and promote individual dignity and worth. People are obligated to care about these concepts because each individual is a

person. The ethic of community transcends the individual and uses concepts like institutions, groups, families, tribes, etc. as the basis of moral concern and obligation. Since individuals are parts of communities and various other groups, they are obligated to care about and promote the concepts and roles that perpetuate a sense of community or society, such as duty, respect, loyalty, and interdependence, which all serve to help a society function. The ethic of divinity functions off of the presupposition that individuals have souls and that God or gods exist and these two concepts are inextricably linked. Because of this, individuals are obligated to keep their bodies (which house their souls) from falling into degradation through spiritual pollution related to such contaminants as sexual perversion, certain foods, and spiritual impurities. The basic premise in the ethic of divinity is the understanding that individuals are humans, not beasts, and therefore, should be obligated to engage in a type of spiritual self-control to protect the sacredness of the human soul (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Shweder, 2003; Shweder et al., 1997).

In response to the expansion of the moral domain by Shweder et al. (1997), Haidt and Joseph (2004) set out to make even further distinctions between different possible moral domains and to try to define the psychological systems that give rise to different moral concerns and intuitions throughout the world. They discovered at least five different moral domains, each with their own psychological function and possible evolutionary history, which inform moral intuitions across cultures: Care/Harm, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity (Moral Foundations Theory, Haidt &

Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). These five foundations (discussed in more detail in the next section) consistently map onto Shweder et al.'s (1997) ethics: Care and Fairness with the ethic of autonomy, Ingroup and Authority with the ethic of community, and Purity with the ethic of divinity. However, by parsing out the ethics into these more specific foundations, Haidt and Joseph (2004) were able to speak to the psychological mechanisms underlying moral discourse and judgment across cultures (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004).

One goal of Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) is to provide a useful way to explain moral conflicts by descriptively defining how moral concerns may vary across individuals and cultures. One area where this explanatory utility has been pursued is in the realm of political partisanship in the United States. I will now turn to explaining the contribution of Moral Foundations Theory to the realm of political psychology and further explain the role of the five moral foundations in relation to political ideology and orientation.

Moral Foundations Theory

It is often the case that disagreements based on differences in political orientation quickly turn into arguments implicating a level of morality, or sense of right and wrong. Because of this, it is helpful to understand political ideology and political differences in light of specific moral concerns. Moral Foundations Theory (MFT, Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) provides a way to explain the liberal/conservative divide in American politics by examining the endorsement of specific, intuitive moral concerns (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Graham,

2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). According to MFT, conservatives believe that people need the constraints provided by such institutions as authority and tradition due to human beings' inherent selfish tendencies. Traditions and hierarchical structures help to provide a role for each echelon of society and maintain social order. Liberals, on the other hand, often take a more optimistic view of humanity and emphasize personal freedom and autonomy to pursue their own course of maturity and development (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Sowell, 2002). Haidt (2008) expands on these points and incorporates the moral domain by specifying the functions of moral systems: values, institutions, and psychological mechanisms that function to regulate selfishness.

The Moral Foundations broadly fall into two categories of moral systems whose functions serve to suppress selfishness: the individualizing approach and the binding approach (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009). The individualizing moral system works to suppress individuals' selfish tendencies directly by protecting individuals so that they are the center of moral value and concern. These moral concerns revolve around preventing individual harm and treating individuals fairly (Graham et al., 2009; Sowell, 2002). The binding approach to suppressing selfishness invokes a moral system that places the group [e.g. the family (Graham et al., 2011)] at the center of moral value, at times at the expense of the individual. Strengthening institutions and placing individuals into roles and specific duties within a hierarchical structure helps to bind individuals into a shared, group-centered moral value (Graham et

al., 2009). Moral Foundations Theory divides the five moral foundations into these two broad moral systems.

Individualizing Foundations

Care/Harm. The Care/Harm foundation is perhaps the most straightforward of all of the moral foundations. The primary moral concerns related to this foundation revolve around caring for the individual and preventing harms to the individual, both from other individuals and from society as a whole (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2012). In addition, the Care/Harm foundation emphasizes the need to care for those who are suffering and in need. Feelings of sympathy, compassion, and nurturance are common among those who endorse this foundation (Haidt & Graham, 2007).

Fairness/Reciprocity. The Fairness/Reciprocity foundation elaborates on Trivers' (1971) research on reciprocal altruism where he noted that evolution created a specific kind of altruism in humans where a condition of repayment was needed from other individuals in order for any continued kindness to ensue (Haidt, 2012; Trivers, 1971). In short, this evolution created desire for mutual cooperation between individuals within a society. The Fairness/Reciprocity foundation makes individuals especially sensitive to acts of cheating or attempts to take advantage of others (Haidt, 2012). Taking this into account, participation in reciprocal interactions over time and the development of role-taking has enabled those who endorse this foundation to place extreme consideration on individual rights and equality among people within a society (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). A recent demonstration of the

Fairness/Reciprocity foundation can be found within the Occupy Wall Street movement. Individuals in the lower “99%” of income earners were upset with the top “1%” of wealthy business men and women whom they felt exploited those at the bottom while being unwilling to pay their fair share of taxes. However, on the other side of the spectrum, the Tea Party movement came into existence as a reaction to what was perceived as inequality coming from the side of liberal Democrats who were seen as socialists trying to take money from hard-working Americans and redistribute it to undeserving, lazy individuals on welfare and to illegal immigrants through free health care and education (e.g. the Dream Act) (Haidt, 2012).

Binding Foundations

Ingroup/Loyalty. Human beings’ tendency to live within, and interact regularly with only a handful of others outside of familial relationships has led to the development of specific capacities for relating to and trusting those within our tight-knit circles (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). At the same time, this trust and investment in an individual’s ingroup concurrently fosters a distrust and suspicion of other groups and its members. The valuation of the ingroup also promotes valuing sacrifice for the good of the ingroup by its members through acts that promote patriotism, loyalty, and even heroism, which are highly cherished. Any acts of betrayal by group members are viewed as morally wrong and collectively shunned by the ingroup members (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Through the promotion of group membership obligations,

individuals within the group are “bound” into promoting an ethic of care for all of the ingroup members (Graham, 2010).

Authority/Respect. Many, if not most, cultures in the world have developed some sort of hierarchical social system within ingroups (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Joseph, Graham, & Haidt, 2009). While some non-human species rely on physical force and fear in order to maintain a dominant/subordinate hierarchical structure, humans have developed a hierarchical structure based more on respect for superiors and voluntary deference to authority figures (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). This respect for authority figures and superiors also extends into a respect for wisdom, both from those in power and from the past in the form of traditions and rituals (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). As much as authority tends to be respected within many cultures, subordination has earned valuation due to being associated with such virtues as duty and obedience (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Another key element of the Authority/Respect foundation involves the protection of subordinates that is socially required of those in a place of superiority. The code of ethics for leaders involves maintaining such virtues as benevolence and wisdom for his/her subordinates. Bad leaders are those who are exploitative, autocratic, or incompetent for the duties of his/her position and standing within a group or society (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2007). Hierarchy consisting of voluntary respect for authority enables individuals to fit into specific roles and duties within a group or society so that people are “bound” together through obligations set forth in the maintenance and promotion of the hierarchy, thus promoting stability within a society (Haidt, 2008; Haidt, 2012).

Purity/Sanctity. The Purity/Sanctity foundation primarily consists of concerns related to, and in response to, feelings of disgust (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Feelings of disgust can be a reaction to physical appearances (e.g. obesity or deformity), occupations and social status (e.g. those in a lower-ranked social status), or relationships (e.g. homosexuality) (Haidt & Graham, 2007). There is also a heavy reliance on promoting spiritual ideals of sacredness and purity to rule the individual instead of bodily passions (e.g. greed, lust, and sloth) (Haidt, 2008; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). By focusing on such spiritual endeavors, individuals within a group or society are able to disinhibit inherent selfish tendencies and promote a group-minded ideal of self-control and restraint. From the perspective of individuals who endorse the Purity/Sanctity foundation, immorality stems from engaging in behaviors that are not seen as spiritually guided or pure, and falling into the trap of selfishly enslaving oneself to carnal desires (Haidt, 2008; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007).

Political Ideology

Political ideology can be defined as a system of beliefs that individuals use to help them interpret the world as they see it (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). In addition to interpreting the way things currently are, adhering to an ideology helps to layout a framework for reaching ideals of how things ought to be (Huckfeldt, Mondak, Craw, & Mendez, 2005; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). In light of this definition, the divide in the United States over political opinions becomes a little clearer. The ideals that are trying to be reached through public policies depend on who is proposing them. Conservatives tend to emphasize such values as

traditionalism and individualism while liberals tend to emphasize upholding such values as egalitarianism and universalism (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Henry & Reyna, 2007; Katz & Hass, 1988; Schwartz, 1996).

This differentiation in value endorsement for each side of the political spectrum can manifest in the way that liberals and conservatives make attributions for individual behavior. Conservatives tend to make more dispositional attributions for individual behavior and life outcomes, meaning that most of the fault for an individual's standing and lot in life is more of a direct result of individual choices, determination, and motivations (Henry & Reyna, 2007; Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2006). On the other hand, liberals tend to make more situational attributions for such behavior, meaning that a person's environment and other situational social factors play a big role in an individual's life outcome, outside of individual choice and ability (Henry & Reyna, 2007; Reyna et al., 2006). However, research has shown that this "ideo-attribution effect" can be reversed based on the consistency between the attribution and salient values. Research has demonstrated that conservatives' motivations could influence whether or not they made situational over dispositional attributions (Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010). In a recent study, conservatives made more situational attributions for Marines accused of killing Iraqi civilians in order to maintain consistency between conservative values (e.g. patriotism) and the Marines' wrongdoing. Therefore, the blame for the Marines' actions was directed at the environment (i.e. a war zone) that the Marines were in rather than the dispositional traits of the Marines themselves (Morgan et al., 2010).

A natural extension of examining the different motivations for political conservatives and liberals involves examining ultimate overarching goals motivating each side of the ideological divide. Liberals tend to be primarily interested in supporting public policies that advocate change intended to result in greater equality among citizens through economic, political, and social reforms. Whereas conservatives tend to support the traditional hierarchical social order and resist social change (Jost et al., 2008; Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton, & Linz, 1962).

Moral Foundations and Political Ideology

Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) was applied to the realm of political ideology in order to see if a more complete picture of political partisan differences could be captured via measuring the range of moral concerns of conservatives and liberals. Graham et al. (2009) conducted a series of preliminary studies showing distinct differences between liberals and conservatives in regards to endorsement of five moral foundations. Patterns indicated that liberals, especially those who identify as strongly liberal, tended to endorse the Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity foundations over the Authority/Respect, Ingroup/Loyalty, and Purity/Sanctity foundations when deciding what to take into consideration when determining whether something was viewed as right or wrong (Study 1). Sample items include “Whether or not someone was harmed” and “Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1044). Conservatives (especially those who identify as strongly conservative), on the other hand, while still valuing the individualizing foundations, also tended to endorse the binding foundations more

so than liberals when deciding whether something was wrong or right. Sample items include “Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group” and “Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for legitimate authority” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1044). A similar pattern was discovered when examining taboo trade-offs (Graham et al., 2009; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). Liberals were more willing (meaning that they accepted a lesser amount of money) than conservatives to engage in actions that violated the binding foundations (Authority, Ingroup, and Purity). Some sample scenarios for Authority, Ingroup, and Purity violations, respectively, included “Make a disrespectful hand gesture to your boss, teacher, or professor,” “Renounce your citizenship and become a citizen of another country,” and “Get a blood transfusion of 1 pint of disease-free, compatible blood from a convicted child molester” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1045). Harm and Fairness violations, respectively, included “Kick a dog in the head, hard” and “Throw out a box of ballots, during an election, to help your favored candidate win” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1045). Overall, the patterns from the data collected through all of these studies was able to show consistent differences between liberals and conservatives when it comes to endorsing areas of moral concern. While everyone seems to care about Harm and Fairness, conservatives also care about issues relating to the binding foundations of Authority, Ingroup, and Purity (Graham et al., 2009, Haidt, 2012).

Much research has examined the predictions put forth by Moral Foundations Theory in concert with other theories surrounding political ideology

and the distinctions between liberals and conservatives (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009). In an attempt to reconcile political ideology research stating that conservatism results from fulfilling a psychological need to manage uncertainty and threat (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), Van Leeuwen and Park (2009) hypothesized that endorsement of the binding moral foundations for conservatives provides a way of quelling uncertainty and diminishing threat due to the protections that are offered through endorsing such foundations as Authority, Ingroup, and Purity. Their results indicated that perceptions of social dangers, as indicated by the belief in a dangerous world (BDW; Altemeyer, 1988), predicted political conservatism. However, this relationship was at least partially mediated by an endorsement of the binding moral foundations over the individualizing foundations (Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). Endorsement of the binding foundations may help individuals manage threat and uncertainty by endorsing the status quo within an established social order and hierarchy, and diminishing attempts at social change, all of which are facets of conservatism (Jost et al., 2003; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009).

There appears to be a link between the five major domains of personality traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and political orientation that is mediated through endorsement of different moral foundations (Lewis & Bates, 2011). Specifically, greater openness, neuroticism, and agreeableness significantly predicted endorsement of individualizing foundations, which then predicted a more liberal political orientation, while greater conscientiousness, neuroticism, and

extraversion significantly predicted endorsement of the binding foundations, which then predicted a more conservative political orientation (Lewis & Bates, 2011). These results further particularized the importance of understanding the role that moral values and concerns play in determining political orientation and understanding how that is connected to personality characteristics. This research provides insight into understanding that subtle nuances in personality traits may play a bigger role in determining both moral endorsements and political orientation leanings than previously thought.

In further support of the correlation between Moral Foundations Theory and political ideology, research has examined the moral stereotypes of liberals and conservatives in relation to perceived endorsement of the moral foundations (Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012). In addition to measuring the actual endorsements of the moral foundations of their over 2,000 participants, the researchers also asked their participants to answer the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007) as a “typical” liberal or “typical” conservative would answer them. Their results indicated that both self-identified liberals and conservatives exaggerated the extremity of typical liberals’ and conservatives’ moral concerns. As noted, this overgeneralization was found for both ingroup and outgroup members, even differing with common research findings within stereotyping literature which would propose that ingroup members would underestimate only the outgroup’s morality (Graham et al., 2012; Judd & Park, 1993; McCauley & Stitt, 1978). Regardless of the role of stereotypes, the researchers argue that not only do the moral foundations map on

to specific political orientations, but that individuals also perceive that to be the case, both for their own political camp and for those outside of their political sphere as well (Graham et al., 2012).

Values

One potential explanation for the correlation between endorsement of moral foundations and political orientation could be that there is a common construct linking the two ideas together: values. Values are abstract principles that serve to guide the way we behave, the way we judge others' behavior, and assist us in explaining our choices, actions, beliefs, and intentions (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, in press). Values are both similar and different from moral principles. Values are considered to be similar to moral principles in ways such as guiding thoughts about what is good or bad, or right and wrong (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). However, values can consist of much broader personal goals that are not always reflected in terms of morality or immorality due to the fact that they may not necessarily be considered universally accepted and impervious to social consensus and desirability (Bersoff & Miller, 1993; Schwartz, 2007; Turiel, 1983). In this sense, values can encompass moral principles, but moral principles cannot encompass all values (Sverdlik et al., 2012).

Schwartz (1992) value theory categorizes all ten distinct types of values within a framework of two different dimensions: conservation versus openness, and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement. Conservation values (e.g.

tradition) emphasize order and resistance to change, whereas openness values (e.g. self-direction) emphasize a readiness to experience new things and independence. Values on the side of self-transcendence (e.g. universalism) emphasize focusing on others' welfare while self-enhancement values (e.g. hedonism), focus somewhat obviously, on promoting one's own interests, sometimes even at the expense of others' welfare (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, 2006; Sverdlik et al., 2012). In other words, universalism and benevolence values emphasize the welfare of others, social justice, and equality, and traditionalism emphasizes adherence to social expectations and traditions (Schwartz, 1992; Sverdlik et al., 2012). Values endorsements are heavily influenced by cultural and social factors where individuals in more Western cultures tend to emphasize benevolence and universalism and individuals in East Asian and African cultures emphasize more conformity and tradition values (Sagiv, Schwartz, & Arieli, in press). However, value endorsements can also differ between different cultural groups within a country, for example, differences in value endorsements between political liberals and conservatives in the United States.

Values and Political Ideology

Politics in the United States is perhaps one of the more obvious examples of intercultural differences in value endorsements. In line with Schwartz (1992) values theory, conservatives tend to adhere to conservation and self-enhancing values while liberals tend to adhere to self-transcendence and openness values due to the different motivations inherent in each aspect of the dimensions of value structure as noted earlier. In terms of specific abstract values, conservatives tend

to endorse such values as traditionalism and individualism (e.g. self reliance). Liberals, on the other hand, tend to endorse such values as universalism and egalitarianism (e.g. equality of outcome) (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Katz & Hass, 1988; Wetherell et al., in press).

Values and Moral Foundations

Values endorsements can be connected to endorsements of different moral foundations as well. Such moral foundations as Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity are linked to universalism values and the Ingroup/Loyalty and Authority/Respect foundations are associated with traditionalism values (Sverdlik et al., 2012). So how can perceptions of morality be so different for those within a shared cultural experience? Some research suggests that one's definition of being a moral person depends on which values are prioritized and emphasized amongst that particular ingroup. People who emphasize conservation values tend to have a more inclusive view of the moral domain, going beyond values related to caring for others and promoting justice (the ethic of autonomy, Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) to include the values related to conformity, traditions, and maintaining social order (i.e. the binding foundations). However, this group of people share a narrower application of the ethic of autonomy (Shweder et al., 1997) meaning that promoting care, preventing harm, and encouraging fairness only applies to fellow ingroup members (Schwartz, 2007; Sverdlik et al., 2012). On the other hand, people who emphasize openness values have a more inclusive view of the ethic of autonomy (Shweder et al., 1997) but a narrower definition of the moral domain, which mainly consists of concerns

about promoting care, preventing harm, and encouraging fairness and reciprocity (i.e. the individualizing foundations) (Sverdlik et al., 2012). Keeping all of this in mind, it is possible to see how the motivational underpinnings of Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and its association with political ideology might be accounted for through endorsement of overarching values, which provide a broader framework for understanding motivations for aligning with one side of the political spectrum versus the other.

Political Ideology and Orientation to Values and Morals

As important as examining the associations between political ideology and different behavioral and attitudinal components is, it is imperative to examine the potential causal link between political orientation and its influence on specific values and moral proclivities. Political ideology has been suggested to have a structural top-down component to influencing political attitudes and behaviors that consists of making salient a unified belief system that can be used, in a heuristic fashion, to inform and influence public opinion and perspectives and guide behavior (Jost et al., 2003; 2009). This ideology superstructure is typically conveyed in a top down process from political elites to mass public (Jost et al., 2009; Zaller, 1992). Because of this direction of information flow from political elites, those who have the most control over the contents of the specific ideologies, to the less informed and less influential public, one can begin to see how adhering to a specific political ideology could result in an automatic orientation to previously defined and established values, beliefs, and attitudes (Converse, 2000; Jost et al., 2009; Layman & Carsey, 2002). In other words,

mere exposure to and investment in political elite discourse can bring about an alignment to and support for the ideas promoted within that discourse (Zaller, 1992).

The causal link from political orientation to specific abstract values has been examined within the context of survey research conducted through the National Election Studies. Political orientations were shown to be more stable than abstract value beliefs and were shown to have a substantial impact on values regarding societal functions, family values, and values related to moral tolerance. These value endorsements were shown to shift in favor of pre-specified political ideological stances over time and coalesce into a uniform orientation reflective of the ideological presuppositions of the political orientation (Goren, 2005). For example, those who identified as a conservative came to adopt more conservative stances on other relevant policy issues and endorsed more conservative values. This research provides evidence for the causal connection from political ideology and orientation to endorsement of abstract values and morals, where a person's endorsement of abstract values is a function of the ideology with which they identify.

The research cited has demonstrated that endorsement of abstract values and morals could plausibly be a function of an individual's specified political ideology. And research on political ideology has often focused on the psychological and behavioral outcomes of endorsing liberal versus conservative ideology. As noted throughout this section, specific political ideology endorsement can be linked to different attribution tendencies (Reyna et al., 2006)

and specific value endorsements (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Henry & Reyna, 2007). However, a question that still remains is whether this causal chain is the only possible explanation for the link between ideology, values, and morals. It might be just as likely that the reversal of this causal connection from ideology to values and morals is true, where political ideologies are a result of endorsements of specific morals and abstract values (as discussed earlier).

Differentiating and Integrating Political Ideology, Moral Foundations, and Values

The relationships between political ideology, moral foundations, and abstract values have been discussed in a myriad of combinations and permutations. Part of the utility and purpose of the current research is to assemble a coherent and streamlined conceptualization of how these three constructs might fit together.

Starting from the perspective of Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), one can see that moral concerns based on concern for the individual versus concern for the group can lead to the development of endorsing specific political ideologies that support these moral concerns and points of view. For example, an individual who is prone to make judgments about right and wrong based on concerns for individuals within a society will be more likely to engage in a liberal political ideology in order to engage in a political process that is congruent with his/her moral outlook (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009).

At the same time, research on political ideology and political orientations (Cohen, 2003; Goren, 2005; Jost et al., 2009) has shown that adhering to a

specific political ideology can predict endorsement of certain moral principles, where an individual is motivated through the commonly held rhetoric of his/her political affiliation, which is passed down from elites, to maintain similar and consistent belief patterns and moral ideals as is common amongst others within that ideological conclave.

Integrating these two constructs are endorsements of overarching abstract values. Values can incorporate both endorsement of moral principles and endorsement of specific political ideologies because values are a core part of the self-concept (Hitlin, 2003; Rokeach, 1973; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Values can drive one's inclinations and motivations to join certain social groups (e.g. political affiliation) and can influence one's perceptions of right and wrong (e.g. endorsement of moral principles), which are both specific manifestations of self-relevant abstract values in specific circumstances. Political ideology incorporates one's values in the realm of thoughts and ideals about society while moral principles incorporate one's values in terms of stances on what is considered right or wrong.

The current research will experimentally test both of these conceptual patterns to see if shifts in one construct, political ideology or endorsement of moral foundations, will predict changes in endorsement of moral foundations or political ideology, respectively. In addition, the crucial connecting link between political ideology and endorsement of moral principles, regardless of causal direction, should be endorsement of abstract values, where overarching abstract values are specifically manifested through endorsement of moral principles and

also through endorsement of specific political ideologies (Schwartz, 1992; Sverdlik et al., 2012). As a result, endorsement of abstract values should mediate any causal link between political ideology and endorsement of moral principles, regardless of causal direction.

CHAPTER II

INTRODUCTION AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 1)

The association between Moral Foundations Theory (MFT, Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and political ideology has been demonstrated in multiple studies through correlational analyses. Multiple moderators and mediators have been suggested for the link between these two constructs. However, the most significantly lacking piece of evidence for the connection between MFT and political orientation is experimental replication and demonstration. Despite the multitude of studies demonstrating the connection between MFT and political ideology, none of these studies have involved an experimental manipulation of moral foundation endorsement or a manipulation of political orientation. This absence of experimental rigor has not gone completely unnoticed by other researchers. According to Graham, Meindl, and Beall (2012):

...future work on the role of political ideology in morality will need to treat ideology not only as a moderator, but as a factor to be experimentally manipulated, as well as a dependent variable for manipulations of moral salience, behavior, and context. Finding more such interactions and pursuing the mechanisms behind them through integrated research can help psychologists predict what situational factors will have the greatest impact on the moral judgments of different individuals, groups, nations, and cultures. (p. 375)

Van Leeuwen and Park (2009) also suggested a call to arms for future research on Moral Foundations Theory by noting, "...researchers might attempt to manipulate

the level of emphasis that people place on certain moral foundations and assess the impact on political orientation” (p. 173). In response, the main goal of this study will be to experimentally test the link between Moral Foundations Theory and political ideology.

Since political orientation is typically viewed as an outcome associated with endorsement of particular moral foundations, one goal of this research was to manipulate endorsement of moral foundations and measure political orientation as a dependent variable. In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to conditions designed to either increase their endorsement of the individualizing foundations (Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity) or increase their endorsement of the binding foundations (Authority/Respect and Ingroup/Loyalty). After this manipulation, participants were asked to respond to measures of political ideology as a dependent variable, which has not typically been done in past research.

Looking at the association between Moral Foundations Theory and political ideology does not, in and of itself, offer a great deal more insight into the causal mechanisms involved in the association. In order to account for this, the present research also attempted to find a causal mechanism for these associations. The proposed causal mechanism was endorsement of specific abstract values like egalitarianism, traditionalism, universalism, and individualism, which have been shown to correlate highly with political ideology (Wetherell et al., in press) and moral foundation endorsement (Sverdlik et al., 2012). Participants were asked to answer measures of abstract value endorsements. Endorsement of egalitarianism and universalism values should be associated with more liberal political

orientation and individualizing moral foundations while endorsement of traditionalism and individualism values should be associated with more conservative political orientation and binding moral foundations. Endorsement of abstract values should mediate the relationship between moral foundations endorsement and political ideology.

Within this proposed research framework, there is a possibility for an alternative explanation for the link between moral foundations and abstract values: cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Stone & Cooper, 2001) states that if an individual simultaneously holds two conflicting self-relevant cognitions, that individual will experience discomfort and will seek to change one or both of those cognitions to make the cognitions more consonant in order to relieve the discomfort. In light of the current research, if a participant who initially does not endorse the binding moral foundations is placed in the endorse binding foundations condition, then that individual might be motivated, because of cognitive dissonance, to subsequently adjust his/her endorsement of abstract values to be more in line with the binding moral foundation. Cognitive dissonance will occur especially for individuals who perceive a high amount of free choice when engaging in the counter-attitudinal behavior or cognition because their cognitions are more self-relevant than someone who felt they had no choice in the matter (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967; Stone & Cooper, 2001). In order to control for this, items assessing the participants' perception of choice and/or free will in completing the manipulation task were measured and controlled for during the analyses. By

controlling for perception of choice, a cognitive dissonance explanation will be less likely.

Statement of Hypotheses (Study 1)

Hypothesis I. There will be a main effect of moral foundations endorsement condition on political ideology such that participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition will report more liberal political ideology than those in the endorse binding foundations condition.

Hypothesis II. There will be a 2 by 2 interaction effect between moral foundations endorsement condition and type of abstract value in predicting endorsement of abstract values. Participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition will endorse egalitarianism and universalism (composite) values more so than individualism and traditionalism (composite) values. However, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition will endorse egalitarianism, universalism, individualism, and traditionalism values equally. Also, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition will endorse individualism and traditionalism values more so than those in the endorse individualizing foundations condition.

Hypothesis III. The extent to which participants endorse certain abstract values will mediate the relationship between endorsement of moral foundations and political ideology. Specifically, participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition will report more liberal political ideology, but that relationship will be at least partially mediated by endorsement of egalitarianism and universalism abstract values. Participants in the endorse binding foundations

condition will report more conservative political ideology, but that relationship will be at least partially mediated by endorsement of individualism and traditionalism abstract values.

CHAPTER III

METHOD (STUDY 1)

Research Participants

Participants for this research were recruited from DePaul University's Psychology Department undergraduate participant pool. One hundred nine ($N = 109$) student participants completed the study online for partial research course credit to fulfill a requirement for their introduction to psychology course.

Demographic measures for each participant were recorded, including age ($M = 20.34$, $SD = 4.07$), gender (63.8% female), religious affiliation (63.8% Christian, 15.2% Atheist, 3.8% Buddhist, 2.9% Jewish, 1.9% Muslim, 12.4% Other), and race/ethnicity (64.8% White, 14.3% Latino/a, 7.6% African American, 1.9% Asian, 7.6% Multiracial, 4% Other). Participants were presented with an information page describing the study and what they would be asked to do. They were given the option to exit the study at any time without penalty if they so desired. Three participants were eliminated for stating that "being good at math" was very relevant or extremely relevant for judging right and wrong. This item has been used in previous research to test the participant's focus and attention in completing the survey (see Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). The final sample size was $N = 106$.

Procedure

The study was administered through an online anonymous survey. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions designed to increase endorsement of binding foundations (Authority/Respect and

Ingroup/Loyalty) or increase endorsement of individualizing foundations (Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity). Once assigned to a condition, participants completed the manipulation task for that condition. Upon completion of the manipulation task, participants answered the first 15 items from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ 30, Graham et al., 2009), measures of abstract value endorsement, measures of political ideology, measures of perception of choice, and demographic measures. Upon completion of these measures participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation in the study.

Moral Foundations Endorsement Manipulation

Participants in the increase endorsement of binding foundations condition (N = 51) were asked to write an essay (1-2 paragraphs) arguing why 1) Betraying one's group is morally wrong, and 2) Disrespecting a legitimate authority is morally wrong. Participants were explicitly told not to report their personal opinions about these issues, but to simply argue why these things were wrong. Participants in the increase endorsement of individualizing foundations condition (N = 55) were asked to write an essay (1-2 paragraphs) arguing why 1) Harming an individual is morally wrong, and 2) Cheating someone (e.g. taking something away from someone when you don't deserve it) is morally wrong. Again, the participants were reminded to simply argue these points and not provide any personal opinion on either of these matters. See Appendix A for full manipulation materials.

Manipulation Check

In order to test whether the moral foundation endorsement manipulation was successful, participants answered the first 15 items of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ 30) in order to see which foundations they endorsed over others. Participants answered on a scale of 0 (not at all relevant) to 5 (extremely relevant) how relevant specific concerns were to their judgments of right and wrong. Sample items included, “Whether or not someone suffered emotionally,” “Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority,” and “Whether or not some people were treated differently than others” (MFQ, Graham et al., 2009). Participants only responded to the first 15 items in order to avoid any possible priming of the moral foundations items for later dependent measures. Since the MFQ is only serving as a manipulation check for this study, it was not pertinent to use all 30 items (individualizing foundations, 6 items, $\alpha = .83$, binding foundations, 6 items, $\alpha = .69$). See Appendix B for full MFQ.

Abstract Values

Endorsement of abstract values was also measured post manipulation. Three items were averaged together to measure endorsement of each abstract value on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Sample items for each abstract value included: egalitarianism, “I believe that everyone should have an equal chance in life” ($\alpha = .83$); universalism, “I think it is important to be tolerant of different ideas and beliefs” ($\alpha = .65$); individualism, “I think it is important to put forth effort to get ahead” ($\alpha = .79$); and traditionalism, “I believe that the traditions of the past should be respected” ($\alpha = .84$) (adapted from Wetherell et al., in press). See Appendix C for complete measures.

Political Ideology

Political ideology was measured, after abstract values, using a number of different variables. Participants were asked to answer on a scale of 1 (strongly liberal) to 7 (strongly conservative) their social political views and their economic political views (i.e. When it comes to social issues, do you usually think of yourself as liberal, conservative, or moderate?). Participants were also asked to report their position on specific social and economic policy issues. They were asked their attitudes regarding same-sex marriage, abortion, immigration, and warrantless wiretapping with three items each on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Sample items included, same-sex marriage: “Gay or lesbian couples should have the same legal rights as heterosexual couples” ($\alpha = .81$); abortion: “I support the right to life for unborn children” ($\alpha = .83$); immigration: “Immigrants contribute more to our society than we give them credit for” ($\alpha = .65$); and warrantless wiretapping: “The government should be permitted to use warrantless wiretapping in order to get information on suspected terrorists” ($\alpha = .78$). Higher scores on the same-sex marriage items indicate more positive attitudes towards same-sex marriage, which is more prevalent in liberal individuals; higher scores on the abortion items indicate more negative attitudes towards abortion, which is more prevalent in conservative individuals; higher scores on the immigration items indicate more positive attitudes towards immigration, which is associated with liberalism; and higher scores on the wiretapping items indicate more positive attitudes towards warrantless wiretapping, which is

associated with conservatism (Danso, Sedlovskaya, & Suanda, 2007; Gibson & Bingham, 1982; Poteat & Mereish, 2012).

Attitudes regarding economic issues were also assessed, including attitudes regarding government assistance and free enterprise. Sample items included, government assistance: “The government should set up programs to help the poor” ($\alpha = .64$) (adapted from Weber & Federico, 2013); free enterprise: “The less government gets involved with business and the economy, the better off this country will be” ($\alpha = .79$) (adapted from Feldman, 1988). Higher scores on the government assistance items indicate more positive attitudes towards government assistance, which is associated with more liberal disposition, and higher scores on the free enterprise items indicate more positive attitudes towards free enterprise, which is associated with a more conservative disposition. See Appendix D for complete measures.

Control Variables

Perception of choice and/or free will in completing the manipulation task was assessed with three items with response scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Items included, “How freely could you express yourself when writing your essays?”; “To what extent do you feel that you had any control when writing your essays?”; and “How much did you identify with what you wrote about in your essays?” Higher scores on these items indicate higher perception of choice or free will in completing the manipulation task.

In addition to these control variables, two items assessed agreement with and difficulty in coming up with the logical arguments in the manipulation task.

In order to measure agreement, participants were asked to report on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), “To what extent do you agree with what you wrote about in your essays?” To measure how difficult it was for participants to come up with the logical arguments, they were asked to report on a scale from 1 (very difficult) to 7 (very easy), “How easy was it for you to come up with your arguments in your essays?” (scale for all five items: $\alpha = .85$). These responses were also used as control variables during the main analyses discussed in the next section. Demographic variables such as gender, ethnicity, age, religion, and political party identification were measured at the end of the survey. See Appendix E for complete measures.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS (STUDY 1)

For Study 1, it was expected that participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition would report more liberal tendencies for the political ideology measures. At the same time, those in the endorse binding foundations condition would report more conservative tendencies for the political ideology measures. However, these relationships would be at least partially mediated via endorsement of abstract values. Specifically, participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition would report a greater endorsement of universalism and egalitarianism values compared to individualism and traditionalism values, which would also predict more liberal political ideology. Participants in the endorse binding foundations condition would report a greater endorsement of individualism and traditionalism values than would those in the endorse individualizing foundations condition, which would predict more conservative political ideology.

Manipulation Check

In order to check if the moral foundations endorsement manipulations were successful, a 2 by 2 mixed model ANCOVA (Analysis of Covariance) was computed with manipulation condition as the independent variable and type of moral foundation endorsement as the within subjects variable predicting endorsement of moral foundations. The average of both the Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity MFQ scores was computed (individualizing foundations) and served as one level of the within subjects variable. The average of the

Authority/Respect and Ingroup/Loyalty MFQ scores was computed (binding foundations) and served as the other level of the within subjects variable. As a reminder, perception of choice¹ was included as a covariate for all further analyses. There was no significant interaction effect between condition and type of foundation predicting endorsement of moral foundations, $F(1, 103) < 1$.

Participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition significantly endorsed the individualizing foundations ($M = 4.84, SE = .09$) more so than the binding foundations ($M = 3.85, SE = .10$), $F(1, 53) = 6.03, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .10$.

However, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition also significantly endorsed the individualizing foundations ($M = 4.89, SE = .11$) more than the binding foundations ($M = 3.99, SE = .11$), $F(1, 49) = 20.94, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .30$. In addition, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition ($M = 4.03, SE = .11$) did not significantly endorse the binding foundations more than those in the endorse individualizing foundations condition ($M = 3.81, SE = .10$), $F(1, 103) = 2.16, ns$. Since the overall 2 by 2 mixed model ANOVA interaction was not significant the moral foundations endorsement manipulation cannot be considered successful.

Analyses for Specific Hypotheses

Hypothesis I. The first hypothesis stated that there would be a main effect of moral foundation endorsement condition on political ideology such that participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition would report more liberal political ideology than those in the endorse binding foundations

¹ Composite score of all 5 perception of choice items.

condition. One-way ANCOVAs controlling for perception of choice were computed with manipulation condition (individualizing, binding) as the independent variable and the social, economic, and general political ideology measures as separate dependent variables. For further detailed analysis, one-way ANCOVAs were also computed with manipulation condition as the independent variable and attitudes towards same-sex marriage, abortion, immigration, warrantless wiretapping, government assistance, and free enterprise as separate dependent variables (see Table 1). Since none of the comparisons between the two conditions on any of the dependent variables were significant (except for General Party ID, which was significant in the wrong direction), Hypothesis I was not supported.

Hypothesis II. The second hypothesis stated that there would be a 2 by 2 interaction effect between moral foundations endorsement condition and type of abstract value on endorsement of abstract values such that participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition would endorse egalitarianism and universalism values more so than individualism and traditionalism values. At the same time, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition would endorse egalitarianism, universalism, individualism, and traditionalism values equally. The interaction between moral foundations endorsement condition and type of abstract value on endorsement of abstract values while controlling for perception of choice was not significant, $F(1, 103) < 1$. Participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition did not significantly endorse egalitarianism and universalism (composite score) values ($M = 5.87, SE = .11$)

more than individualism and traditionalism (composite score) values ($M = 5.11$, $SE = .10$), $F(1, 53) = 1.94$, *ns*. However, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition significantly endorsed egalitarianism/universalism values ($M = 5.94$, $SE = .15$) more than individualism/traditionalism values ($M = 5.17$, $SE = .14$), $F(1, 49) = 6.42$, $p < .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .12$. In addition, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition ($M = 5.20$, $SE = .12$) did not endorse individualism/traditionalism values more so than those in the endorse individualizing foundations condition ($M = 5.08$, $SE = .12$), $F(1, 103) < 1$. Since the 2 by 2 mixed model ANOVA interaction was not significant, Hypothesis II was not supported.

Hypothesis III. The third hypothesis stated that the extent to which participants endorse certain abstract values would mediate the relationship between endorsement of moral foundations and political ideology. Specifically, participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition would report more liberal political ideology, but that relationship would be at least partially mediated by endorsement of egalitarianism and universalism abstract values. Participants in the endorse binding foundations condition would report more conservative political ideology, but that relationship would be at least partially mediated by endorsement of individualism and traditionalism abstract values. In addition to the mediation, it was predicted that perception of choice would moderate the relationship between the manipulation condition and endorsement of abstract values.

In order to test this, moderated mediation path analysis in SPSS using the Process macro with 5000 bootstrap samples was used (Hayes, 2013; Preacher & Hayes, 2008)². The model consists of manipulation condition predicting political ideology and endorsement of abstract values. Abstract values also predicts political ideology and the model also tests for a significant indirect effects of manipulation condition on political ideology through endorsement of each abstract value based on levels of perception of choice as a moderator. The full moderated mediation model was not significant and perception of choice failed to moderate the relationship between manipulation condition and any endorsement of abstract values. Because of all of these factors only a simple mediation model is presented (see Figure 1). The moral foundation manipulation did not significantly predict any of the abstract values, nor did it predict political ideology. In addition, none of the indirect effects of manipulation condition on ideology through any of the abstract values were significant (see Table 2). Therefore, Hypothesis III was not supported.

Additional Analyses

Due to the fact that the moral foundation endorsement manipulation was not successful, one cannot confidently make any claims about how moral foundation endorsement does or does not predict political ideology. However, it is possible to get a little closer to answering this question by looking at the correlations between the moral foundations questionnaire items that were used as a manipulation check and the political ideology measures. By examining these

² Standardizing the scales makes no difference during analyses, so items are left in original scale units (see Hayes, 2013).

correlations, one can see if moral foundation endorsement has any bearing or connection to where people stand ideologically.

Correlations between moral foundations and political ideology measures.

The individualizing foundation composite score was significantly negatively correlated with general political party identification ($r = -.25, p < .01$), attitudes regarding same-sex marriage ($r = -.27, p < .01$), attitudes regarding government assistance ($r = -.45, p < .001$), and attitudes regarding free enterprise ($r = -.20, p < .05$). The more participants endorsed the individualizing foundations, the more liberal they tended to lean in regards to a few political attitudes. The binding foundation composite score was significantly positively correlated with attitudes regarding abortion ($r = .33, p < .01$) and attitudes regarding warrantless wiretapping ($r = .26, p < .01$) only. The more participants endorsed the binding foundations, the conservative they tended to lean, but only in respect to their attitudes on abortion and warrantless wiretapping. So these correlations do, at least to a small degree, support some of the claims of Moral Foundations Theory, where placing the individual at the center of moral value is associated with a more liberal political stance and placing the group at the center of moral value is association with a conservative stance. Of course, causality cannot be implied through correlational analysis, and further work would need to be done to flesh out these associations more clearly.

Analyses of hypotheses dropping those not affected by manipulation. In order to take a closer look at the role that perception of choice and self-relevance played in determining the efficacy of the moral foundations endorsement

manipulation, the manipulation check analysis was computed while eliminating participants who stated that they disagreed with what they wrote about in their essays ($N = 15$). By removing these participants, I increase the chances that the participants who are left are the most personally invested in what they wrote and will be more likely to agree with what they wrote about in their essays.

The 2 by 2 interaction effect between manipulation condition and type of moral foundation in predicting moral foundation endorsement was significant with the pattern in the predicted direction, $F(1, 88) = 4.00, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .04$. Participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition significantly endorsed the individualizing foundations ($M = 4.87, SE = .08$) more so than the binding foundations ($M = 3.87, SE = .10$), $F(1, 51) = 6.56, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .11$. Also, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition endorsed the individualizing foundations ($M = 4.89, SE = .11$) the same as the binding foundations ($M = 4.19, SE = .11$), $F(1, 36) = 1.46, ns$. In addition, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition ($M = 4.13, SE = .11$) significantly endorsed the binding foundations more than those in the endorse individualizing foundations condition ($M = 3.86, SE = .10$), $F(1, 88) = 4.59, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .05$.

These results, without the participants who did not respond to the manipulation, show that the manipulation worked just as hypothesized. Participants who agreed with what they wrote could be manipulated into endorsing either individualizing or binding moral foundations. These results point to the power of perception of choice and of invoking the self in one's argument and how that might cause an individual to more easily believe in and

adopt what they are arguing. And while selecting out these participants allowed the manipulation to be successful, there were no other differences in any of the analyses for the other hypotheses. These data could potential speak to the ability, or lack thereof, of moral foundations to accurately predict one's political ideology, as Moral Foundations Theory currently suggests (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Of course there are concerns with removing so many participants from the sample. Obviously there is something about morality that makes it difficult to get individuals to argue against their predispositions. These ideas will be further discussed in the next section.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION (STUDY 1)

The goal of Study 1 was to experimentally examine the relationship between the pattern of endorsement of moral foundations and one's political ideology. Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) suggests that people who base judgments of right and wrong on principles/foundations related to promoting care, preventing harm, and promoting fairness and equality (individualizing foundations) tend to lean more liberal, politically. At the same time, those who base judgments of right and wrong on principles/foundations related to respecting authority and maintaining loyalty to one's ingroup (binding foundations) tend to endorse a more conservative political ideology. By attempting to experimentally manipulate which set of moral foundations one endorses, I predicted that participants who were manipulated to endorse the individualizing foundations would respond to political ideology measures with a more liberal stance compared to those who were manipulated to endorse the binding foundations and respond more conservatively to the political ideology measures. Along with these predictions, I hypothesized that endorsement of abstract values would mediate this association such that those in the individualizing condition would endorse egalitarianism and universalism values, which would then lead to a more liberal ideology. And those in the binding condition would endorse individualism and traditionalism values, which would then lead to a more conservative ideology.

In addition to these predictions, I hypothesized that the manipulation would only be successful for participants who felt they had a choice when writing their essays. By controlling for the perception of choice, the current research is better able to examine how the internalization of what the participants were writing about had an effect on their abstract value endorsement and political ideology. Participants who did not perceive any choice when writing their essay would be more likely to dismiss what they wrote as something they just “had to do” instead of something they actually believed and were convinced of (Stone & Cooper, 2001).

Findings and Implications

While participants in the endorse individualizing foundations condition did significantly endorse the individualizing foundations more so than the binding foundations after the manipulation, those in the endorse binding foundations condition also endorsed the individualizing foundations more so than the binding foundations. In addition, participants in the endorse binding foundations condition did not differ from those in the other condition on their binding foundations scores. Taken together, these results suggest that the moral foundation manipulation for Study 1 was not successful. Writing about why disrespecting an authority figure and betraying loyalty to one’s ingroup did not make participants endorse the binding foundations any more than those in the other condition.

One potential explanation for the moral foundation manipulation failure is that those in the endorse binding foundations condition were actually providing

more individual-focused explanations for why disrespecting authority and betraying one's ingroup is wrong. Due to time constraints for conducting and analyzing the current research, the actual content of the written essays were not coded for presence of binding versus individualizing foundation content.

Therefore, it could be the case that participants in the binding foundation condition were able to spin their responses in order to line up with their more liberal disposition that they most likely started with (due to DePaul University having a mostly liberal student sample). If this is the case, then the manipulation task for the binding foundations condition would have had the opposite effect as intended, which could explain the lack of difference between conditions for most of the dependent measures. Future research should involve content coding the written responses to see if more individualized content than binding content is found in the essays written by those in the endorse binding foundation condition. If more individualized content is found then one can be sure that a change in the manipulation prompt and/or instructions would need to occur.

One way to improve the manipulation materials would be to adjust the prompt slightly and ask participants to argue why *they* think a specific moral statement is morally wrong. This change could make the manipulation more sensitive by including the participant in the argument itself. By asking the participant why *they* think a specific moral stance is wrong, the manipulation would automatically incorporate more of the self for each participant, allowing for each person to take more ownership of the arguments they provide in their essays. The manipulation prompt currently encourages participants to *not* express their

personal opinion in their writing. This wording could have given the participants license to divorce their actual opinions, thoughts, and feelings from what they wrote. Instead, one could ask the participant to think about a time when something related to the prompt happened to them, a family member or friend, or to their community. Instructing the participants to fuel their arguments from real life experiences would make them really engaged and invested in what they are writing, which would allow more possibility for actually adopting that viewpoint as part of the self.

An interesting point regarding the association between moral foundations, political ideology, and abstract values that was somewhat revealed through these data is that abstract values were not significant explanatory mediators for the association between moral foundation endorsement and political ideology. While egalitarianism and traditionalism value endorsement did significantly predict political ideology in the expected directions, none of the abstract values were endorsed as a result of the manipulation condition. This lack of association between the manipulation and value endorsement could be because the endorse individualizing condition prompt did not ask participants to consider specifically egalitarian concepts or examples. One could easily write about how harming an individual is wrong without invoking egalitarian values for their argument.

In addition, values researchers (e.g. Schwartz, 1992) might argue that everyone endorses all values just to differing degrees. So it may be the case that one's level of absolute endorsement of an abstract value does not change as a result of a change in endorsement of moral principles, but instead one might just

change the order of prioritization for the values. Instead of expecting to see differences in how much one endorses traditionalism in and of itself, it might be more advantageous to look at how one endorses traditionalism in relation to other values, like egalitarianism or universalism. We might find that participants who are manipulated to endorse more binding foundations end up prioritizing traditionalism or individualism over other values without necessarily changing how much they endorse these values. Having participants rank order multiple values and provide their level of endorsement of each one could provide a way of getting a more nuanced look at value prioritization instead of just value endorsement on its own.

Of course, it is also possible that the moral foundation manipulation, even if it had been entirely successful, was not enough to change people's endorsement of moral principles. Indeed, some morality research has shown that people seem to hold onto their moralized attitudes and opinions even in the face of counterargument or opposition (Skitka, 2010). With this in mind, it may be the case that it is close to impossible to manipulate one's moral outlook, especially in such a short experimental study such as the current research. One most likely needs to be extremely motivated to change their moral orientation, and it is possible that the manipulation prompts were too impersonal and generic to warrant any personal investment by the participants.

Without a doubt, the most looming limitation of this study was the fact that the moral foundations endorsement manipulation was unsuccessful. However, manipulations failing are always a risk for experimental studies. This is

part of the price we pay when trying to implement experimental control into research. Inferences about causality become a little clearer and, more importantly, alternative explanations are more easily ruled out with experiments. It would have been possible to examine the relationship between moral foundation endorsement and political ideology organically, but that would have eliminated any chance for speculation on causality and would have also been susceptible to alternative explanations.

Due to the manipulation being unable to make participants endorse the desired moral foundations, it becomes quite difficult to make clear-cut conclusions regarding the implications of the results of the other analyses. As predicted by Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), most of the participants trended toward endorsing the individualizing foundations over the binding foundations, regardless of condition. However, the binding foundation endorsement manipulation made no difference on the binding foundations scores. Also, the additional correlational analyses suggest that, at least to some degree, individualizing foundation endorsement is associated with liberal ideology and binding foundation endorsement is associated with conservative ideology.

These data, although very weak, may provide indirect support for the link between individualizing foundation endorsement and liberal political ideology leaning. Since the manipulation failed, most participants endorsed the individualizing foundations and ended up leaning to the political left on almost all issues and measures of ideology. Of course causality cannot be inferred here and

further experimental work would need to be done in order to test this more clearly. But, for the scope of this study, a case could potentially be made that the link between moral foundations and political ideology as described in the moral foundations literature (e.g. Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) may still be valid, or at least not invalidated because of the results of this study.

Conclusion

In trying to better understand the association between moral foundation endorsement and political ideology, the results of Study 1 are inconclusive at best. Manipulating one's moral foundation endorsement had no effect on their political ideology or their endorsement of specific abstract values within the context of this study. The current research shows that it is difficult to manipulate people's locus of moral concern, which in turn makes it difficult to predict how those concerns will relate to political ideology. While the current study was unsuccessful at manipulating moral foundation endorsement, it does shed some light on areas for future research to further address the methodological shortcomings of this study. By taking into account the presented suggestions for future research, it may be possible to more clearly identify the causal role that moral concerns may have on one's political ideology.

CHAPTER VI

INTRODUCTION AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 2)

Another goal of this research was to examine the direction of causality between endorsement of moral foundations and political ideology. While it has been assumed that political preference stems from endorsement of specific moral foundations as purported by Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), this research also examined if the reverse association could be true, where endorsement of moral foundations results from adherence to specific political ideology. In Study 2, participants were randomly assigned to different conditions designed to either increase conservatism or decrease conservatism by making a logical argument promoting conservatism or by making a logical argument promoting liberalism. Based on previous research, this paradigm has been shown to be effective in producing ideological shifts along a single-item liberal to conservative measure where the increase conservatism condition tended to make participants respond more conservatively and the decrease conservatism condition tended to make participants respond more liberally (Solomon & Brown, 2012). After the manipulation, participants answered political ideology measures, abstract values measures, and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ, Graham et al., 2009) to see if endorsement of moral foundations differed by condition. Also, as with Study 1, perception of choice in completing the manipulation task was measured in order to account for any cognitive dissonance alternative explanation. By looking at the association between Moral Foundations Theory and political

ideology in both directions, this research will be able to examine in greater detail the nuances between the two constructs.

Statement of Hypotheses (Study 2)

Hypothesis I. There will be a 2 by 2 interaction effect between political ideology condition and type of moral foundation in predicting endorsement of moral foundations. Participants in the decrease conservative condition will endorse the individualizing foundations more so than the binding foundations. However, participants in the increase conservatism condition will endorse individualizing and binding foundations equally. Also, participants in the increase conservatism condition will endorse the binding foundations more so than those in the decrease conservatism condition.

Hypothesis II. There will be a 2 by 2 interaction effect between political ideology condition and type of abstract value in predicting endorsement of abstract values. Participants in the decrease conservatism condition will endorse egalitarianism and universalism values more so than individualism and traditionalism values. However, participants in the increase conservatism condition endorse egalitarianism, universalism, individualism, and traditionalism values equally. Also, participants in the increase conservatism condition will endorse individualism and traditionalism values more so than those in the decrease conservatism condition.

Hypothesis III. The extent to which participants endorse certain abstract values will mediate the relationship between political ideology and endorsement of moral foundations. Specifically, participants in the decrease conservatism

condition will report greater endorsement of the individualizing foundations, but that relationship will be at least partially mediated by endorsement of egalitarianism and universalism abstract values. Participants in the increase conservatism condition will report greater endorsement of the binding foundations, but that relationship will be at least partially mediated by endorsement of individualism and traditionalism abstract values.

CHAPTER VII

METHOD (STUDY 2)

Research Participants

As in study 1, participants for this research were recruited from DePaul University's Psychology Department undergraduate participant pool. Eighty-nine ($N = 89$) student participants completed the study online for partial research course credit to fulfill a requirement for their introduction to psychology course. Demographic measures for each participant were recorded, including age ($M = 19.99$, $SD = 4.13$), gender (75.3% female), religious affiliation (69.9% Christian, 8.4% Atheist, 2.4% Buddhist, 1.2% Muslim, 1.2% Hindu, 16.9% Other), and race/ethnicity (56.5% White, 21.2% Latino/a, 9.4% African American, 4.7% Asian, 2.4% Multiracial, 6% Other). Participants were presented with an information page describing the study and what they would be asked to do. They were given the option to exit the study at any time without penalty if they so desired. Four participants were eliminated for stating that "being good at math" was very or extremely relevant for judging right and wrong (see Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), leaving a final sample size of $N = 85$.

Procedure

The study was administered through an online anonymous survey. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions designed to increase conservatism or decrease conservatism. Once assigned to a condition, participants completed the manipulation task for that condition and answered measures of political ideology, measures of abstract value endorsement, the Moral

Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ, Graham et al., 2009), measures of perception of choice, and demographic measures. Upon completion of these measures participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation in the study.

Political Ideology Manipulation

Participants in the increase conservatism condition (N = 46) were asked to write an essay (1-2 paragraphs) about how these particular viewpoints are *correct* or *true*: 1) Everyone is responsible for their own standing in life, 2) Inequality that exists in the world is there for a reason, and 3) Change in society is usually a bad thing (Solomon & Brown, 2012). Participants were explicitly told not to report their personal opinions about these issues, but to simply think of a logical argument for why these points of view could be *correct* or *true*. Participants in the decrease conservatism condition (N = 39) were asked to write an essay (1-2 paragraphs) about how the same viewpoints are *incorrect* or *untrue*. Again, the participants were reminded to simply think of a logical argument for why these points of view could be *incorrect* or *untrue*. See Appendix F for complete manipulation materials.

Manipulation Check

To test if the political ideology manipulation was successful, participants answered multiple political ideology measures, post manipulation. Participants were asked to answer on a scale of 1 (strongly liberal) to 7 (strongly conservative) their social political views and their economic political views (see Study 1). Participants were also asked to report their position on specific social and economic policy issues. They were asked their attitudes regarding same-sex

marriage ($\alpha = .76$), abortion ($\alpha = .75$), immigration ($\alpha = .69$), and warrantless wiretapping ($\alpha = .71$) with three items each on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (see Study 1). Higher scores on the same-sex marriage items indicate more positive attitudes towards same-sex marriage, which is more prevalent in liberal individuals; higher scores on the abortion items indicate more negative attitudes towards abortion, which is more prevalent in conservative individuals; higher scores on the immigration items indicate more positive attitudes towards immigration, which is associated with liberalism; and higher scores on the wiretapping items indicate more positive attitudes towards warrantless wiretapping, which is associated with conservatism (Danso, Sedlovskaya, & Suanda, 2007; Gibson & Bingham, 1982; Poteat & Mereish, 2012).

Attitudes regarding economic issues were also assessed, including attitudes regarding government assistance ($\alpha = .75$) and free enterprise ($\alpha = .62$) (see Study 1). Higher scores on the government assistance items indicate more positive attitudes towards government assistance, which is associated with more liberal disposition, and higher scores on the free enterprise items indicate more positive attitudes towards free enterprise, which is associated with a more conservative disposition. Again, see Appendix D for complete measures.

Abstract Values

Endorsement of abstract values was also measured after the political ideology measures. Three items were averaged together to measure endorsement of each abstract value (egalitarianism, $\alpha = .83$; universalism, $\alpha = .65$; individualism, $\alpha = .82$; and traditionalism, $\alpha = .75$) on a scale of 1 (strongly

disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (see Study 1). Again, see Appendix C for complete measures.

Moral Foundations Endorsement

Participants answered the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ 30) in order to see which foundations they endorsed over others. Participants answered on a scale of 0 (not at all relevant) to 5 (extremely relevant) how relevant specific concerns were to their judgments of right and wrong (individualizing foundations, $\alpha = .83$; binding foundations, $\alpha = .71$) (MFQ; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Again, see Appendix B for full MFQ.

Control Variables

Perception of choice in completing the manipulation task was assessed with three items with response scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) (see Study 1). Higher scores on these items indicate higher perception of choice or free will in completing the manipulation task.

In addition to these control variables, two items assessed agreement with and difficulty in coming up with the logical arguments in the manipulation task (see Study 1). These responses were also used as control variables during the main analyses discussed in the next section (scale for all five items, $\alpha = .89$).

Demographic variables such as gender, ethnicity, age, religion, and political party identification were measured at the end of the survey. Again, see Appendix E for complete measures

CHAPTER VIII

RESULTS (STUDY 2)

For Study 2, it was expected that participants in the increase conservatism condition would report a greater endorsement of the binding moral foundations compared to the decrease conservatism condition. At the same time, those in the decrease conservatism condition would report a greater endorsement of the individualizing moral foundations over the binding moral foundations. However, these relationships would be at least partially mediated via endorsement of abstract values. Specifically, participants in the decrease conservatism condition would report a greater endorsement of universalism and egalitarianism values, which would also predict endorsement of individualizing foundations. Participants in the increase conservatism condition would report a greater endorsement of individualism and traditionalism values, which would predict endorsement of binding foundations.

Manipulation Check

In order to check if the political ideology manipulations were successful, one-way ANCOVAs controlling for perception of choice³ were computed with manipulation condition (increase conservatism, decrease conservatism) as the independent variable and the social, economic, and general political ideology measures as separate dependent variables. For further detailed analysis, one-way ANCOVAs were computed with manipulation condition as the independent

³ One item asking participants how freely they could express themselves while writing their essays was used as the control for all analyses since it was the only choice item that did not systematically differ between experimental conditions (see Field, 2009).

variable and attitudes towards same-sex marriage, abortion, immigration, warrantless wiretapping, government assistance, and free enterprise as separate dependent variables. In order for the manipulation check to be considered successful, participants in the increase conservatism condition would need to report significantly more conservative scores than those in the decrease conservatism condition on some (or all) dependent ideology measures. The two experimental conditions were different on a few of the ideology measures. Participants in the increase conservatism condition ($M = 3.22$, $SE = .20$) were marginally significantly more Republican than those in the decrease conservatism condition ($M = 2.72$, $SE = .21$), $F(1, 81) = 2.83$, $p < .10$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. Participants in the increase conservatism condition ($M = 3.06$, $SE = .19$) were also marginally significantly more socially conservative than those in the decrease conservatism condition ($M = 2.55$, $SE = .21$), $F(1, 82) = 3.25$, $p < .10$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$ (see Table 3). Due to these findings, the manipulation for political ideology can be considered at least partially successful.

Analyses for Specific Hypotheses

Hypothesis I. The first hypothesis stated that there would be a 2 by 2 interaction effect between political ideology condition and type of moral foundation in predicting endorsement of moral foundations such that participants in the decrease conservatism condition would endorse the individualizing foundations more so than the binding foundations. At the same time, participants in the increase conservatism condition would endorse the individualizing and binding foundations equally. The average of both the Care/Harm and

Fairness/Reciprocity MFQ scores were computed (individualizing foundations) and served as one level of the within subjects variable. The Authority/Respect and Ingroup/Loyalty MFQ scores were computed (binding foundations) and served as the other level of the within subjects variable. A 2 by 2 mixed model ANCOVA revealed that an interaction between political ideology condition and type of moral foundation predicting endorsement of moral foundations while controlling for perception of choice was significant, $F(1, 82) = 4.17, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .05$. Participants in the decrease conservatism condition significantly endorsed the individualizing foundations ($M = 4.74, SE = .13$) more so than the binding foundations ($M = 3.76, SE = .10$), $F(1, 37) = 5.67, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .13$. However, participants in the increase conservatism condition also significantly endorsed the individualizing foundations ($M = 4.58, SE = .09$) more so than the binding foundations ($M = 3.95, SE = .09$), $F(1, 44) = 12.35, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .22$. In addition, participants in the increase conservatism condition ($M = 3.97, SE = .09$) endorsed the binding foundations more so than those in the decrease conservatism condition ($M = 3.73, SE = .10$), $F(1, 82) = 3.08, p < .10, \eta_p^2 = .04$ (see Figure 2). Since the overall mixed model ANCOVA interaction was significant, and the pattern was mostly consistent with the predication, Hypothesis I was largely supported.

Hypothesis II. The second hypothesis stated that there would be a 2 by 2 interaction effect between political ideology condition and type of abstract value on endorsement of abstract values such that participants in the decrease conservatism condition would endorse egalitarianism and universalism values

more so than individualism and traditionalism values. At the same time, participants in the increase conservatism condition would endorse egalitarianism, universalism, individualism, and traditionalism values equally. The interaction between political ideology condition and type of abstract value on endorsement of abstract values while controlling for perception of choice was not significant, $F(1, 82) = 2.25, ns$. Participants in the decrease conservatism condition marginally significantly endorsed egalitarianism and universalism (composite score) values ($M = 6.06, SE = .14$) more so than individualism and traditionalism (composite score) values ($M = 5.39, SE = .12$), $F(1, 37) = 2.90, p < .10, \eta_p^2 = .07$. However, participants in the increase conservatism conditions also marginally significantly endorsed egalitarianism/universalism values ($M = 5.86, SE = .13$) more so than individualism/traditionalism values ($M = 5.45, SE = .12$), $F(1, 44) = 3.11, p < .10, \eta_p^2 = .07$. In addition, participants in the increase conservatism condition ($M = 5.46, SE = .12$) did not endorse individualism/traditionalism values more so than those in the decrease conservatism condition ($M = 5.39, SE = .13$), $F(1, 82) < 1$. Hypothesis II was not entirely supported.

Hypothesis III. The third hypothesis stated that the extent to which participants endorse certain abstract values would mediate the relationship between political ideology and endorsement of moral foundations. Specifically, participants in the decrease conservatism condition would report a greater endorsement of the individualizing foundations, but that relationship would be at least partially mediated by endorsement of egalitarianism and universalism abstract values. Participants in the increase conservatism condition would report

a greater endorsement of the binding foundations, but that relationship would be at least partially mediated by endorsement of individualism and traditionalism abstract values. In addition to the mediation, it was predicted that perception of choice would moderate the relationship between the manipulation condition and endorsement of abstract values.

In order to test this, moderated mediation path analysis in SPSS using Process macro with 5000 bootstrap samples was used (Hayes, 2013; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The model consists of manipulation condition predicting moral foundation endorsement and endorsement of abstract values. Abstract values also predicts moral foundation endorsement and the model also tests for significant indirect effects of manipulation condition on moral foundation endorsement through endorsement of each abstract value based on levels of perception of choice as a moderator.

The indirect effect of condition on individualizing foundation endorsement through traditionalism was non-significant despite the significant interaction between condition and perception of choice (see Table 4 and Figure 3). Also, there was a significant indirect effect of condition on individualizing foundations through egalitarianism such that participants in the decrease conservatism condition endorsed egalitarianism values and then in turn endorsed more individualizing moral foundations (see Table 4 and Figure 3).

The indirect effect of condition on binding foundation endorsement through traditionalism was significant for those with high choice perception such that participants in the increase conservatism condition who felt they had a lot of

choice in writing their essays endorsed traditionalism values and then in turn endorsed more binding moral foundations (see Table 5 and Figure 4). Also, there was a significant indirect effect of condition on binding foundation endorsement through egalitarianism such that participants in the decrease conservatism condition endorsed egalitarianism values and then in turn were less likely to endorse binding foundations (see Table 5 and Figure 4).

The indirect effect of condition on moral foundations as a difference score (individualizing minus binding) through traditionalism was significant for those with high choice perception such that those in the increase conservatism condition who felt they had a lot of choice when writing their essays endorsed traditionalism values and in turn endorsed more binding foundations (see Table 6 and Figure 5). Also, there was a significant indirect effect of condition on moral foundations difference score through egalitarianism such that those in the decrease conservatism condition endorsed egalitarianism values and in turn endorsed more individualizing foundations (see Table 6 and Figure 5). Hypothesis III was partially supported because of significant indirect effects of the political ideology manipulation condition on moral foundation endorsement through endorsement of traditionalism values for those who perceived high choice when writing their essays and through endorsement of egalitarianism values.

Additional Analyses

In order to take a closer look at the role that perception of choice and self-relevance played in determining the efficacy of the political ideology manipulation, the manipulation check analysis was computed while eliminating

participants who stated that they disagreed with what they wrote about in their essays ($N = 22$). By removing these participants, we increase our chances that the participants who are left are the most personally invested in what they wrote and will be more likely to agree with what they wrote about in their essays.

Participants in the increase conservatism condition reported being significantly more socially conservative and Republican compared to those in the decrease conservatism condition. In terms of political attitudes, participants in the increase conservatism condition were marginally significantly more conservative in their attitudes toward same-sex marriage and warrantless wiretapping (see Table 7).

The stronger effect of the manipulation also had downstream consequences on all of the other analyses where the effects of the manipulation on moral foundation endorsement and value endorsement were more robust as well. However, while the stronger manipulation enhanced the results, it did not change any of the patterns of results from previous analyses. By eliminating the participants who were not personally invested in their arguments, the political ideology manipulation did become a little stronger and more robust, further exemplifying how important it is for the participant to be personally engaged in what they are doing in order for the manipulation to work as well as possible.

CHAPTER IX

DISCUSSION (STUDY 2)

The goal of Study 2 was to examine the effect of one's political ideology on the endorsement of moral principles. Research has shown that adhering to a specific political ideology can have many downstream consequences, including influencing one's values and moral principles (Goren, 2005; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012). While Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) proposes that moral principles or foundations for moral concern result in one's political ideology, it is also just as plausible that one's political stance could be influencing his/her moral outlook. As in Study 1, values, which are overarching abstract principles that serve to guide both our ideologies and our morality (Sverdlik et al., 2012), should be able to explain this link between one's political stance and one's endorsement of specific moral foundations.

By attempting to experimentally manipulate one's political ideological stance, I predicted that participants who were manipulated to decrease their conservatism would tend to endorse moral foundations related to promoting care, preventing harm, and promoting fairness and equality (individualizing foundations). At the same time, participants manipulated to increase their conservatism would be motivated to endorse moral foundations related to respecting authority and maintaining loyalty to one's ingroup (binding foundations). Along with these predictions, I hypothesized that endorsement of abstract values would mediate this association such that those in the decrease

conservatism condition would endorse egalitarianism and universalism values, which would then lead them to endorse individualizing moral foundations. At the same time, those in the increase conservatism condition would endorse individualism and traditionalism values, which would then lead them to endorse binding moral foundations.

In addition to these predictions, I hypothesized that the manipulation would only be successful for participants who felt they had a choice when writing their essays. By controlling for the perception of choice, the current research is better able to examine how the internalization of what the participants were writing about had an effect on their abstract value endorsement and moral foundation endorsement. Participants who did not perceive any choice when writing their essay would be more likely to dismiss what they wrote as something they just “had to do” instead of something they actually believed and were convinced of (Stone & Cooper, 2001).

Findings and Implications

The political ideology manipulation was partially successful in manipulating participants’ ideologies. Participants in the increase conservatism condition reported being marginally significantly more Republican and marginally significantly more socially conservative than those in the decrease conservatism condition. However, none of the other political ideology manipulation check measures were approaching significance, though most were trending in the expected direction. Therefore, the political ideology manipulation was somewhat successful but not very robust as a manipulation.

This manipulation was adapted from previous research that was able to successfully manipulate conservatism with this task (Solomon & Brown, 2012), but perhaps the task could be improved by making the statements that the participants have to argue as either true or untrue even more relevant to the self. By asking the participants why *they* think a specific political viewpoint is true or untrue, the manipulation would automatically incorporate more of the self for each participant, allowing for each person to take more ownership of the arguments they provide in their essays. The manipulation prompt currently encourages participants to *not* express their personal opinion in their writing. As in Study 1, this wording could have given the participants license to divorce their actual opinions, thoughts, and feelings from what they wrote. Instead, one could ask the participant to think about a time when something related to the prompt happened to them, a family member or friend, or to their community. Instructing the participants to fuel their arguments from real life experiences would make them really engaged and invested in what they are writing, which would allow more possibility for actually adopting that viewpoint as part of the self. Of course, at the same time, it could be possible that wording the manipulation prompt this way could also allow for the participants to just argue their current political opinion instead of argue what they are instructed to argue. By adding more of a connection to the self, one is risking this kind of reaction, but it would be worth it in order to see if the participants would take more ownership for what they argued and therefore take more ownership of that political viewpoint, which would allow the manipulation to be stronger.

As in Study 1, without the time constraints of the current project, the written responses from the manipulation task for Study 2 could be coded for the presence of conservative versus liberal political ideology to see if participants were really adhering to the task appropriately. It is conceivable that the participants might have regressed into adopting the ideology that they were most likely predisposed to endorse (liberalism for the DePaul student sample) before participating in the study. Participants could have been reacting to being asked to write about something they disagreed with and therefore, might have written the opposite of what they were instructed to write, especially for those in the increase conservatism condition.

In addition, a factor that could have affected the robustness of the ideology manipulation was the fact that the manipulation check items included many items about ideologically specific policies. People's opinions and stances on issues like abortion, same-sex marriage, and immigration are typically strongly held attitudes (see Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis, 2005). So not only is it difficult to move around their positions on these issues, simply presenting these issues for the participants to consider might have countered the effect of the manipulation. Assuming that any effect the manipulation had on anyone's ideology was most likely to be short-lived, having the participants state their opinions about hot-button political issues might have been more powerful than the manipulation and might have caused the participants to revert back, at least a little, to their original ideological positions by the time they responded to the abstract values and moral foundations items. It would be worthwhile to consider running the same manipulation but with only

general social and economic political ideology measures as manipulation check items in order to avoid any contamination of the manipulation with cantankerous issues.

An important finding in the current study is that participants who were asked to write about why specific conservative ideological stances were incorrect or untrue ended up endorsing the individualizing moral foundations more than the binding foundations, while participants who were asked to write in favor of conservative ideological stances endorsed the binding moral foundations more so than those in the other condition. These results support the idea that one's view of how society should function can have an impact on one's locus of moral concern. Having a specific ideological viewpoint made salient can provide a heuristic for determining one's moral concerns. If one's political ideology emphasizes a fear of change, justifies inequality, and esteems self-reliance (i.e. conservatism) then that person is going to be more likely to base ideas of right and wrong off of concerns related to benefitting the ingroup (to avoid the unknown of outgroup members) and respecting hierarchy (to avoid upsetting the natural state of inequality) than someone who has a political viewpoint that welcomes societal change and has a place for situational accounts for one's standing in life (i.e. liberalism).

In terms of political ideology and abstract value endorsement, writing about why specific conservative ideological stances were untrue did cause participants to endorse egalitarianism and universalism values more so than individualism and traditionalism values, but writing in support of specific

conservative ideologies did not influence participants' value endorsements to the same extent. This finding is interesting, especially in tandem with the previous finding that ideology affects moral concerns, because it may point to the fact that one's values may function more as an organizer for our ideology and moral concerns. When looking at values as abstract, overarching principles that guide behaviors, beliefs, and intentions that include concerns about morality as well as personal goals and desires, one can see how values are not solely determined by one's ideology or one's moral stance. The abstract nature of values may allow for changes in moral concerns to occur without sacrificing or changing the overarching value that drives it. If a person has a conservative ideology made salient and personally relevant to them and therefore places more importance in basing judgments of right and wrong on whether someone betrayed their ingroup, that person can still espouse an abstract value of egalitarianism and simply use it to guide other aspects of their behavior. One does not necessarily need to throw the abstract value baby out with the morality bathwater. However, as we see in the mediation analyses, imbuing the self in one's ideological stance may be the key component in adhering to the values associated with that ideology.

In all three moderated mediation models (outcome variable consisting of individualizing foundation endorsement, binding foundation endorsement, and the difference score, see Figures 3, 4, and 5) manipulation condition significantly predicted endorsement of egalitarianism values. The interaction between manipulation and perception of choice predicted endorsement of traditionalism values as well. In all three models, endorsement of egalitarianism values

predicted endorsement of individualizing moral foundations. In models 2 and 3 (see Figures 4 and 5) endorsement of traditionalism also predicted endorsement of binding moral foundations.

However, more interestingly, there were significant indirect effects of manipulation condition on endorsement of moral foundations through certain abstract values. In all three models, there were significant indirect effects of manipulation condition on endorsement of individualizing foundations through egalitarianism, regardless of perception of choice. In other words, participants in the decrease conservatism condition endorsed egalitarianism values, which led to an endorsement of the individualizing foundations. This finding is not necessarily surprising due to the fact that most of the participants were likely to already endorse egalitarianism values by virtue of being a liberal university student sample. So when these participants argue an ideological viewpoint that strengthens a liberal worldview, the abstract values that guide that point of view are brought to mind and endorsed. As a result of having the egalitarianism values brought to mind, these participants then lean toward endorsing the individualizing foundations as these foundations are easily identifiable as manifestations of egalitarian values. At the same time, having egalitarian values in mind prohibits these individuals from endorsing binding moral foundations since having a respect for authority and hierarchy does not jibe well with values that promote equality.

In the last two models there were significant indirect effects of manipulation condition on endorsement of binding foundations through

traditionalism values but only for participants who perceived a high amount of choice when writing their essays. This is where imbuing the self may become a key component in the chain of association. Undoubtedly, given the liberal bias in the sample, participants in the increase conservatism condition would have had the greatest chance of having to argue a point with which they did not necessarily agree. This makes it possible that some participants would not have felt personally invested in their argument, thus making it less successful. However, for those participants who did feel that they were able to imbue a sense of self into their arguments, the manipulation would be much stronger. This is exactly what we find in Study 2. Participants in the increase conservatism condition who felt they had a lot of choice in writing their essays were more likely to espouse a conservative political viewpoint, which made traditionalism values salient. As a result of having traditionalism values brought to mind, these individuals then used that guiding, overarching value to inform their moral concerns, thus making them more likely to endorse binding moral foundations, which are easily informed by traditionalism. And this link from conservative political ideology to endorsement of traditionalism does not lead to a decrease in individualizing foundation endorsement because both conservatives and liberals can and do endorse individualizing foundations (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).

An important point to consider when examining the results of these analyses, especially the path models, is how much these associations are causally related. Path models with directional arrows make it tempting to argue that political ideology is causing one to endorse a specific moral outlook. However, it

might more likely be the case that these different moral foundations are already endorsed to a certain degree within all of us. So conservative political ideology may not be causing someone to develop a moral outlook focused on binding foundations, but may instead cause that person to just reprioritize the level of importance that one places on those foundations. In a sense, political ideology primes individuals into thinking about the world in a specific way, which then leads to a reorganization of moral concerns to coalesce around that ideology.

Conclusion

The current study was able to shed some light on the relationship between political ideology and endorsement of moral principles. The data reveal that a relationship does exist between these two constructs and that this relationship is at least partially explained by the values that one endorses. Individuals who are put in a mindset that forces them to endorse a conservative political ideology tend to endorse moral principles related to concerns about group-level morality, placing value in respecting authorities and maintaining loyalty to one's ingroup more so than someone who is put in a mindset that forces them to endorse a liberal political ideology. This relationship between conservatism and group-based morality is at least partially explained by an endorsement of traditionalism values, which are associated with conservatism and with group-based morality. At the same time, individuals forced to endorse a liberal political ideology tend to endorse individual-level morality, placing value in caring for the individual, preventing harm, and promoting fairness and equality more so than someone who is put in a conservative mindset. This relationship is partially accounted for by

endorsement of egalitarianism values, which are associated with liberalism and with individual-based morality. While the results of Study 2 are not completely conclusive, they get us on the right track to further discovering the complex relationship between ideology, morality, and values.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

Much research has examined the association between political ideology and endorsement of distinct moral principles (e.g. Goren, 2005; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). The associations that have typically been observed show that political liberals tend to endorse moral principles that place the individual at the center of concern, resulting in judgments of right and wrong based on caring for individuals and promoting fairness (individualizing foundations); while political conservatives tend to endorse moral principles that include the group as an equally worthy recipient of concern and priority (binding foundations), resulting in moral judgments based on maintaining and preserving important traditions, hierarchies, and social systems as well as caring for individuals and promoting fairness (Moral Foundations Theory, Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). However, research has also shown that endorsement of certain moral principles could be a result of adhering to specific political ideologies (i.e. liberalism versus conservatism) (Goren, 2005; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). In addition, research has also shown that endorsement of abstract values, or overarching principles that guide our behavior, our judgment of others' behavior, and assist us in explaining our choices, actions, beliefs, and intentions (e.g. universalism, egalitarianism, traditionalism, Schwartz, 1992), are associated with both political ideology and with endorsement of moral principles (Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012).

One goal of the current research was to provide an experimental test of the causal link between moral foundations endorsement and political ideology in the direction predicted by moral foundations theory researchers (morals to ideology), and in the direction predicted by some political science researchers (ideology to morals). This goal was important because Moral Foundations Theory has generated a lot of interest and discussion within moral and political psychology research. Moreover, the claims made by MFT researchers, especially when it comes to associations between moral foundation endorsement and political ideology, have not necessarily been subject to explicit experimentation. Theoretically driven hypotheses like these need to be tested with experimental control rather than based on assumptions and speculation. Another goal of the current research was to propose a role for abstract value endorsements as a mediator between both the morals-to-ideology link and the ideology-to-morals link. In order to accomplish these goals, I conducted two studies that each examined one direction of the causal link between political ideology and endorsement of moral principles. Study 1 manipulated endorsement of moral foundations (increase individualizing foundations versus increase binding foundations) through a writing task and measured responses to questions assessing abstract value endorsement and political ideology. Study 2 manipulated endorsement of political ideology (increase conservatism versus decrease conservatism), also through a writing task, and measured responses to abstract values and moral foundations questions.

Taken together, the current research provides us with a number of insights into the world of morality, values, and political ideology. For one, manipulating one's locus of moral concern is a difficult task. Individuals often have extreme feelings and attitudes associated with their moral stances and getting someone to let go of or adjust a moral principle seems to require a high level of motivation and self relevance. Given the high level of specificity and personal relevance that would be needed to make a convincing argument for one to adjust their moral stance, the field of morality research would benefit from developing a clear and effective way to manipulate one's moral stance. This would allow for more nuanced and thorough investigation in to the role of morality in human behavior. The current research was not entirely successful at manipulating moral principle endorsement, but given the critiques and suggestions for future research to implicate the self more when arguing a specific moral stance, a more effective manipulation seems possible to attain.

On the other hand, the current research was able to show that manipulating one's political ideological stance may not be as difficult as once thought. While personal relevance and motivation are factors in determining what sort of ideology one will endorse much in the same way that they inform one's moral stance, perhaps there is some leeway in ideology as far as leaving room for alternative points of view. Unlike morality, political ideology does not have the same objective and universal demands that prevent someone from considering another viewpoint. Instead, if one can be highly motivated and encouraged to be personally invested in a specific ideological tenet, then that person may be more

amenable to self-identifying a shift to a political orientation that corresponds with that new tenet.

Finally, the current research was able to show that abstract values seem to influence and predict both political ideological tendencies and tendencies for basing moral judgments off of specific moral concerns. So one could say that abstract values play an important role in shaping and defining both how we view society and how we make judgments regarding morality. And because values are overarching and broad, they also seem to be difficult to change, even in the face of a slight shift in endorsement of certain moral principles or shift in ideological stance. Values can be seen as somewhat of a constant force that holds a certain amount of imperviousness to the changing tides of ideological preferences and moral principles that people experience throughout their lives. While values are certainly subject to change given the right circumstances, they also provide a way of keeping consistency between our ideologies and our moral penchants. Since values have shown in the current research to influence both political ideology and endorsement of moral principles, it may be the case that values are more self-relevant than ideology or morality. If values are more a core part of the self, then we may reorient our moral stances and ideological opinions to be more in line with our value system which could possibly explain some of the results of the current research where value endorsement has this dual influence on ideology and morals.

Practical Implications

Along with trying to understand what is happening on a theoretical level in the interplay between political ideology, values, and morals, it is perhaps just as important to consider practical, real-life implications of the results of the current research. I think that these data provide a window for looking at what is happening in the current political climate in the United States. In a somewhat sinister fashion, if people can use ideology to get others to reprioritize their moral concerns, as is suggested by the current research, then that could provide a lot more leverage for pushing ideological positions. We already see this sort of tactic used by our elected officials where almost all policy issues are couched in different moral terms depending on which political party is endorsing them. Therefore, this could create an almost cyclical effect where persuading someone to adopt a certain position on an ideological level then leads that person to adapt their moral outlook to further solidify that opinion which then strengthens that position ideologically.

On the other hand, the current research could also suggest that such extreme ideological divides that we see in the current political context are not necessarily intransigent. Under the right circumstances, individuals can be motivated to take alternative points of view, ideologically, which could allow for greater compromise and cooperation between political extremes. If it is the case that everyone endorses all abstract values and all moral foundations just to varying degrees, then it might be easier to get people to realign those values and morals than previously thought. Finding a way to make such differing opinions and alternative viewpoints personally relevant to the self might be the key for

sparking ideological compromise and open-mindedness. Future research could benefit from taking the self into account when examining the complex relationships between ideology, morality, and values.

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Table 1

Study 1 ANCOVA Results for Testing Mean Differences between Experimental Conditions for all Political Ideology Measures

Measure	<i>F</i>	<i>df_n</i>	<i>df_d</i>	<i>p</i>	η_p^2	Individualizing Binding	
						<i>M (SE)</i>	<i>M (SE)</i>
Social Issues ^a	2.40	1	103	.12	.02	3.18 (.18)	2.78 (.19)
Economic Issues ^a	1.12	1	101	.29	.01	3.66 (.19)	3.36 (.20)
General Party ID ^a	5.28	1	102	.02	.05	3.50 (.17)	2.93 (.18)
Abortion ^a	0.01	1	103	.95	.00	3.19 (.22)	3.21 (.23)
Warrantless Wiretapping ^a	0.68	1	103	.41	.01	3.63 (.18)	3.42 (.19)
Free Enterprise ^a	0.25	1	103	.62	.00	4.01 (.15)	3.90 (.16)
Same-Sex Marriage ^b	0.02	1	103	.88	.00	5.93 (.19)	5.89 (.20)
Immigration ^b	0.16	1	103	.69	.00	4.97 (.16)	5.06 (.16)
Government Assistance ^b	0.20	1	103	.66	.00	5.29 (.15)	5.39 (.16)
Mean Total ^a	1.64	1	103	.20	.02	3.22 (.10)	3.03 (.11)

Note. Means are estimated marginal means controlling for perception of choice.

^aHigher scores indicate greater conservatism.

^bHigher scores indicate greater liberalism.

Table 2

Study 1 Indirect Effects and Confidence Intervals for Multiple Mediation Model of Experimental Condition Predicting Political Ideology

Abstract Value	Political Ideology	
	Indirect Effect (<i>SE</i>)	95% CI
Egalitarianism	.06 (.11)	[-.14, .29]
Universalism	.001 (.03)	[-.06, .07]
Individualism	-.0002 (.01)	[-.03, .02]
Traditionalism	-.02 (.06)	[-.14, .08]

Note. CI = confidence interval.

Table 3

Study 2 ANCOVA Results for Testing Mean Differences between Experimental Conditions for all Political Ideology Measures

Measure	<i>F</i>	<i>df_n</i>	<i>df_d</i>	<i>p</i>	η_p^2	Decrease	Increase
						Conservatism	Conservatism
						<i>M (SE)</i>	<i>M (SE)</i>
Social Issues ^a	3.25	1	82	.08	.04	2.55 (.21)	3.06 (.19)
Economic Issues ^a	0.41	1	82	.53	.01	3.16 (.21)	3.34 (.19)
General Party ID ^a	2.83	1	81	.10	.03	2.72 (.21)	3.22 (.20)
Abortion ^a	0.001	1	82	.97	.00	3.12 (.25)	3.11 (.23)
Warrantless Wiretapping ^a	1.16	1	82	.29	.01	3.48 (.21)	3.79 (.19)
Free Enterprise ^a	1.57	1	82	.21	.02	3.75 (.16)	4.02 (.14)
Same-Sex Marriage ^b	0.36	1	82	.55	.00	6.27 (.18)	6.12 (.17)
Immigration ^b	0.24	1	82	.62	.00	5.20 (.18)	5.32 (.17)
Government Assistance ^b	1.10	1	82	.30	.01	5.69 (.18)	5.44 (.16)
Mean Total ^a	2.25	1	82	.14	.03	2.85 (.11)	3.07 (.10)

Note. Means are estimated marginal means controlling for perception of choice.

^aHigher scores indicate greater conservatism.

^bHigher scores indicate greater liberalism.

Table 4

Study 2 Indirect Effects and Confidence Intervals for Multiple Mediation Model of Experimental Condition Predicting Individualizing Moral Foundations

Abstract Value	Individualizing Moral Foundations	
	Indirect Effect (<i>SE</i>)	95% CI
Egalitarianism	.14 (.08)	[.02, .33]
Universalism	-.01 (.05)	[-.14, .07]
Individualism	-.02 (.03)	[-.15, .02]
Traditionalism		
Low Choice	-.001 (.03)	[-.04, .07]
Average Choice	-.001 (.02)	[-.07, .04]
High Choice	-.004 (.05)	[-.13, .09]

Note. CI = confidence interval. Low choice and high choice are -1 *SD* and +1 *SD*, respectively, from the mean level of choice for participants.

Table 5

Study 2 Indirect Effects and Confidence Intervals for Multiple Mediation Model of Experimental Condition Predicting Binding Moral Foundations

Abstract Value	Binding Moral Foundations	
	Indirect Effect (<i>SE</i>)	95% CI
Egalitarianism	-.10 (.06)	[-.26, -.01]
Universalism	-.01 (.03)	[-.11, .04]
Individualism	.03 (.05)	[-.02, .17]
Traditionalism		
Low Choice	.04 (.07)	[-.06, .22]
Average Choice	-.04 (.05)	[-.16, .03]
High Choice	-.13 (.08)	[-.33, -.02]

Note. CI = confidence interval. Low choice and high choice are -1 *SD* and +1 *SD*, respectively, from the mean level of choice for participants.

Table 6

Study 2 Indirect Effects and Confidence Intervals for Multiple Mediation Model of Experimental Condition Predicting Moral Foundations Difference Score

Abstract Value	Moral Foundations Difference Score	
	Indirect Effect (<i>SE</i>)	95% CI
Egalitarianism	.24 (.12)	[.05, .55]
Universalism	-.003 (.03)	[-.12, .04]
Individualism	-.05 (.07)	[-.27, .02]
Traditionalism		
Low Choice	-.04 (.08)	[-.25, .06]
Average Choice	.04 (.05)	[-.02, .16]
High Choice	.13 (.08)	[.01, .35]

Note. CI = confidence interval. Low choice and high choice are -1 *SD* and +1 *SD*, respectively, from the mean level of choice for participants.

Table 7

Study 2 ANCOVA Results for Testing Mean Differences between Conditions for all Political Ideology Measures with Participants who Agreed with their Essays

Measure	<i>F</i>	<i>df_n</i>	<i>df_d</i>	<i>p</i>	η_p^2	Decrease	Increase
						Conservatism	Conservatism
						<i>M (SE)</i>	<i>M (SE)</i>
Social Issues ^a	5.26	1	60	.03	.08	2.54 (.22)	3.32 (.26)
Economic Issues ^a	1.51	1	60	.22	.03	3.19 (.22)	3.61 (.26)
General Party ID ^a	5.76	1	59	.02	.09	2.81 (.22)	3.65 (.27)
Abortion ^a	0.10	1	60	.76	.00	3.08 (.27)	2.95 (.32)
Warrantless Wiretapping ^a	2.89	1	60	.09	.05	3.53 (.21)	4.09 (.25)
Free Enterprise ^a	2.13	1	60	.15	.03	3.72 (.15)	4.07 (.18)
Same-Sex Marriage ^b	2.85	1	60	.09	.05	6.33 (.19)	5.83 (.23)
Immigration ^b	0.13	1	60	.72	.00	5.15 (.20)	5.25 (.23)
Government Assistance ^b	1.31	1	60	.26	.02	5.69 (.19)	5.35 (.23)
Mean Total ^a	4.96	1	60	.03	.08	2.86 (.11)	3.25 (.14)

Note. Means are estimated marginal means controlling for perception of choice.

^aHigher scores indicate greater conservatism.

^bHigher scores indicate greater liberalism.




Figure 1. Path coefficients for multiple mediation model showing the effect of moral foundation manipulation on political ideology (composite score for all ideology measures, higher scores indicated more conservatism), mediated by endorsement of abstract values. Solid paths indicate $p < .05$; Dashed paths indicate non-significant paths ($p > .05$). Coefficients are unstandardized slopes (SE).




Figure 2. Mixed model ANOVA interaction showing political ideology condition and type of moral foundation predicting endorsement of moral foundations (* $p < .05$, + $p < .10$).




Figure 3. Path coefficients for moderated mediation model showing the effect of political ideology manipulation on endorsement of individualizing moral foundations (composite score for Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity foundations) mediated by endorsement of abstract values. For the mediated path through Traditionalism, perception of choice moderates the relationship. Solid paths indicate $p < .05$; Dashed paths indicate non-significant paths ($p > .05$). Coefficients are unstandardized slopes (SE).




Figure 4. Path coefficients for moderated mediation model showing the effect of political ideology manipulation on endorsement of binding moral foundations (composite score for Authority/Respect and Ingroup/Loyalty foundations) mediated by endorsement of abstract values. For the mediated path through Traditionalism, perception of choice moderates the relationship. Solid paths indicate $p < .05$; Dashed paths indicate non-significant paths ($p > .05$). Coefficients are unstandardized slopes (SE).




Figure 5. Path coefficients for moderated mediation model showing the effect of political ideology manipulation on endorsement of moral foundations (difference score for Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity foundations minus Authority/Respect and Ingroup/Loyalty foundations) mediated by endorsement of abstract values. For the mediated path through Traditionalism, perception of choice moderates the relationship. Solid paths indicate $p < .05$; Dashed paths indicate non-significant paths ($p > .05$). Coefficients are unstandardized slopes (SE).

Appendix A

Moral Foundations Endorsement Manipulation

Increase Endorsement of Binding Foundations Condition

In the space below, please write an essay (1-2 paragraphs) about how each of these actions or ideas are morally wrong. We are **not** asking for your personal opinion at this time, rather, simply think of a logical argument for why these points of view could be morally wrong.

-Betraying one's group (e.g. family, friends, etc.)

-Disrespecting (or going against) a legitimate authority (e.g. parents, bosses, teachers, etc.)

Increase Endorsement of Individualizing Foundations Condition

In the space below, please write an essay (1-2 paragraphs) about how each of these actions or ideas are morally wrong. We are **not** asking for your personal opinion at this time, rather, simply think of a logical argument for why these points of view could be morally wrong.

-Harming an individual (e.g. violence)

-Cheating someone (e.g. taking something away from someone when you don't deserve it)

Appendix B
Moral Foundations Questionnaire

Part 1. When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale:

[0] = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and wrong)

[1] = not very relevant

[2] = slightly relevant

[3] = somewhat relevant

[4] = very relevant

[5] = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and wrong)

____ Whether or not someone suffered emotionally

____ Whether or not some people were treated differently than others

____ Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country

____ Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority

____ Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency

____ Whether or not someone was good at math

____ Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable

____ Whether or not someone acted unfairly

____ Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group

____ Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society

____ Whether or not someone did something disgusting

____ Whether or not someone was cruel

____ Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights

____ Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty

____ Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder

____ Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of

Part 2. Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement:

[0]	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]
Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree

___ Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue.

___ When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly.

___ I am proud of my country's history.

___ Respect for authority is something all children need to learn.

___ People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.

___ It is better to do good than to do bad.

___ One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal.

___ Justice is the most important requirement for a society.

___ People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong.

___ Men and women each have different roles to play in society.

___ I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural.

___ It can never be right to kill a human being.

___ I think it's morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit nothing.

___ It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself.

___ If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer's orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty.

___ Chastity is an important and valuable virtue.

The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (full version, July 2008) by Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian Nosek.

Appendix C
Abstract Values Measures

Egalitarianism

I believe that everyone should have an equal chance in life.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

I believe that society should do more to lessen the gap between the rich and the poor.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

I think it is important that there is equality for everyone.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Universalism

I think it is important to be tolerant of different ideas and beliefs.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

I think it is important to try to work in harmony with others.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

I think it is important to have a world free of conflict.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Individualism

I think it is important to put forth effort to get ahead.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

I find it important to be self-reliant.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

I think it is important to work hard in life.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Strongly disagree Disagree Somewhat disagree Neutral Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree

Traditionalism

I think it is important to adhere to traditional values (e.g. time-honored beliefs and customs).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Disagree Somewhat disagree Neutral Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree

I believe that the traditions of the past should be respected.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Disagree Somewhat disagree Neutral Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree

I think it is important that we follow long held-social customs.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Disagree Somewhat disagree Neutral Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree

Appendix D
Political Ideology Measures

Political Ideology Measures (General)

When it comes to social issues, do you usually think of yourself as liberal, conservative, or moderate?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly liberal	liberal	Moderate, leaning toward liberal	Moderate	Moderate, leaning toward conservative	conservative	Strongly conservative

When it comes to economic issues, do you usually think of yourself as liberal, conservative, or moderate?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly liberal	liberal	Moderate, leaning toward liberal	Moderate	Moderate, leaning toward conservative	conservative	Strongly conservative

Political Ideology Measures (Issue Specific)

Same-sex Marriage (Higher scores indicate more liberalism)

Gay or lesbian couples should have the same legal rights as heterosexual couples.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Laws should be passed to prohibit marriage between individuals of the same sex. (Reverse scored)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Marriage should be defined as only between one man and one woman. (Reverse scored)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Abortion (Higher scores indicate more conservatism)

I support the right to life for unborn children.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Abortion should be a legal choice. (Reverse coded)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

I am opposed to abortion rights.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Immigration (Higher scores indicate more liberalism)

Immigrants contribute more to our society than we give them credit for.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Legally admitted immigrants who can't find jobs should be sent back to their countries. (Reverse coded)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

The United States needs to relax its immigration requirements.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Warrantless Wiretapping (Higher scores indicate more conservatism)

In their fight against crime the police should be entitled to use wiretaps and other devices for listening in on private conversations.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

The government should be permitted to use warrantless wiretapping in order to get information on suspected terrorists.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Warrantless wiretapping should be outlawed in its entirety. (Reverse coded)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Government Assistance (Higher scores indicate more liberalism)

The government should set up programs to help the poor.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

The government should provide fewer services in such areas as health and education. (Reverse coded)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

The government should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Free Enterprise (Higher scores indicate more conservatism)

The less government gets involved with business and the economy, the better off this country will be.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

There should be no government interference with business and trade.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Government intervention leads to too much red tape and too many problems.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neutral	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree

Appendix E
Control Variables and Demographics

- <2> Buddhist
- <3> Muslim
- <4> Hindu
- <5> Jewish
- <6> Atheist
- <7> Other (please specify)_____

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Republican, Democrat, or Independent?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Democrat	Democrat	Independent, leaning toward Democrat	Independent	Independent, leaning toward Republican	Republican	Strongly Republican

Appendix F
Political Ideology Manipulation

Increase Conservatism Condition

Below are some political viewpoints. In the space below, please write an essay (1-2 paragraphs) about how these particular political viewpoints are correct or true. We are **not** asking for your personal opinion at this time, rather, simply think of a logical argument for why these points of view could be correct or true.

- Everyone is responsible for their own standing in life.
- Inequality that exists in the world is there for a reason.
- Change in society is usually a bad thing.

Decrease Conservatism Condition

Below are some political viewpoints. In the space below, please write an essay (1-2 paragraphs) about how each of these particular political viewpoints are incorrect or untrue. We are **not** asking for your personal opinion at this time, rather, simply think of a logical argument for why these points of view could be incorrect or untrue.

- Everyone is responsible for their own standing in life.
- Inequality that exists in the world is there for a reason.
- Change in society is usually a bad thing.