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Mark Brandt
DePaul University, BRANDTMJ@GMAIL.COM

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THE EFFECTS OF MOTIVATIONS TO RESIST SOCIAL CHANGE AND ACCEPT

INEQUALITY ON PERCEPTIONS OF SYSTEM LEGITIMACY

A Dissertation

Presented in

Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

BY

MARK JOHN BRANDT

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Department of Psychology

College of Science and Health

DePaul University

Chicago, Illinois

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Mark Brandt graduated from Concordia University, Chicago in 2007 and received his Master's degree in psychology in 2010. His research has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *Perspectives on Psychology Science*, *Political Psychology*, and *Psychological Science*.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

People in the United States desire a much more equal distribution of wealth compared to

the actual distribution of wealth (Norton & Ariely, 2011), yet there is little public protest or

support for the redistribution of wealth from the upper social classes to the lower social classes.

In the social psychological study of justice and legitimacy, it is commonplace to note that people

appear to be remarkably unconcerned with the amount of inequality in the United States and

other Western countries, and to puzzle over the perpetuation of inequality. Despite the stalwart

efforts of activists, politicians, and many ordinary citizens over the last century to rectify this

disparity, racial, gender, and socioeconomic inequality appears to be firmly entrenched. In fact,

over the last several decades economic inequality has actually increased in the United States and

other western industrialized countries (Milanovic, 2002; Saez & Piketty, 2006).

Two social psychological theories, Social Dominance Theory (SDT; Sidanius & Pratto,

1999) and System Justification Theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994), have been developed with the

expressed collective goal of explaining the creation, enhancement, and maintenance of social

inequality and unequal social systems. That is, these perspectives explain why people grant

legitimacy to unequal social systems. The purpose of this paper is to propose and test a Two

Dimensional Model of System Legitimacy (2D-MOSL). By first distinguishing the meta-

theoretical foci of SDT and SJT, and integrating them into a single overarching perspective on

the legitimization of social systems, the 2D-MOSL suggests that there exist two system-relevant

values and motivations that both contribute to perceptions of system legitimacy. The first orients

people to the status quo. The second orients people to inequality.

Legitimacy and Why it Matters

A key research question of SJT, SDT, and the 2D-MOSL is how unequal social systems are legitimized. While the structure of any social system can be maintained by force, coercion, and intimidation, this strategy is costly, destabilizing, and counterproductive in the long term (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Thus, to the extent that a system is to be maintained in the long-term, other forms of moral and intellectual support for inequality and the status quo must be recruited. That is, the system must be perceived as legitimate.

Legitimacy has been defined as something that "is in accord with the norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures accepted by a group" (Zelditch, 2001, p. 33), so that system legitimacy is the experience of the overarching socio-political system as operating in accord with accepted norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures. When a system is widely perceived as legitimate, the exercise of social and political authority is more effective because the authorities in the system can draw on the shared norms, values, and beliefs (Tyler, 2006), leading people to have more trust and confidence in the system, perceive the system as fair and just, and have greater overall satisfaction with the system (Hetherington, 1998; Tyler, 1990, 1997; Tyler & Huo, 2002). When people legitimize the system they are more likely to follow its laws and regulations (Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Huo, 2002) and are less likely to spark protest against the system (Levi & Stoker, 2000), even when the system and its actions (e.g., specific laws) disadvantage a person or group (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Blader, 2003). Legitimacy, then, helps provide support for the system outside of the rational self-interest of the people operating within that system. The questions that this paper engages involve the psychological and motivational forces that compel people to legitimize social systems.

<u>System Justification and Social Dominance Theories</u>

System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) and Social Dominance Theory (Pratto, 1999; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), building on Marxist traditions, have provided much of the empirical and theoretical rationale for the stability of unequal social systems in the social and political psychology literatures. In short, both of these perspectives suggest, among other things, that people are motivated to maintain and legitimize the current unequal socio-political system.

<u>System Justification Theory</u>

System Justification Theory is often used to explain why social systems are resistant to change, even when they appear objectively unjust. A central piece to this theory is that "There is a goal to maintain the status quo" (Jost, Pietrzak, Liviatan, Mandisodza, & Napier, 2008, p. 592), such that people are motivated to defend existing social arrangements and may do so even when it is contrary to their own self-interest. The theory originally focused on explaining instances of outgroup favoritism, where members of low-status groups stereotype high-status outgroups more favorably than their own group (Haines & Jost, 2000; Jost, 2001; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002), and the use of stereotypes more broadly as explanations and justifications for the hierarchy of the status quo (Jost & Kay, 2005; Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005; Kay & Jost, 2003; Kay, Jost, Mandisodza, Sherman, Petrocelli, & Johnson, 2007). For example, stereotypes of the poor as happy and honest and the rich as miserable and dishonest lead people to view the overarching social system as more just and fair because the poor are portrayed as having some compensatory benefit (i.e., happiness, honesty) to make up for their unequal economic position (Kay & Jost, 2003).

People, however, can justify the system in many ways beyond the use of stereotypes. For example, when the system justification motive is activated (i.e., the desire to support the societal status quo) people are more likely to see the way the world is as the way it should be (Kay et al., 2009), perceive governmental agencies and institutions as legitimate (van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2011), reject prospects of system change (Banfield, Kay, Cutright, Wu, & Fitzsimons, 2011; Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007), more firmly endorse the cultural products of their social system (Banfield et al., 2011), and endorse ideologies that provide intellectual and moral support for the status quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). By legitimizing the system people are able to fulfill basic epistemic, existential, and relational needs (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008). Moreover, system legitimacy can be palliative, such that people who justify the system often have greater life satisfaction (Napier & Jost, 2008; Napier, Thorisdottir, & Jost, 2010; Rankin, Jost, & Wakslak, 2009) and experience more positive affect (Haines, & Jost, 2000; Rankin, Jost, & Wakslak, 2009).[1] Because system justification is a motivated and goal-directed process (Jost et al., 2008, 2010), the justification and legitimization of the social system is more pronounced when the system is threatened (Kay et al., 2009; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005; Lau, Kay, & Spencer, 2008), inescapable (Kay et al., 2009; Laurin, Shepherd, & Kay, 2010), and when a person feels dependent on the system (Kay et al., 2009; van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2011). By specifying when and why system legitimization occurs, system justification theory explains why people often see the unjust as just and the unfair as fair.

Social Dominance Theory

Social dominance theory attempts to explain the persistence of hierarchical social structures, but focuses on the support for inequality and hierarchy rather than resistance to

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[1] There are theoretically expected exceptions to this pattern (e.g., Jost & Thompson, 2000)

changes in the social system. Sidanius and colleagues (Sidanius, Levin, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1999) assert, "the main corpus of social dominance theory concerns itself with the specific psychological, social, institutional, and ideological mechanisms that contribute to group-based social hierarchy, and in turn, with how systems of hierarchy themselves affect these contributing mechanisms" (p. 92-93; see also Pratto, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This theory rests on the assumption that in order to accurately understand the perpetuation of inequality, inequality must be examined at multiple levels of analysis. Thus, social dominance theory examines how cultural and political ideologies (Federico & Sidanius, 2002), the practices of societal institutions (Haley & Sidanius, 2005; Sidanius, van Laar, Levin, & Sinclair, 2003; van Laar, Sidanius, Rabinowtiz, & Sinclair, 1997), intergroup relations (Henry, Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 2005; Levin, Federico, Sidanius, & Rabinowitz, 2002; Sidanius, Haley, Molina, & Pratto, 2007), individual differences (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and evolved predispositions (Navarrete, McDonald, Molina, & Sidanius, 2010; Pratto & Hegarty, 2000; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994) all contribute to the exacerbation and perpetuation of group-based social hierarchy (for extensive reviews of all these areas see Pratto, 1999; Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004).

One key component of the theory suggests that people vary in the extent to which they desire group-based inequality and hierarchy, that is, the extent people desire social dominance (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Social dominance can be expressed in discrimination and participation in group and systemic processes that favor high-status and socially dominant groups compared to subordinate groups (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). The tendency to prefer group-based inequality and hierarchy is often measured with the social dominance orientation scale (Pratto et al., 1994) or other measures of anti-egalitarianism

(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 61-102). People who score high on measures of social dominance orientation are more likely to support political and cultural ideologies that accept and promote inequality (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), as well as prefer public policies that exacerbate hierarchy (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), show more prejudice towards low status groups (Duckitt, 2001, 2006; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008), and work in occupations that enhance and maintain hierarchy, rather than attenuate it (Haley & Sidanius, 2005; Sidanius et al., 2003). By incorporating insight from multiple levels of analysis, social dominance theory helps to explain why societies are so often hierarchical.

SJT and SDT Differences and Similarities

Even though both theories focus on the perception and legitimacy of unequal social systems, the theories are not identical. For example, SDT, compared to SJT, highlights ideologies and beliefs that can be hierarchy enhancing or hierarchy attenuating, it focuses on the perpetuation of hierarchy at multiple levels of analysis, and it posits an evolutionary origin for the existence of social inequalities (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see also Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost & Thompson, 2000). These differences aside, many researchers suggest that these two theories are approximately comparable and use both theories to make the same predictions (e.g. Eastwick, Richeson, Son, & Finkel, 2009; Jost, Chaikalis-Petritsis, Abrams, Sidanius, van der Toorn, & Bratt, 2012). Moreover, system justification theorists have used measures of social dominance orientation to measure system justification (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost & Thompson, 2000) and social dominance theorists have argued that SDT subsumes SJT (Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004). I argue, however, that by specifying and differentiating the theoretical foci of the two theories it is possible to derive two basic system-relevant motivations

that contribute to the legitimization of unequal socio-political systems. These two basic system-relevant motivations form the foundation of the 2D-MOSL.

<u>The Two Dimensional Model of System Legitimacy: The Resistance to Social Change and the</u>

<u>Acceptance of Inequality as Two System-relevant Motivations</u>

I propose that SJT and SDT each represent a dimension of the 2D-MOSL, the focus of this dissertation. The 2D-MOSL argues that each theory represents a different system-relevant motivation. SJT represents the motivation to resist social change and SDT represents the motivation to accept and maintain inequality.

System level motivations are those that refer to the systems in which people operate, including "the rules and sociopolitical institutions within which people function" (Kay et al., 2009, p. 422). In research from SJT "the system" has been operationalized as specific institutions (e.g., one's university; Kay et al., 2009; van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2010), the government (e.g., van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2010), society (e.g., Banfield et al., 2010; Kay & Jost, 2003), and even dyadic relationships (e.g., van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2010), such that the system can include any social system that a person happens to be operating in. Consistent with SJT (Jost & Bananji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), I conceptualize system motivations as distinct from preferences, values, and motivations to see oneself (ego-motivations) or one's group (group motivations) in a positive and moral light. Ego motivations pertain to the self and include the motivations to see oneself as having value and worth (e.g., Steele, 1988). Group motivations pertain to important ingroups and include the motivations to see ones' group as positive and moral compared to other groups (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Ego and group motivations are important for understanding the behavior of individuals and groups; however, the thrust of this

investigation is on system level motivations that are relevant to the social system a person is currently functioning in, especially larger sociopolitical systems.

Acceptance of Inequality

The first system level motivation of the 2D-MOSL, most studied by SDT, focuses on the acceptance and promotion of inequality. Consider the quotes in Table 1 from key SDT theorists. The theme across all of these quotations is that SDT, and the related SDO, is geared towards understanding and measuring the desire for social stratification, intergroup inequality, and hierarchy. Thus, the system-level motivation most closely associated with SDT is the acceptance of inequality. This dimension ranges on a continuum from an opposition to inequality to the preference and acceptance of inequality. It may be best represented by measures of anti-egalitarianism and social dominance. For example, social dominance orientation has been described as "a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical, that is, ordered along a superior-inferior dimension" (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, p. 742). As such, measures of SDO may be the quintessential measure of the acceptance of inequality (cf. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).

Resistance to Social Change

The second system level motivation of the 2D-MOSL, most studied by SJT, is one that resists social change. Consider the quotes in Table 2 from the key theorists behind SJT. Across these different quotations there is a consistent theme of the resistance to social change and support for the status quo. Rather than focusing on inequality and hierarchy like SDT, SJT appears to put the focus on the defense and support of the status quo. Thus, the resistance to social change dimension represents a continuum that ranges from a preference

Table 1

Quotes from social dominance theorists highlighting the emphasis on the resistance to social change.

- "Social dominance theory was developed in an attempt to understand how group-based social hierarchy is formed and maintained." (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006, p. 272).

- "SDO has been refined as expressing a generalized orientation towards and desire for unequal and dominant/subordinate relations among salient social groups, regardless of whether this implies ingroup domination or subordination." (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006, p. 282).

- "As such, social dominance theory is the latest attempt at identifying the specific processes responsible for the creation, maintenance, and recreation of group-based social hierarchies and the manner in which these processes affect one another." (Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001, p. 308).

Table 2

Quotes from system justification theorists highlighting the emphasis on the resistance to social change.

- "System-justification refers to the psychological process whereby an individual perceives, understands, and explains an existing situation or arrangement with the result that the situation or arrangement is maintained" (Jost & Banaji, 1994).

- "…we suggest that the individual will sometimes adopt a "system-justifying" stance whereby an existing state of affairs is preserved 'at all costs.'" (Jost & Banaji, 1994).

- "Once a given system or regime is firmly in place, people will be motivated to maintain its existence and stability." (Jost, Pietrzak, Liviatan, Mandisodza, & Napier, 2008, p. 592)

- "The third is "system justification," and it captures social and psychological needs to imbue the status quo with legitimacy and to see it as good, fair, natural, desirable, and even inevitable." (Jost, Banji, & Nosek, 2004, p. 887).

- "In attempting to understand why acquiescence in the face of injustice is so prevalent and why social change is so rare and difficult to accomplish, system justification theory posits that—to varying degrees, depending on both situational and dispositional factors—people are motivated to defend, justify, and rationalize the status quo." (Jost, Pietrzak, Liviatan, Mandisodza, & Napier, 2008, p. 592)

for social change to a preference for the societal status quo. Rather than focusing on the

maintenance of social stratification, like the acceptance of inequality, resistance to social change

is oriented towards maintaining the status quo and traditional societal practices and values (see

also Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009; Eidelman, Pattershall, & Crandall, 2010).[2]

Are SJT and SDT So Similar?

The close association between the two system motivations in the extant literature may be

due to the confounding of societal inequality and the societal status quo. The foregoing analysis

suggests that SJT focuses on the maintenance of the system, which happens to usually be

hierarchical, and SDT focuses on the maintenance of hierarchy, which happens to characterize

most systems. Although the maintenance of the status quo and hierarchy are one and the same in

many situations, they do not have to be. In fact, they may represent two distinct sets of system

level values and motivations that people adopt and use to reason about the social system.

One of the defining contributions of the 2D-MOSL is the suggestion that by examining

these two system-relevant motivations in contexts where the status quo and inequality are less

confounded it might be possible to disentangle the unique effects and dynamics of these system-

relevant motivations. People who are motivated to resist social change are likely to legitimize the

social system because legitimate social systems are more stable and less likely to change (Levi &

Stoker, 2002; Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Huo, 2002). At the same time, people who accept inequality

may be likely to legitimize the social system because unequal social systems uphold their goals.

In general, people are more likely to see authorities and institutions as legitimate when those

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[2] The resistance to social change is theoretically distinct from the resistance to change (e.g., Oreg, 2003). Resistance to social change refers to the broader socio-political system, whereas the resistance to change refers to change within a person's own life. It is feasible for a person to refuse to change their own routines, but still advocate for changes to the over-arching political system. Nonetheless, these two constructs are likely related to some degree. For example, meta-analytic work suggests that political conservatism and the needs for order, structure, and closure are weakly related ($r = .30$), as are political conservatism and the openness to experience ($r = -.35$; Jost et al., 2003).

authorities and institutions support their values, beliefs, and goals (e.g, Skitka, Bauman,, & Lytle, 2009). Similarly, social systems that uphold a person's goals will be more likely to be legitimized by that person. This reasoning suggests that, in more equal social systems, people who reject inequality and are more egalitarian will be more likely to legitimize the social system because these more equal social systems uphold the goals of egalitarians.

The possibility of egalitarians legitimizing their social system is an effect predicted by the 2D-MOSL that is not predicted by current formulations of SJT and SDT. For example, SJT theorists argue that the acceptance of inequality (and other similar measures) is a legitimizing ideology and that people who score higher on this measure are more likely to support the status quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2005), but the 2D-MOSL suggests that in some contexts people who have low scores on this measure are the ones who are legitimizing the social system. Moreover, if SJT subsume SDT then one would predict that the resistance to social change, the dominate motive of SJT, would be a more powerful predictor compared to the acceptance of inequality. By the same logic, if SDT subsumes SJT then one would predict that the acceptance of inequality, the dominate motive of SDT, would be a more powerful predictor compared to the resistance to social change. By examining system-relevant motivations across a range of societies with different social structures it may be possible to tease apart the unique effects of the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality. This will form a more complete theory of the legitimacy of social systems that is better able to account for legitimization across a range of social contexts and social structures.

There are several purposes of the remainder of this paper: (1) I aim to demonstrate with the extant literature that the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change are unique dimensions. (2) In Studies 1, 2, and 3 I aim to demonstrate that both system-relevant

motivations predict system legitimacy even when taking their shared variance into account, but the relationship depends on whether or not the social system matches individuals' goals. (3) In the final study of the dissertation I explore a situation where the two system-relevant motivations may conflict and produce a psychological state I term "system ambivalence." In total, this manuscript will provide an initial basis for the 2D-MOSL.

The Acceptance of Inequality and the Resistance to Social Change as Unique Dimensions

The recent study of political ideology has been primarily characterized by a single dimension that spans from "liberal" or "left-wing" on one hand and "conservative" or "right-wing" on the other with the conservative side of the dimension firmly associated with both the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change (e.g., Jost et al., 2003; Jost, 2006; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). This perspective has effectively highlighted the predictive power of a unitary dimension; however, research on social attitudes and values has consistently found two dimensions (for a list of these works see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). These dimensions approximate a resistance to social change and an acceptance of inequality, dimensions used to simultaneously indicate a unitary dimension of political ideology by some researchers (e.g., Jost et al., 2003, 2007). However, multiple indicators of these two motivations have unique underlying traits (and by extension potentially different genetic and cultural bases, Kandler, Bleidorn, & Riemann, 2012) and predict unique dependent variables suggesting that by collapsing across multiple dimensions researchers may be obscuring theoretically and practically meaningful relationships. In the sections that follow I review research indicating that there are two dimensions of social and political attitudes from the values and political attitudes literature.

Two Dimensions of Values

One area of evidence for the independence of the two system-relevant motivations of the

2D-MOSL is the domain of values. "A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" and they often have a motivational component (Rokeach, 1973, p. 5), which makes values research especially relevant to the system-relevant motivations considered by the 2D-MOSL. Values tell us what we find to be important both for the self and for society at large. By examining dimensions of social values it is then possible to determine how people think about the important behaviors and outcomes for their society. The study of values in social psychology has converged on two primary dimensions of values that approximate the two system-relevant motivations proposed here.

Rokeach (1973) postulated that values of freedom and equality, especially, were the two primary values that served as the foundation and rationale for political ideologies. These two values also closely map on to the two system-relevant motivations. Equality is clearly a conceptual (though reversed) match with the acceptance of inequality. Freedom may be related to the resistance to social change, such that giving people the complete freedom to do as they please likely encourages attitudes and behaviors that could be out of step with socially normative conventions. Rokeach proposed that variation on these two values could effectively account for the differences between major modes of political thought. For example, Rokeach demonstrated that the writings of the top capitalist thinker at the time (Barry Goldwater) were characterized by low expressions of equality and high expressions of freedom. Communism, as represented by the writings of Lenin, was characterized by high equality and low freedom values. Fascism, as represented by the writings of Hitler, was characterized by low equality and low freedom values. Finally, socialism, as represented by the writings of several socialist thinkers, was characterized by high equality and high freedom values. These results show that four major modes of 20th

century political thought can be effectively characterized by the values of freedom and equality, values that map onto the resistance to social change and acceptance of inequality system-relevant motivations.

Building on the work of Rokeach, both Braithwaite (Braithwaite & Law, 1985) and Schwartz (1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990) developed theories and taxonomies of values that attempted to sample from a wider range of potential values. While these two approaches differ in meaningful ways, using large community samples in Australia (Braithwaite, 1997; Braithwaite & Law, 1985) and a variety of samples from all over the world (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1992) these two approaches converged on sets of values that can be described using two different dimensions that are related to the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality. Braithwaite (1997) describes her dimensions of social values as "security" and "harmony". Security values consist of specific values like "national strength and order," "getting ahead," and "propriety in dress and manners." Harmony values consist of specific values like "international harmony and equality," "positive orientation to others," and "secure and satisfying interpersonal relations." The content of these two value dimensions are also related to the two system motivations. Security values highlight the importance of preserving and maintaining the current state of affairs (i.e., resistance to social change) and harmony values highlight the importance of an equal and harmonious society (i.e., the conceptual opposite of the acceptance of inequality).

Similarly, Schwartz (1992, 1994) describes his dimensions as spanning the continua from "openness to change to conservation" and "self-enhancement to self-transcendence". The openness to change-conservation continuum is primarily represented by values such as tradition, conformity, and security and closely maps onto the resistance to social change dimension. The

self-enhancement-self-transcendence continuum is primarily represented by values such as universalism and benevolence and is associated with the acceptance of inequality.

In summary, across three independent research programs that made use of thousands of participants from all over the world there appear to be two primary dimensions of values. All three approaches reviewed here postulate additional values, but the important point is that these two overall dimensions explain a significant amount of variance among all of the values postulated to make-up the system of humans' social values. The near universal structure of human values may motivate individuals to adopt similar values and motivations for the social structure at large and suggests that there may be two distinct system-relevant motivations. Consistent with this possibility, the two dimensions of values are associated with two dimensions of social and political attitudes.

Two Dimensions of Political Attitudes

It is assumed that when a person holds a particular motivation they will more positively evaluate motivation-consistent attitudes (cf. Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). System-level motivations can also be evidenced in the support for social and political attitudes that help to fulfill one's goals. For example, Ashton and colleagues (2005) asked participants' opinions on a variety of political issues. Across several samples, factor analysis revealed two dimensions. The first was consistent with the resistance to social change and was labeled moral regulation at one end and individual freedom at the other. This dimension consisted of attitudes about abortion, prayer in public schools, the legalization of marijuana, and same-sex marriage. The second dimension of political attitudes was consistent with an opposition to equality and was labeled compassion at one end and competition at the other. This dimension consisted of attitudes about helping the poor and stigmatized minorities, as well as attitudes about the death penalty, defense

spending, and immigration. Moreover, these two dimensions were characterized by different underlying values, such that the compassion-competition attitude dimension was associated with Schwartz's self-enhancement-self-transcendence dimension (acceptance of inequality) and the moral regulation-individual freedom attitude dimension was associated with Schwartz's openness to change-conservation dimension (resistance to social change).

Other researchers have come to similar conclusions with vastly different sets of attitudes. Saucier (2000) sampled over 200 social attitudes and found several attitude dimensions, including one related to the resistance to social change and maintenance of the status quo ("alphaisms") and the other related to the acceptance and promotion of inequality ("betaisms"). The first dimension consisted of attitudes in support of tradition and religious belief. The second consisted of attitudes in support of fascism and ethnocentrism. As such, support of alphaisms was strongly related to religiosity, right-wing authoritarianism, and conservatism (resistance to social change). Betaisms, however, were strongly related to social dominance orientation and Machiavellianism (acceptance of inequality).

Duckitt (2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, 2010; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002) has proposed that right-wing authoritarianism (resistance to social change) and social dominance orientation (acceptance of inequality) represent two oft-studied, mostly independent, social and political ideologies that underlie individual differences in prejudice (see also Altemeyer, 1998; Roccato & Ricolfi, 2005; Stangor & Leary, 2006). While SDO has already been described, RWA is a set of attitudes that focuses on maintaining traditions and conforming to social norms (Altemeyer, 1996), consistent with the motivation to resist social change (see also, Jost et al., 2003).

Research on the underlying personality traits and motivations of right-wing

authoritarianism and social dominance attitudes suggests that the two system-relevant

motivations are not only different in content, but also fulfill different goals (for a review see

Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, 2010). As expected, RWA is predicted by perceptions of a dangerous

world, the tendency for social conformity, and the value of order and structure, whereas social

dominance is predicted by perceptions of a competitive world, power, and achievement

(Altemeyer, 1998; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991;

Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; McCann,

1999; Sales, 1972, 1973). This correlational evidence suggests that RWA, and by extension the

resistance to social change, is associated with goals related to conserving social traditions and

norms, as well as maintaining order and structure in society—all goals consistent with the

resistance to social change. SDO, and by extension the acceptance of inequality, however, is

primarily associated with goals that encourage inequality, such that perceiving the world as a

competitive place encourages the support for inequality because inequality justifies the

competition among social groups.

Although much of the work on the motivational and personality underpinnings of RWA

and SDO have been correlational, recent longitudinal studies have confirmed the temporal

precedence of personality and motivations in driving these two dimensions of social and political

attitudes. One study examined the role of openness to experience and agreeableness, two factors

from the Big-Five cluster of personality traits. Agreeableness is associated with tender-

mindedness, empathy, cooperation, and sympathy. Openness to experiences encompasses traits

like creativity, low cognitive rigidity, and ingenuity. Thus, low agreeableness is expected to

underlie SDO (acceptance of inequality and low openness to experience is expected to underlie

RWA (resistance to social change). Consistent with this expectation, low agreeableness predicts

increases in SDO (but not RWA) and low openness to experience predicts increases in RWA (but not SDO) over a one-year period (Sibley & Duckitt, 2010). Conceptually similar results were found over a five-month period that utilized measures of competitive and dangerous worldviews, such that competitive worldviews predicted increases in SDO (acceptance of inequality) and societal threat (i.e., dangerous worldviews) predicted increases in RWA (resistance to social change) (Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007).

Experimental research has suggested that situational primes of different goals can differentially affect SDO and RWA (and closely related constructs). Manipulations of self-threat (Sales & Friend, 1973) and societal threat (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Jugert & Duckitt, 2009) are both related to increases in authoritarianism (resistance to social change) and have much weaker effects on SDO (acceptance of inequality) (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). SDO, on the other hand, is affected by experimental manipulations of an individual's social status (Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003), the presence of competitive outgroups (Hunag & Liu, 2005), and the presence of realistic threats from outgroups (Morrison & Ybarra, 2008). Taken together, research on the cross-sectional personality and motivational correlates, the longitudinal personality and motivational predictors, and the experimental induction of competition and social threat provide firm evidence for the existence of two system-relevant-motivations. Moreover, these studies suggest that theories that postulate unitary system-relevant motivations, such as SDT and SJT, may be missing important motivations by focusing on just the acceptance of inequality or the resistance to social change. A complete theory of perceptions of system legitimacy requires a focus on both motivations. The 2D-MOSL fills this void.

Initial Evidence for the Two System-Relevant Motivations Effects on System Legitimacy

SDT and SJT have both identified two major avenues through which an unequal social system can maintain a sense of legitimacy: stereotyping and prejudice and the adoption of legitimizing ideologies. These methods of legitimization also map onto the two system-relevant motivations. Because the 2D-MOSL argues that the motivations to resist social change and accept inequality and distinct system-relevant motivations, the 2D-MOSL predicts that indicators of both motivations will have simultaneous and independent effects in these two domains. In contrast, both SJT and SDT would predict that the two motivations are part of the same dimension, such that one motivation would be a prominent predictor that obscured the effects of the other (i.e., reduce the effect of the other when entered into a regression equation at the same time).

Unique Forms of Prejudice

Stereotyping and prejudice have often been implicated in both the maintenance of the status quo *and* inequality (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Pratto, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). By derogating subordinate groups who threaten the status quo, people are able to maintain the perception of the system as just and legitimate. For example, Jost and Kay (Jost & Kay, 2005: Kay & Jost, 2003) find that complementary stereotypes about women and the poor lead people to see the current state of gender relations and the socio-economic system as fair and just. Others have found that many forms of prejudice, including modern manifestations of racism, are driven in part by an opposition to equality (Brandt & Reyna, 2012; Sidanius, Devereux, & Pratto, 1992; Sidanius, Levin, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1999) and are related to a variety of policies that contribute to the racial hierarchy (Brandt & Reyna, 2012; Rabinowitz, Sears, Sidanius, & Krosnick, 2009; Sears & Henry, 2003, 2005; Sears, van Larr,

Carrillo, & Kosterman, 1997; Sidanius, Devereux, & Pratto, 1992; Sidanius et al., 1999).

Because both system justification and social dominance theorists attempt to incorporate many of

the effects of the stereotyping and prejudice literatures into their models (Jost & Banaji, 1994;

Jost, Nosek, & Banaji, 2004; Pratto, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), research demonstrating that

prejudice can be the result of both of the system-relevant motivations is a particularly important

step in demonstrating the usefulness of the 2D-MOSL for conceptualizing and incorporating

SDT and SJT.

Recent research has identified three different dimensions of prejudice (Ashbrock, Sibley,

& Duckitt, 2010; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). The first dimension consists of groups who are

socially threatening, but not subordinate (e.g., terrorists, drug dealers). The second dimension

consists of groups who are subordinate, but not socially threatening (e.g., mentally handicapped,

obese, housewives). The third dimension consists of dissident groups who are both threatening

and subordinate (e.g., protestors, feminists). The two different system-relevant motivations are

expected to relate to prejudice in different ways. People who want to preserve the status quo and

social traditions (resistance to social change) should be particularly prejudiced towards groups

who are socially threatening. People who want to preserve inequality (acceptance of inequality)

should be particularly prejudice towards people who threaten the hierarchy or are particularly

low status. Finally, derogating those groups who are both threatening and subordinate (i.e.,

dissident groups) may serve the ends of both system-relevant motivations.

Consistent with this reasoning, Duckitt (2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007) found that RWA

(resistance to social change) best predicted prejudice towards status quo threatening outgroups

(rock stars, drug deals) and SDO (acceptance of inequality) best predicted prejudice towards low

status and competitive outgroups (physically disabled, housewives, unemployed). Both RWA

and SDO significantly predicted prejudice towards a group that was both competitive and socially deviant (feminists). Using a longitudinal model that spanned six months in time, Asbrock, Sibley, and Duckitt (2010) found conceptually equivalent results.

RWA (resistance to social change) and SDO (acceptance of inequality) can differentially predict prejudice of the same group depending on the salience of different aspects of the group and different motivational goals. For example, prejudice towards immigrants who refused to assimilate was best predicted by RWA (resistance to social change) because these immigrants threatened the social order; however, prejudice towards immigrants who assimilated was best predicted by SDO (acceptance of inequality) because this group was perceived as more competitive (Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008). RWA is particularly predictive of prejudice when characterizations of outgroups are manipulated to highlight the social threat of the outgroup (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009) or when a group's values compared to competitive group identity are made salient (Dru, 2007). Taken as a whole, this research suggests that for people who are especially concerned with resisting social change, some groups are especially threatening. By derogating these status quo-threatening groups, a person is able to help maintain the status quo and resist social change. Similarly, for people who are especially concerned with preserving and accepting inequality, low status and competitive groups are seen as threatening the hierarchy. By derogating these hierarchy-threatening groups a person is able to bolster and maintain inequality.

Unique Legitimizing Ideologies

One way people are thought to legitimize the social system and societal hierarchy is by adopting different ideologies that provide intellectual and moral support for the status quo and/or the hierarchy (e.g., Brandt, 2011; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Napier & Jost, 2008; Sidanius, Levin,

Federico, & Pratto, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). By adopting these attitudes people are able

to more easily perceive the system as just and fair, as well as justify the negative treatment of

low status groups and people who threaten the stability of the system. Many legitimizing

ideologies are likely to consist of a mixture of the legitimization of both the status quo

(resistance to social change) and inequality (acceptance of inequality), indicating that these

legitimizing ideologies serve the ends of both system-relevant motivations (cf. Brandt & Reyna,

2012). However, if there exist two unique system-relevant orientations, as the previous review

suggests, then it may be possible that some ideologies serve to primarily resist social change and

others serve to primarily to accept inequality, allowing people to endorse ideologies that match

their system-relevant concerns. This is contary to current formulations of SJT and SDT which

expect ideologies to either legitimize the status quo (SJT) or maintain/exacerbate inequality

(SDT).

Two ideologies that can be used to justify the gender status quo and hierarchy are

benevolent and hostile sexist ideologies (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001). Benevolent sexism takes a

positive but patronizing view of women, such that women are characterized as kind and caring,

but in need of a man for protection and romantic fulfillment. This ideology represents the

traditional view of women as complementing communal partners to men and endorsing it may

indicate a resistance to social change. Hostile sexism takes a negative view of women, portraying

them as a competitive group to male dominance who use their feminine wile or feminist ideology

to get what they want from men and endorsing it may indicate an acceptance (or even

preference) for inequality. As legitimizing ideologies, benevolent and hostile sexism can be

reinterpreted as ideologies that justify the gender status quo (benevolent sexism) or support

gender inequality (hostile sexism) because benevolent sexism promotes traditional views of

women and hostile sexism disparages women who dare challenge men's dominant social position.

Consistent with this reinterpretation, Sibley, Wilson, and Duckitt (2007) found that, meta-analytically, men's right-wing authoritarianism (resistance to social change) predicted benevolent sexism more strongly than hostile sexism and their social dominance orientation (acceptance of inequality) more strongly predicted hostile sexism than benevolent sexism. These researchers also found that the underlying personality traits and chronic motivational goals that underlie RWA and SDO (reviewed previously) predicted benevolent and hostile sexism in theoretically consistent ways. That is, social conformity and perceptions of a dangerous world were significant determinants of benevolent sexism. Tough-mindedness and a competitive worldview were significant determinants of hostile sexism. Further longitudinal analyses confirmed that RWA and SDO were causal antecedents to benevolent and hostile sexism, respectively. While this set of studies focused almost entirely on men, they provide some evidence that the two system-relevant motivations, and their expression in social and political ideologies (i.e., RWA and SDO), have the potential to lead to specific legitimizing ideologies that correspond to the two system-relevant orientations of the 2D-MOSL. Moreover, they question the unitary focus of SJT and SDT on just the resistance to social change or the acceptance of inequality, respectively.

<div align="center">Rationale</div>

SJT and SDT have both attempted to explain the persistence of inequality and injustice. I have proposed the 2D-MOSL that argues that both theories, despite explaining much of the same phenomenon, have different meta-theoretical foci. SDT puts an emphasis on the acceptance of inequality and SJT emphasizes a resistance to social change and the acceptance of the societal

status quo. These two foci are proposed to represent two distinct system-relevant motivations that contribute to system legitimacy. Previous research has demonstrated that values, attitudes, prejudice, and legitimizing ideologies all appear to exist on two different dimensions that are consistent with the two dimensions proposed here. However, evidence for both system-relevant motivations contributing to different forms of system legitimacy could only be inferred from studies on ideology and prejudice. If one accepts that stereotyping, prejudice, and ambivalent sexism contribute to the perpetuation of the status quo and inequality, as theorists and researchers have suggested (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005; Kay & Jost, 2003; Sidanius et al., 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), then these studies provide initial evidence for the 2D-MOSL and the unique effects of the two system-relevant motivations on system legitimacy.

However, it is not clear that the results reviewed above represent instances of system legitimization. Specifically, many of the studies examined the perceptions of ingroups regarding outgroups, meaning that many of the effects could be interpreted as group-level, rather than system-level concerns. For example, research by Duckitt and colleagues (Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010; Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007) on the three forms of prejudice primarily sample university students from the high status social group, such that any expressions of prejudice may be due to classic intergroup dynamics (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) rather than system-relevant motivations. Similarly, Sibley and colleagues' (Sibley et al., 2007) work on benevolent sexism uses male participants and the results do not appear to replicate with women. Simply put, prejudice is not legitimacy.

The purpose of the proposed set of studies is to demonstrate the unique and interactive effects of the two system-relevant motivations on direct perceptions of system legitimacy by both low and high status members of society and in nations around the world. By testing the two

system-relevant motivations and their relationship to system legitimacy, I aim to bridge SDT and SJT, as well as outline the dynamics of the motivational underpinnings of system legitimacy. The 2D-MOSL contributes to the social psychological study of legitimacy by predicting the social contexts where two system-relevant motivations will be associated with system legitimacy. By taking the study of legitimacy outside of the unequal social system of the United States it is possible to form a more nuanced theory of system legitimacy.

The Rationale of the Primary Predictions

There are two primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL that differentiate it from both SDT and SJT. The first considers unequal contexts, a type of context that much of the work on these two theories has focused on previously. In unequal contexts the 2D-MOSL predicts that both the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality will be predictive of system legitimacy. That is, even when using one motivation or the other as a covariate, the 2D-MOSL predicts that both will be significant positive predictors of legitimacy. This prediction is inconsistent with SJT and SDT. To the extent SJT and SDT theorists argue that their theories overlap one another, a simultaneous and independent association would not be expected because the shared variance between the two system relevant motivations would obscure the contribution of the other.

The second prediction argues that the inequality of any given context will moderate the association between the acceptance of inequality and legitimacy, but not the association between the resistance to social change and legitimacy. The amount of inequality in a social system varies quite a bit from system to system. Economists have developed various measures of income inequality that indicate the extent of the status disparities within a given region (e.g., Allison, 1978). For example, one measure, the Gini index, represents roughly the ratio of household

income held by the wealthiest portion of a region compared to the poorest portion of the region. The index can range from zero to 100, where zero indicates that incomes are distributed with perfect equality and 100 indicates that resources are distributed with perfect inequality – one household in a region has all of the income. No country falls at either of the extremes of the Gini index, but countries do show large amounts of variability on the measure. For example, Sweden and Hungry have the most equal distributions of income with the Gini index less than 25 in both countries, while South Africa and Nambia have the most unequal distributions of income with the Gini index greater than 64 in both countries (CIA World Factbook, 2011).

The variation in equality among countries should affect the acceptance of inequality's role in legitimizing the system. Specifically, in countries with greater inequality the acceptance of inequality will be a stronger positive predictor of system legitimacy than in countries with less inequality because the system in more unequal countries is providing outcomes that are more in line with the acceptance of inequality. It is predicted that societal inequality will have no moderating effect on resistance to social change predicting system legitimacy. This result would suggest that the resistance to social change is associated with the justification and legitimization of the system, any system, and that it needs not be equal or unequal.

The extremes of these predictions are illustrated in Figure 1. The horizontal axis represents the resistance to social change motivation and the vertical axis represents the acceptance of inequality motivation. The diagonal axes represent perceptions of system legitimacy. In unequal countries, system legitimacy is determined by a higher motivation to resist social change and a higher acceptance of inequality. In equal countries, system legitimacy is determined by a higher motivation to resist social change and a lower acceptance of inequality. This latter possibility for equal countries is unlikely to fully manifest in the "real world" because

no countries are equal and have at least some degree of inequality. Rather, the relationship

between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy will be positive in more unequal

countries and less positive (or have no association) in more equal countries. It is important to

note that in unequal societies the predictions made by the 2D-MOSL are similar (but not

identical) to the predictions made by SDT and SJT, but that the predictions for the more equal

societies are not easily incorporated into previous models that have not seriously considered the

role of societal context and are unique to the 2D-MOSL.

Figure 1

The predicted relationship between the acceptance of inequality, resistance to social change, and system legitimacy in unequal and equal countries.

<u>Statement of Hypotheses</u>

Many hypotheses can be derived from the 2D-MOSL. The first primary prediction

derived from the previous analysis is that *both system-relevant motivations will predict increased*

system legitimacy in unequal social systems because the outcomes of the system match the

motivational goals of people who accept inequality and perceiving the system as legitimate helps

to preserve the status quo and resist social change. This prediction is unique from SJT and SDT because it suggests that both motivations are at work, rather than just a single unity motivation.

The second primary prediction suggests that the acceptance of inequality will be moderated by the inequality of the status quo such that the acceptance of inequality will be positively associated with legitimacy in unequal contexts, but unrelated or negatively associated with legitimacy in more equal contexts. The resistance to social change, however, will be positively associated with legitimacy no matter the inequality of the social context. This particular prediction more firmly distinguishes the 2D-MOSL from previous perspectives that do not anticipate the possibility that egalitarians will legitimize the social system.

These two primary predictions will be tested in Studies 1 — 3. In Study 4 these primary hypotheses, but also an extension of the 2D-MOSL will be examined. Throughout secondary hypotheses designed to test the distinctiveness of the two system-relevant motivations will be introduced.

CHAPTER II

RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 1)

Study 1 starts with the primary hypotheses of the 2D-MOSL: The acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change will predict system legitimacy in unequal social systems, but that the acceptance of inequality will not be related (or negatively related) in equal social systems. This hypothesis is tested with representative data from 27 countries who are a part of the European Social Survey and objective measures of inequality in a particular country. This allows me to test the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL and people's *lived* experiences with inequality.

Statement of Study 1 Hypotheses

The preceding review and rationale suggests four specific hypotheses that will be tested in this first study. Hypothesis I represents the primary prediction of the model, whereas the other three hypotheses represent secondary predictions of the model.

Hypothesis I. Both the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality will be positively related to, and predict unique variance in, system legitimacy in unequal countries.

Hypothesis II. Societal inequality will increase the strength of the relationship between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy, but it is not expected to moderate the association between the resistance to social change and system legitimacy.

Thus, Study 1 will provide an initial test of two hypotheses derived from previous research and the 2D-MOSL. Both of these predictions distinguish the 2D-MOSL from SJT and SDT because the results consistent with both hypotheses will indicate that the two motivations are independent of one another.

CHAPTER III

METHOD (STUDY 1)

Participants and Procedure

Data from 71,674 participants (49.7% men, 50.3% women; *M* age = 47.2 years, *SD* = 17.2) who lived in the 27 countries who participated in the first through third waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) were analyzed. The European Social Survey (ESS) is a biennial survey of European countries that uses face-to-face interviews to obtain samples representative of the participating countries. The list of the countries and the sample size for each country is available in Table 3.

Measures

Primary Predictor Variables: Tradition and Equality Values. The measures of the two system motivations are part of a larger section of the survey designed to measure Schwartz's model of values (1992). The preamble for this section reads, "Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you." To measure the resistance to social change an item designed to measure traditionalism was used. This item is not a perfect measure of the resistance to social change; however, other researchers have used it to operationalize the resistance to social change (Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007). This item reads, "Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow the customs handed down by her/his religion or her/his family." To measure the acceptance of inequality, an item designed to measure support for equality was used (Thorisdottir et al., 2007). This item reads, "She/he thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. She/he believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life." These items are measured on a six-point scale from very much like me to not at all like me. Items were rescored

Table 3

Countries from the European Social Survey and their levels of income inequality and gender inequality.

	Country	Sample Size	Gini Index	Gender Inequality Index	Acceptance of Inequality b(SE)	Tradition b(SE)
1	Sweden	4039	23	0.212	-.17(.02)***	.02(.02)
2	Hungary	921	24.7	0.401	.04(.05)	.02(.05)
3	Norway	4560	25	0.234	-.07(.02)***	.01(.02)
4	Luxembourg	707	26	0.345	-.04(.06)	.09(.04)*
5	Austria	3361	26	0.3	-.01(.03)	.14(.02)***
6	Slovakia	1550	26	0.352	.03(.05)	.05(.04)
7	Czech Republic	2059	26	0.33	.07(.04)*	.07(.03)*
8	Finland	4439	26.8	0.248	-.08(.02)***	.06(.02)***
9	Germany	5916	27	0.24	-.004(.02)	.09(.02)***
10	Belgium	3822	28	0.236	-.02(.03)	.08(.02)***
11	Slovenia	2465	28.4	0.336	-.03(.04)	.05(.03)
12	Cyprus	661	29	0.284	-.13(.09)	-.15(.08)*
13	Denmark	3530	29	0.209	-.01(.02)	.06(.02)***
14	Ireland	1634	29.3	0.344	.04(.04)	.10(.03)***
15	Netherlands	4873	30.9	0.174	-.06(.02)**	.03(.02)
16	Italy	797	32	0.251	.04(.06)	.03(.05)
17	Spain	2557	32	0.28	.06(.03)*	.06(.02)*
18	France	2952	32.7	0.26	-01(.03)	.07(.02)***
19	Greece	2540	33	0.317	-.06(.05)	.10(.04)*
20	Bulgaria	669	33.5	0.412	.004(.06)	-.15(.07)*
21	Switzerland	4095	33.7	0.228	-.07(.02)**	.11(.02)***
22	United Kingdom	4170	34	0.369	-.11(.02)***	-.03(.02)
23	Poland	3522	34.9	0.325	.02(.03)	.04(.03)
24	Portugal	2283	38.5	0.303	.08(.03)***	.03(.03)
25	Israel	1463	39.2	0.332	.06(.04)	.004(.03)
26	Turkey	1161	41	0.585	.06(.06)	.11(.06)+
27	Russian Federation	928	42.2	0.465	.05(.05)	-.01(.05)

Note: Countries are ranked according to the Gini index. Acceptance of inequality and Tradition slopes (standard errors) are from multiple regression equations run in each country individually and including all of the demographic and control variables predicting system legitimacy. +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

so that higher scores indicated more acceptance of inequality and more support for tradition. See

Appendix A for the results of a pretest of these two items.

Societal-Level Predictor Variables: The Gini Index and Gender Inequality Index. To

measure societal-level inquality I used a measure commonly used by social psychologists and

other researchers to assess societal-level income inequality: the Gini index (Henry, 2009; Napier

& Jost, 2008). This index represents the ratio of household income held by the wealthiest portion

of a region compared to the portion held by the poorest portion of the region. The index can

range from zero to 100 with higher scores indicating higher levels of inequality. Values for this

measure are in Table 3 and were obtained from the CIA World Factbook (2011).

I also used a second measure of inequality, the gender inequality index, as reported by the

United Nations Human Development Report (2010). This measure of gender inequality is

composed of three major indicators of the disadvantage faced by women throughout the world.

The first component is labor market participation. The second component is empowerment and

consists of women's education attainment and parliamentary representation. The third

component is reproductive health. Higher numbers indicate greater gender inequality and the

values for this index can be found in Table 3.

Outcome Variable: System Legitimacy. In social psychological research there have been

three primary methods for assessing system legitimacy. One uses participants responses to

measures of prejudice, stereotyping, or legitimizing ideologies that the researchers assume

represent system legitimizing tendencies (Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005; Kay & Jost,

2003; Sidanius et al., 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The second uses scales that measure the

justification of the system in general or the economic or political systems (Kay & Jost, 2003; Jost

et al., 2010). These scales contain items such as "The main concern of our presidents has almost

always been the public good" and "The way the free market system operates in the United States

is fair" among many others. The third builds on the work of political philosophers and empirical

studies aimed at understanding the underpinnings of the legitimacy of authorities (Tyler, 2006).

From this perspective, measures of satisfaction with the system, trust in the system, the perceived

fairness of the system, and willingness to follow the orders of system leaders are used to index

system legitimacy (Tyler & Huo, 2002; van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2010). This latter approach

mimics the approach used in political science (e.g., Weatherford, 1992) and more directly

captures the essence of the system justification scales (cf. Jost et al., 2010).

Several items are available in the ESS that can be used to measure perceptions of system

legitimacy based on the third approach to measuring system legitimacy described above. These

items are similar in form and content to the items used by Tyler in his study of the trust and

legitimacy of the government and government agencies (Tyler & Huo, 2002) and recent work

from the perspective of system justification (van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2010). Three items

assess satisfaction with the nation's economy, the nation's government, and how democracy

works in the nation. The item measuring satisfaction with the economy reads, "On the whole

how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?" The item measuring

satisfaction with the nation's government reads, "Now thinking about the [country] government,

how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?" The item measuring satisfaction with

democracy in the country reads "And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way

democracy works in [country]?" These three items were all measured on an eleven-point scale

ranging from extremely dissatisfied to extremely satisfied. Three measures assessed trust in

important national political and legal institutions. The interviewer asked, "Please tell me on a

score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do

not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust." On this eleven-point scale,

participants indicated their trust in the country's parliament, the legal system, and the police.

These six items created a highly reliable scale ($\alpha = .85$).

Control Variables. Age, political affiliation, income, education, minority status, and

gender were included as control variables. Political affiliation is measured on an eleven-point

scale ranging from the politically left to the politically right and is included to rule out judgments

of the system based on partisan decision-making. Income in each country was measured on the

same twelve-point scale with ranges of incomes in Euros demarking each scale point. Education

was measured on a five-point scale ranging from less than secondary to higher tertiary education.

Gender (0 = women, 1 = men) and minority status (0 = member of minority, 1 = member of

majority) were measured with participants' self-reports.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS (STUDY 1)

The data for Study 1 exist at two levels of analysis: The individual level and the societal level. To analyze this multi-level data I estimated several multi-level models with MPlus version 6.11 using maximum likelihood estimation and robust standard errors (Muthen & Muthen, 2010). In all of the multi-level models, the individual level predictors and control variables were mean centered within each country because I am interested in the impact of the individual level predictors on the outcome variables (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). The societal-level predictors were also mean centered.

Preliminary ordinary least squares regression analyses were conducted in each individual country. System legitimacy was regressed onto the acceptance of inequality, tradition, the measures of social status, and the control variables in each country. The outcomes of these analyses can be found in the right most two columns of Table 3. As can be seen, tradition was consistently positively associated with system legitimacy. The results for the acceptance of inequality were more mixed. In several countries a greater acceptance of inequality was associated with less system legitimacy.

Hypothesis I

I predicted that both the acceptance of inequality and tradition would predict unique variance in system legitimacy. Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 test this prediction. With or without the inclusion of the measures of social status and control variables, the acceptance of inequality was not significantly associated with system legitimacy. Consistent with predictions more support for tradition was associated with higher levels of system legitimacy in both models with or without the control variables.

Table 4

Main effect and cross-level interaction models (Hypotheses 1 & 2) predicting system legitimacy in 27 societies.

	Model 1 b(SE)	Model 2 b(SE)	Model 3 b(SE)	Model 4 b(SE)
Level 1 Main Effects				
Inequality	-.01 (.02)	-.03(.02)+	-.01 (.01)	-.02 (.01)
Tradition	.05 (.01)***	.05 (.01)***	.06 (.01)***	.05 (.01)***
Education	--	.11 (.02)***	.11 (.02)***	.11 (.02)***
Income	--	.07 (.01)***	.07 (.01)***	.07 (.01)***
Minority	--	-.03 (.08)	-.03 (.08)	-.03 (.08)
Gender	--	.14 (.03)***	.14 (.03)***	.14 (.03)***
Age	--	.002 (.001)+	.002 (.001)+	.002 (.001)+
Ideology	--	.08 (.02)***	.08 (.02)***	.08 (.02)***
Level 2 Main Effects				
Gini Index	--	--	-.07 (.04)+	--
Gen. Inequality Index	--	--	--	-4.88 (3.11)
Cross Level Interactions				
Gini*Inequality	--	--	.01 (.003)*	--
Gini*Tradition	--	--	.003 (.004)	--
Gen. Inq.*Inequality	--	--	--	.44 (.13)***
Gen. Inq.*Tradition	--	--	--	.32 (.32)

Note: Inequality = the acceptance of inequality. Gen. Inq. = Gender Inequality Index. Minority was coded such that minority member = 0 and majority member = 1. Gender was coded so that women = 0 and men = 1. +$p<.10$, *$p<.05$, $p<.01$, $p<.001$.

<u>Hypothesis II</u>

The second hypothesis predicts that the association between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy will be positive in unequal countries and weaker (or even negative) in more equal countries. This hypothesis was tested using both the Gini index and the Gender Inequality Index in Models 3 and 4 of Table 4.

Consistent with my hypothesis, there was a significant cross-level interaction between the Gini index and the acceptance of inequality (Table 4, Model 3) and the Gender Inequality Index and the acceptance of inequality (Table 4, Model 4). The interactions were decomposed by reanalyzing the models at one standard deviation above and below the Gini index and Gender Inequality Index mean. Consistent with predictions, in unequal countries the acceptance of inequality was significantly (or marginally significantly) positively associated with system legitimacy (Gini index model: $b = .03$, $SE = .02$, $p = .09$; Gender Inequality Index model: $b = .03$, $SE = .02$, $p = .03$). In more equal countries, the acceptance of inequality was significantly negatively associated with system legitimacy (Gini index model: $b = -.04$, $SE = .02$, $p = .04$; Gender Inequality Index model: $b = -.04$, $SE = .02$, $p = .01$). Importantly, the measures of societal inequality did not significantly interact with tradition, suggesting that only the association between the system level motivation of the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy varies depending on the inequality of the status quo.

Additionally, consistent with the idea that legitimizing the system is in the best interest of people with high social status (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), people who had higher incomes, who were more educated, and male were more likely to legitimize the system compared to their lower income, less educated, and female counterparts. Consistent with the idea that right-wing ideologies are system justifying ideologies (Jost et al., 2003), people who identified with right-

wing ideology were more likely to legitimize the system than left-wing ideology.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION (STUDY 1)

The 2D-MOSL asserts that the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change are two independent system-relevant motivations. Building on this assertion, I developed two hypotheses that were tested with data from 27 different countries. The first hypothesis predicted that both the acceptance of inequality and tradition would predict unique variance in system legitimacy in unequal countries. Although tradition was consistently associated with system legitimacy, the acceptance of inequality was not a significant predictor (i.e. there was no main effect). Importantly, and consistent prediction that the inequality of the status quo matters, acceptance of inequality significantly interacted with the measures of societal inequality to predict legitimacy. Consistent with the 2D-MOSL, in unequal countries the acceptance of inequality was associated with more system legitimacy, but in more equal countries the acceptance of inequality was associated with *less* system legitimacy. That is, in more equal countries the acceptance of inequality was not a system legitimizing motivation, but rather it appeared to be a system *de*legitimizing motivation. These results provide support for the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL because both motivations were associated with legitimacy in unequal countries and the association for the acceptance of inequality differed predictably depending on the inequality of the status quo.

These results are consistent with the 2D-MOSL, but cannot be explained by current formulations of SJT and SDT, which predict a single unitary dimension. Thus, Study 1 found support for the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL in representative data from a variety of European countries. The second study is designed to further test the role of the societal status quo.

In the pretest for the first study another pattern of results emerged that provides support for the idea that the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality are distinct system-relevant motivations. Specifically, exploratory factor analysis revealed that two measures designed to measure the two system-relevant motivations loaded onto two separate factors. The factors were correlated, but this pattern of item loadings indicates that they are not identical motivations.

CHAPTER VI

RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES (STUDIES 2a and 2b)

The first study was designed to provide initial evidence for the theory from a large and diverse sample; however it is impossible to completely rule out motives of self-interest and there may be additional relevant values, social circumstance, and perceptions of the society that cannot be anticipated. Moreover, the measures used in the first study (e.g., tradition and inequality values) were adopted because they were close approximations of the constructs of interest.; however, more robust measures that more closely tap into the system-relevant motivations will be helpful in determining the robustness of the predictions made by the 2D-MOSL. Studies 2a and 2b are two conceptually similar studies that were designed to test the primary hypotheses and rationale of the 2D-MOSL.

Specifically, Study 2a aims to test the predictions that the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change will both positively predict legitimacy, but that the acceptance of inequality will be moderated by the inequality of the status quo. Study 2b aims to test the rationale for the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL. The 2D-MOSL argues that people who accept inequality legitimize social systems that match their goals, so that they see social systems as legitimate when they are unequal and illegitimate when they are equal. If this rationale is correct, then in social systems that more clearly represent the goals of people who resist social change, the resistance of social change should be associated with legitimacy, but in contexts that less clearly support the resistance to social change the resistance to social change should be less clearly related. This pattern of results suggests that people legitimize social systems that match their goals. This is an important point to demonstrate because it bolsters the rationale of the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL.

Studies 2a and 2b both use of a variation on the hypothetical society paradigm that has been used effectively by researchers interested in perceptions of social justice (Mitchell & Tetlock, 2009). This paradigm asks participants their impressions about a hypothetical society that is designed to represent various societal aspects of interest. For example, Mitchell and colleagues (Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordonez, 1993) manipulated the meritocracy, average income, and income inequality in hypothetical society scenarios in order to examine how people make trade-offs between overall income and inequality (see also Michelbach, Scott, Matland, & Bornstein, 2003; Mitchell & Tetlock, 2006; Mitchell, Tetlock, Newman, & Lerner, 2003; Scott, Matland, Michelbach, & Bornstein, 2001; for a review see Mitchell & Tetlock, 2009). When judging these hypothetical societies, participants are asked not to imagine themselves as a part of the society, but rather as an objective outside observer. In the current studies, participants will be asked to imagine they are a part of the society because both system justification and social dominance theories are explicitly concerned with people's perceptions of the societies and systems they are a part of. More importantly for my purposes, by using the hypothetical societies paradigm it is possible to experimentally design societies that vary on theoretically meaningful dimensions that do not rely on participants' subjective assessment of their own current circumstances or adequate variation among real societies.

In Study 2a the hypothetical society is manipulated to represent a society with either more or less unequal distribution of incomes. The average income in each society remains the same, but the variability in the wealth differs. This manipulation allowed me to conceptually replicate the interaction between societal inequality and the acceptance of inequality from Study 1 in an experimental context. If SJT and SDT theorists are correct in asserting that their theories subsume one another then we would not expect measures of the two motivations to (a) both

predict legitimacy when entered into the same equation that controls for their correlation and (b) the acceptance of inequality to interact differently with the status quo than the resistance to social change. Although both SJT and SDT do not predict these effects the 2D-MOSL does.

Study 2b is designed to test the underlying rationale of Study 2a. If people who accept inequality are legitimizing unequal social systems because they fulfill their system-relevant goals, then it should also be the case that societies that vary on a dimension of change should moderate the association between the resistance to social change and legitimacy. That is, it should be possible to manipulate a hypothetical society so that it is either a match or a mismatch for the goals of people who resist social change. Thus, in Study 2b the hypothetical society is manipulated to represent a society that either rarely, if ever, changes their social attitudes or one that has ever evolving social attitudes. After reading about one of these societies, participants in both Studies 2a and 2b are asked to judge the perceived legitimacy of the hypothetical society.

Statement of Study 2a Hypotheses

Hypothesis I. The acceptance of inequality will interact with societal inequality to predict system legitimacy. Specifically, the acceptance of inequality will predict increased system legitimacy in the more unequal society; however, in the less unequal society the acceptance of inequality will be a weaker predictor of increased system legitimacy and could potentially even predict decreases in perceptions of system legitimacy.

Hypothesis II. The resistance to social change will predict more legitimacy no matter the inequality present in the society.

Statement of Study 2b Hypotheses

Hypothesis III. Resistance to social change will predict increased system legitimacy in the rarely changing society and will more weakly or negatively predict system legitimacy in the

ever-changing society. The acceptance of inequality will play a less substantial role.

Thus, Studies 2a and 2b provide the opportunity to replicate several of the predictions of Study 1 in an experimental context, as well as expand the analysis to include societal variation in the resistance to social change.

CHAPTER VII

METHOD (STUDIES 2a AND 2b)

The experimental methods used in Studies 2a and 2b are largely similar and are described

together. Any deviations of one study from the other is explicitly mentioned.

Participants

Study 2a included 119 participants (46 men, 72 women, 1 no response; M age = 34.0, SD

= 11.95). The participants came from a variety of educational backgrounds (3 No degree earned,

35 High school degree, 18 Associated degree, 48 Bachelors degree, 11 Masters degree, 3

Doctoral degree). Study 2b included 104 participants (56 men, 45 women, 2 no response; *M* age

= 34.5, *SD* = 13.1). The participants came from a variety of educational backgrounds (2 No

degree earned, 35 High school degree, 20 Associated degree, 32 Bachelors degree, 13 Masters

degree, 1 Doctoral degree). In both samples, participants were recruited from Amazon.com's

Mechanical Turk service where people who are willing to complete short tasks (such as a survey)

for a small fee can find these short tasks (for a review of this method see e.g., Buhrmester,

Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, in press).

Procedure and Measures

Each participant completed measures of the resistance to social change and the

acceptance of inequality. The *resistance to social change* measure consists of the same 7-items

used in the Study 1 pretest (see Appendix A). The items were averaged together and created a

highly reliable scale in both studies (Study 2a α = .88, Study 2b α = .89). The *acceptance of*

inequality was measured with the 16-item social dominance orientation scale described in the

Study 1 pretest (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and it created a highly reliable scale

(Study 2a α = .94, Study 2b α = .92).

Participants in Study 2a were randomly assigned to read about a hypothetical society that was more or less unequal. In both societies the average income was $68,200; however the variability in the amount of wealth differed significantly. In the high inequality society the percentage of wealth owned by each wealth quintile was 0.1%, 0.2%, 4%, 11%, and 84%. Even though this wealth distribution is similar to the distribution in the United States, most Americans see this distribution as unequal (Norton & Airley, 2011). In the low inequality society the percentage of wealth owned by each wealth quintile was 10%, 15%, 18%, 21%, and 36%. The scenarios used Mitchell and colleagues, work on hypothetical societies and judgments of social justice were used to guide the creation of these societies (Mitchell et al., 1993, 2003). Next to each description of the society was a pie chart displaying the wealth distribution. The scenarios and accompanying pie chart can be found in Figure 2.

Participants in Study 2b were randomly assigned to read about a hypothetical society that was more or less likely to change their social attitudes. These scenarios and descriptions were designed specifically for this study and can be found in Figure 3. Next to each description is a figure displaying the amount of average social attitude change over the course of a decade compared to other societies. In the ever-changing society the average attitude change is well above the average society. In the rarely-changing society the average attitude change is well below the average society.

After reading about Country A, participants completed two items as manipulation checks on the perceived inequality and social change in Country A. These items read, "The society of Country A is unequal" and "The society of Country A is resistant to social change." The dependent variable is a five-item measure of the perceived legitimacy of the hypothetical society. Three items were adapted from Kay and Jost's (2003) measure of system justification. The items

Figure 2

Unequal (top panel) and equal (bottom panel) stimuli materials for Study 2a.

Country A

Country A is a self-governed society. The people of Country A come from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. There are a broad variety of unskilled, technical, and professional jobs within Country A and the average family income is $68,200.

Percentage of Total Wealth Owned by Each Wealth Quintile

0.1%
0.2%
4%
11%
84%

- 1st Quintile (Richest 20%)
- 2nd Quintile
- 3rd Quintile
- 4th Quintile
- 5th Quintile (Poorest 20%)

A recent census of Country A has shown that the richest 20% of people living in Country A own 84% of the wealth. The next richest 20% own 11% of the wealth and the rest of the society owns only 4.3% of the wealth. So, the richest 40% of the society owns 95% of the wealth and the poorest 60% of society own 4.3% of the wealth. Overall, Country A has a high degree of inequality and a growing economy.

Country A

Country A is a self-governed society. The people of Country A come from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. There are a broad variety of unskilled, technical, and professional jobs within Country A and the average family income is $68,200.

Percentage of Total Wealth Owned by Each Wealth Quintile

10%
15%
18%
21%
36%

- 1st Quintile (Richest 20%)
- 2nd Quintile
- 3rd Quintile
- 4th Quintile
- 5th Quintile (Poorest 20%)

A recent census of Country A has shown that the richest 20% of people living in Country A own 36% of the wealth. The next richest 20% own 21% of the wealth and the rest of the society owns 43% of the wealth. So, the richest 40% of the society owns 57% of the wealth and the poorest 60% of society own 43% of the wealth. Overall, Country A has a low degree of inequality and a growing economy.

Figure 3

Changing (top panel) and unchanging(bottom panel) stimuli for Study 2b.

Country A

Country A is a self-governed society. The people of Country A come from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. The people of Country A are forward thinking and open to new experiences. Although the social order and government in Country A are relatively stable, the people in Country A often re-examine their political, social, and religious values.

A recent analysis of survey responses from many societies throughout the world found that the people of Country A have ever changing social attitudes. Across the last six decades analysis of the survey data found that Country A averaged 49% change in social attitudes from the previous decade—significantly more attitude change than the typical society. Social scientists predict that this trend will continue for at least the next 30 years.

Country A

Country A is a self-governed society. The people of Country A come from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. The people of Country A are cautious and conventional. The social order and government in Country A are relatively stable and the people in Country A seek to maintain their traditional political, social, and religious values.

A recent analysis of survey responses from many societies throughout the world found that the people of Country A rarely change their social attitudes. Across the last six decades analysis of the survey data found that Country A averaged 5% change in social attitudes from the previous decade—significantly less attitude change than the typical society. Social scientists predict that this trend will continue for at least the next 30 years.

can be found in Table 9 and were measured on a seven-point scale with the labels disagree strongly, disagree moderately, disagree slightly, neither agree nor disagree, agree slightly, agree moderately, and agree strongly. Two additional items assessing how much participants want to live in the society and their confidence in the leaders of the society were also included. These seven items created highly reliable scales in both studies (Study 2a α = .95, Study 2b α = .88).

Table 5

Items measuring the legitimacy of Country A in Study 2

In general, you find the society of Country A to be fair.

In general, the Country A political system operates as it should.

The society of Country A needs to be radically restructured.

I would like to live in a society like Country A.

I have confidence that the leaders in Country A will make the right decisions.

Factor Analysis

Similar to the Study 1 pretest, factor analysis was used to further understand the measure of the resistance to social change. Principle axis factoring of the seven items revealed one factor that accounted for 53.68 percent of the variance. All items had loadings ranging from .57 to .83. A second principle axis factor analysis with oblimin rotation was run using items from both the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality scales to demonstrate that the resistance to social change is a separable construct from the acceptance of inequality. This analysis revealed three factors accounting for 42.77, 11.45, and 9.53 percent of the variance. The factor loadings from the pattern matrix are presented in Table 10. Consistent with work on the dimensionality of the social dominance orientation scale (e.g., Jost & Thompson, 2000), the first

two factors represent the pro-trait and con-trait items of the measure of the acceptance of

inequality (i.e., the social dominance orientation scale). The third factor contains all seven items

of the resistance to social change (loadings range from .54 to .86). Thus, the measure of the

resistance to social change appears to represent one factor that is distinct from the acceptance of

inequality. Correlational analyses revealed that, as would be expected in a relatively unequal

country like the United States, the measure of the resistance to social change was moderately

correlated with the acceptance of inequality (r[209]=.54, p<.001). These factor analyses further

demonstrate that the resistance to social change is a coherent construct that is independent

(though correlated) with the acceptance of inequality.

Table 6

Principle axis factor analysis with oblimin rotation reveals a three factor solution for the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change items.

	Factor 1 Acceptance of Inequality Con-Trait	Factor 2 Acceptance of Inequality Pro-Trait	Factor 3 Resistance to Social Change
Resistance to Social Change Items			
I would be reluctant to make any large-scale changes to the social order.	.157	-.054	**.625**
I generally consider social changes to be a negative thing.	.172	.015	**.627**
If I were to be informed that there's going to be significant societal changes, I would probably feel stressed.	-.044	-.052	**.827**
Societal changes seem like a real hassle to me.	-.070	.021	**.856**
Often, I feel a bit uncomfortable even about social changes that may potentially improve my life.	-.096	.120	**.787**
I tend to resist social change even if I think the change may ultimately benefit me.	-.018	.119	**.699**
Being virtuous and law-abiding is in the long run better for us than permanently challenging the foundation of our society.	.078	-.010	**.536**
Social Dominance Orientation Items			
Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.	.084	**.730**	.030
In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.	.012	**.628**	.057
It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.	.292	**.504**	-.049
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.	-.101	**.811**	-.049
If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.	-.064	**.829**	.126
It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.	.359	**.582**	.051
Inferior groups should stay in their place.	.114	**.810**	.040
Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.	-.017	**.815**	.086
It would be good if groups could be equal.	**-.771**	-.121	-.016
Group equality should be our ideal.	**-.927**	.080	-.022
All groups should be given an equal chance in life.	**-.602**	-.139	.063
We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.	**-.860**	.037	-.033
Increased social equality is beneficial to society.	**-.845**	-.042	-.069
We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.	**-.640**	-.226	.035
We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.	**-.729**	.202	-.157
No group should dominate in society.	**-.686**	-.128	-.072

CHAPTER VIII

RESULTS (STUDIES 2a AND 2b)

Study 2a

Study 2a: Manipulation Checks

The manipulation was successful. Participates perceived the unequal society as more

unequal ($M = 5.71$, $SD = 1.65$) than the equal society ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 1.73$), $t(117) = -7.32$, $p <$

.001. Participants also perceived the unequal society ($M = 5.03$, $SD = 1.34$) as more resistant to

change compared to the equal society ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 1.41$), $t(117) = -5.69$, $p < .001$. These

results were confirmed with a 2 (society: Equal vs. Unequal) X 2 (manipulation check measure:

unequal vs. resistant to social change) mixed ANOVA where the second factor was a within

subject variable. There were significant effects of condition, $F(1, 106) = 63.50$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 =$

.38, manipulation check, $F(1, 106) = 5.32$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$, and a condition X manipulation

check interaction, $F(1, 106) = 7.76$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. The significant interaction indicated that

although the equal society was seen as approximately equal in terms of inequality and the

resistance to social change ($p = .74$), the unequal society was seen as more unequal than it was

resistant to social change ($p < .001$).

Study 2a: Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis 1 predicts that the acceptance of inequality will be positively associated with

system legitimacy in the unequal society and unrelated (or potentially negatively related) in the

more equal society. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the resistance to social change will be positively

associated with system legitimacy no matter the inequality of the social system. To test these two

hypotheses, a 2 (society: Equal vs. Unequal) X continuous (resistance to social change) X

continuous (acceptance of inequality) general linear model was used to predict the perceived

legitimacy of the country. As predicted by hypothesis 2, the resistance to social change was positively associated with system legitimacy across both equal and unequal countries, $b = .24$, $SE = .12$, $F(1, 111) = 4.28$, $p = .04$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. There was also a significant main effect of the acceptance of inequality on system legitimacy, $b = .26$, $SE = .13$, $F(1, 111) = 3.97$, $p = .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, and a significant negative effect of condition (coded -1 = equal, 1 = unequal), $b = -.78$, $SE = .13$, $F(1, 111) = 38.39$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .26$, indicating that across participants, people tended to perceive the more equal society as more legitimate.

These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between the experimental condition and the acceptance of inequality, $F(1, 111) = 16.52$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$ (see Figure 4). In the equal country there was a nonsignificant negative association between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy, $b = -.27$, $SE = .21$, $F(1, 111) = 1.70$, $p = .20$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. In the unequal country there was a significant positive association between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy, $b = .78$, $SE = .16$, $F(1, 111) = 24.99$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .18$. These results suggest that when the structure of society matches the goals of people who oppose equality they will be more likely to perceive the society as legitimate, but that when the society does not clearly match these goals there is no consistent association between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy. No other interactions were significant (all $p's > .19$).[3]

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[3] Because the experimental condition affected the *perceived* resistance to social change of the society (the manipulation check), identical analyses were conducted controlling for the resistance to social change manipulation check item. The results are primarily identical to those reported here, although the main effect of the acceptance of inequality becomes marginal ($p = .10$).

Figure 4. *The acceptance of inequality (AOI) only predicts system legitimacy in an unequal society.*

Study 2b

Study 2b: Manipulation Checks

The manipulation was successful. Participants saw the changing society ($M = 2.13$, $SD = 1.41$) as less resistant to change than the unchanging society ($M = 5.51$, $SD = 1.50$), $t(101) = -11.97$, $p < .001$. The two societies were perceived as equally unequal (changing: $M = 3.27$, $SD = 1.59$; unchanging: $M = 3.54$, $SD = 1.60$), $t(100) = -.87$, $p = .39$. These results were confirmed with a 2 (society: changing vs. unchanging) X 2 (manipulation check: unequal vs. resistant to social change) mixed ANOVA where the second factor was a within subject variable. There were significant effects of condition, $F(1, 100) = 56.33$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .36$, manipulation check, $F(1, 100) = 5.04$, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$, and a condition X manipulation check interaction, $F(1, 100) = 69.94$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .41$. The significant interaction indicated that the changing society was seen as less resistant to change than it was unequal ($p < .001$) and the unchanging society was seen as more resistant to social change than it was unequal ($p < .001$).

Study 2b: Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis 3 suggested that the resistance to social change would be positively related to system legitimacy in the unchanging society, but unrelated (or negatively related) in the changing society. To test this hypothesis, a 2 (society: Changing vs. Unchanging) X continuous (resistance to social change) X continuous (acceptance of inequality) general linear model was used to predict the perceived legitimacy of the country. There was a significant positive main effect of the resistance to social change, $b = .24$, $SE = .10$, $F(1, 95) = 6.25$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. Consistent with hypothesis 3, this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between the resistance to social change and the experimental condition, $F(1, 95) = 4.97$, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$ (see Figure 5). In changing societies, there was no association between the resistance to social change and legitimacy, $b = .03$, $SE = .13$, $F(1, 95) = .04$, $p = .84$, $\eta_p^2 = .0004$; however, in unchanging societies there was a robust and positive association between the resistance to social change and legitimacy, $b = .45$, $SE = .14$, $F(1, 95) = 11.05$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .10$. In sum, when society is seen as stable, unchanging, and in line with the goals of people who resist social change, the resistance to social change positively predicts system legitimacy. However, when these goals are not met there is not a relationship between the resistance to social change and legitimacy.

There was also a significant interaction between the acceptance of inequality and the experimental condition, $F(1, 95) = 6.08$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$ (see Figure 6). In changing societies there was no significant association between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy, $b = -.22$, $SE = .16$, $F(1, 95) = 1.80$, $p = .18$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$; however, in unchanging societies there was a significant and positive association between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy, $b = .33$, $SE = .15$, $F(1, 95) = 4.78$, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. All other main effects and

interactions were not significant (all p's > .30).

Figure 5. *The resistance to social change (RSC) only predicts system legitimacy in unchanging societies*.

Figure 6. *The effect acceptance of inequality (AOI) on system legitimacy reverses in changing and unchanging societies*.

CHAPTER IX

DISCUSSION (STUDIES 2a AND 2b)

When a society matches the system-relevant motivations of an individual, the individual perceives the society as more legitimate. In Study 2a, participants who were more accepting and supportive of unequal group relationships perceived the unequal social system as more legitimate than people who opposed inequality and expressed more egalitarian attitudes. In more equal societies there was no association between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy. In fact, the association trended in the opposite direction, consistent with the cross-societal results of Study 1. In Study 2b, participants who were more resistant to social change perceived the unchanging society as more legitimate than participants who were less resistant to social change. In the changing society condition, there was no association between the resistance to social change and legitimacy. These effects were found even though the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality were both entered into the same models predicting system legitimacy which indicates that these two system-relevant motivations, although correlated, affect system legitimacy independently.

The results from these two studies provide important evidence for the 2D-MOSL. First, in Study 2a, both system-relevant motivations predicted legitimacy in the unequal social context, but only the resistance to social change predicted legitimacy in the more equal context. Second, the results of Study 2b, provide evidence for the rationale underlying the predicted acceptance of inequality X societal status quo interaction. Specifically, the results of Study 2b suggest that people will see social systems that match their system-relevant goals as legitimate. One way to succinctly summarize the results from Studies 2a and 2b is "context matters."

There was one unexpected result in Study 2b. In the unchanging society condition there

was a positive association between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy. There are several possibilities for this unexpected result. One explanation could be that some people accept inequality because they believe that inequality and hierarchy create a stable and efficient social system--i.e., they have a lay theory of the "functional nature of hierarchy" (for social psychological accounts of this idea see e.g., Halevy, Chou, & Galinsky, 2012). The stability and efficiency of hierarchy may not be captured in the measure of the resistance to social change, which explains why the unexpected interaction appears even while controlling for the resistance to social change. It could also be that people are using stability as a heuristic for inequality, even though they do not express this idea explicitly (i.e., on the manipulation checks). Future work will be necessary to see if this anomalous pattern of results replicates and to tease apart potential explanations for the effect.

In sum, both Studies 2a and 2b provide further support for the 2D-MOSL. People legitimized social systems that matched their system-relevant goals. Importantly, in the unequal condition the results replicated past research from SJT and SDT, but in the more equal contexts the effects disappeared and nearly reversed, a pattern of results that was also observe in the first study. The resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality are both associated with legitimacy in more unequal countries, but the effect of the acceptance of inequality disappears in more equal countries. By taking into account a more diverse set of societies with different societal characteristics it may be possible to derive a more complex, and more accurate, model of system legitimacy.

CHAPTER X

RATIONAL AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 3)

The first two studies provide support from the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL; however, neither study is completely experimental. That is, in both studies unanticipated third variables may be able to account for the effects. Thus, the purpose of Study 3 is to test the distinct predictive power of the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality, as well as the expected interaction between the acceptance of inequality and the societal status quo with a fully experimental design.

I attempted to manipulate the resistance to social change with a manipulation of system-threat. Researchers use this manipulation (and similar others) to induce several different manifestations of the resistance to system change (Banfield et al., 2009; Jost et al., 2005; Kay et al., 2009; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005; Lau, Kay, & Spencer, 2008) and right-wing authoritarianism (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Jugert & Duckitt, 2009).

In addition, I attempted to manipulate the acceptance of inequality with a manipulation of a competitive worldview. Duckitt (2001; Duckitt et al., 2002; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007a, 2007b) and his colleagues have repeatedly demonstrated that the perception of the world as a competitive place is a key underlying component to the acceptance of inequality; however, this has never been manipulated. Past manipulations of social dominance orientation focus on manipulating the salience of competitive or threatening intergroup relationships (Hunag & Liu, 2005; Morrison & Ybarra, 2008) or the social status of participants (Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003). While these studies are important because they demonstrate that the acceptance of inequality is potentially malleable, they primarily focus on specific intergroup relations rather than the features of the social system.

Thus, the manipulation of the acceptance of inequality via a manipulation of societal competition has the potential to be a methodological advancement.

Finally, the inequality of the status quo was manipulated by varying the extent of racial inequality. Participants will be exposed to one of two sets of information about racial disparities in unemployment. To maintain believability, both sets of information will communicate racial disparities; however, one set of information will convey greater disparities than the other. Consistent with primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL, I expect that the resistance to social change will predict legitimacy no matter the inequality of the status quo, whereas the acceptance of inequality will predict legitimacy in the unequal context, but will be less predictive (or negatively) predictive in the more equal context. This pattern of results would replicate the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL that were demonstrate in the first two studies.

As an additional attempt to distinguish the two system relevant motivations I also included measures of racial intolerance. Recent research has found that people who are motivated to justify the system (i.e., resist social change) will adopt attitudes and beliefs that are consistent with the status quo (Kay et al., 2009). For example, when told that there are large gender disparities, participants reported more sexism because sexist attitudes help to justify the current social system. Other research over the last two decades has demonstrated that the acceptance of inequality is related to racism (see e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In the 2D-MOSL I aim to put these two effects together by predicting that the association between the resistance to social change and racial intolerance will depend on the status quo (a replicate of Kay et al., 1999), but that the acceptance of inequality will predict racial intolerance no matter the inequality of the status quo. If the two system motivations were identical then both motivations should be similarly affected by the societal context. For example, if the acceptance of inequality

was a system justifying motivation than its association with racial intolerance should change depending on the context. However, if it is distinct from the resistance to social change, it should not necessarily interact with the inequality of the societal context.

<center>Statement of Study 3 Hypotheses</center>

<u>Hypothesis I</u>: There will be an interaction between the resistance to social change and the inequality of the status quo when predicting racial attitudes, such that people who are resistant to social change will have equivalent racial attitudes. People who are motivated to resist social change, however, will be affected by the inequality of the status quo, such that they will be more likely to be racially tolerant when the status quo has smaller racial disparities and less likely to be racially tolerant when the status quo has larger racial disparities.

<u>Hypothesis II</u>: There will be a main effect of the acceptance of inequality, such that the acceptance of inequality will lead people to be less racially tolerant.

<u>Hypotheses III</u>: There will be an interaction between the acceptance of inequality and the inequality of the status quo. Participants accepting of inequality will see the system as more legitimate when the status quo is unequal compared to participants who are not accepting of inequality. Participants accepting of inequality will see the system as either equivalent in legitimacy or less legitimate when the status quo is equal compared to participants who are not accepting of inequality.

<u>Hypothesis IV</u>: The relationship between the resistance to social change and the legitimacy of the system will not be affected by the inequality of the status quo. Instead, there will be a main effect of the resistance to social change such that the resistance to social change will lead people to see the social system as more legitimate.

CHAPTER XI

METHOD (STUDY 3)

Participants

Two hundred and twenty two participants (81 men, 170 women, *M* age = 20.2, *SD* = 2.7) were recruited from DePaul University's introduction to psychology subject pool and received partial course credit for their participation.

Procedure and Measures

As a manipulation of societal and system threat, participants were randomly assigned to the high or low system threat condition based on the system threat manipulation originally developed by Kay, Jost, and Young (2005).[4] Participants were asked to read an excerpt from a larger article ostensibly written by a foreign journalist. The high system threat condition contains quotes such as "the country has reached a low point." The low system threat condition contains quotes such as "people in the United States feel safer and more secure relative to the past." Past work with this manipulation demonstrates that it is distinct from state self-esteem (Heatheron & Polivy, 1991) and collective self-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).

The manipulation of competition is adapted from research testing the role of competition on the formation of stereotypes related to warmth and competence (Caprariello, Cuddy, & Fiske, 2009). In this research, the researchers described an incoming social group in competitive or cooperative terms. In my manipulation of competition I used similar wording to describe the

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[4] In addition to the changes to the manipulation to induce system competition, one other edit was made to the original manipulation. The original high system threat manipulation included the sentence, "It seems that many countries in the world are enjoying better social, economic, and political conditions than the U.S. More and more Americans express a willingness to leave the United States and emigrate to other nations." The original low system threat manipulation included the following sentence, " It seems that compared with many countries in teh world the social, economic, and political conditions in the U.S. are relatively good. Very few Americans express a willingness to leave the United States and emigrate to other nations" These sentences were removed because they appeared to manipulate between-system competition that could potentially obscure the manipulation of system competition that was designed for this study and intended to be orthogonal to system threat.

group relationships in the society at a more abstract level rather than focusing on specific social groups. The following sentence was integrated into the high and low system threat manipulations to manipulate high competition: "Because of these social, economic, and political [threats / successes], groups within the United States compete and take more power and resources from one another." The following sentence was used to indicate cooperation: "Because of these social, economic, and political [threats / successes], groups within the United States work together and share power and resources with each other." The complete wording of the manipulations, including the integration into the system threat manipulations can be found in Appendix B.

Following the manipulation, participants completed measures of the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality to check if the manipulations independently manipulated each of the system level motivations. These measures are the same as those used in Study 2 and both had high reliabilities (resistance to social change $\alpha = .79$; acceptance of inequality $\alpha = .92$). Similar to the previous studies, these two measures were modestly and significantly correlated ($r = .50$, $p < .001$).

Next, to manipulate the status quo, participants were asked to read one of two sets of information describing the state of racial disparities in unemployment ostensibly gathered from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. One set of information, the large disparity condition, depicted the racial disparity as more than double, that is, Black Americans had twice the unemployment rate as White Americans (see Figure 7). It should be noted that this racial disparity is close to the actual racial disparity in unemployment. In the smaller disparities condition, the disparity was depicted as a difference of one percentage point (see Figure 8). Participants were encouraged to take their time to fully understand the material. Following this information, participants completed three manipulation check items by indicating their

Figure 7

Materials for the racial inequality is the status quo condition.

Unemployment Rate for Black and White Americans[1]

In the first six months of 2011 the unemployment rate for White Americans ranged from 6.9% to 7.1%, two percentage points below the national average. During the same period, the unemployment rate for Black Americans ranged from 15.2% to 16.3%, more than twice the unemployment rate of White Americans and a full six percentage points above the national average.

[1] Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

agreement with the following three statements: "Based on the information, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics the unemployment rate for Black Americans is significantly higher than the unemployment rate for White Americans," "In the United States, Black Americans and White Americans are equally likely to be employed," and "Blacks and Whites have equal opportunities to obtain employment." Participants responded on a seven point scale with the labels disagree strongly, disagree moderately, disagree slightly, neither agree nor disagree, agree slightly, agree moderately, agree strongly. Responses were coded so that higher levels of

Figure 8

Materials for the racial equality is the status quo condition.

Unemployment Rate for Black and White Americans[1]

In the first six months of 2011 the unemployment rate for White Americans ranged from 7.9% to 8.1%, just a percentage point below the national average. During the same period, the unemployment rate for Black Americans ranged from 8.8% to 9.2%, just one percentage point higher than White Americans and consistent with the national average.

[1] Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

agreement indicated the perception of more racial equality and then averaged together to form a scale. The first item of the scale significantly decreased the scales reliability and so it was analyzed separately. The last two items were used to form a scale ($r = .55$, $p < .001$).

Several items were used as dependent measures. The first two items that measured racial employment tolerance read "In general, Blacks and Whites should have equal opportunities to obtain employment" and "In general, Blacks and Whites should be given equal consideration when applying for an employment position." These items were assessed on a seven-point scale

with the labels disagree strongly, disagree moderately, disagree slightly, neither agree nor

disagree, agree slightly, agree moderately, agree strongly. The items were coded so that higher

scores indicated greater racial employment tolerance and were averaged together to form a scale

($r = .72, p < .001$). The next eight items were from the Symbolic Racism 2000 scale (Henry &

Sears, 2002); a construct that measures attitudes towards Black Americans organized around four

specific themes:

> "(1) 'work ethic and responsibility for outcomes,' the sense that blacks' failure to
>
> progress results from their unwillingness to work hard enough; (2) 'excessive
>
> demands,' the sense that blacks are demanding too much; (3) 'denial of
>
> continuing racial discrimination,' the belief that blacks no longer face much
>
> prejudice in society today; and (4) 'undeserved advantage,' the sense that blacks
>
> have gotten more than they deserve" (Henry & Sears, 2002, p. 256).

The eight items from this scale can be found in Table 11. One item from the symbolic racism

scale, ("Some say that black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they

haven't pushed fast enough. What do you think?") was weakly and negatively correlated with

the rest of the items from this scale and so it was not included with the rest of the scale. The

remaining items were coded so that higher scores indicated higher levels of symbolic racism.

These items were standardized and averaged together to form a reliable scale ($\alpha = .84$). The

measure of racial employment tolerance and symbolic racism were weakly correlated (r [235] = -

.28, $p < .001$).

To measure system legitimacy, several items from Jost's economic system justification

scale and general system justification scale were used (Kay & Jost, 2003; Jost et al., 2010; Jost &

Thompson, 2000). The economic system justification scale is designed to measure the perceived

Table 7

Items from the Symbolic Racism scale (Henry & Sears, 2002)

It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. (1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly)

Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same. (1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly)

Some say that black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they haven't pushed fast enough. What do you think? (1 trying to push very much too fast, 2 going too slowly, 3 moving at about the right speed)

How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think blacks are responsible for creating? (1 all of it to 4 not much at all)

How much discrimination against blacks do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting their chances to get ahead? (1 a lot to 4 none at all)

Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly)

Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly)

Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve. (1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly)

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legitimacy of the American economic system. I did not include items that specifically referenced

capitalism or other economic systems broadly (e.g., "No matter how much people try to stop it,

there will always be widespread business corruption under Capitalism." reverse scored),

choosing instead to just focus on the items assessing the legitimacy of the United States

economic system. Similarly, I did not include items that provided reasons and justifications for

the inequality in the American economic system (e.g., "If incomes were more equal, nothing

would motivate people to work hard.) choosing instead to focus exclusively on legitimacy (and

not justifications). A total of eight items were retained. An example item from the final set of items is, "The way the free market system operates in the United States is fair" (see items in Table 12). After reverse scoring the appropriate items, the items were averaged together to form a reliable scale (α = .83). An additional eight items from the general system justification scale were used. These items measure the perceive legitimacy of the American "system" more broadly, focusing on the social, economic, and political arenas. The items are in Table 13. After reverse scoring the appropriate items they were averaged together to form a reliable scale (α = .82). All items in both scales were measured on seven point scales ranging from 1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly.

Table 8

Items from the Economic System Justification scale (Jost & Thompson, 2000)

The way the free market system operates in the United States is fair.

The American economic system is set up so that everyone is born with the same chance to succeed.

The rules of our economic system only encourage greed and immorality.

Radical changes are needed to turn our economic system into a fair one.

There is no country in the world where economic opportunities are better than in the United States.

The American economic system unfairly increases the gap between rich and poor.

We should be embarrassed by the high rates of poverty in America.

Only a grand-scale economic revolution could create a better, more just distribution of resources in society.

Table 9

Items from the General System Justification scale (Kay & Jost, 2003)

In general, you find society to be fair.

In general, the American political system operates as it should.

American society needs to be radically restructured.

The United States is the best country in the world to live in.

Most policies serve the greater good.

Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness.

Our society is getting worse every year.

Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve.

CHAPTER XII

RESULTS (STUDY 3)

Manipulation Checks

A 2 (Competition vs. Cooperation) X 2 (High vs. Low System Threat) general linear

model was used to predict both the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality

measures. Across these analyses there were no significant main effects or interactions on either

of the measures (all F's < 1.73, all p's > .18, all η_p^2's < .008, see Figure 9), indicating that the

manipulation of system threat and system competition did not affect the resistance to social

change and the acceptance to inequality as anticipated. Thus, for the rest of the analyses in this

study I will collapse across the experimental conditions and use the measured resistance to social

change and the acceptance of inequality scales as my primary independent variables.

For both the single item inequality manipulation check measure (Unequal: $M = 6.36$, SD

$= 1.22$, Equal: $M = 3.82$, $SD = 2.05$, $t(248) = 11.79$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.50$) and the two item

manipulation check scale (Unequal: $M = 5.30$, $SD = 1.45$, Equal: $M = 4.82$, $SD = 1.44$, $t(248) =$

2.62, $p = .009$, $d = .32$) participants perceived more racial disparities in the unequal compared to

the more equal conditions. It is interesting to note that even in the Equal condition the responses

were near the midpoint of the scale indicating that regardless of condition participants perceived

some level of inequality.

Testing Hypothesis I and II

Hypothesis I predicts that the resistance to social change will be moderated by the

inequality of the status quo when predicting racial attitudes because expressing racial intolerance

can serve to bolster and provide justifications for a racially unequal status quo, whereas

expressing racial tolerance can serve to bolster and provide justifications for a more racially

Figure 9.

The effects of the manipulations of competition and system threat on the resistance to social change (top panel) and the acceptance of inequality (bottom panel).

equal status quo (Kay et al., 2009). Hypothesis II predicts a main effect of the acceptance of

inequality because people who accept inequality and have social dominance motives are more

likely to be prejudiced towards low status groups no matter the state of inequality (e.g., Duckitt,

2006). To test these two hypotheses I used a continuous (resistance to social change) X

continuous (acceptance of inequality) X 2 (unequal vs. equal status quo) general linear model predicting the measure of racial tolerance and the symbolic racism scale. I expected that the results would be analogous across measures.

When predicting racial employment tolerance there was only one significant effect. The acceptance of inequality negatively predicted racial employment tolerance ($b = -.42$, $SE = .07$, $F[1, 220] = 36.40$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .14$), consistent with the second hypothesis. There were no other significant main effects or interactions (all F's < 1.19, all p's $> .27$, all η_p^2's $< .005$). When predicting symbolic racism there was a significant main effect for the resistance to social change ($b = .12$, $SE = .05$, $F[1, 211] = 5.68$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$), such that people who resisted social change were more likely to score high on the symbolic racism measure. There was also a main effect of the acceptance of inequality ($b = .31$, $SE = .05$, $F[1, 211] = 48.19$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .19$), such that people who accepted inequality were more likely to be symbolic racists. Again, this latter effect is consistent with the second hypothesis There were no other main effects or interactions (all F's < 1.13, all p's $> .28$, all η_p^2's $< .005$). These results provide consistent support for Hypothesis II, but no support for Hypothesis I.

Testing Hypothesis III and IV

Hypothesis III predicts an interaction between the acceptance of inequality and the manipulation of inequality when predicting legitimacy, such that the acceptance of inequality will be positively associated with legitimacy in unequal contexts, but negatively or unrelated with legitimacy is more equal contexts. This hypothesis is conceptually similar to the findings for the acceptance of inequality in Studies 1 and 2a. Hypothesis IV predicts a main effect for the resistance to social change on the legitimacy of the social system no matter the inequality of the particular context.

To test Hypotheses III and IV I used a continuous (resistance to social change) X continuous (acceptance of inequality) X 2 (unequal vs. equal status quo) general linear model predicting the two measures of legitimacy. When predicting economic legitimacy there were significant main effects of the resistance to social change ($b = .37$, $SE = .08$, $F[1, 218] = 23.84$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .10$) and the acceptance of inequality ($b = .22$, $SE = .07$, $F[1, 218] = 9.41$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$). People who were more resistant to change and who were more accepting of inequality were more likely to see the economic system as legitimate. There were, however, no other significant main effects or interactions (all F's < 1.90, all p's $> .17$, all η_p^2's $< .009$). Nearly identical results were obtained when predicting the measure of generalized legitimization of the social system. There were significant main effects of the resistance to social change ($b = .39$, $SE = .08$, $F[1, 216] = 26.58$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .11$) and the acceptance of inequality ($b = .21$, $SE = .07$, $F[1, 216] = 9.28$, $p = .003$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$). People who were more resistant to change and who were more accepting of inequality were more likely to see the economic system as legitimate. There were, however, no other significant main effects or interactions (all F's $< .29$, all p's $> .59$, all η_p^2's $< .001$). These results provide support consistent with Hypothesis IV, but not with Hypothesis III.

Previously, I noted that even in the unequal experimental condition people perceived some level of inequality (the manipulation checks were near the midpoint of the scale). If people in both conditions primarily perceived society as unequal than the legitimacy results are consistent with the primary prediction of the 2D-MOSL: The acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change will simultaneously and independently predict legitimacy in unequal social systems. Depending on how one interprets the manipulation checks, the result of the previous paragraph provide support for this primary prediction of the 2D-MOSL across two

different measures of legitimacy.

<u>Additional Analyses</u>

Across the analyses of the data from Study 3 thus far there has been clear support for both Hypothesis II and IV. There has not, however, been any support for the first and third hypothesis. It appears that despite the demonstration that the status quo manipulation had an effect on the participants' perceptions of racial inequality it did not result in changes in participants' racial attitudes and perceptions of legitimacy. To further explore this set of data I conducted several additional analyses. First, I replicate the above analyses using just White participants. Although it would be ideal to test my hypotheses with people of other ethnic backgrounds as well, no other ethnic category was well represented in the sample. The largest was Latino/a and only 34 participants (or 13.5% of the sample) fell into this grouping. Only 12 participants identified themselves as African American/Black. Analyses only using White participants resulted in the *exact same* pattern of main effects and (non-significant) interactions for all of the dependent variables as did the analyses using the entire sample.

I also attempted the same basic analyses, but instead of using the manipulation of racial inequality, I used the one-item manipulation check of racial inequality and then repeated the analyses using the two item manipulation check scale. Using the one item manipulation check, the analyses revealed the same exact pattern of main effects and (non-significant) interactions. The two-item manipulation check scale did reveal several different patterns of results for the measure of symbolic racism and the legitimacy of the economic system (the results for racial employment tolerance and general legitimacy of the social system were identical to the results already presented). In the analyses that follow all interactions are probed at $\pm 1SD$ of the mean for the measure of interest. "Perceptions of inequality" refer to the two-item manipulation check

scale.

When predicting symbolic racism there was a significant main effect of the acceptance of inequality (F[1, 211] = 41.72, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .17$) which is consistent with the second hypothesis. There was also a significant main effect of perceptions of inequality (F[1, 211] = 14.35, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$). There was a significant two-way interaction between the resistance to social change and perceptions of inequality (F[1, 211] = 6.35, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$), and marginal two-way interactions between the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality (F[1, 211] = 2.76, $p = .10$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$) and the acceptance of inequality and perceptions of inequality (F[1, 211] = 3.25, $p = .07$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$). Importantly, all of these significant and marginal effects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction between all the predictor variables (F[1, 211] = 4.33, $p = .04$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$; see Figure 10).

Because the first hypothesis predicts a two-way interaction between the resistance to social change and the experimental condition, I first probed and graphed the three-way interaction at high and low levels of the acceptance of inequality to see if the predicted two-way interaction emerged for people with different levels of the acceptance of inequality. When probing the three-way interaction between the resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality, and perceptions of inequality when predicting symbolic racism the significant two-way interaction between the resistance to social change and perceptions of inequality was non-significant for people low on the acceptance of inequality (F[1, 211] = .49, $p = .48$, $\eta_p^2 = .002$; see top panel of Figure 9). Among people who were low on the acceptance of inequality, there was a main effect of the resistance to social change ($b = .12$, $SE = .06$, F[1, 211] = 4.67, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$) and perceptions of inequality ($b = -.16$, $SE = .04$, F[1, 211] = 18.40, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = $

Figure 10.

Three-way interaction between the resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality, and perceive inequality when predicting symbolic racism.

Low Acceptance of Inequality

High Acceptance of Inequality

.08). These results are partially consistent with predictions, such that people who resisted social change where more likely to score high on the measure of symbolic racism; however, I predicted that the resistance to social change would be moderated by the inequality of the status quo and this effect did not emerge for people low on the acceptance of inequality.

The two-way interaction between the resistance to social change and the perceptions of inequality was significant for people high on the acceptance of inequality ($F[1, 211] = 8.30$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$; see bottom panel of Figure 10). For people who were high on the perceived inequality scale, the resistance to social change was marginally negatively associated with symbolic racism ($b = -.19$, $SE = .11$, $F[1, 211] = 2.98$, $p = .09$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$), but for people who were low on the perceived inequality scale (people who perceived equality) there was a significant positive association between the resistance to social change and symbolic racism ($b = .17$, $SE = .09$, $F[1, 211] = 5.43$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$). This latter result is inconsistent with predictions and the work by Kay and colleagues (Kay et al., 2009). The interaction I predicted indicated that the resistance to social change would be positively associated with symbolic racism when there was perceived inequality, whereas the data suggests that there is a positive association when there was perceived equality.

When predicting the legitimacy of the economic system. there were theoretically consistent main effects of the resistance to social change ($F[1, 218] = 16.63$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$) and the acceptance of inequality ($F[1, 218] = 4.60$, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$). There was also a marginal main effect of the perception of inequality ($F[1, 218] = 3.60$, $p = .06$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$). These main effects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction between the resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality, and perceptions of inequality ($F[1, 218] = 8.10$, $p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$; see Figure 11).

Figure 11.

*Three-way interaction between the resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality, and perceive inequality when predicting economic legitimacy.*

Low Resistance to Social Change

High Resistance to Social Change

Because the fourth hypothesis predicted an interaction between the acceptance of inequality and the inequality of the status quo, I first probed and graphed this three-way interaction for people high and low on the resistance to social change (note that this strategy for probing the interaction is different than the symbolic racism analysis because the two relevant hypotheses focus on two different potential interactions). Inconsistent with hypotheses, for participants who were high on the resistance to social change there was no significant interaction between the acceptance of inequality and perceptions of inequality ($F[1, 218] = .46$, $p = .50$, $\eta_p^2 = .002$; see bottom panel Figure 11). There was, however, a significant main effect of the acceptance of inequality ($b = .17$, $SE = .08$, $F[1, 211] = 4.33$, $p = .04$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$) and perceptions of inequality ($b = -.14$, $SE = .06$, $F[1, 211] = 5.97$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$), such that people who accept inequality and people who perceived more equality were more likely to see the economic system as legitimate. For participants that were low on the resistance to change there was a theoretically consistent significant two-way interaction between the acceptance of inequality and perceptions of inequality ($F[1, 218] = 6.28$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$; see top panel Figure 11). Consistent with the results from Study 2a, for participants who perceived there to be higher degrees of equality, there was no relationship between the acceptance of inequality and economic legitimacy ($b = -.12$, $SE = .14$, $F[1, 218] = .69$, $p = .41$, $\eta_p^2 = .003$); however, for participants who perceived there to be higher degrees of inequality, there was a significant positive relationship between the acceptance of inequality and economic legitimacy($b = .36$, $SE = .13$, $F[1, 218] = 7.87$, $p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$).

CHAPTER XIII

DISCUSSION (STUDY 3)

Study 3 attempted to experimentally manipulate the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality simultaneously so that the causal effects of these two system relevant motivations on legitimacy could be established. Although results were mixed, there was some support for the 2D-MOSL. First, on both the measure of racial employment tolerance and symbolic racism, the acceptance of inequality was associated with lower levels of racial employment tolerance and higher levels of symbolic racism no matter the inequality of the status quo. This indicates that people who are motivated to have unequal social systems will be more intolerant towards a low status social group no matter the state of inequality. These results emerged even while controlling for the resistance to social change indicating that the two constructs are no necessarily redundant. However, these main effects, by itself, is easily incorporated into SDT. Second, the resistance to social change was associated with perceptions of legitimacy no matter the inequality of the status quo, indicating that people who are resistant to societal changes will legitimize unequal and equal social systems to gain the desired social stability. These results are consistent with the predictions of the 2D-MOSL and emerged while controlling for the acceptance of inequality.

I also predicted two two-way interactions. The first was between the resistance to social change and the inequality of the status quo when predicting the two measures of racial intolerance. These effects were not observed. Instead there was a main effect of the resistance to social change on the measure of symbolic racism, indicating that people who are resistant to societal changes are more likely to be symbolic racists. Although inconsistent with the predicted interaction, this main effect is consistent with the notion (mentioned briefly in the introduction)

that legitimizing ideologies, including racial legitimizing ideologies like symbolic racism (see Brandt & Reyna, 2012), can be driven by both system-relevant motivations. By endorsing symbolic racist ideologies people may be able to maintain the current racial status quo, especially since there was some racial inequality in both equality/inequality conditions, and thus help maintain the stability of the social system.

The second predicted two-way interaction was between the acceptance of inequality and the inequality of the status quo. This interaction directly tested one of the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL. Specifically, the prediction that the association between the acceptance of inequality and legitimacy depends on the inequality of the status quo. The predicted interaction did not obtain significance; however, the acceptance of inequality was positively associated with both measures of legitimacy. The failure of the inequality of the status quo manipulation to be a moderator in this study may indicate that participants already have a well formulated and crystallized view of racial inequality in the United States and a discrete manipulation of this inequality was not enough to change people's crystallized beliefs. Consistent with this basic idea, participants in both conditions rate the inequality of the status quo near or above the midpoint of the scale. Moreover, a large literature indicates that crystallized attitudes are nearly impossible to change (e.g., Sears & Funk, 1991). If this is the case, then the main effect of the acceptance of inequality on the measures of legitimacy is in line with the predictions of the 2D-MOSL. Specifically, given that the United States is characterized by racial disparities in a number of areas of public life (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Schlesinger, 2005), I would expect that people who accept inequality and resist social change would be more likely to legitimize the social system than their egalitarian and accepting of social change counterparts--an expectation confirmed in the current study. That is, both system-relevant motivations predicted

legitimacy independent and simultaneously indicating that they are independent predictors of legitimacy and not proxies for the same underlying dimension.

Because the manipulation of the racial status quo only appeared to manipulate the relative differences in perceived inequality and not absolute levels in perceive inequality, it raises the question as to why the manipulation worked in Study 2a? The manipulation in Study 2a was not in reference to an individual's own society and the inequality of the system was a key (if not defining) feature of the information given to participants to form their impressions. It may be more effective to manipulate perceptions of inequality prior to the formation of perceptions of societal inequality. Determining the best and most effective way to manipulate perceptions of inequality will be an important next step in this program of research. The differences between the current study and the first two studies (which obtained consistent support) may also be the samples used. The first two studies used representative samples of adults (Study 1) or an adult community sample (Study 2), whereas the current study used a student sample. Student samples may not have the live experiences necessary for the current study to be meaningful to them.

Beyond the planned analyses for Study 3, I also conducted several additional analyses to further understand the data. When predicting symbolic racism, the results were not consistent with my theoretical position. That is, the resistance to social change did not predict higher levels of symbolic racism when people perceived higher levels of inequality. In fact, the resistance to social change was associated with greater symbolic racism when people perceived racial equality and when they were high on the acceptance of inequality (perceived racial equality did not moderate the resistance to social change to symbolic racism relationship for people low on the acceptance of inequality). One potential reason for this unexpected effect is the content of symbolic racist attitudes. Features of symbolic racism include the perception that African

Americans do not suffer from discrimination and violate traditional American values. It might be that the confluence of beliefs about racial equality and the resistance to social change may combine in a similar way as the denial of discrimination and the perceived violation of values to produce a form of symbolic racism. This might especially be the case for people high on the acceptance of inequality because symbolic racism can serve as an ideology that legitimizes preferences for inequality (see Brandt & Reyna, 2012; Sidanius et al., 1992).

When predicting economic legitimacy, the results for people low on the resistance to social change did conform to expectations. For people who perceived inequality, the acceptance of inequality was positively associated with legitimacy, indicating that people legitimized the social system when it matched their goals. For people high on the resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality was positively associated with legitimacy no matter the perceived inequality of the status quo.

In sum, Study 3 found consistent support for the primary prediction of the 2D-MOSL that both the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change predict legitimacy in an unequal country (the United States), but only if one is willing to ignore the ineffectual status quo manipulation. Similarly, the study found support for the idea that both the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality predict racial ideologies; however, as discussed above the role of perceptions of inequality in these relationships are unclear and inconclusive. Moreover, the predicted interaction that would have further distinguished the two system-relevant motivations was not significant. Thus, although there was support for one of the primary predictions of the model, the secondary predictions were not born out.

CHAPTER XIV

RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 4)

Up to this point I have demonstrated that the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality both simultaneously predict legitimacy in unequal social systems and that the association between the acceptance of inequality and legitimacy is dependent on the inequality of the status quo. These findings indicate that the two system-relevant motivations are independent motivations because their effects are independent of one another and they are affected by different societal conditions. Importantly, these effects suggest that SJT and SDT do not effectively capture of the nuance of legitimacy because they imply a single underlying system-relevant motivations. Thus far, the predictions relating the two system-relevant motivations to system legitimacy have followed previous research and ideas with a relatively straightforward strategy of integrating the research traditions of SDT and SJT and demonstrating how different contexts affect different motivations. However, by considering two system-relevant motivations it is also possible to postulate motivational circumstances not anticipated by SDT and SJT. That is, the 2D-MOSL predicts phenomenon that cannot be anticipated by previous theories that postulate unitary system-relevant motivations.

Conflicting System Motivations

One area rich with possibility is the potential for conflicting system-relevant motivations. In a system with inequality, the resistance to social change tacitly supports inequality, which may explain why motivations to resist social change and accept inequality are moderately correlated (e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibely, 2009; Stangor & Leary, 2006). For example, a meta-analysis of the correlation between right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation found that the *highest* recorded correlation between the two constructs was .66 in a sample of

Germans and the *lowest* recorded correlation between the two constructs was -.03 in a sample from Belgium (Roccato & Ricolfi, 2005). The *average* correlation was only .33 indicating that it is possible—if not common—for people to score high on one construct but low on another.

Any potential conflict in system-relevant motivations is likely to occur for individuals who tend to resist change and have a mismatch between their level of the acceptance of inequality and the inequality within their particular system. In unequal countries, people who are low on the acceptance of inequality and high on the resistance to social change may feel conflict between the two motivations because they disagree with the hierarchical structure of the society and also resist the social change necessary to bring the structure of society in line with their preferences. For people who fall into this category of low acceptance of inequality and high resistance to social change, perceiving the system as legitimate represents a conflict of motivations. In more egalitarian social systems the same sort of motivational conflict is predicted to occur, but for those who accept inequality and resist social change.

Research and theory in social psychology has long considered conflicting and inconsistent mental states (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones, 2000). One manifestation of mental conflict is a sense of ambivalence about an attitude object, where "A person who feels mixed emotions and is torn about an attitude object feels ambivalent about it" (Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002, p. 157) and has a mixture of positive and negative feelings toward the attitude object (Kaplan, 1972; Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson & Zanna, 1995). Jost and Burgess (2000) demonstrated that when motivations to feel good about one's group and to justify the system conflict (as is the case with low status social groups) people express ambivalent attitudes about their group. Similarly, if the two system motivations conflict I expect people will experience ambivalence in their perceptions of the legitimacy of the system.

There is some research consistent with this hypothesis. Craig, Martinez, Kane, and Gainous (2005) found that people who scored high on a measure of egalitarianism and high on a measure of traditionalism experienced ambivalence in their attitudes towards gay rights public policy. To the extent that opposition to gays rights policy represents a legitimization of the current gender system; this study is perfectly in line with my perspective. My perspective is also consistent to some degree with Tetlock's (1984) work on ideology and cognitive style. Specifically, Tetlock found that politicians who hold conflicting values make use of a more complex cognitive style that considers multiple perspectives on an issue, which may be a strategy to deal with conflicting values.

There are several goals of Study 4. The first goal of this study is to test the system ambivalence predictions in an experimental context by manipulating the perceived inequality of the system and measuring the two system-relevant motivations. Ambivalence will be measured both objectively and subjectively. Objective measures of ambivalence take into account the number and strength of conflicting impressions, whereas subjective measures of ambivalence ask participants about the extent of their mixed emotions and tension regarding the issue (Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002; Priester & Petty, 1996). The second goal is to test the hypotheses of the previous three studies. By recoding objective measures of ambivalence it is possible to create a measure of legitimacy, and so this study also has the potential to replicate the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL. That is, this study will test whether the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality both predict legitimacy in unequal social system, but that the acceptance of inequality does not predict legitimacy in more equal social systems.

Statement of Study 4 Hypothesis

Hypothesis I. There will be a three-way interaction between the two system-relevant motivations and the inequality of the status quo, such that when people believe the system is very unequal people who are low on the acceptance of inequality and high on the resistance to social change will feel the most ambivalence about the system. People who believe the system is more equal, are high on the acceptance of inequality, and high on the resistance to social change will feel the most ambivalence about the system. This is not to say that no other group of people will feel ambivalence towards the system, but rather the highest levels of ambivalence will be found in these groups.

CHAPTER XII

METHOD (STUDY 4)

Participants

One hundred and seventy-three participants (34 men, 126 women, *M* age = 20.1, *SD* =

2.8) were recruited from DePaul University's introduction to psychology subject pool and

received partial course credit for their participation.

Procedure and Measures

The measures of the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality from the

previous studies were used again in this study. Both measures formed reliable scales (resistance

to social change α = .82; acceptance of inequality α = .93) and were only weakly correlated

(*r*[168] = .28, *p* < .001). After completing these measures participants were randomly assigned to

one of two descriptions of group disparities in unemployment in the United States. In the first

condition participants are asked to read and understand several figures and a short paragraph

indicating that ethnic, age, and educational groups in the United States face large disparities in

employment (see Figure 12). In the second condition participants are given the same task, but the

disparities described are significantly smaller (see Figure 13). These materials are designed to

manipulate the inequality of the status quo.

Following this manipulation participants completed the following nine items as

manipulation checks: "Based on the information, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics the

unemployment rate for Black Americans is significantly higher than the unemployment rate for

White Americans;" "In the United States, Black Americans and White Americans are equally

likely to be employed;" "Blacks and Whites have equal opportunities to obtain employment;"

"Based on the information, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics the unemployment rate

Figure 12

Study 4: Unequal status quo experimental condition.

Unemployment Rates for Groups in America[1]

Unemployment Rate by Race

◆ Black Americans   ■ White Americans

Unemployment Rate by Educational Achievement

◆ High School Graduates
■ College Graduates

Unemployment Rate by Age

◆ 18-24   ■ 25-45   ▲ 45-65

The unemployment rate for the first six months of 2011 was 9.1%. There were large disparities in the unemployment rate for racial, educational, and age groups in the United States. Black Americans, young people, and high school graduates all had a significantly more difficult time finding employment than did White Americans, older people, and college graduates.

[1] Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

Figure 13

Study 4: More equal status quo condition.

Unemployment Rates for Groups in America[1]

Unemployment Rate by Race

— Black Americans — White Americans

Unemployment Rate by Educational Achievement

— High School Graduates
— College Graduates

Unemployment Rate by Age

— 18-24 — 25-45 — 45-65

The unemployment rate for the first six months of 2011 was 9.1%. There were only small disparities in the unemployment rate for racial, educational, and age groups in the United States. Black Americans, young people, and high school graduates all had a slightly more difficult time finding employment than did White Americans, older people, and college graduates.

[1] Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

for high school graduates is significantly higher than the unemployment rate for college graduates;" "In the United States, high school graduates and college graduates are equally likely to be employed;" "High school graduates and college graduates have equal opportunities to obtain employment;" "Based on the information, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics the unemployment rate for young adults (those 18-25) is significantly higher than the unemployment rate for other adults (those 25-65); " "In the United States, young adults (those 18-25) and other adults (those 25-65) are equally likely to be employed;" and "Young adults (those 18-25) and other adults (those 25-65) have equal opportunities to obtain employment." All nine items were measured on a seven point scale ranging from 1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly. After reverse-scoring the appropriate items, the nine items were averaged together to form a highly reliable scale ($\alpha = .82$).

Two measures of system ambivalence were used as the dependent variables. The first is a measure of objective system ambivalence modeled on the measures of ambivalence used by attitude (e.g., Kaplan, 1972; Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002; Priester & Petty, 1996) and system justification researchers (Jost & Burgess, 2000). Objective system ambivalence is conceptualized as the combination of system assessments related to either system legitimacy or illegitimacy. Participants were asked about four pairs of traits as they relate to the Supreme Court, the federal government, the participants' local state government, the military, the police, the public education system, and the banking industry. These targets were chosen as they all represent authorities and important institutions in the United States socio-political system. The four pairs of traits included trust and distrust, confident and skeptical, fair and unfair, and satisfied and unsatisfied. These traits represent important components of the perception of legitimacy as conceptualized by psychologists and political scientists (Tyler & Huo, 2002;

Weatherford, 1992). For each individual trait, participants received the following question

(words in brackets are altered for the other versions of the target qualities and institutions):

How much do you [trust] the [banking industry]?

Participants then rated their perceptions of the trait (e.g., trust) on a four-point scale with the

labels "not at all," "slightly," "quite a bit," and "extremely."

To create the measure of objective ambivalence I first computed the objective measure of

ambivalence based on the similarity-intensity model of objective ambivalence (see Thompson &

Zanna, 1995). This conceptualization of ambivalence considers ambivalence as a joint function

of attitude similarity and attitude intensity. That is, ambivalence is a product of the extent to

which dominant and conflicting reactions are similar or dissimilar and the extremity of the

reactions. Thompson and Zanna (1995) use the following formula to compute objective

ambivalence according the similarity-intensity model:

$$\text{Attitudinal Ambivalence} = [(P + N)/2] - [|P - N|]$$

Where P is the participants' score on positive items and N is the participants' scores on the

negative items. The first half of the equation assesses the average intensity of the components

and the last half of the equation assesses the difference between the positive and negative

components. This index of ambivalence as been one of the most popular indexes and has been

applied to a number of different topics (Armitage & Conner, 2000; Faina, Costarelli, & Romoli,

2002; Fong, 2006; Kachadourian, Fincham, & Davila, 2005; Locke & Braun, 2009; Rudolph &

Popp, 2007; van Harreveld, van der Pligt, de Vries, Wenneker, & Verhue, 2004; Zemborain &

Johar, 2007).

In terms of ambivalence towards system legitimacy the equation can be rewritten as:

$$\text{System Ambivalence} = [(L + I)/2] - [|L - I|]$$

Where L is participants' scores on the legitimacy items (i.e., trust, confident, fair, satisfied) and I

is participants' scores on the illegitimacy items (i.e., distrust, skeptical, unfair, dissatisfied).

Objective system ambivalence was calculated with this formula for each pair of items for each of

the seven targets and then averaged together for each of the seven targets. The measures of

objective ambivalence for each target were averaged together to form an aggregated objective

system ambivalence scale ($\alpha = .67$).

Following the assessment of objective ambivalence for each target was an assessment of

subjective ambivalence based on the measures by Priester and Petty (1996) and Newby-Clark,

McGregor, and Zanna (2002). This measure consists of five items regarding the conflict, mixed

emotions, and indecision felt towards the seven targets (see Table 14). These items were

measured on both seven and five point scales. They were standardized and averaged together to

create the final measure of subjective ambivalence for each target group. As with objective

ambivalence, the measures of subjective ambivalence were combined to form an aggregated

subjective system ambivalence scale ($\alpha = .64$). The measures of objective and subjective

ambivalence were correlated with one another ($r[117] = .58, p < .001$) , indicating that the

measures of objective and subjective ambivalence are capturing similar, but not identical,

constructs.

Table 10

Study 4: Subjective measure of ambivalence

I have strong mixed emotions both for and against the Supreme Court, all at the same time. (1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly)

I do not find myself feeling torn about my opinion of the Supreme Court; my feelings go in one direction only. (1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly)

To what extent are your reactions to the Supreme Court mixed or one-sided? (1 completely one-sided reactions to 7 completely mixed reactions)

To what extent are your reactions to the Supreme Court conflicted or not conflicted? (1 feel no conflict at all to 5 = feel maximum conflict)

To what extent are your reactions to the Supreme Court indecisive or not indecisive? (1 feel no indecision to 5 feel maximum indecision)

CHAPTER XIII

RESULTS (STUDY 4)

Manipulation Check

Participants in the unequal condition perceived more inequality (M = 5.68, SD = 1.03)

than participants in the equal condition (M = 5.05, SD = .84), $t(153)$ = 4.18, $p < .001$, d = .67.

Similar to Study 3, even participants in the equal condition perceived the United States as

unequal (i.e., above the midpoint of the scale).

Hypothesis I: Objective Ambivalence

Hypothesis I predicts a three-way interaction between the inequality of the status quo, the

resistance to social change, and the acceptance of inequality when predicting ambivalence, such

that in the equal condition people who resist social change and accept inequality will be the most

ambivalent, but in the unequal condition people who resist social change and reject inequality

(egalitarians) will be the most ambivalent. To test this hypothesis a 2 (Status Quo: More Equal

vs. More unequal) X continuous (resistance to social change) X continuous (acceptance of

inequality) general linear model predicting both measures of objective and subjective

ambivalence was computed.

When predicting the overall objective system ambivalence scale there was a significant

interaction between the acceptance of inequality and the experimental condition (see Table 15

and left panel of Figure 14). In the unequal condition there was no association between the

acceptance of inequality and objective system ambivalence (b = -.07, SE = .05, $F[1, 124]$ = 1.61,

p = .21, η_p^2 = .01); however, in the equal condition there was a significant positive association (b

= .13, SE = .06, $F[1, 124]$ = 4.90, p = .03, η_p^2 = .04). That is, when the status quo was described

as equal, people who accepted inequality expressed more objective ambivalence about the social

Table 11.

Resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality, the experimental condition, and their interactions predicting subjective system ambivalence, objective system ambivalence, and system legitimacy.

	Objective System Ambivalence	Subjective System Ambivalence	Legitimacy
	$F(1, 124)$	$F(1, 137)$	$F(1, 124)$
Resistance to Social Change (R)	1.84	1.18	3.077^{+}
Acceptance of Inequality (A)	.70	1.33	.479
Experimental Condition (C)	2.37	.43	.637
A X C	6.26*	1.09	.010
R X C	7.07**	14.98***	.475
R X A	1.07	5.10*	1.488
R X A X C	.01	4.73*	.002

Figure 14

Study 4: Significant two-way interactions predicting objective system ambivalence. Left panel: Interaction between experimental condition and the acceptance of inequality. Right panel: Interaction between the experimental condition and the resistance to social change.

system.

There was also an interaction between the resistance to social change and the experimental condition (see Table 15 and right panel of Figure 14). In the unequal condition, there was a significant positive association between the resistance to social change and objective system ambivalence ($b = .16$, $SE = .05$, $F[1, 124] = 8.98$, $p = .003$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$); however, there was no association in the equal condition ($b = -.05$, $SE = .06$, $F[1, 124] = .77$, $p = .38$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$). That is, when the status quo was described as unequal people who resist social change were more likely to express ambivalence in the social system. These two interactions did not support the hypothesis.

Hypothesis I: Subjective Ambivalence

When predicting subjective ambivalence there were two significant two-way interactions; however, these interactions were all qualified by a significant three-way interaction (see Table 15 and Figure 15). In the unequal condition there was no significant two-way interaction between the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality ($b = .003$, $SE = .05$, $F[1, 137] = .004$, $p = .95$, $\eta_p^2 = .00003$). In this condition there was a main effect for the resistance to social change ($b = .18$, $SE = .05$, $F[1, 137] = 13.13$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$) and no significant effect for the acceptance of inequality ($b = -.08$, $SE = .05$, $F[1, 137] = 2.33$, $p = .13$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$). In the equal condition there was a significant two-way interaction between the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality ($b = .15$, $SE = .05$, $F[1, 137] = 8.84$, $p = .003$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$). For participants high in the acceptance of inequality there was no association between the resistance to social change and subjective system ambivalence ($b = .05$, $SE = .08$, $F[1, 137] = .40$, $p = .53$, $\eta_p^2 = .003$). For participants low in the acceptance of inequality there was a significant negative association between the resistance to social change and subjective system ambivalence ($b = -.26$,

Figure 15.

Study 4: Significant three-way interaction predicting subjective system ambivalence.

$SE = .07$, $F[1, 137] = 13.59$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$). That is, in the equal condition, egalitarians who did not resist social change were the most ambivalent. For these people who are not opposed to change, it appears, being in a social system that matches their goals made them feel ambivalence.

Hypothesis II: Predicting System Legitimacy

I also recoded the objective system ambivalence measure to reflect system legitimacy (e.g., reverse coding measures of the extent a social institution was "unfair"). This allowed me to test the hypotheses of the first three studies in a new sample and with different measures of legitimacy. The results of this analysis are in Table 15. There were no significant main effects or interactions (all F's < 3.08, all p's $> .08$, all η_p^2's $< .03$). There was, however, a marginally significant positive association between the resistance to social change and system legitimacy ($b = .06$, $SE = .04$, $F [1, 124] = 3.08$, $p = .08$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$), indicating that people who are resistant to social change are more likely to see societal institutions as legitimate. Although the 2D-MOSL does predict that people who are resistant to social change will see the social system as more legitimate, it also expects that legitimacy will be associated with the acceptance of inequality.

The latter part of the expectation did not come to fruition in the current study.

An additional analysis included the manipulation check scale instead of the experimental condition variable in the equation. This additional analysis revealed no significant main effects or interactions (all F's < 1.69, all p's > .19, η_p^2's < .02).

CHAPTER XIV

DISCUSSION (STUDY 4)

The purpose of the fourth study was to test an additional hypothesis that can be derived from the 2D-MOSL, but not SJT and SDT, surrounding the possibility of conflicting system-relevant motivations. For people who resist social change, being in a social system that conflicts with one's egalitarian or anti-egalitarian goals could produce psychological conflict that might manifest as ambivalence. Statistically this hypothesis should result in a three-way interaction between the resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality, and the experimental condition. The fourth study tested this hypothesis using both objective and subjective measures of ambivalence towards the social system. This study moves past basic associations with legitimacy and uses the potential for system-motivation conflict to demonstrate the distinctness of the two system-relevant motivations.

The measure of objective system ambivalence produced interesting, though inconsistent, results. There was no significant three-way interaction; however there were two significant two-way interactions. In the equal condition people who were high on the acceptance of inequality were more ambivalent compared to those who were low on the acceptance of inequality, but there was no effect of the acceptance of inequality in the unequal condition. Examining Figure 14, suggests that it may be the case that people who are low on the acceptance of inequality are less ambivalent after receiving information that suggests that the social system supports their goals. That is, this may be some indication of relief. As with Study 3, manipulating information about participants own social systems may not have the same effects as manipulating information about an unknown social system. Participants likely already have ideas and

explanations for any disparities in their society and contrary information may be surprising or

less believable more than informative.

There was also a significant two-way interaction between the resistance to social change

and the equality of the status quo. In the equal condition the resistance to social change was not a

reliable predictor of system ambivalence. In the unequal condition, however, people high on the

resistance to social change were significantly more ambivalent about the social system than

people low on the resistance to social change. Before interpreting this effect, it is important to

remember that (a) this effect is found at the average level of the acceptance of inequality variable

and (b) on average people were relatively egalitarian ($M = 2.50$ on a scale with a possible range

from 1 to 7). With this in mind, it appears that people with average levels of egalitarianism, who

were in the unequal condition, and who were high on the resistance to social change expressed

the most objective ambivalence towards the social system--a pattern of results consistent with

my predictions. Unfortunately for the purposes of the this study, egalitarians are well represented

in the sample of participants and thus it may not be possible to fully and effectively test the

three-way interaction predicted by the model.

When looking at the measure of subjective system ambivalence I did find a significant

three-way interaction; however, the pattern of results was not consistent with the predictions

from the 2D-MOSL. In the unequal condition, I predicted that people high on the resistance to

social change and low on the acceptance of inequality would be the most ambivalent. In the left

panel of Figure 15, it is possible to see that participants that fit these criteria were typically

higher in ambivalence, but the difference between people high and low on the acceptance of

inequality was not significant. However, people "high" on the acceptance of inequality were

plus one standard deviation of the acceptance of inequality mean. Because the mean on this

variable reflects a number of committed egalitarians, people high on the acceptance of inequality are still actually below the midpoint of the scale (3.52). Thus, in a sample with a broader set of views on the acceptability of inequality the expected pattern of results may have emerged in this condition.

In the equal condition there was a significant two-way interaction between the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality when predicting subjective system ambivalence. This two-way interaction was primarily driven by people low on the acceptance of inequality. For these individuals, when they were low on the resistance to social change they experienced ambivalence about the social system. It may be that when people who are used to a social system that conflicts with their goals (e.g., egalitarians in the unequal United States) and promote change in that social system (e.g., people low on the resistance to social change) they feel conflict when they are given information about the social system that conflicts with their established perceptions of the system. When they were high on the resistance to social change they had very low levels of ambivalence. That is, when the social system matched egalitarians' goals and they like social change they felt ambivalence about the social system. When the social system matched egalitarians' goals and they resist social change and they experienced very little ambivalence. The latter effect is consistent with predictions. I would not expect people to feel ambivalent about the social system when the social system matches their goals and they are not resistant to change.

Finally, the current study was also able to reexamine the hypotheses tested in the first several studies by recoding the measure of objective system ambivalence to be a measure of system legitimacy. Similarly to the analysis of system legitimacy from Study 3, there was not broad support for the hypotheses; however, there was a small relationship between the resistance

to social change and the legitimacy of the social system indicating that people who resist social change are more likely to see to the social system as legitimate. There were not, however, any other associations with system legitimacy in the study. Although not consistent with the 2D-MOSL, this effect is conceptually consistent with work from SJT (Jost et al., 2004) in that the resistance to social change (marginally) predicted legitimacy.

In sum, although there was not any broad support for the predictions of the 2D-MOSL, there were some promising patterns. First, if the sample contained a broader range of people on the acceptance of inequality dimension, it may have been possible for some supportive results to emerge for the predictions surrounding system ambivalence. Second, the resistance to social change predicted system legitimacy, consistent with predictions from the model. As with the previous studies, the current study suggests several future directions for studies testing the model (see next chapter).

CHAPTER XV

DISCUSSION

I proposed a 2D-MOSL and tested hypotheses derived from this model in four sets of studies. One primary prediction of the model is that the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality will simultaneously predict legitimacy in unequal systems. Consistent with this expectation, both system-relevant motivations predicted legitimacy in equal countries even while controlling for the other system-relevant motivation (Studies 1, 2a, & 3). That is, both motivations contributed to explaining unique variance in legitimacy which indicates that they are not merely redundant with one another. The second primary prediction argues that the resistance to social change will be related to the legitimacy of the social system no matter the inequality of the status quo, but the association between acceptance of inequality and legitimacy will be moderated by societal inequality. Clear support for this hypothesis was found in Studies 1 and 2a find that the resistance to social change is associated with legitimacy across societies, but the acceptance of inequality is only related to legitimacy in unequal societies. There were even instances when the acceptance of inequality was associated with illegitimacy in more equal contexts (see Study 1). Support for the two primary predictions indicate that the two system-relevant motivations are not identical and represent two different motivations to legitimize the social system.

In addition to these the primary predictions, several additional hypotheses were tested. In Study 2b I tested the hypothesis that people will legitimize social systems that match their system-relevant motivations whether those motivations are the acceptance of inequality (e.g., Study 1 and Study 2a) or the resistance to social change (Study 2b). In this study I manipulated the extent a society was described as consistently changing or very unlikely to change.

Consistent with my hypotheses, the resistance to social change was associated with system legitimacy, but only in the condition where it matched the goal to resist social change. That is, only in the "unlikely to change" experimental condition. In this study, there was also an unexpected interaction between the experimental condition and the acceptance of inequality, such that the acceptance of inequality was positively associated with system legitimacy in the unlikely to change experimental condition (and no association in the ever-changing experimental condition). This unexpected effect warrants further investigation. I believe there are at least two possibilities for this effect that could be tested. First, people may be using the possibility of change as a heuristic for the levels of inequality within the social system. Second, people who are high on the acceptance of inequality may desire inequality as a way of maintaining societal stability, and so a stable society unlikely to change may also be seen as fulfilling goals related to the acceptance of inequality.

This is an important possibility because it suggest that the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change may not be strictly orthogonal. That is, there may be an asymmetry between the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change, such that the acceptance of inequality is reliant on some form of stability for legitimacy, whereas the resistance to social change can be associated with legitimacy regardless of the levels of inequality. This does not mean that the two constructs are identical, nor does it mean that they cannot be treated as theoretically orthogonal for the purposes of developing hypotheses and considering the psychological consequences of different combinations of the two system-relevant motivations. Rather, this indicates that we may (and do) find instances where the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality are related. This possibility is consistent with factor analytic results previously described. These analyses used an oblimin rotation which

means that the factors were allowed to correlate, rather than the forced orthogonality of oblique

rotations methods (e.g., varimax rotation). Similarly, across the studies the acceptance of

inequality and the resistance to social change were typically weakly or moderately correlated.

These suggest that the two motivations can be correlated, but because of the separate factor

loadings and only moderate correlations it does not suggest that these two motivations are

identical. Future work will need to test the limits of the assumed orthogonality of the 2D-MOSL

and include measures that assess the extent people adopt acceptance of inequality beliefs because

of the functional benefits of inequality. It will also be important to determine what strengthens or

weakens the relationship between the two system-relevant motivations.

In Study 3 I attempted to expand on the 2D-MOSL in several ways. First, I attempted to

experimentally manipulate both of the system-relevant motivations, but this was not successful

and so the analyses relied on the measured variables. There are many reasons the manipulations

may have failed. For example, given the current economic downturn participants may have

habituated to a chronic state of system threat or, perhaps, the manipulations only produce small

effects that are unlikely to emerge reliably.[5] Second, I attempted to expand the 2D-MOSL to

perceptions of racial intolerance. Recently, Kay and colleagues (Kay et al., 2009) demonstrated

that when people are motivated to justify the social system and the social system is perceived as

unequal they are more likely to see inequality as justified and to express intolerance towards the

low status group, whereas when the social system is perceived as more equal they are less likely

to see inequality as justified and to express tolerance. I expected similar results for the resistance

to social change, but found either null results (racial employment tolerance) or results

inconsistent (the measure of symbolic racism) with the predictions. The low levels of variability

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[5] I recently discovered that the system threat manipulation was not effective for participants in a large nationally representative sample of adults (Wakslak & Jost, 2005).

in the racial employment tolerance measure may have contributed to these results because very few participants were willing to express anything less than full tolerance. The theoretical conceptualization of symbolic racism likely contributed to these results because it represents a form of racism that blends the resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality, and the denial of racial inequality. Participants who scored highest on the measure of symbolic racism were people with higher levels of these three theoretical components of symbolic racism..

Moreover, it appears that although people responded to the manipulation checks as expected, the manipulations of the inequality of the status quo did not make a significant difference on the dependent variables and did not interact with any of the predictor variables. This latter issue is likely the most significant. People spend most, if not their entire lives in their society. Discrete manipulations regarding the inequality of their social system may not be enough to trigger the psychological processes hypothesized by the 2D-MOSL because people are chronically adapting, rationalizing, and reacting to their societal circumstances. This is an important issue moving forward as the relative importance of chronic versus discrete impressions of inequality and the state of the society make a significant difference in the design of future studies. With the results of Study 3 and 4 in mind, it seems that future studies may be better spent on accurately assessing people perceptions of their own societal systems rather than trying to manipulate these perceptions. Another option may be to try manipulating system-issues that are less well known and people have less well-formed opinions about. However, when trying to identify causal pathways the modified hypothetical societies paradigm used in Study 2 may be more effective.

Study 4 explored the possibility of conflicting system-relevant motivations, with the prediction that conflicting motivations would lead to greater ambivalence about the social

system. There was some tentative support for this hypothesis; however, the student sample used in Study 4 had very little variation on the acceptance of inequality measure, with a large majority of the sample scoring on the egalitarian side of the scale. A more heterogeneous sample will be necessary to more accurately test my hypotheses. An additional variation in Study4 that could prove to be consequential is the different method of measuring system legitimacy. In Study 4, system legitimacy was measured by aggregating unipolar measures of trust and distrust, fairness and unfairness of a number of societal institutions with the assumption that by aggregating these perceptions it is possible to get a sense of participants' perceptions of the overall social system. However, this assumption may not be correct. Some societal institutions may be more or less representative of the overall system and this may depend on the individual participant and the salient societal conditions of the moment. Additionally, by combining the four point unipolar measures important variance in the final measure of legitimacy may be obscured. Finally, although less satisfying theoretically, it any sets of studies with small to medium effect sizes, some instances of non-significance are expected by chance (e.g., Francis, 2012, in press).

It is important to consider whether the results not anticipated by the 2D-MOSL can be interpreted through the lenses of SJT and SDT. Interestingly, because many of the secondary predictions were attempting to directly build on the research traditions of SJT and SDT, results that were not predicted by the 2D-MOSL are also inconsistent with these previous theories. For example, both SJT and SDT predict status asymmetries in legitimacy, such that the relationship between system-relevant ideologies and motivations will be weaker predictors of legitimacy for low compared to high status groups. No support was found for this hypothesis (see Study 1). It may be possible to integrate the results that did emerge with some form of SJT or SDT, but only via an ad-hoc reconceptualization of the theories. Similarly, the unexpected interaction between

the amount the society changes and the accpetnace of inequality in Study 2b is not easily

incorporated in SDT. SDT conceptualizations the acceptance of inequality around themes of

heirarchy, dominance, and the subordination of low status groups--these themes are not

immediately indicative of stability. In Study 3, I attempted to replicate and extend the work by

Kay and colleagues (2009); however, I was unable to replicate their results. Instead, the

manipulation of the status quo did not have an effect on racial tolerance, whereas the resistance

to social change and the acceptance of inequality both had independent effects on racial

tolerance. These independent effects are consistent with the 2D-MOSL. Finally, although the

ambivalence pattern of results from Study 4 were not anticipated by the 2D-MOSL, both SJT and

SDT do not allow for conflicting system-relevant motivations within their framework and so do

not make *any* predictions for this particular study. Thus, the results consistent with the primary

predictions of the 2D-MOSL are unique to the 2D-MOSL and the unsupported predictions

suggest shortcomings of SJT and SDT, along with the 2D-MOSL.

<div align="center">SJT vs. SDT vs. 2D-MOSL: Theoretical Contributions</div>

One of the primary contributions of this document is theoretical. Social dominance and

system justification theories have provided much of the theoretical guidance when it comes to

questions about the stability of social systems (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto,

1999)--especially social systems that seem *de facto* unjust (to liberal academics, at least). These

two theoretical perspectives have also been considered analogous and researchers have used both

theories to make the same predictions. The 2D-MOSL, however, argues that these perspectives

each capture a unique motivation for perceiving a social system as just and legitimate. System

justification theory has primarily uncovered the motivation to resist social change, whereas

social dominance theory has primarily uncovered the motivation to accept inequality. By

considering these two dimensions as independent and theoretically orthogonal it is possible for the 2D-MOSL to make unique predictions about when people will see their social systems as legitimate and what motivations will be associated with legitimacy under what circumstances.

To demonstrate the value of a new theory the new theory must either be more parsimonious than existing theories, or it must explain data not adequately explained by existing theoretical perspectives. On the surface the 2D-MOSL is not more parsimonious than either SJT or SDT. The 2D-MOSL proposes two, rather than one, important system-relevant motivations and thus increases the complexity of the model compared to SJT and SDT. However, parsimonious does not need be limited to the complexity of individual theories and can also be extended to the parsimony of a scientific field. This "meta-theoretical" parsimony is the idea that a particular field only has as many theories as it needs. In this sense the 2D-MOSL is more meta-theoretically parsimonious because it reduces the total number of theories necessary for the social psychological study of legitimacy.

The 2D-MOSL also accounts for patterns of data better than either SJT or SDT. SJT argues that the acceptance of inequality is a form of system justification that serves to maintain the status quo. From this perspective we would expect two things. First, that the acceptance of inequality would be associated with legitimacy of the status quo, no matter the status quo. Second, because the two system-relevant motivations are serving the same goal, when entered into a multiple regression equation one of the motivations should dominate the other (i.e., their shared, rather than unique, variance is what predicts legitimacy). SDT argues that SJT is subsumed by SDT and so SJT is in the service of maintaining inequality. From this perspective we would also expect two things. First, that the resistance to social change would be associated with legitimacy in unequal contexts, but not necessarily equal contexts. Second, and similar to

the second point above, because the two system-relevant motivations are serving the same goal, when entered into a multiple regression equation one of the motivations should dominate the other.

There are several patterns of data in the current studies that are not predicted by either SJT and SDT, but is predicted by the 2D-MOSL. In Study 1 and Study 2a, in unequal contexts, the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality were both associated with legitimacy. That is, their unique, unshared variance predicted legitimacy above and beyond their shared variance indicating that they are separate motivations. This is inconsistent with theories that suggest that the motivations are in the service of the same goal. In these two studies, in equal contexts, the resistance to social change was still associated with legitimacy, but the acceptance of inequality was either unrelated or negatively related to legitimacy. If the two motivations were in the service of the same goal they would have the same moderators; however, this is clearly not the case. Moreover, the acceptance of inequality is clearly not always in the service of the status quo because there are times when it is associated with *challenging* the legitimacy of the social system. This pattern of data is difficult to explain with SJT or SDT, but is easily accounted for by the 2D-MOSL, which both integrates and contextualizes the predictions of system justification and social dominance theories.

This does not mean that SJT and SDT do not have any value. For example, the consistent association between the acceptance of inequality and racial intolerance is easily anticipated by both SDT and the 2D-MOSL. In this specific case the SDT may be the most parsimonious explanation; however, if one takes a broader view of all the data available in the current studies SDT does not explain any of the results beyond those covered by the 2D-MOSL and the 2D-MOSL explains several additional patterns of data. Thus, the sum total of the data suggests that

the 2D-MOSL more effectively captures the patterns of data while introducing meta-theoretical parsimony.

SJT and SDT also have trouble explaining the diversity of political protests observed throughout the world. If the acceptance of inequality is in the service of resisting social change, then it is difficult for SJT to explain instances when people who are accepting of inequality demand large scale social change. Two recent examples highlight this issue. In Norway, Anders Breiviki committed a mass murder of children at a summer camp that encouraged tolerance and acceptance (Muhammad, 2011). Anders Breiviki committed this atrocity as an act of political protest against the tolerance of the Norwegian government and society, essentially arguing that the Norwegian status quo is too egalitarian. The second example comes from another typically tolerant western European country, the Netherlands. Currently Geert Wilders is a prominent politician in the Netherlands who is advocating for large scale social changes that would change the immigration laws in the Netherlands in a way that is only in the service of native Dutch people (BBC, 2011; Crouch, 2008). If the acceptance of inequality is in the service of resisting social change, then it is not clear how or why Anders Breiviki or Geert Wilders would adopt political positions that are in opposition to the status quo in their countries. Rather, in terms of the 2D-MOSL, Breiviki and Wilders are likely low on the resistance to social change and high on the acceptance of inequality. In an more equal social system the 2D-MOSL predicts people with these characteristics will be the most likely to protest.[6] Although all three theories can explain the protests in the more unequal uprisings of the recent Arab Spring movement (e.g.,

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[6] SJT theory might argue that both of these people are fighting for the traditional past and so are really resisting social change. However, by allowing the resistance to change to be defined in this way means that only people who advocate for progressive change can score low on the resistance to social change. To me it seems problematic to build unnecessary ideological bias into a construct.

protesters are likely egalitarians who are low on the resistance to social change), the protest movements in more egalitarian countries that are more difficult for SJT and SDT to explain.

The current set of studies also suggests an opportunity to further broaden and generalize the 2D-MOSL. Putting aside the ineffectual manipulation of inequality in Studies 3 and 4, the results of these four studies could be predicted by the simple premise that people will legitimize social systems that uphold their goals. For example, people who value inequality legitimize unequal social systems, people who value equality legitimize equal social systems, and people who devalue social change legitimize social systems that are unlikely to change. People may perceive their social systems on a number of other dimensions beyond those related to inequality and social change. For example, citizens may be particularly concerned about the levels of meritocracy, the success of the education system, or the incorporation of religion into public life. When a social system fails to live up to their standards, the social system may not be seen as legitimate. This implies a theory of "system-discrepancy", building off of the logic of self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), which predicts that people will legitimize a social system when their views of how the system actually is matches their view of how the system ought to be or should be. Ought-actual and should-actual discrepancies may lead to delegitimization and perhaps protest against the current state of affairs. This system-discrepancy perspective could provide additional avenues for future research. For example, a system-discrepancy account would require more idiographic measures that take into account the many different dimensions people might use to evaluate social systems. It may also be the case, as with self-discrepancy theory, that ought-actual discrepancies are more consequential than should-actual discrepancies because ought-actual discrepancies are indicative of a moral difference.

Conclusion

The 2D-MOSL combines unique predictions and past insights from SJT and SDT in order to understand the legitimization of just and unjust social systems. Although the results of the studies were not perfect, the results of the primary predictions indicate that the 2D-MOSL can provide a more nuanced view of system legitimacy than previous perspectives that takes into account societal factors, individual factors, and their interactions. By considering legitimacy in diverse contexts it is possible to integrate, distinguish, and go beyond previous theoretical perspectives on the legitimacy of social systems.

CHAPTER XVI

SUMMARY

Two theories, system justification theory (SJT) and social dominance theory (SDT), both attempt to explain the prevalence and stability of unequal social systems and are often consider analogous by their proponents. With the newly proposed Two Dimensional Model of System Legitimacy (2D-MOSL), I argue that each theory captures a dimension of system relevant motivations: the resistance to social change (RSC), has primarily been studied by SJT and ranges on a continuum from the resistance to the acceptance of social change and the acceptance of inequality (AOI), has primarily been studied by SDT and ranges on a continuum from the acceptance to the rejection of inequality. The 2D-MOSL predicts that both of these dimensions will be independently associated with the legitimacy of the social system, indicating that they are not analogous system-relevant motivations. Results were largely consistent with this expectation (Studies 1, 2a, & 3)

The 2D-MOSL also lends itself to a number of additional predictions. The AOI should be associated with legitimacy only in cases when the society upholds the goal of inequality. As expected, the AOI was negatively or nonsignificantly related to legitimacy in more equal European countries (Study 1) and an unnamed equal country (Study 2), but positively related in more unequal comparison countries. The RSC, however, should not depend on the inequality of the country and so is related to legitimacy no matter the inequality of the status quo (Studies 1 and 2a). Study 2b revealed that the RSC predicted legitimacy in stable societies, but not in societies with ever changing cultural values. Taken together, these studies indicate that people legitimize social systems when it matches their motivations related to inequality and social change.

Study 3 attempted to extend the theory to measures of racial intolerance, expecting that the AOI would consistently predict intolerance, whereas the RSC would predict intolerance when the status quo is portrayed as unequal compared to when it is portrayed as more equal (see Kay et al., 2009). Although both RSC and AOI predicted racial intolerance the manipulation of the inequality of the status quo did not moderate any of the associations.

Study 4 proposed that there are situations where the AOI and RSC conflict, especially for people high on the RSC. People in an unequal system who are high on the RSC and low on the AOI could feel conflict because these individuals disagree with the overall structure of the society, but yet disavow the change needed to rectify the situation. In Study 4, I tested whether this conflict resulted in feelings of ambivalence across measures of subjective and objective system ambivalence. The results indicated that people did experience system ambivalence and that this ambivalence varied depending on participants AOI and RSC and the inequality of the status quo; however, the precise individuals expects to exhibit the highest levels of ambivalence did not emerge. Instead it appeared that people who are used to being antagonistic to the system greatly reduced their ambivalence when they were given information that suggested the system was in line with their own goals.

In sum, results were supportive of the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL indicating that it may be a viable integration of SJT and SDT, but less supportive of the many different secondary predictions.

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APPENDIX A

Study 1 The Acceptance of Inequality and Tradition Pretest

The Acceptance of Inequality and Tradition Pretest

To see if the proxy measures of the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change from the ESS tap into these concepts, 83 undergraduates completed a pre-test for partial course credit. Participants completed seven items for the resistance to social change (see Table 1A). Five of the items are modified from Oreg's (2003) measure of resistance to change in organizational settings. The referent of these items were altered to reflect society at large rather than a particular organizational or work context. For example, an item from the original scale reads "If I were to be informed that there's going to be a significant change regarding the way things are done at work, I would probably feel stressed." The same item modified to measure the resistance to social change reads "If I were informed that there's going to be significant societal changes, I would probably feel stressed." Two additional items from previous studies were also used. The item "I would be reluctant to make any large-scale changes to the social order" was used by Jost and colleagues (Jost et al., 2007) as a measure of the resistance to social change. The item "Being virtuous and law-abiding is in the long run better for us than permanently challenging the foundation of our society" is from the conventionalism factor of Funke's version of the right-wing authoritarianism scale. The other items within this factor did not seem to capture the construct of the resistance to social change, so they were not used.[7] The seven items can be found in Table 1A. These seven items were averaged together to create a reliable scale (α = .76).

The acceptance of inequality was measured with the 16-item social dominance orientation scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The items that make up this scale

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[7] The three items not used from this conventionalism factor are "The withdrawal from tradition will turn out to be a fatal fault one day," "People should develop their own personal standards about good and evil and pay less attention to the Bible and other old, traditional forms of religious guidance," and "Homosexual long-term relationships should be treated as equivalent to marriage."

can be found in Table 1A. They were averaged together to form a highly reliable scale (α = .90).

Items assessing both the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality were

measured on a seven-point scale with the labels disagree strongly, disagree moderately, disagree

slightly, neither agree nor disagree, agree slightly, agree moderately, and agree strongly.

Participants also completed the two items from the ESS using the same wording and scale

as the ESS.

Factor Analysis. Exploratory factor analysis was used to further understand the measure

of the resistance to social change because this measure was specifically created for this set of

studies. Principle axis factoring of the seven items revealed one factor that accounted for 36.63

percent of the variance. All items had loadings ranging from .34 to .77. A second principle axis

factor analysis with oblimin rotation was run using items from both the resistance to social

change and the acceptance of inequality scale to demonstrate that the resistance to social change

is a separable construct from the acceptance of inequality. This analysis revealed two factors

accounting for 33.59 and 10.38 percent of the variance. The factor loadings from the pattern

matrix are presented in Table 1A. The first factor represents the measure of the acceptance of

inequality (i.e., the social dominance orientation scale). The second factor contains all seven

items of the resistance to social change (loadings range from .39 to .61). Moreover, although

there are very few items that cross-over from one factor to another, one item loaded weakly on

both factors ("Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.") and one items loaded

strongly on Factor 1 while weakly loading on Factor 2 ("Inferior groups should stay in their

place."). These exceptions suggest that there may be some overlap between the measures, but

that any overlap is due to social dominance orientation items rather than the resistance to social

change items. Overall, the measure of the resistance to social change appears to represent one

Table 1A

Principle axis factor analysis with direct oblimin rotation reveals two factors for the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change items.

	Factor 1 Acceptance of Inequality	Factor 2 Resistance to Social Change
Resistance to Social Change Items		
I would be reluctant to make any large-scale changes to the social order.	-.012	**.606**
I generally consider social changes to be a negative thing.	.237	**.504**
If I were to be informed that there's going to be significant societal changes, I would probably feel stressed.	-.047	**.521**
Societal changes seem like a real hassle to me.	.079	**.400**
Often, I feel a bit uncomfortable even about social changes that may potentially improve my life.	-.092	**.700**
I tend to resist social change even if I think the change may ultimately benefit me.	-.039	**.772**
Being virtuous and law-abiding is in the long run better for us than permanently challenging the foundation of our society.	-.003	**.386**
Social Dominance Orientation Items		
Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.	**.288**	.300
In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.	**.383**	.262
It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.	**.575**	.247
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.	**.423**	.206
If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.	**.592**	.209
It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.	**.738**	.002
Inferior groups should stay in their place.	**.571**	.312
Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.	**.533**	.287
It would be good if groups could be equal.	**-.843**	.171
Group equality should be our ideal.	**-.742**	-.040
All groups should be given an equal chance in life.	**-.692**	-.075
We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.	**-.685**	.035
Increased social equality is beneficial to society.	**-.698**	-.004
We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.	**-.677**	.070
We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.	**-.484**	.133
No group should dominate in society.	**-.625**	.155

factor that is distinct from the acceptance of inequality. It is important to note that this latter

factor analysis should only be considered preliminary because the sample size was smaller than

ideal for a factor analysis including 23 items (see e.g., MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong,

1999).

Correlational analyses revealed that, as would be expected in a relatively unequal country

like the United States, the measure of the resistance to social change was positively correlated

with the acceptance of inequality (r[81]=.38, p<.001). Consistent with theories that argue that the

resistance to social change is a component of political conservatism (e.g., Jost et al., 2003), the

measure was marginally associated with political conservatism (r[81]=.21, p=.06).[8] The measure

was uncorrelated with gender, father's education, mother's education, and family income (all r's <

|.10|, all p's > .37).[9] In sum, these analyses provide initial evidence that the measure has both

convergent and discriminate validity.

Pre-test Results. Consistent with expectations, the ESS equality value was negatively

associated with the acceptance of inequality (r[81]=-.63, p<.001) and was unrelated to the

tradition item (r[81]=-.10, p=.36). Unexpectedly, the resistance to social change was not

correlated with tradition (r[81]=.12, p=.30) and it was correlated with equality values (r[81]=-

.40, p<.001). This latter association appears to be largely the result of the correlation between the

resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality. Controlling for this correlation

reduces the association between the resistance to social change and equality values (pr[80]=-.22,

p=.05), but leaves the association between the acceptance of inequality and equality values

largely intact (r[80]=-.56, p<.001).

Because the equality values appear to be measuring the acceptance of inequality, the

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[8] Political conservatism was measured on a seven-point scale ranging from strong liberal to strong conservative.
[9] Family income was measure on a nine-point scale ranging from under $20,000 to $160,000 and over. Both parental education variables were measured on a six-point scale ranging from No degree earned to Doctoral degree.

analyses for Study 1 moved forward. Caution should be used when interpreting the results of the tradition variable. Although this variable has represented the resistance to social change in the past (Thorisdottir et al., 2007), it is not clear that this item represents the resistance to social change in the sample of university students who completed the pre-test.

APPENDIX B

Study 3 Manipulations of System Threat and System Competition

System Threat X System Competition Scenarios and Instructions (Study 3)

For the next portion of the study we are interested in how people read and interpret stories in the news. The following passage is a brief excerpt of a larger story written by a British journalist on a recent trip to the United States.

Read the passage as many times as necessary to become familiar with it. You will be expected to answer questions about this passage later in the study.

[High system-threat / High Competition]

> …These days, many people in the United States feel disappointed with the nation's condition. Many citizens feel that the country has reached a low point in terms of social, economic, and political factors. Because of these social, economic, and political threats, groups within the United States compete and take more power and resources from one another…

[High system-threat / Low Competition]

> …These days, many people in the United States feel disappointed with the nation's condition. Many citizens feel that the country has reached a low point in terms of social, economic, and political factors. Because of these social, economic, and political threats, groups within the United States work together and share power and resources with each other…

[Low system-threat / High Competition]

> …These days, despite the difficulties the nation is facing, many people in the United States feel safer and more secure relative to the past. Many citizens feel that the country is relatively stable in terms of social, economic, and political factors. Because of these social, economic, and political successes, groups within the United States compete and take more power and resources from one another …

[Low system-threat / Low Competition]

> …These days, despite the difficulties the nation is facing, many people in the United States feel safer and more secure relative to the past. Many citizens feel that the country is relatively stable in terms of social, economic, and political factors. Because of these social, economic, and political successes, groups within the United States work together and share power and resources with each other …