



DEPAUL UNIVERSITY  
UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

Via Sapientiae:

The Institutional Repository at DePaul University

---

College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and  
Dissertations

College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences

---

6-2012

# Orange revolution - post-socialist urban political movement

Kristina Zaluckyj

DePaul University, [kzaluckyj@yahoo.com](mailto:kzaluckyj@yahoo.com)

---

## Recommended Citation

Zaluckyj, Kristina, "Orange revolution - post-socialist urban political movement" (2012). *College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations*. Paper 121.

<http://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/121>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact [mbernal2@depaul.edu](mailto:mbernal2@depaul.edu).

# **Orange Revolution – Post-Socialist Urban Political Movement**

## **INTRODUCTION**

---

Post-socialist urban political movements are occurring throughout the world in various states. These movements emerge from changes in political democracy and development. When a previously established socialist system is replaced by one that is democratic, transitions follow. When the democratic system is still new, the state's leadership has trouble defining the new principles from which their political system will operate. During the transition the political leadership's activities can stray away from those based in democratic practices. The result is tension felt between the rule enforcers (the political elite) and the citizens who expect execution of promised changes. Throughout the transition, the people see what has changed, the remaining modifications, the developments still expected and what is stagnant. The people react through protest. This is part of the growing process of a new democratic state.

Such is the case for Ukraine and its Orange Revolution, which responded to the rigged presidential election of 2004. This thesis reviews the Orange Revolution and its role in post-socialist urban political movements. It is presented through first-hand recollections of citizens who witnessed and participated in the movement. These people express their observations of the changes seen, expected and still pending.

The Orange Revolution was a social movement – based on political action. Preceding the aforementioned event are similar movements in other states seeking change in political leadership and enacting democratic values. Many urban social movements occurred in states where socialism was once the approach to all politics and way of life. They include Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution in 1989; Serbia's "October 5<sup>th</sup> Overthrow" in September

2000 and Georgia's Rose Revolution in 2003. These movements responded to fraudulent elections. Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution followed the Orange Revolution in 2005, as did movements in Lebanon and Kuwait. Protests became the means to force transition to a functioning democratic state. Therefore, post-socialist urban political movements are important to review as states reform their governmental structures.

Defining post-socialist urban political movements is necessary to clearly see how that transition is the main reason to spur the movement. These movements occurred in states where Soviet-style socialism was politically dominant for two or more generations. The most profound change from the pre-socialist society was the weakening of meritocratic principles of gaining and sustaining employment in favor of a patronage system, especially the patronage of the dominant political party. Often described as corrupt, the Party rewarded loyalty and punished dissent and opposition. Such systems depend on the loyalty and connivance of a large portion of the population to remain in control. Any evidence that "history" may be moving away from the Party in power undermines that authority. Protests, if they can bring enough people into the streets, are strong evidence of a shift in power.

Ukraine's 2004 election marked the end of President Leonid Kuchma's tenure. During his presidency, Kuchma and the oligarchs grew into a strong group whose actions were corrupt. These activities rooted in corruption, resulted in slowing the growing democratic system's development. To preserve their survival, Kuchma and the oligarchs rigged the 2004 presidential election to get their favorable results (Åslund, Anders and Michael McFaul., eds., 2006, 1). They wanted to elect Viktor Yanukovich, Kuchma's preferred candidate and fellow oligarch. Assurance was desired that Yanukovich would lead the government instead of Viktor Yushchenko, the candidate that appeared to be greatly supported and preferred by the people.

Yushchenko, in opposition to Yanukovych, saw that changes were necessary to reinstate democracy and growth within Ukraine. Thus, Yushchenko's candidacy was supported by impatient and disenchanted citizens. This support made his position as a candidate more concrete. It was further complimented by support from Yulia Tymoshenko, who agreed with Yushchenko and wanted changes within Ukraine.

The Orange Revolution held the foundation for a social movement: frustration with the lagging democratic development which created discourse within the state, mobilization of the people through a charismatic leader and the desire for change to promote the greater good. However to succeed, the movement needed to bring people into the street. The events that occurred five years before the Orange Revolution show their service as the catalyst to erupt change. The acts of corruption, fraud and stagnation of growth challenged the desired improvements for the state.

Shortly after the events of the Orange Revolution in 2004, scholar Taras Kuzio acknowledged that the event and the mass protests' strength emerged from three separate sectors of Ukrainian society: civil society and opposition groups who organized the revolution, the *narod* (people) who provided the power behind the crowds and the defectors from the party in power, who turned their backs on Kuchma (Kuzio, 2005, 29). The people's frustration of their current observations and what they desire as an end result for the state solidified in the immediate political goals of increasing civil participation, and governmental transparency.

This motivated to result in the particular presented case study. Kuzio's theory on how the Orange Revolution emerged within the Ukrainian public is reviewed. The key contributing groups of society in Ukraine are broken down in further discussion. The theory presented by Kuzio also is assessed as to how it relates to social movement theory. An analysis on how

Kuzio's theory deviates from the pre-defined understanding of urban social movements is presented in this thesis. Kuzio's theory is also contextualized through the examples provided by testimonies gathered by the *narod* as new information surrounding post-socialist urban political movements.

Though smaller events and activities occurred in the years before Ukraine's 2004 presidential elections; I argue that the Orange Revolution was an independent event. I also argue that it resulted from a political election and Yushchenko's call to action for the people to stand up to the current political regime. With this, I ask: What was it about the movement or timing of the Orange Revolution's emergence that allowed the protest to occur? Why was the Orange Revolution more than just the vote it surrounded, and was it more than just a social movement? What changed within Ukraine (if anything) that led the Orange Revolution, thereby encouraging the public to participate and take to the streets in protest? Finally, what are the implications of the Orange Revolution in the overall big picture of Ukraine's political development?

To answer my questions, I rely on primary sources and historical information on this topic that has already been published. Additionally, I will bring new data to the work of contemporary historians. The data I present regarding this event consists of oral histories of individuals who lived in Ukraine before and during the Orange Revolution. Relating their experiences shows the strong social basis for the appeal of the movement that led to the street protests. This is despite considerable variation in the positions of the individuals.

My research participants needed to meet a set of qualifications: they were at least 14 years old in 1991 and recall life under socialism. I also requested that the candidates all lived in Ukraine, preferably in Kyiv, the capital, during the Orange Revolution, even if they subsequently emigrated. At the time of their interviews, participants were located in the United States –

Boston, Minneapolis, and Chicago – and throughout Ukraine. Interviews were conducted in person, through internet telephony (Skype) and email exchanges.

I want to disprove that the Orange Revolution was merely an event where the public and citizens released a burst of pent up frustrations. I want to prove that the protest and event as a whole occurred independently from the election and previous events. My prediction is: we will find that the Orange Revolution occurred resulting from numerous gradual changes that were too slow for the public to see an end result after they were started. My research findings will be presented as follows:

1. Background
  - I. Urban social movements
    - a. Theoretical approaches
    - b. Indicate how this information is applicable to Ukraine.
  - II. Ukraine
    - a. Understanding Ukraine before the Orange Revolution
      - i. Information on discourse from within to be included.
    - b. Dynamics of Post-Soviet corruption.
  - III. The Orange Revolution
    - a. Basic history of the event
    - b. Description of political parties, their key figures and the candidates' platforms
    - c. Description of *Pora* and the group's role leading up to and during the Orange Revolution.
      - i. Additional discussion on assistance *Pora* received from smaller groups trained in non-violent protest methods.
2. Oral History from the Orange Revolution
  - Participant selection qualifiers, questions posed to participants and methodology of how the histories were collected and recorded
  - Selected narratives showing both common experiences and variations.
  - Review of narratives and their correlation to urban social movements.
3. Hypotheses review and assessment
  - Review of Kuzio's hypothesis
  - Assess Kuzio's hypothesis of how the Orange Revolution emerged within the public.
  - Determine how and if his argument is supported or disproved by social movement theory
  - Determine if my research coincides and agrees with his agreement.
4. Conclusion
  - Review overall new findings on urban social movements
  - Review new findings on Post-Soviet state corruption
  - Assessment of how my research findings can be applied to provide insight to social movements in other states developing their democracies.

## **BACKGROUND**

---

### **URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS**

Urban social movements are not a limited phenomena. Many urban social movements occurred in states where socialism was once the political system and way of life. As a democratic system emerged within these states, a new thought process followed. This is a result of socialism being the norm for two or more generations. Competing ideas are visible between demographical divisions who see different ways of life. Many of these movements emerged because of political activities involving the concept of one person, one vote, and the lack of civic participation and transparency. Frustration regarding growing discourse results in protest, demanding change to encourage a democratic system.

Ultimately, the relationship of such an occurrence and the cause and effect associated is a result of two things. First, the relationship is not random. Second, it's evolving and supposed to happen. Eventually, the end result comes about. It is the combination of a series of smaller factors which come into play. The tipping point is another factor which spurs the movement to evolve. That then, becomes the overall, final result. Furthermore, two primary groups are involved: figures of authority – political power holders, and the general population. The population sees the power holders' actions. These actions are questioned by the population holding certain expectations of what should occur versus what is occurring. It is the way to try to further establish and promote the transition towards democracy.

Reviewing the concept of post-socialist urban political movements is necessary to clearly see how that transition is the reason to spur the movement. It is important to review particular movements within specific cases in order to predict what will likely happen next. The terms of the democratic system are determined by the state itself as no two democracies are identical.

How do you define a social movement? Roberta Garner observes that a social movement “is constituted by human beings engaged in discourses and practices designed to challenge and change society as they define it. It is formed by people, who over the course of time, are involved in non-institutionalized discourses and practices of change” (Garner, 1996, 12). The population sees change is necessary. They desire it to occur and will aid it by means of a social movement. Collectively, the public can communicate and acknowledge the present discourse and initiate resolution by modifying internal happenings of the power holders. Civil participation and transparency must be present to express the frustration of what is observed and for the desired end result. Urban social movements serve as the motivation for the most wanted change from within, expressed by both urban and rural populations.

Traditionally, the urban population is driven to participate in such movements. Their ideology of the event is based in the movement’s opportunity. The urban population in such situations thrives on this ideology. They seek the opportunity for the movement, the chance to improve the quality of their life and the possible available options. They are focused on the end result, regardless of the tension that emerges under such circumstances. The urban population relies on the rural population to assist with the ideal and contribute to the masses along with their own desires and motivations. Urban populations want to improve their quality of life and the potential opportunities available to them. The urban population is more focused on the overall end result – improvement from the current system. The driving force is the desire to see that result become a reality.

Rural populations are motivated to participate in the movement and activities within the state. Additionally, they are more willing to lay their life on the line, sacrificing themselves while fighting for the cause. They feel their desires and participation helps motivate the wanted



change. The rural population helps the ideal and contributes to the masses by adding numbers. The rural population's passion for the desired change unites them with the urban population. The urban population is aided by the rural population's passion and energy. Together, they stand up for the modifications they commonly want to see and develop, making the change systemic.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, rural movements primarily resulted from taxation, being pushed to the economic margins of sustainability. Urban movements, conversely, are massive non-violent demonstrations. Though tensions may run very high during an urban movement, the desire and act to destroy everything does not occur. Such an act would deflect from the movement's focus. Likewise, pro-democracy movements attempt to "limit violent and coercive action against any human being" (Garner, 1996, 149). The ultimate goal of the movement, and initiating change from within, is to express the desire for change in a non-violent fashion. Maintaining non-violent mindsets and actions aids to ensure stability and calm amidst tension. If violent acts emerge, the potential for internal civil war increases.

Certain factors are necessary for urban social movements to emerge. These factors are: discourse within the state, mobilizing the people through a charismatic leader and the desire to promote the greater good to result in a new outcome. The event's desired outcome is to remodel the current conditions and environment in the state. Urban social movements challenge the state's current activities and system. They try to impose change. There is no guarantee that the desired outcome will be the end result.

Due to the unstable nature of an outcome, social movements are "natural experiments in power, legitimating and democracy" (Crossley, 2002, 9). The intent and desire for change is present. Though, means for executing change must be introduced and performed in a way to encourage the desired end result. This end result is contingent on the situation and circumstances

surrounding the movement's initiation. Charles Tilly's three main elements of contingency for social movements are:

- 1). Campaigns of collective claims on target authorities.
- 2). An array of claim-making performances which include special-purpose associations, public meetings, medial statements and demonstrations.
- 3). Public representations of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment of the cause (Tilly, 2004, 7).

Social movements need mobilization tactics to engage the public in the overall cause and encourage their persistent activity. The end result in promoting involvement is ownership and the value experienced by the citizens after participating in such events. This defines Charles Tilly's bottom-up nationalism process. The mobilization leaders reach out to the population lacking their own representation and establish historical distinctions, coherence, connectedness and the followers' determination to claim their right to political autonomy (Tilly, 2002, 68). Uniting the population and finding commonality for their desires, establishes the foundation for a social movement. Additionally, a sense of ownership for participation is instilled; thus furthering personal investment in the event. Together, they can address what they feel may be wrong within society and express the changes desired for improvement.

Social movements campaign to change existing norms within a state. They express the collective desire to right wrongs committed and felt by a very specific population (Tilly, 2002, 88). For many of the post-socialist political movements, a stagnated transition to a democratic system was the primary reason to promote the movement's emergence. The inception of the new system, once socialism was removed as the primary practice, was not developing as expected.

During an urban social movement, diverse feelings and emotions can be present and emerge from those involved. Fear among citizens can exist. This fear results from uncertainty that their efforts demanding change may be done in vain, and the desired end result may not

follow. Such an outcome is possible after the protest. Giugni states, “when protest actions are combined with shifts in public opinion favorable to the movements, the actors’ chances to obtain a substantial impact on policy should increase and thereby point to a joint effect of protest and public opinion” (Giugni, 2004, 6-7). In this case study, the public’s opinion did not shift. Instead, the opportunity to express their pre-existing opinions, without facing serious retribution for their actions was present.

### **HOW URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS RELATE TO UKRAINE**

Ukrainian citizens had the opportunity to express dissatisfaction with the outgoing presidential regime. The cumulative and indirect effects mediated by the overall environment socially and politically, were greater and prominent. Combining the desire to end corruption and manipulation in response to an event holding the potential to either continue the status quo or change it, resulted in the Orange Revolution. These are factors that made the Orange Revolution a civil revolution and involved all groups of society. Many of the social movements that emerged within recent years had a socialistic approach to politics. During the transition to democracy, an urban social movement materializes. It is a way to help establish the initiated transitions and advance it toward democracy.

For someone living in Ukraine today, compared to their life during Soviet Ukraine, they will observe that life has changed quite immensely. These changes are found in their living opportunities. These opportunities are observed in how and where they live, education and the structure of their everyday lifestyle for employment. All of these things are now different from how they were 25 years ago. Therefore, competing ideals exist based on what everyone has known from the previous era and what they want, and aspire to develop for their future.

Looking specifically at Ukraine, under the Soviet Union and the Soviet structure, a small group of political elites always made every decision. It brought about a patron-client relationship. An example of this relationship and how it carried out is seen in the job market. Service jobs were often offered in exchange for citizens' unswerving loyalty. It ensured a job at a particular company once a set of necessary steps were complete. Other amenities could also be awarded like a car, appliances, summer home, vacations and assurance that their children will get into good schools. When Ukraine declared independence and began forming its democratic system, the driving force of patron-client relations was removed.

The Orange Revolution was an urban social political movement favoring democracy. After declaring independence in 1991 from the Soviet Union, the government formed, and agreed to institute a democratic system after Communism. The new system had difficulty developing under Kuchma between 1994 and 2004. Creating a mass protest against corruption and cronyism was the public's way to express their resistance to further manipulation of the established system and favoring only elite members of society. This is what made the Orange Revolution a civic movement involving both urban and rural populations of society.

Like Serbia and Georgia, Ukraine's revolution was brought about by a lack of trust in the regime. The administration in power attempted to control the vote's outcome by adjusting it to their personal preference without regard to the public's voice. In all three instances, the revolutionary leaders – the opposition candidate – called the citizens to protest the current regime's manipulation. This was the turning point for these movements which clearly declared their purpose within the state's democratic development.

Like the revolutions in Georgia and Serbia, Ukraine had an organized youth group trained specifically to gather crowds, express their dissatisfaction and revolt with control, non-violently.

These youth groups reached out to the younger voters, encouraging their participation by expressing their democratic right to support their preferred candidate to lead the state. They emphasized to the younger generation that their contribution via participation was valued and needed to be expressed.

Their efforts helped in mobilizing the public, bringing in the element of populism, “a view and a movement that calls for a mobilization against the rich and powerful in the name of the people” (Garner, 1996, 184). This element of populism helps reinforce the point that the Orange Revolution was a norm-oriented movement. Such a movement looks to “alleviate stress by addressing and transforming the normative structure of the system in which it arises” (Crossley, 2002, 44). The Orange Revolution was a movement that released growing political tension. In Ukraine, the people were protesting against the rich and powerful oligarchs.

## **HISTORY: UKRAINE**

### Ukraine: Before and During Soviet Times

Before further analyzing the Orange Revolution as a pro-democracy, urban social political movement, we must review Ukraine’s history. This helps contextualize the event while acknowledging its relevance within Ukraine’s more recent history. Understanding previous events also aids in greater insight to current events. Before and during the Soviet era, Ukraine struggled to find its position within the world. Cultural and linguistic similarities with Russia, contributed their stronghold on Ukraine. Throughout history, when Ukraine was self-sufficient and striving toward democratic development, stronger outside forces uprooted and changed the state’s plans for growth. Despite this, Ukraine had the basis for democratic development.

Before the Soviet Union’s formation, Ukraine experienced several occupations. Western Ukraine was ruled for over 200 years by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Habsburgs in

the 1790's, and in 1867 until the end of World War I by Austria-Hungary. Ukraine briefly experienced independence in 1917. The Treaty of Versailles partitioned Ukraine to Russia, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. By the end of World War II, all of Ukraine was under Soviet occupation.

In the late 1700's and early 1800's, undercurrents of Ukrainian nationalism emerged through art and literature. From 1863 to 1876 "de-Ukrainianization" efforts were present in Eastern Ukraine. Language restrictions were imposed by Russia. Ukrainian organizations aimed to preserve Ukrainian culture and traditions while combating bans. Ukrainian intelligentsia and nationalists expressed in publications and poetry the need to maintain and uphold national identity. This group of intellectual elites felt obliged to promote and preserve all aspects of Ukrainian culture to avoid absorption and vanish in the political overtaking.

The Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church helped instill cohesion among people during the various occupations. The churches aided to maintain a sense of community and stability. During the Soviet era, Josef Stalin felt threatened by religion as it challenged his plan for full Sovietization. He wanted to assimilate all cultures of the states which formed the Soviet Union and abolish religion. Stalin forced unification between the Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This dissolved the Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church in 1946, which went underground in Ukraine. Meanwhile, faithful abroad continued practicing openly. If caught practicing faith, consequences were severe and included being sent to labor camps in Siberia. The Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church resurfaced in the mid-1980's. By August 1990, the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv was reinstated as a Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as it was, prior to the Russian Orthodox Church's absorption decades before.

Stalin had full authority of the USSR in 1925. He intended socialism to transform the Soviet Union into a powerhouse. He wanted to surpass the rest of the world in industrial, agricultural and economic production, regardless of cost. Stalin announced his Five-Year Plan in October 1928 and forced participation from everyone. He required unattainable grain quotas which were protested by many Ukrainians working the land and fighting assimilation. All foodstuff was confiscated as quotas began appearing unattainable. The result was death by starvation – the Great Famine of 1932-33, killing 11 million people (Subtelny, 1994, 416).

Ukrainian intelligentsia and their nationalism efforts continued in Kyiv and Lviv up until World War I. Many fled to Western Ukraine for their own safety as they promoted upholding all aspects of Ukrainian nationalism. As this became more challenging with the onset of World War I and the Russian Revolution; the intellectuals, including Lesya Ukrainka and Ivan Franko focused their efforts on preserving the Ukrainian language. They knew by upholding the Ukrainian language, total Russian assimilation would be more challenging for the authorities.

During the 1950's Ukraine's political elite acknowledged needed modifications to uphold Ukrainian nationalism under Soviet suppression. Upholding nationalism via language, literature, culture and collective memory helped maintain group cohesion. In the 1960's and 1970's, intense Russification efforts were implemented to counteract the activities of the 1950's. Bans of practicing any religion continued.

Ukrainian nationalism was reinstated in the 1980's. *Rukh*, "Popular Movement for Restructuring" actively worked to unite the people and expressed solidarity through nationalism while declaring its importance within the state. Their message was conveyed through pop music, quickly catching the youth's attention. Anti-Soviet sentiments among Ukrainians grew strong after the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in April 1986. The catastrophic repercussions were

silenced for several days. By 1990, *Rukh*'s membership grew to nearly five million, many defecting from Ukraine's Communist Party. The group's stronghold came from Western Ukraine, who encouraged a nationalistic spirit throughout the state. Driven by the intellectuals, *Rukh* gained further support from all groups and demographics within Ukraine and also from the Diaspora abroad.

### Ukraine – Independence

On August 24, 1991 Ukraine declared independence. Leonid Kravchuk was elected president of Ukraine on December 1, 1991, when the state also voted for independence from the Soviet Union. With assistance from *Rukh*, Kravchuk led the state in a pro-Ukrainian direction, attempting to overturn the previous decades of de-Ukrainianization efforts. He acknowledged Ukraine must work towards European integration and not rely heavily on Russia for support. Kravchuk also emphasized the need to revive the Ukrainian language. Further emphasis for nationalization was incorporated into education including Ukrainian culture, history, literature and language. Said course and more time for the humanities were added while reducing Russian grammar and literature lessons (Wanner, 1998, 85). This was to reestablish Ukrainian nationalism and Ukrainian identity for its citizens.

Ukraine introduced the coupon as its currency. It replaced the rouble, showing economic and monetary independence from Russia. The coupon was unsuccessful in stabilizing inflation and salaries stagnated. To help curb inflation and ease economic transition, in 1996, Yushchenko replaced the coupon and introduced the *hryvnia*. This was one of several accomplishments during his term as Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine. Trading of goods internationally began and Ukraine's internal economic stability was recognized.



Regarding political structure, Ukraine had to start fresh. The state's political structure and actions of the political leaders were challenged in growth and development. Ukraine's early politicians, accustomed to Communist-style rule, were active in the Soviet government. Forming the political structure was difficult due to the ingrained Communist-style rule and practices. The democratic system was very new. Learning and applying principles based in democracy needed constant review and consistent use. Eliminating old, familiar techniques and implementing new democratic methodologies opened the door for corruption and political instability. Examples include exchanging goods for services provided (household items for completing work), and grand gifts in exchange for loyalty (a summer home to ensure party loyalty).

To successfully transition Ukraine politically, economically and nationalistically, President Kravchuk needed strong support within government. He named Leonid Kuchma prime minister. Kuchma ran against Kravchuk for president in 1994 and won. His primary task upon his election was to establish a rubric by which to abide. He made numerous changes to the Constitution. Reforms were necessary as Ukraine's Constitution was composed in 1978. Agreeing to decided reforms was difficult within government; so, Kuchma initiated his favorite tactic to get what he wanted – intimidation. A new Constitution was adopted in June 1996.

Once president, Kuchma began using numerous persuasive tactics to push his personal agenda. Quickly, he implemented a full plan of corruption, fraud, manipulation, abuse and ulterior motives of self-given power and cronyism, challenging the state. The oligarchs emerged, as did multiple acts of corruption. Despite this, Kuchma announced several times that Ukraine was ready to strive towards Europeanization and join the EU and WTO.

Kuchma ran for reelection in 1999, reiterating the desire for EU membership. He ran against Communist Party leader, Petro Symonenko. After reelection, the truth about Kuchma

surfaced through crony capitalism, economic and political reforms. He continued intimidating, which proved positive for task completion. In April 2000, Kuchma proposed a referendum on constitutional changes, assaulting the democratic consolidation process (Protsyk, 2005, 25).

At the start of Kuchma's second term, Yushchenko was named Prime Minister and Tymoshenko Deputy Prime Minister. Quickly, they saw high amounts of corruption within the state. Both observed corruption's infiltration into economics and international trade relations. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko agreed to focus their efforts to eliminate the oligarchs and clean up economic relations in Ukrainian politics. Realizing their goals in March 2000, President Kuchma, said both needed to be destroyed (Wilson, 2005a, 49). Tymoshenko was fired from her post in January 2001. She did not let her dismissal fall by the wayside. On February 9, 2001, she organized the National Salvation Forum intending to impeach Kuchma. She was arrested a few days later. Yushchenko was dismissed in April 2001. Anatolii Kinakh replaced Yushchenko, becoming the eleventh Prime Minister since 1991. This switch was based on Kuchma's anger towards an implemented reform policy to pay pensions.

During his presidency, Kuchma had a near monopoly on all power: economic, within the media – primarily television – and political, regarding elections. In 1996, former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko bribed Kuchma with \$3.7 million as starter capital for mobile phone company, Kyivstar (Wilson, 2005a, 39). Lazarenko was caught and indicted. Kryvorizhstal, Ukraine's major steel works company also faced privatization. In June 2004, the company was privatized for \$800 million by Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk (Åslund, 2005, 341).

Citizens witnessed the oligarchs revel in their rich financial gains from business deals and privatizing companies. Meanwhile, citizens experienced minimal possibility of living a more affluent lifestyle. Their livelihoods stagnated, much like the changes Kuchma proposed during

his reelection campaign. Ukraine's GDP was steady during the Kuchma administration, though inflation was high. This was caused by corruption by the oligarchs. To date, rampant corrupt acts and political instability affect the economic system and trade relations with the West.

With the Kuchma administration's monopoly on television as a news source, many people turned to other media. Reports were limited and constrained by the government's strong censorship rules. The public was fully aware of the government's media manipulation and censorship. Such censorship was carried over from the Soviet era.

The attempted cover-up of the kidnapping and decapitation of opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze in September 2000 challenged the position of Kuchma's government. Gongadze founded the internet-based newspaper *Ukrainska Pravda* which focused on publicizing government acts. Gongadze published an exposé on September 5, 2000 on Kuchma's confidant, Oleksandr Volkov, setting Kuchma over the edge. Kuchma was highly suspected of direct involvement in Gongadze's disappearance; ergo, the scandal was dubbed "Kuchmagate." His involvement was suspected because of audiotapes made by his security guard, Mykola Melnychenko, which indicated Kuchma was well informed of the murder. Melnychenko and his family fled to Czech Republic fearing their safety. The publicized murder motivated Kuchma and the oligarchs to continue their acts and reinforce relations with Russia.

The case's handling, and the government's denial appalled citizens when an investigation led to inconclusive results. In revolt, "Ukraine without Kuchma" began in central Kyiv fighting to impeach Kuchma based on the murder scandal. The initial campaign amounted to 20,000-30,000 protestors. A second wave of demonstrations occurred February 6, 2001, when parliament reopened (Wilson, 2005a, 58). The movement failed because organizers were unable to build their coalition to the strength necessary to demand exposure of the pending case.

Despite the Gongadze scandal's deteriorating effects, the Kuchma regime prepared for the 2004 presidential election. Kuchma and the oligarchs took advantage of their powers and began planning their fight via sabotage. The world quietly observed Kuchma's actions. His forcefulness and brazen efforts to assure task completion done per his preferences led Kuchma to be uninvited to the NATO Summit in November 2002 in Prague. He still attended and was shunned by his peers (D'Anieri, 2003, 59).

Kuchma was reluctant to step down as president as his second term concluded. He realized there was no possibility for the two-term maximum rule to be overturned for him. As a strong member of the oligarchs and supporters of their activities, Kuchma needed to hand pick someone to represent them in the election. Selecting a person to support; needed thought.

Yanukovych was Ukraine's third prime minister during Kuchma's second presidential term. Kuchma knew Yanukovych's reputation. He was confident that corruption would become a way of life in Ukraine if Yanukovych was elected. However, Kuchma did not fully trust his colleague. Even so, Yanukovych quickly became Kuchma's right hand man as prime minister. Corruption and other ill-related acts already occurred within government and ran rampant once Yanukovych became prime minister. Naming Yanukovych to this position was a strategic move within the oligarchs and their growing clique.

Yanukovych stood out among the oligarchs with his brash personality and reputation. He endured a rough childhood in Donetsk, the most criminalized city in Ukraine. In 1968, when Yanukovych was 18, he was imprisoned for robbery. Two years later, he was charged with assault. His harsh and uncouth personality emerged during incarceration. While in prison, Yanukovych earned the nickname "*kham*" or scum and established himself as a verbally and physically violent person (Wilson, 2005a, 13). His criminal records disappeared in 1978 and

resurfaced in 2004 in Moscow. Yanukovych's criminal past became a contention point for Ukrainian citizens during the 2004 elections.

To deflect from the negative concerns, the oligarchs gave Yanukovych a makeover. They dressed him in well-fitted, presentable suits and sent him to the United States to learn how to speak like a politician. This effort did not improve Yanukovych's image with the public. Further dislike and ridicule emerged when Yanukovych officially submitted his candidacy documents. His Curriculum Vitae was laden with spelling and grammatical errors and was submitted hand-written to the Central Election Commission.

Viktor Yushchenko was the opposition candidate, favored by the people. Yushchenko's activity in politics began during his time as Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine. He took the position in 1993 and held until 1999, when he became prime minister. After his dismissal as prime minister, Yushchenko created his political party "Our Ukraine" in January 2002. The party emphasized and promoted Ukrainian language and cultural nationalism. The parliamentary election of 2002 helped solidify Our Ukraine's position in Ukrainian politics after winning 101 of the 450 parliamentary seats (Yushchenko, 2007).

Tymoshenko supported Yushchenko and held similar political views. Her career began and boomed during the mid 1990's in the oil industry. She entered politics when nominated to run in the 1996 parliamentary elections. She became deputy chief of the "*Hromada Party*" (Tymoshenko, 2007). In late 1999 and early 2000, Tymoshenko started learning Ukrainian. She projected a nationalistic image and furthered it by forming her own political party – the *Batkivshchyna* (Fatherland) Party. Her party was in opposition to Kuchma and his administration. In December, 2001, her political party was reformed. With the reformation, it was nicknamed BYuTy.

Our Ukraine refocused its platform just before the 2004 presidential elections. Instead of accentuating economic reforms and Ukrainian nationalism, the party stressed European integration, ascension into the EU, NATO and WTO. On July 2, 2004, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko joined forces and announced their partnership for the campaign. Together, they formed the People's Power Coalition. Their pact ensured Tymoshenko would not run for president. Instead, she would support Yushchenko and campaign for him. Additional campaign rallying support came from politicians Borys Tarasyuk and Yuri Kostenko (Åslund, Anders and Michael McFaul, eds., 2006, 39).

### **BACKGROUND: ORANGE REVOLUTION**

Kuchma and the oligarchs flourished rapidly becoming multi-millionaires filching gained profits from business deals. Along with the manipulations and abuse of power, Kuchma still did not want to be exempt from the election. He argued that the two-term maximum rule for presidents was not applicable to him as it went into effect after his inauguration in 1994. Many did not support his reasoning.

Towards the end of his presidency, Kuchma pushed to give parliament more power. At the same time, Kuchma assured his authority remained intact. This complimented his ruling hand in matters and caused the political system to be more parliamentary than presidential-parliamentary. Doubts were raised if the reforms would strengthen democracy and develop governance in Ukraine (Protsyk, 2005, 26). This systemic change was made official on December 8, 2004, and gave protestors during the Orange Revolution additional fighting fuel. Kuchma was already strongly disliked for the malevolent tactics he used against parliament and Ukraine's citizens during his second term.

Yushchenko, out of office, saw state development stagnate. He wanted to implement changes in the state and decided to campaign for president. Tymoshenko also wanted changes. She and Yushchenko held the same opinions and created their pact, guaranteeing her support for Yushchenko. Tymoshenko's party – YTB, and Yushchenko's Our Ukraine became allies in the election, while maintaining their own political identities.

Yushchenko's driving forces were his political party, campaign promises and argument that the Kuchma administration detoured from its platform five years prior. He vocalized that the public's expectations of the Kuchma administration were never met. The younger generation wanted to see more growth and state development from the government. Developing Ukraine both economically and democratically would help with exchanges between neighbors and trading partners. Working with international business partners, as well as possible study abroad and other exchange opportunities, would also greatly benefit the youth.

The overall feeling that life in Ukraine was no longer improving and state development stagnated, emerged among citizens during the Kuchma administration. This sentiment grew stronger during the 2004 presidential campaign. The stagnation directly affected the public's lives, making everyday life more difficult than before. This mobilized citizens who wanted to right the wrongs they saw. They felt that a controlled and limited set of information was presented. The expected growth and development briefly witnessed by citizens from ten to fifteen years earlier suddenly stopped. Instead, the privatization and re-privatization of companies and businesses grew. Only a political figurehead could stand up and lead the masses to push for change, verbalizing the previously sensed discourse. The opportunity to demand change emerged through the presidential elections.

Like elections in other states, Yushchenko and Yanukovych had very different political platforms. Both candidates rallied and visited cities throughout Ukraine while connecting with voters. Additionally, both received support from varied demographics. Yushchenko's supporters were younger citizens. Older people receiving pensions and reliant on state funds primarily supported Yanukovych. Yanukovych's platform focused on returning Ukraine to the ways of the Soviet Union. He argued all major institutions were established during that era and therefore, they should return to the Soviet structure (Copsey, 2005, 101). From his first campaign day, Yushchenko proposed democracy and democratic growth if elected president. He incorporated this as a major theme in his political platform knowing the public wanted change. With this, he became the face of democracy and hope of a democratic system within Ukraine.

In December 2003, Kuchma forewarned that the upcoming presidential elections would be the dirtiest in Ukraine's history. All acts of trickery Kuchma and his cronies planned were devised for strategic implementation while denying involvement. The plans emerged as Kuchma realized the vote must be rigged to result in his favor. A key trick used during the election was manipulating absentee voting, a very easy way to stuff ballot boxes favoring Yanukovych (Oleshko, 2004a, 39). Many of Yushchenko's campaign posters were vandalized and removed by the Kuchma administration. More tricks emerged through television, claims that Yushchenko's candidacy was part of an American plot, violent acts, extremist groups, intimidating and forcing regional governors and state institutions to support Yanukovych, or risk unemployment (Kuzio, 2005, 42).

The most severe trick, directed at Yushchenko, nearly took his life. He had dinner with Security Services of Ukraine, SBU head Ihor Smeshko and deputy, Volodymyr Satsiuk on September 5, 2004. Yushchenko received an intense dose of dioxin poison during the dinner.



He was rushed to Austria for medical attention later that night. Kuchma is highly suspected in being involved in plotting this activity as he worked closely with Smeshko and Satsiuk. A few months later, the specific dioxin was confirmed as Agent Orange. While recovering in Austria, Tymoshenko stepped in and campaigned on Yushchenko's behalf. After his return home upon initial treatment from the poisoning, 70,000 people welcomed him (Wilson, 2005a, 123).

The presidential election was scheduled for October 31, 2004. Over 20 presidential candidates were listed on the ballot. Both Yushchenko and Yanukovich won 39% of the overall vote. A winner was not produced, forcing a runoff vote on November 21, 2004. Preparing for the runoff, Tymoshenko urged citizens to get out to vote and publicly stand up for Yushchenko.

After the runoff vote on November 21, the Central Election Commission declared Yanukovich president, citing he won by a 3% margin over Yushchenko. In response, Yushchenko immediately called his supporters to come to Kyiv's *Maidan Nezalezhnosti* (Independence Square) and protest the announced results non-violently. From his first call to action for protest, Yushchenko stressed the necessity of remaining non-violent. Maintaining calm in an environment with high tension and emotions, Yushchenko and *Pora* knew that the protest's pro-democracy movement must be nonviolent to avoid a possible riot situation. He felt all human lives were highly valuable.

As Kuchma controlled many of the television stations, many citizens turned to other media for updates on the campaign and election. The Orange Revolution is distinguished as being one of the first technologically-based post-socialist urban political movements. Use of cell phones, text messaging, internet and email played a notable role among the people.

Technologically-based media aided in organizing and managing the crowds and their

participants. The use of technology to this extent is strongly acknowledged. Between 2003 and December 2004, about 12.37% of Ukraine's population used the internet (Dyczok, 2006, 220).

Every development in the protest was published on the web, giving the world a view from the trenches, witnessing the event's details as they happened. The Orange Revolution was the first major movement detailed and broadcast through the internet for the world to see and share in the experience simultaneously. Yushchenko's team and *Pora* utilized technology to forward critical information through non-traditional media in Ukraine. This maintained their momentum and organization during the movement.

### PORA

Yushchenko received additional support from *Pora* (literally translated "Now's the Time"). The group acted as a networking organization which aided to unite Yushchenko's supporters. *Pora*'s main goal was to reinstall democracy and democratic practices in Ukraine and requested these rights through civil actions. It was a residentially based organization and "forged a sphere of local citizenship that involves citizens directly in the management of their collective affairs and that mobilizes them when necessary" (Holson, 2008, 247).

*Pora*, inaugurated in March 2004, became the largest state-wide network of Non-Governmental Organizations, activities and volunteers (Åslund, and McFaul, eds., 2006, 86). The group overcame the challenge of uniting social, cultural and administrative differences as well as within Ukraine, regional diversity for democracy. It was organized through core leaders, a volunteer network, informational campaign and the push for free and fair elections. In total, 150 different national, regional and local NGO's joined *Pora*'s efforts (Åslund, 2006, 88).

The group's core members completed extensive training in crowd control, and non-violent practices. They aided to maintain a civil environment in the tent camps, where many

people resided during the Orange Revolution day in and day out. *Pora* networked with businesses to gain additional support and effectively communicate information and requests for help. During the 2004 campaign, *Pora* informed and mobilized voters. Their slogans encouraged younger citizens to vote, promoted anti-Kuchma sentiment and held “practice” protests during the campaign. *Pora* relied heavily on technology to communicate critical information to their supporters via the internet, emails and text messages.

The group focused their efforts on the younger voters, near university campuses and within student organizations. Through rapport building, extensive training and non-violent reaction, reliance on technology and targeting a specific demographic of the population, *Pora* became a strong ally for Yushchenko. Ultimately, *Pora* became the backbone of public support. Combining these facets with their mission helped involve the youth and encourage them to voice their preference for the next president and what they desire next for the state. In contrast, Yanukovich viewed *Pora* as a terrorist group, which in turn caused more youth to dislike him (Kuzio, 2005, 40).

*Pora* helped Yushchenko address the two main targets of the social movement. He, along with Tymoshenko challenged the power holders of the current administration while *Pora* worked with and led the general public. This way, pressure was put on everyone – leaders and the masses who follow them. *Pora* was influential in keeping the crowds calm and offered direction to refute the announced election outcome. Yushchenko’s grassroots nature of the campaign also sensitized the population to the overall cause they were fighting for – an honest and democratic election.

## **ORAL HISTORIES FROM THE ORANGE REVOLUTION**

---

### **CRITERIA**

After reviewing general information and characteristics of post-socialist urban political movements, and the events before and during the Orange Revolution, it is necessary to review testimonials and oral histories of this specific event. Oral histories not only confirm the historical events documented by researchers, they also add a human element to the Orange Revolution. These testimonials of personal experiences add value to the movement as it would not have occurred without the participation of the people residing in the state.

To complement the already published findings on this particular topic, I sought out new research. My primary goal of this research was to disprove that the Orange Revolution was merely an event where the public and citizens released a burst of pent up frustrations. I wanted to prove that the protest and event as a whole occurred independently from any other event or activity. I predicted that I would find the Orange Revolution occurred resulting from numerous gradual changes that were too slow for the public to see an end result. My overall hope in conducting my research was to better understand the event's outcome and how it advances Ukraine's democratic growth.

To conduct my research, I needed to set criteria for my prospective participants. While initiating my interviews, I needed to qualify participants before interviewing them. Potential participants were located at the time of their interviews in the United States, specifically, Boston, Chicago and Minneapolis. Others were located throughout Ukraine. Requirements of my participants included that they were at least 14 years old in 1991 and have memories of life under socialism. Additionally, my interview candidates all lived in Ukraine, preferably in Kyiv, Ukraine's capital, during the Orange Revolution. Subsequent emigration was acceptable. I began my recruitment process by asking people already within my circle of acquaintances to

relate their experiences to me. From there, I asked these acquaintances to aid me in recruiting others in their wider circle of contacts to reach out to me directly and relay their experiences, if they so desired. These people, beyond my circle, had the opportunity to decline participation without my ever knowing they were contacted. In total, about 20 people provided their histories and experiences. These histories were told by participants via in person interviews, Skype and email exchanges. The questions I asked during all interviews were as follows:

- Tell me about life during Soviet times; specifically during the 1970's and 1980's.
- What was life like at the start of independence?
- Tell me your memories during the state of Ukraine's independence.
- What changes occurred immediately after independence? How long did these same changes continue?
- What were the general sentiments about life during Kuchma's second term in office? For example – Was it easier or harder to buy items or obtain services? What kinds of items were available for purchase that were not possible during Soviet times?
- During Kuchma's second term in office and the time leading up to the 2004 elections, what were your thoughts and viewpoints on politics?
- Share with me your overall feelings, sentiments leading up to the election. Did you experience any changes in your own life that were affected by the upcoming election? Did the upcoming election itself make you take a more pro-active stance?
- Did you participate in the election? Had the election happened under different circumstances, would you have participated by voting? Why or why not?
- During the Orange Revolution, what were your feelings, sentiments? Did your friends, family, colleagues have the same feelings?
- During these elections, what was the most prominent moment for you?
- What were your expectations from these elections and the revolution?
- How did you communicate with others during the Orange Revolution? Telephone? Text message? Email?
- Who did you communicate with outside of your primary location during the protests to exchange updates? Where were they located?
- Tell me about the atmosphere during the revolution.
- How did the atmosphere change, if at all, after the revolution?
- What were your primary expectations that would occur as a result of the revolution?
- Tell me about life now after the Orange Revolution. Has your life improved or worsened? Did the circumstances change?
- Did the result of the Orange Revolution directly change your life in any way? How?
- During your entire life, when did you feel the most patriotic/nationalistic?
- Should an event similar to the Orange Revolution occur again in Ukraine, would you participate? Why or why not?

Interviews were conducted either in Ukrainian or English, depending on the participant's language preference. Interviews conducted in Ukrainian were translated by me into English. All names have been changed to conceal the participants' identity. Further anonymity is presented by not identifying my participants' hometowns, unless they disclosed this information in referencing their location. My focus was to interview people who participated in the main demonstrations of the Orange Revolution in Kyiv. However, I also interviewed people throughout Ukraine. The feedback and answers received from these interviews in some ways challenged the acknowledged division within the state. Religiously, linguistically and culturally Ukraine has been divided east and west. The responses I received to my questions eliminated some of the perceived division. At the same time however, difference in opinions and experiences remain.

To start, I asked my participants about their recollections of life before 1991, during Soviet times. A simpler life during the Soviet Union existed. There were few surprises from day to day. Resources were available to people at a set standard.

### **Soviet Ukraine**

“This was my childhood and school years. I wasn't into politics yet... but I learned... From this era, I have positive memories as a young person and I was content. I remember one time, I noticed my father, by the dim light, listening to the radio program “Voice of America.” Dad was disturbed that I saw this, and when I asked him what he was doing, he answered “I'm a Communist – I am allowed to listen to them.” As I grew up a bit, I often listened to “*Svoboda*,” “Voice of America” and other such programs. I even searched for radio stations and tuned into them... Listening to the channels was fairly difficult – due to the Soviet work of frequency interference as the programs were blocked.”

~~~Petro.

“My childhood was during this era. From my childhood, I have good memories, so I have good impressions of this era. During this time, many people had access to full rights, but not everyone. Above all, people felt more protected, secure than what they did during the 1990’s and early 2000’s.”

~~~Volodya.

“There wasn’t much joy or major excitement for anyone. It often felt very sad, solemn. We were corralled and herded about like cattle. Individualism did not exist. During the Soviet era, there was nothing – no hope, no grand opportunities. You just did your everyday activities and put one foot in front of the other. Conformity abounded.”

~~~Bohdan.

“I was born in the early 1950’s. In Pidhajtsi, all my life, there was the foundation of a church. My parents, aunt and uncle with their family and others from the village started building the church before World War II. The church’s foundation and walls about five feet high stood complete. The War paused everything. When Russian occupation occurred and along with the banning of practicing any form of religion, including Catholicism, the building of the church stopped completely. The partially built structure remained dormant through my adult years. It wasn’t that resources and building materials were not available. These items were available – just not for these types of structure.

Prior to my birth, Pidhajtsi’s general population consisted of three groups of people. About one third of the population was Ukrainians, another third was Polish and the remaining third consisted of a Jewish community. Of course, this changed. By the time I was a young girl, many of the Polish and Jewish populations left and moved elsewhere. Ukrainians remained and became the majority of the population. Even a few people from other villages moved to our small town. A lot of “*Moskali*” – those from Russia – were transplanted and moved to Pidhajtsi. They never spoke or learned a word of Ukrainian, and only spoke Russian to communicate. One of my neighbors who lived down the road was one of these transplanted people. During her entire life, she never uttered a word of Ukrainian, only Russian.”

~~~Nadia.

“The Soviet years of the 1970’s were my childhood and the 1980’s – my youth. From 1970 through 1986, was perhaps the most peaceful and mild for people in Ukraine within the last 40 years. Truly, during that time, all of the citizens of the USSR lived in almost equal status. When we talk about disparity during that time, some of today’s historians use the difference in earnings and economic security as well as the possibility of those who held high positions in the party. It is worth remembering that if this difference existed, it was hardly noticeable. The difference in economic status was not high. Differences were developing in the area of professions, i.e., their higher earnings, and not as a result of thievery of what belongs to the people. That is thievery of what belongs to the people. That is, thievery of state properties, as it is happening today.

I was born and grew up in a simple, working village family. In the early 1960’s, my parents moved from the village to Kirovohrad. My mother got a job in a brick factory and my father worked for the police department. After I was born, my father changed his job and worked as a carpenter in construction, and my mother left her job and managed the household.

After working three years in construction, my father, in 1970 received without any cost to him, from the government, a new two-room apartment. It is worth noting that this opportunity was also available to most residents of Soviet Ukraine. During that period, there was no unemployment. My father earned pay that was sufficient to support his family – wife and a child. His wages covered the cost of groceries, apartment maintenance, buy all clothing, help parents, take family vacations and maintain some savings.

Food choices were considerably lesser than today. There were very few imported products. However, the quality was very high in comparison to what is available today. Nonetheless, foodstuff was adequate. There was very good food selection. The public had very good opportunities to buy for the holidays a sufficient quantity of fine quality production at reasonable prices.

From 1970-1985, citizens of the USSR and Ukraine wore clothing made in the USSR. Imported items were handled exclusively by high-end establishments. Domestically-made products were of low quality and at low prices. The style of clothing and footwear were not of modern design. Foreign cars were not sold, and the domestic units were not manufactured in sufficient quantities – therefore, shortages existed.



In the 1980's, all citizens of the USSR had full medical coverage at no cost to them. Clinics were available even in small villages. Regional and district hospitals were equipped with all necessary medical technology, hospital beds and such. All healthcare, food and time in the hospital were at no charge to every citizen.”

~~~Viktor.

“I do not associate myself with politics whatsoever. I'm not one bit interested in the topic, though life is influenced by politics. I'm forced to acknowledge this fact, despite my personal feelings. My passion lies in my hobby – philately. I can see politics emerge via postage stamps. During the Soviet Union era, stamps were very bland. Only a few colors were used and the images were basic. The images were neutral within the Soviet Republics.”

~~~Taras.

“The educational system in the Soviet Union was one of structure that was consistent throughout. Curriculum was highly focused on sciences and math. The mode of language for classes was Russian. After high school, specialization degrees and vocational schools were very popular. Finals were given at the end of every school year. Sometimes how well a student did on their oral final exams did not correctly reflect how well they knew the material, but what kind of gift they presented to their instructor in appreciation for the knowledge they shared.”

~~~Mychajlo.

### **Independence – 1991**

My participants also discussed their recollections from when Ukraine declared independence and the initial years that followed. They noticed many changes especially in lifestyle and resources. Feelings of uplift and excitement were very common among my participants along with some initial concerns once changes became noticeable.

“Up until independence in 1991, I remember things being quite sad, almost dismal. When Ukraine declared independence, there was a lot of happiness and excitement. Everyone wanted to celebrate, but after a while, shock set in and the questions of “Now what? Where do we go from here? What do we do next?” regarding democratic building came about.

I quickly noticed changes in my classes at the time of independence. Most of my lessons in school were taught in Ukrainian even before independence. I did have a few classes taught in Russian. Classes taught in Russian, including Russian language were quickly minimized. I can still speak to someone in Russian if or when necessary and do it with ease and also transition between Ukrainian and Russian. However, as a Ukrainian citizen, and out of principle, I prefer to speak with others in Ukraine using Ukrainian.”

~~~Mykola.

“The curriculum in Ukrainian schools began to change. Science and math subjects remained strong. Subjects relating more to Ukrainian language, history and cultural studies were introduced and Russian subjects became less frequent. The biggest change was in fact, the push to include Ukrainian language classes and ensure they were being taught in schools.”

~~~Mychajlo.

“I was always intrigued by American culture as a kid. I wanted to know more about American life, lifestyle, culture – everything. After independence, you started seeing American influences come into Ukraine. The most iconic association with American lifestyle introduced to Ukraine after 1991 was McDonald’s. Though, the novelty of it is more fascinating than anything. Like Americans, we could now order a Big Mac and fries.”

~~~Bohdan.

“When Ukraine became independent, postage stamps had a more nationalistic sentiment within them. The Trident was being implemented almost as often as an American flag for common postage in the United States. Flowers, especially poppies and bachelor buttons which are both popular in Ukraine were also visible. Colors on the stamps became more vibrant and images more detailed. The stamps grew into pieces of artwork.”

~~~Taras.

“The church that started being built even before I was born remained untouched until independence. Shortly after Ukraine declared independence, when it became more acceptable to practice religion publicly, the people of Pidhajtsi worked to complete the church’s construction. Around 1997, the church was finished and we were actually able to start holding Masses,

weddings, baptisms and celebrate religious holidays. A few years later, we started building a second church in Pidhajtsi.”

~~~Nadia.

“Everything from the stores vanished just before independence. Life became terrible. Right after independence, authorities elevated themselves in importance and people were then lowered in value.”

~~~Maksym

“Items became more available, but there was nothing to buy them with – no money. Nothing was stable.”

~~~Danylo.

“During Soviet times, people did not have much money, but goods were available. After independence, people had money but goods were scarce. This is the biggest thing I remember from this time. The shift from goods being available to their lacking and the shift in funds to get goods was very pivotal for me. This change really struck me one day in 1992, when I went out to buy toilet paper. Hardly any toilet paper was left on the shelf, whereas before it was plentiful.”

~~~Roman.

“Goods were limited and their quality was not always the best. I was fortunate to receive on occasion bits of care packages of gently used clothes from my cousin’s relatives in Canada. I would get the occasional pair of pants or sweater if certain clothing items did not fit my uncle. We would all wear these items with great care and pride. In one package, my aunt received a bottle of perfume. She used the perfume only for special occasions.”

~~~Vasyl.

“Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, citizens, on average, lived a fairly good and comfortable life. In general, people had access to most all basic necessities. I think the Soviet Union fell apart because of the communist ideology and the government system. It was during the mid-1980s that the government started having difficulties in monitoring the pre-set, high standard of living for its citizens.

The economic structure was based on the principle of strict control by the central government. From my point of view, in the beginning of the 1990's, the complex socio-economic relations, the development of lawlessness, corruption, the lack of laws regulating the transition to a market economy, the desire of the party and government functionaries of the USSR to divide political and economic influences, was the cause of the breakup of the Soviet Union. At that time, and thereafter, there was no conversation about the desire of Ukraine to become independent. This idea was trumped by the functionaries of the Communist criminals with the desire of self-enrichment and to take ownership of the state's wealth.

When Ukraine gained independence, in the beginning of the 1990's; that was the period of expectations and disappointments. It was the beginning of poverty, unemployment, rapid development of criminal activities. Extremely high inflation, ruining of business establishments by the wild privatization, the senseless distribution of properties and after their take over were sold dirt cheap as though they were pieces of scrap metal. The public could not take its savings from the banks; the accounts were frozen. These were very difficult years. But, at the same time, people believed that any day the statesmen would institute law and order. Yes, during this period many people were becoming very rich very quickly, but some not for long. The standard of living for most people was low. City dwellers were growing gardens massively.

Some establishments were not paying the workers their salaries. Instead, the idea of bartering was used. In other words, whatever the factory produced, the workers would receive that product as compensation – bricks, sugar, furniture, alcohol, etc. Also, poor quality items like clothing, food, alcoholic beverages, etc were produced in massive quantities, all because of the lack of government controls.”

~~~Viktor.

“I was studying in college at this time and majoring in history. I actively participated in events through various student groups focused in politics. I helped out with the American-Canadian organization “Active Freedom” in agitation and went to public rallies.

Regarding goods and services, things were not pleasant... The coupon was introduced.

When working on my graduate studies, my interest in politics continued. Truly, there was resistance of the idea of popularizing and using Ukrainian. In Luhansk, you almost never heard it anywhere (aside from the smaller towns, villages and handful of *oblasts*). Other than

that, Ukrainian was hardly used during that time. Government officials started using Ukrainian more regularly and started publishing laws and all official documents in Ukrainian. There was a definite rise in crime, blaming it on someone, some wickedness – hit men, gunmen were hired to kill businessmen and other leaders. But everyday life was not affected much.”

~~~Petro.

“Sneaky, clever people started grabbing at the goods that were around. Thievery started throughout. The people who cared for Ukraine could not fully manage the state rebuilding. The higher leadership was organized with a few patriots and mostly of brotherhoods of professionals (career men) and thieves. Capital gains started to grow with the authorities, the bandits started using bribery, buying off the leaders and law makers.

The years after independence, I was studying at the institute. Goods for purchase in stores were limited, transportation was unstable. Regarding law, total corruption did not exist yet, so they could still control the bandits. They dimmed the lights on economy.

At the institute in 1993, problems started with the heating and electricity. They started withholding, delaying issuance of paychecks. This continued for years. Instead of pay, they gave IOU or barter notes, then, they paid in the form of goods – vodka among other items.”

~~~Volodya.

“In school, I had some classes taught in Russian. We had lessons in Russian before independence. After independence, class information was less frequently being taught in Russian and more in Ukrainian. By the time my younger sister started grade school in Ternopil, there were no more classes taught in Russian. My sister finished her undergraduate studies in Journalism in Kyiv. There, a mixed hybrid of Ukrainian and Russian “*surzhyk*” is spoken. My sister understands *surzhyk* as can I. However, my sister who is 20 years old has difficulty communicating in Russian, or understanding someone from Eastern Ukraine speaking Russian.”

~~~Sophia.

### **The Years Following Independence – The Kuchma Administration**

At the time of independence, changes emerged and aided in developing the state.

Changes in economics, news media, education and other sectors continued gradually once

Kuchma became president. My participants saw Ukraine differently during Kuchma’s tenure.

“The first years of independence, I was not interested in politics. My primary focus was my studies. During this time, the local economy and businesses worked fairly well and changed for the worst 10-15 years later. There was a split between citizens on the language issue. The changes continued until Kuchma issued dictatorship. There was also a political party created, named “*Jedyna Ukrajina*” (United Ukraine). With this party, you were forced to vote. They dictated not only participation in the elections, but also how members were to vote.

Under Kuchma, newspapers and TV only reported on nice, positive events. These stories were the kind that you would forget rather quickly. Simply put – they were show pieces. All democratic reforms were bunched and silenced. Discussions on leading political and democratic processes were kept silent.”

~~~Volodya.

“Voting for Kuchma’s second term was regulated – that is, dictating influences on the electoral committee and the electoral process were present. With that, the fact that Symonenko was a Communist – so above all, it did not sway anyone one way or the other. Though, it was Kuchma who rode on this fact and used it to his advantage to earn more votes.”

~~~Petro.

“Nothing good came about. Kuchma wanted to stay in command and change the Constitution.”

~~~Maksym.

“With reference to Kuchma – he in fact was in charge of Ukraine in 1992-1993 as Prime Minister. With exclusive power to issue laws he was president from 1994-2005. It is worth noting that during Kuchma’s leadership there were some negative moments: wild hoarding of capital, in the 1990’s the general population becoming much poorer, the growth of lawlessness and corruption, no definite direction in foreign policy. On the positive side: new constitution, and creation of some foundation for basic laws, in the beginning of the 2000’s stabilization of the economy, renewal of more normal pricing system of products and elimination of bartering, and improvements of basic pay to workers.

As to the issue of pricing and availability of products, I would say that the availability improved; there were more products to choose from. However, the quality in general was not up to par. Obviously, as soon as the very rich appeared – so did the good quality and the best products. Unfortunately, most of the population lived and still lives in poverty – the earnings are low and the prices are constantly increasing.

With reference to the political issues with Kuchma, in my opinion, the foreign policy was undefined (non-directional). Moves were made in the direction of integration with the EU and at the same time there was evidence and desire to collaborate and work closer with Russia and the ex-Soviet Republics. The internal situation in the mid-2000's was, by that time, different oligarch classes were so organized that they had great influence on the economy as well as political development. Consequently, there were conflicts amongst them, fighting over the economy and the political life. The “Ukraine Without Kuchma” movement was also a result of this struggle. To put it more accurately, it was the way of fighting.”

~~~Viktor.

“Looking back on it, Kuchma was a terrible leader for Ukraine. He did not do a thing for the state. He wasted time for the people, manipulated the instilled government system to suit himself. Plus, he derailed advancement opportunities for Ukraine to strive for eventual memberships to the WTO and EU in a timely manner, which was projected and promised. My parents often discussed their hopes after independence. Their expectation was things would change and improve in Ukraine with much fairness, speed and ease.”

~~~Sophia.

“The availability of goods and services are not to be credited to the Kuchma regime. The end objective was international integration and globalization. Companies during this time, with criminalistic capital had to put their money somewhere. The numerous migrant workers (employees) then, also brought money into Ukraine, and built kiosks for small start up businesses. The big businesses were not functional, so people sought alternative ways to make money. For example, they worked abroad, exported goods to sell in other countries or imported goods to sell in Ukraine, carried goods and sold them. During this time, some became parasites, taking advantage of business people, racketeering organized crime.”

~~~Roman

“Initially, when Kuchma became president, it appeared that opportunities for new growth and the potential for grand life changes emerged. A sense of freedom opened up and became more welcomed by people.”

~~~Maryna.

“During the Kuchma era, the educational system really changed and reforms came into place. Standardized tests began to be implemented to help combat corruption in schools. It was a way to enforce an even standard for equal opportunity in education. This was the biggest way you could see de-politicization efforts and transition to democracy within the education sector of society. Specialization degrees continued, but they became less popular. The higher educational system changed to more of a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree system. All of this was to fight for the quality of education.

Montessori schools began. Pre-school is now for children between six months and six years. Some 22,000 public secondary schools existed. Elementary schools have students from first through fourth grades. These students must take a few standardized tests. Middle school students – grades five through nine, are tested in five subjects – language, history, math, and humanities (English, Business and Arts). High school students, grades ten and eleven, have exams in history, math, language, science and one optional exam subject.”

~~~Mychajlo.

“During the times of the Soviet Union, Russian was taught in school and part of the curriculum. Within a matter of a few years after independence, Russian was no longer a subject taught in schools in Western Ukraine. It was totally eliminated from the curriculum. English became a more popular subject in the classrooms. My niece teaches English in Pidhajtsi in the grade school. She taught herself and now she’s sharing her self-taught knowledge to her students. My niece often acknowledges that resources for both herself and her students are quite limited. My children studied in the United States at universities. They have brought and sent materials for their cousin to use as study aids and educational tools. They’ve also helped their cousin with her own English skills, further helping her to better teach her young pupils.”

~~~Nadia.



“Under Kuchma, more American iconic things entered into the Ukrainian market. McDonald’s started opening more locations throughout Ukraine – the first location of the restaurant was in Kyiv. At first, it was neat to get a taste of American lifestyle in Ukraine through McDonald’s. However, it is very expensive. The cost of going out to eat at McDonald’s nearly equals the cost of a dinner at a nice sit-down restaurant.

Again, anything that is iconic of America is expensive. I’ve seen Nike and Adidas running shoes priced at \$300 per pair in stores in Lviv. I was in the United States for the summer of 2004. This was my first time in America. I walked in to TJ Maxx one day and saw the same shoes I saw in Lviv, and they were priced at \$40. I was shocked at the price variance. In my opinion, I felt like the markups on American-associated goods, is like waving a carrot in Ukrainian citizens’ faces. The way it came off was, “You know you want it, it is there and available, but unattainable for most.””

~~~Bohdan.

“One thing that changed for me within my job after Kuchma took office was an increase in travel abroad. I work as a chemical engineer and have been with the same company for many, many years. I traveled occasionally throughout Ukraine and into Russia a couple times before 1991. After Kuchma became president, my travels have expanded to Germany and I still travel somewhat regularly to Russia and throughout Ukraine checking on projects. I’d still like to see more of the world, which is something I’ve always dreamed of doing, but the opportunity finally came about during this era.”

~~~Roman.

“During the late 1990’s, I was finishing my university studies. While completing my fifth year, my Master’s degree, I was also teaching English to the first year university students. Throughout the academic year, I graded my students on their academic ability and how they retained the information presented in class and in their homework. When year-end finals were around the corner, some of my students (especially those who really had to work hard to earn a passing grade), would start bringing me homemade tortes, cakes, desserts or other gifts. They hoped the sweet treat would sweeten me to award them with good grades. This is something that worked in years past for their parents when they were at university. I always appreciated the

gesture, but also really tried not to let it influence me as I was administering their final exams and grading them.”

~~~Mykola.

“I work with university students. My office is based in Kyiv, which I opened in 2000. The fact that I was able to open my own business is something that would have been a greater challenge some 20 years before – mainly because my business is a recruitment agency. We recruit university students for a work and travel program to gain work experience in the United States. We also run an Au Pair service for university students to nanny abroad. The fact that our people have such an opportunity today is also a dream come true, as travel, back during the Soviet era was accessible only within the states of the Soviet Union.

Many students view this program as a dream come true for their desire to travel and see the world. When submitting their applications, many not only express interest in gaining work experience and advancing their English, but also their desire to have the opportunity to travel abroad and to see firsthand what life is like in the U.S.

Several of the students think or perceive that everyone in the U.S. lives a glamorous lifestyle as seen on American TV shows broadcast in Ukraine. They think everyday life for all is similar as seen on “Friends” or “Beverly Hills 90210.” They are fascinated by the life and culture that exists in America and want that for themselves as well.

When the work and travel program’s popularity began in Ukraine back in the early 2000’s, students were able to stay and work in the U.S. for a full four months and as late into October. However, university classes begin September 1<sup>st</sup>. These students received an exception as they were participating in the program but the stipulation remained they would need to return home to Ukraine to continue their studies.”

~~~Danylo.

“Again, I’ve never had any interest or desire for politics. I’ve always tried to avoid the topic, yet it emerges within my hobby. Under Kuchma, postage stamps were issued commemorating Ukraine’s infrastructure of trains, sports, popular flowers, national holidays and national poets. In the early 2000’s a sense of nationalism and patriotism began to be displayed in the stamps. A series of stamps depicting traditional regional clothing, women’s headdresses, swords, *pysanky* (Ukrainian Easter Eggs), churches and scenes of prominent tourist spots in

major regional cities were depicted. Special stamps honoring national artists (for example, poets Ivan Franko and Taras Shevchenko) were also issued and contained brief biographies. I suppose it was a way to further instill national and cultural pride after independence. In all of these stamps color came alive – bright, vibrant, detailed colors stood out on the stamps.”

~~~Taras.

“During Kuchma’s second term in office, I remember the students’ demonstrations “Ukraine Without Kuchma” ... I read a lot of periodic literary works about Stalin’s repressions, Ukrainian history... Kuchma’s politics were bureaucracy and directed for self-survival. Therefore, I would not call it democratic. However, in all actuality, political repression did not exist... There was anti-regime movement. Even government workers openly discussed with colleagues these events without fear of repercussions.”

~~~ Petro.

### **The 2004 Presidential Elections**

As confirmed by my participants, to further develop the state during the early years of independence, expectations within Ukraine under Kuchma’s command were high. This came about as nationalistic pride continued to be promoted. The promised changes and anticipated results to follow were not coming about. Instead, only cosmetic changes came and were used to mask the stagnation of policies. Therefore, the desire for change in policies and procedures of democratic nature still had not been attained at the end of Kuchma’s presidency. Many felt that the presidential election of 2004 would serve as an opportunity to allow a turning point to become a reality. To make this happen, people needed to participate in the elections.

“Towards the end of Kuchma’s time in office, my impressions were elevated and they were expectations of what remained to be completed. I remember heated discussions with colleagues and friends if they were supporting Yushchenko or Yanukovich. – Everyone’s stances were quite strong either way. People were even able to pat each other on the back or fight with one another, even if they knew each other for years... Despite this, people were not afraid to express their opinions supporting Yushchenko even in Luhansk.

Did I vote during the elections? Yes, of course I voted... Particularly, I remember how strongly it was stressed the need to vote... We waited for some kind of provocation... There was the potential of revenge in the future.”

~~~Petro.

“At first I thought that some of the oligarchs wanted to outlive the others. Not without great costs of being sponsors, Kuchma’s propaganda worked well. They herded up students for meetings supporting the Party of Regions and Yanukovych.

I participated in the elections by voting. I voted during all three rounds. I always feel that need to participate in an election by voting, and you need to choose someone to support.”

~~~Volodya.

“Changes were wanted, not just desired. The belief was that the elections would be a way to help change life for the better. I participated in the election. In other elections I also participate. The tradition for us is this – participate in the elections.”

~~~Maksym.

“I most definitely participated in the election by voting. My younger sister also voted. When the protests began after the first round of the election, she desperately wanted to travel to Kyiv. I would not allow her to go alone, not knowing what could happen en route or upon arrival. Though I wanted to travel to Kyiv myself, I knew that was potentially very unsafe due to probable provocations that could come about. To make sure she did not travel during this time, we hid her ID, so she could not make travel arrangements.”

~~~Mykola.

“In Lviv, we knew this was the time and great opportunity for change to occur. I participated by voting. Some of my friends traveled to Kyiv, though.”

~~~Bohdan.

“In Ternopil, at the time of the election and its purpose was simple. The election was one to determine who would be president – Yushchenko or Yanukovych – Kuchma’s chosen person was to continue the ways of corruption. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko expressed what the

people wanted to hear and expressed the changes that they as political figures and the general public wanted to see in Ukraine.”

~~~Sophia.

“During the campaign, my friends and I often talked about the upcoming elections what we saw and experienced within Lviv and Ternopil. All of us were in the middle of our university studies. Several of my friends at other universities and their classmates were being bullied to vote a certain way (in favor of Yanukovych). They were told if they did not vote for Yanukovych, they would be evicted from student dormitories, face academic probations, or even expulsion. To add to the threat of expulsion, authorities told students they would not be able to transfer to another university in Ukraine after being expelled. Almost all of the universities in Ukraine are run by the state; so, the fear of making these threats a reality was very possible.

Even professors and school teachers in smaller cities and villages were bullied like this too. The threat they received if they did not vote “correctly” was to face unemployment. Another friend of mine, who is a nurse at a small clinic, also was bullied into voting for Yanukovych. Her punishment, like the school teachers, would be losing her job. Personally, I tried to be very careful during this time. I focused hard on my studies and tried to keep to myself and not get into serious discussions with anyone that somebody else might hear.”

~~~Maryna.

“During the 2004 elections, Yushchenko campaign billboards in and around Pidhajtsi were vandalized at night. Sometimes they were vandalized in broad daylight. They were openly destroyed even with guards protecting the boards after the act became quite regular. The pro-Yushchenko boards were replaced with posters expressing support for Yanukovych. Campaign posters for both candidates decorated tall fences, buildings and such, wherever there was space, making it look like wallpaper. You could see the mix of Yanukovych posters overlapping and trying to cover Yushchenko posters. You would not dare take down the Yanukovych posters once they were up. They were all closely monitored, surveyed and protected by the authorities. This was not just in Pidhajtsi or in the Ternopil *oblast*, where Yushchenko was incredibly popular, but it happened throughout Western Ukraine. Western Ukraine heavily supported Yushchenko and what he stood for, what he wanted for us and for Ukraine.”

~~~Nadia.

“I believe the pre-election expectations were for changes for the better. Part of the population put their expectations in support of Yushchenko and part in Yanukovych. Unfortunately, the majority of the population believes in the promises the politicians make, and pay little attention to what they have done. That was before the elections.

When the election started, a lot of people were angered by the way the election was handled. Many infractions and falsifications were allowed by the authorities because they tried to push Yanukovych into the presidency. The hopes and expectations, coupled with the anger for the falsifications during voting, the trust in the politicians who promised better life in case of Yushchenko’s victory, caused the people to invade Maidan in Kyiv – the demonstration.

My personal impression before the election was virtually unemotional. I did not believe any of the promises made by Yanukovych, nor Yushchenko, or his supporter – Yulia Tymoshenko. I knew that these people did not care much for Ukraine and perhaps did not even understand the meaning of the presidency and the responsibility that goes with it. I was leaning to support Yushchenko only because he represented smaller and less influential oligarchs. Furthermore, Yanukovych, we knew, in his youth was involved in criminal activities according to court records. Yushchenko, on the other hand, had a clean record. I would not care to look for a national patriot amongst all the politicians. I did participate in the elections, as I always went voting in the past. This is only because I feel it’s my duty.”

~~~Viktor.

### **The Orange Revolution**

Many citizens understood the value and need to participate in the elections by voting as indicated by my participants’ experiences. Also, was the need to respond to Yushchenko’s call to action, requesting that everyone who could, come on to *Maidan Nezalezhnosti*. Many, who could travel to Kyiv, did. Some traveled with ease and others with great difficulty, as authorities were directed to send travelers from other cities back to their hometowns.

“I was in Western Ukraine at the time of the 2004 elections. I was near Ternopil. We all saw and realized what was going on in the larger cities with the election. About three or four

days after the second round of voting, I decided to go to Kyiv. I took the local shuttle bus 40km from Berezhany to Ternopil without any difficulty.

In Ternopil, I decided to take the bus to Lviv and once there, purchase a train ticket to Kyiv. This was more cost-efficient and the schedule was more flexible than trying to take the train from Ternopil to Kyiv. As soon as I arrived to the train station in Lviv, the ticket agent informed me that all train tickets to Kyiv were sold out. The ticket agent also said that there would not be any more trains traveling to Kyiv. I was not going to let this stop me. I wanted to be part of this event. I wanted to be part of history. I knew all of this would be part of a great story I would tell not only my children, but also my grandchildren, some day.

I went back to the bus station and bought a ticket. Going to Kyiv by bus would, of course, take longer than train, which I was ok with as I knew I had no other real viable option. Shortly after we were on the road, somewhere just outside of Lviv, the authorities had blocked the road. A couple of police officers got on the bus and informed us that the bus had to be turned around. They were not allowing any travel to Kyiv whatsoever. The bus was full of passengers. We were all shocked, disgusted and angered by what had happened.”

~~~Vasyl.

“I was studying at the university when the elections took place. It was the end of November and I had exams I needed to prepare for, so I decided to stay in Lviv. My friends, however, decided to go to Kyiv. Within about a day, they quickly organized themselves to travel in groups to Kyiv. Once there, they planned to take turns standing out in the cold on *Maidan*. This way, not everyone would stand outside in the cold at the same time and get exhausted and not withstand the cold elements for excessive amounts of time. They could also alternate their time and travel between Kyiv and Lviv, while still taking care of everyday matters at home. I helped my friends to take care of things while they were away; including visiting their homes as someone would when watching a house while you are away on vacation. My friends all came back with their impressions of the atmosphere on *Maidan*.

They also told me about the challenges they faced while traveling between Lviv and Kyiv. It was interesting that whenever the group who was in Kyiv and ready to go back after a couple days, they had minimal problems traveling. They had the most issues when they first attempted to go to Kyiv. I think their returning to Lviv during the protests actually helped them.

They made the authorities think for just a moment that the best thing would be was to return home and continue with everyday life activities. They made it look like they were not actively participating in the protests.”

~~~Bohdan.

“During the Orange Revolution, I was in the Czech Republic on business. Abroad and especially in the U.S.A., these events are viewed from a romantic perspective. Ukrainians see it differently. My friends from Western Ukraine expressed doubts during the Orange Revolution and disappointments thereafter.

During the revolution the public was awakened. Some had expectations, some had fear of worrying and some just tried to guess what will come out of all this. In general, there was uplift – people felt they could challenge the authorities. This can be good and it can be bad. It all depends on what direction that energy is aimed at.”

~~~Viktor.

“I was concerned during this time. I was very nervous about telling others who I voted for, who I supported during the campaign and who’s platform would best benefit me as a citizen. My hesitation to talk about who I voted for came from the provocations and bullying my friends experienced at their universities. It wasn’t until several days into the Orange Revolution that I started opening up and telling people that I in fact voted for Yushchenko. Still, I was extremely cautious to share this information with my peers, even those who also supported Yushchenko.”

~~~Maryna.

“Some of my friends traveled to *Maidan* to participate in the protest. I called them from time to time for updates. During this time, I was in Ternopil on a previously arranged trip. I watched the happenings on *Maidan* on TV.”

~~~Petro.

“I vividly remember *Maidan*! Living in Kyiv, I knew I had to go and participate. I met a lot of people, some from Kyiv and others who traveled great distances to participate. Some of the conversations I had with others were quite open, in depth and others; just simply wanted to be a part of the event, kept their conversations with me very brief. From the people I spoke with,



many from Western and Central Ukraine, seemed organized with their travel groups – they were well prepared to face the winter weather with many warm clothes and blankets, food and phone chargers. Whenever anyone had a chance to walk through the underground shopping area under *Maidan*, you would see outlets overflowing with mobile phones charging up and some people were also using their laptops. The ones from Eastern Ukraine seemed to be less organized and ill-prepared, with just the clothes on their backs.

Standing among the crowds, I started talking with a couple of young guys from Eastern Ukraine who were from Dnipropetrovs'k. I asked why they came and how was it that they seemed to have virtually nothing with them. One quickly answered that they were sent to *Maidan* just to see what exactly was going on. They were strong Yanukovich supporters, and the local Yanukovich campaign office sent them to Kyiv to counter-protest. They were simply overwhelmed and mesmerized by the events and what they were seeing. They quickly realized there was no way they could complete the job assigned to them. The young men confided in me that they too wanted to be a part of the event, but they were unsure of their real role. The young men told me that just before stepping on to *Maidan* they threw away pro-Yanukovich, anti-Yushchenko signs they brought into the trash. They wanted to be a part of the events on *Maidan* in a positive way, not to fight for the continuation of what existed until that point.

I offered them what I could – warm food, a chance to stop into my apartment to warm up and freshen up, call their families. The gentlemen said they received an outpouring of support from local Kyivans and those who came prepared to stay outside for long periods of time. People shared their blankets, gave them cups of hot tea and soups. They told me they were overwhelmed by the warm reception from so many; as when they arrived, they anticipated that everyone would express animosity towards them as they were originally sent to fight against the intent of what was happening on *Maidan*.

See, the protests on *Maidan* were a way to unite us. They reminded us that we are all human and we were in this together.”

~~~Roman.

### **Technology and The Orange Revolution**

During the Orange Revolution, regardless of my participants' locations, all relied on technology for communication. The most reliable form of technology was telephone – both cell

phone and land line. Those who had and used cell phones often checked in with others via SMS/text messages. Internet communications via ICQ and emails were quite popular with all participants. Everyone who said they utilized these media found it a positive way to document their immediate feelings and the events in their surroundings. None of my participants really mentioned anything regarding blogs – if they read other blogs or if they personally blogged during this time. They all accessed news websites to get the most up to date information on the happenings around them and throughout Ukraine. Many watched the events on TV.

“I remember the excitement being broadcast on TV from *Maidan*. That was the central place for all activity. All I watched on TV during that time were the events and activities on *Maidan* in Kyiv.”

~~~Maksym.

“Politics have never seriously interested me. I did not travel to Kyiv. It was interesting to observe the events on TV and radio, however.”

~~~Volodya.

“The most important moment was the fact that the government did not order any shooting, and did not put the tanks on the streets, that it did not start a war.”

~~~Viktor.

### **Outcomes and Results**

Viktor noted directly the fear and concern that bloodshed would occur. The fear of internal war potentially starting within the state was a strong concern with the high stress and tension surrounding the discourse of the announced outcome of the election. Many of my interview participants alluded to this point. However, they never came out directly to recall this concern. In addition to asking my participants about where they were at the time of the election, how they participated, what modes of communication they utilized, I also asked them what they

most vividly recalled from this time. Some said the particular events they personally experienced; and others, the conversations they had with virtual strangers. No one referenced the musical entertainment on *Maidan* that continued throughout the movement. I also asked what the most ideal outcome would be. For Viktor, the most positive outcome was the fact that bloodshed did not occur. Hopeful outcomes greatly varied for others who shared their experiences.

“My impressions and feelings were not very happy, nor optimistic about any good results after these elections. Within my family and friends, some were cautious to take any position in the elections. Some felt sorry for this or the other candidate. I did not hear anyone expressing any trust for either candidate. The biggest dissatisfactions were the falsifications. The people would not accept that. It was taken as theft of their rights. In my opinion, that was the basis of this so called “Orange Revolution.” To call what happened a revolution is an over assumption. Was it manifestation of public consciousness? – Yes! Even though, later that too, was squandered away.

There were not many great expectations. Of course the desire for economic stability, reduction in corruption (or hopefully, total elimination), hope for more stable and better laws – not the kind being written for the convenience of certain groups or individuals, since independence.”

~~~Viktor.

“The hope was for growth and opportunities not just for Ukraine, but for the people. Hope existed for European integration, and EU membership. The eventual result from these things would be more opportunities for people to travel abroad and not just travel abroad to find work, but more for leisure, business purposes and such exchanges. Many still want to travel abroad, mainly for the purpose to find employment. Several of my friends will go to the Polish Consulate in Lviv and wait in line for a full day in hopes to obtain a work visa. They know there are many possible opportunities there for employment.”

~~~Sophia.

“A couple things went through my mind during this time while going through the events of the Orange Revolution. Truly, I remember very well the broadcasts from *Maidan* on Radio Era, TV Channel 5. The feeling of joy during the announcement of the re-vote’s results of Yushchenko’s victory.... Unimaginable hatred and fear in the eyes of some leaders who so strongly supported Yanukovych. Ultimately, my hope during this time was the creation of a true, righteous, real Ukrainian lawful state and with equal partnership with Europe while stepping away from Russia. Measurable improvement in the economy – for instance to do like the Czech Republic, and the Baltics – Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, was also expected.”

~~~Petro.

“I hoped for less fear of needing others in order to accomplish something for myself and needing to repay the person or people who expected a favor in return. Really, I wanted to feel more like one large team, working together. All citizens and government officials working toward a common goal to fully better Ukraine is what I envisioned would happen. A sense of that was noticeable during the Orange Revolution even with the tense moments.”

~~~Maryna.

“I hoped for European integration, quality of life to be improved for people, finally, renewal of authority.”

~~~Volodya.

“It’s simple – improvement of life, reforms, democratic elections.”

~~~Maksym.

“I hoped the result of the elections would improve my life and the lives of my family and close friends. I hoped for all of us to have more opportunities and to a certain extent, an easier life, with fewer daily struggles.”

~~~Mykola.

“I hoped the results would lead to a much happier life for everyone. While walking on the streets of Lviv, or any other city in Ukraine, you rarely, if ever, see people smile. Their eyes are lifeless. People’s eyes sparkle when hope and possibility are present. You do not see or feel this in Lviv. I never have felt this here. I see it with Americans when they visit, their eyes

sparkle, even when they are not smiling. You can actually see the hope, possibility and positivity of wonder that is around them.”

~~~Bohdan.

“I was hopeful for more opportunities for personal growth. That is, I was looking forward to the grand possibilities of experiencing life abroad. I expected that it would be easier to travel to and from Ukraine. Fortunately, I had this opportunity; to travel abroad. Though, I am not sure if this opportunity was an actual result of the Orange Revolution, as some travel was possible before the election and the Revolution.”

~~~Sophia.

“Personally, I was very hopeful that the ultimate result of the Orange Revolution would be quite positive. I was very optimistic that it would greatly benefit my company and allow citizens a better chance to travel abroad and experience life overseas. I also hoped that many would take their experiences and apply them to our own economy and workforce. The potential is there to really improve our employment systems here with this new knowledge. The desire for seeing the world who watched us was high. Some of my students said they found the Orange Revolution to be a personal eye opener as they learned that people around the world were following the events.”

~~~Danylo.

“Many people were hoping for a better life. Everyone was under the auspicious of corruption and family ties. Some businesses now, today attempt and make an effort to meet European standards.”

~~~Volodya.

### **Expectations After the Orange Revolution**

Collectively, these were the hopes and sentiments my participants – as well as their families, friends and colleagues – experienced during the Orange Revolution. All participants said there was a sense of calm that emerged after the Orange Revolution, especially since there was also concern that a potentially highly stressful time could possibly erupt into an

uncontrollable situation. It was after Yushchenko took office that reality set in. This was the time for the reforms that were promised were to be executed. Yet, the promised changes were not seen or being noticed. This general observation made by the public as well as scholars and analysts. With the observed changes, expectations also changed.

“Changes were realized when the real reforms didn’t have the strength or power to be implemented to make them a reality when the president forfeited his authority when he realized there would be no illusions and the same leaders remained in their positions. The illusions of patriotic governing and growth (uplifting of nationally oriented economy), instead was present.”  
~~~Petro.

“We expected and felt a breath of fresh air. The chance to go back to a democratic way within life and policies to be restored was present. It sounded like the changes would go into effect immediately. That was not the case. We waited. We waited some more. Nothing ever really happened.”  
~~~Bohdan.

“Gradually, things were, or became clear, that the new leadership that came in was no less corrupt than the oligarchs, but were poorer. Some of the new leaders were in utopia, far from reality. It was like this until Yanukovich became prime minister.”  
~~~Volodya.

“I anxiously waited for the promised changes to occur. I was hopeful for several months. I would wake up in the morning and think to myself, ‘Today will be the day. We will see changes – something will be announced in the news.’ It did not happen. I started to question my own sanity for my anxiousness at the time of the Orange Revolution. Did I really make that sacrifice to travel? Did it help in the long run of my daily life? I was part of the initial event to get the changes to start. Just, the changes did not happen.”  
~~~Vasyl.

“Changes came about when those who won the election did not fulfill their promises. They became friends with those who the public voted against. All that was desired by many was the return to democracy.”

~~~Maksym.

“I would say that after the Revolution, many people were disappointed. Actually, nothing had changed at all. The fighting in the government, economic instability, closing of many banks, due to bankruptcy, and people’s losses of savings created a new vicious cycle. The conflicts between the president and the prime minister, the president and the parliament, the attempt of the president to butt into the judicial system, ignoring of campaign promises, no enforcement of law, the growth in the size of the government, and again the corruption, which everyone is fighting.”

~~~Viktor.

“Personally, my life has not changed much, that is, the quality of life. I’ve always lived fairly simply, like many in and around Pidhajtsi. Parts of the smaller villages surrounding my small town still have limited electricity, just as they did 30 years ago. Some residents don’t even have telephones in their homes or the phone lines do not reach their areas of the villages still today. In general, I expected that some of these things would have improved by now, knowing that technology is around us and we all rely on it to a certain extent daily. At the very least, I expected that there would be consistent electricity throughout the neighboring villages by today.

There are also many very large and potentially dangerous potholes in the streets and roads. The potholes are always ignored, never repaired, and continue to grow with each season and changes in the weather, like anywhere else. Some of the potholes are as big as the road is wide and they get worse each year. The infrastructure just is not executed locally (that is within the *Ternopil Oblast*) to give us the attention we need. Other things are more important.”

~~~Nadia.

“A sense of nationalism and patriotism emerged in the postage stamps about the time of the Orange Revolution and the first few months after. Stamps commemorating the Orange Revolution were issued honoring the most recent event in Ukraine.”

~~~Taras.

### **Were There Any Changes in Life After the Orange Revolution?**

After the Orange Revolution, all of my participants had expectations of what life would be like under the new administration. In addition to sharing their expectations, my participants also discussed if and how their lives have changed since the Orange Revolution.

“Presently, life has worsened. In comparison to the U.S. Dollar, you earn two times less for the same job, because the price of goods and services has increased greatly. I do not feel that the politics are nationally oriented. Mostly, the greater demographic of “grabbers” (leadership) do not indicate any signs of improvement or potential for changes. The opposition is demoralized. People are tired of the politics. They do not believe the politicians. Besides that, economic bad news, and huge price increases for communal services and products are greatly worsening the situation.”

~~~Petro.

“Life worsened. The quality of it deteriorated. Hope was lost. My life has not changed one bit.”

~~~Maksym.

“Right now, life has worsened. This is because now educators are earning very low wages and they have not increased in quite some time. Communal expenses and cost of food (overall cost of living) has increased and it appears it will continue to increase. Anything you need to ask for, anything you need resolution for, you need to pay bribes. There is no law against it. It seems that the laws are in existence not for the protection of anyone, but to have the ability to accuse the innocent, or punish the innocent and protect the guilty (all for the sake of bribes).

Since the Orange Revolution, my life has barely changed. In certain areas, it is impossible to make any moves that will provide resolution. City rulers are leading by the old schemes. One who has access to your body, also controls your mind.”

~~~Volodya.



“In my opinion, the events on *Maidan* in 2004 were not exactly a revolution. A revolution is a change in socio-political and economic order that occurred in 1991. In 2004, one group of oligarchs took control and pushed the other one aside. In fact, after these events, nothing changed. The only item of interest was to follow the infighting in the “Orange Camp” and the efforts of the opposition to out argue and out shout those in power. Now the situation in Ukraine truly has changed. It changed, but not for the better.

The events of 2004, which you call a revolution, did not affect a change in my life or lives of most people. The changes occurred after that in 2010 and even moreso in 2011.”

~~~Viktor.

“My life has not changed as a result of the election’s outcome. Things remain the same. Within a year of the Orange Revolution, I needed minor surgery which still required anesthesia. My doctor referred me to a surgeon for the procedure. The surgeon told me he could perform the necessary surgery as long as I paid him upfront. The payment was to guarantee that the correct procedure would be done and completed properly. My upfront payment did not cover any sort of legitimate medical costs like the time for the surgery, necessary tools and so forth.

In addition to paying the surgeon, I also had to pay the anesthesiologist well in advance of the surgery. This payment was to ensure he administered the proper dosage of anesthesia so as for me not feel the pain, but also for him not to kill me. The bribes I had to pay before the surgery did not stop there. I also had to pay the pharmacist to fill the prescription for antibiotics and any pain medications my surgeon prescribed. The payment was to ensure that the proper doses were given to me as set by my doctor. The additional costs about doubled the actual necessary cost of the procedure. I had no choice but to pay the bribes to have the surgery and have it done correctly.”

~~~Bohdan.

“I’m still extremely cautious in my everyday life. I confide in my closest friends my opinions, especially relating to politics. Telling the wrong person the right thing can get you in trouble. It can also make life very difficult for yourself. Survival of the fittest exists.”

~~~Maryna.

“My life, as I said before, really has not changed much at all during these years and especially after the Orange Revolution. A couple years ago, a cousin of ours made plans to come to Ukraine for a visit for a family event in the village. My relative brought a suitcase on the plane, but it never made it to the baggage claim area in Lviv. The airport authorities promised to track down the luggage and call us once it arrived. We checked in with the airport for couple of days and got the same response that the bag was still lost.

A friend of a friend of my family’s knew one of the guards at the Lviv airport who relayed the story of the missing suitcase. The guard confirmed the bag in fact made it off the plane with my cousin. The friend and guard made an agreement and arranged to return the bag. The arrangement included a bunch of pages of jokes printed from the internet, a bottle of cognac and a box of chocolates.

On our way back to the village, my relative told me of the interrogation regarding the bag’s contents. The interrogation was conducted while signing the paperwork for collecting the suitcase. The bag was returned with a wire wrapped around it, through the zipper and soldered shut. The bag was searched for any possible items of value or importance.”

~~~Nadia.

“A colleague of mine was crossing the street in Kyiv. He was jay-walking and the police officers caught him. The policemen were going to issue the man a ticket, fining him for the offense which was about \$5 U.S. Dollars. However, they started negotiating with my colleague. They told him if he gave them \$10 – double the charge of the ticket, they would not write or issue the ticket let alone document the happening.”

~~~Roman.

“Those changes I wanted to see and rushed to Kyiv and *Maidan* to show my support during the Orange Revolution did not happen. My life has not improved. At best, it remains the same – this is my optimism speaking. To be negative, life has worsened because changes have not occurred to improve the overall quality of life for all. Politics remains the same.”

~~~Vasyl.

“Things have not changed a whole lot. One thing I have noticed is that you hear a little more Ukrainian spoken on the streets of Kyiv. You do not hear it very often and you have to

listen very carefully. It is still a hybrid-mix of Ukrainian and Russian. If you start speaking to someone in Ukrainian in Kyiv, some will be more inclined today than they were ten years ago to respond to you in Ukrainian. I've noticed this whenever I would come to Kyiv to visit my sister and compared this to my earlier travels before she was at university.”

~~~Sophia.

“The program that I run really is a very good experience for our university-aged students. They are able to gain great work experience, practice English and see a part of the world. I think the work experience is the greatest benefit to the students. This is something they would not have a chance to obtain at the same level if they applied for an entry-level job here in Ukraine. The economy just is not strong enough for them at this level. This is a challenge that has not yet been met. My students also have acknowledged this when they express interest in participating in the program. In turn, they can apply their new skills to a job here when seeking employment. Working abroad is very attractive to employers here.

In preparation for their visa interviews, my students also meet with me to assess their language skills, determine if the student is not only qualified, but is sincerely interested in participating in the program. The students applying to the program for the first time, I get a very good feeling about their intentions. It is the students who want to participate for a second or third time on the program who concern me.

The students participating in the program for the first time are concerned to abide by the set rules and ramifications. These guidelines are established by the consulate to ensure students return home in time for their university classes. The “first time” students also tend to follow the rules closely, as they understand that any faulty steps they take could jeopardize the possibility of obtaining a visa to the U.S. in the future.

I mentioned before the students who return to participate in the program raise concern for me. Primarily, my concern is that they will challenge the rules and regulations by not returning home once they completed their programs. A lot of this is because these returning students have already been to the U.S. and feel comfortable traveling abroad. They already know and have a strong understanding of the procedures to participate. Plus, these students already have connections and networks in the U.S. as a result of their previous trip. Some of the students

maintain these new connections along with ties to old friends and distant relatives so they can stay “a couple extra weeks before coming home.”

The most concerning students are the ones who completed their fourth year of university studies, the equivalent of their Bachelor’s degree. I’ve seen many students who, after completing their fourth year of university not return home. I call the students’ family when I learn they have not come back. Often, the parents do not seem concerned that their child has not returned home. The rule is that the students must return home in a reasonable timeframe for their university studies. The students all see opportunity available to them to work in America, and they also see the challenges and slow development of life improvement here in Ukraine.

One of the ways I’ve seen the program change since the Orange Revolution is the length of the visa for our students. A couple years before the Orange Revolution, around 2003-2004, Ukrainian students could participate on their work programs in America until October. University classes begin September 1<sup>st</sup>. Many students saw this program as a luxury and never returned home. The freedom was abused and the consulate started requiring all Ukrainian students to return home in time for their university classes. The expected return date continues to push earlier into August each year. Four years ago, in 2007, students had to return home by September 2<sup>nd</sup>. In 2008, students had to return by August 31<sup>st</sup>. Last year, in 2010, they had to return by August 28<sup>th</sup>.

It is in these ways I see what has changed in Ukraine. Traveling abroad has been less restrictive than it was 25 years ago. My company has had a great chance to grow because of the greater freedom for international travel.”

~~~Danylo.

“Personally, my life has not changed. However, I have noticed that my hobby and passion has. Fewer stamps have been issued in the last couple of years. They are less ornate and much less nationalistic. They lack the cultural pride which influenced the stamps’ previous designs just a few years ago. The stamps are more industrial. They focus on military ships and the most popular train lines in Ukraine. I asked someone at the post office about their observations about the stamps after noticing this change. They blamed the change in motifs due to the economy and the cost of printing such stamps was an unnecessary expense, where funds could be used in other ways.”

~~~Taras.

“Yanukovych and his supporters recently capitalized on this lack of improvement in life. When he ran against Yushchenko in the presidential election a couple years ago, many of his key supporters canvassing for him hit the small villages in Western Ukraine quite hard. They saw these people going through hardships and many lacked funds to take care of everyday matters. They literally capitalized on this. Yanukovych’s supporters talked with these people and offered them bribes if they voted for Yanukovych. They offered some people as much as 3,000-5,000 *hryvnia*. For some, this is massive amounts of money. They promised that with Yanukovych as president, life would be grand and wonderful. They painted a beautiful image of the life they could have if Yanukovych was elected president. Many villagers accepted this bribe as they needed the cash.”

~~~Mychajlo.

### **Patriotism and Nationalism**

From my participants’ feedback one can deduce that life has not changed immensely since the Orange Revolution. If anything, the quality of life is about the same it was the movement, or slightly worse. They’ve acknowledged slight changes in daily life on a grander scale. However, they have not experienced many differences which immediately and directly affect their lives. My participants’ responses led me to ask about their patriotism and at what point did they feel most patriotic or nationalistic in their lives.

“I believe I am more patriotic now than I was ever before. Even with that strong of a conviction, I would not be defending it as energetically. In places, the world has a lot of grey, because the world is not just black and white.”

~~~Petro.

“My patriotism started in the 1980’s. It continues today. It remains at the same level today as it did during the 1980’s.”

~~~Volodya.

“Many times; during various events and times when it was necessary to defend what I believed in.”

~~~Maksym.

“Hearing Ukraine’s national anthem play on *Maidan* during the Orange Revolution was when I felt most patriotic. It was played and sung daily on *Maidan*. This reiterated my patriotism. It was truly reinforced and moved me greatly – to the point of tears. This was particularly moving after the third round of voting. To acknowledge Yushchenko’s election and those standing out on *Maidan* supporting him, the anthem was played yet again. I never felt more Ukrainian in my life or knew what it meant to be Ukrainian until that moment.”

~~~Roman.

“I think I am as patriotic as I was before. My nationalistic pride really came out during the Orange Revolution. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko stood for the things I believed in, wanted and hoped for. They took their positions, expressed what many of us wanted – democracy, openness, and development.”

~~~Mykola.

“My nationalism or patriotism never really existed. I consider all of this part of politics.”

~~~Taras.

“During the last ten years, I’ve proudly displayed a Ukrainian flag on the wall in my home. Many of my friends do the same. Some just display their Ukrainian flag at the time of “patriotic” holidays. They will display their flag to celebrate Independence Day of 1991 and also from 1918. They may also pull out their flag in November when honoring and remembering the millions who perished during the *Holodmor*. I prefer to keep my Ukrainian flag displayed all year long. It reminds me who I am and where I live.”

~~~Bohdan.

“I have always been patriotic. My attitude to my Fatherland fortunately was not affected by the reconstruction (Perestroika), Kuchma, Yushchenko with Tymoshenko, Yanukovych, or the Orange Revolution. I am Ukrainian, grew up in Ukraine, my grandparents and great-

grandparents lived here. I know the history of my country, the culture and the language. I love Ukraine dearly and I strive to do what is the best for the people.”

~~~Viktor.

“I would say I’m still very patriotic. My patriotism really started in 1991. During Kuchma’s time as president, my patriotism subsided, especially during the Gongadze scandal. I questioned the legitimacy of the news reports. This made me question my own nationalistic pride. It wasn’t until Yushchenko started campaigning and traveling throughout Ukraine that my patriotism returned with new energy, passion and excitement. I think it subsided again during the Yushchenko administration when changes were not happening. My own patriotism really declined at the same rate that Yushchenko’s popularity did during his presidency.”

~~~Vasyl.

“During the Orange Revolution was when I felt most patriotic. I was at university and once the Orange Revolution started and it felt “ok” to express my nationalism more than the months before, I did it. The expression was liberating.”

~~~Maryna.

“My most nationalistic moment was voting in the election during all three rounds. The results of the third round put a huge smile on my face. I felt like I helped, I did my part to support Yushchenko in a way I could. In the third round, my vote actually meant something! I felt my patriotism within me was quite strong then and hope came for me that my patriotism would grow with Ukraine.”

~~~Sophia.

### **In the Future...**

In conclusion, after learning about the level of nationalism and patriotism my participants expressed, I had to ask a question about the future. I asked, if a future event resembling the Orange Revolution, or an event calling on the public’s participation, were to occur again, would people follow through on the request to respond?

“In public encounters – no. I cannot do this publically because of my current position and status within society. However, in fact, in voting and referendums and other opportunities of expression of my faith, I would participate in such an event again – absolutely.”

~~~Petro.

“I would be more inclined to participate in a greater fashion. I think that many others would also participate.”

~~~Volodya.

“No. I no longer believe in politicians or revolutions.”

~~~Maksym.

“Definitely. Despite the challenges I faced during my travels to Kyiv, I would do it all again. Instead of going alone, I would bring a group of people with me on such an adventure. This strength in numbers would also further challenge the authorities along the way.”

~~~Vasyl.

“Absolutely! If I needed to open my home to others, as I extended last time, I would do it in an instant. I love meeting new people, learning from them and discussing our viewpoints. This is what makes all of us stronger – more united as citizens.”

~~~Roman.

“I’m not sure. If I knew my life would not be affected because I would support one or the other person, maybe. That is, I would not risk losing my job, my home, not face any charges because of my viewpoint and how I see things.”

~~~Maryna.

“Should something similar were to occur, I would have to see. If again, someone was counting on the patriotic convictions of the public, tried to secure himself a nice, warm position in the government, I will not participate in that. However, if on the scene appeared people who truly will care for Ukraine and the people, for the culture and sovereignty; then, yes, I will work and support them. How could I not?”

~~~Viktor.



“I can see myself participating in the future. I’m not sure in what capacity. At the very least, I would vote, express my opinion, be vocal. At this point in my life, spending numerous hours outside in street protests would be very stressful and take a serious toll on my health.”

~~~Nadia.

“If I were to participate, I might want to do more than just vote. It all depends on where I am in my life, and what happened to instigate the protest.”

~~~Sophia.

“I would participate in an event like this again. It was an exciting, yet stressful and nerve wracking time. As we all went through this once, I think it would be different a second time around. We’ve gone through all of it once. I can see myself taking on a leadership or coordinator role on a local level in my town.”

~~~Mykola.

### **ANALYSIS OF ORAL HISTORIES**

All together, through my participants’ personal experiences, it is evident that over the course of the last 30 to 40 years, life in Ukraine has changed overall. Changes to a democratic system from socialism and the way government functioned have affected Ukraine on a grander level. Despite the changes, people’s lives have not been revolutionized. One of my participants left me with some closing thoughts:

“Do not think of me as a pessimist, but rather a realist. I believe that Ukraine and the Ukrainian people will not get lost in the dust of history. For thousands of years, people in our land developed great culture, built beautiful palaces, grew bread and wrote songs. Attempts for many ages to destroy these people attained no success. We survived and will continue to survive. The current events – they are ‘growth of illness,’ therefore; we should forgive our leaders, because they know not what they are doing.”

With the changes observed by my participants and their personal experiences, it is evident to see how the 2004 election and the Orange Revolution played out for them. Their observations and recollections help reinforce the fact that the Orange Revolution was a post-socialist urban political movement. They painted the picture of life during Soviet times, the initial excitement of independence and the pangs and challenges that followed. My participants' experiences during the Orange Revolution and their feelings before and after, compliment the definition of urban social movements. These firsthand accounts provide additional depth to this topic while further describing the circumstances of this time. The participants' experiences expand the criteria of post-socialist urban political movements by providing specific examples.

#### The 2004 Presidential Elections

One very common point of view among my participants was the personal value and importance they felt when casting their vote. All stressed this basic act of participation. Also commonly, my participants shared what the election meant in their eyes, the expectations, concerns and anxiety that followed, the bullying that occurred, as well as the sense of division.

##### ❖ Meaning of the Election

With the common sentiment that participation in the election by voting was important, the election held meaning to citizens. Several participants stated they hoped the election would bring about great things, especially the possibility for changes. Maksym strongly felt this way. Both Volodya and Sophia felt the election was an opportunity for one of two possible options to emerge. They felt there was potential for the better of two evils to be elected. It would either be by the oligarchs led by Kuchma who would stay in command and things within Ukraine would remain unchanged; or the possibility for change could come with Yushchenko's election. Viktor

also noticed this, but was pessimistic about the end result. Sophia saw hope within the elections. She noted Yushchenko and Tymoshenko spoke directly to the citizens, focusing on the issues that were important to them. Nadia observed strong support for Yushchenko in Pidhajtsi.

❖ Anxiety, Concern and Expectations

Within the election, expectations were set. Anxiety and concern followed, if the expectations were not met. Petro felt the election was an opportune time to finish the expected changes that were not yet complete. His concerns stemmed from possible provocations. Petro felt the need to be on guard. Like Petro, Mykola was also concerned about possible provocations.

Sophia was concerned about the possibility of corruption continuing after the election. Nadia noticed the vandalism of billboards which were monitored after Yanukovich posters came up. A sense of uncertainty was indirect once authorities protected campaign signs.

Maryna was very concerned during the time before and during the elections. She was nearly fearful. Her own anxiety emerged while cautiously confiding in others about the pending elections. Maksym blatantly acknowledged that changes were needed, not only desired. Bohdan felt the election was a solid opportunity for initially expected changes to come about.

❖ Bullying

In addition to the anxiety and concern people felt, bullying was a tactic that enhanced these feelings. Viktor said the bullying furthered after the fear was instilled in citizens. Nadia noticed the bullying by means of destroying pro-Yushchenko billboards and replacing them with pro-Yanukovich posters. The authorities then monitored the signs to prevent further destruction. Maryna provided the greatest details of the bullying that existed which she and her friends

experienced. She noted the posed consequences and how they potentially could change a person's life during their university studies or career.

❖ Division

With the election pending, the possibility for division came about. Petro talked about heated discussions he had with his friends and colleagues. Some conversations were quite intense. Viktor also felt impending divisions based on people's preferences for who would be elected. Nadia felt the divisions through the billboards' destruction, replacement and protection. Finally, Maryna felt the divisions develop via bullying she heard of and witnessed.

Orange Revolution

In discussing the Orange Revolution, my participants described issues surrounding transportation, weather conditions, secrets and confidentiality, anxiety and concern, as well as elements of sharing and teamwork. Their references to this event, confirm it was an urban movement.

❖ Transportation

From the testimonies, people traveled to Kyiv from all over Ukraine. A few of my participants had friends who traveled from their small town or city to Kyiv. Petro was in Ternopil on a trip and had friends who went to Kyiv. Bohdan's friends organized themselves to travel several times to Kyiv from Lviv. He recalled their first trip was challenging. However, as they kept returning to Lviv, traveling during the movement became easier as they returned home and left only for brief times.

Roman, who lives in Kyiv, was able to travel with much ease compared to others. He had the opportunity to learn about the travels of the people he met on *Maidan*. Vasyl had the

most difficulty traveling to Kyiv. Locally, from Berezhany, (a smaller town), to Ternopil, he traveled with ease. His travels by bus from Ternopil to Lviv were also effortless. Both cities are well populated. His difficulties began in Lviv on his way to Kyiv, where the hub of activity was growing. By the time he arrived to the train station, authorities stopped allowing the trains to travel and shortly thereafter, busses were also halted.

❖ Weather

The Orange Revolution started at the end of November. Winter already set in with snow and cold temperatures in Kyiv. The winter elements had to be considered by all who were going to be outside standing on Independence Square. People responding to Yushchenko's call to action to come to Maidan, needed to prepare for winter weather. Bohdan's friends who traveled in groups to Kyiv strategized to stand on *Maidan* in shifts taking breaks while maintaining their presence. This was their way to stay energized while standing up to the announced election results. Their plan also helped maintain a constant presence of people on Independence Square.

Roman shared his observations of groups of people who traveled to Kyiv and how they prepared to withstand the elements. He also keenly observed that people from Central and Western Ukraine were well prepared to brave the weather for longer periods of time. He noticed their preparations indicated intent to stay and follow through on Yushchenko's request. On the other hand, Roman noticed that people from Eastern Ukraine were less prepared for the winter conditions. He described how people went underground on *Maidan* and warmed up in the shopping area. He also discussed how local Kyivans, himself included, helped those from other cities stay warm during the movement. He opened his home to protestors to warm up, freshen up and eat a bowl of warm soup.

❖ Secrets and Confidentiality

With the unity felt on *Maidan* while battling the cold temperatures, secrecy and confidentiality still existed. Viktor's friends cautiously expressed their doubts during the Orange Revolution. Vasyl indirectly experienced the withholding of information during his travels. The bus to Kyiv from Lviv was sent back to Lviv by the authorities. The police simply told the passengers that the road was closed.

In turn, Bohdan's friends expressed their own secrecy towards the authorities by returning regularly to Lviv during the movement. His friends spent a few days at home before returning to Kyiv to further participate in the movement. Maryna was more open in sharing her sentiment of confidentiality and secrets she held during the Orange Revolution. She maintained a very cautious approach to any possible conversations about the movement and her opinions surrounding the topic.

❖ Anxiety and Concern

Maryna's feelings of secrecy tie in with the anxiety and concern she felt. She was cautious and hesitant to share her viewpoint with others. Viktor's friends also expressed their concerns for what could happen next in Ukraine. Vasyl's anxiety came through when traveling to Kyiv and encountered obstacles. He was determined to travel regardless of the challenges. Roman shared the anxiety felt by the two young men from Dnipropetrovs'k who defected upon arriving to Kyiv. They were unsure how they would be received, especially as they were initially sent to Independence Square for a different purpose.

❖ Sharing and Teamwork

Examples of sharing and teamwork were profound with my participants. This emphasizes a sense of unity coming from civil society. Viktor noticed this sentiment from a general view. He observed the people together were empowered to demand change.

Bohdan, who did not travel to Kyiv with his friends, stayed in Lviv. He assisted his friends when they were in Kyiv by house sitting and helping manage everyday activities. Bohdan's friends traveling back and forth to Kyiv also worked together on *Maidan* by taking turns standing out in the cold.

Roman also saw teamwork and sharing on *Maidan*. He helped others by opening his house, talking with new friends and sharing experiences during the movement. He saw people while warming up in the shopping area under *Maidan*, took turns charging cell phones in the outlets. He also learned of teamwork and sharing when fellow protestors embraced the Yanukovich defectors. He detailed the outpouring of support and a sense of welcome they received along with warm clothes and food.

#### ❖ *Maidan Nezalezhnosti's Representation*

*Maidan Nezalezhnosti* was the main location for the Orange Revolution. People congregated here, responding to Yushchenko's request. It was the central hub for the movement. My participants who traveled to partake in the Orange Revolution protests, desired this place as their final destination. For Vasyl, it was the place to be to experience the event. He wanted to be part of the movement and witness it firsthand. Ultimately, he wanted "to be part of history." Bohdan and Petro associated *Maidan* with being the central location of the movement. They experienced the protests through their friends' primary participation. Roman found *Maidan* to be the common ground to unite citizens participating in the movement. It was the place where they all took a stand on the election and raised a collective voice.

#### Outcomes and Results

After the Orange Revolution, much was hoped for and expected. Commonly, feelings of optimism, pessimism and caution followed. Additional hopes for globalization, Westernization,

travel opportunities and the release of Soviet-style practices were expressed and desired. All of these desires circled the hope for state advancement.

❖ Optimism

Almost everyone who shared their experiences with me expressed optimism for growth, development and advancement of the state after the election. They hoped for lawfulness to be instilled and corruption to decrease. Sophia was optimistic for state growth and development. She was also hopeful for improvements citizens could experience. Petro and Viktor's optimism aligned with Sophia's. Bohdan and Mykola hoped for more happiness and a better quality of life. Danylo was optimistic his company would grow. He hoped for more opportunities overseas and travels outside of Ukraine for the people he recruits.

❖ Pessimism and Caution

During the election, some of Viktor's friends were cautious about taking a stance for a particular candidate. He was disappointed about the falsified election results. Sophia's friends grew pessimistic after the Orange Revolution to secure solid employment within Ukraine. Bohdan shared his observation of the lack of hope he sees in others' eyes.

❖ Globalization, Westernization and Travel

Globalization, striving towards Westernization and enhancing relations with Europe were common themes also desired by my participants. Sophia's friends began seeking employment outside of Ukraine and applied for work visas. This was their solution to get the results they desired to improve their economic and employment opportunities. Danylo commented how the work abroad students concern him by staying in the United States and not returning home to complete their university studies. They see this program as an opportunity to escape and leave



Ukraine. Volodya commented how some businesses are being proactive in attempting to meet European standards. Petro also expected great improvement within Ukraine's economy. This would help strengthen European relations and then further other possible opportunities.

❖ Release of Soviet-Style Practices

Another commonly desired outcome was to step away from Soviet practices. Petro noted along with striving towards an equal partnership with Europe, Ukraine would need to step away from Russia. Maryna hoped to be able to escape the patron-client relation system. Instead of feeling indebted to someone and needing to pay them back, she wanted more of a "pay it forward" system. She sought out a way to see how everyone could contribute to the greater good. Maksym simply wanted to see reforms and democratic elections.

Post-Orange Revolution Expectations

Along with the outcomes and results immediately following the Orange Revolution, my participants had subsequent expectations. The major common expectation after the movement was the promised changes verbalized during the election. Primarily, these promised changes surrounded government reforms, a shift in priorities within the state and its development. There was hope and optimism for follow through on the promises made. There was also a sense of dejection or disappointment. Finally, there was the realization that changes were not happening.

❖ Positive Hope

Vasyl and Bohdan both shared their anticipation for seeing changes become realized. Both looked forward to a more democratic system. They expected changes to occur essentially overnight. Taras noted in postage stamps a sense of celebration in the commemorative stamps

issued after the Orange Revolution. Nadia expected infrastructure within her town to be address and improved.

❖ Dejection, Disappointment

With each passing day during the Yushchenko administration, Bohdan and Vasyl started feeling dejected as changes were not seen or being made. Petro felt patriotism and the government's role and activities were merely an illusion. Volodya felt there was no real change in leadership, and corruption still existed. Viktor also noticed the disappointment felt by many people around him. He noted that negative changes occurred, and resulted from infighting among government members.

❖ Lack of Change

Many said changes never happened. Maksym and Viktor said the main change was how government members interacted with each other. Both said new friends were made among government members and new fights started. Nadia felt the lack of urgency while anticipating making changes in the state to improve life. This was talked about during the campaign, but not addressed after.

**ANALYSIS SUMMARY**

Hearing my participants' personal experiences adds a human element to understanding the Orange Revolution's role as a post-socialist urban political movement. It also adds deeper insight in comprehending how such an event is absorbed by the people who partake in it. Understanding the impact of this event from the perspective of the state's citizens further compliments the basis for executing such movements.

Post-socialist urban political movements emerge within a state where desired and expected changes occur very gradually. The public hardly notices these changes. Frustration with the observed lack of change is present among the public. This creates discourse which results in protest demanding change. Authority figures and the general population are involved as the movement is executed. A charismatic leader encourages participation from citizens who desire greater good in return. To pressure the changes wanted, the protest ensues. The demand for changing the norm within the system is a way to revive the stagnated transition to a democratic state. Such is the case for Ukraine. As this time can be volatile, diverse feelings from people involved emerge.

Many of these sentiments were expressed by my participants through their shared recollections and observations. They discussed their memories of life under the Soviet system, the moments surrounding independence in 1991, the transition that followed and seemed to drag on in their eyes and stagnate. They shared their hopes, desires and growing frustration during the Kuchma administration when they saw the democratic development they desired and expected stall. The public was then led by a charismatic leader, Yushchenko and alongside him, Tymoshenko. They wanted to see change. By means of the 2004 presidential election, the public seized the opportunity to demand change and return to a more democratic system as originally promised and planned by the state's leaders.

The Orange Revolution, through the leadership, was an opportunity for the citizens to unite. They took a stand together, expressing their demands for changes and eliminate the corruption they saw within Ukraine. The people were able to raise a common voice on Independence Square. The movement they embodied was one that held the opportunity to demand initiation of the changes already expected.

One big factor considered by the groups supporting Yushchenko and helping to organize the protest was the weather and season during this event. It was the first part of winter when the Orange Revolution began. Weather, with cold temperatures, snow and wind could have been great deterrents for people not to go to Kyiv, let alone stand outside for long periods of time. Instead, people united because of the weather and worked together. They shared warm layers of clothes and blankets, warm food and some Kyivans shared their homes. This instilled a grander sense of community and unity within the protesters.

During the movement, an array of feelings came about. Feelings of fear are commonly expected surrounding such an event. Maryna was fearful before and during the Orange Revolution. Her fears surfaced out of her daily life. Fear can also come through the possibility of the demanded changes not occurring. In essence, an anticipated disappointment can be felt. These feelings were expressed by several of my participants after the Orange Revolution. Vasyly felt his effort to travel to Kyiv was possibly done in vain. At the time of the movement, he wanted to be a part of this event. When he set forth on his journey to Kyiv, his feeling was of great excitement for the opportunity for change. He was also hopeful during this time.

After the Orange Revolution, feelings that followed after some time were frustration, disappointment and dissatisfaction. Many of my participants expressed their unhappiness with the lack of follow through after the movement. Nadia said she anticipated further development within her town and the surrounding villages. Bohdan expected to see the changes within government. Instead, the change they experienced was the return to previous stagnation, and the continuation of corruption.

The feedback from my interview participants verifies that a movement had to occur in order to promote change within Ukraine. The activities surrounding the 2004 presidential

election served as the catalyst which brewed the movement. It was the result of the election that allowed the Orange Revolution to come about and amplify the desire for changes the citizens wanted to see. My participants reconfirmed that the changes following independence were too gradual to be noticed. Frustration followed this observation for the stagnation. Citizens sought out a monumental way to push for the transition initiated previously. Their outlet for this movement came about with the impending change of authority through the state leader.

The participant who left me with their concluding thoughts reaffirms the Orange Revolution was in fact a post-socialist urban political movement. This participant's final statement, "The current events – they are 'growth of illness,' therefore, we should forgive our leaders, because they know not what they are doing," sums up many of the feelings and circumstances surrounding a movement. The referenced "growth of illness" reaffirms the changes and developments that come with the transition from a socialist system to one that is more democratic. The adversity that subsequently follows the initial change in the system was observed by this participant. It is the initial growing pains of a young democratic state.

My participant also noted the state's leaders need to be forgiven as "they do not know what they are doing." The state leaders know how to lead the state. However, it is in what capacity, under what circumstances and the ramifications that exist under the newer democratic system which challenges their leadership. All of the state leaders and politicians involved in the Orange Revolution were still familiar with socialist ways. They, like the public with everyday happenings, are still learning how to eliminate old practices and remain within democratic solutions. It is citizens who then push via protest to initiate change. Therefore, the movement seeks an alternative to what is happening within the state and its stagnation. Collectively, the

citizens express a sense of wanting out of the dormant ways of the state and return to growth and development.

On the other hand, Viktor disagreed that the Orange Revolution was a social movement. He felt the event was manifested by public consciousness. Based on his statement, it appears he would agree that the Orange Revolution was simply a burst of pent up frustration. This contradicts my hypothesis of this particular movement. However, his comments reconfirm that he did not feel that the movement revolutionized his life or the lives of those around him. This coincides simply and clearly with the feedback from other interview participants.

## **HYPOTHESIS REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT**

### **REVIEW OF KUZIO'S HYPOTHESIS**

The Orange Revolution's intent was straightforward, even with the numerous complex factors existing just before its onset. This assisted in shaping it into a politically charged post-socialist urban movement. Several of my research materials concluded that the Orange Revolution was several movements in one. Arguments were presented that this movement was a technological revolution, a protest against corruption and cronyism, and a political protest surrounded by what is presumably the "longest rock concert in history" (Klid, 2007, 118). All of these arguments defining the Orange Revolution accurately explain various aspects of the protest. Ironically, the role of music and the ongoing "rock concert" was never addressed or acknowledged by my interview participants.

Technologically, the media usage of cell phones, text messaging, internet and email played an incredible role among the people participating. Strong anti-corruption sentiments were felt by those who sought and demanded changes within the political system. Ongoing entertainment between news updates on Independence Square aided to keep protestors' spirits positive while listening to some of their favorite Ukrainian music groups. However, not even the execution of the Orange Revolution could have been possible without the people from all facets of Ukrainian society within the state. Without the people, the Orange Revolution would not have occurred. Participation of people from all sectors of society must be reviewed. This includes politicians from various political groups in the state, celebrities, athletes, musicians and citizens.

Ultimately, the Orange Revolution emerged surrounding the 2004 presidential election. Up to that point, the people's frustration of what they saw and desired as an end result for the state reaffirmed the immediate political goals of increasing civil participation and government

transparency. This aided in motivating the initiation of the movement. The event was therefore, made possible by the election's announced results.

Shortly after the Orange Revolution, scholar Taras Kuzio acknowledged that the event and the mass protests' strength emerged from three separate sectors of Ukrainian society: civil society and opposition groups who organized the revolution, the *narod* (people) who provided the power behind the crowds, and the defectors from the party in command, who turned their backs on Kuchma (Kuzio, 2005, 29).

### **KUZIO'S HYPOTHESIS**

#### Civil Society and Opposition Groups

*Pora* was the central cog for organizing and rallying people. It was Yushchenko's main support group who wanted democracy reinstated in Ukraine. The group worked in two parts while striving towards enforcing their goal. One part of *Pora* focused on non-violent protest methods. The second part of *Pora's* efforts was directed at getting people involved to participate and take a stand in for what they believed. Civil societies like clubs, institutions and NGO's were non-existent two decades before.

Alongside *Pora* were *Chysta Ukraina* and *Znayu!* Their missions coincided with *Pora's*. All three wanted a clean, democratic presidential election. Each wanted the system to continue transitioning from the socialist ways of 20 years before and further establish the newer democratic system. All needed the support of manpower from society to exist. *Chysta Ukraina* assisted *Pora* in recruiting people to take a stand publicly for a clean democracy and therefore, a "clean Ukraine" as depicted by their name. *Znayu!* (translated as "I know!"), directed its efforts to target and inform the younger generation to vote. They educated this demographic on the importance of voting and the impact their participation would have on the outcome.



Yushchenko relied heavily on *Pora* and its supporting groups. With their help, *Pora* became the project manager overseeing participation from the public while maintaining a non-violent atmosphere. *Pora* helped set the trend for all protestors to wear something orange. Anything orange that could be worn was fashionable, including armbands made from orange ribbons. *Pora's* colors, yellow and black, were also popular. The two colors defined the two parts of *Pora* – the part focusing and promoting non-violent protests and the other encouraging participation by standing up for what they wanted.

Yushchenko also relied on his main political supporter, Tymoshenko for help. As she canvassed on Yushchenko's behalf, Tymoshenko simply persuaded citizens to vote. She influenced them further, to vote for Yushchenko and support a democratic structure within the state. This was fostered by *Znayu* through their education efforts urging citizens to vote. To represent each of Ukraine's 25 *oblasts*, 25 tents were pitched on *Maidan*, starting the tent city (Wilson, 2005a, 123). As the revolution continued and more people arrived, the tent city grew. Over 1,500 tents were pitched and the makeshift city within Kyiv had a population of over 15,000 (Åslund, eds., 2006, 96). For seventeen days, the public endured the start of winter in Kyiv. *Pora* and those in the tent city lived outside starting November 21, 2004 and remained there until Yushchenko's inauguration on January 23, 2005. *Pora* helped oversee the tent city remained organized, clean and alcohol free. The tent city residents became the key people on *Maidan*. Many floated back and forth between their tent home and Independence Square.

Together, these civil society groups, along with the support from Yushchenko's political colleagues set the foundation and guidelines for the movement's execution. Together, during the Orange Revolution, they were able to publicly express their desire to end corruption, weaken ties with Russia and return to building democracy and strengthen relationships with the West. All of

this further enhanced the drive and motivation for the Orange Revolution. These factors added fuel to the movement and the election from which it originated.

*Pora* successfully drew people to sustain the Orange Revolution by their presence on *Maidan*. First, the strong support from civic organizations and their cooperation. Second, they all focused on the younger population – those in their 20’s and 30’s. This demographic totaled just over half of the people on *Maidan* (Arel, 2005, 328).

### **KUZIO’S HYPOTHESIS**

#### **Narod**

Many young voters of the 2004 election were children in 1991, born Soviet citizens. During their youth, their national identity and citizenship transitioned from Soviet to Ukrainian. Many of the youngest voters experienced a cultural identity crisis while growing up. Like their parents, this younger generation experienced life under Soviet rule. Together, they celebrated independence and the start of a new way of life. Then, they experienced stagnation in the transition towards democracy and growth while realizing Ukraine’s potential of being a strong state. Kuzio refers to this age group as “Generation Orange” (Kuzio, 2005, 39). They saw, learned about and experienced democracy and freedom – rights unthinkable under Communism. They also began learning about life under a different ruling environment, which like them was young, and at times needed guidance.

Before the Orange Revolution, many of Ukraine’s younger citizens, eligible to vote were apathetic and neutral towards politics. The previous generation of Ukraine’s youngest voters was proactive just before the fall of the Soviet curtain. Shortly before independence, the youth observed and expressed nationalism by speaking in Ukrainian more regularly. They also expressed themselves through pop culture, especially via music. The trend of music appeared again during the Orange Revolution.

Helping the *narod* be more openly expressive and participate were celebrities not involved in politics. Athletes, solo musicians and music groups became visual and audio supporters for the candidates. Boxing champion brothers, Wladimir and Vitaly Klitschko supported Yushchenko. Soccer star, Andri Shevchenko supported Yanukovych. Shevchenko's decision to support Yanukovych and encouragement of others to also do so was ill-taken by his fans. Many of his fans protested outwardly during soccer games, including in Donetsk.

Musicians and pop-stars supporting the candidates had the opportunity to express their preference and participate in the campaigns. They participated at various rallies by performing. This has become common practice in Ukraine to further garner voter support (Klid, 2007, 119). This activity becomes a win-win situation for both musicians and candidates. Musicians cannot always afford to incur expenses for concert tours in Ukraine. This gives the musicians the opportunity to perform and increase their popularity. Candidates then, get additional public support from the musicians' fan base. Additionally, the *narod* wins by having the opportunity to support their preferred candidate and enjoy musical entertainment.

Music helped unite the younger generation non-evasively which encouraged their participation by voting and standing on *Maidan*. During the election campaign, some pop stars outwardly expressed their political opinions. Singers Mariia Burmaka, Taras Chubai and Oleh Skrypka signed an open letter declaring their concern Ukraine would become a "Third World dictatorship" (Klid, 2007, 123). Many singers openly expressed the importance of the 2004 elections and their concerns for Ukraine if corruption and crony capitalism continued to exist.

During the campaign, musicians became a sounding board for the candidates. Their own political desires were expressed while endorsing the candidates through moral support. Having musicians perform during the Orange Revolution made the event sort of a "political Woodstock."

“In total, 22 singers and groups performed in support of Yushchenko, and 38 performed for Yanukovich’s events” (Klid, 2007, 119). Many musicians who performed on *Maidan* during the Orange Revolution, are still associated with the event based on their performances. Several of the groups’ songs are canonized in this movement, based on their lyrics. These songs expressed in poetic form the *narod’s* feelings.

Many of the song lyrics sung by music groups, supporting Yushchenko, expressed the *narod’s* feelings and sentiments. The lyrics became the voice for the citizens to articulate their opinions and desires. *Okean El’zy* performed often and regularly on *Maidan*. Many of their song lyrics resonated with citizens and urged them to participate and vote. *Greenjolly*, a band from Ivano-Frankivsk wrote a rap song that became the anthem of the Orange Revolution. The lyrics were clear and direct, stating the public’s disenchantment with the government and leadership. It further empowered citizens reiterating they are not alone; and together they will not back down. Between the music, their artists, cultural icons and leadership of *Pora*, the *narod* was guided to unite. The music also aided in drawing people to *Maidan* and stay there. It entertained them, which in turn helped to maintain an upbeat atmosphere.

As younger citizens were familiar with these pop-culture icons, they turned to them for inspiration to express their personal preferences for political leadership. Today’s youth looked up to these figures much like the younger generation of Ukrainians in the 1890’s who turned to Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Mazepa, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and King Danylo for their aspirations toward democratic ideologies (Klid, 2004, 270). Oleh Skrypka from the music group *Plach Ieremii* decided to publicly support Yushchenko on the basis “that the time had arrived to take a strong civic position” (Klid, 2007, 122). Singers supporting Yushchenko encouraged the students attending their rallies not to let Yanukovich’s camp intimidate them into voting a

particular way. Bullying tactics by university professors and administrators included threats of evictions from student dormitories if they voted against Yanukovych (Karatnycky, 2005b, 4).

## **KUZIO'S HYPOTHESIS**

### Defectors

The third group from society that contributed to the masses of the Orange Revolution is the defectors from Kuchma, Yanukovych and the oligarchs. With the Orange Revolution's onset, both political figures and cultural icons supporting Yanukovych and Kuchma's central group absconded to support Yushchenko instead. One defector Kuzio acknowledged is Yevhen Marchuk. He served as defense minister until the summer of 2004. Other defectors include celebrities and stars who did not immediately verbalize their support for either candidate. Their neutralism until the last minute – closer to the election – can be considered defecting from Yanukovych, as he was counting on their vote and support. Some, like Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, for example, did not reveal for whom they would vote. Their silence and initial announcement of remaining neutral before supporting Yushchenko at the last minute defines these people as defectors.

Vakarchuk, the lead singer of *Okean El'zy*, one of Ukraine's top bands, remained apolitical during most of the campaign. As a musician, he felt he should not participate directly in the election or express his political preferences. He believed everyone should participate in the election and understand the importance of participating. In October 2004, he stated,

“I do not want to go to the political barricades – I am being pushed there by life and my conscience... Today, all of us have to speak out. This is our civic duty. Because when you are asked, for instance, ‘Does Ukraine need to be independent?’, you cannot answer, ‘Don't bug me – that's politics.’ It is understood that these elections will decide the future of the country.”(Klid, 2007, 122).

Closer to the election, Vakarchuk expressed his support for Yushchenko. However, he did not endorse Yushchenko. Vakarchuk was named and accepted the position of adviser to

Yushchenko on youth policies (Klid, 2007, 124). Showing direct support by participating in campaigning for Yushchenko earlier in the election could have sensationalized the event.

During the campaign, Yanukovich asked pop star singer and Eurovision 2004 winner, Ruslana Lyzhychko to serve as the Minister of Culture, a position she declined. Before the election, Lyzhychko remained neutral and did not express her support for either candidate until the last minute – November 17, 2004 (Klid, 2007, 122). She then declared her support for Yushchenko. At the Orange Revolution's start, Lyzhychko went on hunger strike, protesting the election's results. She ate only bread and drank tea.

In both instances, Vakarchuk and Lyzhychko, abstained from supporting either candidate until closer to the election on November 21. As they appeared to be undecided for so long, their sudden act to support Yushchenko can be viewed as defecting from Yanukovich. This can be inferred from Lyzhychko declining Yanukovich's offering of a government job. The Orange Revolution's motivation contributed to the defectors' support for Yushchenko. Pop-culture figures and other politicians also defected from their parties to side with Yushchenko. This helped unite Yushchenko supporters and strengthened the movement.

### **KUZIO'S ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY**

Kuzio stated the Orange Revolution emerged from three sectors of society. His argument factors and accounts for a great majority of what constitutes a social movement. His societal groupings capture the movement's overall, general civil contribution. His major sectors are civil society and opposition groups, the *narod* and defectors. Kuzio displays a very basic definition for each group. He keeps the *narod* broadly defined, simply acknowledging the people who supported Yushchenko and those who stood on *Maidan*. How the people are categorized within society is not addressed or discussed. The participants in the event played a key role. Kuzio

acknowledges this and the civil society groups – mainly *Pora*, who drew the *narod* to Independence Square and participate in the movement. His broad definitions aid to maintain a general, theoretical understanding of the peoples' role.

The three distinct groups Kuzio points out coincide with Roberta Garner's argument that a social movement constitutes the people's collective desire to challenge and change society within the state. Together, they can seize the moment to initiate change. This is the fundamental purpose of a social movement. Additionally, his argument that the participants are a necessity and determining factor for the movement's occurrence aligns with Garner's. Kuzio also acknowledges that discourse regarding Ukraine's continued development was present within the state. However, not everything that captures or embodies a social movement is included in Kuzio's argument.

A major contributing factor to any social movement is missing from Kuzio's argument. In discussing the three groups of society, Kuzio excludes one particular person. This person is not categorized by these groups, though they are the central focus for the participants. Garner acknowledges this vital figure within the activity of social movements. Kuzio's argument lacks acknowledgement of a charismatic leader. His definition of the emergence of the Orange Revolution completely excludes Yushchenko, the voice of the collected people.

Furthermore, Yushchenko was not alone with charisma during the movement. Tymoshenko added her charisma by encouraging participation of others. Without this leadership, or their energy, the social movement would not have been as strong as it was or emerged in the way it had. Their promotion of participation greatly influences and aids the role of the civil society. The leadership adds to the focus and drive of the movement, making it streamlined and not chaotic like a riot. They set the tone for the movement. The leader

expresses the voice and preferences of the collective population during such an event. Kuzio merely blends the leadership into the movement.

The fact that Kuzio does not include the role of a charismatic leader challenges social movement theory. The leader of the movement holds power over the people participating in the event. It is because of the leader and their call to action that the participants actually participate, responding to the request. The leader not only speaks for the people on a higher level and represents them; this person also guides the movement's participants on how to proceed, act or even react during the event.

During this particular social movement, Yushchenko along with Tymoshenko led the public on *Maidan* to remain active and stay put until the falsified election results were overturned. They stressed the importance of remaining non-violent throughout the protest despite high tensions. Had it not been for the mentorship of the leaders, the Orange Revolution may not have been the social movement it became. The expectation and tone they set was further extended through the civil society who set this precedence for the *narod*.

Kuzio's argument supports social movement theory. His theory factors a great majority of what constitutes a movement – the key groups within the state's society. However, it cannot fully define the theory as it focuses primarily on the key groups of people involved and their participation. If the groups of the society do not participate or express interest in making changes, the masses needed for such a sizeable event will not come about to sustain the movement. Without the acknowledged discourse experienced by the public, the desire for change and a charismatic leader; a social movement may have difficulty emerging. Ultimately, Kuzio's argument only assesses the general public and its categories.



The public and the groups of society are not the only ones that embody a movement. He keeps a centric focus on the majority of the people who want changes to emerge within the state. The three key groups are essential in understanding the people and what initially motivated them to participate. Leadership and the pretense of the social movement are not addressed. The reasoning for the social movement is not captured in Kuzio's argument. Unless one understands the Orange Revolution's motives, Kuzio's definition may be difficult to fully assess, as it details one major component for why it occurred and how it was a social movement.

### **MY RESEARCH COMPARED TO KUZIO'S ARGUMENT**

Kuzio's argument focusing on who comprised the Orange Revolution categorized participants in three main groups. Ultimately, the largest group consisted of the *narod*. My interview participants fall under the *narod* category. They voted in the election for their preferred candidate. Some did not openly disclose for whom they voted; however, they alluded to whom they supported. Almost all of my participants expressed their desire for change to occur both prior to and as a result of the Orange Revolution. Regardless of their preference, they were captivated and motivated to vote and participate due to the leadership's displayed charisma and energy. All acknowledged that discourse existed within Ukraine before the election.

Many of my participants expressed their desire for change under the Kuchma administration. Some changes were desired for the government systems and others in their personal lives, affected by the developing discourse. They felt that if changes would occur to positively impact their lives, the discourse would diminish further growth within the state. Many of my participants not only felt a sense of obligation to participate in the movement; but also felt their participation would pressure changes to occur. Their motivation and captivation to take

part in the movement was further ignited by Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and others who expressed the value, need and potential future benefit to be part of the Orange Revolution.

Through my research, I learned about a group of defectors from Donetsk sent to *Maidan* to counter protest. Upon arrival in Kyiv, they defected from Yanukovich and joined the movement. Their act of defecting added them to Kuzio's third group of people. Had they not defected upon arrival and decided to continue supporting Yanukovich, they would not be accounted for in Kuzio's statement. I feel my research coincides and compliments Kuzio's theory. My findings expand his determination of how the movement emerged within society. Additionally, my new research displayed how the *narod* participated and worked together during the movement. These firsthand accounts add a solid dimension to Kuzio's argument and compliment it with a true human element.

Yushchenko's role as the leader of the movement emphasizes that the Orange Revolution was the result of a falsified election vote. His declaration of a call to action, which the public responded to, caused the eruption of the movement. Several of my participants mentioned the political promises made during the election and the Orange Revolution. These statements further encouraged their participation, as they anticipated the reward, or appreciation of their support to be the changes voiced, come to life.

Many of my participants shared their reasoning for voting during the election and taking their stance publically. Many concluded their motivation for participating resulted in their desire for change within Ukraine. They felt it was an opportunity to clearly express their opinions of what was occurring and the desired result in exchange. Many were captivated by Yushchenko's political platform and what he wanted to change once he became president. As Yushchenko stood for many of the ideals that aligned with those of my participants, they were further

motivated to partake in the movement. Their involvement showed their support for Yushchenko. The movement was their way to counteract the announced falsified vote. As so many people constituting the *narod* came out to Independence Square to strengthen the Orange Revolution, they in turn made the event into an urban political movement.

## **CONCLUSION**

---

After reviewing post-socialist urban political movements, specifically, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, we can observe and better understand how such events are initiated and executed. Their intent is also better understood. These movements consistently seek change within their state. In order for change to emerge, the movement then occurs. Though the premise behind these movements remains the same, the way the event comes about varies. The desire for change to occur is expressed by the people of the state. Therefore, post-socialist urban political movements serve as the catalyst for change to erupt.

This thesis reviewed urban social movements, and focused on Ukraine's Orange Revolution of 2004 as its case study. In this project, such movements were the focal point of understanding how urban political movements come about within a state's society. In order for the Orange Revolution to qualify as a post-socialist urban political movement, a set of criteria had to be met. First, socialism was once the norm in Ukraine under the Soviet Union. However, when Ukraine declared its independence, a new governmental system was brought in and implemented. The transition that followed for a more democratic system stagnated during its development. Uncertainty and unfamiliarity with the new structure's ramifications were challenged by the previous socialist practices.

The public saw the stagnation but was unsure how to enact change to impact the newer system. Their frustration and tension built, pushing for the desired changes to be implemented and practiced. Despite these feelings, nothing changed within the state. Then, at a pivotal moment, a charismatic leader comes onto the scene and becomes the voice of the people. This person leads the public in expressing their desired changes. At this turning point, people voice what they want to see occur in the state. Ultimately, for the movement to be effective and

successful, it must first be well organized, with purpose and emerge in response to one key event.

Looking at Ukraine's Orange Revolution, this post-socialist urban political movement is defined as a pro-democracy protest. After declaring independence from the Soviet Union, the government agreed to focus on establishing a democratic system after 70 years of communism. The new system involving democratic methods had a difficult time developing under Kuchma. Democratic initiatives slowed, as oligarchic activity and corruption increased. Yushchenko, along with the public saw this stagnation. With his previous political involvement and prior attempts to return Ukraine toward democratic growth, he used the political situation as a presidential candidate to his benefit. Yushchenko then became the face of democracy and hope of a more secure democratic system for Ukraine's citizens. By doing so, Yushchenko established himself as the Orange Revolution's charismatic leader.

Protesting the skewed outcome of the presidential election was a way to express dissatisfaction with the outgoing regime. Previous protests declaring the citizens' frustrations occurred, but quickly fizzled due to their lack of support. The minimal size was enough for Kuchma and government to ignore complaints, or threaten the demonstrators with arrest. The Orange Revolution, however held consequences that were unanticipated by Kuchma and his administration. The cumulative and indirect effects among others mediated by the overall environment, both socially and physically, did not fit the casual structure of previous protests (Tilly, 2002, 9). Ironically, this contributed to the strength of the movement.

The blending of communist and anti-communist members within parliament, although fair for expressing the voices of all parties created diffusion. This stalled overall growth. Under Kuchma's administration, a sense of uncertainty emerged as stagnation and Europeanization

were replaced by privatization and corruption. Essentially, this broke down a system which needed repair. During Kuchma's presidency, the government began working more for itself opposed for the people. This sentiment then, gave way to a sense of uncertainty citizens felt. Additionally, media censorship emerged, further aiding in uncertain sentiments of the public. Ultimately, these feelings encouraged the motivation for change to occur from within, thereby allowing the opportunity for the post-socialist urban political movement to occur.

Yushchenko, as a charismatic leader, successfully rallied the people to support him both electorally, and to push for reform within the government to make its work more open. Reminders of encouragement emerged to eliminate corruption and aim towards Europeanization with eventual goals of ascension into global organizations. The high corruption that existed in government before and upon Yushchenko's inauguration, also affected the condition of the state, making it more disastrous than previously believed. Additionally, Yushchenko's strong campaign push to rectify government into a properly democratic functioning unit, and the realities of all this as part of daily life vanished. Essentially, "the leader interprets "reality" for his followers in a way that makes them susceptible to mistaken perceptions of society that lead to the end rather than the success of the movement" (Garner, 1996, 27).

The Orange Revolution was successful in terms of a social movement. It succeeded in gathering the public to stand up for elections free of manipulation. The event pressured the existing government not to execute their pre-planned celebratory events and start acknowledging Yanukovych was elected by forced means of bribery, vote manipulations and bullying. This resulted in an overthrow of the government, allowing Yushchenko to officially take office.

One noteworthy point within the specific discussion of Ukraine and its politics revolves around the state's politicians. All of Ukraine's politicians, regardless of their political party

affiliation, are still under the same training, based in communism. All still have close connections, relations and understandings with communistic manners for addressing state concerns and potential improvement. This is not a fault, instead, it is what they experienced during their childhoods and their initial training received upon entering politics. The approaches they learned are continuing through rote, even as they attempt to change their old ways.

Yushchenko acknowledged during his campaign that the 2004 presidential election was a time for change within Ukraine. This selling point gave the public the opportunity to express themselves by voting for a president. Kuchma's approval rating continuously declined during his second term in office. His popularity drastically declined during the Gongadze murder investigation. Once he denied involvement, Kuchma lost the public's trust. Ultimately, this was the demise of Kuchma's image, which he desperately tried to recover throughout the remainder of his presidency.

Many viewed Yushchenko as a hero who wanted to change Ukraine for the better. They more fully supported him as he clearly laid out his political platform and the tasks he wanted to complete during a five year term in office. Others saw him as being a God-like figure, who wanted to change Ukraine and immediately execute the changes he proposed.

The Orange Revolution succeeded in overthrowing the Kuchma regime out of office. The Orange Revolution imminently failed in the long run as the government led by Yushchenko dealt with much infighting and corruption. The transparency and democratic growth spoken of during the campaign had difficulty being initiated. Additionally, promises Yushchenko made during the campaign were not being fulfilled in the set out timeframe. During the campaign and throughout the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko was considered a charismatic leader. This came about through his grassroots campaign during the summer and fall of 2004 before the election.

His charisma and energy while expressing his desire to change Ukraine attracted the public to him. Though, this was an appealing quality for Yushchenko, it may also have been his demise.

Arguably, the Orange Revolution was a well-organized event as the crowds were controlled and expected to remain calm and not resort to violence. The precedence also followed the set of rules as stated by *Pora* both within the tent city and on Independence Square. All of this was accomplished per Yushchenko's request and *Pora's* leadership and assistance in recruiting people while stressing the importance of remaining non-violent at all times. In the end, the peacefulness aided to keep the protests as a revolution and not turn into a coupe. Had the movement escalated and a coupe broke out; arrests, bloodshed and serious military involvement to combat crowds would have resulted. Additionally, as the main protest occurred in the capitol city, government buildings and other historical landmarks could have been susceptible to damage. Had this happened and such destruction followed, an internal civil war could have potentially emerged. Such escalation could possibly void the original intent of the movement.

Reviewing this case study and adding Ukraine's Orange Revolution to the other instances of post-socialist urban political movements is important for others to see trends emerging in post-socialist states. With time, urban social movements will likely continue occurring in other states trying to formulate their democracy after socialism. It appears that post-socialist urban political movements are part of a natural transition in political structures. This is especially true for states whose democratic system is not solidly established and being upheld. Dissidence emerges between citizens and government members.

The state's citizens observe how the state forms, implements and enforces the new democratic initiatives. When they observe consistent events and activities against or challenging



democracy, the public responds in due time. Their response comes after a turning point event, the “last straw,” for the public and results in their reaction. In Ukraine, this turning point was the 2004 presidential election. The public reacted, no longer being passive. The state’s leadership will react in a way to promote the pre-defined democratic guidelines.

Such movements are becoming a phenomenon. Prior to the Orange Revolution, movements in Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Georgia occurred. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution leaders turned to the previous movements and learned from them and furthered their purpose and execution. Ukraine’s post-socialist urban political movement was the first of these movements which heavily utilized and relied on technology – specifically the internet and cell phones to convey updates instantaneously.

Most recently, the political movement in Libya followed and even further enhanced the trend of using technology to communicate information. As in Ukraine, cell phones and internet were used to inform citizens of updates. In Libya, Facebook, was also used to inform citizens. Libya’s movement followed those in Lebanon and Kuwait. It is highly possible to see these movements continue to emerge in states where the foundation of the political structure changes; and these transitions encounter either a delay or complete standstill in their development.

My new research findings show what life was like during socialism, and after independence as well as how the change to democracy stagnated and the effect it had on citizens, urging them to take a stand to reinforce democratic initiatives. My participants clearly saw from their own experiences differences in the early years of independence under Kravchuk, when changes were being implemented; when changes were delayed, and eventually stopped under Kuchma. They expressed how bureaucracy emerged and returned, delaying the acceptance of the changes and guidelines of a new political system. To a certain extent, they allowed

bureaucracy to return to the state, as it was familiar to them and the leadership. However, they also acknowledged that the transition towards democracy severely slowed, coming to a standstill. Their motivation to react and respond to the lag was the presidential election. Citizens realized their beliefs, values and desire for the state aligned with one another. Together, they forged the Orange Revolution resulting from an election laden with fraud.

The Orange Revolution served as a turning point for people to change a system that was developing and deviating from the previously set democratic process. With the Orange Revolution, changes were demanded. Yushchenko became the beacon of light to enforce changes. After the Orange Revolution, people expected democracy to be implemented, practiced and used consistently. Hopes were high for immediate results as previously desired changes took great amounts of time to matriculate or never occurred.

Hearing my participants' personal testimonials and experiences gives a "view from the trenches" and better acknowledges the observed discourse within the state. The oral histories provide a better understanding of the motivation that drove people to *Maidan Nezalezhnosti*. People did what they could to take their stance to the street, more locally in their hometown or neighboring city. Understanding these motivations and emotions felt by people immediately affected by the activities of the governing body within the state, helps gain a better perspective on the movement's potential impact. It also shows the impact of events within the state and how citizens are affected and influenced. By providing this human element, we have a better understanding of the reasoning, desire and motivation for not only participation, but the emergence of the movement.

Assessing these personal stories and the human element that follows, we gain a better understanding of post-socialist urban political movements. Furthermore, we gain insight into

their role and impact within a state where structural transitions occur to a more democratic system. This information helps us to better understand what happens internally within these states going through a growing process. This information is beneficial to analyze future movements similar in nature. It will assist in anticipating where other urban movements may emerge and how they may be executed and ultimately their circumstances.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

---

- Ackerman, Peter; Jack Duvall. 2005. People power primed: civilian resistance and democratization. *Harvard International Review* 27 (summer): 42-47.
- Ajami, Fouad. 1993. The Summoning. *Foreign Affairs*. 72 (4): 2-9.
- Arel, Dominique. 2005. In the Orange Revolution fading? *Current History* 104 (October): 325-330.
- Arter, David. 1996. *Parties and Democracy in the Post-Soviet Republics: The Case of Estonia*. Brookfield, Vermont: The Dartmouth Publishing Company.
- Antonyuk, Lesya. 2006. POSITION PAPER On Ukraine – EU Action Plan Implementation by Ukrainian Side For 2005-2006. Secretariat of Ukrainian Part for the Ukraine – EU Cooperation Committee.
- Åslund, Anders. 2003. Left behind: Ukraine's uncertain transformation. *The National Interest* (Fall):107-116.
- Åslund, Anders. 2004. Revolution, red directors and oligarchs in Ukraine. *Ukrainian Quarterly* 60 (1-2): 5-18.
- Åslund, Anders. 2005. The economic policy of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. *Eurasian Geography & Economics* 46 (July/August): 327-353.
- Åslund, Anders. 2005. The economic policy of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. Global Development Network.  
<http://www.gdnet.org/middle.php?oid=237&zone=docs&action=doc&doc=10983>  
 (Accessed February 20, 2007).
- Åslund, Anders and Michael McFaul, eds. 2006. *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*. Washington, D.C. Carnegie Endowment For International Peace.
- BBC News. November 16, 2004. *Ukraine Rivals Clash in TV Debate*.  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4014881.stm> (Accessed, November 9, 2007).
- Bellah, Robert N. 2005. Civil Religion in America. *Daedalus* 134 (4): 40-55.
- Berger, Peter L. 1996-1997. Secularism in Retreat. *National Interest* Winter (46): 3-13.
- Bellaby, Mara. 2007. Timoshenko: Russia's Grasp On Ukraine Growing Stronger. *The St. Petersburg Times*, February 27, Issue #1249 (115).

- Bojcun, Marko. 2005. Ukraine: Beyond postcommunism. *Debatte: Review of Contemporary German Affairs*, 13 (April): 9-20.
- Brady, Rose. 1991. What a free Ukraine could cost the Soviet Union. *International Outlook* 3242 (December):56.
- Burakovsky, I.; Souza, L.; Schweikert, R.; Movchan, V. and Bilan, O. 2006. Ukraine: "Sandwiched" between the European Union and Russia. Global Development Network. <http://www.gdnet.org/middle.php?oid=237&zone=docs&action=doc&doc=10961> (Accessed February 18, 2007).
- "Campaign Report: Viktor Yushchenko's announcement of his bid for the presidency." pp. 3, *The Ukrainian Weekly*, July 5, 2004, no. 28, vol. LXXII. (via prnewswire.com). (Accessed, March 3, 2007).
- Christensen, Robert K., Edward R. Rakhimkulov and Charles R. Wise. 2005. The Ukrainian Orange Revolution brought more than a new president: What kind of democracy will the institutional changes bring? *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38 (June): 207-230.
- Clem, Ralph S., Peter R. Craumer. 2005. Shades of orange: the electoral geography of Ukraine's 2004 presidential elections. *Eurasian Geography & Economics* 46 (July/August): 364-385.
- Coleman, Fred. 1996. *The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire: Forty Years That Shook the World, From Stalin to Yeltsin*. New York, St. Martin Press.
- Commission of the European Communities. 2004. European Neighbourhood Policy: Country Report: Ukraine. Commission Staff Working Paper. May 12, in Brussels, Belgium. [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/ukraine\\_enp\\_country\\_report\\_2004\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/ukraine_enp_country_report_2004_en.pdf) (Accessed February 5, 2007).
- Copsey, Nathaniel. 2005. Popular politics and the Ukrainian presidential election of 2004. *Politics* 25 (May): 99-106.
- Crossley, Nick. 2002. *Making a Sense of Social Movements*. Open University Press, Philadelphia.
- D'Anieri, Paul. 2003. Leonid Kuchma and the personalization of the Ukrainian Presidency. *Problems of Post-Communism* 50 (September/October): 58-65.
- D'Anieri, Paul. 2005. The last hurrah: The 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections and the limits of machine politics. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38 (June): 231-249.
- D'Anieri, Paul. 2005. What has changed in Ukrainian politics? Assessing the implications of the Orange Revolution. *Problems of Post-Communism* 52 (September/October): 82-91.

- Dubnov, Vadim. 2005. Color revolutions: what civil cataclysms are knocking at the door? *New Times* (July): 26-30.
- Dubnov, Vadim. 2005. The Ukrainian Election. *New Times* (January): 97-101.
- Dyczok, Marta. 2006. Was Kuchma's censorship effective? Mass media in Ukraine before 2004. *Europe-Asia Studies* 58 (March): 215-238.
- Erdahl, Arlen. 2005. Radio interview conducted on KFAI's "Radio Ukraine," January 20, 2005 on "Radio Ukraine," Minneapolis, Minnesota.
- "EU Approves \$647M in Aid for Ukraine." AP. March 7, 2007.  
[http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/070307/eu\\_ukraine.html?.v=1](http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/070307/eu_ukraine.html?.v=1) (Accessed March 7, 2007).
- Feifer, Gregory. November 14, 2007. Ukraine's Tymoshenko Likely Prime Minister.  
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14887224> (Accessed November 14, 2007).
- Garner, Roberta. 1996. *Contemporary Movements and Ideologies*. McGraw-Hill, Inc. New York.
- Giugni, Marco. 2004. *Social Protest and Policy Change Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in Comparative Perspective*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Boulder.
- Gromadzki, Grzegorz, Oleksandr Sushko, Marius Vahl, Kataryna Wolczuk, Roman Wolczuk. 2004. Ukraine and the EU after the Orange Revolution. *Centre for European Policy Studies* 60 (December).
- Harasymiv, Bohdan. 2003. Policing, democratization and political leadership in postcommunist Ukraine. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 36 (June): 319-340.
- Holson, James. 2008. *Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Hunter, James Davison. 1992. *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*. Basic Books.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. The Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3): 22-49.
- IMF. Ukraine: Selected Issues. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0747.pdf> (Published 2.5.07).
- IMF. Ukraine: Statistical Appendix. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0748.pdf> (Published 2.5.07).

- Inozemtsev, Vladislav. 2006. Ukraine is one country, and the Ukrainians are one people *Russian Politics & Law* 44 (March/April): 72-83.
- Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, 2006. EU energy sector reforms: a benchmark for Ukraine. Global Development Network.  
<http://www.gdnet.org/middle.php?oid=237&zone=docs&action=doc&doc=10701>
- Ivanov, Oleg. 2004. Viktor Yanukovich: President of Eastern Ukraine? *Transitions Online* (November 23).
- Karatnycky, Adrian. 1990. Rukh Awakening. *New Republic* 203 (December): 16-18.
- Karatnycky, Adrian. 2001. Meltdown in Ukraine. *Foreign Affairs* 80 (May/June): 73-86.
- Karatnycky, Adrian. 2004. Reform victory, Ukraine's challenge. *New York Post* online edition (December 28).
- Karatnycky, Adrian. 2005. On independence square. *American Scholar* 74 (Spring): 6-9.
- Karatnycky, Adrian. 2005. Ukraine's Orange Revolution. *Foreign Affairs* 84 (March/April): 35-52.
- Klid, Bohdan. 2004. The Origins of Ukrainian Statist Historiography in the Context of Political, Ideological, Cultural, and Generational Change. *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 29 (1-2): 265-273.
- Klid, Bohdan. 2007. Rock, pop and politics in Ukraine's 2004 presidential campaign and Orange Revolution. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 23(March): 118-137.
- Kolos, Ivan. 2005. Ukraine: Great expectations. *Transitions Online* (April 19).
- Kopvillem, Peeter. 2007. Ukrainian politics can be a drag. *Maclean's* 120 (14): 30.
- Korduban, Pavel. 2007. Yushchenko rules to dissolve parliament. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4(65).
- Korotich, Vitaly. 1991. The Ukraine Rising. *Foreign Policy* 85 (Winter):73.
- Kubicek, Paul. 2005. The European Union and democratization in Ukraine. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38 (June): 269-292.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2003. The fear that drives him. *Transitions Online*, October 16, 2003.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2004. Yanukovich-gate unfolds after Ukrainian elections. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 1 (139).

- Kuzio, Taras. 2004. Yushchenko wins first round of Ukraine's presidential election. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 1 (119).
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005. From Kuchma to Yushchenko. *Problems of Post-Communism* 52 (March/April): 29-44.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005. Media bias decreases in Ukraine, but through dubious means. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2 (113).
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005. More problems for Yushchenko government as justice minister caught exaggerating his academic record. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2 (87).
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005. Neither east nor west: Ukraine's security policy under Kuchma. *Problems of Post-Communism* 52 (September/October): 59-68.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005. Political realignment beings in Ukraine. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2 (1).
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005. Regime type and politics in Ukraine under Kuchma. *Communist & Post-Communist Studies* 38 (June): 167-190.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005. The opposition's road to success. *Journal of Democracy* 16 (April): 115-130.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005. Two down one to go? Ukrainian officials target another oligarchic clan. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2 (97).
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005. Ukraine's 2004 presidential election, the Orange Revolution. *Elections Today* 12 (4): 8-10.
- Kuzio, Taras, ed., Paul D'Anieri ed. 2005. Ukraine: Elections and Democratisation, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38 (June): 131-292.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2006. Is Ukraine Part of Europe's Future? *Washington Quarterly* 29 (Summer): 89-108.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2006. The Orange Revolution at the crossroads. *Demokratizatsiya* 14(4): 477-493.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2007. Oligarchs, Tapes and Oranges: 'Kuchmagate' to the Orange Revolution. *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 23(March): 30-56.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2007. Yushchenko radicalizes as political crisis deepens. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4(68).



- Kuzio, Taras. 2007. Yulia Tymoshenko comes out on top in Ukraine's crisis. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4(119).
- Kuzio, Taras. 2007. Yushchenko's multi-vector election strategy. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4(136).
- Kuzio, Taras. 2007. Ukraine's elites remain above the law. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4(147).
- Kuzio, Taras. 2007. Orange Revolution back on track after Ukraine election. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4(185).
- Kuzio, Taras. 2007. President's party is weakest link in orange coalition. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4(206).
- Kyj, Myroslaw J. 2006. Internet use in Ukraine's Orange Revolution. *Business Horizons* 49 (January/February): 71-80.
- Larrabee, F. Stephen. 2007. Ukraine at the crossroads. *The Washington Quarterly* 30(October): 45.
- Little, David. 1991. *Ukraine: The Legacy of Intolerance*. Washington D.C. United States Institute of Peace.
- Little, David. 1995. Belief, Ethnicity, and Nationalism. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*. 1(2): 284-301.
- Little, David. 1999. "Coming to Terms With Religious Militancy." T. J. Dermot Dunphy Lecture, December 1.
- Lozowy, Ivan. 2004. Ukraine: A tide colored orange. *Transitions Online* (December 14-20).
- Lozowy, Ivan. 2004. Ukraine: Kuchma suffers reform setback. *Transitions Online* (April 13-19).
- Lozowy, Ivan. 2004. Ukraine: Orange squeeze. *Transitions Online* (November 23-29).
- Lozowy, Ivan. 2004. Ukraine: Yushchenko gains an edge. *Transitions Online* (November 9-15).
- Lozowy, Ivan. 2005. Tymoshenko: Firebrand of choice. *Transitions Online* (February 1-7).
- Lozowy, Ivan. 2005. Ukraine: A door opened to 'civilization.' *Transitions Online* (January 11).
- Macwilliams, Byron. 2001. Conflict over language impede Ukraine's higher-education system. *Chronicle of Higher Education*. 47 (February): A42-A44.

- Malanchuk, Oksana. 2005. Social identification versus regionalism in contemporary Ukraine. *Nationalities Papers* 33 (September): 345-368.
- Mace, James, "Is the Ukrainian Genocide a Myth?," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*. 37 (3 2003): 45-52.
- Marquis Who's Who LLC. 1995. Leonid Danilovich Kuchma. *Who's Who in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States*. Lexis-Nexus Search (Accessed, October 1, 2007).
- Marquis Who's Who LLC. 2007. Viktor Andriyovich Yushchenko. *The Complete Marquis Who's Who ® Biographies*. Lexis-Nexus Search (Accessed, October 1, 2007).
- \*Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Fundamental economic-trade report. [http://me.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/category/main?cat\\_id=48272](http://me.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/category/main?cat_id=48272) (Accessed February 28, 2007).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ukraine - EU bilateral relations. <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/847.htm> (Accessed February 24, 2007).
- \*Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Integration strategy. <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/846.htm> (Accessed March 1, 2007).
- Molchanov, Mikhail A. 2004. Ukraine and the European Union: a Perennial Neighbour? *European Integration*, 26 (4): 451-473.
- Nahaylo, Bohdan. 1999. *The Ukrainian Resurgence*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Oleshko, Olesya. 2004. The battle for Ukraine. *New Presence: The Prague Journal of Central European Affairs* 6 (winter): 39-40.
- Oleshko, Olesya. 2004. The presidential "elections" in Ukraine. *New Presence: The Prague Journal of Central European Affairs* 6 (autumn): 12-13.
- Our take: Yushchenko's disappearing moment. (2005, June 14) *Transitions Online*.
- Pifer, Steven. 2007. European Mediators and Ukraine's Orange Revolution. *Problems of Post-Communism* 54 (November/December): 28-42.
- Pogarska, Olga. 2007. Ukraine-macroeconomic situation-Jan 2007. Unian News Agency, February 16. <http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-184438.html> (Accessed March 3, 2007).
- Poggi, Gianfranco. 1990. *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects*. Stanford, Stanford University Press.

- “Poland and Ukraine Make Oil Plans.” BBC News. March 7, 2007.  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6428089.stm> (Accessed March 9, 2007).
- Polkovsky, Valerii. 2005. The language of the presidential election campaign in Ukraine. *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 47 (September-December): 317-331.
- Prizel, Ilya. 1998. *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
- Protsyk, Oleh. 2004. Ruling with decrees: Presidential decree making in Russia and Ukraine. *Europe-Asia Studies* 56 (5): 637-660.
- Protsyk, Oleh. 2005. Constitutional politics and presidential power in Kuchma’s Ukraine. *Problems of Post-Communism* 52 (September/October): 23-31.
- Puglisi, Rosaria. 2003. The rise of the Ukrainian Oligarchs. *Democratization* 10 (Autumn): 9-123.
- Reuters. September 27, 2007. FACTBOX: *Key Facts on Ukraine’s Yulia Tymoshenko*.  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/email/idUSL2742839820070927> (Accessed, September 30, 2007).
- Reuters. September 27, 2007. FACTBOX: *Key Facts on Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovich*.  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/email/idUSL2741938720070927> (Accessed September 30, 2007).
- Reuters. September 27, 2007. FACTBOX: *Who is President Viktor Yushchenko*.  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/email/idUSL271055720070927> (Accessed September 30, 2007).
- Rich, Vera. 2005. We told you lies, and we ask you for forgiveness... *Index on Censorship* 34(1): 88-91.
- Rubchak, Marian J. 2005. Yulia Tymoshenko: Goddess of the Orange Revolution. *Transitions Online* (February 1).
- Shulman, Stephen. 2005. Ukrainian nation-building under Kuchma. *Problems of Post-Communism* 52 (September/October): 32-47.
- Socor, Vladimir. 2006. Kyiv Changing Ideas, Mixing Signals on Odessa-Brody Oil Pipeline. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3 (213).  
[http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume\\_id=414&issue\\_id=3925&article\\_id=2371651](http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=414&issue_id=3925&article_id=2371651) (accessed, March 10, 2007).
- Solonenko, Iryna. 2005. The European Union as Democracy Promoter: The Case of Ukraine. *Romanian Journal of Political Science*, 5 (2): 57-69.

- Stepanenko, Victor. 2005. How Ukrainians view their Orange Revolution: Public opinion and the national peculiarities of citizenry political activities. *Demokratizatsiya* 13 (Fall): 595-616.
- Stiglitz, Joseph. 2006. *Making Globalization Work*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Subtelny, Orest. 1994. *Ukraine: A Nation second edition*. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.
- Susak, Victor. 2005. Becoming an agent of change: Analyzing narratives by leaders in post-Soviet Ukraine. *Nationalities Papers* 33 (September): 369-386.
- Tilly, Charles. 2002. *Stories, Identities, and Political Change*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Boulder.
- Tilly, Charles. 2004. *Social movements, 1768-2004*. Paradigm Publishers, Boulder.
- Tymoshenko, Yulia. 2007. *Biography of Yulia Tymoshenko leader of BYUT, Ukraine*. <http://www.tymoshenko.com.ua/eng/about/> (Accessed, October 30, 2007).
- van Zon, Hans. 2005. Political culture and neo-patrimonialism under Leonid Kuchma. *Problems of Post-Communism* 52 (September/October): 12-22.
- van Zon, Hans. 2005. Why the Orange Revolution succeeded. *Perspectives of European Politics and Societies* 6 (December): 373-402.
- Wanner, Catherine. 1998. *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine*. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Way, Lucan A. 2004. The sources and dynamics of competitive authoritarianism in Ukraine. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 20 (1): 143-161.
- Way, Lucan A. 2005. Kuchma's failed authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy* 16 (April): 131-145.
- Way, Lucan A. 2005. Rapacious individualism and political competition in Ukraine, 1992-2004. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38 (June): 191-205.
- Westcott, Kathryn. October 4, 2007. BBC News *The Queen of Ukraine's Image Machine*. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/7025980.stm> (Accessed, October 20, 2007).
- Whitmore, Sarah. 2003. Faction institutionalization and parliamentary development in Ukraine. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 19 (4): 41-64.
- Whitmore, Sarah. 2005. State and institutional building under Kuchma. *Problems of Post-Communism* 52 (September/October): 3-11.

- Williams, Rhys H. 1996. Religion as Political Resource: Culture or Identity? *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 35(4): 368-378.
- Wilson, Andrew. 2002. *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation second edition*. New Haven: Yale Nota Bene.
- Wilson, Andrew. 2005. *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Wilson, Andrew. 2005. *Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Wilson, Andrew. 2006. Ukraine's Orange Revolution, NGOs and the role of the West. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19 (1): 21-32.
- Wilson, Andrew. 2007. Oranges and Regions. *World Today* 63 (June): 14.
- World Bank. Ukraine Country Brief 2006: Economy.  
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/UKRAINEEXTN/0,,menuPK:328543~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:328533,00.html#Economy> (Accessed February 20, 2007).
- World Bank. Ukraine Country Brief 2006: Key Facts.  
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/UKRAINEEXTN/0,,menuPK:328543~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:328533,00.html> (Accessed February 20, 2007).
- World Trade Organization. Accessions: Ukraine.  
[http://www.wto.org/english/thewto\\_e/acc\\_e/a1\\_ukraine\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_ukraine_e.htm) (Accessed February 25, 2007).
- Yanukovich, Viktor. 2007. *Personal Information Server*.  
<http://www.ya2008.com.ua/eng/meet/biography/> Accessed November 10, 2007.
- Yekelchik, Serhy. 2007. *Ukraine Birth of a Nation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Yushchenko, Kateryna. 2007. Official Website of the President of Ukraine *Biography*.  
[http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/p\\_600\\_e.html](http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/p_600_e.html) (Accessed, November 1, 2007).
- “Yushchenko Stresses Importance of EU’s Role in Ukraine.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. March 8, 2007. <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/3/058fa4ca-8f55-4e8e-a4af-265908f3d8b2.html> (Accessed March 9, 2007).
- Yushchenko, Viktor. 2007. My Ukraine: Personal Website of Viktor Yushchenko *Biography*.  
<http://www.yushchenko.com.ua/eng/Private/Biography/> (Accessed, November 1, 2007).

Zarakhovich, Yuri. 2005. Ukraine's iron lady. *TIMEEurope* 165 (6).

Zarycky, George. 1995. A resilient people. *Freedom Review* 26 (November/December): 30-33.

Zhdanov, Igor. 2003. Corruption in Ukraine: Essence, scale, and influence. *The Quarterly Journal* 2 (April): 33-49.

\*Sources translated by the author.