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Revolution of the right: explaining the rise of the front national in light of the 2008 financial crisis

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REVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT:
EXPLAINING THE RISE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL IN LIGHT OF THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS

A Thesis
Presented in
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Abstract

This thesis aims to unpack the reasons for the surge in popular support for the far right Populist Party in France, the Front National. The research is conducted according to the methodology that there are three main contributions to the surge, including economic factors, political factors and social issues. Each chapter is dedicated to exploring one of these contributions through the analysis of data such as political polls, economic statistics and public opinion. The main outcomes of the research are Marine Le Pen has been overall successful in moving the Front National from the fray to the mainstream of French politics, and the political situation in France is particularly volatile due to the economic mismanagement during the financial crisis of 2008, so it was more susceptible to growing strength of a far right party.
# CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................ iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iv

PREFACE ................................................................................................................................... v

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1
   Outline of Major Euroskeptic Parties and Hypothesis ......................................................... 2

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................... 11

CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL THEORY AND HISTORICAL PARTY RELATIONS ................. 24
   Issues of Identity, Assimilation and Tolerance .................................................................. 25
   Creation of the EU and Recent Political Landscape in France ........................................ 26

CHAPTER FOUR: ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND ITS POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS ...... 30
   Political Consequences of Economic Downturns ............................................................. 35

CHAPTER FIVE: POLITICAL OUTCOMES AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES ......................... 45
   Social Situation and Its Relation to the Front National ....................................................... 53
   Identity Crisis and Violent Reactions ............................................................................. 54

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 56

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 56
ILLUSTRATIONS

TABLES

1. French Economic Indicators................................................................. 30
2. France European Parliament Election Results ........................................... 36
3. Greece European Parliament Election Results .......................................... 37
4. United Kingdom European Parliament Election Results ............................. 38
5. Sweden European Parliament Election Results .......................................... 39
6. Netherlands European Parliament Election Results .................................... 40
7. Percentage of Voters for 2017 Candidates .............................................. 46
8. Voter Profiles for 2017 French Presidential Candidates ............................ 47

FIGURES

1. French Unemployment Rate ..................................................................... 31
2. Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate 2009-2014 ...................................... 33
3. Public Debt/GDP 2009-2014 .................................................................. 34
4. Recorded Unemployment Rates 2009-2014 ............................................... 35
5. French Presidential Election Results 2012-First Round ............................. 43
6. French Presidential Election Results 2007-First Round ............................. 43
7. Map of Popular Political Support Across France by Province .................... 45
8. Future of the EU Public Opinion Poll ...................................................... 49
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National</td>
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<td>LPF</td>
<td>List Pim Fortuyn</td>
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<td>PVV</td>
<td>Dutch Party for Freedom</td>
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<td>SD</td>
<td>Sweden Democrats</td>
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<td>UKIP</td>
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I would like to express my deepest thanks to Dr. Morales-Pita for his instrumental support and motivation over the course of my time at DePaul. I started at DePaul having never taken a course on economics before, and became passionate about the IPE field over the course of the four courses I took with Dr. Morales-Pita. It is because of his teaching that I have crafted my thesis around the subject.

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Finally, to my fellow cohort, my friends and family for their constant encouragement. I leave this program even more passionate and excited about my topic, and am eager to see what the future holds.
In many ways my engagement with this topic has been a decade in the making. Always interested in French history and political science from my early teenage years, it wasn’t until undergrad that I began to explore the field of comparative politics. I became engrossed in the field, which I studied in coincidence with my historical research, the development of French nationalism since the French Revolution. Upon graduating in 2010, I knew I wanted to pursue the topic with an even deeper investigation, which led me to widen my scope to Western Europe and look specifically at the phenomena of the far right political parties, something I saw as being contradictory to the European ideals of tolerance and openness I grew up idolizing in a society. The rise of these parties both disrupted and changed the discourse of European affairs, and I have spent my time at DePaul researching this shift. My thesis provided me with the opportunity to deeply look at France from an economic, political and social perspective, but also gave me the chance to utilize my interest in comparative politics, by including a comparison with four other European countries, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden and Greece.

The following thesis is the accumulation of my research thus far. The topic is increasingly dynamic with new events changing the conversation every day, one of the biggest challenges to covering such an ongoing subject, but also one of the most appealing aspects.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The economic, political and social landscape of the European Union is undergoing a sea change due to the relatively recent surge in influence of the leading extremist political parties, from the far left and the far right. Although their ideological roots come from very different places, what these parties share in common is their mutual disdain for the Eurozone; and more often than not, the European project as a whole. Lauded as a project for peace, many of these euro-skeptics disagree with the notion that the EU has helped prevent wars between European Nations for the past 70 years, and rather, has encouraged economic wars, as countries struggle to retain some sort of control over their own economic destinies. One of the founding members of the European Union, France has long fostered a kind of counter culture in the political realm, manifested in the forms of anti-Europe, ultra-nationalist parties. What has changed in the past several years is the seriousness of the threat these parties pose to the French presidency and the European Parliament. The Front National has been making historically unprecedented gains in the years following the financial crisis of 2008. However, the rise of the Front National and other populist far right parties like it across Western Europe cannot be attributed to economics alone. Two other factors are at play: political leadership and cultural conflict. Where all three of these major issues are seen, stagnant economic growth coupled with high unemployment, plus highly unfavorable ratings of the current president and an influx of immigration, the degrees of support for the far right, or similarly extreme euroskeptics, seems to be much higher. What makes the Front National unique from other far right populist parties in its same political family is the very real presence of the party to compete for the presidency in the next election, scheduled for 2017. The people of France are discouraged by their country’s lack of economic opportunity, especially for young people, and many citizens blame Brussels, home of the E.U. for their troubles.

There is a certain momentum behind the Front National, and their groundbreaking performance in the 2014 European Parliament election no doubt only reinforced what is often left unsaid: the Front
National are no longer a mere ‘outsider’ party and have broken into the mainstream of French politics. This considered, the Front National have a real chance at taking control of the country’s highest office come 2017, especially if the economic situation and threats of terrorism continue. That being said, this thesis aims to answer the following questions:

1. What kinds of economic, political and social mechanisms did Marine Le Pen use to bring the Front National into mainstream French politics, and has she succeeded?

2. How exactly does far-right ideology gain acceptance in a historically 'liberal' society?

3. How do the positions of the Front National differ from the societal norms of French society, and how do they draw on tradition to push their message?

Having looked at this all, I will finally ask if the Front National can really be considered a ‘far right’ party, when their economic platform is not entrenched in a classically populist agenda. The last question is imperative because understanding the specific policies of parties on an individual basis, rather than as a general ideology based on party family structures allows us to uncover why certain messages are registering with voters, and additionally serves as a strategy for successful counter-campaigns. The last question will also bring the research back full circle and allow for an expansive interrogation of the main question, has Le Pen been successful at bringing the Front National into mainstream politics?

My hypothesis is: the surge of the Front National’s public support is due to France’s deteriorating economic, social and political situations as a result of its membership within the Eurozone and also as a result of the countries mismanagement by the government.

I plan to support this hypothesis by analyzing the Front National’s economic policy, in addition to analyzing the Front National’s social and political policies, especially concentrating on nationalism, immigration and relations with the EU. This precise and differentiated appeal has thus led to the Front National to more success than if they had only policies strictly appealing to the traditional right.
Outline of Major Euroskeptic Parties and Hypothesis

It must be emphasized that this phenomenon of far right electoral surge is not unique to France, but rather, is something sweeping the EU as a whole. In order to firmly situate France as a case study in the larger field of extreme political parties, I am going to provide a concise analysis of several significant parties from across Europe. Those same countries will be revisited later in the project to compare economic and political statistics with. The parties I will cover include: United Kingdom Independence Party in Great Britain (UKIP), Sweden Democrats in Sweden (SD), Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (PVV) and Syriza in Greece. With the exception of Syriza, all of these parties are politically populist far-right. However, with its message of breaking free from the Eurozone and ending relations with Brussels, Syriza shares much in common with the far right, even though it is technically a far left party. This also goes to show how in Europe, both the far left and the far right have similar motivations when it comes to relations with the European Union. These parties have been selected for various, specific reasons. UKIP was selected for comparison because they share many of the same ideals and controversies as Front National, however, the two parties are often at odds and UKIP does not want to be formally associated with FN, despite their overwhelming similarities. Sweden Democrats were selected because they have enjoyed a similar spike in popularity in a country with an enormous immigrant population, much like France. An interesting dynamic exist in Sweden, in that, while their government supports an “open arms” approach to immigration, a sizeable portion of their population are turning to the Sweden Democrats to push the ultra-nationalist agenda and put a halt to the number of incoming immigrants. PVV is the most overtly similar party to Front National, and their leader, Geert Wilders, like the Le Pen’s, is similarly outspoken and controversial. PVV and FN represent countries that are both culturally and politically similar. Syriza is being included because no discussion of changing European politics in 2015 and beyond is complete without mentioning how this far-left, anti-Europe party won the Greek Presidency. After years of austerity, with public unrest and rioting at an all-time high, Greece electing Syriza serves as an example of the worst possible outcome of all of the economic and political drama confronting the European Project. Of course, these four
The United Kingdom Independence Party was founded in 1991 by Dr. Alan Sked (Ford and Goodwin 2014). More of an academic than a politician, Sked’s main concerns were with theory and abstract ideas, rather than concrete strategy for expanding party awareness (Ford and Goodwin 2014). Although the core of UKIP’s message resonated well with working class voters, Sked was seen as largely disconnected from the blue-collar crowd that felt left behind by the Labour party. UKIP’s largest region of support were in the south of England originally, although today they have a much wider sphere of influence across the whole of the UK. One major turning point in UKIP’s support was hiring Dick Morris, a senior advisor to Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign (Ford and Goodwin 2014). Morris helped simplify UKIP’s message into a simple “Say No” campaign, which portrayed the party’s position on issues ranging from European integration to immigration (Ford 2014). Another turning point in UKIP’s rise to prominence was in the mid-2000’s, when UKIP leaders actively tried to differentiate themselves from Britain’s other far-right party, British National Party (BNP). UKIP announced that any supporters who would offer concessions to BNP should simply leave the party, a demonstration of leadership which made clear the differences between UKIP and the more extreme, more racist BNP (Ford and Goodwin 2014). Since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, UKIP has been taken more seriously and placed themselves as a major contender for forming a coalition government in the upcoming elections (set for 7 May 2015). A few factors have contributed to the recent surge in UKIP support, including the declining British economy, leaving many uneducated, blue-collar workers behind. Related to that point, the influx of immigrants and new labour weak immigration policy has seen many jobs previously held by Brits go to immigrants who will work for lower wages. In addition to traditionally labour voters feeling left behind, disenchanted conservatives form a significant portion of UKIP constitutes. Some challenges faced by UKIP if they want to continue to widen their appeal are increasing their support of younger voters, women, and ethnic minorities.

As of January 2015, with the next general election only five months away, UKIP was the third most supported party in Britain, below Labour and Conservative. Their leader, Nigel Farage, is campaigning as an
equal to the major parties, rather than as an outsider. The inclusion of UKIP in the election debate shows that major media outlets are starting to take the party, and their voters’ concerns, more seriously. However, after the May 2015 general election, with UKIP failing to win more than one seat in parliament, despite strong pockets of support, Farage announced he would step down as party leader. The future for UKIP’s political prowess at present time is uncertain,

Rooted in Neo-Nazism, the Sweden Democrats have historically been classified as a marginal party. As a party, they were formed in the late eighties and consisted of right-wing extremist and former criminals up until the party was re-organized in the early 2000’s (Art 2011). It is only in recent years that they have gained national attention and been taken more seriously, less as a marginalized group of neo-Nazis and more so a viable alternative party. The rise of the Sweden Democrats, the economic crisis, and an open arms approach to immigration are all contributing factors to the changing of Swedish political discourse. Up until 2010, they had never previously won enough votes to be elected to Parliament (Art 2011). The general election of 2010 changed that narrative. Just two years after the financial crisis of 2008, and in the midst of an economic recession, the Sweden Democrats were able to successfully, though controversially, convince the public that they deserved a vote. The young leader of the party, Jimmie Akesson, is just 36 years old, but he campaigned with the tenacity of a veteran politician. For example, in one of their campaign commercials, the Sweden Democrats advertised an elderly white woman in line for pension benefits being trampled by a hoard of Muslim women in burqas running toward the line for welfare payments (Castle 2010). A major news station in Sweden refused to air this ad, but eventually agreed to air it with parts censored. The dispute over the ad allowed the Sweden Democrats to claim they were “victims of censorship” and garnered them a great deal of publicity (Castle 2010). The majority of the public is quick to dismiss the Sweden Democrats, as can be seen in the violence towards party members, the employment rates of party members, and a measure in Swedish media to mention the word “xenophobic” anytime the Sweden Democrats are mentioned (Art 2011).

The fact that the Sweden Democrats were able to win 5.7% of the general vote, however, points to a growing minority of Swedes who identify with their radical rhetoric (Economist 2010). The 5.7% was enough to
win 20 seats in Parliament, granting the Sweden Democrats the power of influence from the inside. Two factors contributed to the Sweden Democrats winning an unprecedented amount of votes in the 2010 election: economic consequences and an influx of immigration. Generally, when compared to the struggling peripheral nations of Europe, Sweden survived the economic crisis satisfactorily. Compared with other Nordic countries, however, Sweden has not fared so well, as Swedes found they were not immune to the negative implications of the 2008 Economic crisis. For example, Sweden’s GDP growth went from positive, 3.4% in 2007, to negative -5.3 in 2009. (EIU Data Tool) Public debt grew almost 4%, and unemployment rose, going from 6.2 in 2008 to 8.3 in 2009 (EIU Data Tool). The economic consequences of the financial crisis help to demonstrate the conditions in the labour market in Sweden. The Sweden Democrats are adamantly anti-immigration, claiming they want to “cut immigration by 90 percent” and think “the growth of Sweden’s Muslim population is the country’s biggest foreign threat since World War II” (Castle 2010). Akesson consistently makes headlines for his nationalistic platform, attracting plenty of attention to his party and their beliefs. Akesson speaks against multiculturalism and emphasizes the need for those migrating to Sweden to become more Swedish. Akesson says, “European countries have to get rid of this naïve idea of multiculturalism as a melting pot. People who come to Sweden must become as Swedish as possible. They are the ones who have to adjust, not us” (The Economist 2011)

In the Netherlands, the political response to immigration intervention has only increased in the past few decades. Two of the most notable parties to emerge with a strong anti-immigration sentiment are the LPF and PVV parties. The first of these parties is LPF, or List Pim Fortuyn, named after its leader, Pim Fortuyn, a sociology professor from Rotterdam. Fortuyn openly rejected multiculturalism and was vocally and adamantly against Islam (Economist 2002). He called for an end of immigration and was very much the face of the far-right movement in the Netherlands. The LPF was formed in 2001, just in time for the 2002 parliamentary elections. Just weeks before the election, however, Fortuyn was assassinated. Fortuyn’s assassination marked the first political murder in the Netherlands since the 17th century, and furthermore, tied the ideas of extreme right politics to violent intervention (Economist 2002). Following his assassination, the government called for campaigning to freeze until the election took place. In the 2002 election, the LPF party gained enough votes to
become the second largest party in the Netherlands. It must be mentioned that although the LPF won a sizeable victory in May, following the election their public opinion poll results drastically dropped (Art 2011). This decrease in popular support is said to be caused by lack of leadership, without Fortuyn as the face of the party, the internal factions began to compromise the party’s legitimacy. However, for a previously unknown party, running on a campaign promise of an end to immigration, this victory was majorly representative of the changing political climate in the early 21st century. LPF was not a sustainable political party, but their message and influence paved the way for the next wave of Dutch far-right politicians. PVV, or the Dutch Party for Freedom, is among the most openly discriminatory of the radical right in modern Europe. The Party for Freedom was founded in 2005, however, it is only in the years following the recession that the party has gained significant support and is now among the largest parties in the Netherlands. Led by Geert Wilders, Party for Freedom has become known as the anti-immigrant party, and their leader is constantly making headlines for his extreme rhetoric. For example, Wilders gave a speech addressing the problem of immigration in the Netherlands. Wilders asked the crowd if they would like to see more or fewer Moroccans in the Netherlands. The vivacious crowd chanted back to him “fewer, fewer!” Wilders responded by saying “then we will arrange that!” (Guardian 2014). The crowd laughed back in reply, as if the dismissal of one of The Netherlands largest minority groups was a joke. Many Dutch born, ethnically Moroccan’s reacted in anger to this and vowed to pursue Wilders in court on account of hate speech (Guardian 2014). Wilders insists that he is not trying to spread a message of hate, but his comments may indicate otherwise. He has stated “I believe the Islamic ideology is a retarded, dangerous one, but I make a distinction…I don’t hate people, I don’t hate Muslims” (Art 2011). PVV has firm positions against Islam: the official party stance is to outlaw the Koran, the Islamic holy book. Additionally, they support taxes on women’s headscarves and want to ban the headscarf in any public space, a law that has recently passed in the Netherlands to the surprise of many more liberal voters. Wilders himself has lived “under constant police protection since 2004,” and has been threatened multiple times by Muslims fed up with his message (Art 2011).

PVV is not only supported for its anti-immigration and anti-Muslim stance, it is also anti E.U., and has
attracted Eurosceptic voters across the country. The party calls for an end to the Euro and has made comments about “slaying the monster in Brussels” (The Economist 2013). 2010 marked a decisive year for the PVV’s popularity, most likely due to the declining economic situation in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis; the party won an unprecedented 24 seats in Dutch Parliament, making them the third largest party in the Netherlands.

The PVV’s popularity may have peaked, however, if the results from the 2014 European Parliament election are any indication. The PVV was expected to attract a massive amount of support; however, it actually lost votes, decreasing from five to three seats in the European Parliament (Hakhverdian 2014). Wilders blames this loss to low overall voter turnout, rather than a sign that voters are moving towards a more pro-immigration, pro-Europe mentality. The anti-immigration sentiments mentioned in the form of radical right parties are not isolated instances of discrimination. For example, one of the most extreme legislative measures pushed by the Dutch government in recent years is the “end of dual citizenship” (Keij 2012). The bill made headway in 2012, and was extraordinarily close to being passed, making it almost all the way without being noticed. The objective of this bill was complex, on the surface; it seemed to be a legislative measure to ensure Dutch allegiance, as it called for anyone with Dutch citizenship to denounce all other citizenships (Keij 2012). On the other hand, this bill was targeted towards the large population of Moroccans living in the Netherlands. According to Moroccan law, a Moroccan national cannot legally renounce their citizenship (Keij 2012). This bill, had it been passed, would have forced Moroccan’s to denounce their Dutch citizenship, making it a targeted derogatory effort. Of course, had the bill passed, it would have largely only held symbolic consequences, but they are representative of the growing trend of fears in immigration across the Netherlands.

Created as an alliance of leftist parties, Syriza was officially born in 2004, and serves to represent both the classic left and various social movements of the 20th century (BBC 2015). Although still a new party, Syriza has capitalized on various elements such as historical communist support and Greece’s financial catastrophe to gain prominence. In addition, Syriza has appealed to Greek youths, the jobless, the middle and lower classes through their anti-elitist messages. Integral to Syriza’s wide appeal is their leader, forty year old Alexis Tspiras. Tspiras is the youngest leader of modern Greece. Tspiras has managed to remain unencumbered by rigid
ideology and maintains Syriza as a diverse party with a strong internal democracy (BBC 2015). After winning the January 2015 elections, Syriza has been trying to renegotiate its bailout from the EU through talks that left many wondering about Greece’s exit from the Eurozone. Mr. Tsipras has used the aforementioned possibility as an instrument to obtain extension on the deadlines established for the payments of the loans. Additionally, they are also fiercely anti-austerity, something that all of these parties share in common.

These parties which I have briefly discussed are all significant to the larger theme of extreme parties in Western Europe, but they differ from each other as well. They are fit for comparison with the Front National because while all of them have areas of contrast, they overlap in their relationship with the E.U. The parties I have mentioned have been carefully selected because of their current relevance and strength, and their diverse representation and my prior familiarity with them. The Netherlands is most similar to France in that both are integral members of the Eurozone and are historically pro-Europe nations. Although they certainly weathered the economic crisis better than France, Geert Wilders and the PVV is one of the most vocal representations of far right sentiment seen in Europe. Sweden is a wealthy country outside of the Eurozone which has a defined problem of racial relations largely due to their generous asylum policy, and the reactions against such are personified in the Sweden Democrats. The United Kingdom is again, outside of the Eurozone, but has strong ties to Europe and a sizeable portion of UK citizens are in favor of joining the Eurozone, those who are adamantly against closer ties to Europe are manifested in the UKIP party. Finally, although on the opposite end of the political spectrum, the far left in Greece, Syriza and their dynamic leader Alexis Tsipras have won the presidency on the promise to break off relations with the Eurozone all together, a shocking and unprecedented step which has the ability to affect the future of Europe as we know it.

As I have demonstrated, the Front National is but one of many parties within Europe sharing overlapping anti-Europe sentiments. Through this project, I aim to understand what mechanisms can be highlighted as a means to political gain, not only in the European Union’s largest country, France, but also throughout Western Europe as a sort of observable pattern. This project does not aim to be a history of the Front National, rather, an examination of their political strategy and an analysis of the circumstances they have
capitalized on to get to where they are today. Through careful investigation, this project should serve as a means for evaluating the trajectory of support for similar political parties, whether they be considered “far right” or “far left.”

In the following chapter, the literature review covers relevant works spanning political theory, current affairs and major debates. The works included are a mix of academic books and journals and modern media, including magazine and newspaper articles, to get a ‘real time’ sense of the situation in Europe.
The overarching goal of this literature review is to develop an understanding of exactly what the far right is, and differentiate the “far right” from the “radical right.” By deconstructing that question into smaller pieces, I am able to see what constitutes the field of populist politics and the underlying theory that supports it. Of particular importance to this research is fully comprehending why far right parties are more politically and electorally successfully in some European states, but not in others.

This literature review is organized both chronologically and thematically, with noticeable areas of overlap used to bridge each author’s contribution to the field. The themes I have chosen to focus on are “radical right theory,” which is general and concerned with the ideology behind the radical right. This section includes leading arguments for why voters vote radical right, why this ideology is appealing, and how this political family came about. The next theme is “Front National,” and these pieces are specifically focused on France and the Front National. This section takes themes from the first section and puts them to practical use through analysis of the situation in France, specifically. The third section is the “theory,” and contains leading theories used to explain the rise of the far right and its ideological origins. These theories are ones in which I will employ in my larger argument later on in the project.

These recurring themes, presented as the major debates in the field, all attempt to unpack the reasons why the far right has been successful, and furthermore, understand what political implications this appeal can have on mainstream parties. While this literature review does include some older, “cornerstone” pieces, the majority of the works more modern in publication, due to the dynamic and ever changing nature of politics.

The earliest text I will address in this literature review is Seymour Martin Lipset & Stein Rokkan’s 1967 “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction” from Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. Lipset & Stein’s contribution is a foundational argument for what constitutes as “cleavages” in modern politics. The authors argue that cleavages exists in two ways: territorial, concerned with defining the nation, stemmed from the French Revolution; and functional, or interest-based, stemmed from the Industrial Revolution. Lipset and Stein demonstrate the four criteria for which political cleavages are translated into party differences: legitimation, incorporation, representation and majority power.
Lipset and Stein’s work is a cornerstone piece in how we understand cleavages, and therefore how we understand fringe parties and the far right; their work has left the door open for more thorough investigations on the effects of these cleavages in modern politics.

Kriesi et. al expands on the theoretical ideas presented in Lipset & Rokkan in that they translate the theory to a modern application, in their *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. This text argues that globalization has created a set of “winners” and “losers,” and the effects of these sets are articulated in the forms of political parties. Economic competition, increasing cultural diversity and political competition all contribute to the determining of the “winners” and the “losers” of globalization. According to Kriesi et. al, losers of globalization include those whose lives were traditionally protected by national boundaries, and are thereby experiencing a threat, real or perceived, to their social status and security. This definition eludes to how various cleavage parties across Europe situate themselves in this larger debate and begins to shed some light on why these parties are appealing to particular kinds of people, in addition to questioning whether or not this represents a new cleavage, and if so, what kind of cleavage has it created?

Cas Mudde’s *The Ideology of the Extreme Right* dives into a topic he explains has not been explored enough: deconstructing exactly what is “the extreme right.” Mudde explains the problematic nature of grouping political parties into families based on similar ideology, as deeper investigation reveals that these “families” may not be so similar, after all. The author also acknowledges that many terms commonplace in the discipline have no agreed on definition, although the term in and of itself is widely used, for example “right-wing extremism.” Mudde finds that there are five characterizes which are mostly agreed upon to define what is “right-wing extremism” and notes they are: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state. Mudde’s case studies are Germany, Flanders and the Netherlands, and by contrasting their respective “extreme right” parties, he is able to highlight the foundational differences in their ideologies, despite all of the parties mentioned falling under the same party family. Mudde ultimately argues that political parties should be evaluated on an individual basis rather than as a part of an imagined ideological whole.

Hanz-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall’s *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and
Movement in Established Democracies contains contributions about extreme right parties across the globe, from France to India to New Zealand. This international collection makes their work unique and offers a chance to compare conditions surrounding the rise of the far right across developed countries. Betz and Immerfall argue that insecurity and physiological strain associated with large-scale uncertainty, such as increasing structural and socioeconomic changes, are the reason populist right parties are expiring success worldwide. Betz and Immerfall highlight a similarity that these parties share, in that the most successful radical right populist parties have strong, charismatic leaders coupled with tight knit internal organization, which contributes to the ability to make decisions regarding policy quicker than other parties. By placing equal importance on party organization and party leadership, Betz and Immerfall situate themselves in the middle of the debate on what makes neo-populist parties successful in certain countries.

Simon Bornschier’s Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe argues very specifically that far right parties in Europe are almost entirely a cultural reaction (question of identity), rather than an economic reaction. In this argument, Bornschier offers a dramatic departure than what was discussed in Kriesi et. al, as Bornschier says economics play no role in the mobilization of the populist right. One of the central arguments in the text states that the rise of the populist right is a consequence of the growing presence of new cultural dimensions of conflict at the expense of the economic state-market cleavage. Bornschier focuses on how the populist right gained momentum by framing the question of identity and community in terms of “us” vs “the other,” and offers immigration and the inability to integrate as examples of this. Another major contribution of Bornschier’s text is the argument that the core of the populist right’s ideology consists of opposition to the process of societal modernization. Because of this, Bornschier argues that right wing populist right parties should be seen in a context of changing societal structures, which relates back to his initial cultural vs economic argument.

Douglas Holmes’ Integral Europe: Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, Neofascism outlines political events of the 1980’s and 1990’s through an integralist framework, which Holmes describes as being a vigorous engagement with the modern world, which stemmed from a commitment to traditional cultural forms. Holmes’
work is concerned with how integralism has been translated into politics via a “cadre of committed partisans,” in particular Jean Marie Le Pen. These partisan leaders have “shrewdly discerned ruptures in the experience of belonging that threatened various registers of European identity. Integralism, according to Homes, adheres to an extremely contentious theory of society, one marked by anti-materialism and authoritarian socialism, in order to deter the advances of fast-capitalism and multiculturalism.

Lloyd Kramer’s *Nationalism in Europe and America: Politics, Cultures and Identities since 1775* offers a comprehensive, theoretical history of nationalism vis a via a comparison of various European countries and the United States. Kramer offers various definitions and arguments for what constitutes nationalism as well has the origins of nationalism in the modern world. By looking at a varied field of subjects, including culture, politics, religion, wars, language, race, etc., Kramer gives scope to the various areas of the world in which nationalism influences. In his post war chapter, Kramer draws a comparison between France and the United States, noting how because of their similar histories of revolutionary origins and collective support for national ideals and universality, France and the United States are two of the most nationalist countries in the modern world. This comparison is something I have not read in other books on the subject, but I agree with Kramer’s position on the matter. Kramer further discusses France as it relates to the European Union, noting that President De Gaulle was nationalist but still saw that the benefits of joining the European Economic Commission would far outweigh the drawbacks. In this case, Kramer notes that peace and transnational cooperation were driving factors to raise public and political support for further EU integration.

David Art’s *Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe* is mostly concerned with answering the question of why anti-immigrant, far-right parties seem to succeed in some countries, while failing in others. In particular, he compares the UK, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Sweden with Italy, France and the Netherlands to understand the different political systems that allow far-right parties to rise in the latter countries. Art argues that the rise of these parties is more so due to the ability of their leaders, who are often charismatic, educated and seemingly rational, rather than a variety of outside factors, such as immigration levels and economics. Of course, much has changed since Inside the Radical Right was
published, in particular, the countries he selected as not having major far right parties now to some degree all of seen increased momentum in popularity of these parties. In the UK and Sweden in particular, you do see the leadership capability of both Nigel Farage of UKIP and Jimmie Akesson of Sweden Democrats. The time frame of the books publishing and the current status of the parties mentioned suggests that the economic slowdown has had much to do with the rise of the far right. Despite some of his judgments being outdated, the text still presents a solid base argument for the importance of a central party figurehead. Art’s placement of the party leader as more important that cultural or economic factors diverges from other authors I have reviewed.

In *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*, Terri Givens explores the question of why radical right parties win more seats in some countries than others. Givens asserts that to understand this question, a systematical comparison of institutional structures in each country, including party systems and the electoral system, must be explored. She argues that extreme right parties are not as successful in electoral systems that encourage strategic voting (the tendency for voters to feel they are “wasting” their vote if they vote for their first-choice party, so instead they vote with the party who has the best chance of beating their least-preferred party). Although Givens considers the socio-economic environment of voters, she does not place prominence on it, as many authors have done in the past. Instead, her focus is primarily institutional, which allows her to craft a hypothesis that can be applied in various developed countries. Givens also differs from authors such as David Art, as she argues that strong party leadership is only consequential in the instance of a holding a party together after a major faction has formed.

While the previous works reviewed have been of a more general political nature, the next few pieces are specific to the case study of my project: France. One of the leading voices in French political scholarship is Nonna Mayer, and her article “From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right” is particularly relevant to my project. In the article, Mayer provokes the question of how Marine Le Pen’s differs from her father, and explores the degree of variance that exists in the two leader’s policies. Mayer goes through several categories of issues that Marine Le Pen and her father might differ on, such as unemployment, immigration, E.U. integration, etc. but is insistent that Front National voters are very ideologically and socially
similar regardless of who is the party leader. Ultimately, Mayer concludes that Marine Le Pen’s ability to attract women better than her father has given her electoral success, which, she notes, could prove catastrophic for both the mainstream left and the right.

In support of Mayer’s conclusions, Marit Ann Berntson’s *Daughters of Jeanne D’Arc: Women in the French Front National* argues that women actually play a much larger role in the Front National that is typically assumed. Berntson dispels the belief that female party members play second fiddle to the male party members through her extensive field work and interviews with women in the Front National. Berntson’s objective is to understand why these women join the Front National, and what larger implication their political activism has. In an attempted to understand what the experience of being a member of the Front National is like for these women, she finds that the women of Front National are concerned about issues affecting all parties, such as globalization, immigration, unemployment and crime. Berntson’s workplaces high importance on women’s role within the Front National, while at the same time investigating gender roles, nationalism and political identity.

Taking a different approach from Mayer, James Shields is more concerned with policy formation as a whole, rather than analyzing the effects of different leaders on party policy. Shields’ “Radical or Not So Radical? Tactical Variation in Core Policy Formation by the Front National” interrogates how capable of change the Front National is in terms of the policy agenda it sets for itself. By tracing a single issue, immigration, Shields argues that Front National is actually more capable of dynamic representation in terms of policy responsiveness than it is typically expected to be. Usually thought of as a single-issue party, Shields traces the development of the Front National’s immigration policy from the 1970’s to present day and shows how the party’s immigration policy has changed over the years: from not being an important part of the policy, to being the “single issue,” and now, with the party trying to diversify its issue portfolio, one of a few main issues. Shields ultimately provokes an important question, that is, can we really classify the Front National as a “radical” party, given its history of issue adaptability?

Similar to Shields, Gabriel Goodliffe takes a historical approach to understanding the sustaining success of the Front National in his *The Resurgence of the Radical Right in France: From Boulangisme to the Front*
National. Goodliffe’s traces the origins of the radical right in France from the end of the 19th century all the way until the 2007 presidential election. By doing this extensive historical study, Goodliffe is able to argue that there is another side to the debate, which usually places the Front National’s success on the coincidence of rising unemployment and powerful anti-immigrant stance. Goodliffe attributes the Front National’s success to an unusual class struggle over time, which has created sustained pockets of support for the populist right and its causes. Goodliffe’s main claim is that the Front National must be understood as an uninterrupted political tradition, rather than as a party with bursts of success here and there.

Far right political parties such as the Front National prey upon fears of an increasingly jeopardized national identity as part of their campaign strategy, so for the purposes of this literature review, covering theory concerned with nationalism and unpacking motivations for voting radical right was crucial. Craig Calhoun’s Social Theory and the Politics of Identity contains contributions from leading social theorist attempting to make sense of the differences in the modern discourse of identity politics. The relationship between identity and nationalism, and where these themes fit in the larger narrative on social theory are the main subjects of argument. Early in the text, Calhoun argues that identity is directly related to the modern era due to efforts to consolidate individualism and reinforce sameness. Elsewhere in the text, Calhoun argues that nationalism is a contemporary construct, rather than something inherited or primordial, which allows citizens to deal with problems of recognition and the exclusionary nature of state powers. Although Calhoun states that nationalism is not intrinsically a bad thing, the way it is employed by authoritarian regimes to impose state power as a tool of repression is certainly problematic.

In “Forms of Attachment to the European Union: a Study of French Conceptions of Identity in the Context of a Changing Europe,” Richard C. Robyn investigates the impact of a growing European power at the supranational level on the individual levels, focusing on France. The main theory Robyn works from is transnational constructivism, and argues that the European Union has helped facilitate the notion that national identity is no longer dominant in the European context. Because of this, Europeans are having to create new ways to politically identify themselves. Robyn finds through his case study that French people seem willing to
bypass the state on certain issues, but are not showing disfavor towards the state overall. While I do not agree with the conclusions made by Robyn, because post-2008 European identity seems to be of a growing cause of anxiety amongst the individual due to the Eurozone financial crisis; his work in transnational constructivism is very thorough and represents a different theoretical dimension.

Much of the literature in this subject has been very broad and very little of it focuses on France in particular. For instance, Katie Engelhart’s “The Rise of the Far Right” offers an expansive investigation of Far-Right parties all over Europe, including France. Engelhart discusses France’s contribution to the rise of the Far-Right by noting France’s participation in the “The Future of Nationalist movements” conference in Tokyo in August, 2010. Engelhart discusses the political alliance between Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. She also touches on Ms. Le Pen’s influence in French politics, despite not being officially elected. The example Englehart offers is in a 2010 television interview, Marine Le Pen “compared Muslims praying in the streets to France’s occupation by Germany during the Second World War A year later, France banned street prayers and became the first European country to prohibit face-covering niqabs in public – in an effort to appease Le Pen, many argue.” Engelhart alludes to Le Pen’s ability to influence French politics in another way, as she points out Madame Le Pen has an eight point higher approval rating than President Hollande. Engelhart also touches on President Sarkozy’s willingness to act on issues raised by Le Pen in an effort to “claw back rightist voters from Le Pen.” Where Englehart touches on issues regarding the political situation in France, it is still merely an overview, as her piece is a very general look at the climate in Europe as a whole. What’s more, she does not touch on the economic situation in France. This is where the author and Englehart differ. The author will go in depth to political and economic issues facing France, and offer a through look at France, specifically.

Jacobs et. Al’s “European Parliament Elections in Times of Crisis” is a multi-faceted report about the current conditions facing voters of the 2014 European Parliament elections. The authors describe the political climate and breakdown why 2014 is an important year for European elections. The authors address the criticism that low-turnout renders the EP elections insignificant by offering a comparison to U.S. Congressional, Mid-Term elections. They say “it should also be noted that turnout for the US Congressional elections, arguably
to elect the most powerful parliament of all, is also very low; indeed, turnout for mid-term elections is consistently lower than for the EP elections. And yet this argument is not traditionally used to question Congress’s legitimacy. “This piece offers an in-depth political investigation of the EP’s composition, providing graphs which map the current EP composition and compare it with the estimated post-election composition of the EP. The report also discusses the ruse of Euroscepticism and notes “the financial and economic crisis in Europe is generally assumed to have fuelled Eurosceptic sentiments, and the EP elections are seen to provide an excellent forum for voters to express their discontent not only with the process of European integration, but with the political establishment more generally.” This 29 page report is very in-depth, providing the reader with an up close look at the fundamentals of the EP and the election process. However, it only lightly touches on France, and focuses heavily on politics and not so much on economics. My research will differ in that I will present the issues in France, and analyze political and economic factors equally.

The next piece I will review is from The Economist’s “Special Report: France,” and were integral to the discourse on France’s economic crisis. I was very much inspired by both pieces. The Economist’s “The Time-Bomb at the Heart of Europe” is especially notable, as its controversial subject matter has angered French Politian’s. The image used for this issue of the Economist was several baguettes tied together with the French flag like dynamite, with a lit fuse burning at the end. The article explains why France’s unique position as one of the proprietors of the Euro makes its vulnerability in lieu of the economic crisis particularly ironic. The article discusses that being part of the Eurozone has worked counterintuitively for France, making it impossible for France to have the option of currency devaluation, and instead having to resort to public spending and debt. This article highlights many of the problems facing France and concludes with doubt about the economic situation, ending with “France, rather than Italy or Spain could be where the euro’s fate is decided. Mr. Hollande does not have long to defuse the time-bomb at the heart of Europe.” I was very much influenced by this article, and this paper differs as the I plan to go in more depth about the problems brought up by this article.

The Financial Times published an article, “France Unveils Sweeping Plan to Revive Flagging Industrial
Base,” about the Socialist government’s efforts to appeal to pro-business voters. In the article, Hugh Carnegy describes the 10-year industrial policy he hopes will be a pragmatic approach to reducing the deficit and creating growth. Carnegy describes the plan as “an effort to stimulate activity at a time when unemployment is rising towards 11 percent of the workforce and the economy is struggling to recover from recession.” This article was useful to the author by outlining a specific example of Hollande’s attempt to quell the recession. The author plans to approach the subject more holistically in this paper, by looking at the situation in more detail.

“The Rise of the Far Right: a European Problem Requiring European Solutions”, by John Palmer first appeared in The Guardian 15 November 2013. Palmer explores the effects of the crisis in relation to the rise of far right political parties all across Europe. Palmer focuses on Marine Le Pen of Front National and Geert Wilders, of the Dutch Party of Liberty (PVV). In the article Palmer explores the notion that austerity measures have a direct relation to the “revival of the far right.” Palmer contrasts The National Front and the Dutch Party of Liberty, showing the former to be the more extreme of the two, but also demonstrates how they have worked together to form an alliance. This article accurately exposes the connections between the economic turmoil felt across Europe and the ability of the far right to appeal to voters feeling the sting of austerity. Palmer’s article differs from this paper in that he focuses on France and the Netherlands, while this paper will focus solely on France, with occasional comparison to Germany. This author also differs from Palmer in that this paper will analyze economic factors in more specific detail.

Competitive Threat and Intergroup Contact are two theories deconstructed by Daniel Della Posta’s “Competitive Threat, Intergroup Contact, or Both? Immigration and the Dynamics of Front National Voting in France.” The article’s central question is: what changed between the 2002 and 2007 elections to lower the Front National’s performance? In 2002, Front National, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen made it to the second round of elections in a run off against Jacques Chirac, the incumbent president. Shields also argues that in the final run off in 2002, more votes were cast as votes against Le Pen, rather than votes for Chirac, which supports the strategic voting theory that other authors have mentioned. Nicolas Sarkozy’s tactic was to be a “rival” to Le Pen,
albeit one with more moderate views. By overlapping on many of the same issues, such as immigration and national identity, Sarkozy was able to attract voters with his similar but less-extreme rhetoric. The theoretical significance of Posta’s article, along with its historical deconstruction of the 2002-2009 period in French elections make it an important piece in the subject of European politics.

Transitioning to more current, journalistic sources, the next piece appeared in the *Wall Street Journal* in October 2014. Entitled “Germany, France Tap Economists for Advice to Avoid ‘Lost Decade’”, the authors, Harriet Torry and William Horobin highlight the prolonged economic woes facing France, and the struggle to get a 2015 budget approved. Torry and Horobin report that France is resistant to implementing austerity measures, especially raising new taxes and cutting additional spending. This is creating a conflict as the deficit is growing and the new budget only proposes to slightly lower the deficit, while E.U. leaders are demanding more significant budget cuts. This ongoing back and forth between the E.U. and leadership in Paris is important to highlight the reality of France’s economic troubles, and the position they are stuck in by being members of a currency union, giving Paris less control over its own finances than if they were fiscally independent.

In *The Economist*, an article appearing on 24 October 2014 entitled “The Big Chill” examines the state of Foreign Direct Investment in France. According to *The Economist*, France used to be the world’s largest recipient of FDI, but now only accounts for 17% of global investment. Of those companies investing, very few are satisfied with the investment. *The Economist* focuses on American companies and notes that only 12% of all US FDI to France would rate as “satisfied,” this is mostly due to the high level of taxes which makes the investment in France unappealing. President Hollande has vowed to make France a more attractive place to do business for foreign companies, and has promised to lower taxes, but many investors are still weary until change actually happens. This article is important because it highlights one of the many economic issues facing France. In a country that does not want to adhere to austerity measures, as seen in the last article from the Wall Street Journal, FDI is a crucial way to trim the deficit. If France is not seen as a good place to do business, then its options for economic recovery look slimmer and slimmer.

An article appearing on Time.com 7 January 2015, by Charlotte McDonald-Gibson entitled “Europe’s
Anti-Immigrant Parties Make Hay From Paris Terror Attack analyses the response of the leading far right parties across Europe, notably PVV’s Geert Wilders of the Netherlands, UKIP’s Nigel Farage of the UK, and FN’s Marine Le Pen of France. Though the leaders all differ slightly in their rhetoric, with Wilders making the most extreme comments of the bunch, calling for the “de-Islamization” of Europe, they are all similar in their readiness to capitalize on the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris on 7 January 2015. Le Pen’s comments appear less extreme and more in line with President Hollande’s, as she notes that the terrorist attacks were carried out in the name of “radical Islam.” McDonald-Gibson argues that all of these far right parties have their roots in the financial crisis of 2008, and with dwindling and negative growth, plus high unemployment rates, migrants become easy scapegoats to support the far right’s arguments.

This overview of the field of far right political ideology has offered several varying arguments for defining the radical right, as well as offering several answers for why some populist parties are more successful in certain countries rather than others. The first question, what is the radical right, is one that does not have a clear, universally agreed upon answer. The naming in itself has proven to be problematic, with the variety in nomenclature ranging from far right on one end, to radical right populist parties on the other, with several other identifications in the middle. I tend to agree with Cas Mudde in “The Ideology of the Extreme Right” in that analyzing these parties on a “family” basis, rather than on an individual basis is problematic. If we do not study these parties individually, many of the country specific factors, such as cultural and economic conditions are ignored. While I agree that many of these parties share macro similarities, in that, as Kriesi et. al. argue, they appeal to losers of globalization, I also agree with Betz and Immerfall’s argument that party organization and leadership are both crucial to the national success of these far right parties. For the purposes of my argument, I will assume this position: the radical right is a political ideology focused preserving national identity through socially and politically exclusionary measures while rejecting globalization and limiting the influence of the outside on its people. I do

As for the second question, I assert that radical right parties are more successful in some countries than they are in others due to certain conditions being at play simultaneously: having a strong leader focused on the
party’s public image, coupled with particular external circumstances, such as economic crisis and identity
insecurity. For the Western European countries, the situation is particularly unique, because they have the
added circumstance of being part of a controversial political and economic union. I believe that being a
member of the European Union/Eurozone has increased the activity amongst radical right movements in
Western Europe. The parties that dominate the field of radical right in Europe all share a common characteristic
in that they are on the “fringe” with only some recently becoming “mainstream.” For example, the Front
National is clearly one of the most popular parties in France, however, they are consistently ostracized from the
mainstream. An example of this is not being invited to the 11 January 2015 march of solidarity against the
Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks. In other countries, such as the UK, the far right is beginning to be recognized in
the mainstream, such as when UKIP’s Farage was invited to the BBC debate vs. Liberal Democrat leader Nick
Clegg. However, UKIP has a much smaller percentage of government seats than Front National. This
inconsistency in public and political acceptance of the far right is one reason why there is currently no far right
party with a majority rule.

My research differs from the texts covered in this literature review because it will focus on one party’s
leader, Marine Le Pen of the Front National, and will unpack the question of whether the Front National can
really be considered “radical right,” given that they seem to be in a lane of their own in many of the policies
offered by the Le Pen’s, most notably having a clearly leftist economic agenda, while still promoting an
exclusionary form of nationalism, something more in line with the traditional far right. In addition, nationalism
as it relates to identity is historically embedded in French culture and the desire to preserve “Frenchness” is not
new nor is it a radical idea. Also the previous literature does not mention the worsening economic situation as
an important reason for the surge of Marine Le Pen’s populist party, while my thesis analyzes this renaissance
of populism in France in a holistic way including economic, political and social standpoints.

CHAPTER 3
POLITICAL THEORY AND HISTORICAL PARTY RELATIONS

The third chapter will cover the history of the Front National in the framework of the populist right in
Western Europe as a whole, as well as the theoretical basis of the research project. To bring the focus back to France, the third chapter will cover the Front National party’s political framework through a historical lens, including a profile on the party’s former leader, Jean Marie Le Pen, and an account of their varied election performances and running platforms over time. The third chapter will next cover a brief discussion of the state of French politics, in order to establish an understanding of the climate in which Front National is existing; this portion will be focused on the financial crisis and the different leadership styles of President’s Sarkozy and Hollande. In this section, it will be vital to demonstrate my knowledge of political theory, most specifically covering the following topics: populism, nationalism, and integration theory. This chapter will present major theories and also distinguish the Front National from other right wing parties across Europe.

Understanding the political theory behind far right populist movements and the historical beginnings of the Front National are essential to understanding the current framework of events. To begin, I offer my own definition of the far right in order to establish a baseline for understanding. I define the far right as a political ideology focused preserving national identity through socially and politically exclusionary measures while rejecting globalization and limiting the influence of the outside on its people. From that definition, the personalities of many of the parties discussed in Chapter One begin to take form in a more singular and coherent way. Using this definition to understand these parties as individuals under a larger umbrella of party family affiliation is critical to analyzing each party in particular. This definition includes the phrase “preserving national identity,” and nationalism as a concept is one of the foundational themes seen across all of the populist parties.

In France, and elsewhere, nationalism is often regarded as a product of modernity. A tool used both positively and negatively by nations to unify, rally and coerce the public consciousness on the merits of nationhood. In France, nationalism has roots in the French Revolution that still permeate culture and politics to this day. Essential to constructing nationalism was Napoleon Bonaparte’s crusade to unify the country to create what we now see as “France,” and transitioned the population from a diverse group of regions with individual languages and customs to a unified whole. This unification was achieved namely through creating a national
education system, in which all children, whether from Brittany, Provence, or Paris, all learned according to the same set of national standards, in French, rather than a regional dialect. The education system was critical in developing a nation of French speaking citizens, and was by far the most integral action in the move towards the construction of modern France. Though a construct of modernity, Nationalism has remained a powerful means to unite large numbers of citizens. This can be used as a tool of politics and government, particularly in times of war or crisis.

Issues of Identity, Assimilation and Tolerance

After two centuries of war, French national identity was both solidified and interrupted again in the post-war world. In the 1960’s, immigrants from many former colonies came to live across Europe, and with so many territories in Northern Africa as well as the Caribbean, France was no exception to this sudden diversification. This insurgence of cultures heightened national anxieties, causing hostility towards the new immigrants. From the early days of the Front National, Jean Marie Le Pen, the party’s founder and father of current party leader Marine Le Pen, preached against the societal ills of immigration and called for a return to “Frenchness,” something allegedly disrupted by this incoming diversification. Jean Marie Le Pen focused his attention on the characterization of the immigrant population and centered his rhetoric around the unassimilated immigrant, who was the “anathema to the construction of society predicated on shared moral preconcepts, sublime cultural distinction and dark historical fears and aspiration” (Holmes 2000). As Douglas Holmes argues, the goal of Le Pen’s insurgency was not just mere bigotry, but rather to construct the Front National policy of “National Preference.” Something described as “giving priority to those deemed to be French in almost every aspect of economic and social life eradicating virtually any political rights for immigrants” (Holmes 2000). This perceived threat to national identity, manifested in this anti-immigrant narrative which seeks to strip immigrants of political, economic and social rights, is one of the uniting features of all of the populist right parties discussed in this project, and they all share this message in common, to varying degrees. Holmes contends that the success of such radical right politicians can be traced back to the “politicizing of
integralist fears and aspirations” (Holmes 2000). Holmes cites the “unfolding of advanced European political and economic integration that is manifest in the project to create a multiracial and multicultural European Union” as a main reason for the socioeconomic forms of estrangement that have been previously discussed in this paper (Holmes 2000). According to Wendy Brown, one reason for the problematization of immigration across Europe is the threat of outside cultures eroding traditional ethnic identities. As a result, the concept of “tolerance” began to work its way into political vernacular, disguised as a peaceful means of coexistence, despite racially and economically divided societies (Brown 2006). For Brown, the use of tolerance is merely a tool of power, and its effects are two-fold: a state can claim to be tolerant of different cultures (despite actions of intolerance still occurring within that state), and a state can claim to be tolerant and use it as an excuse to take action against “intolerant” societies (Brown 2006). For the countries discussed in this project, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Greece and United Kingdom, this argument certainly holds true. There is a paradoxical relationship between the ideals of the European Union project and the reality for non-native Europeans living in the E.U. These dichotomous concepts, between tolerance and intolerance, native EU and non-EU, us vs other, are used by political parties as tools, but have real life implications on the actual subjects of the dialogue. While it strives for equality and multiculturalism, the actual myriad of people trying to join European culture are often rejected and systematically marginalized, be it through employment opportunities, housing allotment and educational possibilities.

Creation of the EU and Recent Political Landscape in France

The creation of the European Union unintentionally disrupted national unity across the most cohesively nationalist countries in European, such as France, as the project aimed to economically, politically and socially unite the continent in order to preserve peace and cooperation. With that being said, France played an integral role in the construction of the EU. A nationalist in his own right, Charles De Gaulle’s efforts to “constantly protect France’s national interests” were subdued in exchange for the common market and transnational cooperation which the EU fostered (Kramer 2011). Representing France in the creation of the
Eurozone was President Jacques Chirac. Although he once considered himself an “anti-European Gaullist,” he was instrumental in the creation of the Euro, and became a “champion of the single currency” (BBC 2011). President Chirac represented the conservative “Union for a Popular Movement” Party (UNP), which was a spawn of several other parties consolidated into one, including Chirac’s self-created party, “Rally for the Republic,” (RPR) (BBC 2011). Chirac’s predecessor, Socialist President Francois Mitterrand, was heavily influential in the creation of the European Union. After so many years under a Socialist leader, the people of France turned to Chirac and his right-wing ideals. Although in good political standing in 2002, by the time the European Union constitution was brought to a referendum vote in France, in 2005, the French people had begun to express their doubts with President Chirac, and the European integration (BBC 2005). Voters in France turned out in large numbers to vote “oui” or “non” on the referendum. By ultimately rejecting the constitution, the people of France also rejected President Chirac’s position. This rejection came about because of “dissatisfaction” bubbling under the surface in France, being “plagued for years by high unemployment and uncertainty over who should belong in the European club” (BBC 2005). The voters had expressed their disapproval, and in 2007 would turn out once again to favor a new leader, Nicolas Sarkozy.

If the tides were turning under President Chirac, with regards to the French position of the integrated Eurozone, they came to a crashing halt under President Sarkozy. President Sarkozy was not dissimilar from Present Chirac in that they both represented the conservative UNP party. They were political rivals, however. Sarkozy was elected in May 2007, a year of great economic prosperity (BBC 2014). Only a year later, in the summer of 2008, would Sarkozy be put to the test in his handling of the Global Economic Crisis of 2008. President Sarkozy was “at the forefront of the European response to the global economic crisis in 2008 and helped establish the G20 summits involving the world's biggest economies,” according to BBC News (BBC 2014). Hard hit by the crisis, Sarkozy turned to reforms to help France recover from the economic downturn. Though extremely unpopular, these reforms were arguably necessary, including “raising the retirement age from 60 to 62, relaxing the 35-hour working week, overhauling the universities and altering the tax system to encourage overtime
and home ownership” (BBC 2014). For a welfare-state nation so historically against conservative reforms, Sarkozy’s attempt to quell the economic struggle was faced with massive popular unrest. People took to the streets in protest of the retirement age being raised, and went on strike in incredible numbers. In September of 2010, over one million workers protested the pension reforms (BBC 2010). Among the striking workers were teachers, which affect school’s closing, and Air France employees, which disrupted “short and medium haul flights” (BBC 2010). President Sarkozy’s cabinet defended his decision. For example, Labour Minister Eric Woerth warned that if the pension reform bill was not passed, “then tomorrow there will be no money left to pay the French pensions” (BBC 2010). Nicolas Sarkozy’s conservative reforms continued to receive backlash from the French people, who did not reelect him in the elections of 2012, instead returning to a Socialist leader, Francois Hollande.

The election of Socialist President Francois Hollande was a reactionary effort by the French voting public. After angering voters with pension reforms and carrying on with a lavish and flashy lifestyle in the midst of recession, voters had had enough of Sarkozy and turned to Hollande. Voters saw Hollande as the opposite of Sarkozy, a Socialist promising to lead France out of the recession by offering an alternatively leftist economic agenda. A longtime politician, Francois Hollande joined the Socialist party in 1979, and served as an economic advisor to Francois Mitterand (BBC 2014). He has been a Member of Parliament since 1998, and is seen as having crossover appeal, as praised by Jacques Chirac in his memoir, stating Hollande is a "true statesman, capable of crossing party lines” (BBC 2014). One of Hollande’s most grandiose campaign promises, which appealed to the struggling workers of France, was imposing a 75% income tax rate on those making over 1 million Euros per year (Economist 2012). Hollande also gained support in his open criticism of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her push for austerity measures. Although, as the economic crisis shows no sign of slowing, reforms will be necessary at some point, leaving President Hollande with a difficult challenge of balancing the Socialist ideals on which he was elected, preserving his own legacy and rescuing the reputation of France as it dips deeper and deeper into economic disaster. The Economist sums up the challenges faced by President Hollande “Mr Hollande was elected on a promise to kick-start growth, cut unemployment and end austerity. Now he presides
over recession, rising joblessness—and the need to impose more austerity on dumbfounded voters” (Economist 2012). Hollande’s approval rating has remained consistently low, holding the record for lowest approval rating of a French President (Economist 2012). Polls have Hollande taking third place in the 2017 Presidential election, behind Sarkozy and Le Pen, something that is discussed in further detail in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER FOUR

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND ITS POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

Amongst the many reasons offered for explaining the rise of the far right in France, the economy seems
to be the most commonly cited rationale. Since 2008, the French economy has seen a slowdown, leaving France to be associated more with the dreaded “PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain)” or “peripheral,” rather than the richer, northern classification of countries. France has been called the “new sick man of Europe,” by major news outlets, including the Guardian, Al Jazeera and Forbes, an embarrassing title to the prideful French people. It’s not just media attention that has put France’s destitute economic situation in the limelight. The statistics speak for themselves, as France has seen negative growth and shockingly high unemployment in the years since the financial crisis. Without much control over their own economy, French politicians have tried to implement certain austerity type measures, such as raising the retirement age and cutting pensions, to the dismay of the people, who have taken to the streets in protests of these changes. This chapter will analyze the economic conditions affecting France, comparing the past several years of data to the European countries previously mentioned in Chapter One. The chapter will conclude by drawing relationships between the worsening economic situations with the increasing vote for Front National and the other extreme parties depending on the country, and summarizing observable correlations.

The table below presents an outline of the major economic indicators from 2009-2014. The data is taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit Data Tool. In order to have a general understanding of the economic outlook in France, I will analyze each economic factor before comparing France’s situation with the other four countries, and finally, comparing economic indicators with political data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Economic Indicators</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (% real change pa)</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour productivity growth (%)</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public debt (% of GDP)</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recorded unemployment (%)</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EIU Data Tool

Growth in France following the 2008 financial crisis has been dismal. Immediately after the crisis, in 2009, GDP was actually negative, at -2.9% growth. France’s declining economy saw a slight “rebound” in 2010 and 2011, before shrinking back to less than 1% growth in 2012-2014. Labour Productivity follows a similar pattern to GDP, with negative growth in 2009, followed by a slight improvement in 2010-2011, and another dip
from 2012-2014. Public debt has been creeping up to startlingly high numbers, much outside of the recommend levels. 2009’s public debt was not outrageously high, but notice that every year since then, public debt has risen. As of 2014, it was at 95.7% of GDP, putting France in the same economic category as the struggling peripheral counties of Europe. Finally, unemployment has been on the rise in France, with national levels at 9.7 in 2014. This figure, however, doesn’t tell the whole story of the dreary employment situation in France. Below, the statistics for youth unemployment tell an even more worrisome tale, with levels reaching as high as 26% in 2013.

*Chart 1*

The youth unemployment rate peaked in 2013, but has hovered above the 21% mark for the past several years, since 2009. At the end of 2014, levels were back on the rise, over 25% of youths looking for work in France were without a job.

Overall, the economic situation in France is a dire one. Many supporters of FN blame this on the European Union and common currency. The economic situation facing France is challenging, as multiple factors are working against the potential for recovery and growth. Eurozone membership has increased dependency on the rest of Europe, in particularly, Germany, and has prevented the French government from implementing
external measures of economic control. For example, if France were still economically independent, as it was prior to the 2002 adaptation of the common currency, the government would have the ability to reduce imports, create export subsidies, generate tax incentives and devalue its currency, in order to curb the deficit and stimulate growth. Because of their reliance on the Euro, however, the options to get a handle on the economy are limited. The president’s must rely on internal adjustment measures, which infringe on democracy and are politically unpopular. Fortune Magazine highlights this issue, “France epitomizes the real problem with the single currency: The inability of nations with high and rising production costs to adjust their currencies so that their products remain competitive in world markets” (Tully 2013). Some of these measures have already been seen in France, for instance, applying contractionary fiscal policy, reducing spending by way of austerity measures.

These measures have so far been extremely unpopular in France, as in the case of pension reform introduced by President Sarkozy. President Hollande has taken to raising taxes to the wealthy, an effort that has exhausted the French workers so much that even Monsieur Hollande recently admitted that the over taxation on ordinary workers had gotten out of control. The tax increases since 2011 totaled 60 billion Euros, which is the equivalent to 3% of the national income (Tully 2013). In a television interview, President Hollande promised a tax pause, a promise which was echoed by Finance Mister Pierre Moscovici, who has said that he is “very conscious that the French are fed up with taxes” (Tully 2013). This increase in taxation is a negative result of having a common currency, as it is one of the only economic measures the French government can directly control. Elsewhere in economic recovery, President Hollande and his Socialist government are noticing that they will have to reconcile their interventionist instincts “with a more pro-business approach” (Tully 2013). In September, 2013, President Hollande unveiled his ten year plan, meant to generate industrial growth, which supports “no fewer than 34 sectors, spanning new technologies in areas ranging from renewable energy to robotics and medical biotech” (Carnegy 2013). Over the last decade, France has lost “750,000 manufacturing jobs…slipped from a trade surplus to a heavy deficit and lost ground to neighboring competitors” (Carnegy 2013) Hollande calls this plan pragmatic, and is championing a “Made in France” campaign, an effort to bring
back jobs to the country that have recently been outsourced to more business friendly economies. President Hollande asked the EU’s help in his business plan, calling on the EU to “change its competition doctrine to allow companies to merge more easily to ‘promote European champions’ and to adopt a trade policy ‘worthy of the name, to combat vigorously unfair trade practices, both internal and external” (Carnegy 2013).

The next section in this chapter will contain various sets of data comparing France with the four countries selected for analysis: Britain, Sweden, Netherlands and Greece. The first selection for comparison is GDP.

**Chart 2**

As seen by the above graph, France’s GDP is somewhere in the middle of the countries used for comparison in this project. By far, the United Kingdom and Sweden are doing the best in terms of growth, though this fact is not surprising, as neither country is a member of the Eurozone, and therefore has more control over fiscal policy. The UK and Sweden both are able to implement economic policy which helps combat the effects of the recession, rather than depending on policy from Brussels. This control over their own economy also means that they have seen less devastating effects from the crisis than their Eurozone incorporated neighbors. On the other hand, Greece is the clearest example of a drastically suffering economy.
Although as of 2014, they were starting to see a slowdown of the shrinking. The Netherlands have also obviously suffered, as they experienced a series of negative growth from 2011-2013, but seem to be on the rebound.

The next factor for comparison is Public Debt.

*Chart 3*

![Graph showing public debt/GDP 2009-2014 for France, Greece, Netherlands, Sweden, and United Kingdom.](Image of graph)

*Source: EIU Data Tool*

The first thing that stands out in the above chart is Greece’s public debt levels, which hover around 175%, an enormous and troubling number. Note that France has the second highest amount of public debt out of these five countries. The UK and France have very similar levels, with the UK doing a slightly better job keeping those numbers down. The Netherlands, although in the Eurozone, has managed to keep its public debt quite low, and Sweden, unsurprisingly, has the lowest public debt out of these countries.

The final factor for comparison is recorded unemployment.

*Chart 4*
Unemployment rate levels are unsurprisingly high in Greece, with levels peaking above 25%. The growth of unemployment in Greece is also striking, as in 2009, just following the economic crisis, four out of five of the countries were experiencing similar levels, but from 2010 to 2014, Greek unemployment has made incredibly drastic leaps. Dutch unemployment, in contrast, has been relatively low, certainly the lowest out of these five countries. French unemployment has been the second highest, compared to Greece, although not nearly as high. Sweden and the UK, have seen unemployment levels at steady and similar rates across the past several years. In order to make sense of the effect economics has had on the political world, the next section will include the results from the two most recent European Parliament elections, 2014 and 2009. This demonstration will show the same period (2009-2014) politically, and offer an example of the very real political consequences the economic situation can have.

Political Consequences of Economic Downturns

The following set of charts will display the most recent European Election results, which took place on May 26, 2014. The most major parties of each country were included in the data, and “other” indicates the parties which received less than 2% of the vote. Some of these countries have over thirty-five different parties
competing in the election, so the “other” category is filled with these smaller parties who may have received 1% of the vote, but are overall not relevant to the argument of this paper. Note that the party that is a subject of this thesis is in violet for quick identification.

Most central to this project is the French result, which will be observed in much greater detail in the following chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, note immediately that the Front National placed first, with 25% of the vote. While UMP earned 21%, Socialist earned only 14%. FN and UMP together make up almost 50% of the total vote, signifying a general shift to the right, with the most sizeable amount shifting to the far right. This fact is integral to both parties strategy going forward into the 2017 general election.

Compare the 2014 results with the 2009 results, as seen below and note the dramatic difference in the showing of support for Front National.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UMP</th>
<th>Socialist</th>
<th>Democratic Movement</th>
<th>Europe Ecologie</th>
<th>Left Front</th>
<th>Front National</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Parliament: europa.eu

Relating this political data back to economics, note that public debt and unemployment both rose in France from 2009-2014, so the economic influence is certainly there. Another important observation is where the support for Front National came from in the five year period of 2009-2014. UMP and Europe Ecologie saw the biggest decline in support. Where support for the Front National came from is integral to understanding the rationale behind voting FN, because for a sizeable percentage of voters who chose FN in 2014, they had to make the decision to vote against the party that previously held their allegiance.

The following several tables will serve as an overview of other European countries, however, it must be
emphasized that the primary objective of this paper is France, and as a complement to the economic, political and social results in France, other European countries will be analyzed in Greece, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

The next table compares Greece in 2014 and 2009. The most immediate observation is how Syriza seems to have come out of the blue to gain 26% of the vote in 2014.

2014 and 2009 in Greece show many major political changes, many of the parties that competed in 2009 were nowhere to be found in 2014. Of course, Greece has gone through several changes economically, as both their economy and the EU imposed austerity measures have been disastrous, which was demonstrated in the graphs on the previous several pages. Note that Greece had over 35 political parties competing in this election, with most of them only receiving 1% or less than 1% of the vote, which makes the “other” group so significant, although no party in this category earned over 2% of the vote by itself.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New Democracy</th>
<th>Syriza</th>
<th>Golden Dawn</th>
<th>Olive Tree</th>
<th>The River</th>
<th>Communist</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Panhellenic Socialist Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Parliament: europa.eu

In the case of Greece, it can be observed that the economic crisis has dramatically changed the face of Greek politics. With the incumbent leadership’s party, New Democracy, losing almost 10% of its support in the EP elections over the five year period seen above. Syriza and its mission to challenge the EU head on has seen the biggest benefit from the economic crisis. It is important to note that Syriza did not simply see a dramatic increase in votes, although they did generate a large amount of new support over the course of the two elections. Syriza was made out of a combination of much smaller parties, which explains its inception and large
Next, the United Kingdom’s election results from EP elections, 2014 and 2009.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>UKIP</th>
<th>Labor</th>
<th>Liberal Democrats</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>British National Party</th>
<th>Scottish National Party</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Parliament: europa.eu

The United Kingdom has seen a similar spike in support for the far right party, UKIP. Most recently, in 2014, UKIP earned 27% of the EP election vote, compared with 2009 when they earned 17%. This 10% increase in support came at a cost for the two parties in particular: Conservatives and BNP. UKIP has long been campaigning to earn disenchanted conservatives, who see the country’s current conservative party, led by Prime Minister David Cameron, as showing sympathy to immigrants and being more and more pro-EU integration. Note that in the five year period between elections, Conservatives lost 5% of their support, and these voters most likely went to UKIP because of their nationalist, pro-Britain and anti-Europe perspective. BNP, or British National Party, is regarded as both extreme and racist in message, but at the same time, they are often grouped together with UKIP, who have denounced the party and its sympathizers. In 2009, BNP earned 6% of the vote, and in 2014, earned less than 1%. It seems that many of these former BNP voters may have gone to UKIP, who have altogether more support and therefore a more realistic chance at leadership, parliament seats and therefore, legislative power.

The next country to observe is Sweden. Note that support for the Sweden Democrats, the adamantly
anti-immigration, extremely nationalist party, saw support stay the same in the five year period between EP elections.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social Democratic</th>
<th>Liberal People</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>Sweden Democrats</th>
<th>Feminist</th>
<th>Christian Dem</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Centre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Parliament: europa.eu

Comparing results in Sweden, notice that most of the parties saw no change in support, save for some of the smaller parties. The supporters of these smaller parties seem to have consolidated their votes to have a better chance at representation. It is important to note that Sweden has survived the financial crisis very well, seeing low public debt and low unemployment, so these results are not surprising.

The last set of election results that will be observed in this chapter is for the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, we see a curious thing happen that is not in line with many of the other countries and their increase in support for the most dominant anti-Europe party. Support for PVV, Party for Freedom, actually declined in the years of 2009-2014. Looking back at some of the economic data provided in the previous pages, recall that while growth has stalled and unemployment has increased, the Netherlands still maintain the lowest unemployment rate of any of the other countries for comparison in this project. Additionally, much like Sweden, the Netherlands have maintained low public debt.
In the Netherlands, it seems that economics has played a main role in the fate of the far right. In this case, the positive economic outlook, relative to the other four countries being compared in this study, has negatively affected the popular support for Eurosceptic PVV.

Recently, in March 2015 I had the opportunity to travel to Brussels, home of the European Union, to partake in a study abroad program led by DePaul’s School of Public Service. This incredibly unique experience allowed me to take my questions to the source, as we met with a plethora of prominent European leaders and public figures, including the Ambassadors of Austria, Hungary, Lithuania and Estonia, in addition to leaders of non-profits and the EU press secretary. On multiple occasions, I was able to ask about the impact of the rise of the far right on European policy, and on all of these occasions, my hypothesis was met with confirmation, that yes, these parties are seen as a very real, viable threat to European policy as a whole. In Brussels, the recent surge in popularity for the Euroskeptics is a great concern, and the ways to solve the issue are hotly debated. On one hand, these parties represent popular dissatisfaction with the direction of the European Union, on the other, they also represent a reaction to the poor leadership of some of the major parties. From an EU level, the question is not how to stop these parties from being successful, but rather, how to manage and work with these parties once they make into parliament. These leaders often come with the intention of blocking legislation and disrupting the progress being made at the supranational level, so how to integrate these parties and their agendas into the European level of policy making becomes a challenge.

This chapter has presented a fusion of economic data and political results, focusing solely on the 2014 and 2009 European Parliament election results. This section has presented different findings which relate

### Netherlands European Parliament Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Christian Democratic Appeal</th>
<th>PVV</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Democrats 66</th>
<th>Socialist</th>
<th>Green Left</th>
<th>Party for Freedom &amp; Democracy</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: European Parliament: europa.eu*
directly back to this project’s main hypothesis. First among these findings is all of the countries observed, France, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and Greece, were negatively affected by the 2008 Economic crisis, and in the case of all but the Netherlands, support for the Euro-skeptic parties rose or stayed the same in that same period. France, Greece, and the United Kingdom saw the biggest gains in support for FN, Syriza and UKIP in the 2009-2014 period, while Sweden Democrats earned the same amount of votes. This juxtaposition of economic and political data has shown that the economic situation of a country does affect its political outcome, and can make a difference in voters deciding to support parties such as the far right Front National or UKIP, or the far left, Syriza, all parties which share the common goal to distance their country from ties with the European Union. On the other hand, this chapter has shown that in countries whose economies have emerged from the crisis relatively successfully, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, there is a neutral or negative inter-relation between the votes for the anti-Europe parties, Sweden Democrats and Party for Freedom.
CHAPTER FIVE
POLITICAL OUTCOMES AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

This section will be broken into two parts, the first spent considering the political mechanisms employed by the Front National to infiltrate mainstream French politics, and the second spent analyzing the effect this recent surge in support has had on the social situation in France. The political section will be dedicated to answering two of the central questions posed in the introduction chapter, those are: How has the Front National infiltrated politics, and, can the Front National really be considered a ‘far right’ party, when their economic platform is not entrenched in a classically populist agenda?

As mentioned in the third chapter, Front National has had its ups and downs in terms of popular support, cumulating in the 2002 presidential election, making it to the second round of elections. Recall that Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National suffered a tremendous defeat in the final election runoff in 2002, only receiving 18% of the vote, while Jacques Chirac earned 82%. The Front National have undergone a massive overhaul since that time, with the elder Le Pen retreating from the spotlight a bit and his daughter, Marine Le Pen, officially taking over as party leader in 2011.

One of the most notable showings of support for the far-right occurred in the 2012 Presidential election, the first presidential election that preceded the recession. The first round of elections saw Marine Le Pen competing against the sitting president, Nicolas Sarkozy and Socialist candidate Francois Hollande. Le Pen came in third overall, with 17.9%. By comparison, the next-closest party, the Left Front, only earned 11.10%.
To contrast with the previous presidential election, in 2007, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, the Front National came in fourth place with only 10.44% of votes.

As argued in the previous chapter about economics, the period of 2009-2014 was marked by recession and a shrinking economy, coupled with high debt and high unemployment. These findings can be used to partially explain the surge in support for Front National from 2007-2012 in the general election. During the
crisis, center right President Nicolas Sarkozy of the Union for a Popular Movement party (UMP) tried to steer France out of recession, to no avail. Not surprisingly, Sarkozy was not reelected in the presidential elections of 2012. Instead, Socialist Francois Hollande was elected, taking 51.64% of the vote in the second round, enough to win the presidency. During the first round of that election, a third party emerged with a shocking number of votes. The far-right party, The National Front, headed by Madame Marine Le Pen, earned 17.9% of the votes, or 6.4 million. Hollande and Sarkozy earned 28.63% and 27.18%, respectively, and the next closest alternative party, Left Front, with 11% of votes. What makes these poll numbers more surprising is that in the 2007 Presidential Election, the National Front finished fourth place, only earning 10.4% of votes. The period of 2007-2012 showed substantial improvements in the popularity of the National Front, due to worsening economic situations and the inability for center-right to successfully navigate the Crisis. As an alternative party, the National Front took advantage of factions within the center-right, as disgruntled voters looked for a party that could more accurately represent their concerns.

There is growing speculation that Front National have a very substantial chance at winning the next general election, scheduled for 2017. Opinion polls seem to suggest that Front National will get past the first round and be competitive in the second round. If Le Pen enters a run off with Sarkozy, most polls show her losing, while some polls suggest if the run off is Le Pen v Hollande, Le Pen will win. The following map shows the drastic change in support for the Front National in the two consecutive European Parliament elections, 2009 and 2014. The dark blue represents Front National, the magenta pink represents the Socialist Party, the orange represents UDI, Union of Democrats and Independents, or the centre right, and light blue represents UMP, Union for a Popular Movement.
Map of Popular Political Support Across France by Province

In 2009, the majority of the country was in support of UMP, the conservative party in the European Parliament elections. A few pockets of support for the Socialist Party existed, particular in the North, and in the south. Notice that in 2009, no region was won by Front National. However, only five years later, in 2014, the map is nearly entirely dark blue, signifying a huge shift in support from the centre-right to the far right as French voters moved to the Front National. UMP still maintained some of their support, particular in Paris and in the east in Brittany, as well as some areas in central France. Note that voters who chose Socialists in 2009 switched to Front National in the north and very south of France, a noticeable gain as both a densely populated areas, particularly in the South of France. This map is useful because it provides an overview of how different regions of France vote in the European elections.

Looking ahead to the 2017 general elections, the majority of polls have Marine Le Pen winning, besting
incumbent President Hollande and former President Sarkozy. Below, Table 7 shows the latest results from January 2015 presidential voting poll.

Table 7

PERCENTAGE OF VOTERS FOR 2017 CANDIDATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF VOTES FOR 2017 CANDIDATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathalie Arthaud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe Poutou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Luc Mélenchon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François Hollande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cécile Duflot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François Bayrou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Sarkozy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Dupont-Aignan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Le Pen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IFOP for Marianne

According to the poll by IFOP for Marianne, a weekly French News magazine, from July 2014 to January 2015, Marine Le Pen has been not only leading, but increasing in popularity, rising from 26% to 29% over that time period, signifying that voters are becoming more supportive and additionally, less closeted about their support for the far right, something that has historically carried a sense of taboo.

To get a closer look at exactly who is voting for the Front National, this next table deconstructs the profile of the average voter in France, by sex, age, education level and 2012 vote.
### Table 8

**Voter Profiles for 2017 French Presidential Candidates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hollande</th>
<th>Sarkozy</th>
<th>Le Pen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voter Breakdown</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-24</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and up</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Graduate</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2012 election vote</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollande</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarkozy</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Pen</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source: IFOP for Marianne**

This table breaks down the voter profile to understand exactly who is voting for Le Pen, and what the demographics of said voters look like. Le Pen’s popularity seems to be slightly higher with men than with women, though only by a 5 point difference. Le Pen appeals to voters over 35 more, but isn’t doing terribly with younger voters, particularly with the 18-24 year old crowd. Another notable mention is that FN voters seem to be those without a college degree, with 39% of their voters not attending university. Le Pen appeals to generally less educated, older than 35 voters, and more to men than women. Additionally, from the table, we can tell that FN voters tend to be extremely loyal to the party, with slight percentages from UMP and Socialists crossing over. For the college educated crowd, the vote is split quite closely between Hollande and Sarkozy. Those with a Bachelor’s degree make up 25% of Hollande’s demographic, and 22% of Sarkozy’s demographic,
respectively. Both candidates do well in the post-graduate demographic, those who have completed education higher than a Bachelor’s degree favor Hollande (26%) and Sarkozy (30%), while only 13% of voters receiving post graduate education say they would vote for Marine Le Pen.

Another hallmark characteristic of populist parties in Europe is Euroskepticism, and as was previously mentioned, voters for Front National tend to hold very disapproving views of the European Union, the Eurozone and European integration. Euro skepticism is on the rise amongst the French and is no longer a marginal issue. The French newspaper, La Croix, found that in 2012, 38% of French citizens felt that membership in the E.U. was a bad thing. In September of 2013, however, that figure rose, with 43% of French citizens feeling that E.U. membership was the wrong choice for France. On the Contrary, in 2013, 33% of French citizens wanted France to leave the Eurozone, a figure that is slightly lower the 35% who wanted to leave the Eurozone in 2012. This data alludes to the fact that the people of France are largely unsatisfied with the loss of national sovereignty in exchange for membership in the European Union, however, it also points to a lack of understand of the Euro’s consequences on the French economy. Interestingly, the French population in general seems to have adopted more pessimistic views of Europe in the past several years, as is indicated in the following table from Eurobarometer, the European Commission’s polling institution.
The poll asks “Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly pessimistic or very pessimistic about the future of the EU?” The results are ordered according to satisfaction. France is unsurprisingly at the far-right of the graph, with 56% of those polled saying they are totally pessimistic about the future of the EU. The only more pessimistic nations are those in the peripheral facing extreme financial crisis, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus and Greece. Also note that only 40% of those polled say they are optimistic about the future of the EU. Contrasted with Germany’s majority of optimistic voters, 60%, the consensus in France is to negatively view the future of the EU. France’s optimism has decreased by -4% since the last time this poll was conducted, in spring 2013. This trend of increased pessimism towards the EU points to a growing frustration within France, and also alludes to motivations for turning to a party which supports this anti-European sentiment.
After observing the past several elections, and speculating the outcome of the next election in 2017, as well as a brief discussion of the rise of Euroskepticism and its implications, the next section will interrogate why voters are choosing FN. One reason has already been argued in the economic chapter, as there is certainly a cause effect relationship between worsening economic conditions and increased votes for FN. Economics and politics aside, what other reasons are voters flocking to FN? The following section will offer answers to this question which focus primarily on the issues of immigration and cultural tensions.

Social Situation and its Relation to the Front National

The social portion of the fifth chapter will focus primarily on two of the biggest social issues affecting France, immigration and identity. Although France is experiencing a wide scope of social issues which add tension and malaise to the French society, these two problems are related to overarching theme of voter motivations and help relate incentives for voting FN back to the social situation. Approximately 1 in 10 people in France are immigrants (The Local 2014). This population of immigrants has seen a dramatic rise since the financial crisis, in particular because of the free movement of labour that European Union laws allow for. Thus, workers struggling to find work (largely affected by the crisis in peripheral countries such as Portugal and Italy) freely came to France after the crisis in 2008 (The Local 2014). This influx of other Europeans, which represents approximately half of the immigrant population in France, coupled with the already high numbers of incoming persons from Northern Africa and the Middle East contributed to this large portion of immigrant in a country that has historically managed a relatively significant population of immigrants since post war times. As mentioned, more and more Europeans came to France seeking work in light of the 2008 crisis, but at the same time, France’s own economic situation was struggling, as demonstrated in Chapter Four. Historically a potent political issue, the “immigration issue” has been a longstanding issue on the Front National’s running platform, and the main leaders of FN use the issue as a rally cry when they need to attract attention to their party. Part of this anti-immigrant agenda includes calling for a halt on immigration and making it more difficult for those
already in France to obtain citizenship. With the large numbers of immigrants arriving in France, a population rising 1.6 percent per year, less are actually being granted French citizenship. For comparison, in 2012, 96,000 immigrants were naturalized, a 16% decrease from 2011 (The Local 2014). This decline is in line with the wishes of Front National, a party who call for a “France for the French” and support largely exclusionary measures to achieve this.

For the immigrants that settle in France, particularly the non-Europeans, life is largely segregated from the rest of the community; a phenomenon that has been labeled “the Other France” by observers (Ware 2015). Part of this systematic isolation includes large complexes of public housing, almost always located on the peripheral of the major metropolitan areas. This suburban communities are called banlieues, and are often high in crime, low in income and with substandard schools and education when compared to non-immigrant communities (Ware 2015).

Identity Crisis and Violent Reactions

The issue of immigration has affected France for the greater part of the twentieth century, and certainly prevails in modern times. A society which defends the revolutionary motto of “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity” is really practicing exclusionary means of achieving Frenchness on particular terms. For example, there exists a disconnect, where immigrants, and children of immigrants, French citizens in their own right, are not seen as being “French.” This identity tension, a racial and cultural discrimination, has been the root of France’s social issues. As a political force, Front National embodies the idealistic narrative of being “French,” and capitalizes on insecurities in communities which fear diversity and are conflicted with this identity tension in everyday life.

No example is more fitting than the January 2015 attack on Charlie Hebdo, a satirical French magazine that frequently features controversial cartoon images on its front cover, including the Islamic prophet, Muhammad kissing a Charlie Hebdo writer. This was not the first, nor will it be the last offensive cover that the magazine publishers, despite the massacre of its staff on January 7 2015. In addition to the Charlie Hebdo staff,
a kosher market was also raided by Islamic extremist, with several people killed in the process. The attackers were French citizens, a fact that makes the entire episode more disturbing, as these are citizens who have travelled overseas to learn training needed to carry out acts of violence. In response to this recent outpour of violence, President Hollande has invited his peers, including Marine Le Pen, to discuss the situation and policy going forward. At her meeting with the president, Le Pen pushed for the revoking of French citizenship for those holding dual citizenship and have travelled abroad to places like Syria to receive training, such as the Charlie Hebdo attackers. Le Pen also used the moment to further critique the European Union in general, noting that its policy of open borders and free movement of people needs to be suspended in order to fight terrorism and arms trafficking across member states. While Le Pen was included in the post-attack meetings with President Hollande, she and Front National supporters were excluded from the unity rally which took place 11 January 2015 in response to the terrorism which plagued the city only days before. By excluding Le Pen from the largest public demonstration in French history, in particular one centered around “unity,” Hollande and the rally organizers sent a message to the Front National supporters that they were unwelcome, and being excluded based on their beliefs. This message is quite contradictory, as a rally for unity should include all, and by ostracizing Le Pen and the FN, there is a probably risk of generating more support and passion for the party.

France has many embedded social ills it must cure in order to prevent the political takeover of the far right agenda. A society which lives by the historically motivated republican idealism instilled from the French Revolution, modern France does not embody this free and equal society any longer. With entrenched racism, xenophobia and discrimination, it is no surprise that the Front National has capitalized on these sentiments.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The hypothesis of this thesis is the surge of the Front National’s public support is due to France’s deteriorating economic, social and political situations as a result of its membership within the Eurozone and also as a result of the country’s mismanagement by the government. This thesis was proven through a point of comparison with France’s situation with that of other European Union countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Greece and the United Kingdom. Additionally, this hypothesis has been proved by exploring the question “what are the economic, political, and social mechanisms Marine Le Pen has used to bring the Front National into mainstream politics, and has she succeeded?” The first category, economics, has been examined through an analysis of various key economic indicators and compared to other countries within Western Europe. There, it was proven that economic recession and financial suffering in France has given the Front National a boost, politically speaking. There exists a clear relationship between the economy and political trends. The countries which performed most successfully during the financial crisis, namely Sweden and the Netherlands, saw less of a spike in votes for the Eurosceptic, extreme parties in the European Parliament elections, such as Sweden Democrats and PVV. On the other hand, those countries who suffered the most economically, United Kingdom, France and Greece, saw a large increase in votes for the Eurosceptic, nationalist parties, such as UKIP, Front National and the far left Syriza. This relationship has been proven and supports the argument that the poor economy has helped boost the Front National. Marine Le Pen has used the economic situation to her advantage by tailoring her economic policy to be decisively different from President Hollande, giving herself a differentiated appeal on the economic front. This strategy is successful, as was seen in the political section. Front National votes are increasing because voters are growing more skeptical of Hollande’s attempts at reform, as they have largely been ineffective. Another political mechanism that Marine Le Pen has used to her advantage is her message of anti-Euro zone ideals. Le Pen openly promotes a return to the Franc, something that would allow France to regain external measures of monetary control over their economy in times of recession. As many French begin to see the Euro common currency as more of an obligation rather
than a benefit, this running platform has proven popular, though the details of execution of this plan remain unknown. In addition to the economic and political factors, social issues have proven a useful tactic to boost Marine Le Pen and the Front National’s public profile. In particular, tensions are high in France between those seen as being “true” French, and those seen as “other,” or not belonging to mainstream society because of their ethnic background, typically immigrants from Northern Africa. Coupled with a migration crisis, in addition to persistent fears of terrorist attacks, the social situation in France is volatile to say the least.

This project has argued that the power of the Eurosceptic parties across Western Europe is undeniably linked to economic, political and social factors: the financial crisis, growing nationalism and the stress of immigration. The hypothesis, that Marine Le Pen has succeeded in bringing the Front National into mainstream politics thanks to her combination of populist social and political platforms, contrasted with a more leftist position with regards to the economy, has been proven. This project has determined that Marine Le Pen has thus far been successful in her mission to bring the Front National into the mainstream of French politics, and her efforts to capitalize on the economic, political and social situation have brought legitimacy to her party. Previously seen as being on the outside of the political realm in France, Front National is now a viable and promising party competing for the presidency in 2017, a fact that Marine Le Pen is responsible for due to her mission to validate her party’s platforms in the public eye. Marine Le Pen’s rise to public prominence has disrupted the discourse of French politics in an unprecedented manner. By vocalizing her position against the Eurozone and immigration, while representing a very nationalist, pro-France public image, Le Pen appeals to traditional conservative values. Le Pen also remains anti-austerity and supports economic protectionism, values which help her appeal to more left-minded voters. This unique position has greatly contributed to the success of Le Pen’s mission to bring the Front National into the mainstream of French politics.

As stated in the political section of this paper, the research done during my recent visit to Brussels confirmed the influence of the poor economic situation on the surge of the populist parties in Europe. Leaders in Europe are treating this as an extraordinary threat to the way policy is made and commissioning various think tanks, such as the European Policy Centre, to research ideas on how to combat the rise of the far right because
of its destructive effects on lawmaking and governing.

Further research is needed to determine the lasting consequences of these parties gaining in popularity, and of course to determine the future of the Eurozone’s composition. As all of these situations are fluid, the research needs to be updated every few weeks. A larger scale project would be able to trace the trajectory of each of the Eurosceptic parties in isolation to identify which of these parties will succeed in the long run.

In conclusion, it has been determined that the most problematic thing about the rise of the far right is how it affects the discourse of the mainstream political parties by creating a political insurgency, causing moderate conservatives to shift the narrative further to the right to appease populist voters. Regardless of if the representatives of the far right populist parties are elected, they still create a dramatic disruption in the European political process by having an indirect effect of negotiations at the supranational, E.U. level of policy making.
Bibliography


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